Economy

Highlights An uptick in COVID-19 infections and squabbling on Capitol Hill are making investors newly uneasy, … : A rising 7-day moving average of new virus infections and falling probability of new fiscal aid weighed heavily on equities last week. … turning their focus back to the economy and equities’ seeming disconnection from it, … : Multiple retail, hospitality and entertainment concerns are under extreme pressure but the overall economy has held up far better than most commentators acknowledge. Households’ massive pile of new savings will help support consumption and credit performance well into next year even if Congress fails to provide a new round of stimulus. … and causing them to re-assess their comfort with dot-com-era valuations: We may not like the S&P 500 at 23 times forward four-quarter earnings, but the current valuation climate is a given and we have to figure a practical way to navigate through it. We are not abandoning equities yet. Feature COVID-19 appears to be making a comeback, in the US and around the globe, and its revival has investors reconsidering the sustainability of the spectacularly potent rally. How much longer can we go without a vaccine? How long before the economy succumbs without a new round of fiscal aid? How long can equities diverge from the economy? How long can equity multiples stay so high? COVID-19 infections have made another leg up and the 7-day average of new US cases is up over 25% since the second-wave bottom on September 12th (Chart 1). Even with most colleges and universities limiting in-person attendance and on-campus residence, the siren song of alcohol, fellowship and potential romance has turned many college towns into pandemic hot spots. The nation’s elementary and secondary schools could become another source of infections as children, teachers and staff return to classrooms, and the approach of cooler weather across most of the country brings no small measure of trepidation. The disease seems not to spread nearly as easily outside, but case counts threaten to pick up as activity moves indoors in fall and winter. Chart 1Daily New US COVID-19 Infections A much-slowed mortality rate mitigates the gravity of the rise in infections. Improved treatment protocols and heightened efforts to keep the most vulnerable out of harm’s way have pushed fatalities well below their April peak and considerably shy of their late July-early August levels, when new cases peaked (Chart 2). Indeed, one benefit of outbreaks on university campuses is that young adults are apparently much less likely to succumb to the virus. Unfortunately, the likelihood that invincible 18-to-22-year-olds won’t suffer too terribly if they contract COVID-19 may encourage them to disregard social distancing measures, contributing to its spread across the entire population. Chart 2Daily US COVID-19 Deaths Bottom Line: There is no reason to expect the virus to disappear when it is gaining new footholds in college towns across the country and a large measure of activity is headed back indoors. How Much Does The Economy Have Left? The good news about the reduced mortality rate is that it would seem to lessen the likelihood that state and local officials would feel the need to impose lockdowns as severe as the ones in early spring. The bad news, as our European Investment Strategy colleagues have stressed, is that lockdowns have less bearing on activity than economic actors’ personal perceptions of safety. If people are as unconcerned about contracting COVID-19 as many undergraduates appear to be, they’ll gather around the keg as closely as if they were riding the Tokyo subway at rush hour no matter how often they’re reminded that it’s unsafe. If they become fearful of getting sick, they’ll shun common carriers, offices, stores and gyms regardless of official rules giving them the green light to return. Last week’s release of European flash September PMIs may have illustrated the way personal concerns can override official rules. The divergence between solidly rising manufacturing PMIs, which comfortably topped expectations, and sharply and surprisingly weaker services PMIs, which crossed below the 50 expansion/contraction threshold, was stark (Chart 3). Modern manufacturing can be carried out in controlled environments by a comparatively modest number of workers whereas services demand is much more tied to public confidence, which appears to be fraying in Europe. Chart 3Europe's Demand For Services Has Slipped Developed economies employ considerably more people in services than manufacturing. If progress in reducing unemployment stalls upon upticks in COVID-19 cases, and mass manufacturing and distribution of an effective vaccine is still at least six months away, economies will require more fiscal support than initially envisioned in the spring. In the United States, the need for additional support places attention squarely on the off-again, on-again negotiations to extend key CARES Act provisions. Although we would expect households to have more difficulty keeping up with their obligations now that CARES Act flows have ceased, the data don't yet reveal any signs of strain. With the federal unemployment benefit supplement having expired at the end of July, households with laid-off wage earners are clearly at risk and they could light the fuse to spark a chain reaction of defaults. Despite the withdrawal of some federal support, however, the apartment rent collection and consumer delinquency data we’ve been following continue to indicate that households are managing to stay current on their obligations. The wobble in apartment rent collections through the week ended September 6th was apparently a function of the late Labor Day, as they have returned to the 2-percentage-points-below-2019 level they've occupied since the CARES Act took effect (Table 1). TransUnion’s latest monthly consumer credit update showed that consumers didn’t skip a beat in August, maintaining their streak of reducing month-over-month delinquency rates and shrinking them relative to their year-ago levels (Table 2). Table 1US Households Are Still Paying Their Rent ... Table 2... And They're Still Servicing Their Debt The forward-looking question is how long they can keep it going in the absence of additional help. A simple analysis of the data in the monthly Personal Income release suggests that households stored up over $1 trillion of excess savings in the five months through July, possibly enough to tide them over through the rest of the year (Box 1). Our estimate in last week’s report1 that households will need at least $800 billion of direct aid to bolster consumption into the second half of next year did not address the possibility of deploying some of the new savings and may thus be a little high. Although we continue to believe a bill will be passed ahead of the election despite increasing worries that Congress will not be able to reach an agreement, the near-term impact may not be as severe as feared. Box 1: What About All The New Savings? The upward explosion in the savings rate (Chart 4, top panel) and the associated plunge in consumption (Chart 4, bottom panel) illustrate that households squirreled away a record share of income while they were under lockdown and CARES Act measures were in force. This analysis attempts to determine the size of the savings windfall and households’ capacity to deploy it to support consumption and debt service until the economy can return to operating at its pre-pandemic capacity. Chart 4Two Sides Of The Same Coin Table 3 illustrates the steps we followed to estimate the quantity of pandemic-driven excess savings. The top two rows in the top panel show actual disposable income and outlays for each month from February through July and sum the five post-pandemic months in the Mar-Jul column. Savings are equal to the difference, and the savings rate is simply savings divided by disposable income. Table 3Household Savings, With And Without The Pandemic The bottom panel of the table models the outcome that might have occurred had there been no pandemic, assuming disposable income grew each month at a 4% annualized nominal rate, in line with the US economy’s real trend growth rate of ~2% plus ~2% inflation. We held the savings rate constant at February’s 8.3% to solve for baseline monthly outlays and savings. We aggregated our annualized monthly savings estimates ($7 trillion) and subtracted them from actual annualized savings ($19.6 trillion) to get $12.6 trillion annualized excess savings, or slightly more than $1 trillion, de-annualized (all four savings figures circled in the table). Table 4 quantifies the monthly consumption shortfalls that may occur in the absence of a new round of fiscal aid, projecting the path of the six broad disposable income categories for the rest of the year. We assume that employee compensation, proprietors’ income and taxes maintain July’s modest month-over-month growth rate in August and September and are then flat for the rest of the year. Rental income and interest and dividends are assumed to be unchanged from their July levels, as are transfer receipts, which incorporate only the share of July transfers that resulted from automatic stabilizers. (Though we tried to err to the side of conservatism, there is a meaningful possibility that virus-driven pessimism could produce a consumption double dip, causing income to fall short of our estimates.) Table 4Excess Savings Could Cover Projected Consumption Shortfalls We assume that the savings rate declines to 16.5% in August (twice February’s pre-pandemic rate) but remains there the rest of the year as households continue to exercise caution. Using our assumed savings rate and modeled disposable income, we calculate monthly outlays and compare them to the outlays that would meet economists’ consensus third and fourth quarter growth projections. That comparison yields around $300 billion of consumption shortfalls through the end of the year, a modest sum relative to the $1 trillion of excess savings that were accumulated from March through July. Investors interpreting our simple analysis should recognize that the possible range of actual results is quite wide and projecting how animal spirits will drive household consumption decisions is inherently uncertain. It is clear to us, however, that the direct aid households received from the CARES Act is not yet exhausted. The massive savings that households built up from March through July will allow the second quarter’s fiscal thrust to act something like a time-release medication, especially when it comes to consumer credit performance. The surprisingly low delinquency rates reported so far do not appear to have been a fluke when viewed against a $1 trillion cache of unanticipated savings. How Long Can Equities Float Free Of The Economy? One would expect that a once-in-a-century shock like a deadly pandemic would induce a brutal recession. In terms of the unemployment rate and GDP contraction, COVID-19 has not disappointed, delivering the worst numbers this side of the Depression. Movie theaters, concert venues, pro sports franchises, airlines, car rental companies, retailers, gyms, restaurants and bars face significant losses and potential extinction. For all the disruption in select individual businesses and industries, however, there has not yet been significant systemwide damage. We don't think the economy is doing as badly as the majority ofcommentators believe, ... Fiscal transfers and monetary accommodation have forestalled the unchecked wave of defaults that might otherwise have occurred, shielding the banking system from stress and preventing a negatively self-reinforcing cycle of illiquidity and reduced credit availability from taking hold. Away from businesses that depend on physical crowds and their landlords and lenders, the economy is not doing too badly. Disposable household income grew at a record rate in the second quarter, four standard deviations above its seven-decade mean (Chart 5); corporations issued record amounts of bonds at low rates that will reduce their long-run funding costs; and private equity funds and other entities with visions of the post-GFC recovery dancing in their heads are itching to deploy the ample capital they’ve raised to buy businesses at deep discounts. There will be many pandemic business casualties, but at the level of the overall economy, we expect a reasonably orderly transfer of viable assets from weak hands to amply funded strong ones. Chart 5Despite The Recession, Fiscal Shock And Awe Made Households Flush The bottom line is that we don’t think the economy is suffering all that badly, and that it won’t going forward provided that fiscal and monetary policy makers continue to pursue the measures that have successfully suppressed defaults and bankruptcies so far. Austrian School devotees may suffer severe emotional distress and deficit hawks will rant and rave, but investors should come out of it all okay. Equities quickly sized that up and the reversal of their steep losses can be viewed as a rational response to Congress’ and the Fed’s shock-and-awe measures. In our view, financial markets are not disconnected from the economic backdrop per se; they’re disconnected from the economic backdrop that would have unfolded were it not for policy makers’ extraordinary measures. Commentators with a more pessimistic bent seem to be focusing more on the scenario that didn’t occur than the one that actually did. And About Those Valuations? We frankly confess to discomfort with an S&P 500 valuation of 23 times forward four-quarter earnings. In forward estimates’ 41-year history, the index has only ever traded at a multiple of 23 or more at the 1999-2000 height of the dot-com mania (Chart 6). It is not a level that bodes well on its face for the index’s intermediate- and long-term prospects. By collectively bidding up the forward multiple to the 97th percentile as of the end of August, investors would seem to have pulled future returns into the present. ... because it seems that they've been focusing on the worst-case scenario that didn't occur, rather than the much milder one that policy makers have so far been able to engineer. Chart 6Back To The Future When asked if we can justify current equity valuations and if they can be sustained, we tread carefully, replying that we can make our peace with them for short stretches of time. We are not trying to dodge the tough questions, we are simply seeking practical ways for professional investors, judged on a relative performance basis, to navigate through a tricky backdrop. For a professional manager to align his/her portfolios with a view that today’s valuations are unsupportable, s/he would have to possess two things: extremely high conviction in that view and clients willing to stick with him/her despite tracking error that would make a pension consultant faint dead away and may well involve extended underperformance. Table 5How Expensive Is Too Expensive? Alpha is only earned by swimming against the tide but resisting a move like the rally from the March bottom is akin to an all-in bet, and all-in bets should be made sparingly if at all. Forward multiples have exceeded the dot-com heyday’s 20 level every month-end since April. Assuming the forward multiple series is normally distributed, there was only a 6% chance that the multiple would exceed its April level and the probabilities have shrunk every succeeding month as the multiple itself has climbed (Table 5). Based on valuation, a manager could have begun leaning against the rally in April and may have resisted participating in it at the end of March, given that the forward multiple never signaled that stocks were cheap. The dot-com mania, when the S&P traded two standard deviations above its forward multiple’s mean for fifteen straight months before peaking, presents an even starker example. Five quarters of sizable underperformance would have tested a manager’s commitment, not to mention his/her clients’. The bottom line is that valuations are a notoriously poor timing indicator. We tend to pay close attention to them only at extremes, but we never view them as decisive on their own – two standard deviations can become two-and-a-half or three before surges or plunges fully play out. The catalyst that might provoke mean reversion in the S&P 500’s forward multiple is still unclear, and we prefer to maintain a benchmark equity exposure until the potential catalyst(s) and the timetable over which it/they might emerge becomes clearer. If this really is a mania, there will be plenty of money to be made from betting against it over the last three quarters of its unwind; there’s no need to rush to be the first to call a top, which can prove to be a costly pursuit. For now, we are content to continue to watch and wait.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the September 21, 2020 US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fundamental Theorem Of Macroeconomics," available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Senate Republicans would be suicidal not to agree to a fiscal relief bill before the election. Democrats are still offering a $2.2 trillion package. Grassroots Republican voters will forgive Republicans for blowing out the budget deficit but they will never forgive them for throwing away control of the White House and Senate. Nevertheless financial markets face more downside until a deal is reached. We are booking gains on several of our tactical risk-off trades but will hold our strategic risk-on trades, as we are still constructive over a 12-month period. Turkey is stepping back from its foreign adventurism in the face of constraints. Our GeoRisk Indicator for Turkey has rolled over. Feature Financial markets continue to sell off in the face of a range of risks, including new threats of COVID-19 restrictions in Europe, an increase in daily new cases of the disease in the United States (Chart 1), and the US Congress’s problems passing a new round of fiscal relief. Chart 1Increase In COVID-19 Cases Among Factors Weighing On Markets Chart 2Congress Will Pass Stimulus ~$2-$2.5 Trillion Since May, when the Democrats passed the $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, we have maintained that “stimulus hiccups” would roil the market. However, we also argued that Congress would eventually pass a new package – probably in the range of $2-$2.5 trillion (Chart 2).1 The latter part of this view remains to be seen and has come under pressure from investors who fear that Congress could fail to produce a bill entirely. We are sticking with our guns. GOP senators will recognize that they face sweeping election losses; House Democrats will not be able to reverse course and deprive households of badly needed assistance. However, stock investors might sell more between now and the final deal, which must be done by around October 9 so that lawmakers can go back to their home states to campaign for the November 3 election. Moreover the fiscal deal might not come in time to save the Republicans’ re-election bid in the White House and Senate, which raises further downside risk due to the Democratic agenda of re-regulation and tax hikes. And the election’s aftershocks could also be market-negative. For example, President Trump could also escalate the conflict with China, whether as the “comeback kid” or as a lame duck. Therefore this week we are booking some gains. We will not recommend a tactical risk-on position until our fiscal view is confirmed and we can reassess. US Fiscal Stimulus Is Coming Chart 3Republicans Highly Unlikely To Win House Of Representatives Why would Democrats agree to a stimulus bill given that it could help President Trump and the Republicans get re-elected? Democrats are afraid to deprive households of relief amid a crisis merely to spite the president and score election points. Around 28-43 of Democrats in the House of Representatives face re-election in districts that are competitive or could become competitive. Republicans need a net gain of 20 seats to retake the House (Chart 3). If Democrats offer to cooperate yet Republican senators balk, then the latter will take the blame for any failed deal and ensuing financial turmoil. The experience of other fiscal cliffs bears this out. The debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013 and the government shutdowns of 2013 and 2018-19 all suggest that net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues (Charts 4A and 4B). This is a risk for the ruling GOP. All Democrats have to do is remain open to compromise. Net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues – a risk for the ruling GOP. Chart 4AFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Chart 4BFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Confirming this reasoning, Democrats joined with Republicans this week to pass a continuing resolution to maintain government spending levels through December 11, thus avoiding a government shutdown. Clearly the two parties can still cooperate despite record levels of partisanship. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ruled out using government shutdown as a weapon to hurt the Republicans, fearing it would backfire. And just last week vulnerable House members pressured Pelosi into stating that the House will remain in session in October until a fiscal relief bill is passed. Democrats remain committed to their current plan – solidifying their grip on the House and demonstrating that they can govern, and that government can do more for households, by passing bills. This is still the strategy even if the risk is that these bills give Trump a marginal benefit. The Democratic demand is for a very large fiscal package – House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is today offering $2.2 trillion, a compromise from the initial $3.4 trillion bill (Table 1). A smaller bill is harder to negotiate because it would cut the House Democrats’ spending priorities for their constituents, including around $1 trillion in state and local government aid, while still giving Trump a bounce in opinion polls for boosting pandemic relief. This is unacceptable – and this is how a policy mistake could happen. Table 1What A Fiscal Compromise Will Look Like Chart 5Senate Republicans Face A Hotly Contested Election Chart 6Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Senate Republicans face a hotly contested election – with 23 of them up for re-election versus only 12 Democrats. However, 30 of them are not up for re-election this year (Chart 5). These senators fear the eventual return of deficit concerns among the Republican base so they are bargaining to limit emergency spending (Chart 6). Until they can be cajoled by their fellow senators and the White House, they pose a risk to the passage of new stimulus. But this risk is overrated. Ultimately Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and the Senate Republicans will capitulate. It is political suicide if they do not. The GOP will lose control of the Senate and the White House if premature fiscal tightening sparks a bloody September-October selloff just ahead of the election (Charts 7Aand 7B). Chart 7AStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 7BStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 8Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Only three out of six presidents in modern times have been re-elected when a recession struck during the election year yet ended prior to the fall campaign. These were William McKinley in 1900, Teddy Roosevelt in 1904, and Calvin Coolidge in 1924.2 Trump faces the same scenario, but financial markets are signaling that Trump is not faring as well as these three predecessors (Chart 8). The Senate races are all on a knife’s edge (Chart 9). American politics are highly nationalized – partisan identification overrides regional concerns. President Trump has also personalized his political party, making the election a referendum on himself (Chart 10). These trends suggest the Senate will fall to the party that wins the White House. Chart 9The Senate Races Are All On A Knife’s Edge Consumer confidence is weak and bodes ill for the incumbent president and party (Chart 11). Chart 10Trump Has Personalized Partisan Politics Chart 11Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP A failure to provide stimulus will ensure that sentiment worsens for the rest of the campaign and overshadows some underlying material improvements that are the Republicans’ only saving grace. Wage growth is recovering in line with the V-shape recovery in blue and purple states, including purple states that voted for Trump (Chart 12). The manufacturing rebound – and a surge in loans – is creating the conditions for the “Blue Wall” of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin to re-elect President Trump (Chart 13). A fiscal failure will blot out this positive news. Chart 12Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Chart 13Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Republicans’ standing offer is for a $1.3 trillion bill. The bipartisan “Problem Solver’s Caucus” has separately proposed a $1.5 trillion package that could be converted. McConnell has shown he can muster his troops by producing 52 Republican votes on a skinny relief bill on September 10. The Senate will go on recess on Friday, October 9 and the House is committed to staying until a bill is done. Negotiations cannot drag on much longer than that, however, because lawmakers need to go back to their home states and districts to campaign for the election. The equity selloff suggests policymakers will need to respond sooner anyway. Is there a way for Trump to bypass Congress and provide stimulus unilaterally? Chart 14Gridlock In 2020-22 Is Possible Under Trump Or Biden Trump is only too happy to run against a “do-nothing Congress,” which is how Harry Truman pulled off his surprise victory in 1948. He could use executive orders to redirect federal funds that have already been appropriated. However, he has already provided stimulus by decree – delaying payroll tax collections and calling on states to provide unemployment insurance – and yet the market has sold off anyway. That is because these measures are half-baked – they lack the size and the force of an act of Congress. They require coordination with states and firms, which face uncertainty over the legality of the measures and have little incentive to make sacrifices for an administration that may not last more than a few months. In short, if Trump tries to stimulate by decree, it is an election gimmick that will not satisfy market participants who need to look beyond the next 39 days to the critical question of whether US fiscal authorities understand the needs of the economy and can coordinate effectively. Congressional failure will cast a pall over the outlook given that there is still a fair chance the election could produce gridlock for the 2020-22 period, under Trump or Biden (Chart 14). Bottom Line: Financial markets face more downside until Senate Republicans capitulate to Pelosi’s demand of a bill around $2-$2.5 trillion. We think they will, but that is not an argument for getting long now – Republicans could capitulate too late to save the market from a deeper selloff. Investors should book profits now and buy when the deal is clinched. What About The Supreme Court? The Supreme Court battle over the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg may increase the risk of miscalculation in the stimulus negotiations, but not by much. Subjectively we would upgrade that risk from 25% to 33%. Republicans will fill the vacant seat before the election. So far they have the votes – even if Senator Mitt Romney changes his mind, there is still a one-seat buffer. However, a win on the high court has a mixed impact on financial markets. It may increase the odds of a Democratic Party sweep, which is initially a net negative for equities. But House Democrats will become less inclined to compromise on the size of the fiscal bill that we expect. They will say “take it or leave it” on the $2.2 trillion offer. The lowest we can see Democrats passing is $1.9 trillion. If the GOP fails to budge, the equity selloff will be aggravated by the implication that Democrats will win a clean sweep and thus gain the power to raise corporate and capital gains taxes next year. We have put 55%-60% odds on a clean sweep, but the market stands at 49%, so there is room for the market to adjust (Chart 15). As for the Supreme Court itself, a Republican nomination is legitimate regardless of the election timing, though the decision to go forward this close to the election reveals extreme levels of polarization. The Republican pick could energize the Democrats in the election, as occurred with the nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh just ahead of the 2018 midterms. A Democratic overreaction could mobilize conservatives, but this will be moot if the stock market collapses. If the presidential election is contested or disputed, Trump’s court nominee pick could cast the decisive vote, although, once nominated, a justice may not rule in accordance with his or her nominator’s wishes. The Supreme Court battle raises the risk of stimulus miscalculation to 33%. In a period of “peak polarization,” one should expect the Supreme Court battle to escalate further from here (Chart 16). Democrats are likely to remove the filibuster if they win the Senate. This would theoretically enable them to create four new seats on the court, which they could then fill with liberal judges. Franklin Roosevelt attempted to pack the court in 1937 when it got in the way of the New Deal and his plan only narrowly failed due to the unexpected death of a key ally in the Senate. Chart 15A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff Chart 16Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Not only might the court decide the election outcome, but future controversial legislation could live or die by the court’s vote, as occurred with Obamacare in 2012 (Chart 17). In the event that Democrats achieve a clean sweep, the conservative court will be their only obstacle and they will possess the means to remove it. Chart 17Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Bottom Line: Earlier we saw a 25% chance that stimulus would fail – now we give it a 33% chance. However, the size of the stimulus is now even more likely to fall within the $2-$2.5 trillion range we have signaled in previous reports. The Supreme Court will become a major factor in domestic economic policy uncertainty if Democrats win a clean sweep of government. Turkey Hits Constraints In East Med – For Now … Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy assertiveness has once again put Turkey in conflict with NATO allies. Tensions escalated last month after Greece signed a maritime boundary deal with Egypt that Athens said nullified last November’s Libya-Turkey agreement (Map 1). Map 1Turkey Testing Maritime Borders In the East Med In response, Turkey issued a navigational warning (which was renewed thrice) and dispatched its seismic research vessel, the Oruc Reis, to explore for hydrocarbons in disputed areas of the Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Cyprus. In shows of force, Turkey and Greece both deployed their navies to the area last month, raising the risk of an armed confrontation.3 The motivation for Erdogan’s hard power tactics is multi-pronged. Chart 18Erdogan’s Foreign Adventurism Reflects Domestic Weakness On a domestic level, Erdogan’s East Med excursions are an attempt to rally domestic support, where he and his party have lost ground (Chart 18). Given that popular opinion in Turkey indicates that the majority see the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a “kin country” and that they do not expect Turkey to be accepted into the EU, Ankara’s East Med strategy is likely to find support. On an international level, Turkey is flexing its muscles against the West. Erdogan has inserted Turkish forces into conflicts in Syria and Libya, confronting NATO allies there, and authorized the provocative purchase of the Russian S400 missile defense system at the expense of membership in the US F-35 program. The East Med gambit is another challenge to the West by testing EU unity. Specifically Erdogan is demonstrating that Turkey is willing to use military force to reject any unilateral attempts by foreign powers to impose maritime borders on Turkey – for instance through the EU’s Seville map.4 By demonstrating maritime strength, Turkey hopes to twist the EU’s arm into agreeing to a more favorable maritime partition plan in the East Med. As such the conflict is part of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” strategy to expand its sphere of influence and secure energy supplies.5 Turkey is extremely vulnerable as a geopolitical actor because it depends on imports for three-quarters of its energy needs.6 With energy accounting for 20% of its import bill, these imports are weighing on the current account balance (Chart 19). Turkey’s exclusion from regional gas agreements has thus been a blow to its self-sufficiency goals. Meanwhile Greece, Italy, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Jordan have recently formalized their cooperation through the Cairo-based East Mediterranean Gas Organization. Turkish agitation in the East Mediterranean is an attempt to prevent others from exploiting gas resources there so long as its demands remain unmet. Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. While the EU has yet to impose sanctions or penalties, Erdogan has now backtracked. Oruc Reis returned to Antalya on September 13, despite official statements that it would continue its mission. Turkish and Greek military officials have been meeting at NATO headquarters. And following talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and EU President Charles Michel, Erdogan’s office announced on September 22 that Turkey and Greece were prepared to resume talks. The postponement of the European Council’s special meeting to discuss Turkish sanctions to October 1-2 plays to Turkey’s favor by giving more time for talks. Chart 19Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. The possibility of damaging sanctions was too much at a time of economic vulnerability. Given Turkey’s dependence on the EU for export earnings and FDI inflows, the impact of sanctions on Turkey’s economy cannot be overstated (Chart 20). Chart 20EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy Turkey is also facing constraints diplomatically as two of its regional rivals – the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel – have agreed to normalize relations and strengthen ties under the US-mediated Abraham Accords (Table 2). The UAE already dispatched F-16s to Crete to participate in joint training exercises in a show of support to Greece. Table 2The Abraham Accords Unify Turkey’s Regional Rivals Details about the potential sanctions have not been released. However, EU Minister of Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell has indicated that penalties could be levied not only on individuals, but also on assets, ships, and Turkish access to European ports and supplies. This could include banks financing energy exploration or even entire business sectors, such as the energy industry. Moreover, the EU could play other damaging cards such as halting EU accession talks, or limiting its customs union with Turkey, which Ankara hopes to modernize. Chart 21EU Needs Turkey’s Cooperation To Stem Flow Of Migrants It is also in Europe’s interest to de-escalate the conflict. Sanctions on Turkey could accelerate Ankara’s re-orientation towards Russia and possibly China, expediting its transition to a hostile regional actor. In addition, Turkey has not shied away from using the 2016 migration deal, whereby Turkey has become the gatekeeper of Middle Eastern migrants fleeing to Europe, as a bargaining chip (Chart 21). Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu outright stated that Turkey will respond to EU sanctions by reneging on the deal, which could result in an influx of refugees into the EU and new challenges for Europe’s political establishment. Erdogan’s retreat is also likely a response to pressure from Washington. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lent some support to Greece and Cyprus during his September 12 visit to Cyprus. While the US has distanced itself from recent developments in the East Med, leaving German Chancellor Angela Merkel to play the role of mediator, a deterioration in Ankara’s relations with NATO allies could accelerate Turkey’s de-coupling from the West. Some within Washington are already calling for a relocation of the US strategic Incirlik air base to Greek islands. Erdogan’s retreat from a hawkish stance is in line with similar behavior elsewhere. For instance, despite having taken delivery of all parts and completed all necessary tests, Turkey has yet to activate its Russian S-400 missile defense system. It is wary of US sanctions. Similarly, Ankara has paused its Libyan offensive toward the eastern oil crescent in face of the risk of an outright military confrontation with Egypt. In each case, Erdogan appears to be at least temporarily recognizing the limits to his foreign adventurism. Nevertheless, the recent de-escalation does not mark the end of the conflict. Rather it demonstrates that both sides have hit constraints and are pausing for a breather. Chart 22Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk The tactical retreat will provide some relief for the lira, which hit all-time lows against the dollar and euro, and thus pull down our Turkey GeoRisk indicator (Chart 22). But it does not guarantee that the Turkish risk premium will stay low. Talks between Greece and Turkey are unlikely to result in substantial breakthroughs. Instead the conflict will resurface – perhaps when Turkey is in a stronger economic position at home and the EU is distracted elsewhere, whether with internal political issues or conflicts with Russia, the UK, or any second-term Trump administration. Bottom Line: The recent de-escalation of East Med tensions does not mark the end of a bull market in Turkey-EU tensions. These tensions arise from geopolitical multipolarity – Turkey’s ability to act independently in foreign policy without facing an overwhelming, unified US-EU response. However, Turkey’s vulnerability to European economic sanctions shows that it faces real constraints. A major attempt to flout these constraints is a sell signal for the lira, as European sanctions could then become a reality. We remain negative on the lira, but will book gains on our short trade. Investment Takeaways We are booking gains on some of our tactical risk-off trades, given that we ultimately expect the US Congress to approve a new fiscal package. We are closing our long VIX December 2020 / short VIX January 2021 trade, which captured concerns about a contested election in the United States, for a gain of 4%. Volatility will still rise and a contested election is still possible, but the fiscal risk has gone up, COVID-19 cases have gone up, and Trump’s polling comeback has softened. The 4% gain does not include leverage or contract size. We were paid to put on the trade and now will be paid to exit it, so we are booking gains (Chart 23). Chart 23Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility We are closing our short “EM Strongman Basket” of Turkish, Brazilian, and Philippine currencies for a gain of 4.5%. The trade has performed well but Turkey is not only recognizing its constraints abroad but also recognizing constraints at home by raising interest rates to defend the lira. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s approval rating has surged and our GeoRisk indicator has topped out. The latest readings on our GeoRisk Indicators provide confirmation of our major themes, views, and trades. The charts of each country’s indicator can be found in the Appendix. Short China, Long China Plays: Geopolitical risk continues on the uptrend that began with Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and has not abated with the Phase One trade deal. Policymakers will remain entirely accommodative on fiscal and quasi-fiscal (credit) policy in the wake of this year’s recession. New financial regulations do not herald a return of the deleveraging campaign in any way comparable to 2017-18. The October Politburo meeting on the economy could conceivably sound a hawkish note, which could conveniently undermine sentiment ahead of the US election, but if this occurs then we would not expect follow-through. China plays and commodity plays should benefit, such as the Australian dollar, iron ore prices, and Brazilian and Swedish equities. Yet we remain short the renminbi, which has recently flagged after a fierce rally. Trump is negative for the RMB and Biden will ultimately be tough on China, contrary to the market consensus. Short Taiwan: US-China strategic relations have collapsed over the course of the year but financial markets have ignored it due to COVID-19 and stimulus. The only thing keeping US-China relations on an even keel is the Trump-Xi gentleman’s agreement, which expires on November 3 regardless of the election outcome. While outright military conflict over Taiwan cannot be ruled out, Beijing is much more likely to impose economic sanctions prior to any attempt to take the island by force. This has been our base case since 2016. Our GeoRisk indicator is just starting to price this risk so it remains highly underrated from the perspective of the Taiwanese dollar and equities. We are short and there is still time to put on shorts. Long South Korea: The rise in Korean geopolitical risk since the faltering of US-North Korean diplomacy in 2019 has peaked and fallen back, as expected. Pyongyang has not substantively tested President Trump during the election year and we still do not think he will – though a showdown would mark an October surprise that could boost Trump’s approval rating. South Korean political risk should continue falling and we are long Korean equities. Short Russia: Russian geopolitical risk has exploded upward, as we expected. We have been bearish on the Russian ruble and local currency bonds, though we should note that this differs from our Emerging Markets Strategy view based on macro fundamentals. Our reasoning predates the escalation of tensions with the EU over Belarus, but Belarus highlights the negative dynamic: Vladimir Putin in his fourth term is concerned about domestic social and political stability, and this concern is especially heightened after the global pandemic and recession. Therefore he has little ability to tolerate unrest in the former Soviet sphere. Moreover, he has a window of opportunity when the US administration is distracted, and not unfriendly, whereas that will change if the Democrats take over. If Democrats win, they will not try another diplomatic “reset” with Russia; they believe engagement has failed and want revenge for Putin’s undermining the Obama administration and 2016 election interference. The Nordstream 2 pipeline and Russian local currency bonds are at risk of new sanctions. The Democrats will also increase their efforts at cyber warfare and psychological warfare to counter Russia’s use of such measures. If Trump wins, the upside for Russia is limited as Trump’s personal preferences have repeatedly lost to the US political and military establishment when it comes to Russia. The US has remained vigilant against Russian threats and has increased support for countering Russia in eastern Europe and Ukraine. Chart 24Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions In Belarus, President Lukashenko has been sworn in as president again, and he will not step down unless Russia and its allies orchestrate a replacement who is friendly toward Russian interests. Russia will not allow a pro-EU, pro-NATO government by any stretch of the imagination. The likeliest outcome is that Russia demonstrates its security and military superiority in a limited way, while the US and Europe respond with sanctions but not with military force. There is no appetite for the US or EU to engage in hot war with Russia over Belarus, which they have little hope of re-engineering in the Western image. We are short Russian currency and local bonds on the risk of sanctions stemming from either the US election cycle or the Belarus confrontation or both. We note that local currency bonds are not pricing in the risks that our geopolitical risk indicators are pricing (Chart 24). Long Europe: Our European geopolitical risk indicators show that the EU remains a haven of political stability in an unstable time. European integration is accelerating in the context of security threats from Russia, the potential for sustained economic conflict with the US (if Trump is re-elected), and economic competition with an increasingly authoritarian and mercantilist China. Europe’s latent strengths, when acting in unison, are brought out by the report on Turkey above. However, the 35% chance that the UK fails to reach a trade deal at the end of this year will still push our European risk indicators up in the near term.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   We Read (And Liked) … Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework For Predicting The Future What better way to revive the hallowed tradition of BCA Geopolitical Strategy book reviews than to give clients a sneak preview of our founder Marko Papic’s literary debut, Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework for Predicting the Future?7 Long-time readers will know much of this book – it is the distillation of a decade of Marko’s work at BCA Research and, more recently, Clocktower Group. Here is the story of European integration – perhaps Marko’s greatest call, from back in 2011. Here is the story of multipolarity and investing. Here is the apex of globalization. Here is the decline of laissez-faire and the rise of dirigisme. Here is the end of Chimerica. Attendees of the BCA Research Academy will also recognize much in Marko’s formal exposition of his method. The categories of material constraints that bind policymakers. The practical application of the median voter theorem. The psychological lessons from Richards Heuer and Lee Ross. The occasional dash of game theory – and the workingman’s critique of it. The core teaching is the same: “Preferences are optional and subject to constraints, whereas constraints are neither optional nor subject to preferences.” There is also much that is new, notably Marko’s analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is bound to generate controversy for classifying the whole episode as an example of mass hysteria comparable to the Salem witch trials, but which is as well-researched and well-argued as any section in the book. I was fortunate to learn the geopolitical method with Marko under the guidance of George Friedman, Peter Zeihan, Roger Baker, Fred Burton, Scott Stewart, and other colleagues at Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) in Austin, Texas from the era of the Iraq troop surge, the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the Lehman Brothers collapse. We both owe a lot to these teachers: the history of geopolitics, intelligence analysis, open source monitoring, net assessments, and, of course, forecasting. What Marko did was to take this armory of geopolitical analysis – which we both can testify is best taught in practice, not universities – and to put it to use in the financial context, where political analysis was long treated as optional and anecdotal despite the manifest and growing need for a rigorous framework. A hard-nosed analyst will never cease to be amazed by the gaps that emerge between the consensus view on Wall Street and a careful, disciplined net assessment of a nation or political movement. By the same token, the investor, trader, or economist will never cease to be amazed by the political analyst’s inability to grasp the concept of “already priced in” or “the second derivative.” What needed to be done was to master the art of macro investing and geopolitics. Marko took this upon himself. It was audacious and it provoked a lot of skepticism from the dismal scientists and the political scientists alike. But Geopolitical Alpha, the concept and the book, is the consequence – and we are now all the better for it. Marko is fundamentally a post-modern thinker. His methodological hero is Karl Marx for the development of materialist dialectic, the back-and-forth debate between economic forces that humans internalize in the form of competing ideologies. His foil is the humanist and republican, Niccolo Machiavelli – not for his amoral approach, but for prizing the virtue of the prince in the face of outrageous fortune. Human agency is Marko’s favorite punching bag – he excels at identifying the ways in which individuals will be frustrated despite their best efforts by the cold, insensitive walls of reality around them. If there is a critique of Marko’s book, then, it is that he gives short shrift to the classical liberal tradition – or as I like to think of it, the balance-of-power tradition. The idea that hegemony, or unipolarity, leads to a stable social and political environment conducive to peace and prosperity has a lot going for it. But it also partakes of an older tradition of thought that envisions a single, central political order as necessarily the most stable and predictable – a tradition that can be ascribed to Plato as well as Marx. You can see the positive implication for financial markets. But what if this tradition is only occasionally right – what if it too is subject to historical cycles? If that is the case, then the Beijing consensus is a mirage – and the US’s reversion to a blue-water strategy (not only under President Trump, but also under a future President Biden, according to his campaign agenda) does not necessarily herald the “end [of] American dominance on the world stage.” The classical tradition behind the Greco-Roman, British, and American constitutional systems, including their naval strategies, envisioned a multipolar order that was somewhat less stable but more durable, and this tradition has proven immensely beneficial for the creation of technology and wealth. Of course, Marko is very much alive to this tradition and, despite his critique of the ancients, shows himself to be highly sensitive to the interplay of virtue and fortune. Throughout the work, the analytical style can be characterized as restless energy in the service of cool, chess-playing logic. Marko is generous with his knowledge, merciless in drawing conclusions, and outrageously funny in delivery. He attacks the questions that matter most to investors and that experts too often leave shrouded in finely wrought uncertainty. He also shows himself to be a superb writer as well as strategist, interspersing his methodological training sessions with vivid anecdotes of a lifelong intellectual journey from a shattered Yugoslavia to the heights of finance. The bits of memoir are often the best, such as the intro to Chapter Six on geopolitics. To paraphrase a great author, Marko writes because he has a story to tell, not because he has to tell a story. The tale of the mysterious consulting firm Papic and Parsley will do a great public service by teaching readers precisely how skeptical of mainstream news journalism they should be. It isn’t enough to say that we read Geopolitical Alpha and liked it – the sole criterion for a review in this column. Rather, the book and its author are the reason this column exists. And Geopolitical Alpha is now the locus classicus of market-relevant geopolitical analysis.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We favored the upper side of the range, first $2.5 trillion, and subsequently something closer to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s demand of $2.2 trillion. We have speculated that Republicans may get her to settle at $1.9 trillion. 2 Two of these cases were unique in that a vice president took over from a president who died and then won re-election – unlike Trump’s scenario. 3 On August 12 a Greek Navy frigate collided with a Turkish vessel guiding the Oruc Reis. Athens called the incident an accident while Ankara referred to it as a provocation. 4 The so-called Seville Map was prepared at the request of the European Union by researchers at the University of Seville, attempts to clarify the exclusive economic zones of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The US announced on September 21 that it does not consider the Seville map to have any legal significance. 5 The Blue Homeland or Mavi Vatan doctrine announced in 2006 intends to secure Turkish control of maritime areas surrounding its coast (Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea) in order to secure energy supplies and support Turkey’s economic growth. 6 Erdogan’s claim that gas from the recently discovered Sakarya gas field would reach consumers by 2023 is likely overly optimistic and unrealistic. The drilling costs and commercial viability of the field are yet to be determined. Thus, the find does not impact dynamics in the East Med. 7 New Jersey: Wiley, 2021. 286 pages. Section II: GeoRisk Indicators China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The rising policy rate in the past couple months has been driven by a liquidity crunch, which is expected to ease in Q4. Government bond yields, which have been trending upwards since May, will also take a breather. The extremely accommodative phase of monetary conditions has ended. Monetary policy will be tightened, possibly by the middle of next year. We expect the yield curve to move broadly sideways in Q4 and into early 2021. As early as Q2 next year, a rebound in rate hike expectations will cause the curve to flatten. We remain overweight on Chinese stocks over the next six to nine months. Beyond that, a more restrictive monetary policy and less buoyant economic outlook may warrant a trimming of positions in Chinese stocks. Feature Chinese government bond yields have rebounded sharply since bottoming in late April; 10-year yields have climbed by 62 basis points to 3.1% as we go to press. Given that the 3-month SHIBOR (the PBoC’s de facto policy rate) has gone up by 128 basis points from its nadir in April, the higher bond yields reflect policy-driven liquidity tightening. The economy’s quick turnaround following the reopening of business activities has prompted the authorities to normalize the monetary stance (Chart 1). China recently made more interbank liquidity injections to slow the speed of policy rate normalization. We think it is the right move. China’s economic recovery is still at an early stage and may not withstand a rapid tightening in monetary policy. Furthermore, the chances are low that the 3-month SHIBOR will rise above its pre-COVID-19 level of 3% in this calendar year. Yields on short-duration government bonds will have little room to move higher in 2020. China’s 10-year government bond yield may even drop slightly when geopolitical tensions between the US and China heat up as the US election nears. Chart 1Policy Rate Normalization Started In May Chart 2Rate Normalization Will Resume In 2021 As China’s economic recovery is expected to continue accelerating into the first half of 2021, interest rates will also resume their climb (Chart 2). Our base case view is that the first rate hike, which will lift the policy rate above its pre-COVID-19 level, will happen as early as Q2 next year but no later than mid-2021. This means that the cyclical bear market in the bond market will continue. A Temporary Easing In Q4… In our report published on February 19, we argued that the rally in Chinese government bonds in early 2020 would be short lived rather than a cyclical (6-12 month) play.1 Furthermore, a journey back to the pre-outbreak monetary stance would start as early as Q2 this year. Notably, Chinese policymakers have pivoted to normalize monetary policy from an ultra-loose stance linked to COVID-19. In our view, the speed of the rebound in the policy rate has run ahead of the economic recovery. In other words, the policy stance tightened before inflation expectations turned more optimistic (Chart 3). Retail sales growth barely turned positive in August from a year ago, core inflation has dropped to its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis and producer prices are still contracting on an annual basis (Chart 4). Chart 3Policy Stance Tightened Before Inflation Moved Higher In the past two weeks, the PBoC has injected liquidity more frequently through open market operations, an indication that policymakers may be trying to slow the pace of tightening (Chart 5). Maintaining nominal GDP growth above 4% this year is politically imperative for the Communist Party to achieve its employment growth objective.2 This overarching goal will likely hold back the PBoC from easing off the gas too abruptly. Chart 4The Economy Is Still Growing Below The Trend Growth Liquidity conditions will continue to improve into Q4, moderating the rise in the 3-month SHIBOR. The liquidity crunch in the banking system since May was created by a massive government bond issuance and curbing of high-yield structured deposits. Government bond issuance has reached its peak this year and bond quotas will plummet in Q4, which will help ease liquidity shortages in the banking sector (Chart 6). In turn, demand for interbank liquidity should moderate as banks have fewer bond purchasing obligations, giving the 3-month SHIBOR some breathing room with or without the PBoC’s intervention. Chart 5The PBoC May Be Trying To Slow The Pace Of Its Rate Normalization A pause in the policy rate hike will limit any upside risks for yields on short-duration government bonds. Yields on 10-year bonds may even drop if tensions between the US and China escalate leading up to the November US election, and/or additional significant pandemic waves affect the global economy. Chart 6Liquidity Conditions Should Ease In Q4 Bottom Line: It is unlikely that China’s policy rate and the long-duration government bond yield will end the year above their pre-COVID-19 levels. …Followed By Decisive Rate Hikes In 2H21 There are good and rising odds that Chinese authorities will fully switch to a tightening mode in 2021. Barring any domestic resurgence in COVID-19 that could trigger lockdowns, the PBoC may resume policy rate hikes as early as Q2, and no later than mid-2021. Our reasoning is as follows: Chart 7The PBoC Has Been Consistent With Policy Reaction In Previous Recoveries Consistent policy reaction in previous recoveries. Our April 23 report showed how the PBoC has been consistent in normalizing its monetary policy following each of the past three economic and credit cycles.3 The central bank raised interest rates on average nine months following a bottom in the business cycle. The tightening of interest rates occurred even after the prolonged economic downturn and deep deflationary cycle in 2015/16. The structurally slowing rate of China’s economic growth since 2011 has not prevented the PBoC from cyclically raising its policy rate (Chart 7). When the output gap is closed in 1H21, the PBoC will gain enough confidence to push for higher interest rates. Property market is strong. The property market has been heating up on the back of falling bank lending rates, despite policymakers’ efforts to curb both property lending and purchases. New home sales surged by 40% in August, the highest year-over-year growth since the last housing boom in 2016. In particular, demand for the first- and second-tier cities have rebounded sharply (Chart 8). This trend will likely prompt policymakers to enact stronger and earlier policy responses by tightening the medium lending facility (MLF) rate, an anchor for the mortgage lending rate. The labor market is recovering. The employment sub-indexes in the official PMIs of late point to an improvement in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors (Chart 9). Additionally, by the end of June, the number of returned migrant workers reached 96% of last year’s level. At this rate, the labor market should return to its pre-COVID-19 level by early next year. Chart 8Property Market Is Heating Up Chart 9The Labor Market Is Recovering Inflation will probably accelerate next year. We expect the recovery in the labor market to drive up both wage income and core CPI next year. Higher oil and industrial metals prices should also lift producer prices (Chart 10). Higher interest rates may not be counterproductive to policymakers’ support for SMEs. This is due to the authorities’ “window guidance”, mandating banks to reduce the spread between the loan prime rate (LPR) and bank lending rates. As seen in the past five months, although the policy rate has been rising, average bank lending rates have fallen (Chart 11). Policymakers will likely continue hiking policy rate to curb financial and property market speculations, but at the same time still able to guide bank lending rates lower and target their support for SMEs. Chart 10Inflation Will Likely Accelerate Along With Economic Growth In 1H21 Chart 11Bank Lending Rates Have Been Trending Down Despite Rising Policy Rate Bottom Line: Odds are rising that the PBoC will continue to hike interest rates (short and medium-term) by the middle of next year. In turn, the rebound in Chinese government bond yields will resume early next year in the expectation of better economic conditions and policy tightening. Investment Conclusions The upward momentum in both the short and long-end of the yield curve will likely abate from now till year-end (Chart 12, top panel). As early as Q2 next year, however, a rebound in rate hike expectations will cause the curve to flatten. Historically, the yield curve has always moved in lockstep with the 3-month SHIBOR with a perfect reverse correlation (Chart 12, bottom panel). Given the extremely dovish stance among central banks (the Fed in particular), the upside in rate hikes by PBoC will be capped. We expect a less than 30bps rise in long-term bond yields. Tighter monetary policy is bullish for the RMB. Nonetheless, the risk-return profile of taking a direct bet on the RMB is not attractive in either direction. The CNY has appreciated against the USD by 5% since bottoming in May, and we doubt that there will be a meaningful upside in the RMB against the dollar leading up to the US election. Meanwhile, widening interest-rate differentials have further reduced the odds of any significant CNY/USD depreciation (Chart 13). Chart 12A Rebound In Rate Hike Expectations In 1H21 Will Flatten The Yield Curve Chart 13Limited Upside For The RMB Against USD And On Trade-Weighted Basis In this vein, the CNY/USD exchange rate will be dominated by broader dollar performance. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the PBoC will tolerate sharp, trade-weighted currency appreciations. A declining USD will also limit the upside in the trade-weighted RMB. The RMB may be less reflationary to businesses in China, but it will not become outright deflationary for the time being (Chart 13, middle and bottom panels). In terms of equities, we maintain our positive cyclical view on China's growth outlook. The PBoC will maintain its tightening bias, but this should not lead to major growth disappointments. We continue to expect Chinese domestic and investable equities to outperform in both absolute and relative terms, at least for the next six to nine months. Beyond the next six months, however, a more restrictive monetary policy should bring China’s economy closer to its trend growth in 2H21. Sectors such as technology and real estate, which benefit the most from easy liquidity conditions and strong economic growth, will be negatively and disproportionally impacted. Given their heavy weight in China’s investable equity market, we will probably trim our positions in investable stocks by the middle of next year.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don’t Chase China’s Bond Yields Lower", dated February 19, 2020, available at cis.bcareseach.com. 2 Please see BCA Research China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Taking The Pulse Of The People’s Congress", dated May 28, 2020, available at cis.bcareseach.com. 3 Please see BCA Research China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Questions Following The Coronacrisis", dated April 23, 2020, available at cis.bcareseach.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights We present a thought experiment for the next eight years. 7000 constitutes a reasonable long-term target for the S&P 500. A doubling of the S&P 500 over the coming eight years is in line with the historical experience. Monetary policy is unlikely to tighten meaningfully, which will allow multiples to remain elevated Earnings per share can rise to $310 by 2028. Market technicals are also consistent with significant long-term gains for stocks. Feature Chart II-1Prolonged ZIRP Neither Eliminates Corrections... Our structural target is neither a joke nor a marketing ploy. And yes, it really does read SPX 7000! This is our S&P 500 target for the year 2028. A new business cycle has commenced and with it a fresh bull market. Our secular US equity market view is bullish. Our readers can fault us for our optimistic view on the world. But we live by the Buffett maxim that “there are no short sellers in the Forbes Billionaires list.” What gives us confidence in this prima facie hyperbolic market view? The Fed’s explicit acceptance that it is ready to incur inflation risk, cementing the fed funds rate near the zero-lower bound for as long as the eye see. In the last cycle, it took the Fed seven years to lift the fed funds rate from zero, a move that ended being judged as premature and forced the Yellen-led Fed to pause for another year (bottom panel, Chart II-1). Seven years. As such, there is a good chance the Fed will stay put until the year 2028, another election year. Even if it ultimately raises interest rates faster due to an overheated economy goosed up on the sweet nectar of fiscal largesse, it is highly likely to be behind the curve. Before we move on to justifying our target, some observations on ZIRP are in order. First, the Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy (QE and ZIRP) in the last cycle did not prevent stock market corrections, including a near 20% fall in 2011 (top panel, Chart II-1). In other words, we do not expect smooth sailing or a 45-degree angle line in the SPX heading to 2028. Rather, an era of volatility with a plethora of sizable corrections is upon us, but the path of least resistance will be higher. Make no mistake, we are in a “buy the dip” market now. Similar to 2008-2015, there will be a lot of fits and starts and a number of mini economic cycles will develop. Chart II-2 highlights that the ISM oscillated violently during the ZIRP years and so did equity momentum and the 10-year Treasury yield. Granted, the Fed managed to suppress economic volatility as real GDP averaged ~2%/annum in the aftermath of the GFC, but mini economic cycles and profit growth scares did not disappear (top panel, Chart II-3). Chart II-2...Nor Mini Economic Cycles Chart II-3"Lowflation"/Disinflation Has Been The Story Of The Past 30 Years   Importantly, while the 10-year Treasury yield moved with the ebbs and flows of the ISM manufacturing survey’s readings, it remained in a downtrend and every bond market selloff proved a buying opportunity in the era of ZIRP (third panel, Chart II-2). What the Fed failed to generate was inflation – of either the CPI or PCE deflator variety. In fact, the Fed has not seen core PCE price inflation overshoot 2.5% since the early 1990s (bottom panel, Chart II-3). Another feature of the ZIRP years in the last cycle was that early on easy monetary policy coincided with easy fiscal policy, as was warranted for the first few years post the GFC. Subsequently, fiscal thrust increased starting in 2016 counterbalancing the Fed’s interest rate hikes. Despite all that fiscal easing, real GDP growth peaked at 3% in 2018 before decelerating last year, raising a question mark about the long-term health of the US economy, a question to be answered in a future Special Report. Frequent readers of US Equity Strategy know our long-held view that the two primary equity market drivers have been easy fiscal and monetary policies since the March carnage. Looking ahead, the Fed has cemented the view that easy monetary policy will stay with us for quite some time. While the jury is still out on fiscal policy, it appears at the moment that profligacy has staying power as no party in Washington is campaigning on austerity or worrying about paying down the debt (save for the lone voice of the Kentucky Senator Rand Paul). The Buenos Aires Consensus is a paradigm shift, and the most important long-term consequence will be higher inflation. The US has abandoned the guardrails on populism established by the Washington Consensus – countercyclical fiscal policy, independent central banking, free trade, laissez-faire economic policy – and has adopted something… different. A new Consensus. These are extremely potent macro forces and given that there is a lag between the time both easy monetary and loose fiscal policies hit the economy, their effects will be long lasting. Especially given that they are now synchronized – unlike for large periods of the previous cycle – and undertaken at a much greater order of magnitude than after the GFC. Table II-1 With that macro backdrop in mind, let us circle back to our 7000 SPX target. A fresh bull market has commenced and we consider the breakout above the previous cycle’s highs as its starting point. In August, the SPX surpassed the February 19, 2020 highs, giving birth to the new bull market. Using empirical evidence since the late-1950s we conclude that, on average, the SPX doubles from its breakout point (Table II-1). This gives us the SPX 7000 reading before the new bull is slayed in the plaza de toros of economic cycles. While this qualitative analysis is enticing, ultimately earnings have to deliver in order to justify the equity market’s appreciation. Put differently, easy fiscal and monetary policies the world over will deliver EPS inflation. On the quantitative EPS front, we first turn to the reconstructed S&P 500 earnings back to the late-1920s. On average, EPS have grown by 7.5%/annum, effectively doubling every decade (Chart II-4). Chart II-4Average Annual EPS Growth Since 1920s = 7.5% More recently, using I/B/E/S data, there have been four distinct EPS growth periods over the past four decades with different durations. From trough-to-peak, EPS have enjoyed an average CAGR of over 10% (top panel, Chart II-5). Chart II-5EPS Can Double In Next Eight Years The current trough in forward EPS stands just shy of $140. Applying the average CAGR until 2028 results in a $310 EPS figure. This is our starting point of our EPS sensitivity analysis. Assigning the current forward multiple equates to an SPX terminal value of over 7000. Table II-2 showcases different EPS and forward P/E multiple permutations with the grey shaded area representing our tight range of peak cycle multiples and peak EPS estimates. Table II-2SPX EPS & Multiple Sensitivity With regard to what is currently priced in by sell side analysts, the 5-year forward EPS growth rate – the longest duration estimate available – is near a trough reading of 10%. The historical mean is 12% since 1985, with a range of 19% near the dotcom bubble peak and a trough of 9% at the depths of the 2016 manufacturing recession (bottom panel, Chart II-5). A few words on presidential cycles are relevant given our structural bullish equity market view. We first noticed Tables II-3 & II-4 in the WSJ in late-2016 and we have corrected some minor mistakes and updated them filling in the gaps. Drawdowns are frequent during term presidencies1 dating back to Hoover. Table II-3Every Presidency Experiences Drawdowns Table II-4S&P 500 Returns During Presidential Terms What is truly remarkable, however, is that since the late-1920s only three term presidencies ended up in the red. What the WSJ article did not mention was that in all three market declines GOP presidents were at the helm and had taken over at/or near all-time highs in the SPX! This represents a risk to our SPX 7000 view. If President Trump wins the upcoming election, given the recent modest recovery in the polling, he could meet the same fate as his Republican predecessors. Our sister Geopolitical Strategy service still assigns 35% probability for the incumbent to remain in office, a solid figure that suggests the race remains close. Importantly, while we believe a transition to a Democratic president will be tumultuous as we have been cautioning investors recently, a Biden presidency along with the possibility of a “Blue Wave” will bode well for the long-term prospects of the US equity market, if history at least rhymes. BCA’s Geopolitical strategist Matt Gertken assigns 65% odds to a Biden win and 55% to a Blue trifecta. Finally, on a technical note, the recent megaphone formation has stirred a lot of debate among technical analysts in the blogosphere and is eerily reminiscent of a similar formation that lasted from 1965 until 1975. Typically, these megaphone formations get resolved/completed by a diamond formation (Chart II-6). Chart II-6Of Megaphones And Diamonds Chart II-7Diamond Base Is Long Term Bullish While this points to a selloff in the broad equity market in the near-term, which is in accordance with our tactically cautious view (please see the last section of this Weekly Report), it is very bullish for the long-term, as equities catapult higher from such a diamond base formation (Chart II-7). In other words, odds are much higher that the SPX will hit 7000 first, before it ever revisits 2200. Adding it all up, we are introducing a structurally constructive US equity market view with an SPX 7000 target for year 2028 on the back of peak cycle EPS of $310 and peak cycle P/E multiple of 23. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist Footnotes 1 By term presidencies we are referring to the different duration of Presidents staying in office.