China

The 14th Five-Year Plan has more strategic importance than in the past decade. Spending on national defense, technological self-sufficiency, public welfare and green energy will likely see substantial increases under the guidelines of a strong central government. The Proposal from the Five-Year Plan does not change our cyclical view on Chinese assets. Beyond mid-2021, the differences in sectoral performance will widen. We will likely begin to trim our position in China’s “old economy” stocks in the first half of 2021.

Highlights Global risk assets have more downside in the near term. The US dollar is primed to rebound. Without major fiscal stimulus in the US, the upside in the greenback will be substantial. China’s business cycle recovery will continue but Chinese stocks and China-related plays are over-hyped and will experience a setback. For equity and credit investors, we recommend maintaining a neutral allocation to EM versus their DM counterparts. Feature Global risk assets have been in a twilight zone. On the one hand, there has been enormous uncertainty related to the US elections, the US fiscal stimulus and the impact of renewed social mobility restrictions on economic activity, especially in Europe. On the other hand, ultra-accommodative central banks, zero or negative interest rates on risk-free investments and the possibility of positive news on the COVID-19 vaccine front have until recently precluded a carnage in global risk assets. What will be the path going forward? We believe the risk-off period in global markets will continue in the near run, i.e., there will be a dusk before a sunrise. Hence, investors should maintain dry powder at the moment. Several negative outcomes have a non-trivial probability of occurring over the very near term. Chiefly these include a contested US presidential election or a Republican Senate under a Biden presidency acting as a constraint on large fiscal stimulus. Chart I-1The US Needs $1.5tn (7.4% Of GDP) Of Fiscal Stimulus In 2021 To Have A Neutral Fiscal Thrust Needless to say, without a large fiscal stimulus package, the US is facing a fiscal cliff. According to the US Congressional Budget Office, the fiscal thrust will be negative 7.4% of GDP in 2021 if no further stimulus is enacted (Chart I-1). The fiscal thrust is the change in the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit. Even if the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit as a share of GDP remains the same, fiscal thrust will be zero. Hence, to achieve a positive fiscal thrust in the US, the fiscal stimulus must be greater than 7.4% of GDP or above $1.5 trillion.  Even though Congress eventually approves a large fiscal package, there is a risk that the economy will slip in the interim. To emphasize, we do not mean there will be no fiscal stimulus. The point is that a large fiscal package is possible only if markets riot. With equity and credit markets still richly priced relative to their fundamentals, the carnage in global risk assets will likely continue.     With equity and credit markets still richly priced relative to their fundamentals, the carnage in global risk assets will likely continue. Chart I-2The US: Lower Inflation Expectations, Higher Real Rates And A Stronger Dollar In the absence of a large US fiscal package and amid falling oil prices, US break-even inflation expectations will drop and the TIPS (real) yields will bounce in the near term (Chart I-2). A rebound in TIPS (real) yields will induce a bounce in the US dollar (Chart I-2, bottom panel).  Provided that the primary risks presently stem from DM rather than Chinese growth, we recommend maintaining a neutral allocation to EM within respective global equity and credit portfolios. Why not overweight EM versus DM? First, the rebound in the greenback will weigh on EM financial markets. Second, outside China, Korea and Taiwan, EM fundamentals are poor. Net-net, odds of EM out- and under-performance versus DM are, for now, balanced. China: Peak Stimulus, Equities And Commodities China’s business cycle recovery is intact. However, Chinese equities have become fully priced and are at risk of a setback (in absolute terms) along with global share prices. Notably, there are several elements that could trigger a meaningful setback in Chinese stocks. First, the money and credit impulses are about to peak. The top panel of Chart I-3 shows that changes in commercial banks’ excess reserves ratio lead the credit impulse by about six months. The drop in the excess reserves ratio since May foreshadows the top in the private credit impulse. Interbank rates – shown inverted in the bottom panel of Chart I-3 – point to an apex in the narrow money (M1) impulse. Authorities have been shrinking commercial banks’ excess reserves at the PBoC since May/June.  Tightening liquidity conditions in the banking system have led to higher interbank rates as well as government and corporate bond yields. Higher borrowing costs will weigh on money and credit growth. Second, the loan approval index of the PBoC banking survey has rolled over (Chart I-4). This implies that bank loan origination will subside going forward. Chart I-3China: Money/Credit Impulses Are At An Apex Chart I-4China: Loan Growth To Moderate Finally, fiscal stimulus is also peaking. Chart I-5 shows that the issuance of local government bonds is set to dwindle in the coming months. A peak in stimulus does not herald an immediate end of the recovery in the business cycle. China’s combined credit and fiscal spending impulse leads the business cycle by about nine months (Chart I-6). Therefore, even as the credit and fiscal spending impulse reaches an apex, the Chinese mainland’s economic activity will stay firm in H1 2021. Consequently, corporate profits will continue to recover. Chart I-5China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Peaking Chart I-6China: The Economy Will Continue Recovering What do all these imply for share prices? In periods when borrowing costs rise along with accelerating profit growth/improving net EPS revisions, share prices could still advance (Chart I-7). Hence, peak stimulus is not a sufficient reason to turn negative on share prices. Chart I-7China: Share Prices (ex-TMT), EPS Expectations And Corporate Bond Yields That said, there are some signs that the Chinese equity market is overbought and over-hyped, making it vulnerable: A major IPO often marks a top in an asset class. Chart I-8 illustrates that Goldman Sachs’ IPO in 1999 preceded the secular top in US equities, IPOs of KKR and Blackstone in 2007 took place before the US credit bubble and the LBO boom unraveled; and finally, Glencore, the largest commodity trading house, went public in 2011 at the very peak of the secular bull market in commodities. In this respect, will Ant Group’s upcoming IPO mark a major top in Chinese or new economy stocks? Time will tell. Chart I-9 illustrates that Chinese IPO booms were historically associated with equity market tops. The current surge in Chinese IPOs – in various jurisdictions including China, Hong Kong, and the US – is a symptom of an over-hyped market. Chart I-8A Major IPO Often Marks The Top in Respective Asset Classes Chart I-9China: Booming IPOs = An Equity Market Top? Finally, new economy stocks in both the US and China have risen by about 20-fold since January 2010. Both in terms of duration and magnitude, their rallies are identical to the bull market in the Nasdaq 100 index in the 1990s (Chart I-10). The striking similarity with those episodes as well as current euphoria among investors about FAANG and Chinese new economy stocks warrant caution. In regard to commodities, in recent months we have been arguing that China is entering a commodity destocking cycle following the major restocking cycle that occurred in April-August. As Chinese imports of key commodities temporarily diminish due to destocking, commodities prices will relapse. Importantly, investor sentiment and net long positions in some key commodities are very elevated, suggesting overbought conditions (Chart I-11). Chart I-10FAANG And Tencent Have Been Tracking The Trajectory Of Nasdaq 100 In The 1990s Chart I-11Investors Are Very Bullish On Copper Critically, global mining stocks have been dropping since early September and are signaling a relapse in industrial metals prices (Chart I-12). In brief, commodity prices and commodity plays remain vulnerable. Chart I-12Global Mining Stocks Point To A Relapse In Industrial Commodities Prices Bottom Line: Marrying the positive outlook for China’s business cycle on the one hand with an  impending potential correction in global stocks, the peak in Chinese stimulus and signs of Chinese equity investor euphoria, we conclude that the risk-reward profiles of Chinese stocks and China-related plays in absolute terms are unattractive. That said, we continue recommending overweighting Chinese stocks within an EM equity portfolio. From a cyclical perspective, Chinese corporate profits will outperform EM and DM corporate earnings because China has dealt with the pandemic much better than almost all other countries. An Update On Currencies And Local Fixed-Income We have been shorting a basket of EM currencies – BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, KRW and IDR – against an equally-weighted basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. This strategy remains intact. However, we believe the US dollar is primed to stage a major rebound, in general, and versus EM currencies, in particular. Therefore, US dollar-based investors should hedge their currency risk or short the same EM currency basket versus the greenback. In EM local fixed-income markets, we have been receiving 10-year swap rates but have not recommended owning cash domestic bonds because of currency risk. We continue to recommend investors receive 10-year swap rates in the following markets: Mexico, Colombia, Russia, China, India and Korea. We have also been recommending long positions in domestic bonds in certain frontier markets like Egypt, Ukraine, and Pakistan. The global risk-off phase will cause their currencies to relapse versus the US dollar, raising the possibility that local bond yields will rise. Therefore, investors who are long these markets should close these positions.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights China’s 14th Five Year Plan and broader national strategy will continue to provoke opposition from the US and the West, regardless of the US election. China’s economic blueprint will focus on self-sufficiency, “dual circulation” (import substitution), state subsidies, and high-tech advancement – all factors that will continue to provoke western ire. US political polarization creates geopolitical risks, particularly for China, which will support the dollar and US equity outperformance, depending on the election result. If Trump wins, polarization will persist, he will face gridlock at home, and he will thus continue his aggressive foreign and trade policies, with China facing disruptive consequences. The CNY, EUR, and especially TWD would suffer. If Biden wins, he could face either gridlock or full Democratic control. The former case presents a greater risk of a focus on trade and foreign policy. The latter would result in a domestically focused Washington, which gives China breathing space. The CNY and EUR would benefit, but the TWD would face limited upside. Either way, investors are likely to become over-exuberant about assets that are exposed to the US-China relationship in the event of a Biden victory. Over the long run, this is a bull trap.  Feature In the years after the 2008 financial crisis, the global news media proclaimed the rise of China and the demise of the United States as a global leader. The US’s free-wheeling democracy and capitalism led to economic collapse, partisan gridlock, and nearly a self-inflicted default on sovereign debt. Meanwhile China’s state-controlled system stimulated its economy, cracked down on the first inklings of unrest in the spring of 2011, and expanded its regional and global influence.  The conclusion is similar today in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. The US has squandered its response to the pandemic, while partisan gridlock threatens the economic recovery. China has suppressed the virus that started within its borders and its economy is rapidly on the mend. The orgy of social unrest and political dysfunction in the US has weighed on its international image and leadership. What the past decade showed, however, is that the first narrative to take hold after a global crisis is not likely to be the final narrative. In fact, the past decade was the most difficult for China since the 1980s. The next decade will be even more challenging. The COVID-19 pandemic brought to an official conclusion the unprecedented economic boom of the past four decades (Chart 1). Though Chinese policy makers have navigated relatively well, the social and political system faces greater challenges in a new economic and international environment. Chinese potential GDP growth has now fallen to 3%, as the labor force contracts and productivity remains flat. Chart 1China Already Plucked The Long-Hanging Fruit China is well-situated in the short run to benefit from domestic and global economic stimulus, but over the long run its challenges are significantly underrated. China Faces Headwinds From Abroad Chinese leaders are prepared for any of the possible outcomes in the US election. With regard to US foreign and trade policy, the election is about tactics, not strategy. US grand strategy clearly dictates that Washington focus on curbing China, which is the only country that can challenge the US for global supremacy over the long run. But the US is not alone – other countries are also taking a more skeptical stance toward China’s geopolitical prominence. The result is that China will continue to emphasize self-sufficiency, a centrally guided economic model, and state-supported technological advancement in its fourteenth Five Year Plan for 2021-25 (see Appendix). This policy trajectory, combined with the key policy developments of the past decade, suggests that China’s self-sufficiency drive will continue to attract geopolitical opposition from the US and the West: Capital Controls: China tightened its capital controls aggressively during the financial turmoil of 2015-16. This emergency decision undercut the liberal reform agenda and alienated the western world on one of its critical structural demands. With China having grown its money supply from 175% to 197% of GDP since 2009, and capital flowing out again amid this year’s crisis (Chart 2), Beijing will not be able to fully liberalize its capital account anytime soon. Chart 2China's Capital Controls Chart 3China's State-Owned Enterprises Revived State-Owned Enterprises: The current administration has struggled with slowing trend growth and deflationary pressures. This is not an environment opportune for restructuring or liquidating inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is the opposite of the 1990s, when SOEs were last culled. The regime has instead promised to make SOEs bigger and stronger (Chart 3). While it has pursued reforms to allow more private ownership of state assets, it has also encouraged public ownership of private assets, thus producing “mixed ownership” and a fusion of state and corporate power. The US and western countries resent this reassertion of state-backed economic power, notwithstanding the fact that all countries are increasing state support amid the collapse in global demand. Notably, China will likely resist cutting manufacturing capacity any faster than it will already be cut due to the global recession and foreign protectionism, meaning that stimulus-fueled overcapacity will continue to be a problem for foreign competitors. Chart 4The Tech Race Continues The Tech Race: Beijing is continuing a frantic dash to upgrade its science and technology capabilities in order to lift total factor productivity, which is essential to maintaining growth in the coming decades in the post-export-industrial phase. Expenditures on research and development are skyrocketing, now rivaling the United States. True, R&D spending is flattening out as a percentage of GDP, but this is likely temporary — even faster R&D spending will probably become an official target for the next five years (Chart 4). The full weight of the political system is being thrown behind the goal of creating a “Great Leap Forward” in advanced and emerging technologies. Western countries are increasingly sensitive to China’s advances in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, new vehicles, new energy, new materials, and computing. The new strategy of “dual circulation” will consist of import substitution, especially for critical tech goods, and will incorporate programs like “Made in China 2025” as well as “new infrastructure” that are high tech and have become targets of the West. The US and others are openly adopting export controls and reducing supply chain dependency on China. Beijing will struggle to maintain its rapid innovation drive without inviting more punitive measures from the West. Chart 5US Fears China’s Military Rise Military Spending: China adopted a more assertive foreign policy in the mid-2000s and intensified this approach after 2012. Military spending has risen along with economic heft and western experts have long believed that China spends considerably more than it lets on. If we assume that China began to spend 3.75% of GDP per year after its strategic break with the US – a reasonable number in keeping with Russia’s long-term average – then China is narrowing the defense spending gap with the US more rapidly than is widely believed (Chart 5). Given the US’s giant defense spending, this is a continual source of distrust. Bear in mind that China’s defense and security aims are more limited than those of the US, at least in the short run. While the US must maintain the ability to project power globally, China need only grow its regional sphere of influence. Regionalism: While the Xi administration consolidates power within the Communist Party and central government in Beijing, it is also consolidating Beijing’s authority within Greater China. This includes efforts to bring to heel wayward provinces and regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Much of this is a fait accompli that western governments can do little about. Even in Hong Kong, public opinion is showing signs of resignation to the new legislative powers that Beijing has asserted. However, Taiwan is the clear outlier. Public opinion has shifted sharply against mainland China. Given that Taiwan is the epicenter of the new cold war with the US, both for reasons of political legitimacy as well as technological capability, a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is looming (Chart 6). China has economic leverage to use first, but if this fails then a military confrontation cannot be ruled out. The above points do not hinge on the US election outcome or other cyclical factors, and highlight that geopolitical tensions will persist, particularly with the United States. The US’s adoption of a confrontational rather than cooperative posture toward China is a paradigm shift in international relations. Unlike Washington’s crackdown on Japanese trade in the 1980s, the US and China do not have an underlying trust or sense of shared security interests. Beijing’s willingness to increase US imports or appreciate its currency arbitrarily, to suit the shifting demands of US administrations, have substantial limits. Economic decoupling will continue in an environment of strategic insecurity (Chart 7). Chart 6Struggles In Greater China Chart 7US Redistributes Trade Deficit   President Trump’s biggest mistake in pursuing his trade war with China lies in his failure to build a grand alliance, or coalition of the willing, among likeminded liberal democracies. This would have amplified his leverage over China in making demands for structural reform and opening up. But this point can be overstated. China’s international image has collapsed, in Europe and Asia as well as in North America, despite the Trump administration’s diplomatic failures. Much of this effect stems from COVID-19, but that does not mean it is less grave. If the US courts allies in the trade conflict with China, it will find governments willing to cooperate (Chart 8). Chart 8China’s Image Suffers Under Trump Map 1Proxy Battles In Asia Pacific Chart 9US Arms Sales To Taiwan China’s perennial geopolitical challenge is shown in Map 1. It is geographically encircled by nations that have grown increasingly wary of its regional ambitions and will reach out to the US and West. These countries wish to continue benefiting from China’s economic rise but seek security guarantees to offset China’s rising strategic clout. The result will be “proxy battles,” in some cases political, in others military (Chart 9). Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam each face substantial geopolitical risk. In the case of South Korea and the Philippines, this risk is partially priced by financial markets. But in the case of Taiwan and Vietnam, it is almost entirely underrated. Taiwan has only an ambiguous defense commitment from the US, while Vietnam is a Chinese rival that entirely lacks a security guarantee from the United States. Bottom Line: Geopolitical risk will remain elevated in Asia Pacific regardless of what occurs in the US election. The growth of Chinese power, and its state-led economic model, will ensure that trade tensions persist. These will culminate in strategic conflicts in certain neighboring countries. China Will Re-Consolidate Power When Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, we argued that the looming US-China trade war would not be determined solely by relative economic size and export exposure. Instead, political unity would be a critical factor. While the US ostensibly had the economic advantage, China had the political advantage. The nineteenth National Party Congress would see Xi Jinping consolidate power domestically, while President Trump would struggle with domestic opposition and divisions within the US and the West over his protectionism. Having secured an economic rebound this year, China is likely to consolidate domestic power even further in 2021-22. This period culminates in the critical twentieth National Party Congress. Originally Xi Jinping was expected to step down at this time and hand the reins to the leader of the opposing faction. Now the opposing faction has been laid low, and Xi is likely to promote his faction and entrench his rule. The period will likely be marked with at least one major crackdown on the regime’s political rivals. Ultimately, social and political control will be tightened, particularly beginning in late 2021. These events provide good reasons for anticipating that Chinese monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy will not tighten drastically, but rather will merely normalize by mid-2021, assuming that the recovery stays on track (Chart 10). Yet this logic only goes so far – it is more bullish for the macro view today and in 2021, than it is in 2022. Obviously the regime wants to avoid a slump in 2021, the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party, and investors should keep this in mind. But the 2017 party congress was attended by a deleveraging campaign that surprised the world in its intensity. The point is that stability, not rapid growth, is the imperative in 2022. If speculative bubbles have become a greater threat by that time, then the monetary and fiscal policy backdrop will lean hawkish rather than dovish. Tightening central control over the economy helps the Xi administration consolidate power. Chart 10China Still Consolidating Domestic Power, 2021-22 US Polarization A Risk For China If China continues to consolidate, the key question is what will happen in the United States. The answer will be known in short order, but what is critical to observe is that US political polarization is a geopolitical risk, and therefore if it continues to escalate it will be positive for the US dollar and negative for Chinese and other emerging market assets. The past several years have been marked by an increase in US social and political instability. Indeed, according to Worldwide Governance Indicators, the US’s governance has declined while China’s has improved, notably on the issue of political stability and the absence of violence (Chart 11). While these rankings are partial, nevertheless they point to the reality of US political division. The decade’s giant increase in political polarization has coincided with a bull market in US equities and the greenback, best exemplified by the outperformance of the US technology sector (Chart 12). Chart 11US Instability A Source Of Global Risk If President Trump prevails, this trend will continue. Trump cannot win the popular vote, but his regional support could grant him a victory in the Electoral College. Or he could prevail through a contested election adjudicated by the Supreme Court or the House of Representatives. If this should occur, polarization will intensify, as the government’s legitimacy will suffer due to lack of popularity in a democracy. Facing gridlock at home, Trump would pursue trade war – not only with China, but also conceivably with the European Union. The consequence is that a surprise Trump victory (45% odds) would be negative for the euro, the renminbi, and especially the Taiwanese dollar (Chart 13). Chart 12US Polarization Reinforces Safe-Haven Status Chart 13Trump Second Term Would Weigh On CNY, EUR, TWD However, if former Vice President Biden prevails, he could win in two possible ways: one with gridlock in Congress, the other with a Democratic sweep of the House and Senate. In the former case, US polarization will persist. Biden will be incapable of executing his domestic agenda, as he will be obstructed by a Republican Senate. This will drive him into foreign policy, where he will ultimately prove to be tough on China – and certainly tougher than the Obama administration. In the latter case, a Democratic sweep of legislative and executive branches, Biden will not face domestic constraints and will be primarily focused on an ambitious agenda for rebuilding and rebalancing the US economy, with elements of the New Deal and the Green New Deal. He will be less focused on international affairs, at least initially. Trade risks will decline, along with US fiscal risks, thus producing a higher-growth macro policy environment. In both cases, while we expect a President Biden to seek a diplomatic “reset” with China, he is unlikely to repeal President Trump’s tariffs. Instead he will seek to utilize the leverage that Trump has built up, while pursuing a new strategic and economic dialogue with China. Ultimately this dialogue will be undermined by China’s state-backed economic policies and foreign policy assertiveness (see previous section), as well as Biden’s simultaneous courting of Europe and other liberal democracies. But clearly there is more room for Chinese assets to outperform under a Biden victory, especially a Democratic sweep. Investment Takeaways If Biden wins, the stock market is likely to become overly exuberant about a Biden administration’s positive implications for China-exposed companies (Chart 14). The same can be said for Chinese tech companies that are highly export-oriented (Chart 15). In a Democratic sweep, this rally can be prolonged, as US equities will face greater political risk than international equities. But any rally in assets exposed to the US-China relationship will ultimately be a bull trap, as US grand strategy calls for containing China, while Chinese grand strategy calls for breaking through containment. The US and Chinese tech sectors and Taiwanese assets are by far the most vulnerable to this dynamic, given their lofty valuations. Chart 14Market Over-Optimistic On Biden Boost To China Plays Chart 15Chinese Tech Faces Trade Tensions If we are correct that geopolitical risk will persist for China regardless of US political party, then the primary beneficiaries of Chinese stimulus and US decoupling will be domestic-oriented Chinese equities as well as “China plays” – external markets that export machinery and resources to China, such as Australia, Brazil, and Sweden. China will still invest heavily in traditional infrastructure, property, and manufacturing to shore up demand whenever it sags amid the difficulties of the economic transition. Our China Play Index, designed by Mathieu Savary of our flagship The Bank Credit Analyst, neatly captures the potential for this index to outperform on the back of Chinese stimulus, which will be even more necessary if US policy continues to be punitive (Chart 16). The near term could involve substantial US fiscal risks as well as geopolitical risks with China, which can occur under a gridlocked Biden administration or a second term Trump administration. Over the next year, the looming Chinese and global recovery, combined with ultra-dovish US monetary policy, spells continued downside for the US dollar and upside for Chinese and emerging market currencies and risk assets (Chart 17). But while the dollar may face challenges to its reserve currency dominance, China’s geopolitical risks, at home and abroad, will prevent the renminbi from making more than incremental gains on the dollar. The euro is a much likelier alternative for the foreseeable future. Chart 16China Plays Will Benefit From Reflation Chart 17King Dollar Persists … But Cyclical Downside Looms   Appendix Table 1China’s 14th Five Year Plan Goals   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Under the newly released deleveraging policies, Chinese real estate developers have no choice but to deleverage. Over the next six months, the most likely scenario will be moderate growth in property sales, starts and completions, but a drop in land purchases. We expect Chinese onshore and offshore property stocks to continue underperforming their respective benchmarks. However, we recommend buying Chinese property developers’ offshore corporate bonds. Feature The country’s real estate sector has exhibited clear signs of improvement. As both commodity buildings’ floor space starts and sales showed four consecutive months of year-on-year growth, Chinese real estate investment has returned to its pre-pandemic annual rate of acceleration (Chart 1). In addition, our broad measures of Chinese real estate construction activity – the “building construction” floor area starts and completions – have also rebounded sharply (Chart 2). Chart 1Chinese Property Market: A Sustainable Recovery Ahead? Chart 2Sharp Rebound In Post-Pandemic Construction Activity One driving force behind the real estate sector’s recovery was that China loosened up its monetary policy and implemented fiscal stimulus earlier this year. However, since July, the government has implemented a flurry of restrictive policies to clamp down on flows of capital into the real estate sector, and has repeatedly stressed the mantra: “Houses are for living in, not for speculation.” Most importantly, in late August the government released a framework mandating Chinese property developers to deleverage. As Chinese homebuilders have no choice but to reduce their debt load, will the property market recovery continue? Chart 3Constrained Financing May Lead To A Drop In Land Sales Going Forward Over the next six months, we expect a 4-6% year-on-year growth in property sales. The government-set deleveraging mandate will likely result in considerable property sales promotion by real estate developers. In the meantime, faced with constrained financing, homebuilders may prioritize completion of already sold but unfinished buildings over land investment (Chart 3). This may result in a moderate pickup in construction activity, but a drop in profit margins and land sales. Beyond the next six months, property sales in China will likely struggle to grow, as price discounts may not be enough to outweigh demand headwinds. In turn, construction activity may falter, as the government-led deleveraging mandate and weakening sales will curtail the cash flow to homebuilders.  Mandated Deleveraging Chart 4Property Developers Will Have No Choice But To Deleverage The Chinese real estate sector is highly indebted. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the sector’s total liability-to-asset ratio rose to 80%, and its debt-to-equity ratio was at 4.1 by the end of last year (Chart 4). Policymakers in Beijing well recognize that excesses in the property market in general, and leverage among property developers in particular, constitute a major risk to financial stability. As part of the strategy to establish a long-term, sustainable mechanism for the real estate sector, the Chinese central bank and the housing ministry issued a framework – essentially a deleveraging mandate for Chinese property developers. This framework includes Three Red Lines and Four Tiers. Three Red Lines There will be a 70% ceiling on liabilities to assets, excluding advanced payments from presold houses; The net debt-to-equity ratio needs to be less than 100%; Short-term borrowings cannot exceed cash reserves. Four Tiers Companies that exceed all three red lines are placed into the red tier, while those passing any two of the three red lines are in the orange tier and enterprises that cross one of the three lines are in the yellow tier. Firms with financials within the three red lines are classified in the green tier. The government is using these debt tiers to control which firms will have access to new financing and how much new financing they can apply for. Failing to meet all three “red lines” (i.e., the red tier) may result in them being cut off from access to new loans from banks. If a firm passes all three red lines (i.e., the green tier), it can increase its debt up to a maximum of 15% in the next year. If it is in the yellow or orange tier, it can increase its debt up to a maximum of 10% and 5% in the following year, respectively (Table 1). Table 1The Mandated Deleveraging Framework: Three Red Lines And Four Tiers Enterprises that break all three red lines are required to submit a report on their debt-reduction plan, listing their planned deleveraging measures to reduce the number of red-line breaches within one year, as well as the planned measures to reach the green tier within three years. Based on the 2020 mid-year data released by 100 major public-traded property-developing companies listed as either A-shares or H-shares, 86% of them are breaking at least one of the red lines, 22% of them are breaching all three red lines and only 14% of them are in the green tier. Bottom Line: Chinese home developers are set to embark on the deleveraging path due to the new regulation. This will limit their access to financing and has implications for their activity and, thereby, the overall economy. What Does This Mean? Property development is an asset-heavy and capital-intensive business, and this industry typically relies a lot on debt. Chart 5Chinese Real Estate Investment: A Breakdown Of Funding Source There are several ways for homebuilders to finance themselves. Chart 5 shows the breakdown of the source of Chinese real estate investment funding, with 15.5% of the total funding from domestic and foreign loans, 32% from a self-raising fund through issuances of bonds or equity, 33.2% from deposits and advanced payments, and 16.2% from homebuyers’ mortgages.  With limited financing from the loan and bond markets, the country’s real estate developers will have to seek more financing from deposits and advanced payments, homebuyers’ mortgages and equity issuances. Chart 6Property Developers Need To Boost Their Sales To Raise More Cash As equity issuance dilutes existing shareholders' profits and drives down share prices, developers often opt for presales to raise financing, i.e., they pre-sell more properties to increase their revenue from deposits and advanced payment, as well as mortgages (Chart 6).  Hence, in the short term, i.e., over the next six months, many property developers may need to cut home prices to boost their sales and shore up cash for their operations. For example, the country’s biggest real estate developer – Evergrande – falls short on all three metrics and lies in the red tier. The company announced in early September that it would do aggressive sales of properties by lowering the selling prices for all types of properties by 30% across the country during the period of September 7 to October 8. Indeed, the company’s sales reached a record high for this period. The aggressive sales promotion of properties will encourage demand. We expect the year-on-year growth of floor space sales to reach 4-6% over the next six months – an acceleration from 1.3% during the pre-pandemic period of 2H2019, but a moderation from the 6.4% growth in the post-pandemic months (Chart 7). Beyond the next six months, home sales may struggle to grow as the impact from price discounts diminishes and demand will face the following headwinds:  The authorities continued to show their determination to crack down on speculative housing demand. Stricter policies, including tighter restrictions on both first and second home purchases and mortgage applications, as well as raising the down payment ratio, have been implemented recently in cities experiencing a rapid rise in property prices, such as Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Tangshan, Zhengzhou and many other cities. The government also set new bank lending regulations to the real estate sector; new bank loans issued to the real estate sector, measured as a share of total new bank loans, should be kept under 30% of total banks’ loans (Chart 8). The ratio has declined to the current 25% from 30-50% in the past four years. We believe the ratio will remain below 30% over the next six to twelve months. Chart 7Chinese Property Sales, Starts And Completions Will Grow Moderately In Coming Months Chart 8Constrained Lending To Chinese Real Estate Sector From Banks Lending to the real estate sector includes housing mortgages and loans for real estate development. The capped bank loans to the property sector suggests that tighter lending standards will be applied to mortgage loans as well as property development loans. This will likely curb demand for housing. The authorities stopped the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program in 2020. The PSL was a driving force behind property demand in China during 2015-2018, but this time the government has refrained from PSL injections. The government-subsidized shantytown renovation program (e.g., adding elevators, building parking spots, painting interior and exterior walls, paving roads, etc.) will reduce demand for new properties. With improved living conditions, some households may not need to buy new properties. The government’s renovation project covers 7 million houses this year, of which 76.4% (5.4 million) were completed during the first eight months of this year. Moreover, a renovation project of a similar scale will be implemented next year.   The government’s active promotion of rental housing will also reduce the demand for new housing. Rental prices have been falling due to the pandemic, and that may delay home buyers from purchasing residential properties.    Chart 9Chinese Property Demand Faces Structural Headwinds The Chinese property market also faces strong structural headwinds. For example, property demand in China has already entered a saturation phase, and the working-age population (15-64 years of age) is shrinking (Chart 9). What about the outlook of property starts and completions? Constrained net borrowing will weigh on floor space starts and floor space completions. As such, we only expect moderate growth (i.e., smaller than 5%) in both property starts and completions over the next six months (Chart 7 on page 6). With constrained financing, homebuilders may have to allocate an increasing amount of funding to complete their unfinished projects instead of purchasing new land (Chart 3 on page 2). The pace of property completion has to catch up with both sales and starts. Property developers are currently under increased pressure to deliver units that were pre-sold about two years ago (Chart 10). Rising property sales will provide more financing for the developers to complete these projects under construction. The moderate growth in floor space starts and completions will lift construction activity slightly in the commodity buildings market (Chart 11). Chart 10Homebuilders Need To Deliver Their Unfinished Projects Chart 11Construction Activity In China: Moderate Increase Ahead That said, construction activity may relapse beyond the next six months. Both the enduring government-led deleveraging mandate and weakening sales will lead to funding shortages for Chinese homebuilders to carry on new construction projects. Bottom Line: Floor space sales, starts and completions will expand moderately despite the mandated deleveraging of developers in the next six months.  Investment Implications First, it is reasonable to expect a moderate pickup in real estate construction activity in China over the next six months. This will be marginally positive for construction-related commodities demand.  Chart 12Commodity Prices: Hold A Neutral Stance For Now However, commodity prices have already rebounded sharply since April, and China's infrastructure-related construction activities usually peak in October. Therefore, a marginal increase in commodity demand from the real estate sector is not a catalyst for further price increases in commodities such as steel, cement, and glass. For now, we prefer to hold a neutral stance on these commodities (Chart 12).  Beyond six months, the possibility of negative growth in home sales, starts and construction is rising, raising warning signs for construction-related commodities demand. Second, property developers may cut their land purchases in order to allocate more funds to completing unfinished homes. This heralds that a drop in the local government’s revenue may lie ahead. This will have ramifications for their spending in 2H2021. Third, regarding property stocks, they have been moving sideways in absolute terms this year, having significantly underperformed the benchmark (Charts 13 and 14). This reflects their poor profit growth prospects and weak financial fundamentals. We expect the Chinese property stocks to continue to underperform their benchmark, as the aggressive selling strategy will reduce companies’ profit margins. Chart 13Chinese Property Stocks: A Tapering Wedge In Absolute Terms, And… Chart 14…Continuing Underperformances Relative To Their Respective Benchmarks Lastly, we recommend buying Chinese offshore real estate bonds, as moderate growth recovery in the country’s real estate sector and deleveraging will lead to a narrowing of the sector’s corporate spread. In addition, the ongoing global search for yields will intensify the demand for high-yield bonds.   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations