Recession-Hard/Soft Landing

Clients should forgive us for being too gloomy at the start of the year -- it is difficult to be optimistic in the dead of a Montreal winter. However, with springtime comes the reflation trade, born on the wings of massive Chinese fiscal and credit expansion. In this report, we discuss how long (not very) the trade can go (and how to play it). Our In Focus feature returns to pessimism, with a discussion of why the Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire economic model may be in for a big pendulum swing.

The Treasury market is now discounting too slow a pace of Fed tightening, while junk spreads are discounting too rapid an increase in the default rate. This week we examine the risk/reward proposition of temporarily leaning against some prevailing long-run macro trends.

Credit growth acceleration in China is a bearish development in the long run. Potential non-performing loans at Chinese banks could wipe out 40-55% of their equity capital. "Muddling through" for China, from its own internal standpoint, is possible. However, Chinese stocks and China-related equities worldwide will remain in a bear market. From the perspective of the rest of the world, China is now in recession.

Global trade is plummeting as commodity prices remain depressed and emerging markets unravel. Even if oil were not plumbing new lows, we would remain bearish on EM economies, where poor governance and low efficiency suggest that more crises will rear their heads. Above all, we are watching China for policy clarity. After seizing 14% of global exports in recent years, it is now exporting surplus goods into an already deflationary world. Protectionism - not a coordinated response among leading countries - is the likely result. In essence, we reiterate our theme that globalization has peaked. Along the way, we call attention to five geopolitical "Black Swans" that <i>no one</i> is talking about.

It is highly unusual for equities to enter a bear market without the economy going into recession. Since we see the risk of recession as low, we recommend a neutral allocation between bonds and equities.

The U.S. corporate re-leveraging cycle is far more advanced than is widely believed. Corporate health looks only mildly better excluding the troubled energy and materials sectors. Mushrooming leverage ratios are not restricted to junk issuers either.

There are no signs of broader financial stress in the Chinese corporate sector. The most recent financial market turmoil has had no systemic damage to corporate sector balance sheets. We are leaning against being overly bearish. Current valuation readings, particularly for Chinese H shares and Hong Kong stocks, on a historical basis have never been sustainable.