Inflation/Deflation
The Philippine economy continues to overheat. Both headline and core inflation measures are rising precipitously and have breached the central bank's upper target of 4% by a wide margin. Odds are that inflation will continue to climb. Overall domestic…
Highlights Four high conviction long-term investment views: The Italy versus Spain sovereign yield spread will compress. The yen will go up. The yield shortfall on German bunds versus U.S. T-bonds will compress. Swedish real estate prices will face strong headwinds. Chart of the WeekThe Italy Versus Spain Sovereign Yield Spread Is At An All-Time Wide Feature This week's report focusses on 'must-read' recent commentaries from two giants of central banking: Mario Draghi, President of the ECB 2011-19; and Paul Volcker, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve 1979-87. In the case of Paul Volcker, the term giant is not just metaphorical but also literal, as he stands six feet seven inches tall! The Volcker piece is the more profound of the two commentaries because it shatters a shibboleth of monetary policy - the 2 percent inflation target. But we will begin with Draghi. Draghi Reveals Some Home Truths The first must-read is the transcript of the latest ECB press conference.1 Draghi's remarks provide valuable insights into the direction of euro area monetary policy, the impact on sovereign yield spreads, and a view on the budget spat between the EU and Draghi's country of origin, Italy. Despite the recent wobble in the euro area economy, the ECB remains on course to end QE and gradually raise ultra-accommodative interest rates. Although Draghi acknowledged the deceleration in euro area growth in the third quarter to 0.6 percent (annualised rate), he attributed some of it to "country-specific idiosyncratic phenomena", for example the car sector in Germany having to meet new standards on emissions. Another drag came from exports, but Draghi pointed out that "the emerging market situation seems to have stabilised". Meanwhile, euro area consumption trends remain pretty strong, buoyed by expanding employment and rising wages. Negotiated wages keep on going up. "This is a very comforting sign because it means that wage increases, which have been quite significant in some core countries, are going to stay". Most significantly, "the labour market keeps on expanding but it is progressively getting tighter and tighter, and capacity utilisation rates in most countries are pretty high". Draghi went on to correct a common myth. The ECB's QE (and its end) does not in itself impact euro area sovereign credit spreads, and he gave a powerful illustration. Although the ECB has not bought Greek bonds but has bought Italian bonds, the spread between Greece and Italy has narrowed sharply (Chart I-2). Hence, the end of QE does not imply widening spreads. "We would expect spreads to depend only on perceptions of net issuance... if countries were having the same net issuance, you wouldn't see any change in spreads". Chart I-2The ECB Hasn't Bought Greek Bonds, Yet The Greece Versus Italy Sovereign Spread Has Narrowed Draghi also provided an important insight on the recent low-level game of chicken between EU institutions and the Italian government over its 2019 budget. Draghi explained that for Italy, escalating the game of chicken risks higher interest rates through the bond market's perceptions for net issuance. But paradoxically, this reduces the room to expand the budget. The weakened capital position of Italian banks from lower bond prices (Chart I-3) combined with deteriorating funding conditions squeezes bank credit, economic growth, and thereby the very space that is needed for fiscal expansion. The latest bank credit data show signs of this danger (Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Capital Position Of Italian Banks Is Weak... Chart I-4...And Italian Bank Credit Growth Has Faltered Meanwhile, for the EU, escalating the game of chicken risks financial market contagion to other so-called 'non-core' countries such as Spain. But so far, the sovereign yield spreads of the non-core countries indicate few signs of such danger (Chart I-5). Chart I-5No Major Contagion From Italy To Other Non-Core Countries... Yet Hence, at this stage in the low-level game of chicken, the onus to budge falls more on Italy than on the EU. Opining on his country of origin, Draghi says that in the end "it is just good common sense and perception of what is good for the country and the interests of the Italian people that will lead parties to converge to some sort of agreement". On the basis of Draghi's confidence, the long-term investment opportunity is the Italy versus Spain sovereign 10-year yield spread (Chart of the Week). At almost 200 bps, the spread is at its all-time widest, and incongruous with the vanishing gap between the non-performing loans ratios in Italy and Spain (Chart I-6). Still, for those interested in timing, our tactical stance is to wait for the 10-year BTP yield to move closer to 3 percent before buying Italian assets. Chart I-6Spain Fixed Its Banks In 2013, Italy Is Fixing Its Banks Now What's Wrong With The 2 Percent Inflation Target The second, and more profound, must-read is a Bloomberg op-ed by Paul Volcker, What's Wrong With The 2 Percent Inflation Target.2 To be fair, we have an ulterior motive as the Volcker op-ed repeats almost word for word a Special Report that we penned three years ago, Mission Impossible: 2 Percent Inflation, and its subsequent update last year.3 Of course, we are not implying that Volcker based his piece on ours. Rather that it is a great honour that a central banking colossus such as Volcker would endorse every heterodox argument that we made. The 2 percent inflation target is a relatively recent phenomenon, whose origin can be traced back to New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 (Chart I-7). But Volcker's (and our) overarching point is that in trying to manage an economy, "false precision can lead to dangerous policies". Price stability is that state in which expected changes in the general price level do not effectively alter business or household decisions (Chart I-8). However, it is ill-advised to define that state with a point target, such as 2 percent (Chart I-9). Chart I-7The 2 Percent Inflation Target Was Born In New Zealand In 1989 Chart I-8Excluding Wars, Britain Had Price Stability For Centuries Chart I-9Switzerland And Japan Have Had Price Stability For Decades Despite Not Achieving 2 Percent Inflation To paraphrase Volcker, a 2 percent target, or limit, is not in the textbooks; there is no theoretical justification; it is difficult to be both a target and a limit at the same time; and no price index can capture, down to a tenth or a quarter of a percent, the real change in consumer prices. Yet with economic growth robust and unemployment rates near historic lows, concerns are being voiced that consumer prices are growing too slowly - just because they are a quarter percent or so below the 2 percent target! Could that be a signal to delay restraint? That would be nonsense. The seeming numerical precision of 2 percent suggests that it is possible to fine-tune policy with more flexible targeting as conditions change. Unfortunately, the tools of monetary and fiscal policy simply do not permit that degree of precision. Another argument runs, let's keep a little inflation - even in a recession - as a kind of safeguard against deflation, and a backdoor way of keeping real interest rates negative. Borrowers will be enticed to borrow at zero or low interest rates, to invest before prices rise further. However, all these arguments seem to have little empirical support. Actual deflation is rare, yet the exaggerated fear of it can lead to policies that inadvertently increase the risk. Deflation is a threat posed by a critical breakdown of the financial system, so the real danger comes from encouraging extreme speculation and risk taking, in effect standing by while bubbles and excesses threaten financial markets (Chart 10). Previously, we wrote that "the single minded pursuit of 2 percent inflation creates risks and instabilities". Volcker issues a strikingly similar warning: "Ironically, the easy money, striving for a little inflation, as a means of forestalling deflation, could, in the end, be what brings it about". Chart I-10The Real Danger Comes From Bubbles And Financial Market Excesses Hence, the central banks whose interest rates remain at the zero bound - the BoJ, ECB, and Riksbank - are the ones whose policy is most dangerous and incongruous with their economic fundamentals. On this premise we hold three high conviction multi-year investment views: The yen will go up. The yield shortfall on German bunds versus U.S. T-bonds will compress. Swedish real estate prices will face strong headwinds. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2018/html/ecb.is181025.en.html. 2 https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-24/what-s-wrong-with-the-2-percent-inflation-target 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Mission Impossible: 2% Inflation' August 20, 2015 and Weekly Report 'Mission Impossible: 2% Inflation An Update' July 20, 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* Long Eurostoxx50 versus Nikkei225 achieved its 3.5% profit target and is now closed. There are no trades this week, leaving three open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model RECOMMENDATIONS Asset Allocation Equity Regional And Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond And Interest Rate Allocation Currency And Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Duration: Foreign economic growth continues to diverge negatively from growth in the United States. The resulting upward pressure on the U.S. dollar will eventually drag U.S. growth down, and could temporarily threaten the cyclical uptrend in Treasury yields. But so far there is no evidence that dollar strength is too much for the U.S. economy to handle. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration until signs of contagion are more apparent. Yield Curve: A reading of the macro drivers of the yield curve suggests that the slope of the curve will not steepen or flatten dramatically during the next 6-12 months. In this environment, trades that are long the belly of the curve and short a duration-matched barbell consisting of the short and long ends will profit, due to extremely attractive valuation. We currently recommend going long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell. Feature If investors were already worried about the impact of restrictive Fed policy on credit spreads and equities, the minutes from September's FOMC meeting - released last Wednesday - did nothing to calm their nerves. The minutes revealed that "a few participants expected that policy would need to become modestly restrictive for a time" while an additional "number" of participants "judged that it would be necessary to temporarily raise the federal funds rate above their assessments of its longer-run level." There is a small distinction between the "few" participants who expect that a fed funds rate above the estimated longer-run neutral level of 3% will be necessary because restrictive monetary policy will be warranted and the "number" of participants who think that the fed funds rate will move above 3% without policy turning restrictive. However, the main takeaway for investors should be that a large portion of the committee expects that rate hikes will continue until the fed funds rate is at least above 3%. In last week's report we explored the risk that higher yields lead to an excessive tightening of financial conditions and actually sow the seeds of their own decline.1 But we do not view that as the greatest threat to our recommended below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. The biggest risk to that view comes from the ongoing divergence between strong U.S. and weak foreign economic growth. No Contagion... Yet Chart 1 shows that, since 1993, every time our Global (ex. U.S.) Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has fallen below zero, the U.S. LEI has eventually followed. But while the Global (ex. U.S.) LEI has now been below zero for nine consecutive months, there is so far no evidence of contagion into the United States. The resilience of the U.S. economy probably explains why the September FOMC minutes only briefly mentioned the risk from weak foreign growth. Chart 1U.S. And Foreign Growth Continue To Diverge From the minutes:2 The divergence between domestic and foreign economic growth prospects and monetary policies was cited as presenting a downside risk because of the potential for further strengthening of the U.S. dollar... But: Participants generally agreed that risks to the outlook appeared roughly balanced. The concern is that, much like in the 2014-16 period, the divergence in growth between the U.S. and the rest of the world puts so much upward pressure on the dollar that it eventually drags U.S. growth and bond yields lower. But despite this year's 4.6% appreciation in the trade-weighted dollar, we have yet to see any impact on our Fed Monitor and Treasury yields remain in an uptrend (Chart 2). This suggests that we have not yet reached peak divergence between U.S. and foreign growth. Further divergence and dollar strength is necessary before the U.S. economy is negatively impacted. Chart 2More $ Strength Required The reason why the dollar's recent appreciation has not yet exerted a discernible impact on the U.S. economy might be because overall global GDP growth is on a more solid footing than it was in 2014-16 (Chart 3). The IMF forecasts that global GDP growth will be 3.7% in 2018 and 2019, compared to 3.5% in 2015. Meanwhile, the moderation in Eurozone growth represents a decline from lofty 2017 GDP growth of 2.4%. Even in emerging markets, where the global growth slowdown is most apparent, the IMF is still forecasting GDP growth of 4.7% for both 2018 and 2019, a far cry from the 4.3% seen in 2015 (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Global Growth Stronger Than 2014-16 Of course, IMF forecasts can always change, and they likely will be revised lower if current trends continue. However, the key point for bond investors is that the global economy is in much better shape than it was between 2014 and 2016. This means that non-U.S. growth needs to see further significant weakness before the uptrend in U.S. Treasury yields is threatened. Bottom Line: Foreign economic growth continues to diverge negatively from growth in the United States. The resulting upward pressure on the U.S. dollar will eventually drag U.S. growth down, and could temporarily threaten the cyclical uptrend in Treasury yields. But so far there is no evidence that dollar strength is too much for the U.S. economy to handle. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration until signs of contagion are more apparent. Can Uncertainty Steepen The Yield Curve? The yield curve has steepened somewhat during the past few weeks, the result of much higher yields at the long-end of the curve and short-end yields that have been roughly unchanged. We think Fed communication has been an important catalyst for this curve action. Specifically, the Fed's deliberate attempt to introduce uncertainty around its estimates of the neutral fed funds rate.3 Bond investors are finally getting the message that the Fed's median forecast of a 3% longer-run fed funds rate is not written in stone. Depending on the economic outlook, the funds rate could peak for the cycle at a level that is well above or below 3%. Given the recent spate of strong U.S. economic data, the market is starting to discount a peak that is above 3%, no matter what median forecast appears in the Fed's dots. This raises the question of whether a further un-anchoring of long-dated yields could occur. Is it possible that the yield curve will continue to steepen, even with the Fed lifting short rates at a gradual pace of 25 basis points per quarter? Below, we review a few different macro drivers of the yield curve and conclude that neither a large steepening nor large flattening is likely during the next 6-12 months. Nominal GDP Growth One useful rule-of-thumb for when monetary policy turns restrictive is when the 10-year Treasury yield exceeds the rate of growth in nominal GDP. In the past, a 10-year yield above the rate of growth in nominal GDP has coincided with downward pressure on core inflation (Chart 4). With that in mind, we note that nominal GDP has grown by 5.44% during the past year, by 3.98% (annualized) during the past two years and by 3.85% (annualized) during the past three years. Chart 410-Year Yield & Nominal GDP We discount the recent 5.44% growth rate because it was largely fueled by fiscal thrust that will fade in the coming quarters. This leaves us with a recent trend of 3.85% - 4% in nominal GDP growth. Even with no further deterioration in growth as the cycle matures, this puts an approximate cap on how high long-dated yields can rise before policy becomes restrictive and the cycle starts to turn. With the 10-year Treasury yield already at 3.19%, it can rise by between 66 bps and 81 bps before it reaches that range. If that adjustment were to occur very quickly, then the yield curve would steepen sharply and then re-flatten as the Fed lifted rates to catch up with the long end. Alternatively, if that adjustment were to occur over a period of 6-9 months, with the Fed hiking at a pace of 25 bps per quarter, the slope of the yield curve would be roughly unchanged. Wage Growth While nominal GDP growth is useful for thinking about long-maturity yields, wage growth correlates quite strongly with the slope of the yield curve itself. Specifically, rapid wage gains tend to coincide with curve flattening, and vice-versa. In fact, a typical cyclical pattern is that first the yield curve flattens and then wage growth accelerates to catch up with the curve (Chart 5). It would be highly unusual for the yield curve to steepen significantly while wage growth is rising, which it finally appears to be doing. Chart 5Higher Wage Growth = Flatter Curve We cannot completely rule out the possibility that stronger productivity growth actually causes unit labor costs to decelerate even as "top line" wage pressures mount. Unit labor costs are essentially the ratio of wages (compensation per hour) to productivity (output-per-hour), and the bottom panel of Chart 5 shows that a deceleration in unit labor costs could cause the yield curve to steepen. However, we note that there is not much precedent for strong productivity growth overwhelming an acceleration in wages, causing unit labor costs to diverge from other wage measures. For example, even as productivity growth strengthened in the 1990s, unit labor costs continued to rise alongside other measures of wage growth. Inflation Expectations We have frequently noted that inflation expectations embedded in long-dated Treasury yields remain too low compared to levels that are consistent with inflation being well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. It stands to reason that long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates could steepen the yield curve as they adjust higher. However, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 2.11%, only slightly below the range of 2.3% to 2.5% that has historically been consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations (Chart 6). In other words, the upside in long-dated breakevens is now fairly limited. In contrast, the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate stands at only 1.70%, still considerably below "well-anchored" levels (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 6More Upside In Short-Dated Breakevens Further, since the financial crisis, breakevens at both the short- and long-ends of the curve have been driven by trends in the actual inflation data (Chart 7). If it is rising realized inflation that has driven both the 2-year and 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rates higher this cycle, and the 2-year rate is further away from target than the 10-year rate, then it stands to reason that inflation expectations are more likely to exert flattening pressure on the nominal yield curve than steepening pressure. Chart 7Realized Inflation Is Driving Expectations Rate Volatility & The Term Premium One final macro driver that could steepen the yield curve would be a spike in interest rate volatility and an increase in the term premium at the long-end of the curve. Our prior research has shown that implied interest rate volatility is linked to uncertainty about the macro environment, and Chart 8 shows that the MOVE index of implied interest rate volatility has tended to track the dispersion of individual forecasts of 3-month T-bill rates and GDP growth. In this context, it should not be surprising that implied volatility fell to very low levels when interest rates were pinned at zero and not expected to move for an extended period. Chart 8Macro Uncertainty & Rate Volatility But, as was mentioned above, the Fed has been trying scale back its forward guidance and inject some uncertainty into the market. Indeed, we think this is one reason why the yield curve steepened and rate volatility increased during the past few weeks. Taking a broader view, we also observe that, historically, macro uncertainty and implied interest rate volatility have tended to fall when the Fed is hiking rates, only spiking once monetary policy becomes restrictive and the economic recovery is threatened. The yield curve is typically inverted by that point. This leaves us to conclude that some further increase in interest rate volatility from exceptionally low levels is possible, but a large spike is unlikely until monetary policy becomes restrictive. Investment Implications A survey of the macro drivers of the yield curve leaves us to conclude that the most likely outcome for the next 6-12 months is that the slope of the curve remains close to its current level, meaning that the curve undergoes a roughly parallel upward shift as the Fed continues to lift rates. However, if nominal GDP growth fails to decelerate from its current 5.44% clip, it is possible that the yield curve steepens first and then flattens as the Fed lifts rates more quickly to catch up. This is not the most likely outcome, but rather a risk to our base case scenario. The final piece of the puzzle is the observation that curve steepener trades continue to look attractively priced. Our current recommendation is to favor the 7-year bullet over a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 1-year and 20-year notes. This trade offers a spread of +8 bps above the reading from our fair value model (Chart 9). Or alternatively, our model shows that the 1/7/20 butterfly spread is currently priced for 29 bps of 1/20 curve flattening during the next six months (Chart 9, bottom panel). Chart 9Curve Steepeners Are Still Attractive That much curve flattening is highly unlikely in the current macro environment, and we continue to recommend curve steepener trades to profit from an unchanged yield curve during the next six months. Bottom Line: A reading of the macro drivers of the yield curve suggests that the slope of the curve will not steepen or flatten dramatically during the next 6-12 months. In this environment, trades that are long the belly of the curve and short a duration-matched barbell consisting of the short and long ends will profit, due to extremely attractive valuation. We currently recommend going long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rate Shock", dated October 16, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20180926.pdf 3Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty", dated June 19, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
The Fed is still trying to nudge realized and expected inflation higher, but its bias could turn on a dime. Force-feeding sizable fiscal stimulus to an economy already operating at full capacity is a recipe for fueling inflationary pressures. The Fed's 2%…
Highlights Duration: Our Fed Policy Loop provides a framework for understanding last week's equity market correction and its implications for future Fed policy. So far, the equity sell-off is not severe enough to deter the Fed. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Credit: With the Fed lifting rates and the market still not priced for the likely pace of hikes, it is highly likely that we will witness further periods where corporate spreads and Treasury yields rise in unison. We recommend steps investors can take to insulate their portfolios from this risk. Inflation: The macroeconomic environment remains highly inflationary. The unemployment rate is very low and wage growth is rising. However, recent trends suggest that the year-over-year growth rate in core CPI will stay close to its current level, near the Fed's target, for the next six months. This will not alter the Fed's "gradual" +25 bps per quarter rate hike pace. Feature Chart 1The Second Rate Shock Of 2018 Last week's equity market rout was the second time this year that stocks reacted negatively to a sharp rise in bond yields (Chart 1). As was the case in February, our Fed Policy Loop remains the appropriate framework for understanding the relationship between bond yields and the stock market (Chart 2).1 It can be explained as follows: Chart 2The Fed Policy Loop Step 1: The perception of easy Fed policy fuels strong performance in the stock market. Rising stock prices and "easing financial conditions" cause economic growth to strengthen and sow the seeds of inflation. Step 2: Equity investors catch a whiff of inflation and start to price-in a more restrictive monetary environment. This leads to a stock market correction. Step 3: Falling stock prices and "tightening financial conditions" cause the Fed to downgrade its economic outlook and adopt a more dovish policy stance. Return To Step 1. The Equity Correction For Bond Investors At this juncture, the important question for bond investors is whether financial conditions have tightened enough to prompt a slower pace of rate hikes from the Fed. If so, then it might be appropriate to buy the dip in the bond market. We think such a move would be premature, for two reasons. First, the increase in bond yields that spooked the equity market was concentrated at the long-end of the curve and was fueled by Fed Chairman Powell's comment that the funds rate is "a long way from neutral." A steeper yield curve offsets some of the financial conditions tightening caused by falling stock prices (Chart 3). This is because it signals that monetary policy is becoming more accommodative - the fed funds rate is further below neutral than previously thought. This intuition is confirmed by the bounce in gold, a move that often coincides with an upward rerating of the neutral fed funds rate.2 Chart 3Steeper Curve Will Reassure The Fed Second, the amount of financial market pain that the Fed can tolerate depends on the economic environment. Our Fed Monitor is an indicator that is designed to signal whether the Fed should be hiking or cutting interest rates (Chart 4). It consists of 44 variables that can be grouped into three categories: Chart 4The BCA Fed Monitor Economic growth indicators (Chart 4, panel 3). Inflation indicators (Chart 4, panel 4). Financial conditions indicators (Chart 4, bottom panel). The overall Fed Monitor is currently deep in positive territory, signaling that rate hikes are appropriate. This is true despite the fact that the financial conditions component of the monitor has been falling (tightening) since the beginning of the year. Last week's equity market drop will not be reflected in the indicator until the end of the month, so further downside in the financial conditions component is forthcoming. But so far, tighter financial conditions have barely made a dent in the overall Fed Monitor because they have been offset by rising economic growth and stronger inflation. The conclusion is that the Fed is able to tolerate more market pain when growth is strong and inflation is high. Viewed through this lens, it is clear that a lot more market pain is required before the Fed backs away from its +25 bps per quarter rate hike pace. In fact, the Fed likely views some tightening of financial conditions as desirable, as long as the tightening doesn't severely impede the economic outlook. Just last week New York Fed President John Williams said: Normalization of the monetary policy, I think, has the added benefit of reducing somewhat, on the margin, some of the risk of imbalances in financial markets.3 While a few weeks ago, Fed Governor Lael Brainard noted: The past few times unemployment fell to levels as low as those projected over the next year, signs of overheating showed up in financial-sector imbalances rather than in accelerating inflation.4 In other words, the Fed is increasingly cognizant of the fact that higher interest rates might be necessary to prevent excessive risk-taking in financial markets, even if inflation stays well contained near target. Unless financial conditions tighten so much that they cause the reading from our Fed Monitor to hook down, the Fed will be inclined to view the market correction as healthy. It is also important to note that while a large increase in long-maturity Treasury yields prompted last week's stock market action, the short-end of the yield curve didn't move much at all. In fact, overnight index swap forwards show that the market is just barely priced for three rate hikes during the next 12 months. According to our golden rule of bond investing, if you expect the Fed to lift rates by more than what is priced in for the next 12 months, you should keep portfolio duration low.5 Bottom Line: Last week's equity market sell-off is not enough to prompt the Fed to back away from its +25 bps per quarter rate hike pace. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. On The Correlation Between Yields And Spreads It wasn't just the stock market that struggled to digest higher Treasury yields last week. Corporate bond spreads also widened, particularly in the high-yield credit tiers (Chart 5). As with equities, this is the second time in 2018 that credit spreads widened sharply alongside higher Treasury yields. Chart 5Credit Also Struggling With Higher Rates Credit spreads and Treasury yields tend to be negatively correlated, a feature that benefits bond investors by reducing the volatility in corporate bond yields and total returns. But, as evidenced by last week's price moves, the correlation does occasionally turn positive. This is particularly damaging during sell-offs when both the rate and spread components of corporate bond yields rise. Chart 6 shows the frequency of negative and positive yield/spread correlations since 1994, using 3-month investment horizons. It shows that yields and spreads were negatively correlated in 64% of 3-month periods. Yields fell alongside tighter spreads in 23% of cases, while yields and spreads rose together only 13% of the time. Chart 6The Correlation Between Yields And Spreads Is Typically Negative Since those periods when both yields and spreads rise in unison are particularly damaging for bond investors, it is worth exploring them in more detail. Table 1 lists all 13 quarters since 1994 when junk spreads and duration-matched Treasury yields rose together. Using the logic of our Fed Policy Loop, we also identify three risk factors that might be associated with those periods. The main idea being that yields and spreads are likely to rise together in periods when the market starts to price-in much more restrictive monetary policy, and an earlier end to the economic recovery. The three risk factors we identify are: Table 1Periods When Both Treasury Yields And Junk Spreads Rose Since 1994 Whether the Fed raised interest rates during the investment horizon. Whether our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter increased during the investment horizon, meaning that the market priced-in a more aggressive near-term rate hike path. Whether the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose during the investment horizon. Higher long-dated inflation expectations could cause the Fed to respond with a more restrictive monetary policy. The single most important risk factor is whether the Fed raised rates during the investment horizon. Nine of the 13 episodes coincided with a Fed rate hike, and three of the four episodes that didn't coincide with a rate hike occurred between Q2 2013 and Q4 2015. The fed funds rate was pinned at zero during that period, but the Fed was starting to turn hawkish by backing away from QE and preparing for liftoff. This leaves the second quarter of 2007 as the only true outlier. The Fed did not lift rates during this period, but it is clear that markets were spooked by overly restrictive Fed policy all the same. The 2/10 Treasury slope was only 7 bps at the start of the quarter, signaling that monetary policy was already quite restrictive. Meanwhile, long-dated inflation expectations rose during the quarter and the market went from discounting 60 bps of rate cuts during the next 12 months to only 17 bps. An inflationary shock when monetary policy is already restrictive is an environment where yields and spreads are very likely to rise at the same time. An upward move in our 12-month discounter is also associated with periods of rising yields and spreads in 9 out of 13 cases. This risk factor didn't work in Q4 2005 or Q2 2006, but once again it is quite clear that markets were spooked by overly restrictive monetary policy in those periods. The yield curve was inverted in both of those quarters, and the Fed lifted rates despite an inverted yield curve. That combination sends a clear signal to markets that the Fed is trying to choke off the recovery. The 12-month discounter also failed to send the correct signal in Q3 1999 and Q2 2000. In those cases the culprit appears to be a large jump in long-dated inflation expectations while the Fed was in the midst of a rate hike cycle. Since rate hikes should dampen inflation, rising inflation expectations suggest that rate hikes might need to speed up. Thinking about the current environment, we are very much in the danger zone where yields and spreads could rise at the same time. The Fed is in the midst of a rate hike cycle and the market is still not priced for quarterly rate hikes to continue for the next 12 months. Finally, long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates are almost back to the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with "well-anchored" inflation expectations (Chart 7). The higher long-dated breakevens get, the more likely it is that the Fed will respond forcefully to further increases. Chart 7Almost Re-Anchored With all three of our risk factors present, it is highly likely that we will see more episodes where credit spreads widen and Treasury yields rise. The risk will only dissipate once the full extent of the Fed's rate hike cycle is reflected in the Treasury curve, but we are not there yet. While this is not a great environment for bond investors, there are steps investors can take to limit the damage from periods of rising spreads and yields. First, investors should maintain portfolio duration at below-benchmark. Second, while it is too early in the cycle to completely abandon credit, a more defensive posture is advisable. We recommend only a neutral allocation to spread product, focused on the higher-quality credit tiers.6 To the extent possible, investors should also seek to focus their spread exposure at the long-end of the maturity spectrum, while also limiting overall portfolio duration by favoring the short-end of the Treasury curve.7 Inflation Uptrend On Hold Lost in the shuffle amidst last week's market turmoil, the consumer price index (CPI) for September was released and it delivered a soft month-over-month print for the second month in a row. The top panel of Chart 8 shows that the year-over-year trend in core CPI rose rapidly earlier in the year, but now appears to be leveling off. We do not envision a meaningful deceleration in core CPI, but it seems likely that the year-over-year rate of change will stay near current levels for the next six months. Chart 8Core Inflation & Pipeline Pressures Our Pipeline Inflation Indicator remains consistent with rising inflationary pressures in the economy, but it has softened of late. This is mostly due to weaker commodity prices (Chart 8, bottom panel). Further, our Base Effects Indicator - based on rates of change in the core CPI that have already been realized - is now consistent with a lower year-over-year core CPI growth rate six months from now (Chart 9).8 Chart 9Expect Year-Over-Year Core CPI To Flatten-Off, Or Even Decline Looking at the main components of core CPI, the last two monthly prints have been dragged down by the core goods component, with most of the weakness in apparel and used vehicles (Chart 10). This could reverse in the near-term as core goods prices catch up with import prices, which have been rising for some time. However, non-oil import prices have decelerated recently, on the back of a stronger dollar. In other words, any near-term increase in core goods inflation will probably not last very long. Chart 10Core CPI Components The core services excluding shelter component continues to have the most potential upside, since it is highly geared to rising wage growth. Shelter inflation, the largest component of core CPI, has been flat for some time and our models suggest this will continue to be the case for the next six months. Bottom Line: The macroeconomic environment remains highly inflationary. The unemployment rate is very low and wage growth is rising. However, recent trends suggest that the year-over-year growth rate in core CPI will stay close to its current level, near the Fed's target, for the next six months. This will not alter the Fed's "gradual" +25 bps per quarter rate hike pace. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On The MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "A Signal From Gold?" dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-10/williams-says-fed-rate-hikes-helping-curb-financial-risk-taking 4https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20180912a.htm 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty," dated June 19, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Out Of Sync," dated July 3, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Powell Doctrine Emerges," dated September 4, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Asset allocation: Go long industrial commodities versus equities on a 6-month horizon. If an inflationary impulse is dominating, beaten-down industrial commodities have more upside than richly valued equities; and if a disinflationary impulse is dominating, its main casualty will be equities. Currencies: Take profits on long EUR/CNY. Maintain a broadly neutral stance to EUR, with short EUR/JPY counterbalancing long EUR/USD. Equity sectors: overweight basic materials versus the market. And within the basic materials sector, overweight basic resources versus chemicals. Chart of the WeekChina's 6-Month Credit Impulse Provides A Perfect Explanation For Commodity Inflation Feature Equity markets are entering the crossfire between two opposing forces: an inflationary impulse coming from the global economy; and a disinflationary impulse as higher bond yields threaten to deflate the very rich valuations of equities and other risk-assets. As this battle plays out in the coming months a good strategy is to go long commodities versus equities. The logic is simple: if the inflationary impulse from the economy is dominating, then beaten-down industrial commodities have more upside than richly valued equities; and if the disinflationary impulse from higher bond yields is dominating, then commodities have less downside than equities, because commodities have a much weaker valuation link with bond yields. Therefore, going long industrial commodities versus equities on a 6-month horizon should be a good strategy however the battle between inflationary and disinflationary impulses plays out. Inflationary Impulse Battles Disinflationary Impulse Chart I-2 shows the credit impulse oscillations in the euro area, U.S., and China since the start of the millennium, all expressed in dollars to allow a comparison between the three major economies. It is a fascinating chart because the change in the dominant oscillation - the one with the highest amplitude - perfectly illustrates the shift in global economic power and influence from Europe and the U.S. to China. Chart I-2The Shift In Economic Power From Europe And The U.S. To China Through 2000-08 the impulses in the euro area and the U.S. dominated. But during the global financial crisis that all changed: the credit stimulus from China dwarfed the responses from the western economies. Then through 2009-12 the impulse oscillations from the three major economies were briefly the same size, before China took on the undisputed mantle of dominant impulse, which it has held consistently since 2013. The world's three major economies are now all in 'up' oscillations according to their credit impulses. This means the global economy will experience an inflationary impulse for the next couple of quarters or so. However, battling the inflationary impulse is a disinflationary impulse. As the inflationary impulse pushes up bond yields, it threatens to deflate the very rich valuations of equities (and other risk-assets). Crucially, this disinflationary force is particularly vicious when bond yields are rising from ultra-low levels. We have described this dynamic exhaustively in previous reports, so we will not go into the detail here. But in a nutshell, both parts of an equity's required return - the risk-free component and the risk premium - go up together when bond yields are rising from ultra-low levels. Meaning that rising yields deflate equity valuations exponentially (Chart I-3).1 Chart I-3At Low Bond Yields The Valuation Of Equities Changes Exponentially But Which Inflationary Impulse? At our recent investment conference in Toronto, the three speakers on the China panel gave three different conclusions on China: aggressively bullish, moderately bullish, and bearish! The aggressive bull pointed out that the 3-month credit impulse has gone vertical (Chart I-4); the moderate bull pointed out that the 6-month credit impulse appears to be turning up (Chart I-5); while the bearish argument was that the level of the 12-month credit and fiscal impulse remains depressed. Chart I-4The 3-Month Impulse Is Up Sharply... Chart I-5But The 6-Month Impulse Is Just Turning So which narrative should we use? The answer is the one that provides the best explanatory power for the cycles that we actually observe in the economic and financial market data. As we described in our Special Report The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles, the theory and evidence powerfully identifies the 6-month credit impulse as the one with the best explanatory power for the oscillations that we actually observe in the economy and markets - because the 6-month period aligns most closely with the lag between credit demand and credit supply.2 In any case, as we use the 6-month impulse to powerful effect in Europe, consistency demands that we must use the 6-month impulses in U.S. and China too. For the sceptics, the Chart of the Week should finally obliterate any lingering doubts. China's 6-month impulse gives a spookily perfect explanation for the industrial commodity inflation cycle. The important takeaway right now is that if the 6-month impulse is turning up, so will industrial commodity inflation. What Does All Of This Mean For Investors? This brings us to our central message. As we have just seen, an up-oscillation in 6-month impulses, especially in China, will lift industrial commodity inflation. But it will likely have a much smaller influence on developed market equities which, in these circumstances, will be under the strong constraining spell of higher bond yields. On this basis the asset allocation recommendation is to go long industrial commodities versus equities on a 6-month horizon (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Go Long Commodities Vs. Equities Interestingly, technical analysis also supports this recommendation over the next three months or so. Our tried and tested measure of excessive trending and groupthink suggests that the recent underperformance of industrial commodities relative to developed market equities is extreme and at a point which indicates a countertrend move, or at least a trend exhaustion (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Underperformance Of Industrial Commodities Is Technically Stretched For currencies, the foregoing analysis and charts means it is time to take profits in our long position in the euro versus the Chinese yuan. This leaves us with a broadly neutral exposure to the euro, with a short position versus the yen counterbalancing a long position versus the dollar. As for European equities, many years ago they were a pure play on events in Europe. Today, this might still be true for European 'tail-events' such as the euro sovereign debt crisis, or a potential 'no deal' Brexit. However, for the most part, European equity markets are tightly integrated with global equity markets - at least in direction if not level. Given that industrial commodity inflation takes its cue from the 6-month credit impulse - especially in China - it is hardly surprising that the European basic materials sector follows exactly the same cycle, both in absolute terms (Chart I-8) and relative to the broader equity market (Chart I-9). Therefore the equity sector recommendation is to overweight basic materials versus the market. Chart I-8China's 6-Month Credit Impulse Drives Europe's Basic Material Equities In Absolute Terms... Chart I-9...And In Relative Terms Interestingly, there is also a play within the basic materials sector. The basic resources sector which represents the miners and extractors of raw materials should fare better than the chemicals sector which uses these raw materials as an input (Chart I-10). Hence, overweight basic resources versus chemicals. Chart I-10Overweight Basic Resources Vs. Chemicals Readers may argue that most of the foregoing charts illustrate the same cycle. But that's precisely the point! Never forget that financial markets follow the Pareto principle: the most important 20 percent of analysis explains 80 percent of the moves across all asset classes across all geographies across all times. The key to successful investing is to find the most important 20 percent of analysis. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Reports 'Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?' September 13, 2018 and 'The Rule Of 4 For Equities And Bonds' August 2, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* It was a busy week for our trades. Long basic resources versus chemicals achieved its profit target, but short U.S. telecom versus U.S. autos hit its stop-loss. Meanwhile, short trade-weighted dollar reached the end of its 65 day holding period broadly flat. All three trades are now closed. In line with the main body of the report, this week's trade recommendation is to go long industrial commodities (represented by the CRB industrials index) versus equities (represented by the MSCI World Index in USD). The profit target is 2% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Duration: The housing market is the key channel through which monetary policy impacts the economy. As such, it is unlikely that Treasury yields will peak until housing shows meaningful weakness. While residential investment has decelerated in recent quarters, we expect this weakness will prove temporary and that Treasury yields have further cyclical upside. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Yield Curve: The Fed will maintain its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace for the time being, but could be forced to pause next year if weak foreign growth migrates to the U.S. via a stronger dollar. We recommend hedging this risk via a long position in the 7-year bullet versus a short position in the 1/20 barbell. Corporate Health: Strong profit growth - both organic and as a result of corporate tax cuts - has led to a significant improvement in corporate balance sheet health during the past few quarters. This improvement will not persist for much longer. We recommend only a neutral allocation to corporate bonds, both investment grade and junk. Feature This time last week the 10-year Treasury yield was bumping up against 3% and money markets were on the cusp of discounting an extra rate hike between now and the end of 2019. Both resistance levels broke during the past seven days. The 10-year yield is now 3.07% and the January 2020 fed funds futures contract is fully priced for four rate hikes (Chart 1). Chart 1Past Resistance Levels With the 10-year yield back above 3%, many investors are once again speculating about where it will ultimately peak for the cycle. Any answer to this question relies on an assumption about the neutral fed funds rate, the level of interest rates above which monetary policy turns restrictive and acts to slow economic growth and inflation. In past reports we have suggested several measures investors can track to help decide whether interest rates are close to breaking above neutral.1 In this week's report we focus on one particularly important indicator - the housing market. In his essential 2007 paper "Housing Is The Business Cycle", Edward Leamer notes that of the ten post-WWII U.S. recessions, eight were preceded by a significant slowdown in residential investment.2 Given that recessions are also typically preceded by tightening monetary policy, it is not a stretch to connect the two. In fact, there is good reason to believe that housing is the main channel through which monetary policy impacts the economy. Since leverage is employed in the acquisition of new homes, interest rates impact the cost of homeownership more directly than other assets. A similar claim could be made about leveraged investment from the corporate sector, but business investment is also beholden to swings in expected future demand. Households can easily postpone the acquisition of a new home if the interest rate environment makes it uneconomical, businesses need to act when the market demands it. But most importantly, Leamer's paper demonstrates that, unlike residential investment, weaker business investment does not consistently provide advance warning of recession. The State Of U.S. Housing Turning to the data, we see that Leamer's claim is validated by the top panel of Chart 2. Residential investment tends to decline in the year preceding a U.S. recession. Housing starts and new home sales display a similar pattern (Chart 2, panels 2 & 3). Chart 2The Housing Market Predicts Recessions What's worrying is that residential investment has barely grown at all during the past year (Chart 2, bottom panel). If this weakness continues it would signal that interest rates are too high for the housing market, and that we are likely very close to the cyclical peak in bond yields. However, we doubt the current weakness will persist. For one, the recent decline in construction activity has been concentrated in the multi-family sector while single-family construction continues to expand at a steady rate (Chart 3). This could simply reflect a shift in demand away from multi-family toward single-family, reversing the trend witnessed between 2010 and 2012. It's possible that some households who were forced into the rental market in the aftermath of the Great Recession now find themselves able to switch back. But even if we focus on the multi-family sector exclusively, there is little reason to believe that construction will see significantly more downside. The rental vacancy rate remains very low, and the National Multi Housing Council's Survey of Apartment Market Conditions suggests that there is no strong upward or downward pressure on the vacancy rate at the moment (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). The fact that single-family housing starts have not declined casts some doubt on the notion that higher mortgage rates are to blame for the deceleration in residential investment. This is further borne out by the fact that, while higher mortgage rates have certainly increased the cost of homeownership, mortgage payments as a percent of median income are not stretched compared to history (Chart 4). The demand back-drop for housing also remains robust, with household formation in a clear uptrend (Chart 4, panel 2) and homebuilders as optimistic as ever about future sales activity (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3A Temporary Weakness In Residential Investment Chart 4Higher Mortgage Rates Are Not The Culprit We conclude that interest rates are still too low to meaningfully impact the housing market. Residential investment will re-accelerate in the coming quarters and Treasury yields have plenty of room to rise before reaching their cyclical peak. Bottom Line: The housing market is the key channel through which monetary policy impacts the economy. As such, it is unlikely that Treasury yields will peak until housing shows meaningful weakness. While residential investment has decelerated in recent quarters, we expect this weakness will prove temporary and that Treasury yields have further cyclical upside. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Hedging Weak Foreign Growth With Steepeners The resilience of the U.S. housing market makes it likely that interest rates will continue to rise for quite some time. However, this does not preclude weak foreign growth - and the resultant dollar strength - from forcing the Fed to slow its 25 basis point per quarter rate hike pace at some point during the next 6-12 months. In fact, we have flagged in recent reports that, since 1993, every time the Global (ex. U.S.) Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has fallen below zero, the U.S. LEI has eventually followed (Chart 5).3 Unless foreign growth suddenly recovers, it is quite likely that dollar strength will drag the U.S. LEI lower in the first half of next year. At that point, the Fed may be forced to pause its rate hike cycle in order to take some shine off the dollar, allowing the recovery to continue. Chart 5Weak Global Growth Could Bring Down The U.S. Drops in the U.S. LEI to below zero almost always coincide with a recommendation for easier monetary policy from our Fed Monitor (Chart 5, bottom panel). Although one notable exception did occur in 2005. An examination of the three components of our Fed Monitor reveals that a falling LEI caused the economic growth component of our monitor to decline in 2005 (Chart 6). However, this was offset by an elevated inflation component and extremely easy financial conditions (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels). Chart 6The Three Components Of Our Fed Monitor As in 2005, inflation pressures are once again elevated and financial conditions remain accommodative. It follows that it could take a significant deterioration in economic growth before the Fed is forced to pause its 25 bps per quarter rate hike cycle, one that is not yet evident in the data. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the risk that weak foreign growth will infiltrate the U.S. via a stronger dollar, forcing the Fed to pause. With only two 25 basis point rate hikes currently discounted for 2019, some pause is already in the price. This makes us reluctant to advocate shifting away from below-benchmark portfolio duration. We think a better way to hedge the risk of a Fed pause is through yield curve steepeners. Since short-dated yields are more heavily influenced by the expected near-term pace of rate hikes than long-dated yields, any Fed pause will cause the yield curve to steepen. Steepeners are also very attractively priced at the moment, meaning that they should even perform well in a mild curve flattening environment.4 Our preferred method for implementing a curve steepener is to go long a bullet maturity near the middle of the curve and short a duration-matched barbell consisting of the very short and very long ends of the curve.5 With that in mind, we can determine the best yield curve trade to implement by answering the following two questions: Which bullet over barbell combination offers the most attractive value? Which bullet over barbell combination is most likely to outperform in the "Fed pause" scenario we are trying to hedge? In response to the first question, we consider the 2-year, 3-year, 5-year and 7-year bullet maturities all relative to a duration-matched 1/20 barbell. All of those butterfly spreads offer approximately the same yield pick-up (Chart 7). They also all offer approximately the same yield pick-up relative to our fair value models, which are based on regressions of the butterfly spread versus the 1/20 slope of the curve (Chart 8).6 To answer the second question, we try to identify which of the 2-year, 3-year, 5-year or 7-year yields is likely to decline the most in response to the market pricing-in a pause in Fed rate hikes. To do this we look at the historical correlations between different yield curve slopes and our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter - the change in the fed funds rate that is priced into the market for the next 12 months. The correlations are displayed in Chart 9, and they show that monthly changes in the 7/10 slope are almost always negatively correlated with monthly changes in the 12-month discounter. In other words, when the discounter falls, the 7-year yield falls by more than the 10-year yield. Chart 7Different Bullets, Similar Yield Pick-Up I Chart 8Different Bullets, Similar Yield Pick-Up II Chart 9Hedging The "Fed Pause" Scenario Monthly changes in the 5/7 slope are also usually negatively correlated with changes in the discounter, though the correlation has been closer to zero in recent years. This makes it difficult to say with certainty whether the 5-year or 7-year yield would fall by more in response to a decline in the discounter. Chart 9 also shows that changes in both the 2/3 and 3/5 slopes are positively correlated with changes in the 12-month discounter. This means that when the discounter falls, the 3-year yield falls by more than the 2-year yield and the 5-year yield falls by more than the 3-year yield. In general, we can safely conclude that the 5-year and 7-year bullets are better hedges against a Fed pause than the 2-year or 3-year bullets. The 7-year in particular appears to be a safe bet. Given that the differences in valuation between the different options are miniscule, we are inclined to maintain our current yield curve position: long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell. This week we also close our recommendation to favor the 5/30 barbell over the 10-year bullet for a small loss of 2 bps. This trade was designed to hedge the risk of Fed overtightening leading to an inverted yield curve. This trade would underperform in the event of a Fed pause, which we now view as the greater risk. Bottom Line: The Fed will maintain its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace for the time being, but could be forced to pause next year if weak foreign growth migrates to the U.S. via a stronger dollar. We recommend hedging this risk via a long position in the 7-year bullet versus a short position in the 1/20 barbell. Corporate Balance Sheet Reprieve Last week's release of the second quarter U.S. Financial Accounts (formerly Flow of Funds) allows us to update our indicators of nonfinancial corporate balance sheet health. Overall, there has been a significant improvement in our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) since the end of 2016. It has fallen from deep in "deteriorating health" territory to close to the "improving health" zone (Chart 10). By far, the biggest driver of the CHM's improvement has been the sharp increase in after-tax cash flows (Chart 10, panel 2). This is partly due to the recent corporate tax cuts, but also reflects a significant rebound in pre-tax cash flows (Chart 10, bottom panel). Despite the rebound in profits, we remain cautious on the outlook for corporate balance sheets going forward. First, our bottom-up samples of firms included in the investment grade and high-yield Bloomberg Barclays bond indexes both show that the median firm's net debt-to-EBITDA has improved in recent quarters, but remains elevated compared to history (Chart 11). Chart 10After-Tax Cash Flows Drive CHM Improvement Chart 11Debt Levels Still High Second, we see increasing headwinds to profit growth going forward. The positive impact from tax cuts is set to wane, while the stronger dollar and faster wage growth will both weigh on pre-tax profits during the next year.7 It is important to note that it will not take much deceleration in pre-tax profits for corporate balance sheets to worsen. Our measure of gross leverage - total debt over pre-tax profits - has only managed to flatten-off during the past few quarters, even as profit growth has surged. This means that the rapid gains in profits have only managed to keep pace with the rate of debt growth. Even a small deceleration in profits will cause leverage to rise, and rising leverage tends to occur alongside an increasing default rate (Chart 12). Chart 12Gross Leverage And Corporate Defaults Bottom Line: Strong profit growth - both organic and as a result of corporate tax cuts - has led to a significant improvement in corporate balance sheet health during the past few quarters. This improvement will not persist for much longer. We recommend only a neutral allocation to corporate bonds, both investment grade and junk. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The Two-Stage Treasury Bear", dated August 14, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2http://www.nber.org/papers/w13428 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Playing Catch-Up", dated September 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresesarch.com 5 For further details on why we prefer this trade construction, please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 We calculate the butterfly spread as: the bullet yield minus the yield of the duration-matched barbell. 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights The U.S. dollar is likely to correct further over the coming weeks. The CAD should benefit as it is cheap and oversold, and the inflationary back-drop warrants tighter monetary conditions. This will be a bear market rally, not the ultimate trough for the loonie. EUR/SEK should correct as the Riksbank will start tightening policy in December; a pause in the global growth slowdown should also give the cheap SEK a welcome boost. Cheap long-term valuations will not help the yen in the coming weeks; instead, falling Japanese inflation expectations and growing investor expectations of Chinese stimulus will weigh on the JPY. A better opportunity to buy the yen on its crosses will emerge later this year. EUR/CHF has upside over the coming months; the swissie needs additional global growth weakness to rally further. This is unlikely to happen for a few months. Feature Chart I-1DXY Correction Has Further To Run By the middle of the summer, the dollar had hit massively overbought levels, which left it vulnerable to any signs of stabilization in global growth, especially if some key U.S. activity gauges began to soften (Chart I-1). This is exactly what is transpiring. As we highlighted last week, BCA's Global LEI Diffusion Index is rebounding, EM and Japanese exports are stabilizing and U.S. core inflation and building permits have disappointed. This bifurcation in the data suggests the dollar has more room to correct, as neither our Capitulation Index nor our Intermediate-Term Technical Indicator have hit technically oversold levels. Last week we also argued that this correction in the dollar is likely to prove a temporary reprieve, but that in the interim the euro and the Australian dollar were well placed to experience significant rebounds.1 This week, we explore if the same case can be built for the Canadian dollar, the Swedish krona, the yen and the Swiss Franc. CAD: The Bank of Canada Will Proceed Cautiously The first half of 2018 has not been kind to the Canadian dollar. A rout in EM assets, signs of softening global growth and tough rhetoric from the White House on trade generally and NAFTA and Canada in particular have conspired to create fertile grounds for loonie-selling. Since the end of June, the CAD has managed to regain some composure, rallying by 3.3% against the USD. Essentially, much bad news has been embedded in this currency, which now trades at a significant discount to BCA's estimate of its short-term fair value (Chart I-2). Moreover, speculators, who had been aggressively buying the CAD at the end of 2017, now hold large short positions in the currency (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This combination is now resulting in a situation where any pause in the USD's strength is being mirrored in CAD strength. Can this rebound continue? Canadian economic data sends a murky message. Canadian real GDP growth had overtaken that of the U.S., peaking at 3.6% in February last year. However, it is now below U.S. growth (Chart I-3). Canadian consumers have been the main source of the slowdown as Canadian capex growth is in line with the U.S. and the Trudeau government has been spending generously. Can this rebound continue? Canadian economic data sends a murky message. Canadian real GDP growth had overtaken that of the U.S., peaking at 3.6% in February last year. However, it is now below U.S. growth (Chart I-3). Canadian consumers have been the main source of the slowdown as Canadian capex growth is in line with the U.S. and the Trudeau government has been spending generously. Chart I-2No One Is Going Crazy For The Loonie Chart I-3Canada: Growth Picture Is Mixed The weakness in Canadian consumption partly reflects the underperformance of Canadian employment relative to the U.S. However, the slowdown in house prices has played a bigger role (Chart I-4). Canadian households are burdened by a debt load of 170% of disposable income. Now that mortgage rates are rising, Canadians are spending more than 14% of their disposable income servicing their debt, a burden last experienced in 2008 when mortgage rates were 220 basis points higher. Without the benefit of rapidly rising real estate assets, it is much more difficult for Canadian retail sales to grow at an 8.7% annual rate as they did three quarters ago. Despite these weaknesses, it is hard to justify that Canadian monetary conditions - as approximated by the slope of the yield curve, the level of real rates, and the trade-weighted CAD - should be as easy as they are today (Chart I-5). This is even truer when we take into account Canadian inflationary conditions. Chart I-4Canadian Consumers Have A Problem Chart I-5Canadian Monetary Conditons Are Very Easy The three inflation gauges targeted by the Bank of Canada stand between 1% and 3%, or at its objective. This means that the BoC's 1.5% policy rate is negative in real terms. Moreover, this inflationary pressure is unlikely to abate. The BoC estimates that the output gap has closed, and companies are running into growing capacity constraints (Chart I-6, top panel). Despite a correction last month, wages are in an uptrend, powered by growing and severe labor shortages (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Thanks to these conditions, we anticipate that the BoC will track the pace of rate increases by the Federal Reserve over the next 12 months. This is not very different from what is currently priced into Canadian money markets. Chart I-6Canadian Capacity Pressures Point To A Hawkish ##br##BoC Inflation Will Force The BoC's Hand If the BoC does not disappoint, the combination of a cheap and oversold CAD should help the loonie rally against the USD, so long as the current stabilization in global growth continues. A move toward USD/CAD 1.26 is likely. The biggest risk to this view is that trade negotiations between the U.S. and Canada deteriorate further. While we do not anticipate an imminent breakthrough in these negotiations, we do not see much scope for significant deterioration in the relationship either. The energy market could prove to be another positive for the loonie. Bob Ryan, who leads BCA's Commodity and Energy Strategy service, argues that the oil market is currently very tight and vulnerable to supply disruptions.2 Under these circumstances, the removal of Iranian exports, tensions in Iraq, declining Nigerian production and Venezuela's cascading implosion all risk causing a melt-up in oil prices by the first half of 2019. This could help the CAD as well, even if the Canadian oil benchmark remains at a large discount to Brent. Longer-term, the upside in the CAD is likely to be capped. There is only one rate hike priced into the U.S. OIS curve from June 2019 to December 2020. We expect the Fed to hike rates by more than that. Meanwhile, the emerging softness in the Canadian household sector suggests it will be much more difficult for the BoC to keep following the Fed higher over that period. The CAD is not cheap enough to compensate for these long-term headwinds (Chart I-7). Bottom Line: On a short-term basis, the Canadian dollar is cheap and oversold. While the Canadian consumer has begun to disappoint, the inflationary pressures present in Canada should keep the BoC on track to follow the Fed and push rates higher over the coming 12 months. The CAD should therefore benefit from any USD weakness, with USD/CAD moving toward 1.26. Once the short-term undervaluation and oversold conditions are corrected, USD/CAD should rebound toward 1.40. Chart I-7We Like The CAD For Now, But The Rally Has A Limited Shelf Life EUR/SEK Will Trade Heavy Any which way we cut it, the SEK is cheap. The trade-weighted krona is trading at its cheapest levels relative to BCA's long-term fair value since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart I-8). The SEK is not only trading at a 32% discount to its purchasing-power parity against the greenback, it is also trading at a 10% discount against its PPP relative to the euro. Chart I-8The SEK Is An Attractive Long-Term Buy... The SEK is not only cheap on a long-term basis, it is also cheap on a short-term basis. This is most evident against the euro. Currently the SEK trades at a 7% discount to the euro according to our short term fair value model based on real rate differentials, commodity prices and global risk aversion. Historically, this kind of discount in the SEK has been followed by a prompt rebound (Chart I-9). Are there any catalysts to convert this good value into good returns? We see many. First, as was the case in Canada, Sweden's Monetary Gauge has not been at such easy levels since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart I-10). Meanwhile, the economy is also experiencing rising capacity pressures. The OECD's estimate of the output gap stands at 0.7% of GDP, and inflationary pressures are building, as evidenced by the Riksbank's Capacity Utilization measure (Chart I-11). Chart I-9...And A Short-Term One As Well Chart I-10The Riksbank Is Too Easy Chart I-11Swedish Inflation Has Upside This set of circumstances suggests the Riksbank could start hiking rates as early as this coming December, well ahead of the European Central Bank. As a result, we project that Swedish real interest rates could rise further relative to the euro area. Historically, falling euro area / Swedish real interest rate spreads precede depreciations in EUR/SEK (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Real Rate Differentials Point To A Lower EUR/SEK Chart I-13Chinese Liquidity Injections Point To A Lower EUR/SEK The global context also points toward an imminent correction in EUR/SEK. The krona is much more pro-cyclical than the euro. This reflects the more volatile nature of the Swedish economy and the extraordinarily large role of trade in its GDP. EUR/SEK greatly benefited from the tightening in Chinese liquidity conditions, as evidenced by the widening between the 1-month and 1-week Chinese interbank rate (Chart I-13). EUR/SEK essentially sniffed out a slowdown in Chinese capex, a key source of ultimate demand for Swedish goods. However, now that the PBoC is injecting liquidity in the Chinese interbank system, EUR/SEK is likely to suffer. Moreover, the outperformance of Chinese infrastructure and real estate stocks in recent weeks also suggests the SEK could appreciate further against the EUR. The rally of risk assets on the day that U.S. President Donald Trump announced an additional 10% tariff on US$200 billion worth of Chinese exports further confirms that investors may be in the process of discounting additional stimulus out of China, which would further hurt EUR/SEK. To be clear, we have already noted that we do not anticipate the Chinese authorities to attempt to boost growth - we only expect them to limit the damage created by an intensifying trade war with the U.S. As a result, the positive impact of China on the krona should prove transitory. But for the time being, it could be enough to help correct the SEK's 7% discount to the euro. Since we anticipate the USD to continue to correct in the coming weeks, this also implies that USD/SEK possesses ample tactical downside. This negative EUR/SEK view is not without risks. The first comes from the fact that the Swedish current account surplus is now smaller than the euro area's, something not seen since the early 1990s. This is mitigated by the fact that Sweden's net international investment position is now 10% of GDP, while it used to be negative as recently as 2015. The euro area NIIP is still in negative territory. The second risk is that Swedish house prices have begun to contract in response to macroprudential measures. However, we believe that Sweden's inflationary backdrop is likely to dominate the Riksbank's reaction function. Bottom Line: The SEK is cheap against the dollar and the euro on both long-term and short-term metrics. As the Riksbank is set to lift rates in December, we expect EUR/SEK to decline significantly. Recent injections of liquidity by the PBoC and growing expectations among investors of Chinese stimulus could create additional downward impetus under both EUR/SEK and USD/SEK. This is a tactical view. We anticipate the reprieve in the global growth slowdown to be temporary. Once it resumes, the SEK will find it difficult to rally further. JPY: Down Now, Up Later Investors are well aware that the yen is one of the cheapest G10 currencies on a long-term basis. BCA's long-term fair value model shows that the real trade-weighted yen is trading at a 17% discount, close to its cheapest levels in 36 years. However, despite its prodigious long-term cheapness, the yen is not nearly as attractive when compared to its short-term determinants, which show a small premium in the price of the yen versus the dollar (Chart I-14). This means the direction of Japanese monetary policy and global growth will remain more important for the yen's price action over the coming months than its long-term cheapness. When it comes to growth, Japan is doing okay. We witnessed a decline in industrial production driven by foreign demand this summer, but domestic machinery orders are improving and export growth is finding a floor. Actually, BCA's real GDP model for Japan is suggesting that growth could re-accelerate significantly next quarter (Chart I-15). In our view, this improvement reflects the fact that business credit is once again growing after decades of hibernation. Chart I-14Is The JPY A Bargain? Long Term, Yes; Short Term, No! Chart I-15Japanese Growth Doing Just Fine However, we doubt this is enough to prompt any tightening in the Bank of Japan's policy. The most immediate problem facing the BoJ is that Japanese inflation expectations are in free fall (Chart I-16). Since the BoJ assigns the blame of low realized inflation on depressed inflation expectations, this aforementioned weakness, despite the yen's softness, guarantees that the BoJ will stay on the sidelines for much longer. After all, if any little shock can spur such a sharp impact on Japanese inflation expectations, despite an unemployment rate at 2.5% and an output gap at 0.8% of GDP, the BoJ has not anchored inflation expectations higher. Further reinforcing our bias that the BoJ is not set to tighten policy for many more quarters, the VAT is set to be increased to 10% in October 2019. The LDP leadership race is currently underway, and no one is mentioning postponing that hike. This suggests that significant fiscal tightening could emerge next year. The fact that the BoJ will continue to lag behind other global central banks forces us to be negative on the yen. However, could an external event push the yen higher, despite this absence of domestic support? A big downgrade in EM asset prices and global growth would do the trick. While we do think this is likely to happen over the next six to nine months, now does not appear to be the moment to implement such a bet. As we highlighted above, the deceleration in global growth seems to be pausing, and Chinese liquidity conditions have eased. Seven weeks ago, we introduced our China Play Index to track whether or not investors were discounting additional easing on the part of China.3 This indicator looks as if it is forming a base right now (Chart I-17), indicating that pro-growth plays could perform well over the coming weeks while countercyclical plays, like the yen, could perform poorly. Until this indicator begins a new down leg - something we anticipate for the backend of the year - the yen will remain under downward pressure against the dollar, the euro or the aussie. Chart I-16The BoJ's Problem Chart I-17Chinese Plays Are Stabilizing As a result, while we continue to expect more upside in the yen in the latter part of the year, for the time being we will remain on the sidelines as neither short-term valuations, monetary policy dynamics or the global growth environment point to an imminent rally in the yen. Bottom Line: The yen is an attractive long-term play as it displays prodigiously cheap long-term valuations. However, the short-term outlook is less favorable. The yen is not cheap enough based on our augmented interest rate differentials models, the BoJ will remain dovish for the foreseeable future, and an uptick in our China Play Index bodes poorly for countercyclical currencies like the yen. However, since we do expect that global growth will stabilize only on a temporary basis, we will look to open some long yen bets later this fall. Close Short EUR/CHF Trade Last March, we argued that EUR/CHF had more cyclical upside, but that bouts of volatility in global markets would cause periods of weaknesses in the cross.4 Based on this insight, we proceeded to sell EUR/CHF on April 6 as we worried that markets were set to price in a period of weakness in global growth.5 We closed this trade in August, but EUR/CHF kept falling. Now, is EUR/CHF more likely to rally or selloff in the coming quarter? We think a rebound is in the cards. First, the franc is once again highly valued, based on the Swiss National Bank's assessment. It is true that the SNB has not intervened to limit the franc's upside recently, but the CHF's strength is likely to short-circuit the increase in inflation that could have justified betting on the Swissie moving higher (Chart I-18). Ultimately, there is limited domestic inflationary pressures in Switzerland. Moreover, since the import penetration of goods and services in Switzerland is the highest of all the G10, imported deflation will soon be felt. Further, as Swiss labor costs remain very high internationally, the large improvement in full-time jobs witnessed this year is likely to peter off as Swiss businesses work to maintain their competitiveness. Second, the franc received an additional fillip this year as the breakup risk premium in Europe surged (Chart I-19). Every time investors perceive that the probability of a disintegration of the euro rises, they end up pouring money into stable Switzerland. Marko Papic, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy expert, believes that the euro break-up risk will continue to be a red herring in the coming few years. Investors will therefore price out this risk, pulling money out of Switzerland where interest rates remain 30 basis points below the euro area, and boosting EUR/CHF in the process. Chart I-18The Swissie's Strength Will Be Deflationary Chart I-19If A Euro Break-Up Is A Red Herring... Finally, if a temporary stabilization in global growth will hurt the yen, it will also hurt the Swiss franc. As a result, the stabilization in the China Play Index should support EUR/CHF. While we expect EUR/CHF to rally over the coming months, we worry that any such rebound will prove temporary. The current expansion in Chinese stimulus is only a passing phenomenon, and not one powerful enough to put a durable bottom under global growth and EM assets. Hence, while EUR/CHF could easily rally to 1.15, any such rebound should be faded. This move, if followed by a deterioration in our China Play Index, should be used to re-open EUR/CHF shorts. Bottom Line: The Swiss franc remains in a cyclical bear market, punctuated by occasional rallies against the euro when global growth sentiment sours. We just experienced such a rally in the Swissie, but it is ending as the deflationary impact of the CHF's rally will soon be felt. Moreover, the breakup risk premium in the euro is currently too large, and the pricing-in of slowing global growth is likely to take a breather. As a result, EUR/CHF is likely rally over the coming months. We will look to bet again on a CHF rally once the reprieve in global growth ends. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Policy Divergence Are Still The Name Of The Game", dated September 14, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl", dated September 20, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus", dated August 3, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: Retail sales and retail sales ex autos yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.1% and 0.3% respectively. Capacity utilization and building permits also surprised to the downside, coming in at 78.1% and 1.229 million respectively. However, Housing starts and the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index surprised positively, coming in at 9.2% and 100.8 respectively. DXY has fallen by nearly 1% this week. Overall, we continue to be bullish on the dollar on a cyclical basis, as inflationary pressures inside the U.S. will force the Fed to hike more than the market expects. That being said, the slowdown in the dollar's momentum, the growing Chinese stimulus, and accumulating signs of stabilizing global economic activity are likely to further weigh on the dollar on a more immediate basis. We will monitor these factors closely in order to gauge whether or not this pullback will remain a garden-variety correction or something more serious. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus - August 3, 2018 Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area has been positive: Labor costs growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.2%. Moreover, construction output yearly growth also surprised positively, coming in at 2.6%. Finally, both core and headline inflation came in line with expectations, at 1% and 2% respectively. EUR/USD has rallied by 1.1% this week We are bearish on the cyclical outlook for the euro, given that core inflation measures are continue to be too weak for the ECB to meaningfully change their dovish monetary policy stance. However, the current tactical rebound is likely to continue, as the weakness in the euro this year has eased financial conditions, which could lead to a temporary boon for the economy. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 Time To Pause And Breathe - July 6, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Industrial production yearly growth surprised negatively, coming in at 2.2%. Moreover, capacity utilization also underperformed expectations, coming in at -0.6%. Finally, both export and import yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 6.6% and 15.4% respectively. USD/JPY has been relatively flat this week. We are bearish on the yen on a structural basis, given that the economy continues to suffer from strong deflationary forces, which will force the Bank of Japan to keep their ultra-easy monetary policy. Report Links: Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been positive: The retail price index yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 3.5%. Moreover, both core and headline inflation outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.1% and 2.7% respectively. Finally, the DCLG House Price Index also surprised positively, coming in at 3.1%. GBP/USD has rallied by roughly 1.5% this week. The GBP's vol is likely to increase further going foirward, as very little political risks is priced into it. A practical strategy will be to lean against large weekly moves, both on the upside and downside. This strategy should be particularly profitable versus the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been positive: The participation rate surprised to the upside, coming in at 65.7%. Moreover, the total change in employment also outperformed expectations, coming in at 44 thousand. Finally, the house price index yearly growth also surprised positively, coming in at -0.6%. AUD/USD has risen by roughly 1.8% this week. We continue to be cyclically bearish on the Australian dollar, as the deleveraging campaign in China will weigh on demand for industrial metals, Australia's main export. Moreover, the AUD will also have downside against the CAD, as oil should continue to hold up relative to other commodities thanks to supply cuts from OPEC. That being said, the AUD's recent rebound is likely to continue on a short-term basis. Hence, investors already shorting the Aussie should consider buying hedges. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD/USD has rallied nearly 1.9% this week. We are negative on the New Zealand dollar on a structural basis due to the measures taken by the Ardern government, which include reducing immigration, and adopting_a dual mandate for the RBNZ. Both of these measures will weigh on the real neutral rate, which means that the RBNZ will have to hold rates lower than otherwise. However, on a more tactical basis, this cross could rally, thanks to the temporary stimulus by the Chinese authorities which will help risk assets. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mixed: Manufacturing shipments monthly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.9%. However, capacity utilization surprised to the downside, coming in at 85.5%. Finally, the new house price index yearly growth was in line with expectations, coming in at 0.5% USD/CAD has depreciated by 1% this week. We remain bullish on the CAD among the dollar bloc currencies, given that inflationary pressures continue to be strong in Canada. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has rallied by 0.5% this week. We continue to be bullish on this cross on a cyclical basis, as the Swiss economy is still too fragile for the SNB to remove its ultra-dovish monetary stance. Moreover, the recent appreciation in the franc that has taken place over the last four months should be very negative for inflation, as Switzerland is the country with the most imports as a percentage of demand in the G10, and thus the country with the most sensitive inflation to currency movements. Finally, on a tactical basis we are also bullish on this cross, as the recent easing of monetary policy by Chinese authorities should be weigh on safe heaven assets like the franc. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Yesterday, Norges Bank increased rates for the first time since 2011, yet the NOK was flat against a weak USD, and fell against the euro and the Swedish krona, suggesting that the hike was well anticipated by market participants. Despite this price action, USD/NOK has depreciated by 1.2% this week. We are positive on the NOK against other non-oil commodity currencies, as oil should outperform base metals in the current environment. After all, OPEC supply cuts and geopolitical risk in the Middle East should provide a boon for oil prices. On the other hand, while temporary easing is likely, the Chinese deleveraging campaign will continue once the Chinese economy has stabilized. Finally, the positive NIIP, and positive current account of the NOK should give it an additional advantage against the rest of the commodity currencies. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been negative: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 2%. Moreover, the unemployment rate increased from 6% in July to 6.1% on the August reading. USD/SEK has depreciated by almost 2.8% this week. We expect the Riksbank to begin tightening policy in December, as Swedish inflationary pressures remain strong. Moreover, the recent stimulus from the PBoC should put additional downward pressure on EUR/SEK, given the krona's more pro-cyclical profile than the euro. Finally, valuations also support the SEK, as the krona is cheap according to multiple measures. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades