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Highlights Our leading gauges of EM commodity-demand growth indicate global industrial-commodity demand has troughed and will be moving higher in the wake of supportive global financial conditions. The magnitude and speed of any commodity-demand rebound hinges on the joint evolution of the USD, which remains close to record highs, and global economic policy uncertainty. Reduced policy uncertainty will translate to a weaker USD, which, all else equal, will be bullish for commodity demand. Chinese economic stimulus remains weak, suggesting policymakers are holding off deploying aggressive fiscal and monetary policy until later this year or next year. Policy risk remains the chief threat to a robust recovery of industrial-commodity demand globally. A ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war will not resolve deeper trade and security issues, which means global financial easing must offset still-pronounced economic uncertainty that is keeping the USD well bid. If policy uncertainty remains high, it will continue to be a headwind for commodity-demand growth. Feature EM GDP growth is showing signs of accelerating, based on our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast model. This will translate to higher commodity demand in coming months (Chart of the Week). Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast is a coincident indicator of commodity demand, comprised of our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models (Chart 2). The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity, which is highly correlated with trade-related activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different commodity prices traded globally. Lastly, the EMIV model is driven by EM import volumes reported with a two-month lag by the CPB in the Netherlands, which we update to current time using FX rates for trade-sensitive currencies, commodity prices and interest rates variables. Chart of the WeekEM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Hooking Up Chart 2BCA EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Components Show Growth Resuming Globally We expect the recovery in global economic growth to reduce the marginal impact of the global policy uncertainty on the USD, and on oil demand. Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast is strongly correlated with y/y growth in nominal EM GDP and non-OECD oil consumption. Its improvement supports our view oil demand will continue to strengthen, particularly next year, when we expect growth to average 1.4mm b/d. We expect the recovery in global economic growth to reduce the marginal impact of the global policy uncertainty on the USD, and on oil demand.1 As demand strengthens – and recession fears subside – economic policy uncertainty’s contribution to safe-haven demand for the USD will diminish. This means economic growth will once again be the main driver of cyclical commodity demand growth. The GIA component of our Nowcast is sensitive to real activity in China, which is the largest consumer of base metals, iron ore and steel. Here, it is instructive to see the components other than manufacturing appear to have bottomed, which, at the margin, should be supportive of base metals, iron ore and steel products (Chart 3). The China Economy Component of the index has hooked higher last month, but it still is lagging. This suggests policymakers are holding off on deploying fiscal and monetary stimulus aggressively for now. We expect this will change by 1H20, if organic growth fails to materialize.2 Chart 3BCA GIA Index Components Point Toward Demand Growth Global Financial Conditions Support Commodity Demand For the better part of this year, systemically important central banks globally have been running accommodative monetary policies. With this week’s rate cut, the Fed now has lowered rates three times this year, and the ECB is preparing to roll out QE once again. We expect monetary policy to continue to support a revival of industrial-commodity demand (Chart 4). The easing of global financial conditions has been a pillar of our view. The easing of global financial conditions has been a pillar of our view that globally accommodative monetary policy will reverse the damage done to global commodity demand growth by the Fed’s rates-normalization policy last year and China’s deleveraging campaign of 2017-18. Financial markets have responded to this stimulus, as our colleague Rob Robis points out in this week’s Global Fixed Income Strategy.3 Global equity markets have moved 10% higher y/y, as financial conditions ease (Chart 5): Chart 4Global Financial Conditions Remain Supportive For Commodities Chart 5Global Equities, LEIs Move Higher “Equity prices are an excellent leading indicator of global growth, while bond yields typically reflect current economic conditions. … We see no reason to discount the positive message on growth from rallying equity markets, especially when confirmed by an improvement in our global leading economic indicator (LEI), led by the more cyclical emerging market (EM) countries.” (Chart 6). The real economy also is responding to stimulative global financial conditions, as EM manufacturing activity indicates. EM manufacturing is outpacing activity in DM markets (Chart 7). This is bullish for trade volumes and EM income growth, which will, all else equal, be supportive of industrial-commodity demand (Chart 8). Chart 6EM Equity, FX Markets Strengthen Chart 7EM Manufacturing Outperforms DM Chart 8EM Manufacturing Correlates With Trade Growth Economic Policy Uncertainty Continues To Dog Growth As promising as these indications of a revival in commodity demand may be, global economic policy uncertainty – particularly as regards the Sino-US trade war and trade in general – will remain a hindrance to reviving commodity demand. We have shown that global economic uncertainty stifles oil-demand growth, and commodity demand generally.4These policy risks are exogenous to the commodity markets and are, therefore, very difficult to hedge. While we expect economic uncertainty globally to decline, it will not completely evaporate. It will remain elevated vs. its historical average, despite the decline from its recent record-high level. Presently, commodity markets are positively discounting the likely “phase one” trade deal expected to be agreed between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping. We expect this to reduce economic uncertainty and weaken the USD, at the margin. In addition, as our colleague Matt Gertken notes in last week’s Geopolitical Strategy, other sources of uncertainty – particularly a disorderly Brexit – also are being addressed: “Not only are U.S.-China relations slightly thawing, but also the risk of the U.K. leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed. This will reinforce Europe’s underlying political stability despite the manufacturing recession and help create a drop in global uncertainty.”5 Still, while we expect economic uncertainty globally to decline, it will not completely evaporate. It will remain elevated vs. its historical average, despite the decline from its recent record-high level. Consequently, monetary policy will have to remain accommodative in order for the momentum in global growth – mainly in EM economies – to increase and reach the threshold where fears of recession dissipate, a necessary condition required to reduce the correlation between global economic policy uncertainty and the USD. For the USD to no longer be a headwind to commodity-demand growth, monetary policy globally will be forced to offset the remaining, lingering economic policy uncertainty that is keeping the USD well bid. There still are significant risks going into 2020, as our geopolitical strategists note: “Uncertainty will remain elevated beyond the fourth quarter, however, for two main reasons. First, US uncertainty will rise, not fall, as a result of the impending 2020 election. Second, the trade ceasefire is highly unlikely to resolve the slate of disagreements and underlying strategic distrust plaguing U.S.-China relations. This will cap the rebound we expect in global business sentiment.” So, while uncertainty will fall as President Trump retreats from his previously intransigent trade position vis-à-vis China, its diminution will be limited. All the same, the chances markets will return to the status quo ante are close to zero. This means that for the USD to no longer be a headwind to commodity-demand growth, monetary policy globally will be forced to offset the remaining, lingering economic policy uncertainty that is keeping the USD well bid. So far, it would appear this is happening, given the improvement in global financial conditions currently visible in the data. However, it is not a given this will continue, and markets will be forced to keep a weather eye on these conditions going forward. Bottom Line: Global financial conditions are easing significantly and propelling financial markets higher, particularly global equity markets. We expect the real economy – i.e., commodity markets – also will benefit from monetary accommodation and that aggregate demand will lift as EM income growth improves. This likely will put downward pressure on the USD. Importantly, if the divergence between EM and DM increases, it could offset the impact of global economic policy uncertainty’s impact on the USD and reduce the demand for dollars. We continue to expect oil demand to be supported by monetary accommodation globally and fiscal stimulus as 2019 winds down and into 2020. We also expect real interest rates will remain soft, as central banks try to keep financial conditions loose enough to encourage risk taking and investment. This will continue to support demand for industrial commodities, particularly oil and base metals. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Market Round-Up NB: This week we are adopting a new format and moving our short summaries of other commodity markets to the back of our Weekly Report, which will align our layout with BCA Research’s new look. Energy: Overweight. Saudi Aramco is set to IPO November 3, 2019, according to Reuters. The company is looking at a float of 1 – 2% on the Tadawal, which could be the largest IPO in history.6 Separately, the Trump administration renewed Chevron’s waiver to operate in Venezuela for three months last week. Chevron produces ~ 47k b/d in Venezuela. Sanctions waivers for Halliburton, Schlumberger, Baker Hughes and Weatherford International also were renewed.7 Base Metals: Neutral. LME nickel closed close to 12% below the five-year high registered September 2, following the announcement of an immediate ban in exports of nickel ore from Indonesia on Monday. Although LME nickel stocks are at an 11-year low refined nickel production is expected to rise 4.5% next year to 2.5mm MT, according to MB Fastmarkets. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold traded sideways going into this week’s FOMC meeting. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge, and continue to expect it to move higher as 4Q19 progresses. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grains remain lackluster, despite President Trump's expectations of cementing his “phase one deal” with Chinese President Xi Jinping, which will open the way for China to purchase some $40-$50 billion worth of US ag products. Footnotes 1 We discuss the impact of global economic policy uncertainty on oil prices at length in Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth, which we published October 17, 2019. 2 Our China Investment Strategy team cautions investors to wait for “hard data” to confirm recent indications the economy has bottomed and will be moving toward stronger growth. Please see our China Macro And Market Review published October 2, 2019. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Big Mo(mentum) Is Turning Positive, published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy October 29, 2019. It is available at gfis.bacresearch.com. 4 Please see Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth, which we published October 17, 2019, for more detail on the transmission mechanism from global economic uncertainty to the USD to commodity demand. Briefly, as uncertainty increases safe-haven demand for the USD increases. This stifles demand growth for commodities generally, because it increases the local-currency costs of commodities ex-US. 5 Please see Is China Afraid Of The Big Bad Warren?, a Special Report published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy October 25, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Saudi Aramco aims to begin planned IPO on Nov. 3: sources published by reuters.com on October 29, 2019. 7 Please see US Extends Chevron's Venezuela waiver published by Argus Media’s argusmedia.com service October 21, 2019. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2016
Three cuts and done. This is very reminiscent of the 1995 and 1998 mid-cycle slowdowns. By flagging policy as being “appropriate” and “accommodative”, Fed Chair Jerome Powell indicated that the Fed will not cut rates anymore, unless global and U.S. growth…
Following the BoC’s press conference, Canadian 10-year yields collapsed 15 basis points and the CAD depreciated 0.6% versus the USD, on a day when the greenback was weak. During Governor Poloz's press conference, market participants latched on to the mention…
Highlights Declining uncertainty over policy, stabilizing growth in China and improvements in international liquidity, all will allow global economic activity to pick up in the months ahead. A weak dollar will reinforce this positive economic outlook; investors should favor pro-cyclical currencies such as the AUD, NZD and SEK. Bond yields will rise and stocks will outperform bonds on a 12- to 18-month basis. Cyclical stocks are more attractive than defensives. European stocks will outperform U.S. equities and European financials will shine. Copper is a promising buy; stay long the silver-to-gold ratio. Feature The outlook for risk assets and bond yields hinges on global economic activity. The S&P 500 has hit a new high, but our BCA Equity Scorecard Indicator remains non-committal towards stocks (Chart I-1). If global economic activity improves, the Scorecard will begin to flash a clear buy signal, but if growth deteriorates, the indicator will point towards sell. Chart I-1Stocks Could Go Either Way Cautious optimism is in order. Politics, China, liquidity conditions and the dollar collectively will determine the global economic outlook. The liquidity backdrop has significantly improved, political uncertainty should recede and China will morph from a headwind to a modest tailwind. A weak dollar will indicate that the world is healing, and also will ease global financial conditions which will facilitate economic strength. We remain committed to a positive stance on equities on a 12- to 18-month horizon, and recommend below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. Cyclicals should outperform defensives, European banks offer an attractive tactical buying opportunity and European equities will outperform their U.S. counterparts. Heightened Risks… Chart I-2Risks To The Economy And Stocks Many domestic indicators overstate the intrinsic fragility in the U.S. The Duncan LEI, which is the ratio of consumer durable spending and residential and business investment to final sales, has flattened. Therefore, the S&P 500 looks vulnerable and real GDP may contract (Chart I-2). CEO confidence and small business capex intentions warn of a looming retrenchment in household income (Chart I-2, bottom two panels). If consumer spending weakens, then a recession will be unavoidable. As worrisome as these indicators may be, we previously discussed that the major debt imbalances that often precede U.S. recessions are absent,1 the rebound in housing starts and homebuilding confidence is inconsistent with a restrictive monetary stance,2 and pipeline inflationary pressures are absent.3 Instead, business confidence and the Duncan LEI have been eroded by heightened political uncertainty and weak global manufacturing and trade. … Meet Receding Policy Uncertainty … The two biggest sources of policy uncertainty affecting markets, the Sino-U.S. trade war and Brexit, are diminishing. However, the U.S. election will continue to lurk in the background. Chart I-3Weaker Brexit Support = No Hard Brexit Support Brexit Westminster and Britain’s Supreme Court have rebuked U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s threat of a “No-Deal” Brexit. Moreover, parliamentary support for his latest plan, which essentially keeps Northern Ireland’s economy within the EU, indicates that the probability of a “No-Deal” Brexit has collapsed to less than 5%. This assessment is reinforced by the delay of Brexit to January 31, 2020. An election is scheduled for December 12 and the chance of a new referendum to vet the deal is escalating. According to Matt Gertken, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist, an election does not increase the risk of a hard Brexit. Meanwhile, support for Brexit is near its lowest point since the June 2016 referendum (Chart I-3). Thus, a new plebiscite would not favor a “No Deal” Brexit. Sino-U.S. Trade War Chart I-4Why The Trade-War Ceasefire? The trade war truce will also greatly diminish economic uncertainty. Uncertainty created by the China-U.S. conflict accentuated the collapse in business confidence and capex intentions. The “phase one deal” announced earlier this month will likely materialize. The White House’s tactical retreat on trade is tied to U.S. President Donald Trump’s desire for a second term. He cannot risk inflicting further economic pain on his base of constituents. Weekly earnings are decreasing for workers in swing states located in the industrial rust belt, especially in those areas that Trump carried in 2016 (Chart I-4). Those swing states are most affected by the slowdown in the global manufacturing and trade sectors. Beijing is also motivated to agree to truce due to its soft economy and deflationary pressures. An easing in trade uncertainty will be positive for the domestic economy. China’s willingness to replace Carrie Lam, the embattled Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and to withdraw the extradition bill at the heart of the protests confirms its eagerness to come to an agreement with the U.S. China’s readiness to make a deal is also made evident by its increasing imports of U.S. agricultural products (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Ultimately, the U.S. will not implement tariffs in December on $160 billion of Chinese shipments. Consequently, investors and businesses should become less concerned about the chances of a worsening trade war. Moreover, chances are growing of a decrease (but not a complete annulation) of the previously imposed U.S. tariffs on China. … And A Q1 2020 Acceleration In Global Growth Global economic activity will improve in Q1 2020 because the drag from China will dissipate and global liquidity conditions will improve. Many activity indicators increasingly reflect these fundamental supports. China China’s economy has reached a new low point: Q3 annual GDP growth is at a 27-year low of 6%, capital spending is weak, industrial production and profits show little life, the labor market is soft, and imports and exports continue to contract. However, a turn in policy has materialized, which will protect the domestic economy. Moreover, this summer’s Politburo and State Council statements showed an increased willingness to reflate the economy. The global economy will accelerate in Q1 2020. Credit creation has stabilized and monetary conditions have eased (Chart I-5). Faced with producer price inflation of -1.2% and employment PMIs of 47.3 and 48.2 in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, respectively, authorities have allowed the credit impulse to improve to 26% of GDP from a low of 23.8%. In accordance with this new policy direction, the drag from the shadow banking system’s contraction will slow considerably, thanks to a stabilization in both the growth rate of deposits of non-depository financial institutions and the issuance of bonds by small financial institutions. Additionally, the emission of local government bonds will accelerate. Beijing has also meaningfully eased fiscal policy, which is its preferred reflationary tool. Policymakers have cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP in the past two years. The marginal propensity of households to consume is trying to bottom (Chart I-5, bottom). If history is a guide, the acceleration in the rate of change of public-sector capex will fuel this turnaround in China’s marginal propensity to consume, and push up BCA’s China Activity Indicator (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Overlooked Chinese Improvements Chart I-6Public Investment Matters Chart I-7A Bottom In Chinese Exports Growth? China’s economy is unlikely to bounce back as violently as in 2009, 2012 or 2016. Authorities are much more circumspect in their use of credit to reflate the economy than they were previously. Moreover, the regulatory environment will prevent a boom in the shadow banking system. Nonetheless, the fiscal push and the end of the decline in aggregate credit growth will allow the Chinese economy to stabilize and maybe pick up a bit. Therefore, China will move from a large headwind to a slight tailwind for global activity (Chart I-7, top panel). Mounting public capex also points toward a modest global recovery (Chart I-7, middle panel). Finally, the upturn in our Chinese reflation indicator, which incorporates both fiscal and monetary policy, points to a re-acceleration in U.S. capex intentions (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Global Liquidity Global liquidity conditions continue to improve and the global economy should soon respond within normal policy lags. 95% of central banks are loosening policy, which normally leads to an escalation in global activity (Chart I-8). The dominant central banks (the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan) will not tighten anytime soon. Inflation expectations in the U.S., the euro area and Japan stand at 1.9%, 1.1%, and 0.2%, respectively, well below levels consistent with a 2% inflation target. Moreover, U.S. core CPI has been perky, but both the ISM and the performance of transportation equities relative to utilities indicate that a deceleration in inflation is imminent (Chart I-9). Salaries are not yet inflationary either because U.S. real wages are growing in line with productivity (Chart I-9, bottom panel). In the euro area and Japan, realized core inflation remains at 1.0% and 0.5%, respectively, and supports the dovish message emanating from inflation expectations. Chart I-8Easier Global Policy Is Important Chart I-9If Inflation Peaks, The U.S. Economy Will Breath A Sigh Of Relief Liquidity indicators are reflecting this accommodative policy setting. The growth of U.S. and European bank deposits has reaccelerated from 2.5% to 6%, a development linked to the exit of a soft patch (Chart I-10). Moreover, BCA’s U.S. Financial Liquidity Indicator is still moving higher and flashing a resurgence in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI), the ISM Manufacturing Index, commodity prices, and EM export prices (Chart I-11). Finally, U.S. and global excess money reinforce the message of BCA’s U.S. Financial liquidity Indicator (Chart I-12). Chart I-10Deposits Suggest The Worst Of The Slowdown Is Behind Us Chart I-11Continued Pick-Up In Financial Liquidity The Fed will add to the supply of global liquidity by tackling the repo market’s seize-up. Depleting excess reserves and mounting financing needs among primary dealers resulted in the September surge in the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). The Fed announced three weeks ago it would buy $60 billion per month of T-Bills and T-Notes, which will lead to a climbing stock of excess reserves. Higher excess reserves create a weaker dollar, stronger EM currencies and firming global PMIs (Chart I-13). Ultimately, EM currency strength eases EM financial conditions, which supports global growth (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Excess Liquidity Is Accelerating Chart I-13U.S. Excess Reserves Will Grow Again Borrowing activity in Advanced Economies is showing signs of life. Bank credit is already responding to the drop in global yields, and global corporate bond issuance in September 2019 rose to $434 billion. In the U.S., new issues of corporate bonds have also reaccelerated (Chart I-14). Global Growth Indicators Crucial indicators of global economic activity are picking up on this improving fundamental backdrop. The list includes: A sharp takeoff in the annualized three-month rate of change of capital goods orders in the U.S., the Eurozone and Japan (Chart I-15, top panel). Improvement in this indicator precedes progress in the annual growth rate of orders and in capex itself. Chart I-14Borrowers Are Responding To Easier Financial Conditions Chart I-15Some Green Shoots Are Coming Through Chart I-16Positive Market Signals A significant upturn in the Philly Fed, Empire State, and Richmond Fed manufacturing surveys for October, which sends a positive signal for the ISM Manufacturing Index (Chart I-15, second panel). Moreover, the new orders and employment components of these surveys indicate that cyclical sectors of the economy will recover and the recent deterioration in employment conditions will be fleeting. A rebound in BCA’s EM economic diffusion index, which incorporates 23 variables. Such an increase usually precedes inflections in global industrial production (Chart I-15, bottom panel). An acceleration – both in absolute and relative terms - in the annual appreciation of Taiwanese stocks. A strong and outperforming Taiwanese equity market is a harbinger of firmer PMIs (Chart I-16, top two panels). A solid performance of EM carry trades financed in yen, European luxury equities, and the relative performance of global semiconductors, materials and industrial stocks, which signal stronger global PMIs (Chart I-16, bottom three panels). Bottom Line: The global economy will accelerate in Q1 2020. A melting probability of a “No-Deal” Brexit and a truce in the Sino-U.S. trade war will allow global uncertainty to recede. Concurrently, China’s economic slowdown is ending and global liquidity conditions are improving. The Dollar As The Arbiter Of Growth Chart I-17The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The dollar faces potent headwinds. The greenback is a countercyclical currency; a business cycle upswing and a weak USD go hand in hand (Chart I-17). The tightness of this relationship results from a powerful feedback loop: weak growth boosts the dollar, but the dollar’s strength foments additional economic slowdown. Global liquidity and activity indicators signal a weaker dollar because they point toward an economic recovery. BCA’s U.S. Financial Liquidity Index, which foresaw a deceleration in the greenback’s rate of appreciation, is calling for an outright depreciation (Chart I-18, top panel). The expanding holdings of securities on U.S. commercial banks’ balance sheets (a key measure of liquidity) corroborates this message. According to a model based on the U.S., Eurozone, Japanese and Chinese broad money supply, the USD should significantly depreciate in the coming 12 months (Chart I-18, third panel). Finally, our EM Economic Diffusion Index validates pressures on the greenback, especially against commodity currencies (Chart I-18, bottom two panels). Chart I-18Liquidity And Growth Indicators Point To A Weaker Dollar Growth differentials support this picture. Late last year, the stimulating effect of President Trump’s tax cuts allowed the U.S. to temporarily diverge from a weak global economy, but the U.S. manufacturing sector is now succumbing to the global slowdown. Once global growth snaps back, the U.S. is likely to lag behind as fiscal policy is becoming more stimulative outside the U.S. than in the U.S. Based on historical delays, this will continue to hurt the dollar (Chart I-19, top panel). Finally, the European economy generally outperforms the U.S. when China reflates, especially if Beijing’s push lifts the growth rate of M1 relative to M2, a proxy for China’s aggregate marginal propensity to consume (Chart I-20). Europe’s greater cyclicality reflects is larger exposure to both trade and manufacturing compared with the U.S. Chart I-19A Global Growth Convergence Will Hurt The Dollar Chart I-20European Growth To Rise Vis-A-Vis The U.S. The greenback is expensive and technically vulnerable, which compounds its cyclical risk. The trade-weighted dollar is at a 25% premium to its purchasing power parity equilibrium (PPP), an overvaluation comparable to its 1985 and 2002 peaks. Moreover, our Composite Technical Indicator is overextended and has formed a negative divergence with the price of the dollar (see page 54, Section III). Finally, speculators are massively long the U.S. Dollar Index (DXY). Balance-of-payment flows also flash a significant downside in the dollar (Chart I-21). The U.S. current account deficit stands at 2.5% of GDP, but it is widening in response to the dollar’s overvaluation and the White House’s expansive fiscal policy. Since 2011, foreign direct investments (FDI) have been the main driver of the dollar’s gyrations. Last year, net FDI surged in response to profit repatriations encouraged by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, while portfolio flows stayed in neutral territory. This regulatory change had a one-off impact and FDI will begin to dry out. Therefore, financing the widening current account deficit will become harder. Finally, after years in the red, net portfolio flows into Europe have turned positive (Chart I-21, bottom panel). The USD’s depreciation will ease global financial conditions and supports growth further. In this context, interest rate differentials are noteworthy. The two-year spread in real rates between the U.S. and the rest of the G-10 has fallen significantly since October 2018. Reversals in real rates herald a weaker dollar, especially when it faces valuation, technical and flow handicaps. Moreover, European five-year forward short rate expectations are near record lows. If global growth can stabilize, then the five-year forward one-month OIS will pick up, especially relative to the U.S. An uptick will boost the EUR/USD pair and hurt the dollar (Chart I-22). Chart I-21Balance-Of-Payments Dynamics Turning Against The USD Chart I-22Relative Long-Term Rate Expectations And The Euro The three most pro-cyclical currencies in the G-10 – the AUD, NZD and SEK - strengthen the most when BCA’s Global LEI bottoms but global inflation slows (Chart I-23). The GBP will likely generate a much stronger-than-normal performance next year. Cable trades at a 22% discount to PPP. It is also 19% cheap versus short-term interest rate parity models. The absence of a “No-Deal” Brexit should allow these risk premia to dissipate and the pound to recover. The CAD is also more attractive than Chart I-23 implies. The loonie is trading 10% below its PPP, and the USD/CAD often lags the EUR/CAD, a pair that has broken down (Chart I-24). Chart I-23Currency Performance As A Function Of Growth And Inflation Chart I-24EUR/CAD Flashing A Bearish USD/CAD Signal Bottom Line: A rebound in the global manufacturing sector next year will hurt the USD. The dollar is particularly vulnerable because growth differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world have melted, the greenback is expensive, balance-of-payment dynamics are deteriorating and interest rate differentials are becoming less supportive. The USD’s depreciation will ease global financial conditions and supports growth further. Additional Investment Implications Bond Yields Have More Upside While the short-term outlook for bonds remains murky, the 12- to 18-month outlook is unambiguously bearish. The BCA Bond Valuation Index is still consistent with much higher U.S. yields in the next 12-18 months (see Section III, page 51). BCA’s Composite Technical Indicator for T-Notes is massively overbought and sentiment, as approximated by the Long-Term Interest Rates component of the ZEW survey, is overly bullish (Chart I-25). Thus, bonds represent an attractive cyclical sell. The Fed will not cut rates aggressively enough for bonds to ignore these valuation and technical risks. Treasurys have outperformed cash by 7.5% in the past year. Based on historical relationships, the Fed needs to cut rates to zero for bonds to beat cash in the coming 12 months (Chart I-26). After this week’s Fed cut to 1.75%, our base case is none to maybe one more rate cut. Chart I-25Sentiment Points To Yield Upside Chart I-26The Fed Must Cut To Zero For T-Notes To Outperform Cash Further Bond yields will need a recession to move lower. The deviation of 10-year Treasury yields from their two-year moving average closely tracks the Swedish Economic Diffusion Index (Chart I-27, top panel). Sweden, a small, open economy highly levered to the global industrial cycle, is a good gauge of the global business cycle. The broad weakness in the Swedish economy is unlikely to worsen unless the global slowdown morphs into a deep recession. Even if global growth remains mediocre, Sweden’s Economic Diffusion Index will rise along with yields. The expansion in securities holdings of U.S. commercial banks and the stabilization in China’s credit flows both support this notion (Chart I-27, bottom panel). Financial market developments also point to higher yields. Sectors that typically capture the momentum in the global economy are perking up. For example, bottoms in the annual performance of European luxury equities or Taiwanese stocks have preceded increases in yields (Chart I-28). Chart I-27Yields Have Upside Chart I-28Key Financial Market Signals For Yields Stocks Will Outperform Bonds Our conviction is strengthening that equities will outperform bonds. The total return of the stock-to-bond ratio has upside. BCA’s Global Economic and Financial Diffusion Index has rallied sharply, which often precedes an ascent in the stock-to-bond ratio, both in the U.S. and globally (Chart I-29). Bonds are much more expensive than stocks, therefore, only a recession will allow stocks to underperform in the coming 12 to 18 months. The environment is positive for equities. BCA’s Monetary Indicator is very elevated and our Composite Sentiment Indicator shows little complacency toward stocks among investors (see Section III, page 47). Finally, the strength in the U.S. Financial Liquidity Indicator supports the S&P 500’s returns (Chart I-30). Chart I-29Cyclical Indicators Argue In Favor Of Stocks Over Bonds Chart I-30Liquidity Tailwind For The S&P 500 A few market developments are noteworthy. 55.6% of the S&P 500’s constituents have reported Q3 earnings, and 74% of those firms are beating estimates. Moreover, the market is generously rewarding firms with the largest positive earnings surprises. Additionally, the Value Line Geometric Index is forming a reverse head-and-shoulder pattern, while the relative performance of the Russell 2000 has formed a double bottom (Chart I-31). The environment also favors cyclicals relative to defensive equities. By lifting bond yields, stronger economic activity leads to a contraction in the multiples of defensives relative to cyclicals. The latter’s earnings expectations respond more positively to reviving economic activity, which creates an offset to climbing discount rates. As a result, cyclicals often outperform defensives when the stock-to-bond ratio increases, or after Taiwanese equities gain momentum (Chart I-32). Chart I-31Improving Equity Market Dynamics Chart I-32Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives Compared to other equity markets, the U.S. faces the most challenges. Our model forecasts a 3% annual drop in the S&P 500’s operating earnings in June 2020, and the deviation of U.S. equities from their 200-day moving average has greatly diverged from net earnings revisions (Chart I-33). U.S. equities have already discounted a turnaround in earnings. Moreover, the S&P 500’s margins have downside, a topic covered by BCA’s Chief Equity Strategist Anastasios Avgeriou.4 Our Composite Margin Proxy, Operating Margins Diffusion Index and Corporate Pricing Power Indicator all remain weak (Chart I-34). Downward pressure on margins will limit how rapidly earnings respond when a rebound in global economic activity lifts revenues. Finally, the S&P 500 trades at a historically elevated forward P/E ratio of 18.4, the MSCI EAFE trade at a much more reasonable 14-times forward earnings. Chart I-33Headwinds For U.S. Stocks Chart I-34Headwinds For U.S. Margins The tech sector will also weigh on the performance of U.S. equities relative to international stocks. Tech stocks represent 22.5% of the U.S. benchmark, compared with 9.7% for the euro area. Anastasios recently argued that software spending has remained surprisingly resilient despite the global economic slowdown; it will likely lag spending on machinery and structures when the cycle picks up.5 Consequently, tech earnings will lag other traditional cyclical sectors. Moreover, tech multiples will suffer when the dollar depreciates and bond yields rise (Chart I-35). As high-growth stocks, tech equities derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows and their terminal value. Thus, tech multiples are highly sensitive to discount factors. Unaffected by those negatives, European equities will benefit most from the outperformance of stocks relative to bonds. A weak dollar will be the first positive for the common-currency returns of European equities. Valuations are the second tailwind. The risk premium for European equities is 300 basis points higher than for U.S. stocks. Moreover, U.S. margins will likely diminish relative to the Eurozone’s because of stronger unit labor costs in the U.S. Sector composition will also dictate the performance of European equities. Compared with the U.S., Europe is underweight tech and healthcare stocks, a defensive sector (Table I-1). Investors who favor Europe will also bet against these two sectors. Europe is a wager on the other cyclical sectors: materials, industrials, energy and financials. Chart I-35Tech P/Es Are At Risk Table I-1Europe Overweights The Correct Cyclicals European financials are particularly attractive. Negative European yields are a major handicap for European financials, but this handicap is already reflected in their price. European banks trade at a price-to-book ratio of 0.6 versus 1.3 for the U.S. This discount should be narrowing, not widening. Yields are bottoming and European loan growth is contracting at a -2% annual rate relative to the U.S. versus -8.6% five years ago. Meanwhile, the annual rate of change of European deposits is in line with the U.S. The attraction of European banks comes from the outlook for their return on tangible equity. A model shows that three variables govern European banks’ ROE: German yields, Italian spreads and the momentum of the silver-to-gold ratio (SGR). German yields impact net interest margins, Italian spreads drive peripheral financial conditions and thus, loan generation in the European periphery, and the SGR tracks the global manufacturing cycle (silver has more industrial uses than gold, but is equally sensitive to real yields), which affects loan flows in the European core. This model logically tracks the performance of European banks and financials (Chart I-36). Our positive outlook on global growth and yields, along with the fall in Italian spreads, augurs well for cheap European financial equities and banks in particular. Commodities Our constructive stance on the global business cycle and yields, plus our negative view on the greenback, is consistent with higher industrial commodity prices. Copper looks particularly attractive. Speculators are aggressively selling the metal, whose price stands at an important technical juncture (Chart I-37). Chart I-36The Drivers Of RoE Point To Higher European Bank Stock Prices Chart I-37Cooper Is An Attractive Play On Global Growth Chart I-38Favorable Technical Backdrop For Silver-To-Gold Ratio Finally, we have favored the SGR since late June. Silver is deeply oversold and under-owned relative to the yellow metal (Chart I-38). Consequently, silver’s greater industrial usage should be a potent tailwind for the SGR.6 Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst October 31, 2019 Next Report: November 22, 2019 - Outlook 2020 II. Back To The Nineteenth Century The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.7 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. The U.S.-China conflict will not lead to complete bifurcation of the global economy. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”8 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”9 Chart II-1Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.10 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart II-1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. In a multipolar world, the U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart II-2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart II-2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart II-3). Chart II-3The Beijing Consensus Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead To Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. Diagram II-1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram II-1Trade War In A Bipolar World However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.11 History teaches us that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime. The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.12 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart II-4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart II-4The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart II-5). This is for three reasons: Chart II-5Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.13 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. Diagram II-2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram II-2Trade War In A Multipolar World Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.14 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts II-1 and II-4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”15 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”16 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”17 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.18 Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.19 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart II-6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart II-7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart II-6The Allies Traded With Germany ... Chart II-7… Right Up To WWI Chart II-8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart II-8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram II-2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart II-9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart II-9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart II-10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart II-11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing. Marko Papic Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group III. Indicators And Reference Charts The S&P 500 is making marginally new all-time highs. Seasonality is becoming very favorable for stock prices. However, our U.S. profit model continues to point south and expanding multiples have already driven this year’s equity gains. The S&P 500 has therefore already priced in a significant improvement in profits. Further P/E expansion will be harder to come by with bond yields set to rise. Thus, until the dollar falls and creates another tailwind for profits, stocks will not be as strong as seasonality suggests and will only make marginal new highs. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) remains cautious towards equities. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive readings from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if strong market momentum is not supported by valuations and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Until global growth bottoms and boosts the earnings forecasts of our models, stock gains will stay limited. The outlook for next year remains constructive for stocks. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. continues to improve. This same indicator has recently turned lower in Japan. Meanwhile, it is deteriorating further in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Global yields have turned higher but they remain at exceptionally stimulating levels. Moreover, money and liquidity growth has picked up around the world, and global central banks continue to conduct very dovish policies. As a result, our Monetary Indicator remains at extremely elevated levels. Furthermore, our Composite Technical Indicator is still flashing a buy signal. Also, our BCA Composite Valuation index is still improving. As a result, our Speculation Indicator is back in the neutral zone. 10-year Treasury yields continue to rise, but they remain very expensive. Moreover, both our Bond Valuation Index and our Composite Technical Indicators are still flashing high-conviction sell signals. If the strengthening of the Commodity Index Advance/Decline line results in higher natural resource prices, then, inflation breakevens will also climb meaningfully. Therefore, the current setup argues for a below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. Weak global growth has been the key support for the dollar in recent months. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar remains extremely expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator has lost momentum and has formed a negative divergence with the Greenback’s level. Moreover, the U.S. current account deficit has begun to widen anew. This backdrop makes the dollar highly vulnerable to a rebound in global growth. In fact, a breakdown in the greenback will be the clearest signal yet that global growth is rebounding for good. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-23Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "September 2019," dated August 29, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2019," dated May 30, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2019," dated July 25, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report "Peak Margins," dated October 7, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Follow The Profit Trail," dated October 15, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report "On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver," dated October 11, 2019, available on fes.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 8 Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 9 See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017). 10 The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 11 Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 12 We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own. 13 See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 14 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 15 See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 16 Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 17 Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 18 Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia. 19 See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.
ハイライト
デュレーション: 貿易に関する不確実性が調査による経済センチメント指標を押し下げている一方で、実体経済のハードデータは比較的堅調である。今後2か月の間に貿易戦争が落ち着き始めると見込んでいるため、調査データは反発し、債券利回りは上昇するだろう。
フェド: インフレ期待が低い状況では、フェドは金融環境を緩和的に維持し、景気回復が順調に進むことを確保しなければならない。これは、フェドが市場の期待に応じて来週利下げを行うことを意味する。その先については、成長が十分に改善するため、さらなる利下げは不要になると予想している。
ネガティブ・コンベクシティ: 今年の大幅な利回り低下は、リスク調整後の観点でネガティブ・コンベクシティ資産の魅力を高めた。投資家はインベストメント・グレードよりもハイイールドを優先すべきである。また、Aaa、Aa、A 格の社債よりもエージェンシーMBSを優先すべきである。
特集
チャート 1
ハードデータがもたらすポジティブなサプライズ
Positive Surprises Driven By The Hard Data
Positive Surprises Driven By The Hard Data
今後2か月は米国経済にとって重要である。企業側と消費者側の両方で示されるセンチメント指標は景気後退を示すシグナルを発している。しかし、実際の経済活動を示す指標はより穏やかな状況を描いている（チャート 1）。この「ハード」データと「ソフト」データの乖離は、今後数か月以内に解消される可能性が高く、その解消の方向性は米中貿易交渉の結果が大きく左右するだろう。
「ハード」と「ソフト」データについて
最近は投資家向けに大量の経済データが公開されているが、これらは一般的に「ソフト」か「ハード」のいずれかに分類できる。着工件数や小売売上高のような実際の経済活動を測る指標を我々は「ハード」データと呼ぶ。これらは国のGDP算出に使われる種類の指標である。一方、企業や消費者に対して活動が改善しているか悪化しているか、将来に対してより楽観的か悲観的かを尋ねる調査指標を「ソフト」データと呼ぶ。PMI調査や消費者信頼感の指標などがソフトデータの例である。
どちらの種類の指標も価値がある。ソフトデータは通常タイムリーであり、ハードデータより先行することが多い。しかし、その分フリップフロップ（振れ）を起こしやすい。ハードデータはより信頼性が高い傾向にあるが、実行可能な先行時間を必ずしも提供するとは限らない。
ソフトデータとハードデータは全く異なるシグナルを発している。
現時点では、ソフトデータとハードデータは非常に異なるシグナルを発している。消費者側では、コア小売売上高は堅調に前年同期比4.8%のペースで拡大しているが、消費者信頼感は過去1年で低下している（チャート 2）。
企業側では、ISM製造業PMIは9月に47.8と、2009年以来の最低水準に達した。しかし鉱工業生産は過去1年でわずか0.1%の減少にとどまっている。鉱工業生産の成長は2015/16期にISMがより高い水準にあった際に-4%まで低下したことがある（チャート 3）。同様に、コア耐久財受注の実績はほとんど縮小していない一方で、CEOの信頼感は景気後退水準にある（チャート 3、パネル2）。稼働率も2016年の底を大きく上回る水準で比較的強いままである（チャート 3、下段）。
チャート 2
ハード vs ソフトデータ：消費者側
Hard Vs. Soft Data: On The Consumer Side
Hard Vs. Soft Data: On The Consumer Side
チャート 3
ハード vs ソフトデータ：企業側
Hard Vs. Soft Data: On The Business Side
Hard Vs. Soft Data: On The Business Side
住宅は、現在ハードとソフトのデータの間に二分法を示していない唯一のセクターである。全ての住宅活動指標は強く伸びており、昨年の弱さからの急速な回復を示している（チャート 4）。
チャート 4
住宅活動の概要
Housing Activity Summary
Housing Activity Summary
貿易交渉が重要な鍵を握る
ソフトデータがハードデータに遅れ始めたのは、昨年にグローバル経済政策不確実性指数が急上昇したのとほぼ同時期であった（チャート 5）。これにより、貿易戦争の負の影響への懸念がセンチメントと信頼感の指標を急落させたと結論づけられる一方で、貿易戦争のハードデータに対する実際の影響は小幅にとどまっている。
これが11月の米中貿易協議の結果が極めて重要である理由だ。新たな関税が導入されないことが明確になる合意が得られれば、ソフトデータは十分に改善してハードデータと収斂すると予想される。しかし、交渉が決裂すれば、ネガティブな調査データが最終的にハードデータを押し下げることになるだろう。
住宅は、現在ハードとソフトのデータの間に二分法を示していない唯一のセクターである。
現時点での感触では、迫り来る2020年の米国選挙が両者にとって合意を成立させる十分なインセンティブを提供していると考えているが、結果はどちらに転んでもおかしくない。先週金曜に公表した当社のグローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジーサービスのレポートでは、貿易交渉の見通しをより詳しく論じている。1
債券投資家にとって、貿易不確実性の除去はISM製造業PMIやCRB Raw Industrials指数のような重要なソフトデータの反発につながると確信している。これらの指標の上昇は債券利回りを急上昇させるだろう。CRB Raw Industrials指数と金の比率は10年米国債利回りを引き続き緊密に追跡している（チャート 6）。
チャート 5
貿易戦争の懸念が##br##センチメントに影響
Trade War Worries Affecting Sentiment
Trade War Worries Affecting Sentiment
チャート 6
貿易不確実性が薄れると債券利回りは急騰する
Bond Yields Will Shoot Higher Once Trade Uncertainty Dissipates
Bond Yields Will Shoot Higher Once Trade Uncertainty Dissipates
結論: 貿易に関する不確実性が調査による経済センチメント指標を押し下げている一方で、実体経済のハードデータは比較的堅調である。今後2か月の間に貿易戦争が落ち着き始めると見込んでいるため、調査データは反発し、債券利回りは上昇するだろう。
来週のフェド
ハードとソフトの二極化は、フェドが今年大部分で述べてきた経済見通しの説明とよく整合する。すなわち、ベースラインの見通しは好ましいが下振れリスクがあるという認識だ。その見通し自体は直ちに政策対応を示唆するものではないが、インフレ期待が低いことは今後数か月のフェドの取るべき行動をかなり明確にしている。
5年/5年フォワードTIPSのブレークイーブン・インフレ率は現在1.68%であり、フェドのインフレ目標と整合する2.3%〜2.5%のレンジを大きく下回っている（チャート 7）。さらに、ニューヨーク連銀の消費者期待調査における3年物のインフレ予想の中央値は史上最低を更新した（チャート 7、下段）。フェドはインフレ期待を高めるために適切な行動を取らなければならない。現状では、景気回復が続くように金融環境を緩和的に保つことを確実にする必要がある。最終的に継続的な景気回復は実際のインフレの上昇をもたらし（チャート 7、パネル2）、インフレ期待は実際のインフレに追随して上昇するだろう。
チャート 7
インフレ期待の低さ＝緩和的なフェド
Low Inflation Expectations Equals Accommodative Fed
Low Inflation Expectations Equals Accommodative Fed
金融環境を緩和的に保つために、フェドは少なくとも市場の現時点での利下げ期待に合わせる必要がある。10月の利下げはほぼ完全に織り込まれており、したがって来週フェドが利下げを行う可能性は非常に高い。その後、市場は12月に4度目の利下げが行われる確率を概ね50/50で織り込んでいる。しかし、これらの期待は11月の貿易協議の結果や今後の経済データ次第で変化するだろう。
最終的には、今から12月までの間に十分な好材料が出て4回目の利下げは不要になると予想している。しかし、より重要なメッセージは、インフレ期待が低い限りフェドは市場の期待を裏切るリスクを取らないということである。
バランスシート更新
フェドは改定されたバランスシート政策の公表を来週まで待たない決断をした。先日報告したマネー・マーケットの混乱を考えれば、時間的余裕がなかったのは明らかである。2 我々のレポートの主な結論は、フェドが金利をコントロールし続けたいのであれば銀行準備金を市場により多く供給する必要があるということだ。これがまさにフェドが今後行うであろう措置である。フェドは短期国債の買い入れを遅くとも2020年第2四半期まで継続すると発表し、当初は月600億ドルのペースで開始する。さらに満期を迎える国債やMBSの償還金は新発の国債へ再投資し続ける。
継続する景気回復は実際のインフレ上昇につながる。
月600億ドルのペースが維持され、非準備金負債の成長率など他の仮定を置くと、フェドの措置により準備金の供給は来年6月までに1.53兆ドルから1.63兆ドルに増加し、証券保有は3.59兆ドルから4.05兆ドルに増加すると予測する（チャート 8および表 1参照）。
チャート 8
フェドのバランスシートの推移
The Fed's Balance Sheet Over Time
The Fed's Balance Sheet Over Time
表 1
フェドのバランスシート：予測
Crisis Of Confidence
Crisis Of Confidence
これまで主張してきたように、フェドのバランスシートと金利政策の連動が切断された今、フェドの新しいバランスシート戦略から投資上の示唆は見出せない。債券投資の黄金律に従えば、フィードファンド金利の期待との相対的変化が引き続き債券利回りを駆動する。3 フェドのバランスシート戦略は将来の金利方針について何も教えてくれないため、概ね無視してよいだろう。
結論: インフレ期待が低い状況では、フェドは金融環境を緩和的に維持し、景気回復が順調に進むことを確保しなければならない。これは、フェドが市場の期待に応じて来週利下げを行うことを意味する。その先については、成長が十分に改善するため、さらなる利下げは不要になると予想している。
ネガティブ・コンベクシティを買う好機
過去数週間にわたり、我々はハイイールド債とエージェンシーMBSの魅力を繰り返し指摘してきた。これらのセクターに共通するのはネガティブ・コンベクシティである。つまり、ほとんどのフィクスト・インカム商品とは異なり、これらのデュレーションは利回りと正の相関を持つ。
その結果、今年の利回りの大幅な低下はハイイールド債とエージェンシーMBSの双方でデュレーションの大幅な低下を招いた（チャート 9）。しかしこのデュレーション低下にもかかわらず、ジャンクスプレッドは比較的横ばいを維持し、MBSスプレッドは実際に拡大している。言い換えれば、ネガティブ・コンベクシティ証券に内在するリスクが顕著に低下したにもかかわらず、期待リターンは下がっていない。
チャート 9
ネガティブ・コンベクシティ商品は魅力的
Negatively Convex Products Are Attractive
Negatively Convex Products Are Attractive
先週、我々は米国スプレッド商品向けの新たなリスク測定法を発表した。4 「100ベーシスポイントを失うリスク」は、あるセクターが期間一致の米国債に対して100ベーシスポイント以上のアンダーパフォーマンスを示すために必要な年次スプレッド変化の標準偏差の数と考えられる。値が高いほど、そのセクターが100bpを失うリスクは低いことを意味するし、その逆もまた同様である。
チャート 10は、新しいリスク指標をインベストメント・グレードおよびハイイールドのクレジットティア、ならびに従来の30年エージェンシーMBSの期待リターンに対してプロットしたものである。縦軸は各セクターの12か月の期待超過リターンで、我々はこれをOASから期待デフォルト損失の調整分を差し引いて算出している。横軸は「100ベーシスポイントを失うリスク」を示している。
最近の市場の動きを文脈化するために、スプレッドが最後にボトムをつけた約1年前から各セクターがチャート10内でどのように動いたかを示している。注目すべき点は、昨年10月にはBa格およびB格のジャンク債がBaa格の社債よりも同等のリスクで高い期待リターンを提供していたことだ。現在ではBa格とB格は同様のリターン優位性を提供しているが、リスクははるかに小さくなっている。Caa格ジャンクは現在、リスクとリターンの両面でBaaセクターを明確に上回っている。
チャート 10
リスク・リワードのトレードオフはネガティブ・コンベクシティ証券に有利
Crisis Of Confidence
Crisis Of Confidence
エージェンシーMBSに目を向けると、デュレーションの大幅な低下が昨年10月以降の大幅なリスク削減につながっていることが再び確認される。これが、我々が最近エージェンシーMBSをAaa、Aa、A 格の社債に替えてアップグレードすることを推奨した理由である。5
結論: 今年の大幅な利回り低下は、リスク調整後の観点でネガティブ・コンベクシティ資産の魅力を高めた。投資家はインベストメント・グレードよりもハイイールドを優先すべきである。また、Aaa、Aa、A 格の社債よりもエージェンシーMBSを優先すべきである。
Ryan Swift 米国債券ストラテジスト rswift@bcaresearch.com
脚注
1 当社のグローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー週次レポート「Kumbaya」（2019年10月18日付）を gis.bcaresearch.com でご覧ください
2 当社のU.S. ボンド・ストラテジー週次レポート「What’s Up In U.S. Money Markets?」（2019年9月24日付）を usbs.bcaresearch.com でご覧ください
3 当社のU.S. ボンド・ストラテジー特別レポート「The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing」（2018年7月24日付）を usbs.bcaresearch.com でご覧ください
4 当社のU.S. ボンド・ストラテジー週次レポート「A Perspective On Risk And Reward」（2019年10月15日付）を usbs.bcaresearch.com でご覧ください
5 当社のU.S. ボンド・ストラテジー週次レポート「Two Themes And Two Trades」（2019年10月1日付）を usbs.bcaresearch.com でご覧ください
フィクスト・インカム・セクターのパフォーマンス
推奨ポートフォリオ仕様
ハイライト
通貨市場は短期的な期待と長期的な要因の点で二分されている。スウェーデンクローナ、ノルウェークローネ、英ポンドは長期的には堅調に買いだが、短期的には非常にボラタイルなままでいる可能性がある。
我々はドルの単純な押し目買いよりもクロス通貨に引き続き注目している。SEK/NZD、GBP/JPY、NOK/SEKはロングを維持。利益保護のためGBP/JPYのロスカットを引き締める。
世界的な成長が改善すればEUR/SEKは天井を打つはずだ。
先週のレポートで推奨した通り、金/銀比率を90で売る。1
特集
Chart I-1
2018年以降の一方通行
2018年以降の一方通行
2018年以降の一方通行
我々が注目するG10通貨の中で、最も不可解なのはおそらくスウェーデンクローナだ。リクスバンクは今年利上げを行った数少ない中央銀行の一つだが、クローナは依然としてG10で最も弱い通貨である。確かにスウェーデンの製造業のパフォーマンスはみじめで、特に9月はそうだったが、これはスウェーデンだけの話ではない。製造業の深刻な景気後退を経験しているユーロ圏の方が、よりハト派な欧州中央銀行（ECB）にもかかわらず通貨のパフォーマンスは良好だった。
クローナのアンダーパフォーマンスは、世界的な製造業の景気後退が長引くことを示しているのか、それともスウェーデン固有の内生的な問題を示しているのかという疑問を投げかける。言い換えれば、USD/SEK（さらにはUSD/NOK）の上昇を牽引してきたのはドル高なのか、それともより国内的な要因なのか（Chart I-1）？ もし後者であれば、反転が近づいている場合に注目すべき重要な指標は何か？
ソフトデータ対ハードデータの議論
スウェーデンにとって大きな問いは、製造業がただボラタイルに底打ちしているだけなのか、それともこれからさらに大きく収縮するのか、という点だ。鉱工業生産は現在前年比で4％成長しているが、ソフトデータのシグナルは二桁の縮小を示唆している（Chart I-2、上段）。したがって、投資家の認識と現実の間に大きな乖離があるか、あるいは我々がはるかに深刻な製造業の落ち込みの瀬戸際にいるかのどちらかだ。為替は幅広い経済データの織り込みが極めて流動的であり、スウェーデンの場合は世界成長の見通しを織り込む傾向にある。しかし、EUR/SEKが10.8、USD/SEKが9.7（後者は2008年の高値を大きく上回る）であることを踏まえれば、深刻な不況以外の結果であればクローナは強くなると見て差し支えない。
スウェーデン製造業の底を示す比較的一貫した指標の一つは新規受注対在庫比率だ（Chart I-2、下段）。9月の低下は不安を誘う。しかし、製造業PMIとは異なりこの比率は新たな安値を付けていない点は注目に値し、我々が長期的な落ち込みではなくボラタイルな底打ちプロセスにあるかもしれないという暫定的な証拠である。我々がこのような発散を最後に見たのは2011/2012年の欧州債務危機の最中であり、その際にはスウェーデンのハードデータが最終的に経済全体の正しいシグナルを送った。
製造業の悪化は、まだ国内消費一般や労働市場には影響を与えていない。
製造業の悪化は、まだ国内消費一般や労働市場には影響を与えていない。PMI指数の輸入項目は輸出のそれを大きく上回っている。一方で、PMIの雇用項目は今年の中頃から安定化し始めており、雇用成長は約1％前後で底打ちするはずだ（Chart I-3）。スウェーデンの輸出は多くの先進国よりも製造業の上位サプライチェーンに位置しており、自動車は重要な役割を果たす。しかしこれまでのところ、スウェーデン経済は自動車の減速を比較的うまく耐え抜いており、生産は依然として年率約7％で推移している。
Chart I-2
ソフトデータがはるかに悪い
ソフトデータははるかに悪化している
ソフトデータははるかに悪化している
Chart I-3
国内需要は堅調に持ちこたえている
国内需要は堅調に推移している
国内需要は堅調に推移している
スウェーデンの失業率の上昇は問題だが、我々はこれが労働市場のダイナミクスに重大な変化をもたらしたとは考えていない。スウェーデンは多くの他の欧州諸国よりも亡命希望者や難民に対して開放的である歴史が長い。数年前のシリア危機は例外的な急増を引き起こし、亡命希望者数は15万人を超え、総人口のほぼ1.5％にまで達した（Chart I-4）。歴史的に移民はスウェーデンに大きな労働力の恩恵をもたらし、成長は米国やユーロ圏を上回ってきた。ただし、新たな移民が労働力に統合される過程で摩擦的失業も生じている。
Chart I-4
統合される必要のある新たな労働力プール
統合しなければならない新たな労働力のプール
統合しなければならない新たな労働力のプール
外国生まれの労働者は現在総人口の約20％を占め、その大部分が新しい言語を学び新たなスキルを習得する必要がある（Chart I-5A）。この成長のメリットは今後何年にもわたって享受されるだろう。統合は政治的に敏感な問題であり、2016年中頃に採択された高度に制限的な亡命・再統合法は移民ブームの後退を意味する可能性が高い。2018年9月の選挙で反移民派のスウェーデン民主党が台頭したのはその典型例だ。しかし、民主主義国の有権者が右寄りに向かう動きは世界的な現象であり、相対的に見ればスウェーデンにとってそれほどネガティブではない。つまり、ほとんどの先進国と比較して、スウェーデンの人口見通しは依然として比較的良好だ（Chart I-5B）。
Chart I-5A
巨大な労働力の恩恵
巨額の労働配当
巨額の労働配当
Chart I-5B
明らかな人口の崖は見えない
明らかな人口の崖は見られない
明らかな人口の崖は見られない
移民の流入はインフレに対して混合的な影響を与える。賃金が低い就業比率の上昇により賃金を押し下げる圧力がある一方で、労働者数の増加に応じて住宅と消費には上押し圧力が掛かる。これは政府が社会サービスに支出を増やす財政刺激にもつながる。一方で、外国生まれの人々の失業率は約15％に達している。これはフィリップス曲線が最初の数年間は平坦で、その後急勾配になることを意味する。しかし新たな労働力が最終的に経済に吸収されれば、賃金圧力を生み出し始めるはずだ。
リクスバンクはこれらのダイナミクスを明確に理解しており、だからこそ過去数年はスウェーデン経済が比較的持ちこたえている局面でもハト派の姿勢を取ってきた。金利は2015年にマイナス領域に引き下げられ、2016年から2017年の世界的な回復期を通じて-0.5％に据え置かれた（ECBの政策金利より低い）。また量的緩和はECBの資産購入プログラムの再開発表よりも早く2020年まで延長された。これらは弱い通貨を通じて含め、スウェーデンの金融状況を大いに緩和した。今後、クローナの下値抵抗が薄く上昇しやすいと考える主要な理由がいくつかある：
弱いクローナは通常12か月のラグをもって製造業を助けてきた。
弱いクローナは通常12か月のラグをもって製造業を助けてきた。マイナスの乖離は深刻な不況の前にしか起こらない傾向がある。現在がまさにそのような状況でない限り、比較的安価になったスウェーデン製品（ボルボ対BMWを想起せよ）への需要が強まれば、クローナは強含みになるはずだ（Chart I-6）。
確かにRiskbankは量的緩和を実施してきたが、バランスシートの拡大ペースはここ数四半期で鈍化している。USD/SEKはリクスバンクとフェドの相対的なバランスシート動向を追う傾向があるが、クローナに有利な大きな差が開きつつある（Chart I-7）。一方で、フェドがバランスシートを再拡大しようとしていることも、USDに対してSEKを強める方向に働くはずだ。
Chart I-6
スウェーデンクローナと製造業
スウェーデン・クローナと製造業
スウェーデン・クローナと製造業
Chart I-7
USD/SEKと相対的バランスシート
USD/SEKと相対的バランスシート
USD/SEKと相対的バランスシート
スウェーデンの住宅市場はリクスバンクにとって悩みの種になりつつある。2015年にマイナス金利が導入された際、住宅価格は前年比で15％という急上昇を見せた（Chart I-8）。最近では移民抑制がある程度の冷却をもたらしたが、スウェーデンの家計のレバレッジは依然として非常に高い。1990年代の住宅危機の記憶が鮮明なため、現行の政策スタンスにリクスバンクは強い違和感を抱いている。
キャリーコストは米ドルをショートするよりNZDをショートする方が低い。
我々のバイアスは、ステファン・イングベス総裁ができるだけ速やかに政策を正常化したがっている一方で、彼が扱っているのは貿易がGDPの約45％を占める小規模開放経済であり、外部条件に翻弄されやすいという点だ。SEKはG10の中で最も割安な通貨であり、世界成長の底打ちを示すいかなる弱い証拠に対しても急反発する可能性がある。さらに、世界的な成長が上向けば資源利用がひっ迫し、スウェーデンの基調的なインフレ圧力が高まるはずだ（Chart I-9）。
Chart I-8
スウェーデンの住宅価格##br## バブル気味
スウェーデンの住宅価格はバブル状態にある
スウェーデンの住宅価格はバブル状態にある
Chart I-9
スウェーデンの資源利用とインフレ
スウェーデンにおける資源の活用とインフレ
スウェーデンにおける資源の活用とインフレ
SEKの取引ストラテジーに関しては、USD/SEKとNZD/SEKは高い相関を示す傾向にある。SEKはキウイよりも世界成長に対するベータが高い（スウェーデンはGDPの45％を輸出、ニュージーランドは27％）。相対的に見ると、スウェーデン経済は米国よりも底打ちしているように見え、SEK/NZDはUSD/SEKの下落をプレーする魅力的な手段だ。一方、キャリーコストは米ドルをショートするよりもNZDをショートする方が低い（Chart I-10）。EUR/SEKについては、当面現水準で推移したのち下落に向かう可能性があるが、最終的には世界成長が再加速するとピークを打つだろう。
Chart I-10
SEK/NZDはロングを維持
SEK/NZDのロングを維持
SEK/NZDのロングを維持
結論：我々は相対価値プレーとしてSEK/NZDを引き続きロングしているが、真の上昇余地はSEK/USDクロスにある。ソフトデータの失望に市場が注目していることがSEK安の主因である一方、ハードデータは比較的耐性を示しているというのが我々の見方だ。調査が示すほど世界成長環境が危うくないことが明確になれば、クローナは急反発する可能性がある。
事務連絡
我々のGBP/JPYロングは今週5%の含み益となった。利益を守るためストップを138に引き締める。EUR/NOKショートは2%の損失でロスカットされた。現時点では様子見である。EUR/NOKは現在2008年のリセッション時の水準を上回っており、それは長期化した景気後退のみで正当化されうるが、リスク管理の観点からは当面忍耐が必要だ。続報を待たれたい。
チェスター・ントニフォア, 外国為替ストラテジスト chestern@bcaresearch.com
脚注
1 詳細はForeign Exchange ストラテジー 週次レポート、題名「マネー回転率、EUR/USD、そして銀」（2019年10月11日付）を参照。fes.bcaresearch.comで入手可能
通貨
米ドル
Chart II-1
USDテクニカル 1
USD テクニカル 1
USD テクニカル 1
Chart II-2
USDテクニカル 2
米ドルテクニカル 2
米ドルテクニカル 2
米国の最近のデータは軟調である：
9月の小売売上高は前月比-0.3％。鉱工業生産は前月比-0.4％。
9月の輸出物価・輸入物価はともに前年比-1.6％下落。
ミシガン消費者信頼感指数は10月に96まで上昇、前月の93.2から上昇。
NYエンパイア・ステート製造業指数は10月に4に上昇、9月の2から。
9月の建築許可と住宅着工はそれぞれ前月比-2.7％、-9.4％と減少したが、住宅回復は維持されている。
10月11日終了週の新規失業保険申請件数は214Kに増加。
DXY指数は今週0.7％下落した。最新のベージュブックは米経済が緩やか〜中程度のペースで拡大しているとまとめた。製造業の減速は依然として最大のリスクであり、貿易摩擦は企業心理と設備投資意向に重しをかけ続けている。最近の貿易協議における“合意”は、夏を通じて続いてきた高い不確実性からの転換点を示す可能性がある。
レポートリンク：
マネー回転率、EUR/USD、そして銀 - 2019年10月11日
暴動ポイントにおける資本保全 - 2019年9月6日
通貨の風景は変わったか？ - 2019年8月16日
ユーロ
Chart II-3
EURテクニカル 1
EUR テクニカル分析 1
EUR テクニカル分析 1
Chart II-4
EURテクニカル 2
EURのテクニカル分析 2
EURのテクニカル分析 2
ユーロ圏の最近のデータは低調のままである：
9月の総合インフレ率は前年比0.8％に低下し、約3年ぶりの低水準となった。ただしコアインフレは前年比1％に上昇した。
ユーロ圏の鉱工業生産は8月に前年比-2.8％と引き続き縮小した。
ユーロ圏のZEW景況感は10月にさらに低下し-23.5となったが、これは予想の-33を大きく上回る。ドイツのZEW期待指数も10月に-22.8に低下した。期待は現状に比べて改善している点は注目に値する。
ユーロ圏の貿易収支は8月に203億ユーロに改善、7月の下方改定された175億ユーロから上昇した。ただしこれは主に輸入の縮小によるものだ。
EUR/USDは今週0.9％上昇し、広範なドル安が一因となった。ユーロ圏の貿易動向は依然憂慮すべきで、8月の輸出は前年比-2.2％、輸入は前年比-4.1％と大きく落ち込んだ。注目すべきは、年初来で対米のEUの貿易黒字が1年前の910億ユーロから1030億ユーロに拡大する一方、中国との貿易赤字は1160億ユーロから1270億ユーロにさらに拡大している点だ。
レポートリンク：
マネー回転率、EUR/USD、そして銀 - 2019年10月11日
いくつかのトレードアイデア - 2019年9月27日
中央銀行の対決 - 2019年6月21日
日本円
Chart II-5
JPYテクニカル 1
JPYのテクニカル分析 1
JPYのテクニカル分析 1
Chart II-6
JPYテクニカル 2
JPY テクニカル指標 2
JPY テクニカル指標 2
日本の最近のデータは引き続き失望的である：
8月の鉱工業生産は前年比-4.7％。
8月の稼働率は前月比-2.9％低下。
日本円は今週対米ドルで0.8％下落した。黒田総裁は経済状況がさらに悪化し続ければ躊躇なく行動すると改めて強調した。一方で、フェドやECBが資産買入を通じてバランスシートを拡大する方向にある中で、日銀がイールドカーブコントロールを超えてどれだけ追加で打ち手を講じられるかは不透明である。我々は日銀が攻撃的に動くには「リーマン級の瞬間」が必要だと考えており、円をロングで保有している。
レポートリンク：
いくつかのトレードアイデア - 2019年9月27日
通貨の風景は変わったか？ - 2019年8月16日
薄い夏場の取引に向けたポートフォリオ調整 - 2019年7月5日
英ポンド
Chart II-7
GBPテクニカル 1
GBP テクニカル指標 1
GBP テクニカル指標 1
Chart II-8
GBPテクニカル 2
GBP テクニカル分析 2
GBP テクニカル分析 2
英国の最近のデータは概ねネガティブである：
ILO失業率は8月にわずかに上昇して3.9％に。平均賃金の四半期成長率は3.8％に鈍化したが、予想の3.7％を上回った。
小売物価指数は9月に前年比2.4％と、前月の2.6％から減速。
総合インフレ率は9月に前年比1.7％で横ばい、コアインフレは1.5％から1.7％に上昇。
小売売上高は9月に前年比3.1％増、前月の2.6％から上昇。
GBP/USDは欧州理事会のブレグジットに関する楽観が高まったことで今週3.3％急騰した。バリュエーションの観点からは、ポンドはそのフェアバリューに対して大きく割安で取引されている。ブレグジットに関するポジティブなニュースが続けば、ポンドはさらに上昇し得る。我々はGBP/JPYをロングしており含み益は5％超。ストップを138に引き上げる。
レポートリンク：
いくつかのトレードアイデア - 2019年9月27日
英国：循環的減速か構造的停滞か？ - 2019年9月20日
中央銀行の対決 - 2019年6月21日
豪ドル
Chart II-9
AUDテクニカル 1
AUD テクニカル 1
AUD テクニカル 1
Chart II-10
AUDテクニカル 2
AUD テクニカル分析 2
AUD テクニカル分析 2
豪州の最近のデータは穏やかである：
NAB企業景況感はさらに-2に低下したが、Q3の活動状況は1に改善した。
労働市場では9月の失業率が5.2％に低下。14.7Kの雇用が創出され、うち26.2Kがフルタイム、11.4Kがパートタイムの減少だった。
AUD/USDは今週0.4％上昇した。今週初めにRBA議事録が公表されたが、低金利の効果について鋭い論争が示されている。一方では低金利は完全雇用とインフレ目標達成のため理論的に正当化される。だが他方で、一部のRBAメンバーは低金利が既に高騰している住宅価格をさらに煽ることを懸念している。したがってRBA議事録後、追加利下げの確率は低下した。
レポートリンク：
豪ドルに関するコントラリアンの見解 - 2019年5月24日
限界効用逓減に注意 - 2019年4月19日
まだ安全圏を脱していない - 2019年4月5日
NZドル
Chart II-11
NZDテクニカル 1
NZD テクニカル分析 1
NZD テクニカル分析 1
Chart II-12
NZDテクニカル 2
NZドルのテクニカル分析 2
NZドルのテクニカル分析 2
ニュージーランドの最近のデータはネガティブである：
観光客到着数は8月に前年比1.8％増と、前月の2％からわずかに低下。
第3四半期の総合インフレ率は前年比1.5％に鈍化。
NZD/USDは今週ほぼ横ばいで推移した。世界成長に密接に結びつくニュージーランドドルは米中貿易の見出しの浮き沈みに伴って変動している。両国は先週部分合意に達したが、詳細はまだあいまいだ。キウイはハイベータ通貨である一方、クロスではアンダーパフォームするはずだ。我々は引き続きオーストラリアドルとスウェーデンクローナを通じてキウイの弱さをプレーしている。
レポートリンク：
USD/CNYと市場の動揺 - 2019年8月9日
米ドルは次にどこへ向かうか？ - 2019年6月7日
まだ安全圏を脱していない - 2019年4月5日
カナダドル
Chart II-13
CADテクニカル 1
CADのテクニカル分析 1
CADのテクニカル分析 1
Chart II-14
CADテクニカル 2
CADのテクニカル 2
CADのテクニカル 2
カナダの最近のデータは比較的強い：
9月の失業率はさらに低下し5.5％に。さらに平均時給は前年比4.3％の伸びを続け、前月の3.8％から加速した。最後に9月の雇用者数は53.7Kの増加で、予想の10Kを大きく上回った。
9月の総合インフレ率とコアインフレ率はともに前年比1.9％で横ばいだった。
カナダドルは先週公表された好調な雇用データを受けて対米ドルで1％の上昇となった。今月の総選挙はカナダのエネルギーセクターと環境政策の将来にとって重要となり得る。
レポートリンク：
暴動ポイントにおける資本保全 - 2019年9月6日
薄い夏場の取引に向けたポートフォリオ調整 - 2019年7月5日
金、原油、暗号通貨について - 2019年6月28日
スイスフラン
Chart II-15
CHFテクニカル 1
CHF テクニカル分析 1
CHF テクニカル分析 1
Chart II-16
CHFテクニカル 2
CHF テクニカル 2
CHF テクニカル 2
スイスの最近のデータは良好である：
貿易黒字（貴金属除く）は9月に急拡大し28.8億CHFとなった。特に化学・製薬製品の販売増によりスイスの輸出は月次で8.2％増の203億CHFとなった。輸入は月次で1.4％減の174億CHFだった。
生産者物価と輸入物価は9月に前年比-2％のまま推移した。
USD/CHFは今週1％下落した。スイスフランは防御的通貨としての性格と、SNBによる操作ツールとしての性格の綱引きにさらされ続けるだろう。我々の推定ではEUR/CHF1.06が究極のストレスポイントである。グローバルポートフォリオは構造的にアウトパフォームするという単純な理由からスイスフランを保険として保有すべきだ。
レポートリンク：
SNBに関する注記 - 2019年10月4日
スイスフランへの対処法 - 2019年5月17日
限界効用逓減に注意 - 2019年4月19日
ノルウェークローネ
Chart II-17
NOKテクニカル 1
NOKのテクニカル指標 1
NOKのテクニカル指標 1
Chart II-18
NOKテクニカル 2
NOK テクニカル 2
NOK テクニカル 2
ノルウェーの最近のデータは低迷している：
貿易収支は9月に12億NOKの赤字に転じた。これは前年比で240億NOKの減少である。
ノルウェークローネは今週対米ドルでほぼ1％下落した。エネルギー価格はここ数週間低迷している。さらにノルウェーの貿易収支は2017年11月以来初めて赤字に転じた。輸出はエネルギー製品の販売減により前年比-19.5％と急落し、一方で輸入は前年比+12.9％と増加した。メッセージは明確だ――ノルウェーは国内的には比較的堅調だが、石油輸出への依存が成長見通しにボラティリティをもたらしている。BCAは2019年の原油価格見通しを引き下げており、これがノルウェークローネの魅力をそいでいる。続報にご期待ください。
レポートリンク：
いくつかのトレードアイデア - 2019年9月27日
薄い夏場の取引に向けたポートフォリオ調整 - 2019年7月5日
金、原油、暗号通貨について - 2019年6月28日
スウェーデンクローナ
Chart II-19
SEKテクニカル 1
SEK テクニカル 1
SEK テクニカル 1
Chart II-20
SEKテクニカル 2
SEK テクニカル 2
SEK テクニカル 2
スウェーデンの最近のデータは中立的である：
9月の失業率は7.1％で横ばいだった。
USD/SEKは今週1.1％下落した。今年に入って最もパフォーマンスが悪いG10通貨として、スウェーデンクローナは現在そのフェアバリューに対して大きく割安に取引されている。今週の本文前半でスウェーデン経済とクローナに関する詳細分析を提示しているので参照されたい。
レポートリンク：
米ドルは次にどこへ向かうか？ - 2019年6月7日
G10全体の国際収支 - 2019年2月15日
通貨の単純な魅力度ランキング - 2019年2月8日
トレード＆予測
予測サマリー
コアポートフォリオ
タクティカルトレード
指値注文
決済済み取引
ハイライト
先週合意された暫定的な「フェーズ1」貿易協定は、米中貿易戦争におけるデタントに向けた重要な一歩を示しています。
ブレグジット交渉の今後にかかわらず、ハード・ブレグジットは回避される見込みです。ポンドをロングで保有し続けてください。
米国の企業業績の伸びは第3四半期に横ばいとなる可能性が高く、ボトムアップの予想にある前年比減少とは対照的です。
世界成長が年末までに再加速すれば、企業業績の伸びは回復するはずです。
世界成長の強まりは米ドルに下押し圧力をかけるでしょう。
12か月の期間では、債券に対してグローバル株式をオーバーウェイトのまま維持してください。
景気循環株はディフェンシブ株をアウトパフォームし始めるはずです。金融セクターはついに日の目を見るでしょう。
好ましい追い風
2週間前に公表した第4四半期ストラテジー・アウトルックでは、グローバル株式が「見せて」フェーズに入ったと主張しました。つまり、株価指数が上昇するには、貿易戦争のエスカレーションの緩和と世界成長の回復を示す具体的な証拠が必要だという意味です。1
先週金曜、貿易面でいくつかの好材料がありました。2500億ドル相当の中国からの輸入品に対し10月15日に25％から30％へ引き上げる予定だった関税の実施を見送ることと引き換えに、中国は年間で400～500億ドル分の米国農産物を購入し、米国の金融サービス企業への市場アクセスを改善し、為替管理の透明性を高めることに合意しました。
確かに、やるべきことはまだ多く残っています。協定文はまだ最終化されていません。両国は、11月16–17日のチリ・サンティアゴでのAPECサミットまでに合意をまとめることを目指しています。しかし、どのような執行・解決メカニズムが協定に盛り込まれるかなど多くの重要課題が未解決のままであることを考えると、さらに遅延したり、交渉が決裂したりする可能性もあります。
先週の暫定合意は、知的財産保護の扱いという厄介な問題を「フェーズ2」に先送りする形にもなっています。「フェーズ1」がまとまり次第、間もなく「フェーズ2」が始まる予定です。
独立かつ超党派の米国知的財産の窃盗に関する委員会によれば、米国の生産者は知的財産の窃盗により年間で約$225～$600 billionの損失を被っているとされています。2 中国はしばしば最悪の加害国の一つと見なされてきました。
知的財産問題の重要性を考えれば、約1600億ドル相当の中国からの輸入に対して15％の関税が12月15日に導入されないようにするには、実質的な進展が必要となるでしょう。
トランプは合意を望んでいる
多くの障害が残るものの、先週の展開は18か月に及ぶ貿易戦争のデタントの見込みを大きく高めました。自称「マスター交渉人」であるトランプ大統領は、交渉を「ラブフェスト」と表現し、この貿易協定は「我が偉大なる愛国的農家のために結ばれたこれまでで最大かつ最高の取引だ」と呼び、最終合意が達成されることに「ほとんど疑いはない」と述べて自らの信頼性を賭けています。NAFTAの後継であるUSMCAと同様に、トランプは交渉を自らの功績として宣伝するマーケティングモードに入る可能性が高く、米国民のために交渉した「驚くべき」新協定を大々的に宣伝するでしょう。
政治的観点から見ると、これは非常に理にかなっています。正否は別として、トランプ大統領は有権者から経済運営について他のどの分野よりも高い評価を受けています（チャート 1）。長引く貿易戦争は米国経済を弱体化させ、トランプの再選の見通しを損なうことになります。
チャート 1
トランプは経済運営について比較的高評価を得ているが、他はそれほどではない
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チャート 2
中国企業は関税の大部分を負担していない
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トランプの主張に反して、証拠は明確に米国の消費者が関税の大部分を負担していることを示唆しています。チャート 2は、対中輸入品に対する関税率が上昇する一方で、米国の輸入価格はほとんど下がっていないことを示しています。最近の関税の多くが米国や第三国に競合相手がほとんどいない中国製品に焦点を当てている以上、中国の生産者が関税コストを転嫁する能力はさらに高まります。
もし発表されたすべての関税引き上げが実施されれば、対中輸入品の実効関税率は8月下旬時点の約15％から12月には最大約25％にまで上昇することになります（チャート 3）。そのような関税率は、米国の可処分所得を1000億ドル以上減少させ、2017年の減税によるほとんどの恩恵を消し去ることになります。トランプは貿易戦争をそこまで進行させるわけにはいきません。
チャート 3
度重なる関税引き上げが積み重なり始めている
相次ぐ関税が積み重なり始めている
相次ぐ関税が積み重なり始めている
中国は強硬策に出るか？
貿易戦争を有利に解決する上でのリスクの一つは、中国側がトランプを「合意に飢えている」と見なし、交渉で強硬姿勢をとる可能性があることです。このリスクは無視できませんが、我々は次の三つの理由でそれを過度に重視しません。
第一に、貿易戦争の期間、中国の輸出業者はある程度の価格決定力を維持してきたとしても、貿易量は依然として悪化しており、9月の対米輸出は前年同月比でほぼ22％減少しています。
第二に、ZTEに対する強力な制裁が示したように、中国は依然として米国の技術に大きく依存しています。これがトランプに交渉上の大きなレバレッジを与えています。
チャート 4
誰が2020年の民主党指名を勝ち取るか？
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第三に、トランプ自身がよく言うように、中国は彼の第1期目の任期中に彼と交渉する方が、第2期目になってから交渉するよりも容易だと考えるでしょう。数か月前、ジョー・バイデンが世論調査で高支持率だったときにはトランプの再選を望まない方が中国にとって理にかなっていたかもしれませんが、エリザベス・ウォーレンが民主党指名を獲得する有力候補として浮上したことで、その希望は消えました（チャート 4）。数週間前に述べたように、中国はウォーレンが貿易問題でトランプよりも手ごわくないとは考えないでしょう。3
これらすべてを総合すると、中国もトランプ同様、今後数週間で貿易緊張を和らげる方法を模索するだろうと示唆しています。
ブレグジットの突破口か？
記事執筆時点で、ブレグジット合意の見通しは明るくなっています。詳細はまだ公表されていませんが、提案された合意は北アイルランドを事実上、欧州単一市場の一部でありながら同時に英国の一部でもあるという量子的な重ね合わせ状態に置くことになります。これは北アイルランドを英国の政治的管轄下に置きつつ、EUの規制基準と整合させ続けることで実現されます。
交渉が破綻する可能性は依然としてあります。ジョンソン首相が「素晴らしい新協定を取り付けた」と確約したにもかかわらず、保守党の連立相手である北アイルランドの民主統一党は依然として協定への支持を留保しています。労働党のジェレミー・コービン党首もこれを拒否し、テリーザ・メイが当初提案した協定よりもさらに悪いと述べています。
今後数日に何が起きようとも、我々はハード・ブレグジットは回避されると引き続き考えています。ブレグジット問題を通じて、英国の支配階級の中に無協議離脱を支持する十分な政治的支持は存在しないと我々は主張してきました。世論調査が示すように、再度国民投票が行われればEU残留を選ぶ有権者の割合が増えていることが明らかになるにつれ、その確信はさらに強まっています（チャート 5）。
我々は2017年8月3日以来、ユーロに対してポンドをロングしています。このトレードはこの期間で6.6％上昇しました。投資家はこのポジションを維持すべきです。実質金利差に基づけば、GBP/EURは現在の1.16ではなく1.30付近で取引されるべきであると考えられます（チャート 6）。ハード・ブレグジットリスクがさらに後退すれば、クロスは公正価値に向かうと予想します。
チャート 5
ブレグジット不安：後悔の事例
ブレグジット不安：ブレモースの場合
ブレグジット不安：ブレモースの場合
チャート 6
ポンドには大きな上値余地がある
ポンドの大幅な上昇余地
ポンドの大幅な上昇余地
世界成長見通しは改善
チャート 7
成長減速はソフトデータでより顕著だった
景気の減速はソフト指標でより顕著になっている
景気の減速はソフト指標でより顕著になっている
チャート 8
ISMの低迷の中で製造業生産は反発している
製造業の生産高がISM指数の低迷の中で反発
製造業の生産高がISM指数の低迷の中で反発
貿易戦争のデタントとブレグジット問題の解決は世界成長を下支えするはずです。経済データの弱さは、事業調査のような「ソフト」指標でより明確に現れており、工業生産などの「ハード」指標ほど顕著ではありません（チャート 7）。特に、ISM製造業指数が低迷する中でも、過去3か月間で米国の製造業生産は安定しています（チャート 8）。センチメントが回復すれば、ソフトデータも改善するでしょう。
世界の金融環境は、主に多くの中央銀行によるハト派転換のおかげで過去5か月で大幅に緩和されました（チャート 9）。政策金利を引き下げた中央銀行の純数は、一般に6～9か月先行して世界の製造業PMIをリードします（チャート 10）。加えて、FRBが再び国債買入れを開始した決定はドル流動性を増やし、金融環境の更なる緩和に寄与するでしょう。
チャート 9
緩和された金融環境が世界成長を押し上げる
金融環境の緩和が世界経済の成長を後押しする
金融環境の緩和が世界経済の成長を後押しする
チャート 10
金融緩和の効果は間もなく実体経済に波及するはずだ
金融緩和の効果は間もなく経済に波及するはずだ。
金融緩和の効果は間もなく経済に波及するはずだ。
中国による景気刺激の強化も世界成長の再加速を後押しするはずです。中国のマネーおよびクレジットの伸びは9月に予想を上回りました。中国人民銀行は預金準備率を引き下げており、これがインターバンク金利の低下に寄与しています。残りの今年期間で中期貸出制度（MLF）への更なる利下げが予想されます。中国のクレジット成長の変化は世界成長を約9か月先行します（チャート 11）。
チャート 11
中国の信用拡大が世界成長の回復を支える
中国のクレジットは世界経済の成長回復を支えるはずだ
中国のクレジットは世界経済の成長回復を支えるはずだ
グローバル株式をオーバーウェイトのまま
APECサミットまでに「フェーズ1」貿易協定をまとめる道のりはでこぼこ道である可能性が高いものの、我々は12か月の投資期間において債券に対してグローバル株式をオーバーウェイトするという推奨を引き続き強調します。
世界成長が底打ちしているという証拠をもう少し確認でき次第、数週間以内に新興国（EM）および欧州株式の評価を引き上げる見込みです。
最終的に株式の軌道は業績の動向に依存します。米国の決算シーズンは今週始まりました。先週時点でFactSetがまとめたデータによれば、アナリストはS&P500のEPSが第3四半期に前年同期比で4.6％減少すると予想していました。ただし、2015年以降、EPS成長は概ね予想を約4ポイント上回ってきたことを念頭に置いてください（チャート 12）。したがって、妥当な見方は、米国の業績は今四半期横ばいとなり、低い期待値のハードルをクリアするというものです。
チャート 12
実際のEPSは概ね予想を上回っている
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チャート 13
利益と名目GDP成長は同じ動きをする傾向がある
収益と名目GDP成長率は歩調を合わせて動く傾向がある
収益と名目GDP成長率は歩調を合わせて動く傾向がある
これまでに決算を発表した63社のS&P500構成銘柄のうち83％が予想を上回っており、これは歴史的平均の64％を上回っています。これにより現在の第3四半期の見積りは悲観的すぎるという見方が支持されます。
先を見れば、名目GDP成長が加速するにつれて業績成長は回復するはずです（チャート 13）。
世界成長が加速すると、新興国（EM）と欧州株式は一般にグローバルベンチマークをアウトパフォームする傾向があります（チャート 14）。これはそれらの株式市場がより景気循環的であるためです。加えて、ドルは逆循環的通貨として、高成長環境では弱含む傾向があります。ドル安は景気循環株に対して相対的に大きな恩恵をもたらします（チャート 15）。
チャート 14
新興国およびユーロ圏の株式は世界成長が改善すると通常アウトパフォームする
世界経済の成長が改善すると、新興国株式とユーロ圏株式は通常アウトパフォームする
世界経済の成長が改善すると、新興国株式とユーロ圏株式は通常アウトパフォームする
チャート 15
ドルが弱含めば景気循環株がアウトパフォームする
ドル安になれば景気循環株がアウトパフォームする
ドル安になれば景気循環株がアウトパフォームする
我々は金融株を景気循環セクターの定義に含めます。世界成長が改善すると、長期国債利回りは限界的に上昇します。中央銀行が急いで利上げする状況にはないため、イールドカーブはスティープ化するでしょう。これが銀行の利益と株価を押し上げます（チャート 16）。
景気循環株は現在ディフェンシブ株と比べてかなり割安です（チャート 17）。同様に、非米国株式は地域間のセクター構成の違いを調整しても、米国株に比べてかなり割安です。米国株はフォワードEPS倍率で17.5倍で取引されているのに対し、国際株式はより魅力的な13.7倍のフォワードPEで取引されています。より高い利益利回りとより低い海外金利の組み合わせは、米国外の株式リスクプレミアムが概ね2パーセントポイント高いことを示唆しています（チャート 18）。
チャート 16
利回り曲線の急勾配化は金融株に恩恵をもたらす
より急勾配なイールドカーブは金融セクターに恩恵をもたらす
より急勾配なイールドカーブは金融セクターに恩恵をもたらす
チャート 17
景気循環株はディフェンシブ株より魅力的だ
景気循環株はディフェンシブ株より魅力的だ
景気循環株はディフェンシブ株より魅力的だ
チャート 18
株式リスクプレミアムはかなり高く、特に米国外で顕著だ
株式リスクプレミアムはかなり高く、特に米国外で顕著です。
株式リスクプレミアムはかなり高く、特に米国外で顕著です。
世界成長が底打ちするという証拠をもう少し確認でき次第、我々は数週間以内に新興国および欧州株式の評価を引き上げる見込みです。
ピーター・ベレジン、 チーフ・グローバル・ストラテジスト グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー peterb@bcaresearch.com
脚注
1本文は、グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジーの「第4四半期2019 ストラテジー・アウトルック：『見せて』市場」（2019年10月4日）を参照してください。
2 「Update to IP Commission Report: The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property」（2017年）、The National Bureau of Asian Research。
3本文は、グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー週次レポートの「エリザベス・ウォーレンと市場」（2019年9月13日）を参照してください。
ストラテジー＆マーケット動向
マクロクォント・モデルと現在の主観的スコア
クンバヤ
クンバヤ
戦略的推奨
クローズドトレード
Highlights Duration & Fed: Our late-1990s & 2015/16 roadmap for the economy still holds, but risks are mounting. Despite the risks, we expect that trade tensions will calm enough for the economic data to improve during the next few months. The result will be one more Fed rate cut this month, followed by an extended on-hold period. Investors should keep portfolio duration low in that environment. Junk Quality Spreads: This year’s divergence between the Caa/Ba quality spread and the high-yield index spread is highly unusual, but has more to do with movements in Treasury yields and changing index duration than with broader concerns about corporate credit quality. Investment Grade Risk & Reward: We present a novel approach for assessing the risk/reward trade-off among investment grade corporate bond sectors. We note that Saudi Arabian and Mexican Sovereign bonds, Foreign Agency bonds and Conventional 30-year Agency MBS look particularly attractive in risk-adjusted terms. Feature Contagion? This publication has repeatedly pointed to the late-1990s and the 2015/16 periods as appropriate comparables for today’s global growth slowdown. That is, we expect that the current spate of weakness will stay confined within the manufacturing sector and will not spread into the broader economy, leading the U.S. into recession. This call is important from an investment perspective because it implies that the Fed is not currently engaged in an easing cycle that will bring the funds rate back to zero. Rather, we anticipate only three rate cuts this year (we’ve already seen two), followed by the eventual resumption of hikes. Bond yields will not make new lows in that environment. Chart 1Manufacturing Weakness Spreading? Chart 2"Hard" Data Still Firm But some data received this month challenge our economic narrative. Specifically, September’s drop in the ISM Non-Manufacturing PMI from 56.4 to 52.6 and the year-over-year decline in the Conference Board’s survey of consumer confidence (Chart 1). Both are sending tentative signals that economic weakness might be spreading from the manufacturing sector into the broader U.S. economy. The Fed is worried about the same thing, as evidenced by this passage from the September FOMC minutes: One risk that the economy faced was that the softness recorded of late in firms’ capital formation, manufacturing, and exporting activities might spread to their hiring decisions, with adverse implications for household income and spending. Participants observed that such an eventuality was not embedded in their baseline outlook; however, a couple of them indicated that this was partly because they assumed that an appropriate adjustment to the policy rate path would help forestall that eventuality. This passage makes two important points. First, it stresses the risk of contagion from manufacturing into services and consumer spending as a precondition for recession. This risk has clearly increased, but we are not yet ready to abandon our base case outlook. For one thing, Chart 1 shows that the ISM Non-Manufacturing survey printed at 51.8 for one month in 2016, before rebounding sharply. Second, the “hard” economic data paint a much rosier picture that the “soft” survey data (Chart 2). Industrial production has already bounced off its lows and, unlike the ISM Manufacturing PMI, has not yet approached 2015/16 levels. Similarly, new orders for capital goods are much stronger than during the 2015/16 period. As for consumer spending, it continues to grow at a rapid pace despite the drop in confidence. Chart 3Expect One Rate Cut In October The most logical explanation for the divergence between “hard” and “soft” data is that business and consumer sentiment are being pulled down by concerns about the ongoing trade war. Our sense is that some positive news on that front is now required to bring the survey data back into line with the “hard” numbers. On that note, we anticipate that the looming 2020 election will provide enough incentive for President Trump to reach some sort of détente with China. In fact, as we go to press, optimism about a potential trade deal has pushed the 10-year Treasury yield up above 1.70%. If this optimism is not vindicated, then weak survey data will eventually drag the “hard” data lower. The economy is at a critical and highly uncertain juncture. Amidst so much uncertainty, and with so much hinging on near-term political decisions, how should we expect the Fed to respond? The above passage from the September FOMC minutes gives us a strong clue. It illustrates that the Fed believes that sufficiently accommodative monetary policy will help mitigate the risk of contagion from manufacturing into services and consumer spending. In other words, the Fed must help weather the current storm by ensuring that financial conditions remain supportive. This means refraining from delivering hawkish surprises to market expectations.1 The Fed believes that sufficiently accommodative monetary policy will help mitigate the risk of contagion from manufacturing into services and consumer spending. With that in mind, we note that the market has mostly priced-in an October rate cut (Chart 3), and we expect the Fed to deliver on that expectation. Assuming an October cut, the market is only pricing-in a 28% chance of another cut in December. Overall, the market is priced for 59 basis points of rate cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate a 25 bps cut this month, followed by an improvement in the economic data that will make further cuts unnecessary. Bottom Line: Our late-1990s & 2015/16 roadmap for the economy still holds, but risks are mounting. Despite the risks, we expect that trade tensions will calm enough for the economic data to improve during the next few months. The result will be one more Fed rate cut this month, followed by an extended on-hold period. Investors should keep portfolio duration low in that environment. High-Yield Quality Spreads: Less Than Meets The Eye Corporate bonds have generally performed quite well this year, but oddly, the lowest tier of junk has not kept pace (Chart 4). Investment grade excess returns have followed a typical risk-on pattern. That is, the lowest rated / riskiest credit tiers have performed best in a bull market. However, in the high-yield space, Caa-rated debt has bucked the trend and actually underperformed the duration-matched Treasury index by 33 bps. Chart 4Caa-Rated Junk Is Not Keeping Pace Is this a potentially worrying sign for corporate spreads more generally? To consider the question, we looked at the historical relationships between quality spreads – the spread differential between low-rated and high-rated credit tiers – and the overall index spreads for both investment grade and high-yield. We found a strong positive correlation in both cases, but no leading or lagging properties. That is, quality spreads tend to follow the same trend as the overall index spread, but do not flag signs of trouble before the overall index. Nonetheless, the current divergence between the Caa/Ba quality spread and the high-yield index spread is highly unusual (Chart 5). Our sense, however, is that the divergence has less to do with concerns about credit quality and more to do with this year’s large moves in Treasury yields and changes to bond index duration. Chart 5De-Coupling In Quality Spreads... Chart 6...Is Due To Duration Specifically, we note that this year’s large decline in Treasury yields has caused junk index duration to plunge, but the drop has been greater for the Ba credit tier than the Caa credit tier (Chart 6). Ba index duration has fallen by 0.8 this year (from 4.4 to 3.5), while Caa index duration has fallen by 0.6 (3.4 to 2.8). The result is that if we control for changes in duration by looking at a 12-month breakeven spread instead of the average index option-adjusted spread (OAS), we see that the quality spread widening is roughly consistent with the overall index (Chart 6, panel 3).2 In other words, the steep drop in Treasury yields has not led to the same reduction in risk in the Caa credit tier as it has in the other junk credit tiers. Caa spreads have widened on a relative basis, as a result. This year’s large decline in Treasury yields has caused junk index duration to plunge. It’s also interesting to note that the opposite dynamic is afoot within the investment grade corporate space. The Baa/Aa quality spread is more or less consistent with the overall index spread in OAS terms (Chart 5, top panel), but the quality spread widening is exacerbated when the impact of changing duration is considered (Chart 6, panels 1 & 2). That is, index duration has lengthened by more for the upper credit tiers than it has for the Baa credit tier. This makes Baa corporates look particularly attractive in risk-adjusted terms, as we have noted in prior research.3 From a big picture perspective, it is unusual for Treasury yields to fall so much without a concurrent widening in credit risk premiums. Eventually, this anomaly will be resolved by either: Higher Treasury yields in the event that recession is avoided, or Wider credit spreads in the event of a contraction in U.S. economic activity But in the meantime, negatively convex sectors such as high-yield corporates and Agency MBS look particularly attractive on a risk-adjusted basis. These sectors have benefited from the drop in Treasury yields by seeing their durations fall. They should perform well as long as the current environment of low Treasury yields and stable credit spreads persists. We take a more detailed look at the prospects for risk-adjusted performance within the different investment grade bond sectors in the next section. Risk And Reward In Investment Grade Bond Sectors As mentioned above, in this week’s report we present a novel approach for considering the risk/reward trade-off between different investment grade sectors of the U.S. bond market. We consider 23 sectors in total: 4 corporate credit tiers Conventional 30-year Agency MBS and Agency CMBS Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS, credit card ABS and auto loan ABS Domestic and Foreign Agency bonds Supranationals Local Authority bonds (mostly taxable munis and USD-denominated Canadian provincial debt) USD-denominated Sovereign bonds for 10 different emerging markets Reward First, we consider the reward side of the equation. We do not impose any macro view, but instead, use the average index OAS as the best estimate for each sector’s 12-month expected excess returns relative to a duration-matched position in Treasuries. Chart 7 shows the expected excess returns for each sector. Right away, the attractiveness of Mexican sovereign debt is apparent. Mexico carries an A rating, but offers a greater spread than the Baa corporate index. Chart 7Expected Returns Risk We decided to assess risk using a breakeven spread framework. We calculate a 12-month breakeven spread for each sector. This spread represents the basis point spread widening required for each sector to break even with a duration-matched position in Treasury securities on a 12-month horizon. We calculate the breakeven spread using the following equation: 0 = OAS – D(B) + 0.5*CVXs*(dYs)2 - 0.5*CVXT*(dYT)2 Where: OAS = the sector’s option-adjusted spread D = the sector’s duration B = the breakeven spread CVXs = the sector’s convexity CVXT = the convexity of a duration-matched Treasury security dYs = trailing 1-year volatility of the sector’s yield dYT = trailing 1-year volatility of the duration-matched Treasury yield Chart 8 shows each sector’s 12-month breakeven spread, and it illustrates that the breakeven spread is a sub-optimal measure of risk. In theory, the highest breakeven spreads should be the least likely to see losses, but this is obviously not the case. Baa-rated South African Sovereign debt carries the largest breakeven spread, but it should be among the riskiest of the sectors. Chart 812-Month Breakeven Spreads The missing piece of the puzzle is spread volatility. South African sovereign spreads need to widen by 39 bps before losses are incurred, while Aaa-rated credit card ABS spreads only need to widen by 13 bps. However, if spread volatility is much higher for South African sovereigns than for credit card ABS, then the sovereign sector still might be more likely to see losses. To control for this difference we calculate the standard deviation of annual spread changes for each sector, starting from May 2014 when all sectors have available data. We then divide each sector’s breakeven spread by the result. This calculation gives us a volatility-adjusted 12-month breakeven spread. In other words, it is the number of standard deviations of spread widening required for each sector to see losses on a 12-month horizon (Chart 9). Chart 912-Month Volatility-Adjusted Breakeven Spreads Risk & Reward We bring risk and reward together in Charts 10-12. Chart 10 shows expected returns on the y-axis and the vol-adjusted 12-month breakeven spread on the x-axis. Sectors plotting near the top-right of the chart give the best returns and lowest risk of losses, while sectors plotting near the bottom-left provide low expected returns and high risk of losses. Immediately, Saudi Arabian sovereigns and Foreign Agency debt stand out as offering high expected returns for their risk levels. Note that South African sovereigns plot off the charts, toward the top-left of Charts 10-12, as indicated by the arrows. Chart 10Expected Returns Vs. Risk Of Negative Excess Returns Chart 11Expected Returns Vs. Risk Of Losing 100 BPs Chart 12Expected Returns Vs. Risk Of Losing 200 BPs In Charts 11 and 12 we make one further refinement to our risk measure. In these charts, instead of calculating 12-month breakeven spreads, we calculate the spread change necessary for each sector to underperform Treasuries by 100 bps and 200 bps, respectively. Saudi Arabian sovereigns and Foreign Agency debt stand out as offering high expected returns for their risk levels. This adjustment arguably gives a more useful perspective on risk. For example, because spreads are quite narrow in the Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors, the risk of negative returns versus Treasuries is quite elevated. However, these sectors also carry high credit ratings and low spread volatility, making it exceedingly unlikely that they would deliver losses of 100 bps or more. Considering Charts 11 and 12, we look for sectors that clearly dominate other ones, i.e. plotting both higher and further to the right. Once again, Foreign Agencies and Saudi Arabian sovereigns both look very appealing. Mexican sovereign debt also offers very high expected return, and less risk that the Baa corporate sector. We would also like to point out the attractiveness of Agency MBS. As we noted in a recent report, Agency MBS offer considerably less risk than high-rated corporate debt, and similar expected returns. Note that this analysis doesn’t impose any macroeconomic view, and our sense is that the macro back-drop is more favorable for MBS spreads than for corporates.4 All in all, we reiterate our recommendation to favor Agency MBS over Aaa-, Aa- and A-rated corporate bonds. We will continue to refine this approach to measuring the risk/reward trade-off in the coming weeks, including incorporating high-yield debt into our analysis. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further discussion on this topic please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Act As Appropriate”, dated August 27, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon to break even with a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. It can be approximated by dividing the option-adjusted spread by duration, as is done in Chart 6. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors. All of the Monitors are now below the zero line, indicating a growing need to ease global monetary policy (Chart of the Week). Central bankers have already gone down that path in several countries over the past few months (the U.S., the euro area, Australia and New Zealand), helping sustain the powerful 2019 rally in global bond markets. Feature With the global manufacturing & trade downturn now threatening to spill over into domestic demand in the major developed markets, policymakers will need to stay dovish to stave off recession. This will keep global bond yields at depressed levels in the near term, at least until widely-followed data like manufacturing PMIs stabilize and/or there is positive news on U.S.-China trade negotiations. Chart of the WeekStrong Pressures To Ease Global Monetary Policy Yields already discount a lot of bad economic news, however, and there is a ray of hope visible in the bottoming out of our global leading economic indicator. A sustainable bottom in global bond yields, though, will require some change in the current downward growth or inflation momentum highlighted in our Central Bank Monitors. Yields already discount a lot of bad economic news, however, and there is a ray of hope visible in the bottoming out of our global leading economic indicator. A sustainable bottom in global bond yields, though, will require some change in the current downward growth or inflation momentum highlighted in our Central Bank Monitors. An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors* Chart 2Low Bond Yields Are Consistent With Our CB Monitors The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future monetary policy decisions. The economic data series used to construct the Monitors are not the same for every country, but the list of indicators generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand strength, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc). The data series are standardized and combined to form the Monitors. Readings above the zero line for each Monitor indicate pressures for central banks to raise interest rates, and vice versa. Through the nexus between growth, inflation, and market expectations of future interest rate changes, the Monitors do exhibit broad correlations to government bond yields in the Developed Markets (Chart 2). All of the Monitors are currently pointing in a bond-bullish direction, making them less useful as a country allocation tool within global bond portfolios. With easing pressures most intense in the euro area, given that the ECB Monitor has the lowest reading, our recommended overweight stance on core euro area government bonds (hedged into U.S. dollars) remains well supported. In each BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook, we include a new chart for each country that we have not shown previously. In this edition, we show the components of the Monitors, grouped into those focusing on economic growth and inflation, plotted against our central bank discounters that indicate the amount of rate cuts/hikes priced into global Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves. Fed Monitor: Signaling A Need For More Cuts Our Fed Monitor has fallen below the zero line (Chart 3A), indicating that the Fed’s summer rate cuts were justified with more easing still required. The Monitor, however, has not yet fallen to levels seen during U.S. recessions and is more consistent with the below-trend growth periods in 2016 and the late-1990s. The views of the FOMC on U.S. monetary policy are more deeply divided now than has been seen in many years. The doves can point to slumping global growth, persistent trade uncertainty, contracting capital spending and falling inflation expectations as reasons to continue cutting rates. The hawks can look at continued labor market tightness, elevated asset prices and realized inflation rates holding near the Fed’s 2% inflation target (Chart 3B) as reasons to keep monetary policy steady. That mixed picture can be seen in the components of our Fed Monitor, with the growth components showing the biggest pressure for more rate cuts compared to more stable readings from the inflation and financial components (Chart 3C). Chart 3AU.S.: Fed Monitor Chart 3BU.S. Realized Inflation Holding Firm Chart 3CGreatest Pressure For Fed Rate Cuts From Growth Components Of Our Fed Monitor The U.S. Treasury market may have gotten ahead of itself after the latest decline in yields, which looks stretched versus the Fed Monitor. The U.S. Treasury market may have gotten ahead of itself after the latest decline in yields, which looks stretched versus the Fed Monitor (Chart 3D). We still expect the Fed to deliver just one more rate cut at the FOMC meeting at the end of October, as the “hard” U.S. data is outpeforming the “soft” data like the weak ISM surveys. That leaves Treasury yields vulnerable to some rebound if global growth stabilizes, although that is conditional on no new breakdown of the U.S.-China trade negotiations – a factor that continues to weigh on U.S. business confidence. Chart 3DTreasury Yields More Than Fully Discount Fed Easing Pressures BoE Monitor: Easier Policy Needed Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor, which was in the “tighter money required” zone from 2016-18, has been below the zero line since April of this year (Chart 4A). The market agrees with the message from the Monitor and is now pricing in -12bps of rate cuts over the next twelve months. The relentless uncertainty surrounding Brexit has triggered sharp downgrades of growth expectations and weakened business confidence, which the BoE is now factoring into its own projections. In the August Inflation Report, the BoE lowered its 2020 inflation forecast to below 2% - no surprise given the sharp fall in realized inflation that has already occurred even as economic growth has still not yet fallen substantially below trend (Chart 4B). Chart 4AU.K.: BoE Monitor Chart 4BFalling U.K. Inflation Opens The Door To A BoE Ease Still, weakening growth components have been the main driver of the BoE Monitor into rate cut territory (Chart 4C). While a strong jobs market is helping support consumer spending, the Brexit turmoil is having a lasting impact on future growth. Since the 2016 Brexit referendum, business confidence and real business investment have collapsed which, in turn, has hurt productivity growth, as we discussed in a Special Report last month.1 Chart 4CBrexit Uncertainty + Slumping Growth = Pressure For BoE Rate Cuts The uncertainty around Brexit dominates the economic outlook and any future BoE decisions. Our Geopolitical Strategy service anticipates that Brexit will be delayed beyond October 31st. As a result, uncertainty will continue to weigh on Gilt yields, even though yields have already fallen in line with our BoE Monitor (Chart 4D). We continue to recommend an overweight stance on U.K. Gilts. Chart 4DGilt Yields Have Fallen In Line With Our BoE Monitor ECB Monitor: Intense Pressure For Easier Monetary Policy Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor is now well below the zero line, signaling a strong need for easier monetary policy (Chart 5A). The global manufacturing downturn has hit the export-dependent economies of the euro area hard, with Germany now likely in a technical recession. Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor is now well below the zero line, signaling a strong need for easier monetary policy. Despite the weaker growth momentum, there remains far less spare capacity in the euro area economy than at any time since before the 2009 global recession (Chart 5B). This is keeping realized inflation in positive territory, in contrast to what was seen during the previous downturn in 2015-16. Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BEuro Area Inflation Is Subdued, Despite Tight Labor Markets The ECB has already responded to the weakening growth & inflation pressures, introducing a new TLTRO program back in March and then cutting the overnight deposit rate and restarting its Asset Purchase Program in September. The latest policy moves were reported to be more contentious, with the “hard money” northern euro area countries opposed to restarting bond purchases. The new incoming ECB President, Christine Lagarde, will likely have her hands full trying to gain consensus on any further easing measures from here, even as both the growth and inflation components of our ECB Monitor indicate that more stimulus is needed (Chart 5C). Chart 5CA Consistent Message On The Need For Future ECB Easing From Growth & Inflation The big decline in euro area bond yields, which has pushed large swaths of sovereign yields into negative territory, does not look particularly stretched relative to the plunge in the ECB Monitor (Chart 5D). Without signs that the global manufacturing downturn is ending, however, euro area yields will stay mired at current deeply depressed levels. We recommend a moderate overweight on core European government bonds, on a currency-hedged basis into U.S. dollars. Chart 5DBund Rally Looks In Line With The ECB Monitor BoJ Monitor: A Rate Cut On The Horizon? Our Bank of Japan (BoJ) Monitor has drifted slightly below the zero line into “rate cut required” territory (Chart 6A). Over the past few years, the BoJ’s monetary policy has remained unchanged for the most part and its messaging has grown less dovish, citing an expanding economy. However, recent Japanese economic data shows widespread deterioration in growth momentum, as the nation has been hit hard by the global manufacturing and trade recession. Yet even with weaker growth, Japan’s unemployment rate keeps hitting all-time lows. This has not helped boost inflation much, though, with Japan’s CPI inflation still struggling to reach even the 1% level (Chart 6B). Still, the latest leg lower in our BoJ Monitor has been driven by the growth, rather than inflation, components (Chart 6C). Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BNo Spare Capacity In Japan, But Still No Inflation Weakening confidence has resulted in significant declines in both consumer spending and business investment. Due to the struggling domestic economy, it was expected that the Abe government would postpone the scheduled consumption tax hike, but it was finally initiated on October 1st. The timing could not be worse given the ongoing contraction in global manufacturing and trade activity that has clearly spilled over into Japan’s export and industrially-focused economy. Chart 6CThe Slumping Japanese Economy Could Use Some More BoJ Assistance The BoJ will likely try and deliver some sort of easing in the next few months, but its options are limited after years of already hyper-easy policy. A modest rate cut is likely all that will be delivered, on top of a continuation of the Yield Curve Control policy. That will be enough to keep JGB yields at depressed levels (Chart 6D), even if global yields were to begin climbing. Chart 6DJGB Yields Look Fairly Valued Vs The BoJ Monitor BoC Monitor: Rate Cuts Needed, But Will The BoC Deliver? The Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has been below zero since April of this year, indicating a need for easier monetary policy (Chart 7A). Although the BoC has maintained its policy rate at 1.75%, dovish Fed policy and softening domestic economic growth are making it harder for the BoC to continue sitting on its hands Although the Canadian labor market remains solid, household consumption has continued to weaken alongside falling consumer confidence. However, the inflation rate for both headline and core CPI measures is still hovering near the mid-point of BoC 1-3% target range (Chart 7B). Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BRising Inflation Making The BoC’s Job Harder At the moment, our BoC Monitor is more influenced by weaker growth components than stabilizing inflation components (Chart 7C). Similar mixed messages are also evident in other data. According to the latest BoC Business Outlook Survey, the overall outlook has edged up to the historical average,2 but real capex growth remains in negative territory and manufacturing new orders are still falling. In contrast, the Canadian labor market remains tight and both wage and price inflation are holding firm. Chart 7CBoC Growth & Inflation Components Signaling Moderate Pressure To Ease Canadian government bonds have rallied strongly this year, but the yield momentum has appeared to overshoot the decline in our BoC Monitor (Chart 7D). The Canadian OIS curve is discounting -27bps of rate cuts over the next twelve months, but the BoC is not signaling that they will ease. We upgraded our recommended stance on Canadian government bonds to neutral back in May, and we see no need to alter that view without further evidence of more deterioration in Canadian growth or inflation data.3 Chart 7DCanadian Bond Rally Looks A Bit Stretched RBA Monitor: Expect Another Cut The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Monitor has been below the zero line since September 2018, indicating a need for easier monetary policy (Chart 8A). The RBA has already delivered on that signal this year, cutting the Cash Rate twice to an all-time low of 0.75%. Markets are still expecting more, with the Australian OIS curve discounting another -29bps of cuts over the next year, although most of those cuts are expected to occur within the next six months. The signal from our RBA Monitor suggests that Australian bond yields should remain under downward pressure, although the yield momentum has been excessive relative to the fall in the Monitor. Both headline and core CPI inflation remain below the RBA’s 2-3% target range (Chart 8B), and the central bank continues to lower its inflation forecasts, suggesting an entrenched dovish bias. Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BNo Inflation For The RBA To Worry About The latest downturn in our RBA Monitor is related to declines in both the inflation and growth components (Chart 8C). The weakness in the growth components is led by falling exports to Asia, in addition to the sharp drop in house prices in the major cities. The fall in the inflation components reflects both weak inflation expectations and spare capacity in labor markets. Chart 8CA Loud & Clear Message On The Need For RBA Easing The signal from our RBA Monitor suggests that Australian bond yields should remain under downward pressure, although the yield momentum has been excessive relative to the fall in the Monitor (Chart 8D). Australia’s economy will not begin to outperform again, however, until China’s current growth slump starts to bottom out, which is unlikely to occur until the first quarter of 2020 at the earliest. Thus, we expect the RBA to deliver another rate cut before the end of the year, justifying a continued overweight stance on Australian government bonds. Chart 8DA Lot Of Bad News Discounted In Australian Bond Yields RBNZ Monitor: More Easing To Come Our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) monitor remains well below zero, indicating that easier monetary policy is still required (Chart 9A). The central bank has already delivered two rate cuts this year: a -25bps cut in May and, more importantly, a shock rate cut of -50bps in August. Forward guidance remains dovish, with RBNZ Governor Adrian Orr signaling more easing is likely and even hinting at negative rates in the future. This rhetoric is reflected in the NZ OIS curve, which is pricing in a further -42bps of easing over the next twelve months. High inflation is not a constraint for the RBNZ. Both headline and core measures of inflation are currently at 1.7% (Chart 9B). As the RBNZ targets a 1-3% range over the medium term, the prospect of overshooting the 2% longer-term target will not restrict policymakers from acting as appropriate to boost growth. Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BNZ Inflation Creeping Higher Most of the pressure to ease has come from the continued deterioration in the growth component of our RBNZ Monitor (Chart 9C), reflecting weakness in manufacturing and consumption. The manufacturing PMI is currently in contractionary territory at 48.4, having fallen almost five points since February of this year. Annual growth in retail sales has been slowing for the past two years while consumer confidence is at 7-year lows. Chart 9CWeak Growth Is The Reason RBNZ Rate Cuts Are Needed We feel confident in reiterating our bullish recommendation on NZ government bonds versus U.S. and German sovereign debt. The RBNZ Monitor suggests that policy will stay dovish for some time, while NZ yields still offer a relatively attractive yield, unlike deeply overbought Treasuries and Bunds (Chart 9D). Chart 9DStill A Bullish Case For New Zealand Government Bonds Riksbank Monitor: Watching And Waiting Our Riksbank Monitor remains very slightly below zero and the market is currently priced for -4bps of rate cuts over the next year (Chart 10A). The Riksbank has decided to hold the Repo Rate constant at -0.25% while forecasting a hike towards the end of this year or the beginning of 2020. Given the policy environment, rate cuts remain unlikely. At most, the Riksbank can further delay rate hikes if the data continues to disappoint. The Riksbank noted in its September Monetary Policy Report that the unexpectedly weak development of the labor market indicates that resource utilization will normalize sooner than expected. This is reflected in Chart 10B, where the unemployment gap is now negative. Meanwhile, inflation readings are giving a mixed signal for the central bank. While the headline CPI measure has declined precipitously year-to-date, owing to the dramatic fall in oil prices, core inflation has continued to climb steadily. Chart 10ASweden: Riksbank Monitor Chart 10BMixed Messages From Swedish Inflation As a result, the inflation components of our Riksbank monitor - driven by a spike in the Citigroup Inflation Surprise Index, wage growth hooking upward and inflation expectations holding firm around 2% - are signaling the need for tighter monetary policy (Chart 10C). However, the growth components – led by weak exports, employment, and manufacturing data - are exerting pressure in the opposite direction. This is evident in the Swedish Manufacturing PMI, which tumbled from 51.8 to 46.3 in September, deep into contractionary territory. Chart 10CThere Is A Reason Why The Riksbank Has Been On Hold Keeping in mind the inflation constraint, it remains unlikely that the Riksbank will cut rates unless the economic data disappoints more significantly to the downside. This should help put a floor under Swedish bond yields in the near term (Chart 10D). Chart 10DSwedish Yields Have Fallen Too Far, Too Fast Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Research Associate shaktis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes * NOTE: All information in this report reflects our knowledge of global events as of Thursday, October 10. 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report “United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise?” dated September 20, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/06/business-outlook-survey-summer-2019/ 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Weekly Report, “Reconcilable Differences” dated May 8, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns