金融市場

特別レポート

Dear Client, Instead of our regular Weekly Report, this week we are sending you a Special Report written on February 20 by our Geopolitical Strategy service colleagues that discusses China’s recent stimulating efforts. We have only made a few minor revisions to account for the past month’s events. We trust that you will find this Special Report useful and insightful. Best regards, Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist   Highlights So What? China’s January-February credit data suggest that stimulus is here. Why? China’s early-year credit and fiscal policies suggest that stimulus risks are to the upside. January-February credit was a blowout number and fiscal spending is up. Equity bourses in South Korea and Russia are the most likely to benefit from Chinese stimulus. Industrial metals such as copper will also benefit – with a delay. Feature New credit data for China in January-February improves the chances that Beijing’s stimulus measures will overshoot this year, causing China’s economy to bottom in 2019 and jumpstart global growth. In our annual outlook for this year we argued that while China was stimulating the economy, the magnitude of stimulus would be the decisive factor for the global macro environment in 2019. We argued that the type of stimulus would remain primarily fiscal – tax cuts for households and small and medium-sized enterprises – and hence that it would be modest as fiscal easing would merely offset relatively weak credit growth. This view stemmed from our assessment of the Xi Jinping administration, highlighted in April 2017, as an “elitist” (not populist) administration. Its policy priorities are to discipline the Chinese economy, and in particular to contain systemic financial risk, which President Xi has cited as a national security threat. This view is not wrong, but the latest data clearly show that Xi has decided to pause these painful efforts at limiting leverage and rebalancing China’s economy. Witness January-February’s decisive uptick in both total social financing (total private credit) and local government bond issuance (Chart 1). Chart 1Higher Risk Of An Overshoot A massive spike in new credit is the single most important criterion in our “Checklist For A Stimulus Overshoot.” Thus, from a policy perspective, we are now at higher risk of an overshoot (Table 1). Not only credit as a whole but also informal lending saw a surge in January-February, implying that the government is relenting in its crackdown on the shadow banks. The approval of local government bond issuance for early in the year – and the People’s Bank of China’s announcement of a “Central Bank Bills Swap” program – reinforce this policy shift.1 Table 1Checklist For A Chinese Stimulus Overshoot In 2019   A stimulus overshoot is positive for Chinese demand in the short run but negative for potential GDP in the long run. A “traditional” credit surge of this nature cannot be surgically targeted at SMEs or households. It will go to state-owned enterprises, privileged corporations, property developers, and the like, which have always had the advantage in China’s financial system. SOEs have taken a much larger share of new loans than private companies in recent years,2 and the only silver lining of this trend was the possibility that tighter credit controls would discipline the SOEs. That silver lining is now fading, barring some new and surprising development on the reform front. China needs to create 26 trillion renminbi in new credit over the course of the year to avoid a corporate earnings contraction. These January-February numbers put China on track to do just that (Chart 2), assuming that President Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump agree to a short-term, framework trade deal this year. Chart 2On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction Of course, a few caveats are in order. First, January-February’s credit number is only one data point and credit growth is always abnormally strong in the first month of the year. Early in the year, banks seek to expand their assets rapidly in a bid to get as much market share as possible before administrative credit quotas kick in. Because of Chinese New Year, it is best to combine January and February data to get a sense of the rate of credit expansion in the first part of the year. This year’s January-February numbers are very strong relative to previous years (Chart 3) and the context is more accommodative than the 2017 January-February credit surge, when authorities were beginning to tighten rather than ease macroprudential policy. Still a rapid rate of credit expansion will have to be sustained in the coming months in order to meet the 26 trillion RMB requirement highlighted above. Second, there is some risk that China’s households and private businesses will not respond as positively today as in the past. The intensification of Communist Party control over the society and economy, President Xi’s cancellation of term limits, and the strategic confrontation with the United States have created a bearish sentiment in the private sector. Our Emerging Markets Strategy would point out that if the propensity to consume, and money velocity,3 do not accelerate, then a surge in new credit may fail to ignite a reacceleration in China (Chart 4). Chart 4Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Still, what we now know is that Xi Jinping and his top economic adviser, Vice Premier Liu He, are not initiating the “assault phase of reform” that their predecessors initiated in the late 1990s in order to cleanse China’s economy of bad loans and zombie companies. Instead, they are likely reestablishing the “Socialist Put” in order to reverse the current deceleration, demonstrate China’s continued economic might and face down the United States’ threat of tariffs. Bottom Line: China’s stimulus measures are increasingly likely to overshoot, with positive implications for both Chinese and global growth. China is still facing a corporate earnings recession, but the odds of averting it are increasing. Trade Deadline More Likely To Be Extended What of the trade war? First, we would warn clients that China’s annual credit origination is a much bigger factor for the global economy than China’s exports to the United States (Chart 5). The trade war can escalate from here and yet, if China’s stimulus works as it has in the past, the results will be manageable for China’s economy save for Chinese companies expressly exposed to the U.S. economy through exports. In reality, both the U.S. and China are now effectively stimulating their economies and in this sense global trade as a whole will benefit regardless of bilateral tariffs. Chart 5Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War But it is possible that just as global equity markets ignored China’s economic slowdown and only sold off when the tariffs were levied (Chart 6), they may not continue to rally much on China’s credit data. Given the already considerable rally in global risk assets since October, markets may not be satisfied merely with one or two months of solid credit data out of China without a clear resolution to the trade conflict. After all, if a collapse in U.S.-China trade talks portends a new Cold War, then institutional investors may be justified in taking a wait-and-see approach despite China’s credit cycle upswing. Chart 6Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? In the past, we have highlighted that the U.S. and China are not economically prohibited from engaging in a trade war – the export exposure is too small – and China’s new stimulus reinforces this point. However, President Trump is concerned about causing a sell-off in the tech sector and hence the broad equity market which could translate into a bear market and raise the probability of a recession occurring prior to November 2020. Meanwhile, in China, given Beijing’s reported trade concessions, there is apparently a desire to pacify the relationship and discourage U.S. unilateral tariffs and sanctions that could become seriously destabilizing for the Chinese economy and society. The need to have a happy 2021 centenary celebration for the Communist Party may factor into policymakers’ thinking. The latest news flow is mildly positive for the odds of getting a framework deal sometime this year. President Trump visited the Chinese negotiators in Washington, D.C. while President Xi reciprocated with the American negotiators in Beijing. A new round of two-week shuttle diplomacy is beginning. Trump has extended the tariff ceasefire and the two sides reportedly have arrived at an agreement on currency and are drafting written agreements on other areas of dispute. China’s National People’s Congress has passed a new Foreign Investment Law that ostensibly guarantees many of the American demands on forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, and discriminatory treatment of U.S. companies (Table 2). Table 2New Foreign Investment Law Would Be A Positive For U.S.-China Negotiations However, Presidents Trump and Xi have yet to schedule a new summit, which is probably necessary for a final deal. And there are murmurs from the press suggesting that China’s new law and other concessions are not going to satisfy the U.S. negotiators on the critical point of “structural changes” and a verification process. This leaves us inclined to change our trade war probabilities to increase the odds of an extension (Table 3). The improvement in U.S. financial conditions and China’s stimulus, if anything, make it more likely that negotiations will be extended, as both sides feel their economic and financial constraints less acutely. Table 3Updated Trade War Probabilities Bottom Line: Global and Chinese risk assets should rally on China’s credit uptick, but the lack of resolution of the trade war could continue to inhibit animal spirits – and the odds of a March 1 resolution are declining. Who Are The Equity Winners Of China’s Stimulus? China’s strong January-February credit number is supportive of global equity markets. That much is obvious. But which equity markets will benefit the most? In what follows we examine the relationship between Chinese credit and MSCI equity returns of various countries. We find that Malaysian, Australian, South Korean, and Indonesian equities are the most highly correlated with Chinese credit growth and are thus most likely to benefit from the recent upturn (Chart 7). On the other hand, France and Italy stand out as countries whose bourses are more insulated. Out of the markets that are positively correlated, South Korea and Russia stand out as relatively cheap (Chart 8). Thus we expect these equities to do especially well. By contrast, while Indonesia and the Philippines are highly leveraged to China, these markets are currently relatively expensive. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy is currently overweight Korean and Russian equities within the EM space, neutral Turkey (although recently upgraded from underweight), and underweight Indonesia and the Philippines. In addition to credit stimulus, we expect Chinese household consumption to also gain support going forward. This will likely be driven by policy stimulus targeting the consumer specifically and is best exemplified by the recently announced tax cuts (Chart 9), which we expect to trickle down to greater consumer demand and growth in retail sales. Our base case calls for 8%-10% growth in household consumption over the coming 12 months, up from the current 3.5%. However, consumer sentiment in China is weak. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy’s proxy for household marginal propensity to spend ticked up recently, after falling since early last year (see Chart 4 above). A resumption in the decline would highlight that households are increasingly unwilling to spend, which would translate into weaker retail sales despite policy efforts to boost consumption. Such a scenario – in which credit growth accelerates without a substantial uptick in consumer spending – is plausible, given that it occurred between mid-2015 and mid-2016 (Chart 10). In any case, whether Chinese stimulus comes in the form of the traditional credit channel, or instead in the form of fiscal stimulus to household consumption, the same equity markets will generally benefit the most (Chart 11). Chart 10...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility Indeed, global equity markets react the same way regardless of the type of stimulus implemented. For instance, MSCI returns for the Philippines, Sweden, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey are more closely correlated to both Chinese credit growth and retail sales growth compared to Italy, Japan, and France. The same conclusion is reached when we look at the correlations between Chinese credit growth or consumption growth and individual MSCI sectors such as industrials and consumer discretionary (Chart 12). The relatively stronger correlation between Chinese credit growth and equity returns – as opposed to Chinese retail sales and equity returns – can be put down to the nature of Chinese imports. While industrial goods account for the bulk of China’s purchases of foreign goods, consumer goods excluding autos make up only 15% of China’s imports (Table 4). However, as Chart 12 illustrates, the relationship between China’s retail sales growth and global equities is much tighter in the case of the consumer discretionary sector, whether the latter is compared to global industrials sectors or the overall MSCI index. Table 4Import Composition Of Chinese Imports Equity market exposure to China is not always in line with the extent of each country’s trade exposure to China (Chart 13). There are some clear exceptions – most notably Mexico, which has the highest correlation coefficient with Chinese credit and consumption variables since 2010. However, this is likely due to idiosyncratic factors.4 Correlation does not imply causation, and we cannot conclude with certainty that Mexican equities will outperform amid China’s new round of stimulus. Nevertheless, given that Mexico is a very deeply liquid market that benefits amid EM bull markets, this may not be entirely coincidental. The correlations between global equity markets and Chinese credit peak two months after the stimulus measures are first implemented (Chart 14). This is more or less in line with adjusted total social financing’s correlation versus industrial metals. However, BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy has shown that copper’s correlations versus other measures of Chinese money and credit peak after roughly three quarters (Chart 15).5 This is evident in both the 2012 and 2015-16 stimulus episodes in which the bottom in copper prices lagged the bottom in China’s credit growth. Thus we may witness a rebound in equity markets on the back of China’s credit splurge before we see an improvement in annual returns on copper prices. Chart 15Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Bottom Line: South Korean and Russian equities are best positioned to benefit from the positive surprise in China’s credit data. France and Italy are the worst positioned. Copper prices will rebound with a delay.  Investment Implications BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors stay long Chinese equities ex-tech relative to the emerging market benchmark. This is a tactical call initiated in August 2018 that is now becoming a cyclical call on the basis of the credit upswing. We also remain long the “China Play Index,” a basket of China-sensitive assets. A rebound in China’s credit data and stronger global growth will support copper demand. Prices are still 15% below the mid-2018 peak and are poised to benefit in this environment, especially given that global inventories are already falling. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors go long copper. Meanwhile, BCA’s China Investment Strategy recommends (for now) staying only tactically overweight Chinese equities relative to the global benchmark, pending higher conviction that the pace of credit growth will be strong enough to overwhelm the negative ramifications of a continued deceleration in actual activity over the coming few months on sentiment and 12-month forward earnings expectations. Over the long run, Geopolitical Strategy would look to underweight Chinese equities, as we are not optimistic about China’s productivity and potential GDP. This is because of the negative structural consequences of continuing the Socialist Put (i.e., bad loans, zombie companies, trade protectionism). We would expect CNY/USD to remain relatively buoyant in the context of both trade negotiations with the U.S. and fiscal-and-credit stimulus. The trade talks can hardly succeed if CNY/USD is falling. Depending on whether and how soon China’s stimulus results in a durable economic bottom, global growth could stabilize and the USD could see a substantial countertrend selloff.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled “China: Prepping A Bazooka?” dated February 14, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see Nicholas Lardy, “The State Strikes Back: The End Of Economic Reform In China?” Peterson Institute For International Economics, January 29, 2019, available at piie.com. 3          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled “Dissecting China’s Stimulus,” dated January 17, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4       The 2012 election of President Enrique Peña Nieto caused Mexican equities to outperform their EM counterparts. Similarly in 2015-16, U.S. outperformance relative to EM also supported Mexico relative to EM because Mexico’s economy is highly leveraged to its northern neighbor. In both periods Mexico’s outperformance was not caused by – but instead coincided with – Chinese credit stimulus. These idiosyncratic events biased the correlation between Mexico’s equity markets and Chinese credit growth to the upside. 5      Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Trade Wars, China Credit Policy Will Roil Global Copper Markets,” dated June 21, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.                  

特別レポート

ハイライト 通貨市場は、悪化する世界の成長と緩和する世界の金融環境との綱引きを続けている。 一方で、歴史的に見て、ポートフォリオ資金フローと金利差に基づけば実効為替レートベースのドルは10〜15％高くあるべきだったことを示唆している。実際の抑制された戻りは懸念材料だ。 この攻防が進む中、当面の勝者は円のような安全資産通貨であろう。 勢力バランスの変化を探る手掛かりとして金と債券の比率に注目すべきであり、この比率の上昇はドルにとってネガティブだ。 投資家が上昇する双子の赤字、世界経済の脱ドル化、及び米国資産の低い期待リターンに注目を移せば、最終的に米ドルに対する清算の日が到来すると我々は予想する。 特集 先週の世界の金融市場を襲った嵐を考えると、先進国の通貨市場の最近の落ち着きは非常に不気味だ。先週のヨーロッパと日本の冴えない製造業PMIは株式市場を急落させた。注目されている米国の10年対3か月のスプレッドが逆転し、これを最も信頼できる景気後退指標と考える投資家の間でパニック売りを誘発した。アジアの株式市場は年初来高値から下落しており、地域の国債利回りは取引安値付近にとどまっている。原油を除き、コモディティ市場も軟調だ。 これらの動きにもかかわらず、実効ドルは比較的安定している。ここ数か月、多くの通貨ペアは非常に狭いウェッジ形成の頂点に向けて狭く推移している。これがボラティリティを大幅に低下させている（チャート1）。長期的には、これらの通貨クロスの金に対する安定性は、ブレトン・ウッズ風の固定為替相場体制を彷彿とさせる恐ろしい響きがある（チャート2）。 チャート1 通貨市場の不気味な静けさ An Eerie Calm In Currency Markets An Eerie Calm In Currency Markets チャート2 金に対する固定為替相場か？ Fixed Exchange Rates Versus Gold? Fixed Exchange Rates Versus Gold?   物理学では、向心力系は平衡を保ちやすい一方で、遠心力は劇的に爆発することがある。ポスト・ブレトン・ウッズの世界では、長期にわたる通貨の安定が持続することは稀だった。これは、どの経済間で不均衡のトレンドと大きさを常に監視し、圧力点がどこにあるか、対応する為替レートがどの方向に最終的に崩れるかを見極める必要があることを意味する。ドル見通しを左右する力のバランスがこの作業の自然な出発点のように思える。 グローバル流動性とドル ほとんどの相対的トレンドの尺度で判断すると、ドルは今まさに急騰しているはずだ。3月のマークイット製造業PMI発表では、日本とユーロ圏はいずれも縮小域にある一方、米国は52.5と世界の他地域を確実に上回っている。確かにこのリーダーシップの勢いは最近失速してきているが、歴史的には米国と世界の他地域の間でこれほど大きな成長差があると、6か月間で10〜15％のドル高をもたらすことがあった（チャート3）。これまでのところ、DXYドル指数は10月以降で1.9％上昇している。 過去にこの指標が大幅に縮小したたびに、ドル不足がどこかで爆発を引き起こしてきた。 米連邦準備制度理事会（FRB）が最近の金融政策の急転換をするまでは、相対的利回りもまたドルに有利に働いていた。米国と世界の他地域との2年スワップ利回り差はDXYドル指数を105に押し上げ、これは現在水準より8％高い値を示していた（チャート4）。一方、相対的な政策金利も実効為替レートベースのドルが約6％高いはずだと示唆している。そして今日でさえ、FRBが明確な利下げ方向に動かない限り、世界の他の中央銀行のハト派シフトは米ドルにとって即時の追い風であり続けるだろう。 チャート3 成長差に基づけば米ドルはもっと高いはず USD Should Be Higher Based On Growth Divergences USD Should Be Higher Based On Growth Divergences   チャート4 スワップ差に基づけば米ドルはもっと高いはず USD Should Be Higher Based On Swap Differentials USD Should Be Higher Based On Swap Differentials   国際的には、FRBの資産購入のテーパリングが米ドル流動性に対する純流出を引き起こしてきた。これは米国の経常収支赤字が拡大しているにもかかわらず起きている。FRBのバランスシートは2015年初めに4.5兆米ドルをわずかに上回ってピークに達し、それ以来減少している。これが米国のマネタリーベースの深刻な縮小を招き（チャート5）、商業銀行の超過準備金を大幅に削減し、現在は前年比で20％超の縮小となっている。BCAのお気に入りの国際流動性の主要指標の一つはFRBに預けられた外国中央銀行の準備高だが、これは過去40年以上で最悪のペースで縮小している。過去にこの指標が大幅に縮小したたびに、ドル不足がどこかで爆発を引き起こし、典型的には双子の赤字を抱える国々で顕在化してきた。 チャート5 ドルの流動性逼迫 A Liquidity Squeeze Of Dollars A Liquidity Squeeze Of Dollars 付け加えれば、昨年の米国税制の改正により海外現金の還流が認められたことはドルを支援したが、期待されたほどの効果はなかった。ローリング12か月ベースで、米国は約4,000億米ドル、すなわちGDPの約2％に相当する純資産を還流させている。歴史的に見てこれは非常に大きな金額であり、ドルを火の出るように上昇させる可能性がある量だ—おおむね10％程度の上昇（チャート6）。 チャート6 還流フローに基づけば米ドルはもっと高いはず 本国送還フローを考慮すれば、米ドルは本来もっと高くなるはずだ 本国送還フローを考慮すれば、米ドルは本来もっと高くなるはずだ ドル流動性の不足は負のフィードバックループを引き起こすために悪性化しやすい。国際的な米ドルの回転率が上がると、オフショアのドル金利が上昇し、借入国の資本コストが上がる。これが限界点に達すると、設備投資や消費は返済に置き換わる。生産や物価の下落、またはその両方は債務デフレ問題をさらに悪化させる。 結論として、過去のトレンドを見ると、ドルは現在の水準よりずっと高くあるべきだ。実務的な投資家は相関のシフトに注意を払う必要性を認識している。我々の好む流動性指標が完全に機能しなくなったのか、より現実的には別の力が働いてドルの相対的安定を説明しているのか、どちらかだろう。 逆循環的な通貨 一つの可能性は、最近の米ドルの安定が今年後半の経済指標の改善を織り込んでいるということだ。我々は過去に何度も示してきたが、ドルは逆循環的な通貨であり、世界経済の勢いが回復すると成績が悪くなりがちだ。多くの投資家は現在中国に注目しており、最近の信用供給が中国経済、ひいては世界経済を立て直すのに十分かどうかを見守っている。さらに、米中貿易協議が進めば、人民元の対ドル下落を防ぐ通貨条項が盛り込まれる可能性が高い。 実際のところ、世界成長の底打ちを支持する十分な証拠はまだ乏しく、これをドル安定に結びつけるのは難しい。 実際のところ、世界成長の底打ちを支持する十分な証拠はまだ乏しく、これをドル安定に結びつけるのは難しい。典型的なリフレーションの指標であるコモディティ価格、新興市場通貨、輸送株価は安値から反発しているが再び失速している。3月の輸出データは世界的に依然として弱かったが、構成的には幾つかの緑の芽が見られた。シンガポールから中国向けの輸出は前年比で34％増、エマージング向けは前年比で22％増加した。日本の工作機械の対中受注も一部安定化を示した。歴史的に見ると、これらは底打ちプロセスに入るかを判断するには必要条件だが十分条件ではない（チャート7）。 もう一つの矛盾点がある：もしドルラリーが世界成長の改善見通しによって抑えられているなら、金は弱く推移し、ほとんどの通貨は金とドルの両方に対してアウトパフォームしているはずだ。昨日の金の売りまで、そうなっていなかった。つまり何らかの別の説明が米ドルの上昇を抑えている可能性がある。 チャート7 世界貿易における回復の兆しか？ 世界貿易における暫定的な回復の兆しか？ 世界貿易における暫定的な回復の兆しか？   レジーム・シフトか？ 米国居住者が資本を国内に呼び戻している一方で、外国人投資家は近年でも有数の速さで米国資本市場から逃避している。ローリング12か月トータルで見ると、米国からは外国人による株式の約2,000億米ドルの流出があり、これは過去最大だ（チャート8）。総じて、外国の公的・民間の長期ポートフォリオ投資はいずれも減少傾向にあり、投資家の関心はエージェンシー債や社債に限られている。外国人は依然として約4,500億ドルの米国証券のネット買い手であるが、近年の買い入れの下落トレンドは明白だ。興味深いことに、この期間において金は米国債をアウトパフォームしている。 米ドルは今日も世界の基軸通貨であり続けているが、その莫大な特権は確かに端がほころび始めている。 対公的フローの観点では、中国は米国の貿易赤字の最大の寄与国にまで台頭している。同時に、北京は米国の過去の政策への報復として、あるいは人民元の国際化のための余地を作るために、保有する米国債の在庫を削減してきた可能性がある（チャート9）。より広く見れば、FRBにおけるドル預金の減少は、世界経済がドルから離れ、より多様化した通貨バスケットへ向かう基礎的なシフトを示しているのかもしれない。原油、天然ガス、バルクコモディティ、さらにはソフトコモディティに至るまで、取引の相当部分が米国の取引所外で行われる割合が高まっていることを考えれば、これは理にかなっている。 チャート8 外国人が米国株を投げ売りしている 外国人投資家が米国エクイティを投げ売りしている 外国人投資家が米国エクイティを投げ売りしている   チャート9 中国は黒字を米国債に再循環させるのを止めた 中国は余剰資金をトレジャリーズに再投資するのをやめた。 中国は余剰資金をトレジャリーズに再投資するのをやめた。   国際通貨基金（IMF）のデータは、対外準備高におけるドルの割当が2000年代初頭に約72％でピークに達し、それ以来下落傾向にあることを示している。一方、英ポンド、スイスフラン、円など他の通貨への割当は急増している（チャート10）。同時に、中央銀行は金の準備を大量に積み上げており、特にロシアと中国は年間生産量のほぼ総量に匹敵する量を蓄えている（チャート11）。これらはドルが本来あるべきほど強くない理由を説明するのに役立つ。こうした要因は、金価格に対するこれらの通貨ペアの相対的安定性も説明する。 チャート10 世界はドルからの多様化を進めている 世界はドルからの分散化を進めている 世界はドルからの分散化を進めている チャート11 中央銀行が金の生産の大部分を吸収している Central Banks Are Absorbing Most Gold Production Central Banks Are Absorbing Most Gold Production 米ドルは今日も世界の基軸通貨であり続けているが、収支のダイナミクスは間違った方向に向かっており、その莫大な特権は確実にほころびつつある。今後5年間で米議会予算局（CBO）は米国の財政赤字がGDP比で4.5％まで膨らむと見積もっている。経常収支赤字が多少拡大してその後安定すると仮定すれば、双子の赤字はGDP比で8.1％に達する見込みだ。これは不況が起きないという前提での見通しであり、不況が発生すれば赤字はさらに膨らむ可能性がある（チャート12）。 チャート12 ドルにとっての双子の赤字の崖 ドルが直面する双子の赤字の崖 ドルが直面する双子の赤字の崖 金融危機後、米国の双子の赤字はGDP比でほぼ13％まで膨らんだが、その当時との違いはコモディティブームの結果ドルが割安であった（コモディティ通貨が過大評価されていた）ことだった。その後のシェール革命も米国の貿易赤字を大いに緩和した。シェールの生産性は引き続き堅調で米国の生産はさらに増えるだろうが、取りやすい果実はすでに摘み取られている。 何らかの理由で外国の中央銀行はドルからの多様化を進めている。貿易の景色が変わっているためであればこの傾向は続くだろうし、急速に拡大する米国の双子の赤字を避けたいという理由であればこれも続くだろう。そして米ドルが「良いニュース」で十分に上昇できないのであれば、悪いニュースが出始めたときに沈むことを期待すべきだ。ただしタイミングは不確実だ。   民間資本フロー 外国の公的フローが米ドルから離れている理由が基軸通貨としての魅力の低下であったとしても、民間資本は米国資産の投下資本利益率（ROIC）が資本コストを下回ると出口へ殺到し始めるだろう。長期保有の投資家にとっては、これはすでに起きている可能性がある。 例えば10年国債を見てみよう。日本やドイツの投資家にとって、現地通貨で借りて米国に投資するのは、国内金利がマイナスで10年米国債利回りが2.4％であることを考えれば論理的に思えるかもしれない。しかし、この正のキャリーはヘッジコストを考慮すると突然消えてしまう（チャート13）。 チャート13 ヘッジ済み米国債より日本国債が魅力的 日本国債はヘッジされた米国債より魅力的 日本国債はヘッジされた米国債より魅力的 強気相場では、マイナス金利の国々はキャリートレードによる強い資本流出を受けやすい。これらの影響を測るのは難しいが、ヘッジコストが低い期間（通常はボラティリティが低い期間に相当）には強力な触媒となり得ることは間違いない。市場が変動的になりこれらの取引が巻き戻されると、非ヘッジの取引はショートカバーのフローの犠牲になる。 世界の多くの利回り曲線が逆イールドになっている中で、長期債のリターンがスポット金利に対して相対的に劣後するため、このショートカバーの頻度が暗黙のうちに上昇する危険がある。ボラティリティが上がり始めると一つの勝者は円だ。投資家はヘッジとして今日ドル/円のショートポジションの組成を検討すべきだ。 フィクスト・インカム領域を除けば、重要なのは相対的なROICが資本コストより高いかどうかだ。どちらも多くの新興国や先進国の資産クラスで測るのは難しい。しかし株式市場に関しては、為替が国間のリターンを均等化する方向に動く傾向があるため、評価指標が常に良い出発点となる。 MSCIの米国、欧州、日本の各指数のフォワードP/Eはそれぞれ16.5倍、12.6倍、12.3倍だ。米国に偏るのは、市場参加者が米国の利益が引き続きアウトパフォームすると期待しているか、米国通貨が引き続き上昇すると期待しているか、その両方を見込んでいるためだ。だが経験的には、現在の米国のバリュエーションは将来の利益ストリームが既に今日の価格に織り込まれていることを示唆している（チャート14）。 チャート14A 投下資本利益率は米国で最も低い可能性がある（1） Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (1) Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (1) チャート14B 投下資本利益率は米国で最も低い可能性がある（2） Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (2) Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (2) チャート14C 投下資本利益率は米国で最も低い可能性がある（3） Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (3) Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (3) MSCI米国の期待される10年年率リターンは3.1％、MSCI欧州は5.5％、MSCI日本は9.6％だ。いくつかのモデルが示唆するように米ドルが過大評価されていると仮定すれば、これは将来の米国リターンをさらに侵食することになる。前述の図に示したように、米国への純株式ポートフォリオフローは既にマイナスだ。これは、現在の追い風が最終的に弱まったときに米ドルの清算の日が遠くない可能性を示唆している。   Chester Ntonifor, 外国為替ストラテジスト chestern@bcaresearch.com トレード＆フォーキャスト 予測概要 コア・ポートフォリオ タクティカル・トレード 決済済み取引

ハイライト グローバル株式およびその他のリスク資産は、今後数週間はボラティリティ高止まりの横ばい推移となり、その後一連の出だし失敗を経て世界成長がようやく加速するにつれて年末までは徐々に上昇するだろう。 私たちは現在、フェドが以前想定していたよりも遅いペースで利上げを行うと見ているが、最終的にはインフレを抑えるために利上げを急がざるを得なくなるだろうと考えている。 フェドファンド金利はおそらく2021年に4％で頭打ちとなり、市場が現在織り込んでいるよりも四半期ごとに0.25ポイントの利上げが合計9回多く示唆される。 12か月の投資期間では、投資家はグローバル株式をオーバーウェイトし、国債をアンダーウェイトし、現金配分は中立を維持すべきである。 ドルは第2四半期にピークを迎え、その後年末までおよび2020年にかけて弱含みとなり、来年遅い時期に再び強含み始めるだろう。 投資家は今後数週間、新興国（EM）および欧州株を一時的に格上げする準備をすると同時に、景気循環型の株式セクターへのエクスポージャーを増やすべきである。 工業用金属と原油は年の経過とともに強含みとなるだろう。金は押し目で買うべきである。 投資家は2020年末にポートフォリオのリスク低減を開始し、2021年の景気後退に備えるべきである。 チャート 001   特集 また始まるのか？ 昨年6月によりディフェンシブになった後、私たちは12月のFOMC後の急落を受けて株式に対して強気に転じた。株式が反発を続けるにつれて、私たちは楽観を和らげた。3月初めに私たちは「年初から上昇してきた世界の株式は、投資家が慌てていわゆるグリーンシュートの出現を待つため、今後6～8週間で『デッドゾーン』に入る可能性が高い」と書いた。1 先週金曜日に発表された期待外れの欧州PMIデータは、グリーンシュート論に一部止めを刺した格好だ。ドイツの製造業PMIは6年ぶりの低水準に落ち込み、新規受注の構成要素はグレート・リセッション以来の弱い水準を示した。これを受けてドイツの10年国債利回りは2016年以来初めてマイナス圏に入り、米10年国債利回りも15か月ぶりの低水準まで下落し、3か月/10年のカーブが逆イールド化した。歴史的に見て、逆イールドは米国の景気後退を予測する信頼できる指標であった（チャート1）。 チャート1イールドカーブの逆転、景気後退、およびタームプレミアム イールドカーブの逆転、景気後退、そしてタームプレミアム イールドカーブの逆転、景気後退、そしてタームプレミアム トランプ大統領がテレビ評論家のスティーブン・ムーアをフェドの理事に任命する決定を下したことも事態を好転させなかった。供給側（サプライサイド）の「経済学者」ラリー・クドローの推薦を受けたムーアは、2007年の住宅市場の懸念を軽視したこと、2010年にQEがハイパーインフレを引き起こすと的確に予測したことで知られ、トランプ減税が財政赤字を小さくするだろうと信じている点でも有名だ。 世界成長は年の後半に加速するだろう これらの憂慮すべき展開を踏まえ、景気とリスク資産に対して再び景気循環的に弱気に転じるべき時だろうか。私たちはそうは考えない。今後数週間は株式にとって厳しい局面があり得る――これは私たちのマクロクオンツ・モデルが現在示しているリスクだ――が、一連の出だし失敗を経て世界成長がようやく加速するにつれてセンチメントは改善するはずだ。実際、すでにいくつかの前向きな兆候が見えている：上昇している先行指標を持つ国の比率を追跡する当社のグローバル先行経済指標の拡散指数は上昇しており（チャート2）、グローバルLEIを先行している。サービス業のPMIも概ね改善しており、世界成長の弱さは主に貿易と製造業に集中していることを示唆している。さらに貿易面でも、バルチック・ドライ指数や世界のコンテナ船の活動を示す週次のHarpex海運指数といったいくつかの先行指標が安値から反発している。 我々はイールドカーブのシグナルを過小評価すべきだと考える。現在それはマイナスのタームプレミアムによって深刻に歪められているからだ。もし米10年のタームプレミアムが2004年の水準に戻っていれば、3か月/10年のスロープは200ベーシスポイント以上急勾配になり、この問題について誰も話題にしないだろう。実際、今日のタームプレミアムを考慮すれば、1995年にはほぼ確実にカーブは逆転していただろう。当時株式を手放した者は歴史上最も偉大なブルマーケットの一つを逃したことになる。 また、米10年利回りの一部低下はポジティブな展開を反映していることは言うまでもない：フェドがよりハト派に転じたのだ。10年/30年部分のイールドカーブを見れば、実際にはスティープ化している。これは市場がフェドの行動をリフレーション的であると見なしている兆候である。 逆イールドカーブが経済活動を鈍化させる明確な因果メカニズムはないが、イールドカーブの逆転が投資家を怯ませ、それによって金融環境のタイト化を招くという自己成就的予言になる可能性はある（チャート3）。このような「ドゥームループ」は概念的には可能だが、今年初めに我々が議論したように、現在の環境で発生する可能性は低い。2いずれにせよ、金融環境は年初以来緩和している。これは今後数か月の成長を押し上げるはずだ。   チャート2世界成長は##br##安定し始めている可能性がある 世界の成長は安定し始めている可能性がある 世界の成長は安定し始めている可能性がある チャート3年初来の金融環境の緩和は世界成長にとって好材料 年初以来の金融環境の緩和は世界経済の成長にとって好材料だ 年初以来の金融環境の緩和は世界経済の成長にとって好材料だ 中国のクレジット成長は上昇へ 世界成長は中国経済の減速に足を引っ張られてきた。昨年のデレバレッジ化キャンペーンは投資支出の大幅な減速を招き、これは世界中の資本財メーカーやコモディティ生産者に悪影響を及ぼした（チャート4）。 歴史的に見て、クレジット成長が名目GDP成長に近づくとき、中国は金融部門への締め付けを緩めてきた（チャート5）。おそらく我々はそのポイントに達したようだ。季節調整で歪んだ弱い2月の数値にもかかわらず、クレジット成長はついに前年比で加速している。 チャート4中国：デレバレッジ化キャンペーンは投資支出に悪影響を与えた 中国：デレバレッジ化の取り組みは投資支出に悪影響を及ぼした 中国：デレバレッジ化の取り組みは投資支出に悪影響を及ぼした チャート5歴史的に、中国はクレジット成長が名目GDP成長に接近するとデレバレッジを縮小してきた 歴史的に見ると、信用の伸びが名目GDP成長率に近づくと、中国はデレバレッジの取り組みを縮小してきた。 歴史的に見ると、信用の伸びが名目GDP成長率に近づくと、中国はデレバレッジの取り組みを縮小してきた。 我々は中国のクレジット成長が過去の再レバレッジ局面ほど大きく上昇するとは予想していない。だが、これは経済の状態がより良くなっているためであり、現状からの債務増加に内在的な制約があるためではない。 中国の高い貯蓄率は、ターム名目GDP成長率よりも金利を大きく下回る水準に保ってきた。これは債務持続可能性の主要な決定要因である（チャート6）。3中央政府が現在のように大部分の地方債務と企業債務に対して暗黙の保証を維持している限り、デフォルトリスクは最小限にとどまるだろう。いずれにせよ、総債務がGDP比240％に達していることを考えれば、クレジット成長が1パーセンテージポイント上昇するだけで、GDPの2.4％に相当する大きなクレジット刺激が生じることになる。 中国のクレジットインパルスは輸入を約6～9か月先行する（チャート7）。これは年の後半における世界貿易にとって良い兆候である。 チャート6中国の高い貯蓄率は金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を大きく下回る水準に保ってきた 中国の高い貯蓄率が金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を大幅に下回る水準に抑えている 中国の高い貯蓄率が金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を大幅に下回る水準に抑えている チャート7中国のリフレーション的刺激は世界貿易に恩恵をもたらすだろう グローバル・トレードは中国のリフレーション的な刺激から恩恵を受けるだろう グローバル・トレードは中国のリフレーション的な刺激から恩恵を受けるだろう   貿易戦争の一服か？ 貿易戦争の緊張緩和は事態を改善するだろう。自称「名交渉人」であるドナルド・トランプは、来年の大統領選挙前に中国との合意をまとめる必要があり、同時にその合意が米国にとって有利な条件で成立したと有権者に納得させなければならない。 任期序盤に中国と合意に達することは、双方向の貿易赤字を減らせなかった場合にはリスクがあった――米国の財政政策が景気循環的であることを考えればそれは全くあり得る結果だ。しかし現時点では、トランプは中国と素晴らしい取引をまとめたと自慢でき、かつその成果が実現するのは再選後であると有権者に安心させることができる。したがって、トランプが合意の締結を目指す可能性は高まっている。 中国側は可能な限り大きな交渉力を確保したがっている。これは、自国経済が双方の利益にならない貿易協定を突っぱねても、その影響を十分に吸収できるほど強いと説得力を持って示せることを意味する。クレジットサイクルが中国成長の支配的な原動力であるため、これはデレバレッジ化キャンペーンを一時的に後回しにすることを必要とする。世界成長の加速と強い国内需要は欧州に恩恵をもたらす 中国の成長加速は今年後半に欧州の輸出セクターを助けるだろう。中国のCaixin購買担当者指数（PMI）の輸出コンポーネントは底値から上昇している。これはユーロ圏のPMIを約三か月先行している。一方で、ユーロ圏の国内需要はより緩和的な財政政策と低下する債券利回りの恩恵を受けるだろう。 イタリアにとっては債券利回りの低下が特に有益だ。昨年三月にポピュリスト政権が選出された後の利回り急騰と企業信頼感の喪失は景気後退に突入させた（チャート 8）。現在、10年物BTP利回りが高値から100ベーシスポイント以上低下しているため、イタリア経済は回復し始めるはずだ。 国内成長が加速しても欧州中央銀行は今年利上げを行わないだろうが、市場はおそらく2020年以降に数回の利上げを織り込むだろう。これによりコア欧州債券市場の利回り曲線がわずかに再スティープ化し、長らく苦しんでいる銀行の収益にはプラスに働くはずだ。 ブレグジットは依然として懸念材料だ。この継続する物語は滑稽な段階に達しており、1) 英国はEU離脱に投票したが、2) 議会はブリュッセルと満足のいく合意に達しない限りEUに留まることに投票し、しかも3) 提示されていた唯一の合意案を拒否した。多くの英国有権者がもはやブレグジットを望んでいないことを考えると（チャート 9）、我々は政府がいわゆる先送りを続け、二度目の国民投票が発表されるか「ソフト・ブレグジット」合意が策定されるまでその問題を先送りにするだろうと考えている。いずれの結果も市場には歓迎されるだろう。 チャート 8イタリアの債券利回りはもはや逆風ではない イタリア国債利回りはもはや逆風ではない イタリア国債利回りはもはや逆風ではない チャート 9英国：やり直しとなれば残留側が勝つ可能性が高い 英国：やり直しが行われれば、残留派が勝つ可能性が高い 英国：やり直しが行われれば、残留派が勝つ可能性が高い   フェッドはどうするか？ チャート10 昨年の「クリスマス暴落」はフェッドの反応関数を明らかによりハト派の方向へと変えた。今後数か月でジェローム・パウエルが利上げを行うとは予想していないが、世界成長の再加速は12月にフェッドを再び引き締めに向かわせる可能性が高い。フェッドは2020年に四半期に一度の利上げを継続し、インフレ上昇に対応して2021年には引き締めペースを加速させるだろう。 総じて、我々はこのサイクルの終わりまでにフェデラルファンド金利が約4%に上昇すると見ている。これは市場が現在織り込んでいる水準よりも四半期ごとの25ベーシスポイントの利上げが九回多いことを意味する（チャート 10）。我々はフェデラルファンド先物のショートポジションで損切りになったが、顧客には2021年6月限フェデラルファンド先物または同等の手段をショートすることを推奨する。 米国経済：再び好調 基本的に米国経済は堅固な基盤にあり、より高い金利にも耐えられる。10年前とは異なり、住宅市場は良好な状態にある（チャート 11）。持ち家空室率は記録的な低水準近辺にある。フィコ・スコアを見る限り、住宅ローンの貸出の質は依然として高い。労働市場も堅調で、求人件数は二月に再び過去最高を記録した（チャート 12）。健全な住宅市場と労働市場の組み合わせは消費者にとって不可避的に良い。 チャート 11米国の住宅の基礎条件は堅調 米国の住宅ファンダメンタルズは堅調だ 米国の住宅ファンダメンタルズは堅調だ チャート 12米国の労働市場は堅調である 米国の労働市場は堅調だ 米国の労働市場は堅調だ チャート13 個人貯蓄率は現在7.6%にあり、家計の純資産対可処分所得比率から期待される水準よりもかなり高い（チャート 13）。貯蓄率の低下は消費支出が所得よりも速く増加することを可能にするだろう。後者は賃金上昇によって支えられているため、これは消費にとって強気材料となる。 設備投資意向は過去数か月で低下したが、歴史的基準から見ると依然として高い水準にある（チャート 14）。実質非住宅資本ストックは回復開始以来平均でわずか1.7%しか成長しておらず、リセッション前の期間の3%から低下している（チャート 15）。生産性成長の景気循環的な上振れ、上昇する労働コスト、低い余剰生産能力の水準は、企業が新しい工場や設備に投資する動機付けとなるはずだ。 チャート 14設備投資意向は軟化したが、依然として高水準にある 設備投資の意向は軟化したが、依然として高水準にある 設備投資の意向は軟化したが、依然として高水準にある チャート 15米国の設備投資余地はまだある 米国への資本投資にはさらなる余地がある 米国への資本投資にはさらなる余地がある   企業債務：どれほどのリスクか？ チャート 16米国の企業債務は世界基準で極端ではない 米国の企業債務は世界基準では極端ではない 米国の企業債務は世界基準では極端ではない 近年、企業債務水準は大幅に増加し、契約条項の緩いローンの増加に見られるように引受基準は悪化した。それでも状況は深刻とは程遠い。 他国と比べると、米国の企業債務はかなり低い（チャート 16）。フランスの企業債務はGDP比で143%に達し、米国の2倍である。これはフランスの企業セクターがすべて順調であることを示すわけではないが、事実としてフランスは企業債務の危機に見舞われていない。これは米国が差し迫った危機に瀕していないことのシグナルにもなる。 現金を差し引くと、米国の企業債務のGDP比は1989年と同じ水準にあり、その年のフェデラルファンド金利はほぼ9%であった。法人ネット負債対EBITDの比率は比較的低いままである。利子負担能力比率は歴史平均を上回っている。加えて、過去数年で企業資産もかなり速く増加しており、企業の債務対資産比率は概ね安定している（チャート 17）。 企業部門の金融収支－－企業の収入と支出の差－－は依然としてGDPの1%でプラス圏にある。過去50年のすべての景気後退は企業部門の金融収支が赤字になったときに始まっている（チャート 18）。 チャート 17米国の企業債務：どのくらい高いか？ 米国の企業債務：どこまで高くなる？ 米国の企業債務：どこまで高くなる？ チャート 18企業部門の金融収支は依然として黒字 企業部門の金融収支は依然として黒字 企業部門の金融収支は依然として黒字 住宅ローンのようにレバレッジドな機関が多く保有する債務とは異なり、ほとんどの企業債務は年金基金、保険会社、ミューチュアル・ファンド、イーティーエフのような非レバレッジのプレイヤーによって保有されている。銀行貸出は非金融企業部門債務のわずか18%を占め、1980年の40%から低下している（チャート 19）。銀行が保有するレバレッジド・ローンのシェアは10年前の約25%から現在は10%未満に低下している。さらに、今日の銀行は過去よりもはるかに高品質の自己資本を多く保有している（チャート 20）。これにより企業債務は経済にとってシステミックに重要である度合いが低くなっている。   チャート 19銀行は企業セクターへのエクスポージャーを削減した 銀行は企業向けのエクスポージャーを縮小した 銀行は企業向けのエクスポージャーを縮小した チャート 20米国の銀行は十分な自己資本を保有している 米国の銀行は健全な資本水準にある 米国の銀行は健全な資本水準にある 我々が12月にリスク資産に対してより強気になった理由の一つは、株式が急落し企業スプレッドが拡大したにもかかわらず金融ストレス指数に大きな追随がなかったためである。例えば、悪名高いテッド・スプレッドはほとんど動かなかった（チャート 21）。 チャート 21テッド・スプレッドは落ち着いており、深刻な金融ストレスの兆候は示していない TEDスプレッドは良好に推移しており、金融ストレスの重大な兆候は見られない TEDスプレッドは良好に推移しており、金融ストレスの重大な兆候は見られない みんなラリーに同意している 米国経済に大きな不均衡がないことを踏まえると、投資家はなぜフェッドが実際にはさらに利上げできないと考えているのだろうか。フェデラルファンド金利の実質ベースはかろうじてゼロを上回っているにすぎないのに。答えは、投資家がラリー・サマーズの世俗的停滞（セキュラー・スタグネーション）論を受け入れているように見えることである。これは中立金利が過去に比べて今日ははるかに低いという仮説である。 我々はこの理論にいくぶんの同情を持っているが、これは生産性や人口動態といった長期的な金利決定要因に関する理論であることを忘れてはならない。この理論は景気循環的な金利のドライバー、すなわち余剰生産能力の量、財政政策のスタンス、信用の成長、賃金動向などについてはほとんど何も語っていない。 今十年初め、我々がまだ債券に非常に強気であったときには、経済は極めて低い金利を必要としているともっともらしく主張できた：産出ギャップは依然として大きく、デレバレッジのサイクルは始まったばかりであり、住宅と株価は下押しされ、賃金上昇は乏しく、大不況の間の短い景気刺激のバーストの後に財政政策は制約的になっていた。中立からはほど遠いか？ 上述のすべての要因は、過去数年の間に完全にまたは部分的に方向を転じている。財政政策を一例として挙げると、IMFは米国の構造的財政赤字が2014–15年にGDPの平均で3.3%だったと推計している。2019–20年にはIMFは赤字がGDPの平均で5.6%になると見込んでいる。 より緩和的な財政政策はどの程度まで米国の中立金利を押し上げたのだろうか。保守的に仮定して、追加の1ドルの財政刺激が総需要を1ドル押し上げるとしよう。この場合、財政政策は過去5年間で総需要に対してGDP比で2.3%を上乗せしたことになる。総需要が1パーセンテージポイント増加すると中立金利が1%上昇すると仮定すると（これはイエレン元FRB議長が支持したテイラールールの仕様と一致する）、財政政策だけで中立金利を2パーセントポイント以上押し上げたことになる。 上の議論は、長期的な構造要因が中立金利を下押ししているとしても、景気循環的な要因が中立金利をかなり押し上げた可能性があることを示唆している。FRBは今後1〜2年の経済にとって適切な水準を見据えて金利を設定するはずなので、金利が過度に低い状態が長く続くことになりかねない。これにより経済は過熱し、最終的にはインフレが急上昇するだろう。 インフレの脅威 良いニュースは、我々のお気に入りの指標のいずれも大規模な差し迫ったインフレ上昇を示していないことだ（チャート22）。関税が高まっているにもかかわらず、消費者向け輸入物価のインフレ率は鈍化している。コア中間財の生産者物価インフレ率は減速している。ISMや地域連銀の調査における支払価格項目は急落している。インフレ・サプライズ指数は反転して低下している。調査ベースおよび市場ベースのインフレ期待はともに昨夏より低いままである。これらの動きに沿って、BCAの独自のパイプライン・インフレ指標は2年半ぶりの低水準に下落している。 賃金上昇は加速しているが、生産性の伸びの方がさらに大きくなっている。その結果、単位労働コストのインフレ率は昨年中頃から低下している。単位労働コストはコアCPIの約12か月先行指標である（チャート23）。これは少なくとも来年下半期までは消費者物価のインフレ率が不快なほど高い水準に達する可能性は低いことを示唆している。 Chart 22米国における差し迫った大規模インフレ上昇の兆候は見られない 米国で差し迫った大規模なインフレーションの急騰の兆候は見られない... 米国で差し迫った大規模なインフレーションの急騰の兆候は見られない... Chart 23単位労働コストの減速は当面インフレ圧力を和らげる ...そして、単位労働コストの減速は当面の間、インフレ圧力を和らげるだろう ...そして、単位労働コストの減速は当面の間、インフレ圧力を和らげるだろう その時点では、インフレが上昇に転じるリスクが高い。これによりFRBは2021年初めに急激な利上げを開始せざるを得なくなり、ドルが上昇し株式やスプレッド・プロダクトが売られる可能性がある。結果として金融状況が引き締まり、2021年中～後半に米国と世界の景気が後退に陥る恐れが高い。   当面はグローバル株式に強気を維持し、来年後半に防御的姿勢へ転換 Chart 24アナリスト予想はかなり控えめである アナリストの予想はかなり控えめだ アナリストの予想はかなり控えめだ 上で述べた二段階のFRBによる引き締めサイクル――12月に始まり2020年にかけて徐々に利上げを行い、その後インフレ上昇に反応してより積極的な利上げに移行する――が今後数年間の投資見解を形作る。本刊行物の冒頭にある主要金融市場予測チャートは、主要資産クラスが向かう先の大まかなスケッチを示している。 株式や他のリスク資産は、FRBが年内にさらに利上げを示唆して市場の準備を始める時期の前後でボラティリティが高まるものの、最初の段階の利上げを織り込むことができるだろうと我々は考えている。昨年9月とは異なり、利益見通しはより保守的だ。ボトムアップの推計では、2019年に米国で1株当たり利益（EPS）が3.9%上昇し、世界のその他地域で5.4%上昇する見通しである（チャート24）。成長の加速、金融環境の緩和、継続的な自社株買いの組合せは、これらの数値に上振れ余地を示唆している。 さらに重要な点は、9月とは異なり、FRBは経済が良好に推移している場合にのみ利上げを開始するだろうということである。パウエルは米国経済が減速し始めたちょうどその時に「金利は中立からは遠い」と述べてしまい、誤りを犯した。もしその発言が米国の成長がまだ加速している時点で出ていたなら、投資家はおそらくそれを無視しただろう。 ジェローム・パウエルは同じ過ちを繰り返さないだろう。代わりに別の誤りを犯す可能性がある：経済を過熱させ、FRBが明らかに後手に回り、追いつくために慌てて利上げを行わざるを得ない状況にしてしまうことである。その結果生じるスタグフレーション的な環境――労働力不足により成長が鈍化しつつインフレが上向く状況――は株式や他のリスク資産にとって有毒となるだろう。 タイミングを正確にするのは難しいが、我々は投資家に対して今後12〜18か月は控えめにリスク志向を維持することを推奨する。ただし、FRBが利上げのペースを加速する前の来年後半には株式とスプレッド・プロダクトへのエクスポージャーを削減すべきだ。 国際株式を一時的に格上げする準備をする 米国株式市場は他の市場と比べて「ロー・ベータ」になりがちである。もし今年後半に世界成長が加速するなら、国際株式は米国株式をアウトパフォームするだろう。我々はEEMイーティーエフのプットを1月3日に売却して104%の利益を得ており、現在は新興国株式を純粋にロングすることを推奨している。世界成長の回復を示すさらなる確証が得られ次第、為替ヘッジなしの条件で新興国株式と欧州株式の両方をオーバーウェイトへ格上げすることを数週間以内に検討する予定だ。 日本株については判断が分かれるところだ。強い世界成長は日本の多国籍企業に恩恵をもたらすが、国内市場に重心を置く企業は政府が10月に消費税を引き上げるなら打撃を受ける可能性がある。当面は日本株の格上げは見送るつもりだ。 グローバルなセクターレベルでは、我々は今年初めにディフェンシブ寄りの配分を縮小した（昨夏により慎重になっていた後で）。投資家にはエネルギーとインダストリアル（工業）をオーバーウェイトすることを推奨する。金融とマテリアル（素材）にも好感を抱き始めている。前者は今年後半のイールドカーブのスティープ化やクレジット成長の加速から恩恵を受けるだろう。後者はより堅調な中国経済から利益を得るだろう。ヘルスケア、情報技術、コミュニケーション・サービスは中立配分を維持する。不動産と公益事業は債券利回りが上昇し始めるとどちらも傷を負う。生活必需品のような古典的なディフェンシブ・セクターもアンダーパフォームするだろう。  世界の債券利回りは上昇しそうだ 世界の債券利回りは、成長が上振れサプライズを起こすにつれて今後12〜18か月で上昇する可能性が高い。インフレが加速するにつれて利回りは2021年前半に向けてさらに上昇し続けるだろう。 過去のリスクオフ局面とは異なり、次の景気後退に向かう過程で米国債が大きなセーフヘイブンの役割を果たすとは限らない。上述の通り、今日債券利回りがこれほど低い理由の一つはターム・プレミアムが非常に低下していることだ。FRBの債券買入の累積効果がターム・プレミアムを押し下げている可能性は高いが、より大きな影響は投資家が米国債をさまざまなマクロリスクに対する保険として見なしていることに由来している。投資家は、経済が景気後退に陥ると株価は下落し、住宅市場は悪化し、賃金上昇は鈍化し、雇用見通しは悪化するが、少なくとも債券ポートフォリオの価値は上がるだろうと考えることに慣れているのだ。 この考え方の問題は、それが有効なのはFRBが成長の強まりに対して利上げを行う場合だけだという点だ。もしFRBがインフレが手に負えなくなっていることに反応して利上げを行うなら、米国債利回りは上昇する一方で株式は下落する可能性がある。これは実際、1960年代後半から2000年代初頭にかけては常態だった（チャート25）。 Chart 25米国債利回りが上昇する一方で株式が下落する可能性 米国債利回りは上昇する一方で、株価は下落する可能性がある 米国債利回りは上昇する一方で、株価は下落する可能性がある もし米国債がセーフヘイブンの地位を失えば、ターム・プレミアムは上昇するだろう。利回り上昇が株式市場を弱め、投資家が株式と債券の両方から現金へと一斉に逃げることで、さらなる利回り上昇と株価下落を招くという悪循環が生じる可能性がある。 投資家は今後12か月間、米国債に対してはやや短めのデュレーション・スタンスを維持し、その後インフレが表面化し始める2020年中頃にはデュレーションを最大限アンダーウェイトにするべきだ。デュレーションをロングする（長めの債を保有する）判断が合理的になるのは、FRBが金利を制約的な水準まで引き上げ、経済が景気後退に入った場合だけである。それが起こるのは2021年下半期まで見込まれない。 地域別には、今後12か月間で米国債に対して欧州、カナダ、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、特に日本の国債を好む。米国経済が最も過熱するリスクにさらされているからだ。通貨ヘッジありの観点では、10年物米国債利回りは世界の主要国の中で低い部類に入る（表1）。例えば日本の10年国債は通貨ヘッジありの条件で2.72%を提供し、ドイツ国債は2.94%を示している。 Table 1先進国の債券市場 2019年第2四半期 ストラテジー見通し：デッドゾーンからエンドゾーンへ 2019年第2四半期 ストラテジー見通し：デッドゾーンからエンドゾーンへ  米ドル：ソフト・パッチへ向かう 米ドルの見通しを測るのはやや厄介だ。米連邦準備制度理事会（Fed）は今後12か月間で段階的に利上げを行うにせよ、市場が織り込んでいる水準よりは高い利上げを行う見込みだ。他の大半の中央銀行がまだ様子見の姿勢を続けているため、短期金利差は米ドルに有利に動く可能性が高い。それでも、日本を除けば、世界的な成長が強まると投資家は2020年以降の他の先進国での追加利上げを織り込む可能性が高い。その結果、長期の利回り差は短期の利回り差ほど拡大しないかもしれない。 おそらくそれ以上に重要なのは、米ドルはカウンターサイクリカル、つまり世界成長の動きと逆方向に動く通貨であるという点だ（Chart 26）。この逆循環性は、米国経済が世界の他地域と比べて製造業よりもサービス業により重点を置いていることに起因する（Chart 27）。したがって、世界成長が加速すると、資本は米国から世界の他地域へ流れる傾向が強まり、外貨需要が増え、ドル需要は減少することになる。 Chart 26ドルは逆循環通貨である ドルは景気循環に逆行する通貨である ドルは景気循環に逆行する通貨である Chart 27米国はグローバル成長に対する低ベータの投資対象である 米国はグローバル成長に対する低ベータの投資先 米国はグローバル成長に対する低ベータの投資先 もし世界成長が今年後半に持ち直すなら、ドルは第2四半期にピークを付け、その後2019年末から2020年にかけて弱含む可能性が高い。ドルの動きは、2017年の経過と似た経路をたどるかもしれない。2017年はFedが4回利上げした年だが、貿易加重換算の広義ドルはそれでも7％弱含んだ。 Chart 28円はリスクオフ通貨である 円はリスクオフ通貨だ 円はリスクオフ通貨だ 2017年と同様に、ユーロは今年後半に米ドルに対して上昇するだろうし、多くの新興国通貨やコモディティ通貨も同様に上昇するだろう。ただし、2017年に多くの通貨がドルに対して上昇したのに日本円がその動きに参加しなかったのと同じように、円は米ドルに対してあまり勢いよく上昇するのは難しいだろう。 円は“リスクオフ”通貨であり、したがって世界のリスク資産が上昇すると円は弱まる傾向がある（Chart 28）。さらに、もし今年後半に世界の国債利回りが日本国債（JGB）利回りに対して上昇するならば、円は打撃を受けるだろう。特に、財政政策の引き締まりを受けて日銀がイールドカーブ・コントロールの運用を長引かせざるを得ない場合はその傾向が強まる。123を下回る場面ではEUR/JPYをロングするつもりだ。 一旦弱含んだ後、米ドルは来年末に再び上昇する 米国経済が2020年に供給面の制約にますます直面するにつれ、成長は鈍化し、インフレは加速するだろう。Fedはインフレの上昇以上の速さで利上げを行って応じる。結果として実質金利が上昇し、ドルに上方圧力がかかるだろう。 このスタグフレーション的な環境では、株式は急落し、クレジットスプレッドは拡大する。米国の金融環境の引き締まりは世界中に波及し、世界成長はそれがなかった場合よりも一層減速するだろう。これがさらにドルを加速させる。米ドルがピークを付けるのは、Fedが2021年末に利下げを開始した時点のみである。 コモディティ：より強気に 今年後半のドルの弱含みと、中国の回復に牽引された世界成長の強化はコモディティにとって追い風となる。BCAのコモディティ・ストラテジストは、現行水準で銅のロングを推奨する。また、原油に対する強気のバイアスも維持している。ブレントは今年平均75ドル/バレル、2020年は80ドル/バレルになると見込んでいる。米国のシェール生産の増加は、深海の輸出施設整備の遅延によって相殺され、供給は比較的タイトに保たれるだろう。 過去のレポートでは、インフレヘッジとして金を購入することの有用性を論じてきた。ただし、我々はドル強気見解のためにそれを実行に移すのを控えてきた。今やドルが今後数か月でピークを付けると見ているため、1275ドル/オンスを下回る場面があれば金を買いたい。   Peter Berezin, チーフ・グローバル・ストラテジスト グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー peterb@bcaresearch.com 脚注 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “グレツキーのドクトリン,” dated March 1, 2019. 2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “FCIドゥーム・ループの可能性は低い,” dated January 4, 2019. 3      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “本当に世界には政府債務が多すぎるのか？” dated February 22, 2019. ストラテジー & マーケット動向 マクロクォント・モデルと現在の主観的スコア チャート29 タクティカル・トレード ストラテジー推奨 クローズド・トレード

Highlights Just when it looked like the agricultural complex was starting to perk up, it was slapped down again. After crawling its way back from a mid-2018 crash – retracing more than half of its decline – the CCI Grains and Oilseeds index plummeted in February, declining by nearly 9% (Chart Of The Week). The decline was broad-based, but was led by wheat, which was dragged down by muted demand and accounted for most of the index’s decline. Looking forward, we expect U.S. financial conditions and developments on the trade-war front to remain the main forces driving ag prices. Ample inventories will provide the cushion necessary to moderate the impact of potential supply-side shocks. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Venezuela suffered another power outage earlier this week, indicating the deterioration of its infrastructure is accelerating. While officials claim to have restored power, we expect more such outages going forward, which will severely reduce the country’s production and export capacity. Separately, Aramco announced it will buy 70% of Sabic, a Saudi state-owned petchem producer, for $69 billion, according to the Wall Street Journal. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s MMG Ltd was set to declare force majeure following protests at its Las Bambas mine in Peru earlier this week. The mine produces ~ 385k MT p.a., most of which goes to China. Precious Metals: Neutral. The inversion of the U.S. yield curve put a bid into the gold market this week, as investors sought a safe-haven refuge. Continued weakness in bond yields, and accommodative central banks responding to low inflation expectations globally will continue to support gold. Agriculture: Underweight. A more patient Fed will be supportive of ag prices in 2H19, as we discuss below. Feature Chart of the WeekWheat Had A Rough Start To 2019 A Patient Fed Will Support Ags In 2H19 While differences across ag markets will arise due to idiosyncratic supply shocks and targeted trade policies, a common determinant of ag price movements more generally is U.S. financial conditions. Since our last assessment of global ag markets, Fed policymakers have adopted a much more patient approach to monetary policy.1 In line with the pause in the Fed’s rates-normalization policy, financial conditions have eased considerably (Chart 2). We believe this will, ceteris paribus, bring relief to commodity markets in general, ags in particular, in the second half of this year. Chart 2Easier Financial Conditions Bode Well For Ags The bulk of this relief will be transmitted through the impact of a weaker dollar. Since the dollar is a countercyclical currency, its weakness implies an improvement in global growth. This more solid economic backdrop is associated with greater aggregate demand, particularly in EM economies, as well as demand for agricultural products. The lagged effects of financial tightening, weak Chinese credit growth and the trade war will persist in 2Q19. Furthermore, when the USD weakens against the currencies of ag exporting countries, farmers there are incentivized to hoard or cut exports – thus reducing supply – awaiting periods when a stronger greenback will raise their profits. At the same time, ags priced in USD become relatively more affordable for importing nations, incentivizing them to raise consumption. The net impact of this contraction in supply amid greater demand will pull up prices – illustrated by the relatively tight inverse relationship between ag prices and the dollar (Chart 3). Chart 3A Weaker USD Will Be A Tailwind In 2H19 Going into mid-2019, we expect global economic indicators to continue to be uninspiring. The lagged effects of financial tightening, weak Chinese credit growth and the trade war will persist in 2Q19. However, as these factors fade and give way to an improvement in global economic conditions and easier financial conditions, we expect the dollar to peak around mid-year. As such, a resurgence in global growth in the second half of the year will be reflected in an improvement in the value of the currencies of major ag exporters ex-U.S. (Chart 4). Ceteris paribus, this also benefits ag prices. Chart 4Weak Local Currencies Supporting Farm Profits, Incentivizing Production China’s Economy Remains Central Our outlook hinges on developments in the Chinese economy. Peter Berezin – our Chief Global Investment Strategist – expects Chinese authorities to not only stabilize credit growth, but also increase it, creating room for improvement in the world’s second largest economy.2 This combination of supportive global growth and a softer dollar bodes well for ag prices in 2H19. The Fed pause and associated easing in U.S. financial conditions will support global growth, causing the U.S. dollar to weaken – a bullish force for ag markets. Apart from the currency impact, easy financial conditions are supportive of global growth. A rise in income levels of emerging economies will support demand for goods and services generally, and agricultural commodities specifically.3 The market now expects 36 and 51 basis points of rate cuts over the coming 12 and 24 months, respectively. Similarly, following last week’s FOMC meeting, the median Fed dot indicates no rate hikes this year from the U.S. central bank, and only one in 2020. While our Global Investment Strategists would not be surprised to see a hike this year, the noticeably less hawkish tone in the Fed’s forward guidance and dot plots are positive for ag markets.4 Looking beyond that into late-2020 or early 2021, a potential pick-up in inflation will force the Fed to take a more hawkish stance, and once again support the U.S. dollar. This will weigh down on ag prices over the strategic time horizon. Bottom Line: The Fed pause and associated easing in U.S. financial conditions will support global growth, causing the U.S. dollar to weaken – a bullish force for ag markets. However, this is unlikely to occur before mid-year. In the meantime, a stronger dollar on the back of the lagged effects of growth dampening events in 2018, will remain a headwind. Ample Inventories Will Cushion Against Supply Shocks Putting aside the more or less uniform impact of U.S. financial conditions, individual supply-demand fundamentals will manifest as idiosyncratic risks and opportunities. The USDA has been revising its projections for ending stocks higher in its monthly World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) across the board since it released the first projections for the 2018/2019 crop year last May. However, we find that solely on the back of fundamentals, soybeans are more likely to resist upward pressure from easier U.S. financial conditions in 2H19 vs. wheat and corn. The USDA’s latest projections for the current crop year indicate that global bean markets are well supplied. Expectations of a global surplus this crop year – for the seventh consecutive year – will add to the growing cushion (Chart 5). Chart 5Beans Surplus Will Add To the Glut Since May, global ending bean stocks have been revised higher by a total of 20.47mm MT. The change in projections comes on the back of upward revisions to production and beginning stocks, compounded by downward revisions to consumption. The latter will likely contract further if the U.S. and China do not reach an agreement on the trade front (see below). Consequently, unless a weather disruption weakens supply, we expect soybean inventories to stand at record highs relative to consumption at the end of the current crop year. In the case of wheat, the impact on prices will likely be marginal. The global balance is expected to shift to a deficit in the current marketing year, following five years of surplus (Chart 6). While this is a positive for wheat prices, given that global inventory levels are relatively elevated – capable of supporting 37% of consumption – and the current deficit is relatively small, we do not expect the deficit to pressure prices in the near term. Chart 6Elevated Wheat Inventories Will Cushion Against Minor Deficit Despite continued downward revisions to the USDA’s wheat production projections, expectations of ending stocks have actually risen on the back of downward revisions to consumption. Similarly, corn fundamentals are also unlikely to sway prices much. The grain is expected to remain in deficit for the second consecutive year, which will pull inventories down off their 2016/17 peak to be capable of covering ~27% of global consumption (Chart 7). Despite this contraction in availability, global supplies remain relatively elevated, especially compared to the 2003 to 2012 period. Thus unless there is a significant supply shock, we don’t expect much support from fundamentals. Chart 7A Global Corn Deficit ... Unlike wheat demand, which has been downgraded, the USDA has revised corn consumption up relative to the first projections for the crop year released last May. Nevertheless, stronger expectations of consumption have been overwhelmed by upward revisions to production and beginning inventory levels. Given that world inventories already are bloated, we do not expect the likely deficit in wheat and corn supplies this crop year to pressure prices much to the upside. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. farmers had been planting more corn and wheat at the expense of soybean acreage (Chart 8). On a global level, while wheat remains more popular in terms of acreage, it is generally trending downwards, while corn and soybean plantings are trending up. However, over the longer term, U.S. farmers are expected to dedicate more land to corn relative to soybeans. Chart 8... Will Be Met By Rising U.S. Acreage Bottom Line: Given that world inventories already are bloated, we do not expect the likely deficit in wheat and corn supplies this crop year to pressure prices much to the upside. Similarly, a global glut in soybean supplies will only add to swelling inventories. The Trade War And Soybeans: It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over Aside from U.S. financial conditions and supply-demand balances, U.S. trade policy has also been roiling ag markets since China slapped U.S. soybeans with 25% tariffs in mid-2018. In fact, since the escalation of the trade dispute, soybean prices have been moving largely in response to developments on the trade front (Chart 9). As developments since the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires last December have been more favorable, soybean markets are on the path to recovery. Chart 9Markets Optimistic Of A Trade War Resolution So far, even though U.S. soybean exports to China picked up over the past two months, total U.S. exports still lag levels typical for this time of year (Chart 10). This comes despite U.S. efforts to raise shipments to other trading partners. Furthermore, U.S. exports will now be in direct competition with the Brazilian crop, which usually dominates trade flows at this time of year (Chart 11). While the U.S. tariff hike from 10% to 25% on $200bn of Chinese goods has been postponed, a resolution to the trade war has yet to occur. The path to a resolution is fraught with risks. While the U.S. tariff hike from 10% to 25% on $200bn of Chinese goods has been postponed, a resolution to the trade war has yet to occur. The path to a resolution is fraught with risks. The Trump-Xi meeting that was expected to occur in late-March was postponed; the next most likely date for a meeting is at the G20 summit in end-June. This leaves another 3 months of trade uncertainty. Nevertheless, our models indicate that soybeans are now priced at fair value, based on U.S. financial variables – absent a trade war (Chart 12). Furthermore, the premium priced into Brazilian beans above those traded on the CBOT has returned to its historical average (Chart 13). Thus, we do not expect a further reduction in the premium in the event Sino-U.S. trade negotiations are successful. Chart 13Premium For Brazilian Beans Has Normalized Rather, markets will be disappointed if the U.S. and China are unable to conclude a deal. This would put CBOT prices at risk and support the premium on those traded in Brazil. Given that our geopolitical strategists assign a non-negligible 30% probability that the trade war escalates further, we believe markets are overly optimistic that a deal will be concluded.5 If the trade war drags on and turns into a multi-year conflict, soybean markets will likely take a more meaningful hit. According to the USDA’s latest long-term projections released earlier this month, China’s soybean imports were projected to rise 32.1mm MT during the 2018-28 period – a massive downward revision from the 46mm MT expected for the 2017-2027 period contained in the previous long-run projections. Furthermore, outbreaks of African swine fever in China may put demand there at risk. Over 100 cases have so far been reported in China, with several cases already reported in Vietnam as well. This threatens to depress China’s need for soybean as animal feed, regardless of what happens on the trade front. Bottom Line: A positive outcome from the U.S.-China trade negotiations is not a given. Nevertheless, soybean markets are treating it as such. Our geopolitical strategists assign 30% odds that a final deal falls through. This non-negligible probability threatens to cause soybean prices to relapse anew, should Sino-U.S. trade negotiations break down.   Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “2019 Key Views: Policy-Induced Volatility Will Drive Markets,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy December 13, 2018.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled “What’s Next For The Dollar,” dated March 15, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018,” dated November 30, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled “Questions From The Road,” dated March 22, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled “China-U.S. Trade: A Structural Deal?,” dated March 6, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table   Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades  

Highlights For the Eurostoxx50 to outperform the S&P500, the big euro area banks have to outperform the big U.S. tech stocks. Tactically overweight Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 as well as other pro-cyclical positions such as overweight EM versus DM… …but prepare to take profits in the summer months. In the medium term, the euro area versus U.S. long-bond yield spread has plenty of scope to compress from its current -180 bps… …and EUR/USD has the scope to head higher. Feature Without a shadow of a doubt, the chart that causes the greatest stir among our clients is the Chart of the Week. It shows that one of the biggest investment decisions, the choice between the euro area and U.S. equity markets, reduces to the choice between the three large euro area banks – Santander, BNP Paribas, and ING – and the three U.S. tech behemoths – Apple, Microsoft, and Google.  Chart of the WeekEurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 Is Just 3 Banks Vs. 3 Tech Stocks! Clients are simultaneously amazed and unsettled by this manifestation of the Pareto Principle, which states that the vast majority of an effect is explained by a tiny minority of causes. Financials feature large in the Eurostoxx50 while tech giants dominate the S&P500. But the amazing thing is that almost all of the relative performance can be explained by just three stocks in each market. The vast majority of an effect is explained by a tiny minority of causes.  The chart creates a cognitive dissonance. What about the things that are supposed to matter for stock market selection: relative economic growth, profits growth, margins, valuations and geopolitics? The answer is that all of these are interesting areas of study, but they are mere details in the big picture. For the Eurostoxx50 to outperform the S&P500, the big euro area banks have to outperform the big U.S. tech stocks (Chart I-2). Period.  Chart 2For The Eurostoxx50 To Outperform The S&P500, Euro Area Banks Have To Outperform U.S. Tech Our view is that in the immediate future this is certainly possible, but that over the long haul it will prove to be a very tall order. When The Mean Is Meaningless The structural performances of vastly different equity sectors can diverge for a very long time. How long? Japanese banks have underperformed U.S. tech for thirty years and counting! In this situation, mean-reversion and ‘standard deviations’ from the mean become meaningless concepts (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Japanese Banks Have Underperformed U.S. Tech For Thirty Years And Counting! The statistical concept of a standard deviation is only meaningful if the underlying data is stationary, which is to say mean-reverting. If it isn’t, then it is impossible to say that a sector price or valuation is stretched either versus another sector, or versus its own history.  One problem is that sector performances and valuations undergo phase-shifts when they enter a different economic climate. The structural outlook for bank profits experiences a phase-shift when a debt super-cycle ends. Therefore, comparing a bank valuation after a debt super-cycle with the valuation during a debt super-cycle is as meaningless as comparing your height as an adult to your height when you were a child! Sector performances and valuations undergo phase-shifts when they enter a different economic climate. To which, a frequent riposte is: within the same sector, euro area companies appear cheaper than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. But again, this apparent value is deceptive because it is simply an adjustment for the so-called ‘currency translation effect’ and the anticipated long-term moves in exchange rates. If investors anticipate the euro ultimately to strengthen – because they see that it is trading well below purchasing power parity – then a multinational company listed on a euro area bourse will suffer a future headwind to its mixed-currency denominated profits when they are translated back to a stronger euro. To discount this anticipated headwind, the euro area multinational must trade cheaper compared with a peer in, say, the U.S. But the cheapness is a false impression. Pulling together these complexities of sector effects, phase-shifts in sector valuations and currency effects, making the big call between Europe and America on the basis of performance or valuation mean-reversion is dangerous. Instead, we come back to the basic question: should you tilt towards euro area financials or towards U.S. tech? Own Banks For The Short Term Only Japanese financial sector profits peaked in 1990 and stand at less than half that level today. Euro area financial sector profits peaked in 2007, and are tracking the Japanese experience with a 17-year lag. If euro area financial profits continue to follow in Japan’s footsteps, expect no sustained growth through the next 17 years (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Euro Area Financial Profits Are Following Japanese Footsteps In a post credit boom era, banks lose the lifeblood of their business: credit creation. This loss becomes a multi-decade headwind to financial sector profit growth and share price performance. Bank profits are dependent on two other drivers. One is operational leverage – the amount of equity held against the balance sheet. More stringent European regulation is making this a headwind too. Banks have to hold more equity capital against assets, diluting their profitability. The other driver is the net interest margin – the difference between rates received on loans and rates paid on deposits. In this regard, both fintech and the blockchain are likely to create a further headwind to bank profitability. Japan’s experience suggests that euro area financials will struggle to outperform structurally. Admittedly, U.S. tech may also face its own headwinds or phase-shift, most obviously antitrust lawsuits to counter its near-monopoly status. But even allowing for this, Japan’s experience suggests that euro area financials will struggle to outperform structurally. Rather, financials is a sector to play for outperformance phases lasting no more than a few quarters. Last autumn, we noted that short-term credit impulses in the major economies were flipping from a sharp down-oscillation into an up-oscillation phase (Chart I-5). On that basis, we recommended a tactical overweight to Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 as well as other pro-cyclical positions such as overweight EM versus DM. Those pro-cyclical sector positions have broadly succeeded, but they are still appropriate given that up-oscillation phases very reliably last around nine months. Chart I-5Short-Term Credit Impulses Have Flipped To Up-Oscillations The caveat is: prepare to take profits in the summer months. The Fed Is Now At ‘Neutral’, But Where Is The ECB? Last week, the Federal Reserve confirmed that “the Federal funds rate (at 2.5 percent) is now in the broad range of estimates of neutral – the rate that tends neither to stimulate nor to restrain the economy.”  This begs the question: where is the ECB policy rate (now at 0 percent) relative to its neutral? Our very high conviction view is that the ECB policy rate is well below neutral. Financials is a sector to play for outperformance phases lasting no more than a few quarters. The twenty year life of the euro captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. Through these twenty years, the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread has averaged -50 bps1 (Chart I-6). Over this same period, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -50 bps (Chart I-7). Ergo, the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. Meaning, the ex-post neutral real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been exactly the same. Chart I-6The Euro Area Vs. U.S. Yield Spread Has Averaged -50 Bps... Chart I-7...The Euro Area Vs. U.S. Inflation Spread Has Also Averaged -50 Bps With little difference in the neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there a valid reason to expect a difference in the future? An obvious response is the fragility of the euro area’s banking system will require the ECB to persist with its zero interest rate policy for years. In Germany and France, bank lending is healthy, and could easily weather modestly tighter monetary policy. In fact, the evidence suggests that this fear is exaggerated. In Germany and France, bank lending is healthy, and could easily weather modestly tighter monetary policy (Chart I-8). The problem has been localised in Italy, where bank lending relapsed once again in 2018. Chart I-8Bank Lending Is Healthy In Germany And France However, on closer examination this was a direct result of political tensions. Recently, Italian bank lending has been a very tight (inverse) function of the Italian bond yield. The BTP yield spiked last year when Rome escalated its budget spat with Brussels, and bank lending took a hard hit. But now that the Italian bond yield has retraced, lending should recover (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Italian Bank Lending Should Recover Now That The Bond Yield Has Come Down The central issue is can the U.S. policy rate – which is at neutral – and the ECB policy – which is below neutral – diverge much from here? Our high conviction answer is no. Therefore, in the medium term, the euro area versus U.S. long-bond yield spread has plenty of scope to compress from its current -180 bps, one way or the other (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Can Interest Rate Expectations Diverge Much From Here? It also implies that after remaining range-bound in the immediate future, EUR/USD has the scope to head higher. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System This week’s recommended trade is to go long SEK/NOK, as it is close to the limit of tight liquidity that has signaled many previous technical reversals in this currency cross. Set a profit target of 1.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, the on-going rally in government bonds caused the short position in 30-year T-bonds to hit its stop-loss. This leaves us with five open positions. Long SEK/NOK. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

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Highlights Taiwan’s semiconductor sector is facing both cyclical and structural headwinds. Semiconductor exports will continue to contract over the next six months or so, on retrenching global demand. In the long run, Taiwan is facing increasing competition from Korea in the high-end supply, and from mainland China in the medium- to low-end supply of the semiconductor market. The latest rebound in Taiwanese share prices is unsustainable, and they are about to relapse anew. Within an EM equity portfolio, we recommend staying neutral on Taiwanese stocks for now. Feature Taiwan’s exports and manufacturing are in full-blown recession. The equity market has rebounded after a major selloff last year. However, the overall manufacturing PMI and its export sub-component are extremely weak, and do not justify the latest share-price rebound (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Taiwanese Equities: Unsustainable Rally Are manufacturing activity and exports about to recover? Or will the stock market rally fade? Our answer is the latter. There are currently no signs suggesting a recovery in exports is imminent. Moreover, the engine of the economy – the semiconductor sector – is facing both cyclical and structural headwinds. We remain negative on Taiwanese stocks in absolute terms. Within an EM equity portfolio, we recommend a market-weight allocation to Taiwanese stocks for now. Importance Of Semiconductors Over the past 15 years, the semiconductor sector has become the cornerstone of the Taiwanese economy. The Taiwanese economy is highly dependent on its external sector, as exports contribute to nearly 70% of GDP. As such, Taiwan’s business cycle has often been closely associated with its export sector. This means the region’s growth outlook relies on both external demand (a cyclical factor) and the competitiveness of its export sector (more of a structural factor). Over the past 15 years, the semiconductor sector has become the cornerstone of the Taiwanese economy. It contributes to over one-third of the region’s total exports, up from 22% in 2009 (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Semiconductor: Cornerstone Of Taiwanese Economy Consistently, tech stocks also account for the lion’s share of the Taiwanese stock market, representing nearly 60% of the MSCI Taiwan Index and 47% of the Taiwanese Stock Exchange (TSE) index in market-value terms. There have been two key forces behind the significant growth of Taiwan’s semiconductor sector: booming global demand for smartphones/tablets and increasing competitiveness among domestic semiconductor companies. However, looking forward, the Taiwanese manufacturing sector and its semiconductor exports are facing a double-whammy: cyclical weakness in global demand and a relative decline in Taiwan’s export ability. In the context of a negative structural outlook, a cyclical downtrend engenders substantial deterioration in manufacturing, and by extension corporate profitability. Cyclical Downturn In Global Semiconductor Demand The outlook for the Taiwanese semiconductor industry remains poor. The global semiconductor industry has already been in a cyclical downtrend since early 2018. Global smartphone sales are shrinking. Both DRAM and NAND prices have been falling (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Falling Memory Chips Prices The freefall in Taiwan's new export orders seems to entail a further contraction in exports (Chart I-4). Chart I-4A Further Contraction In Exports Is Likely Importantly, exports of electronics parts lead Taiwanese tech EPS growth, and currently point to an impending contraction in corporate earnings (Chart I-5). Chart I-5An Impending Contraction In Corporate Earnings The outlook for the Taiwanese semiconductor industry remains poor. First, Taiwanese semiconductor producers are highly vulnerable to any further downside in global smartphone demand. There are two major pure-play wafer manufacturers in Taiwan: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and United Microelectronics (UMC). TSMC and UMC are the world’s largest and fourth-largest dedicated integrated circuit (IC) foundries, respectively. The smartphone sector has been the main revenue source for both companies, accounting for a 45% share for TSMC and 40% for UMC. Global smartphone demand is likely to decline further in 2019, as major markets such as mainland China and advanced economies have entered the saturation phase of mobile-phone demand. DRAMeXchange expects global smartphone production volume for 2019 to fall by 3.3% from last year following a 4% drop in 2018 (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Global Smartphone Demand Started A Downtrend Smartphone sales in mainland China remain in deep contraction after two consecutive years of declines (Chart I-7). Odds are that smartphone shipments will remain sluggish amid the ongoing economic slump in the mainland’s economy. Chart I-7Smartphone Sales In Mainland China Are In A Deep Contraction In addition, Taiwan’s TSMC is the sole chip supplier for Apple iPhones. A further decline in Apple smartphone shipments will reduce the company’s revenue and profits, damaging the region’s growth outlook. Mainland China now can produce top-notch quality smartphones at relatively cheaper selling prices. This will further crowd out higher-priced products from Apple, Samsung and others (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Apple Has Been Losing Market Share In Global Smartphone Market Second, the significant surge in bitcoin prices greatly boosted cryptocurrency mining activity in 2016-‘17 as miners quickly expanded their computing power. This boosted demand for graphic process unit (GPU) chips and in turn brought higher revenue for Taiwan chipmakers between June 2016 and early 2018. However, with the bust in bitcoin prices (Chart I-3 on page 3), demand from cryptocurrency mining has vanished and is unlikely to revive soon. Indeed, Taiwan chipmakers have suffered from last year’s plunge in cryptocurrency mining activity. According to TSMC, revenue from the cryptocurrency mining-related high-performance computing (HPC) sector contracted by double digits in 2018. Given that HPC demand is the second-biggest source of revenue for TSMC, with 32% share, TSMC revenue will be curtailed as HPC chip demand will continue to decline on weak bitcoin prices. Last, developments in new technologies, such as foldable smartphones, artificial intelligence, fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks and the so-called Internet of Things (IoTs) could only produce a modest pick-up in semiconductor demand. Most of these developments are still in their infancy and early stages. Hence, their growth will not be large enough to make a cyclical difference in global semiconductor demand. For example, the foldable smartphone that Huawei recently announced is indeed appealing. However, a lack of stability in panel supply and quite-high selling prices will limit sales. WitsView, a division of TrendForce, predicts that the market penetration rate of the foldable phone will be only 0.1% in 2019, and could rise to 1% in 2020 if more panel providers join the game, enabling a significant reduction in panel costs. Moreover, these categories together account for only ~23% of TSMC’s revenue; their modest growth will not be able to make up for the losses from the smartphone and HPC sectors within Taiwan’s economy. Besides, there has been a slowdown in demand from high-growth areas such as data center servers, as well as the automotive and industrial sectors. Putting it all together, odds are that global semiconductor demand will only materially recover in 2020. By that time, more-mature 5G technology and the increasing adoption of the 5G network and 5G-related products may be able to shift global semiconductor demand from the current downturn to a cyclical uptrend. Hence, the cyclical weakness in global semiconductor demand is likely to persist over the next six months. Consequently, Taiwan’s major types of semiconductor production will likely remain in contraction, and inventory levels will stay elevated (Chart I-9 and Chart I-10). Chart I-9Taiwan: Semiconductor Output Contraction Will Likely Continue Chart I-10Taiwan: Semiconductor Inventory Are Elevated Bottom Line: There are no signs of an imminent recovery in exports. A Potential Decline In Taiwan’s Semiconductor Competitiveness Taiwan wafer manufacturers are facing an increasing threat from their Korean and mainland China competitors. Leadership in advanced process technologies has been a key factor in Taiwan’s strong market position in the global semiconductor industry. With cutting-edge technologies, Taiwan has been the global wafer capacity leader since 2015. As of last year, it held about 22% of global installed wafer capacity (Chart I-11). However, Taiwan wafer manufacturers are facing an increasing threat from their Korean and mainland China competitors. Korean Chipmakers While Taiwan will remain highly competitive in 7 nanometer (nm) and 10 nm wafer production, it is facing fierce competition from Korea. Manufacturing technologies designated by smaller nanometer numbers tend to have faster speeds and be more power-efficient than technologies designated by larger numbers. TSMC was the first company in the world to mass-produce 7 nm node wafers. Its 7 nm deep ultraviolet lithography (DUV) node has been in mass production since April 2018, producing chips for AMD, Apple, HiSilicon, and Xilinx. Beginning at the end of this month, TSMC will be ready to begin mass production of 7nm wafers using extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV). The switch from 7nm DUV to 7nm EUV allows for fewer defects and fewer steps required during the production process. The company also aims to boost volume production of its 5 nm nodes in early 2020 and has a target of 3 nm wafers for 2022. Last year, wafer revenue from 7nm and 10nm chips accounted for 9% and 11% of TSMC’s total revenue, respectively (Chart I-12). Samsung has been closely following TSMC in terms of technological innovation. It started mass production of EUV-based 7nm chips last October, with a plan of risk production1 of 5nm wafers in 2019 and a target of 4nm wafers in 2022. Meanwhile, IBM announced last December that it signed an agreement with Samsung to produce its next-generation processors with Samsung’s 7nm technology. As Samsung seeks to diversify its revenue source away from memory chips, which last year contributed to about 80% of its operating profit, the company has been determined to ramp up the development of its foundry business. It aims to replace TSMC as the world’s largest foundry producer by 2030. In the near term, Samsung aims to secure a 25% market share in the global pure-play foundry market by 2023, a rise from 19% currently. Last year, Samsung surpassed Taiwan’s UMC to become the world’s second-largest dedicated chipmaker. Moreover, Samsung’s capital spending has been and will continue to be much higher than TSMC. Over the course of 2017 and 2018, Samsung spent about $46.9 billion on semiconductor capital expenditures, more than double TSMC’s $21 billion. Hence, the competition between TSMC and Samsung in the high-end chip market will intensify in the coming years. Chipmakers In Mainland China The competition between TSMC and chipmakers from mainland China is also escalating. Chart I-12 shows that 80% of TSMC’s wafer revenue comes from bigger node wafers (bigger than 10 nm). Taiwan’s second-biggest chipmaker, UMC, only produces wafers equal to or bigger than 28 nm. Therefore, the chip market using less-advanced technology than 10 nm will be the main battlefield between Taiwanese and mainland China’s chipmakers. Before 2014, there were few wafer manufacturers in mainland China, and those that did exist were too weak to compete with giant market players like TSMC. In 2014, the Chinese central government made a move to foster development within the local IC industry. Since then, the authorities have poured significant amounts of capital into semiconductor foundries, as well as companies focused on memory production, chip design and related equipment and materials. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) is the world’s fourth-largest dedicated wafer manufacturer, and is the largest in mainland China. While 28nm will likely remain a large part of its business, SMIC plans to go into production on its 14 nm technology in the first half of 2019. The company is also working on 10nm and 7nm nodes with the use of EUV. SMIC currently counts HiSilicon and Qualcomm as customers, manufacturing smartphone chips with medium-to-low technology. As mainland China aims to increase its self-sufficiency rate for ICs significantly over the next five to 10 years, the nation’s producers will significantly expand their wafer capacity. Mainland China is likely to reduce its semiconductor imports from Taiwan considerably in the coming years, especially wafer imports. According to IC Insights, nine 300mm wafer fabs2 are scheduled to open worldwide in 2019, with five of them in mainland China. Based on another set of data from SEMI, the number of 200mm wafer fabs in the world will increase from 194 in 2017 to 203 by 2022, with an additional 56 established fabs planning to expand their manufacturing capacity. Mainland China is expected to account for 44% of the growth. In comparison, Taiwan only accounts for about 10% of the growth. Mainland China currently accounts for over 30% of Taiwanese electronic parts exports (wafers, PCBs, mainboards and others). As mainland China continues to build new wafer manufacturing capacity and gradually improve its existing technology, it will switch its consumption from imports to domestic production. Consequently, mainland China is likely to reduce its semiconductor imports from Taiwan considerably in the coming years, especially wafer imports (Chart I-13). This is structurally bearish for Taiwanese semiconductor companies. Chart I-13Mainland China’s Semiconductor Imports From Taiwan Will Drop Bottom Line: Taiwan is facing increasing challenges from Korea in terms of defending its market share in the high-end wafer market. Meanwhile, Taiwan is also set to lose market share in the medium-to-low market to wafer producers from mainland China. What About The Rest Of The Economy? The rest of the economy is exhibiting mixed signals, with contracting major non-semiconductor export sectors but decent household consumption and property market. Table 1 shows Taiwan’s top 10 exported products, with the top three attributing to over half of total exports. Besides the semiconductor sector, exports of the other two major products – electrical machinery products and machinery – are beginning to contract (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Taiwan: Contracting Non-Semiconductor Exports However, the domestic economy seems to be running well at present. Production of construction materials in volume terms is growing rapidly, accompanied by a rebound in building permits granted (Chart I-15). While employment growth is decent, average wage growth has been quite strong (Chart I-16). With persistent contraction in exports and inflation very low, the central bank could cut rates in 2019. Chart I-15Decent Domestic Demand Chart I-16Strong Wage Growth Ongoing contraction in semiconductor exports will likely slow domestic demand with a time lag. In fact, the inverted 5-year/6-month yield curve is indeed signaling an economic slump in Taiwan (Chart I-17). Chart I-17Inverted Yield Curve Signals Continuing Economic Slump Ahead Investment Recommendations The latest rebound in Taiwanese stocks is unsustainable and share prices will relapse again. Within an EM equity portfolio, we recommend maintaining a market-weight allocation to Taiwan for now. We are reluctant to downgrade Taiwan to underweight because some other emerging markets and sectors within the EM universe have a poorer outlook. In addition, Taiwanese shares have already underperformed the EM benchmark since last September (Chart I-18). Chart I-18Taiwanese Stocks: Staying Neutral Within EM The Taiwanese currency is cheap (Chart I-19). The region has a massive current account surplus and foreigners do not hold any local bonds, which is very different from many other EM countries. Hence, Taiwan is less vulnerable to capital outflows than many current-account-deficit EM economies. The latter could be forced to raise rates, which will place pressure on their banks as well as on domestic demand. In contrast, Taiwan has the ability to cut rates. Chart I-19TWD Is Cheap Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy ellenj@bcaresearch.com     1 "Risk Production" means that a particular silicon wafer fabrication process has established a baseline in terms of process recipes, device models, and design kits, and has passed standard wafer level reliability tests. 2 A fab, sometimes called foundry, is a semiconductor fabrication plant where devices such as integrated circuits are manufactured. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Driven by its fear that deflation is a more intractable danger than inflation, the Federal Reserve has enshrined its pause for the remainder of 2019 in order to lift inflation expectations. Since the U.S. business cycle expansion is not over, the Federal Reserve’s plan to put policy on hold this year raises the odds that the economy will overheat. Global growth is set to bottom during the second quarter in response to easier financial conditions. Accommodative policy, rebounding global economic activity and a softening dollar will boost risk asset prices during the remainder of the year. Safe-haven bonds, including Treasurys, will underperform cash over the coming 12 to 18 months. The rally in risk assets will ultimately prove the last hurrah as the Fed will resume tightening later this year or in 2020, and a bear market lies down the road. Only investors with tactical investment horizons should aggressively play this rally. Those with longer investment horizons should use this rally to lighten up their exposure to risk. Feature Introduction Following the introduction of the word “patience” into the Federal Reserve’s lexicon, a move lower in the so-called Fed dots was to be anticipated. The FOMC now expects no rate increases in 2019 and only one hike in 2020. The interest rate market remains skeptical that the Fed will be able to deliver on its forecast. For now, the OIS curve is pricing in a 75% probability of a cut this year, and rates at 1.9% by the end of 2020. With the 10-year/3-month yield curve inverting last week and the U.S. Leading Economic Indicator still decelerating, it is no wonder that investors are betting on the Fed becoming ever more dovish (Chart I-1). BCA is inclined to take the Fed at its word – the next move will be a hike, not a cut. This call rests on our view of the business cycle: The fed funds rate is still somewhat below neutral, U.S. economic activity can expand further, and global growth is likely to trough soon. The current dovish inclination of global central banks will only nurture the cycle a little bit longer. Consequently, we continue to recommend a positive stance on stocks for the coming quarters, while keeping in mind that the cycle is long in the tooth, and that beyond this last climb lies a significant bear market. The U.S. Business Cycle Has Further To Run… The Fed remains data dependent, but this now means that depressed inflation expectations in the private sector need to be vanquished before the hiking can resume (Chart I-2). With the view that low realized inflation has curtailed expectations now common across major central banks, this implies that a temporary overshoot in actual core PCE will be tolerated in order to lift expectations. Chart I-1Worrisome Signs For Growth Chart I-2The Fed Wants To Lift Inflation Expectations   Since consumer prices are a lagging variable, lifting both realized and anticipated inflation will only be possible if we move ever further along the business cycle, further pressuring the economy. Our base case remains that the risk of a recession is low in 2019, and is even receding in 2020. First, U.S. credit-dependent cyclical spending currently constitutes only 25.3% of potential GDP. As Chart I-3 illustrates, this is in line with its historical average, and well below the levels recorded near the end of previous business cycles. This suggests that the amount of vulnerability caused by misallocated capital is not yet in line with previous cycles. It also indicates that the share of output generated by the sectors most sensitive to higher rates is also low. Chart I-3U.S. Cyclical Spending: Limited Signs Of Vulnerability Second, the consumer remains in good shape. Households have deleveraged, and debt-service payments relative to disposable income are still near multi-generational lows (Chart I-4). Moreover, thanks to a saving rate of 7.6%, consumer spending is likely to move in line or even outperform income growth. On this front, the outlook is also good. As Chart I-5 demonstrates, the link between wages and salaries relative to the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers – a measure of labor utilization unaffected by the demographic changes that have muddied the interpretation of the unemployment rate – is still as tight as it was 20 years ago. Thus, as long as the labor market does not suddenly collapse, wage growth will continue to accelerate, supporting household income and consumption.   Chart I-4Household Balance Sheets Are Solid Third, at 0.4% of GDP, the fiscal thrust remains positive. In other words, fiscal policy will still add to GDP in 2019. Fourth, we do not see the traditional symptoms associated with a fed funds rate above neutral. After dipping sharply in the second half of 2018, mortgage for purchase applications are back near their cycle highs (Chart I-6). Moreover, the performance of homebuilders’ equities relative to the broad market has begun to rebound, which is inconsistent with a fed funds rate above neutral. Chart I-6Mortgage Applications Do Not Suggest Policy Is Tight Fifth, there is scope for the contribution from housing sector activity to morph from a negative to a positive. A fed funds rate below neutral historically is correlated with an improving housing market. Rising mortgage rates from 3.8% to 4.6% depressed home sales and construction output, and the fall in mortgage rates over the past x month 4.3% should stimulate housing activity (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Residential Activity Will Rebound This Year Bottom Line: U.S. first-quarter GDP growth will be dismal, but one quarter does not make a trend. The low degree of economic vulnerability in the U.S., and the likelihood that the fed funds rate will stay below neutral for a while suggest that growth should rebound to the 2-2.5% range and should remain above-trend for the remainder of 2019. … And Global Growth Will Soon Trough As the cliché goes, it is darkest before the dawn. This is a fitting description of the world economy outside the U.S. right now. Global trade is depressed, global PMIs are moribund and nothing feels good. But it is exactly when nothing is going well that one needs to wonder what may cause the outlook to turn for the better. Thankfully, green shoots are emerging. To begin with, central banks around the world have taken a more dovish slant. This dovish forward guidance is nurturing global activity via a significant easing in global financial conditions, which is undoing the severe brake-pumping imposed on global growth in the fourth quarter of 2018 (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Global Financial Conditions Are Easing This more dovish forward guidance has helped our Financial Liquidity Index, which sharply deteriorated through 2009, rebound. Historically, this presages an improvement in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (Chart I-9). Improving liquidity conditions have already been reflected in lower real rates around the globe, creating a reflationary impulse. EM financial conditions are responding positively, pointing to an upcoming pick-up in industrial activity, as measured by our Global Nowcast (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Improving Global Liquidity Backdrop Chart I-10A Tailwind From EM? Our Global LEI diffusion Index has begun to reflect some of these developments. After forming a trough in 2018, more than 50% of the countries in our Global LEI are currently experiencing a sequential improvement in their LEIs. We are now entering the normal lag after which a broadening growth impulse converts into aggregate activity moving higher (Chart I-11). Most interestingly, investors do not seem to be anticipating such a rebound. There is therefore room for growth surprises around the world. Chart I-11Scope For Growth Surprises China has a role to play in this story, will likely morph from a headwind to global growth to a positive. Positive may be a strong word, but at the very least, we expect China to stop detracting from global growth. Premier Li-Keqiang recently put the accent on stability and preserving employment, suggesting Chinese policymakers are likely to de-emphasize deleveraging over the coming 12-18 months. For Chinese growth to improve, deleveraging does not even have to stop. As both theory and history have shown, a slower pace of deleveraging means that the credit impulse moves back into positive territory and growth re-accelerates, even if only temporarily (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Growth Can Improve Even If Deleveraging Continues As a thought experiment, if Chinese leverage were to stabilize this year and nominal growth were to hit 8% – the lower bound of the real GDP target of 6-6.5% and inflation of 2% – the Chinese credit impulse would surge to more than 10% of GDP (Chart I-13)! We are not forecasting such a large rebound in the impulse, but this exercise clearly shows that if the Chinese authorities – who are cutting taxes and trying to ease credit conditions for small- and medium-sized enterprises – want to favor stability and employment for just one year, the impact on growth will be non-negligible, even if deleveraging continues. Since domestic demand responds to the credit impulse, and imports sport an elevated beta to domestic demand, Chinese imports are likely to soon morph from a negative to something more neutral – maybe even a small positive for the rest of the world. Chart I-13A Thought Experiment Finally, as weak as Europe is right now, it will likely be an important source of positive surprises in the second half of the year. To begin with, Europe is much more sensitive to EM growth conditions than the U.S. (Chart I-14). In the same way as Europe felt the full force of the deceleration in global trade last year, it will benefit from any improvement in trade this year. A myriad of idiosyncratic shocks rammed through the euro area last year, worsening an already difficult situation. The new WLTP emission standards caused German auto production to collapse by nearly 20%. Nonetheless, as contracting domestic manufacturing orders and a large inventory pullback in the final quarter of last year suggest, the inventory overhang has been worked off (Chart I-15, top panel). Chart I-15Passing European Idiosyncratic Shocks Just as critically, Italy’s technical recession should end soon. The country’s economic malaise reflected the tightening in financial conditions that followed the violent battle between Rome and Brussels early last year. Ultimately, Rome folded: The budget deficit is 2.3% of GDP, not above 6%, and threats of leaving the union have been abandoned. Consequently, financial conditions are easing. Italian bond auctions are massively oversubscribed this year, and rising bond prices are supporting the solvency of the Italian banking system. The last hurdle affecting Europe was the fact that funding stress in the Italian and Spanish banking systems have been directly addressed by the TLTRO-III announced three weeks ago by the European Central Bank. Spanish and Italian banks have to refinance EUR 425 billion of TLTRO-II this June, in a year where a sizeable amounts of European bank bonds also needs to be refinanced. This is simply too much. With the ECB again bankrolling Italian and Spanish financial institutions, funding stress in the periphery can decline. Consequently, the European credit impulse, which had formed a valley in 2018 Q1, can continue its ascent (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Investors expect little from the global economy outside the U.S., yet easing liquidity and financial conditions, a temporary shift in Chinese policy preferences and passing idiosyncratic shocks in Europe all point to improvement in global economic activity. U.S. Inflation Expectations Will Allow The Fed To Resume Rate Hikes Above-potential growth in the U.S. and rebounding economic activity in the rest of the world are consistent with higher – not lower – U.S. inflation. First, rebounding global growth is normally associated with a weakening dollar (Chart I-16). This time will not be different, especially as U.S. equity valuations relative to global stocks suggest that investors are particularly pessimistic on non-U.S. growth. A weaker dollar will lift import prices, commodity prices, and goods prices, helping inflation move higher. Chart I-16The USD Is Counter-Cyclical Second, the change in the velocity of the money of zero maturity in the U.S. is consistent with a further strengthening in core inflation (Chart I-17). Chart I-17The Fisher Equations Points To Gently Rising Inflation Third, above-trend U.S. growth in the context of elevated capacity utilization is also consistent with rising inflation (Chart I-18). Chart I-18Elevated U.S. Capacity Utilization If these three forces can cause core PCE inflation to move slightly above 2% in the second half of 2019, this will likely result in inflation expectations firming. Moreover, the combination of positive growth surprises around the world and easy monetary and liquidity conditions will prove supportive of asset prices globally, implying further easing in global and U.S. financial conditions. This set of circumstances will allow the Fed to shift its tone toward the end of 2019, in order to crystalize additional hikes in 2020. Additionally, we estimate the U.S. terminal policy rate to be around 3.25%. In fact, a longer-than-originally-anticipated Fed pause reinforces confidence in this assessment, even if it means that it will take longer to reach the terminal level than we previously thought. Bottom Line: Our growth outlook is consistent with robust inflation and improving inflation expectations. This means we disagree with interest rate markets and anticipate the Fed will resume its hiking campaign instead of cutting rates next year. Moreover, easier-for-longer policy also strengthens our view that the fed funds rate can end this cycle near 3.25%. Stay Positive On Risk Assets For Now… Most bear markets are linked to recessions. It follows that if the U.S. business cycle can be extended and the Fed remains on the easy side of neutral for longer, then the S&P 500 has more upside (Chart I-19). So do global equities. Chart I-19Low Bear-Market Risk This view is reinforced by the fact that buy-side analysts and investors alike have aggressively curtailed their expectations for EPS growth this year, to 3.9% for the U.S. and 4.9% outside the U.S. Yet, our profit model suggests that U.S. EPS growth is likely to come in at around 8.1% this year. Earnings revisions are pro-cyclical. Hence, our expectation that the BCA global Leading Economic Indicator meaningfully revives in the second half of 2019 points toward analysts having ample room to revise global earnings higher in the second half of the year (Chart I-20). Chart I-20Global Profit Margins Will Improve If Growth Rebounds Moreover, global valuations experienced a reset last year. Despite a rebound, the forward P/E ratio for the MSCI All-Country World Index remains in line with 2014 levels, 12.5% lower than at their apex last year. When looking at the U.S., our composite valuation index has also improved meaningfully (Chart I-21). This improvement in valuations increases the probability that a bottom in global growth will lift stock prices. Chart I-21Large Improvement In The Equity / Risk Reward Ratio Our Monetary Indicator further reinforces this message. After being a headwind for stocks over the past eight quarters, now that the Fed has paused and is essentially guaranteeing low real rates for an extended period, this gauge is growing more supportive of further equity price gains (Chart I-22). Chart I-22Stock-Friendly Monetary Backdrop A below-benchmark duration exposure for fixed-income portfolio still makes sense, even if the Fed has prolonged its pause. As per our U.S. Bond Strategy service’s “Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing,” if the Fed increases rates more than the market has priced in 12 months prior, Treasurys underperform cash (Chart I-23). Even if the Fed does nothing this year, it will still be more than the OIS curve is currently pricing in. Moreover, the dollar is likely to soften and the Fed is increasingly taking the risk of falling behind the realized inflation curve. This should create upside not only for inflation breakevens but also for term premia, which are depressed everywhere across the G-10. The yield curve should modestly steepen in this environment. It may take a bit more time than we originally expected, but safe-haven bond yields are trending higher, not lower. Chart I-23The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing Spread products are also likely to continue to do well. Easy monetary policy, a soft U.S. dollar, an ongoing U.S. business expansion, an upcoming rebound in global growth and rising asset values all point toward a delay of the inevitable wave of defaults. Corporate bonds may offer poor value and credit quality has deteriorated, but an end to the business cycle and a tighter Fed will be key to catalyzing these poor fundamentals. We are not there yet. The Brexit saga continues to have the potential to unsettle markets. Nonetheless, we would fade any broad market sell-off linked to poor British headlines. As Marko Papic writes in this month's Special Report, despite continued political uncertainty in Westminster this year, the risk of a no-deal Brexit is dwindling by the minute, and political logic suggests that there is a high probability that the U.K. will ultimately remain in the EU in two to three years. Bottom Line: After the reset in valuations and earning expectations last year, markets should continue their ascent. The Fed has showed that its “put” is alive and well. This will both favor risk-taking and extend the duration of the business cycle. If global growth can rebound in the second quarter, it will create fertile ground for strong asset prices over the bulk of 2019. Treasury yields will also exhibit upside, even if achieving these higher rates will take more time now. … But Beware What Lurks Below The benign outlook for this year masks that the rally in risk assets is living on borrowed time. A Fed willingly falling behind the curve may fan speculative flames this year, but it doesn’t mean that policy will stay easy forever. On the contrary, the inevitable rise in inflation will push rates higher down the road and the unavoidable recession will ultimately materialize, most likely somewhere around 2021. Since asset valuations will only grow more inflated between now and then, a bigger fall will ultimately ensue. Our Composite Valuation Indicator may currently be flashing a positive signal, but dynamics within its components already point to brewing trouble down the road (Chart I-24). First, the balance sheet group of indicators has showed no improvement. In other words, without last year’s rebound in profitability, stocks would not be as attractively valued as the overall indicator suggests. Chart I-24Disconcerting Internal Dynamics Second, the interest rate group is currently flattering aggregate valuations. To remain supportive of higher returns ahead, this group depends on interest rates staying constrained. Here, the Fed will play a particularly perverse role. Its willingness to tolerate inflationary pressures right now means lower rates today at the price of a higher cost of capital tomorrow. Once it becomes obvious that the Fed is falling behind the curve – something more likely to happen once inflation expectations normalize – safe-haven yields will rise sharply. The interest rate group will suddenly look a lot less supportive than it does today. Third, the profit components of our valuation indicator may look healthy today, but this will not remain the case. At 31.7%, EBITD margins are currently extraordinary elevated. In fact, if the profit margins were to normalize to their historical average, the Shiller P/E would skyrocket to 40.3 from 29.9 today, implying the stock market may be just as expensive as it was at the start of 2000. For margins to remain wide, wages will have to stay depressed relative to selling prices (Chart I-25). However, the combination of an economy at full employment and the Fed goosing economic growth points to rising wages. Since the pass-through from wages to prices is below 100%, unless productivity rises more than labor costs, profitability will suffer and P/E ratios will start sending the same message as the price-to-sales ratio, a multiple that currently stands near record highs. Chart I-25Rising Wages Will Ultimately Hurt Profits Valuations are not the only danger lurking for stocks: Spread products will morph from a tailwind to a headwind for equities. Whether or not it steepens a bit this year, the yield curve’s previous big flattening already points toward rising financial market volatility (Chart I-26). The Fed’s recent dovish tilt can keep the VIX and the MOVE compressed for a while longer. However, since inflation expectations will ultimately move higher, likely within a year or so, the Fed will once again tilt to the hawkish side, and volatility will follow its path of least resistance higher. Carry trades of all kinds will suffer, and spreads will widen. The deteriorating credit quality this cycle, with BBB and lower-rated issues constituting 60.1% of the corporate universe, could make this widening more violent than normal. This phenomenon will hurt stocks. Chart I-26Volatility Is A Coiled Spring Finally, the improvement in global growth this year is likely to prove temporary. China may want to slow the pace of deleveraging this year, but pushing debt loads lower and reforming the economy remains Beijing’s number one priority on a multi-year horizon. China has created USD 26 trillion worth of yuan since 2008, making the Chinese money supply larger than the euro area’s and the U.S.’s together. As a result, China’s incremental output-to-capital ratio continues to trend lower, implying large misallocation of capital (Chart I-27). State-owned enterprises, the recipients of much of the credit created over the past 10 years, now generate lower RoAs than their cost of borrowing, an unmistakable sign of poorly allocated funds. Chart I-27The Biggest Threat To China's Long-Term Prosperity Correcting this structural impediment will require the Chinese credit impulse to once again move back into negative territory. This means that unless Chinese policymakers abandon their efforts to prise the country off easy credit, Chinese growth will morph back into a headwind for the world somewhere in 2020, i.e. not so late as to encourage excesses, but not so early as to sharply slow the economy ahead of the Communist Party’s one-hundredth birthday in July 2021. In 2018, the global economy nearly ground to a halt after China had shifted from stimulus to policy tightening. The next time around, we doubt that a global recession will be avoided. The second half of 2020 may set up to be one tumultuous period. Bottom Line: In all likelihood, global risk assets should perform well this year, but we are living on borrowed time. In the background, equity valuations are deteriorating meaningfully, a phenomenon that will worsen once the Fed’s desired outcome comes to fruition: higher inflation. Wage pressures and higher interest rates will reveal how fully rotten stock valuations genuinely are. Compounding this effect, higher volatility and a resumption of China’s deleveraging efforts will likely achieve the coup de grace for stocks in the second half of 2020. Conclusion The FOMC wants to lift inflation expectations in order to defuse any lingering deflationary risk. Consequently, the Fed’s pause will last longer than we originally anticipated, but terminal rates are likely to climb higher than would have otherwise been the case. Before last week’s Fed meeting, the U.S. was already set to grow above trend. Now, the Fed will only extend the business cycle further, fanning greater inflationary pressures in the process. This potentially misguided reflationary impulse, which is echoed around the world, will contribute to a rebound in global growth that will become fully evident by the summer. Consequently, we expect risk assets to climb to new highs over the coming 12 months. Treasurys will likely underperform cash over that timeframe, as interest rate markets are currently too sanguine. Investors are facing a real dilemma. On one hand, the potential for elevated stock market returns is high over the coming 12 months. On the other, poor valuations will only grow more onerous, and the Fed will ultimately have to tighten policy even more following the on-hold period. Moreover, Chinese policymakers are unlikely to ignore the pressing danger created by misallocating capital for an extended period of time. Consequently, the outlook for long-term returns is deteriorating. As a result, we recommend more tactically minded investors to stay long stocks, with a growing preference for international equities that are both cheaper and more exposed to global growth than U.S. ones. However, longer-term asset allocators should use this period of strength to progressively move out of stocks and into safer alternatives. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst March 28, 2019 Next Report: April 25, 2019   II. The State Of Brexit So What? It makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP. However, short-term investors should instead buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones. Why? The U.K. electorate is not staunchly Euroskeptic. In fact, Bregret has already set in. Volatility is the only sure bet over the tactical and strategic time horizons. The most likely scenario is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. Brexit is unsustainable over the secular time horizon. Our low-conviction view is that in the long term, the U.K. will remain inside the European Union. The hour is late in the ongoing Brexit saga. The original deadline, once spoken of with religious reverence, will be tossed aside for one, potentially two, extensions. In this analysis, we attempt to consider the state of Brexit from multiple time horizons. First, we offer our tactical view, what will happen in the next several weeks and months. Second, we offer our strategic view, surveying the Brexit process to the end of the year. Third, we consider the secular view and attempt to answer the question of whether the U.K. will ever fully exit the EU. We then assign investment recommendations across the three time horizons. How Did We Get Here? In March 2016, three months ahead of the fateful June referendum, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy published a joint report on the topic that drew three conclusions: The probability of Brexit was understated by the market. “According to our modeling results, roughly 64% of Tory undecided voters would have to swing to the “Stay” camp in order to ensure that the vote crosses the 50% threshold in favour of continued EU membership … Conventional wisdom suggests that the probability of Brexit is around 30%, anchoring to the 1975 referendum results. Our own analysis of current polling data suggests that it is much closer to 50%, as in too close to call.” The biggest loser of Brexit, domestically, would be the Conservative Party. “The risk is that the British populace realizes that leaving the EU was a sub-optimal result and that little sovereignty was recovered. As such, there could be a backlash against the Tories in the next general election. In this scenario, the winner would not necessarily be UKIP, but rather the Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party – as close to the Michael Foot-led opposition in the early 1980s as any Labour Leadership.” The EU would survive, intact, with no further “exits.” “European integration is therefore a gambit for relevance by Europe’s declining powers. Brexit will not create centrifugal forces that tear the EU apart, and could in fact enhance the sinews that bind EU member states in a bid for 21st century geopolitical relevance.” Thus far, all three predictions have proven prescient. Not only was the probability of Brexit understated, but the electorate actually voted to exit the EU.1 The Conservative Party has wrapped itself into an intellectual pretzel trying to deliver on a referendum that the pro-Brexit Tories – a minority in the party – promised would not mean losing access to the Common Market. And the EU has not only seen no other “exits,” but has held firm and united in the negotiations with the U.K. while witnessing an increase in the support for its troubled currency union, both in the Euro Area in aggregate as well as in crisis-ridden Italy (Chart II-1). Chart II-1The Euro Area Stands Unified The net assessment we conducted in 2016 correctly gauged what the Brexit referendum was about and what it was not about. Our view was that behind the angst lay factors too general to be laid at the feet of European integration. Decades of supply-side reforms combined with competition from emerging economies led to a sharp rise in U.K. income inequality (Chart II-2), the erosion of its manufacturing economy (Chart II-3), and the ballooning of the country’s financial sector (Chart II-4). As a result, the U.K.’s income inequality and social mobility were, in 2016 as today, much closer to those of its Anglo-Saxon peer America than to those of its continental European neighbors (Chart II-5). Chart II-2Brits Saw Inequality Surge Chart II-3Manufacturing Jobs Collapsed Chart II-4The Financial Bubble Burst The underlying economic angst has continued to influence British politics since Brexit. Campaigning on an anti-austerity platform in the summer of 2017, the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn nearly won the general election, only underperforming the Conservative vote by 2% (Chart II-6). The election was supposed to politically recapitalize Theresa May and allow her to lead the U.K. out of the EU. But the failure to secure a single-party majority created the political math in the House of Commons that is today preventing the prime minister from executing on Brexit. There are simply not enough committed Brexiters in Westminster to deliver on the relatively hard Brexit – no access to the EU Common Market or customs union – that Prime Minister May has put on offer (Chart II-7). The decision not to pursue a customs union arrangement with the EU is particularly disastrous. As our colleague Dhaval Joshi – Chief Strategist of BCA’s European Investment Strategy – has pointed out, remaining in the customs union would have protected the cross-border supply chains that are vital to many U.K. businesses and would have avoided a hard customs border on the island of Ireland.2 However, the slim margin of the Tory victory in 2017 has boosted the influence of the 20-to-40 hard-Brexiters in the party. They pushed Theresa May to the extreme, where a customs union arrangement – let alone access to the Common Market – became politically unpalatable. Had the British electorate genuinely wanted “Brexit über alles,” or the relatively hard Brexit on offer today, the margin of victory for Leave would have been greater. Furthermore, the electorate would not have come so close to giving the far-left Corbyn – who nonetheless supports the softest-of-soft Brexits – a majority in mid-2017. The slim margin of victory effectively tied May’s hands in her subsequent negotiations with both the EU and her own party. But there was more to the 2016 referendum than just general malaise centered on the economy and inequality. There were idiosyncratic events that provided tailwinds for the Leave campaign. Or, as we put it in 2016: Certainly, a number of ills have befallen the continent in quick succession: the euro area sovereign debt crisis, Russian military intervention in Ukraine, rampant migrant inflows from Africa and the Middle East, and terrorist attacks in France. It is no surprise that the U.K. populace wants to think twice about tying itself even more closely to a Europe apparently on the run from the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. The two issues we would particularly focus on were the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks in Europe. Data ahead of the referendum clearly gave credence to the view that the influx of migrants was raising “concerns about immigration and race.” This angst was primarily focused on EU migrants who came to the U.K. legally (Chart II-8), but the influx of millions of migrants into the EU in 2015 – peaking at 172,000 in the month of October – certainly bolstered the anxiety in the U.K. (Chart II-9).3 Chart II-8EU Migrants A Source Of Anxiety In 2016 Chart II-9The Refugee Crisis Boosted Brexit Vote Terrorism was another concern. In the 18 months preceding the referendum, continental Europe experienced 13 deadly terror attacks. Two were particularly egregious: the November 2015 Paris terror attack that led to 130 deaths, and the March 2016 Brussels terror attack that led to 32 deaths. Both the migration and terror crises, however, were temporary and caused by idiosyncratic variables with short half-lives. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy argued that both would eventually abate. The migration crisis would subside due to firming European attitudes towards asylum seekers and the exhaustion of the supply of migrants as the Syrian Civil War drew to its tragic close. The extremist Islamic terror attacks would dwindle due to the decrease in the marginal utility of terror that has been observed in previous waves of terrorism (Chart II-10). Neither forecast was popular with our client base, but both have been spot on. Chart II-10Fewer Attacks Due To Declining Marginal Utility Of Terror The point is that the British electorate was never as Euroskeptic as the Euroskeptics cheering on Brexit thought. Support for EU integration has waxed and waned for decades (Chart II-11). Instead, a combination of macro-malaise caused by the general plight of the middle class – the same factors that have given tailwinds to populist policymakers across developed markets – and idiosyncratic crises in the middle of this decade created the context in which the public voted to leave the EU. Whatever the vote was for, we can say with a high degree of certainty that it was not in favor of the current deal on offer, a relatively hard Brexit. After all, the pro-Leave Tories almost universally campaigned in favor of remaining in the Common Market post-Brexit.4 Chart II-11Data Does Not Support Euroskeptic U.K. Today, Bregret has clearly set in. Not only on the specific issue of whether the U.K. should leave the EU – where the gap between Bremorseful voters and committed Brexiters is now 8% (Chart II-12), a 12% swing since just after the referendum – but also on the more existential question of whether U.K. citizens feel European (Chart II-13). Chart II-12Bregret Has Set In... Chart II-13...And Brits Feeling More European The political reality of Bregret is the most important variable in predicting Brexit. Not only is it difficult for Prime Minister May to deliver her relatively hard Brexit in Westminster due to the mid-2017 electoral math, but it is especially the case when the electorate does not want it. Yes, the mid-2016 referendum is an expression of a democratic will that must be respected. But no policymaker wants to respect the referendum at the cost of disrespecting the current disposition of the median voter, which is revealed through polls. Doing so will cost them in the next election. Reviewing “how we got here” is essential in forecasting the tactical, strategic, and secular time horizons in the ongoing Brexit imbroglio. To this task we now turn. Bottom Line: The U.K. electorate is not staunchly Euroskeptic: data clearly support this fact. The Brexit referendum simply came at the right time for the Leave vote, as the secular forces of middle-class discontent combined with idiosyncratic crises of migration and terror. Three years following the referendum, the discontent remains unaddressed by British policymakers while the idiosyncratic crises have abated. As such, Bregret has set in, creating a new reality that U.K. policymakers must respond to if they want to retain political capital. Where Are We Going? The Tactical And Strategic Time Horizons The EU has offered a two-step delay to the Article 50 deadline of March 29. The first option is a delay until May 22, but only if Theresa May successfully passes her Brexit plan through Westminster. The second option is a delay until April 12. This would come in effect if the House of Commons rejects the deal on offer. The short time frame is supposed to pressure London to come up with the next steps, which the EU has inferred would either be to get out of the bloc without a deal or to plan for a long-term extension. Although there are no official conditions to awarding a long-term extension, it is clear that the EU only envisages three options: Renegotiate the terms of Brexit, to include either a customs union or full Common Market membership (a softer Brexit); Hold a general election to break the impasse; Hold another referendum. The EU is suggesting that it could deny the U.K. an extension if London does not come back with a plan. There are two reasons why we would call the EU’s bluff. First, it is likely an attempt to help May get the deal through the House of Commons by creating a sense of urgency. Second, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in December 2018 that the U.K. could “revoke that notification unilaterally, in an unequivocal and unconditional manner, by a notice addressed to the European Council in writing.”5 The only requirement is that the notification be sent to Brussels prior to March 29 (or, in the case of a mutually agreed upon extension, prior to April 12). It is increasingly likely that, after the deal on offer fails, Theresa May will have to go “hat-in-hand” to the EU to ask for a much longer extension. She will have until April 12 to ask for that extension, but it would require participation in the European Parliamentary (EP) elections on May 23. Prime Minister May has said that the U.K. will not hold those elections. We beg to differ. Not holding the election would allow the EU to end the U.K.’s membership in the bloc, which would by default mean contravening the Parliament’s will to reject a no-deal Brexit (which it did in a rebuke to the government in March). As such, the U.K. will absolutely hold an EP election in May. Yes, it will be a huge embarrassment to the Conservative government. And we would venture that the election would turn out a huge pro-EU majority from the U.K., given that it is the Europhile side of the aisle that is now excited and activated, further embarrassing the ruling government. The most likely scenario, therefore, is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. As we have been arguing throughout the year, the only way to break the impasse without calling a referendum – is to call a new election. A new election would be contested almost exclusively on the issue of Brexit – unlike the 2017 election, which Jeremy Corbyn managed to be almost exclusively contested on the issue of austerity. As such, the winner would have a clear political mandate to pursue the Brexit of their choice. If it is Jeremy Corbyn, this would mean a second referendum, given his recent conversion to supporting one. If Theresa May remains prime minister, it would be her relatively hard Brexit option; if another Tory replaces her, it would potentially be a softer Brexit. Intriguingly, Theresa May is coming up to the average “expiry date” of a “takeover” prime minister, which is 3.3 years (Chart II-14). Why do we think that Theresa May would be replaced with a soft Brexit Tory? Because there are simply not enough members of parliament in the Conservative Party caucus to elect a hard Brexiteer. Furthermore, the current deal on offer, which is a form of hard Brexit, clearly has no chance of passing in the House of Commons. Theresa May herself did not support the Leave campaign, but she converted into a hard Brexiteer due to the pressures in the Conservative Party caucus. If, on the other hand, we are wrong and the Conservative Party elects a hard Brexit Tory as leader, the odds of losing the election to the Labour Party would increase. Furthermore, the impasse in the House of Commons would not be resolved as Theresa May would be replaced by a prime minister with essentially the same approach to Brexit. Confused? You are not alone. Diagram II-1 illustrates the complexity of the tactical (0-3 months) and strategic (3-12 months) time horizons. There are so many options over the next six months alone that we ran out of space in our diagram to consider the consequences of the general election. Needless to say, an election would induce volatility in the market as it would put Jeremy Corbyn close to the premiership. While he has now promised a second referendum, his government would also implement policies that could, especially in the short term, agitate the markets. Our forecasts of the currency moves alone suggest that volatility is the only sure bet over tactical and strategic time horizons. We do not have a high-conviction view on a directional call on the pound or U.K. equities. However, global growth concerns, combined with political uncertainty, should create a bond-bullish environment. Bottom Line: Over the course of the year, political uncertainty will remain high in the United Kingdom. A general election is the clearest path to breaking the current deadlock. However, it is not guaranteed, as Labour’s recent decline in the polls appears to be reversing since Jeremy Corbyn finally succumbed to the demands that he support a new referendum (Chart II-15). Chart II-15Labour Party Revives On Referendum Support The Secular Horizon BCA Geopolitical Strategy believes that the median voter is the price maker in the political market place. Politicians are merely price takers. This is why Theresa May’s notion that the sanctity of the 2016 referendum cannot be abrogated is doubly false. First, she cannot truly claim from the slim 52%-48% result that U.K. voters want her form of Brexit. The referendum therefore may be a sacred expression of the democratic will, but her “no customs union” Brexit option is not holy water: It is an educated guess at best, pandering to hard Brexit Tories (a minority of the electorate) at worst. Given that 48% of the electorate wanted to remain in the EU and that a large portion of Brexit voters wanted a Common Market membership as part of Brexit, it is mathematically obvious that the softest of soft Brexit options was the desire of the median voter in June 2016. Furthermore, polling data (presented in Chart II-12 and Chart II-13 on page 28) now clearly show that the median voter is migrating away from even the softest of soft Brexit options to the “Stay” camp. Bregret has set in and a strong plurality of voters no longer supports Brexit. The question behind Chart II-12 is unambiguous. It clearly asks, “In hindsight, do you think Britain was right or wrong to vote to leave the EU?” What does all of this infer for the long term, or secular, horizon? First, an election this year could usher in a Labour government that delivers a new referendum. At this time, given the polling data and the geopolitical context, sans terror and migration crises, we would expect such a referendum to lead to a win for the Stay camp. Second, an election that produces a soft Brexit prime minister or negotiated outcome would allow the U.K. to leave the EU in an orderly fashion. A new Tory prime minister, pursuing a soft Brexit outcome, could even entice some Labour MPs to cross the aisle and support such an exit from the bloc. However, over a secular time horizon of the next two-to-three years, we doubt that a soft Brexit outcome would be viable. Investors have to realize that the vote on leaving the EU does not conclude the U.K. long-term deal with the bloc. That negotiating phase will last during the transition phase, over the next two-to-three years, and would conclude in yet another Westminster vote – and likely crisis – at the end of the period. If this deal entails membership in the Common Market, our low- conviction view over the long term is that it will ultimately fail. Take the financial community’s preferred soft Brexit option, the so-called super soft “Norway Plus” option. A Norway Plus option would entail the highest loss of sovereignty imaginable, given that the U.K. would essentially pay full EU membership fees with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. There is also a debate as to whether London would be able to constrict immigration from the EU under that option over the long term, a key demand of Brexiters.6 As such, the only viable option would be to switch to a customs union relationship. However, we fear that even this option may no longer be available to U.K. policymakers. Conservative Party leaders have wasted too much time and lost too much of the public’s good will. With only 40% of the electorate now considering Brexit the correct decision, it is possible that even a customs union arrangement will be unacceptable by the end of the transition period. Aside from the electorate’s growing Bregret, there is also the economic logic – or lack thereof – behind a customs union. A customs union would ensure the unfettered transit of goods between the U.K. and the continent, but not of services. This arrangement greatly favors the EU, not the U.K., as the latter has a wide (and growing) deficit in goods and an expanding surplus in services with the bloc (Chart II-16). Chart II-16Services Are Key For The U.K. The only logic behind selecting a customs union over the Common Market is that a customs union would allow the U.K. to conclude separate trade deals with the rest of the world. While that may be a fantasy of the few remaining laissez-faire free traders in the U.K. Conservative Party, the view hardly represents the desire of the median voter. Other than a potential trade deal with the U.S., it is practically inconceivable to expect the U.K. electorate to support a free trade agreement with China or India, both of which would likely entail an even greater loss of blue-collar jobs. Even a trade deal with the U.S. would likely face political opposition, given that the U.K. is highly unlikely to be given preferential treatment by an economy seven times its size.7 The fact of the matter is that the Conservative Party has wasted its window of opportunity to push a hard, or moderately hard (customs union), Brexit through Parliament. Bregret has set in, as the doyens of Brexit increasingly pursued an unpopular strategy. On the other hand, a Brexit that retains the U.K. membership in the Common Market has never had much logic to begin with. Where does this leave the U.K. in the long term? Given the time horizon and the uncertainty on multiple fronts, our low-conviction view is that it leaves the U.K. inside the European Union. Bottom Line: The combination of increasing Bregret, lack of economic logic behind a customs union membership alone, and the lack of a political logic behind a Common Market membership, suggests that Brexit is unsustainable over the secular time horizon. This imperils the ultimate deal between the U.K. and the EU, which we think will not be able to pass the House of Commons in two-to-three years when it comes up for approval. This is a low-conviction view, however, as political realities can change. Support for Brexit could turn due to exogenous factors, such as a global recession that renews the Euro Area economic imbroglio or a major geopolitical crisis. Both are quite likely over the secular time horizon. Investment Implications Today, cable is cheap, trading at an 18% discount to its long-term fair value as implied by purchasing-power parity models (Chart II-17). The growing probability that the U.K. may, down the road, remain in the European Union means that, at current levels the pound is indeed attractive, especially against the U.S. dollar. Chart II-17Cable Attractive On Higher Odds Of Bremain However, when it comes to short-term dynamics, the picture is much murkier. The low probability of a no-deal Brexit implies limited downside. However, the path to get the U.K. to abandon the current relatively hard Brexit is also one that involves a new election. This implies that before a resolution is reached, multiple scenarios are possible, including one where Corbyn becomes the next prime minister. Jeremy Corbyn could be the most left-of center leader of any G-10 nation since Francois Mitterrand in France in the early 1980s. Mitterrand’s audacious nationalization and left-leaning policies were met with a collapse in the French franc (Chart II-18). Chart II-18A Left-Wing Leader Bodes Ill For The Currency Global growth also has an impact on cable. Despite all the noise around Brexit, the reality remains that exports constitute 30% of U.K. GDP, a larger contribution to output than in the euro area. This means that if global growth deteriorates, GBP/USD will face another headwind. If, however, global growth improves, then cable would face a new tailwind. Since BCA is of the view that global growth will likely trough by the summer, we are inclined to be positive on the pound. Netting out all those factors, it makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP, using the dips along the way to build a larger position in this currency. Even on a six-to-twelve-month basis, the path of least resistance for cable is likely upward. The problem is that risk-adjusted returns are likely to be poor as volatility will remain very elevated. We therefore recommend that short-term investors instead buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones (Chart II-19). Chart II-19Volatility Will Be A Challenge For Short Term Investors Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts Equities have had a volatile month of March, something that was bound to happen after the violent rally witnessed from the end of December to the end of February. When a rally is being tested, it always make sense to review our indicators to gauge whether or not a trend change is in the offing. Generally, our indicators remain broadly positive. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators for the U.S. and the euro area continue to improve. Meanwhile, it has begun to hook back up in Japan. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The current readings in major advanced economies thus suggest that investors are still inclined to add to their stock holdings. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) has however once again deteriorated, suggesting that the period of churn in global equities prices could last a bit longer. This indicator is essentially saying that in order to resume their ascent, stocks need a bit more time to digest their previous surge. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. According to BCA’s Composite Valuation Indicator, an amalgamation of 11 measures, the U.S. stock market remains slightly overvalued from a long-term perspective. Nonetheless, despite this year’s rally, the S&P 500 offers a much more attractive risk/reward profile than it did in the fall. Moreover, our Monetary Indicator has shifted out of negative territory for stocks, and is now decisively in stimulative territory. The Fed’s dovish forward guidance last week only reinforces the message from this indicator. Our Composite Technical Indicator for stocks had broken down in December, but it is finally flashing a buy signal. This further confirms that the current period of churn is most likely to ultimately make way for a continued rally in the S&P 500. The 10-year Treasury yield remains within its neutral range according to our valuation model. Moreover, our technical indicator flags a similar picture. This means that without signs of improvements in global growth, price action alone will not be enough to lift bond yields higher. That being said, since BCA expects that over the next 24 months, the Fed will lift rates more than the OIS curve anticipates, and since the term premium is incredibly low, once green shoots for global growth become evident, bonds could suffer a violent selloff. The U.S. dollar is still very expensive on a PPP basis. Our Composite Technical Indicator is not as overbought as it once was, but it is far from having reached oversold levels either. This combination suggests that the greenback could experience further downside this year. However, for this downside to materialize, global growth will first have to stabilize. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1       At the time of publication of our March report, we still had a low-conviction view that the vote would swing towards Stay at the last moment. 2       Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Important Message From The Currency Markets,” dated March 14, 2019, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3       Trying to play up the threat of unchecked migration, the U.K. Independence Party ran a famous campaign poster showing hundreds of refugees on a road under the title of “Breaking Point – The EU has failed us all.” Despite the fact that the U.K. accepted only around 10,000 Syrian refugees since the 2015 crisis. Germany has accepted over 700,000 while Canada – which is located across the Atlantic Ocean on a different continent – accepted over 40,000. Even the impoverished Serbia has accepted more Syrian refugees than the U.K. 4       One of the most prominent Leave supporters, Boris Johnson, famously quipped after the referendum result that “There will continue to be free trade and access to the single market.” 5       Please see The European Court of Justice, “Judgement Of The Court,” In Case C-621/18, dated December 10, 2018, available at curia.europa.eu. 6       Proponents of the Norway Plus option point out that Article 112(1) of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement allows for restriction of movement of people within the area. However, these restrictions are intended to be used in times of “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties.” It certainly appears to be an option for London to restrict EU migration, but it is not clear whether Europe would agree for this to be a permanent solution. Liechtenstein has been using Article 112 to impose quantitative limitations on immigration for decades, but that is because its tiny geographical area is recognized as a “specific situation” that justifies such restrictions. 7       President Donald Trump may want to give the U.K. preferential trade terms on the basis of the filial Anglo-Saxon relationship alone, but it is highly unlikely that the increasingly protectionist Congress would do the same. There is also no guarantee that President Trump will be around to bring such trade negotiations across the finish line. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights Analysis on Turkey is published below. The key reason why we believe the ongoing EM rally will falter is that EM corporate earnings have begun to contract. When EPS growth turns negative, low interest rates typically do not prevent share prices from selling off. The recent pick-up in China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse suggests the bottom in EM corporate profit growth will only occur toward the end of 2019. There are several key differences between the economic backdrops and financial markets signposts between now and 2016. The current profiles of both EM and DM share prices are a close match to those in 2011-2012 when the strong rally in the first quarter was followed by a major selloff in the second quarter. Feature The common narrative in the market is that the current policy backdrop – a pause by the Fed and policy stimulus from China – is a repeat of early 2016. As such, market participants expect moves in global risk assets to be analogous to those during that period. We too could easily adopt this simple narrative, and recommend investors to chase EM higher. Instead, we have chosen to take on the very difficult task of expounding why 2019 is not a repeat of 2016 in EM and China-related financial markets. Based on this, our view remains that investors should not be chasing the current EM rally. The essential pillar of our negative thesis on EM is that their corporate profits will contract this year. This will be bad news not only for EM share prices but also for EM credit markets and currencies. Chart I-1 illustrates that during the past 10 years, EM stock prices plunged every time profit contraction commenced. Having rallied meaningfully in the past three months, EM financial markets will sell off as EM corporate earnings begin to shrink. Chart I-1EM EPS Is Beginning To Contract The basis for EM profit contraction is the continued slowdown in China. Chart I-2 illustrates that China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse leads EM EPS growth by about 12 months. Hence, the recent pick-up in the former entails the bottom in the latter only toward the end of 2019. Chart I-2EM EPS Growth Will Bottom Only Toward The End Of 2019 In brief, even assuming China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse has bottomed and will improve going forward, EM EPS contraction will deepen for now. EM share prices are unlikely to embark on a cyclical bull market until EM EPS growth bottoms. Earnings Versus Interest Rates Lower interest rates are typically bullish for both equity and credit markets so long as corporate profits do not contract. However, when EPS growth turns negative, low interest rates usually do not prevent share prices from selling off. In general, when discussing the effect of interest rates on equities, one should differentiate between economic and financial linkages. Given the cornerstone narrative of this EM rally has been declining U.S. interest rate expectations, we examine the nexus between EM risk assets and U.S. interest rates. The economic link refers to the impact of borrowing costs on aggregate spending, and hence corporate profits. The pertinent question is as follows: Was the Fed tightening responsible for the growth deceleration in EM/China in 2018? The short answer is not really. Chart I-3 illustrates that as of the end of February, while Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese and Singaporean exports to the U.S. expanded by 10% from a year ago, their shipments to China contracted by 10%. Chart I-3Global Trade Slowed Due To China Not The U.S Hence, the slowdown in EM corporate profits has not been caused by Fed policy. U.S. domestic demand in general and imports in particular have so far been expanding at a healthy pace and they have not been instrumental to EM corporate earnings cycles (Chart I-4). This signifies that lower U.S. interest rates should not have a material impact on EM growth, and thereby corporate profits. Chart I-4EM EPS Growth Has Not Been Driven By Sales To U.S. Notably, one can argue that the economic and financial market dynamics that prevailed in 2018 worked in the opposite direction: It was China’s slowdown that ultimately imperiled U.S. manufacturing growth, causing U.S. equity and credit markets to sell off, thereby forcing a reversal in the Fed’s stance. The financial link refers to a declining discount rate for EM risk assets as U.S. interest rates drop. A drop in the discount rate lifts the present value of future cash flows and boosts risk asset prices. However, EM equity multiples have not been historically negatively correlated with U.S. bond yields, as shown on the top panel of Chart I-5. Besides, EM credit spreads do not always positively correlate with U.S. borrowing costs, as widely expected (Chart I-5, middle panel). Chart I-5U.S. Bond Yields And EM: No Stable Relationship Further, EM currencies have not been negatively correlated with either U.S. bond yields or with the interest rate differential between the U.S. and EM (Chart I-5, bottom panel). As to EM local bond yields, especially in high-yielding markets, it is EM exchange rates that drive EM domestic bond yields and their differential over U.S. Treasurys. When EPS growth turns negative, low interest rates usually do not prevent share prices from selling off. Finally, Chart I-6 illustrates the relationship between the returns on EM assets on one hand and U.S. bond yields on the other. This chart corroborates the evidence from Chart I-5 – that the relationship between U.S. interest rates and EM asset markets is not stable. Chart I-6U.S. Bond Yields And EM Risk Assets: No Stable Relationship Even though in the short term financial markets in developing countries seem to react to changes in U.S. interest rates, in the medium and long run there is no stable relationship between EM risk assets and U.S. Treasury yields. In short, lower U.S. interest rate expectations is not a sufficient condition to be positive on EM risk assets. How do we explain the absence of a strong relationship between these financial and economic variables? Our take is as follows: When EPS growth turns negative, low interest rates typically do not prevent share prices and credit markets from selling off. That is why there is no clear and strong relationship between EM risk assets and U.S. interest rates. Was the Fed tightening responsible for the growth deceleration in EM/China in 2018? The short answer is not really. Corporate earnings are the key to sustaining this EM rally. What is needed for EM corporate profits to recover is a revival in Chinese demand. The latter is not yet imminent, implying that EM assets will likely hit an air pocket before a more durable bottom occurs. Are lower interest rates in China a justification for the latest EM equity rebound? Chart I-7 demonstrates that both EM and Chinese investable stock indexes positively correlate with interest rates in China. The reason is because all of them are driven by Chinese growth: When growth accelerates, these share prices and Chinese local bond yields rise, and vice versa. Chart I-7Chinese Interest Rates And EM / China Share Prices: Positive Correlation Bottom Line: Lower interest rates in the U.S. or in China in and of themselves do not constitute sufficient conditions for a cyclical rally in EM share prices. The primary driver of EM share prices in the past 10 years has been Chinese growth, because the latter has a considerable bearing on EM corporate profits. For now, there have been no substantive signs of a growth revival in China. How 2019 Is Different From 2016 We elaborated in detail on how the current round of policy stimulus in China differs from the one in 2015-‘16 in our report titled, Dissecting China’s Stimulus, and will not discuss it here. Instead, we offer several economic and financial signposts illustrating how the EM/China outlook and financial market dynamics in 2019 will differ from those of 2016: Presently, there is no meaningful policy stimulus for the real estate market in China, and property sales will continue to shrink (Chart I-8). This is the opposite of what occurred in 2015-‘16 when the Chinese central bank literally monetized excessive housing inventories by financing residential real estate via its Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) facility. The ensuing surge in property demand substantially contributed to the business cycle recovery on the mainland in 2016-‘17. Chart I-8A Downbeat Outlook For Chinese Housing EM share prices have been underperforming the DM equity index since late December. In contrast, EM began outperforming DM in January 2016 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9EM Equities Have Been Underperforming DM Ones Since Late December In early 2016, the pace of EM profit contraction stabilized after 18 months of deepening shrinkage (Chart I-1 on page 1). What’s more, investor sentiment on EM was very downbeat in early 2016. Presently, the EM profit contraction is just commencing, and its rate of change will bottom only in late 2019, as per Chart I-2 on page 2. In the meantime, investors are ill prepared for bad news, as their sentiment on EM is extremely buoyant. Finally, the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar began selling off in early 2016, corroborating the EM rally. This year the broad measure of the trade-weighted dollar has not sold off. Hence, the dollar has not yet confirmed the EM rebound (Chart I-10). Chart I-10The U.S. Dollar And EM Share Prices Is 2019 Akin To 2012? In terms of share-price patterns, the current profiles of both EM and DM are a close match to those in 2011-2012 (Chart I-11). Following a major plunge in the second half of 2011, share prices bottomed in December 2011 and rallied sharply in the following three months. Not only is the duration similar to what transpired with share prices in 2011-’12, but also the magnitude (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Is 2018-19 Akin To 2011-12? As to the economic backdrop in 2011-‘12, the euro area was in the midst of a credit crisis and China/EM growth was slowing due to the preceding Chinese policy tightening. After the strong rally in January-March 2012, both EM and DM bourses sold off sharply in the second quarter of 2012, re-testing their late 2011 lows. Critically, like the present and unlike early 2016, EM stocks were underperforming DM ones during the early 2012 rally. Lower U.S. interest rate expectations is not a sufficient condition to be positive on EM risk assets. On the surface, it appears that the magic words of the European Central Bank President Mario Draghi that “…the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro” that halted the global selloff. Yet, in reality, Draghi’s speech was the trigger for – not the cause of – the markets’ reversal. In retrospect, the primary reason for a major bottom in global risk assets in June 2012 was the bottom in the global business cycle in the second half of 2012 (Chart I-12, top panel). Chart I-12Global Growth Has Not Yet Bottomed As can be seen on this panel, global equity prices are often coincident with “soft” economic data like global manufacturing PMI. Global stocks typically lead “hard” economic data and corporate profits but do not always lead “soft” data. Presently, the bottom in global manufacturing and trade is not yet in sight. The bottom panel of Chart I-12 shows that Taiwanese exports of electronics products parts are still nose-diving, and they typically lead global manufacturing PMI by a few months. These electronics parts are inputs into final goods; when producers of these goods plan to increase production they first order these parts. As a result, trade in these electronics parts lead the broader trade/manufacturing cycle. Taiwanese exports of electronics products parts are still nose-diving, and they typically lead global manufacturing PMI by a few months. On the whole, odds are that China’s business cycle as well as global trade and manufacturing have not yet hit a durable bottom and are not about to recover. Countries/industries leveraged to China will experience a meaningful profit contraction. Hence, there is a significant probability that EM stocks re-test their recent lows akin to what transpired in 2012. Investment Considerations There is no meaningful evidence indicating that China’s business cycle and global trade and manufacturing have bottomed. Global cyclical equity sectors have rebounded but have not yet decisively broken above their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-13). Crucially, their relative performance to the overall global index has been rather sluggish (Chart I-14). This corroborates the lack of global growth tailwinds behind this global equity rally. Chart I-13Global Cyclical Equity Sectors: Absolute Performance Chart I-14Global Cyclical Equity Sectors: Relative Performance Asset allocators should continue to underweight EM stocks and credit markets within their global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. Without an improvement in the global business cycle, the rebound in EM currencies is not durable. As China’s growth disappoints, EM currencies will depreciate versus the dollar, the euro and the yen. Renewed currency depreciation will erode returns on EM local currency bonds for international investors. For dedicated EM local bond portfolios, our recommended overweights are Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Russia, central Europe, Thailand and Korea (Chart I-15). Our underweights are South Africa, Indonesia, India and today we are downgrading Turkish local bonds to underweight (please refer to section on Turkey starting on the next page). Chart I-15Favor These Local Currency Bond Markets Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Turkey: Brewing Policy Reversal? The odds of a policy reversal in Turkey are rising. The government’s patience with tight monetary policy may be running thin. The nation’s GDP contracted by 3% in the final quarter of 2018 from a year ago. Further contraction is in the cards. Chart II-1 signifies that monetary policy is indeed tight: Lira-denominated bank loan growth is at zero, and in real (inflation-adjusted) terms bank lending has shrunk by about 18% from a year ago. The ongoing painful economic retrenchment (Chart II-2) and rising unemployment may lead the authorities to loosen monetary policy/liquidity conditions via “backdoor” liquidity easing – something the Turkish central bank has done often over the current decade. Specifically, the central bank’s liquidity provisions to the banking system will likely begin to rise (Chart II-3). The severe liquidity tightening, underway since October 2018 via reduced lending to banks, has been partially responsible for the stability in the exchange rate. As the central bank augments liquidity provisions to the banking system, the lira will again come under renewed selling pressure. Rising unemployment may lead the authorities to loosen monetary policy/liquidity conditions via “backdoor” liquidity easing. The goal of liquidity provisioning would be to bring down interbank rates and, ultimately, lending rates. Presently, the spread between commercial banks’ lending rates and the interbank rate is negative (Chart II-4, top panel). This is unsustainable. The authorities have forced banks to bring down their lending rates in recent months. As a result, the gap between banks’ lending and deposit rates has also narrowed considerably (Chart II-4, bottom panel). This will weigh on the banks’ profitability. Consequently, we are closing our tactical long Turkish banks / short EM banks trade. The government cannot force banks to reduce their lending rates further without reducing their cost of funding. Hence, the central bank might opt to inject excess reserves into the system to bring down interbank rates. Thereafter, the authorities could “guide” banks to further lower their lending rates. Policy easing might not be in the form of outright policy rate cuts to avoid a negative reaction from financial markets. Instead, the central bank could push down inter-bank rates by way of obscure liquidity injections into the banking system. To be sure, the odds of the currency reacting poorly to such loosening of liquidity are non-trivial. This, along with the ongoing recession, the shrinking bank net interest margins and the slow pace of bank loan restructuring, are leading us to downgrade the Turkish bourse that is heavy in bank stocks. Investment Recommendations Downgrade Turkish stocks and local currency bonds back to underweight. We closed our short/underweight positions in the Turkish currency, bonds and equities on August 15, 2018. For details, please see the report Turkey: Booking Profits On Shorts. This has proved to be a timely move as Turkish markets have rebounded notably and outperformed their EM peers (Chart II-5). In our opinion, it is now time to downgrade it again. ​​​​​​​ We are also closing our tactical long Turkish banks / short EM banks trade. This position has netted a modest 2.3% gain since its initiation on November 29, 2018. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Investors should use the following dynamic for tactical asset allocation: 1. Sum the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB. 2. When the sum is near 4 percent, it is prudent to de-risk portfolios and sit aside, at least for a while. It is a good level to buy a mixed portfolio of high-quality 10-year government bonds. 3. Just below this level, a sum in the 3-4 percent range defines a kind of ‘no man’s land’ in which equities drift sideways. 4. When the sum is near 3 percent, the seemingly rich valuations of equities versus bonds is fully justified. And it is appropriate to redeploy tactically from bonds to equities (Chart of the Week). 5. Use the 65-day fractal dimension to pinpoint the precise transition points between asset-classes: as for example, successfully achieved for the DAX versus German bunds. Right now, with the sum near 3 percent, it is still appropriate to be overweight equities versus bonds, and our preferred expression is overweight the DAX versus the German long bund. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Rule Of 4 Becomes The Rule Of 3 The global long bond yield recently hit a two-year low (Chart I-2). This is the direct result of central banks’ pivot to dovish – a commitment to keep policy rates at current levels, rather than to hike, for the foreseeable future. Chart I-2The Global Long Bond Yield Recently Hit A Two-Year Low One consequence is that high-quality bonds have become riskier. Consider a German bund or a JGB which is yielding zero percent. The short-term potential for capital appreciation – nominal or real – has almost vanished, while the potential for vicious losses has increased dramatically. The technical term for this negative asymmetry is negative skew. Years of research in a field of behavioural economics called Prospect Theory concludes that negative skew is the metric that best encapsulates investment risk. The Correct Way Of Thinking About Investment Risk A great misunderstanding of finance is to equate risk with volatility. Risky assets, such as equities, are risky not because they are volatile in the conventional sense. After all, who minds when their asset price goes up sharply? Risky assets are risky because they have the propensity to experience much larger short-term losses than short-term gains – captured in the saying: equities climb up the stairs on the way up, but they jump out of the window on the way down. High-quality bonds have become riskier. Another great misunderstanding of finance is the idea that bonds offer a diversification benefit and, therefore, that investors should accept a lower return from them. This argument is also flawed. The bond market is bigger than the equity market, and just as bonds are a diversifier for equity investments, equities are a diversifier for bond investments. Indeed, equities have protected bond investors during vicious sell-offs in the bond market such as after Trump’s shock victory in 2016. So we could equally argue that equities offer a diversification benefit. In fact, the correct way of thinking about investment risk is as follows: An investment’s risk depends on the negative asymmetry of its short-term returns. At very low bond yields, bond returns develop the same negative asymmetry as equity returns (Chart I-3). This means that equities lose their excess riskiness versus bonds, requiring equity valuations to experience a phase transition sharply higher (Chart I-4). But when bond yields normalize, equities regain their excess riskiness versus bonds – and their valuations must suffer a phase transition sharply lower. The phase transition in equity valuations is most pronounced when the global 10-year bond yield goes up or down through 2 percent (Chart I-5). This dynamic proved to be the biggest driver of asset allocation in 2018, and is likely to be a big driver in 2019 too. Essentially, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, triggering a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets which threatens a disinflationary impulse. The unsurprising response from central banks is to pivot back to dovish, pulling back bond yields to previous lows. These lower bond yields then push up equity (and other risk-asset) valuations back to previous highs. An investment’s risk depends on the negative asymmetry of its short-term returns. The good news is that record high valuations of risk-assets are fully justified if bond yields remain at current levels or decline further. But the longer-term danger is that these rich valuations are hyper-sensitive to rising bond yields. The Bubble In Everything The current episode of elevated risk-asset valuations is not unprecedented, but there is a crucial difference. Previous episodes of elevated risk-asset valuations tended to be localised, either by geography or sector: 1990 was focussed in Japan; 2000 was focussed in the dot com related sectors; 2008 was focussed in the U.S. mortgage and credit markets. Extraordinary monetary policy has boosted the valuations of all risk-assets across all geographies and all asset-classes. By comparison, the post-2008 global experiment with quantitative easing, and zero and negative interest rate policy has boosted the valuations of all risk-assets across all geographies and all asset-classes – equities (Chart I-6), credit (Chart I-7), and real estate (Chart I-8). This makes it considerably more dangerous, because we estimate that the total value of global risk-assets including real estate is $400 trillion, equal to about five times the size of the global economy.1 Chart I-6Equities Remain Richly Valued Chart I-7Credit Remains Richly Valued Chart I-8The EM Real Estate Boom Happened After 2008 Let’s say you had a risk-asset that was priced to generate 5 percent a year over the next decade. Now imagine that the valuation boost from ultra-accommodative monetary policy capitalises all of those future returns to today. For those future returns to drop to zero, today’s price must surge by 63 percent.2 If you were prudent, you might amortise today’s windfall to generate the original 5 percent a year over the next decade. But if you were imprudent, you might spend a large amount of the windfall today. The total value of global risk-assets equals five times the size of the global economy. Now let’s imagine a valuation derating moves the risk-asset’s returns back to the future. For those that had prudently amortised the original windfall, nothing has really changed and future spending patterns would not be impacted. But not everybody is prudent. For those that had imprudently spent the original windfall, future spending would inevitably suffer a nasty recession. The Rule Of 4 Becomes The Rule Of 3 How can we sense the crucial 2 percent level in the global 10-year bond yield? The answer is that it broadly equates to when the sum of the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund and JGB is at a 4 percent level (Chart I-9). This is the genesis of our very successful ‘Rule of 4’. In 2019, just as in 2018, investors should use the following dynamic for tactical asset allocation. The rule of 4 identifies when the global 10-year bond yield is at 2 percent. Chart I-9When The Sum Of 10-Year Yields On The T-Bond, Bund, And JGB Equals 4 Percent, The Global 10-Year Yield Equals 2 Percent  Sum the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB. When the sum is near 4 percent, it is prudent to de-risk portfolios and sit aside, at least for a while. It is a good level to buy a mixed portfolio of high-quality 10-year government bonds. Just below this level, a sum in the 3-4 percent range defines a kind of ‘no man’s land’ in which equities drift sideways.  When the sum is near 3 percent, the seemingly rich valuations of equities versus bonds is fully justified. And it is appropriate to redeploy tactically from bonds to equities. Use the 65-day fractal dimension to pinpoint the precise transition points between asset-classes: as for example, successfully achieved for the DAX versus German bunds (Chart I-10). Overweight equities versus bonds. With the sum of the three 10-year yields now near 3 percent, the rule of 4 has, in a sense, become the rule of 3. It is still appropriate to be tactically overweight equities versus bonds, and our preferred expression is to overweight the DAX versus the German long bund. Chart I-10Use The 65-Day Fractal Dimension To Pinpoint The Precise Transition Points Between Asset-Classes   Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?”, September 13, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 5 percent compounded over ten years.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy As growth becomes scarce, investors flock to sectors that are slated to outgrow the broad market and shy away from the ones that are forecast to trail the SPX’s growth rate. This week we rank sectors and subsectors by EPS growth in our universe of coverage, and identify sweet and trouble spots. Fired up crack spreads, firming refining industry operating metrics, reaccelerating exports along with washed out technicals and compelling valuations, all signal that the time is ripe to buy into refining weakness. The cable industry’s demand headwinds are reflected in depressed relative valuations at a time when industry pricing power is trying to stage a comeback and a drifting lower greenback may also provide positive profit offsets. Stick with a benchmark allocation. Recent Changes Boost the S&P Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing index to overweight all the way from underweight today, locking in relative profits of 21%. Table 1 Feature Equities broke out last week and surpassed the upper band of their recent trading range, despite economic data releases that continued to surprise to the downside. Two weeks ago, we cautioned investors not to put cash to work as a tactical indigestion period loomed, with the SPX facing stiff resistance near the 2,800 level. In addition, we posited that most of the good news related to the U.S./China trade spat front was reflected in the S&P 500’s V-shaped recovery (top panel, Chart 1). In relative terms, the bottom panel of Chart 1 confirms that the easy money has already been made on the assumption of a positive resolution to the U.S./China trade dispute. Chart 1Trade Deal Priced In Going forward, the earnings juggernaut will have to remain in place in order for stocks to vault to fresh all-time highs, likely in the back half of the year. The Trump administration’s massive fiscal stimulus artificially fueled profit growth last year both by lowering the corporate tax rate and by encouraging overseas cash repatriation. The latter boosted share buybacks to an all-time record. Despite 24% EPS growth and $1tn in equity retirement, the SPX ended 2018 6% lower. Why? It became clear that EPS growth was headed lower. In order to gauge trend EPS growth we opt to use EBITDA, a cash flow proxy measure that strips out the direct impact of last year’s fiscal easing. Chart 2 clearly shows that trend growth took a step down following the positive base effects of the GFC-induced collapse and averaged close to 5%/annum from 2012 to 2014. Subsequently, the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession sunk EBITDA into contraction, but the euphoria surrounding the newly elected President pushed trend EBITDA growth to near 10%/annum for two full years in 2017 and 2018. Chart 2Return To 5% Growth? Since the late-2018 peak, 12-month forward EBITDA growth continues to drift lower and is now hovering just shy of 3%. Our sense is that 5% organic profit growth is consistent with nominal GDP printing 4%-4.5% at this stage of the business cycle, signaling that a return to the 2012-2014 growth backdrop is likely later in the year. As a reminder, positive profit growth in calendar 2019 remains one of the three pillars underpinning stocks that we have highlighted since the beginning of this year. Stocks have come full circle recovering all of last December’s losses, but in order to make fresh all-time highs, profits will have to deliver. We deem that an earnings validation phase is transpiring and there are early signs that profit growth will trough sometime in the first half of the year. Not only has EBITDA breadth put in a bottom (Chart 2), but also economically hypersensitive indicators suggest that forward EBITDA growth will soon tick higher. Namely, the ISM manufacturing new orders component has perked up on a year-over-year basis. The trough in lumber futures momentum corroborates this message, as does the tick higher in the U.S. boom/bust indicator (Chart 3). Chart 3Growth Green-shoots Given the current macro backdrop and awaiting the profit validation, when growth becomes scarce investors flock to sectors that are outgrowing the broad market and shy away from ones that trail the SPX’s growth rate. Typically, in recessionary times that would equate to investors bidding up defensive sectors that command stable cash flow businesses and avoiding highly cyclical industries. But, BCA does not expect a recession in the coming year. Thus, in order to identify high growth sectors that should outperform during the current soft patch and growth laggards that should underperform, we compiled a table with the GICS1 sectors and all the subsectors we cover. First, we rank the GICS1 sectors and then within each sector we rank the subsectors, both times by absolute 12-month forward EPS growth using I/B/E/S/ data (see second columns, Table 2). We aim to reproduce this table once a quarter. Table 2Identifying S&P 500 Sector EPS Growth Leaders And Laggards The third columns in Table 2 show the sector growth rate relative to the SPX. The final columns in Table 2 highlight the trend in relative growth. In more detail, they compare the current relative growth rate to that of three months ago: a positive sign indicates an upgrade in analysts’ relative estimates and a negative sign a downgrade in analysts’ relative estimates. Industrials and financials (we are overweight both) are leading the pack outpacing the broad market by 410bps and 350bps, respectively, and enjoy a rising profit trend. On the flip side, energy (overweight) and real estate (underweight) trail the broad market by 490bps and 1480bps, respectively, and showcase a deteriorating EPS trend. With regard to energy, we first identified that analysts are really punishing this sector in the January 22 Weekly Report and the sector’s 2019 EPS contribution was and remains negative.1 Our overweight call will be offside if oil prices suffer a new setback, but our Commodity & Energy strategy service remains bullish on oil, implying relative EPS outperformance in 2019. Year-to-date, energy has bested the SPX by 170bps. This week, we make an energy sector subsurface tweak, and also update a communication services subgroup. Light My Fire Last summer we took refiners down to a below benchmark allocation as all of the good news was perfectly reflected in soaring relative share prices (top panel, Chart 4), at a time when cracks were forming. Now we are compelled to book gains of 21% and boost exposure all the way to overweight. Chart 4Crack Spreads Are On Fire Today, refiners paint a near exact opposite picture compared with last July. Relative share prices are no longer rising by 50%/annum. Instead, momentum has collapsed and is now contracting (middle panel, Chart 4). Sell-side analyst exuberance has turned into outright pessimism: refiners’ profits are expected to trail the broad market in the coming year. By comparison, last summer they were penciled in to beat the market by 30 percentage points (bottom panel, Chart 4). Granted M&A activity had also added fuel to the fire, but now all the hot air has come out of the refining industry, and then some. Refiners’ riches move in tandem with crack spreads. When refining margins widen, profits excel and vice versa. Now that refining margins are in a slingshot recovery, refining ills will turn into fortunes (bottom panel, Chart 4). Importantly, wide Brent-WTI spreads underpin crack spreads. Moreover, the crude oil versus refined product inventory backdrop currently reinforces a widening in refining margins. In absolute terms, gasoline stockpiles are being worked off (gasoline inventories shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 5) and grinding higher demand for refined petroleum products (top panel, Chart 5) will further tighten the industry’s inventory outlook. Chart 5Healthy Supply/Demand Backdrop One way domestic refiners are taking advantage of the still wide Brent-WTI differential is via the export markets. Net refined products exports are running at over 3mn barrels/day (bottom panel, Chart 6), and the softening greenback since November will further boost profits with a slight lag as U.S. refining exports will grab an even larger slice of the global pie (U.S. dollar shown inverted and advanced, middle panel, Chart 6). Chart 6U.S. Dollar Softness Is A Boon To Refining Profits On the valuation front, both the relative forward P/E and P/S have undershot their respective historical means and EPS breadth is as bad as it gets, offering investors an excellent entry point in the pure-play oil & gas refining industry (Chart 7). Chart 7Extreme Analyst Pessimism Reigns In sum, fired up crack spreads, firming refining industry operating metrics, reaccelerating exports along with washed out technicals and compelling valuations, all signal that the time is ripe to buy into refining weakness. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index to overweight all the way from a below benchmark allocation, crystalizing 21% in relative profits since last summer’s inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5OILR – PSX, MPC, VLO, HFC. Cable’s Down But Not Out Cable & satellite stocks had been in an uninterrupted run from the depths of the Great Recession until the peak in relative share prices in August 2017. Since then, cord cutting news and the proliferation of on demand streaming services have wreaked havoc on the industry and cable stocks have trailed the market by over 33% from peak to the most recent trough (top panel, Chart 8). Chart 8Cable Signals Are… This deteriorating demand backdrop more than offset the industry’s reaction function, which has been intra and inter-industry M&A. Now that the M&A dust has settled, what is next in store for the industry? We reckon that leading profit indicators are a mixed bag and we continue to recommend a benchmark allocation in this niche communications services subgroup. The top panel of Chart 8 shows that relative outlays on cable are on a slippery slope, and will continue to weigh heavily on relative share prices for the coming quarters. Nevertheless, the ISM services survey ticked higher recently and is on the cusp of making fresh recovery highs, unlike its sibling the ISM manufacturing survey. This is encouraging news for cable executives and suggests that demand for cable services may not be as moribund as the PCE release is projecting (second panel, Chart 9). Chart 9..A Mixed… While the cable demand backdrop is unclear, industry pricing power has managed to exit deflation. Cable selling prices have been positive for the better part of the past decade, but starting in late-2017 they collapsed by roughly 600bps relative to overall inflation. True, this deflationary impulse dented profit margins, but currently the industry’s selling prices – and to a much lesser extent profit margins – are in a V-shaped recovery mostly courtesy of base effects (middle & bottom panels, Chart 8). Absent a sustained hook up in cable demand, selling price inflation will prove fleeting and the recent margin expansion phase will also lose steam. Meanwhile, cable stocks and the U.S. dollar enjoy a positive correlation as most of the constituents’ earnings are derived domestically (Chart 10). The recent U.S. dollar softness will, at the margin, weigh on relative profits and thus relative share prices, especially if the Fed stays pat and refrains from raising rates for the rest of the year as the bond market currently expects. Chart 10…Bag Finally, earnings breadth continues to fall, but relative valuations are still well below the historical mean (third & bottom panels, Chart 9). Netting it all out, cable’s demand headwinds are well reflected in depressed relative valuations at a time when industry pricing power is trying to stage a comeback and a drifting lower greenback may both provide positive profit offsets. Bottom Line: Remain on the sidelines in the S&P cable & satellite index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CBST – CMCSA, CHTR, DISH.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps