財務

特別レポート

Highlights Just ahead of the attempted coup d'état in Turkey, the international press was largely complementary of the political situation in the country. For example, a Bloomberg headline read "Once Spurned, Turkey Stocks Find Love As Political Risk Ebbs" mere hours before the coup!1 Feature Politics Stay The Same: Not Good BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has challenged the sanguine narrative on Turkey since 2013.2 The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) - once a reformist beacon in emerging markets - has become a political vehicle for President Recep Erdogan's political power grab - Erdogan has been planning to turn Turkey into a presidential republic, giving himself more powers - since 2013. Protests erupted that year against the government, in large part due to growing suspicion among secular, and mainly urban, middle classes that Erdogan and his Islamist AKP were evolving the country towards soft authoritarianism. Since the protests in 2013, the country's politics have been off track: A vast corruption scandal ensnaring the ruling AKP, including Erdogan's family, erupted in late 2013, prompting then-Prime Minister Erdogan to blame the moderate Islamist Gülen movement and its allies in the judiciary; Erdogan won a closer-than-expected presidential election in 2014, becoming the first democratically-elected president in modern Turkish history, and immediately set out to award himself greater powers through constitutional reform; AKP then failed to win a majority in the June 2015 general election; The election was immediately followed by a manufactured anti-insurgency campaign against ethnic Kurds designed to reduce support for moderate pro-Kurdish parties and allow the AKP to win a majority in the next election; In November 2015, the AKP finally won a majority; Many reformist members of the AKP have since been sidelined, including Erdogan's predecessor as President Abdullah Gül, and his successor as Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Despite the political turbulence, markets have largely looked through the risks (Chart 1). And, this is not even including the geopolitical risks engulfing Turkey's neighbors, including the souring relations with Russia, Israel, and the EU, due to Ankara's role in the migration crisis. Investors have largely given Turkey the benefit of the doubt, despite Erdogan's penchant for heterodox monetary policy and lack of focus on structural reforms. The AKP - which swept into power in the early 2000s on an agenda of promoting democracy, moderate Islamist cultural values, and economic reforms - has essentially become completely focused on the single goal of enhancing Erdogan's power. The failed coup is a silver lining for Erdogan as it will allow him to accomplish what electoral politics could not (he has in fact referred to the coup as a "gift of God"). Thousands of military, law enforcement, and judicial professionals have been arrested since the uprising. It is very likely that Erdogan will use the event as a pretext to undermine whatever checks and balances still exist in the country. In addition, it would appear that relations between Turkey and the West are also set to sour. First, Erdogan has demanded that the U.S. extradite moderate cleric Fethullah Gülen, who Erdogan sees as a chief rival, despite the fact that Gülen has not lived in Turkey since 1999. Second, the government has arrested the Turkish commander in charge of the Incirlik Air Base, which hosts U.S. forces, grounding U.S. air operations against the Islamic State. Third, the EU could pull the plug on its deal with Turkey which would see Ankara limit the migrant flows into the bloc, which Turkey had agreed to in exchange for visa-free travel, progress in negotiations for EU membership, and EUR 3 billion. The deal was signed in March, well past the point at which the migrant flows to Europe peaked (Chart 2), which suggests that the deal may not be as relevant to stopping the flow of migrants as most pundits claim. The EU's post-coup statement emphasized support for democracy in Turkey, but also stopped short of backing Erdogan personally. Chart 1Investors Should Stay##br##Underweight Turkish Assets Chart 2Migrant Flows: No Longer##br##A Bargaining Chip For Turkey Bottom Line: Investors who hoped that the November election would resolve political intrigue in Turkey and focus Ankara on structural reforms will be disappointed. The coup gives Erdogan the excuse to use extra-judicial methods to grab as much power as he can and to concentrate on rooting out enemies in the judiciary and the armed forces. Economic And Financial Headwinds While President Erdogan will consolidate power and finalize the formation of an authoritarian regime, the economic and financial challenges facing the government will intensify. A negative confidence shock is the last thing Turkey needs: The country runs a current account deficit of US$ 27 billion, or 4% of GDP (Chart 3). Any country running a current account deficit relies on foreign funding in order to grow. If foreign funding diminishes, the country will have to reduce domestic demand. This will be achieved via a weaker currency, higher interest rates, or a combination of the two. A weaker currency will depress imports by making them more expensive for residents, while higher interest rates will curtail domestic demand. Given recent political developments, it is reasonable to assume that foreign investors will reduce their appetite for Turkish assets. This will weigh on the currency and potentially force interest rates higher. Furthermore, tourism makes up 22% of total exports and 4% of GDP. Tourism revenues will be hit more in the following months (Chart 4), aggravating their current nose-dive. Chart 3Turkey Is Heavily Reliant##br##On Foreign Funding Chart 4Plunging Tourist Arrivals Will##br##Weigh On The Currency's Value The central bank only has US$12 billion of net foreign exchange reserves - equivalent to 0.6 months of imports - to defend the exchange rate. The gross value of foreign exchange reserves (US$ 103 billion) published by the central bank includes commercial banks foreign currency deposits at the central bank (Chart 5). These foreign currency resources do not belong to the central bank. The authorities might use them to defend the lira, but that could undermine investor confidence and reduce their willingness to hold Turkish assets. Finally, the funding of Turkey's current account deficit is not of high quality. Net FDI has amounted to US$ 9 billion over the past 12 months, with net portfolio investment at US$ -5 billion, and net errors and omission at US$ 2 billion. Overall, odds are that the foreign flows will diminish in the wake of political uncertainty and the lira will depreciate. As this occurs, local market-driven interest rates - bond yields and money-market rates - will rise. This will force banks to hike their lending rates and credit growth, which has been running at an annual pace of 10%, will decelerate further (Chart 6). This will weigh on the economy and thus odds of recession are not trivial. Chart 5Turkey Is Low On Hard Currency Reserves Chart 6Credit Growth To Slow Further Chart 7The Credit-Led Growth Boom Is Over As growth deteriorates following a 10-year credit boom (Chart 7), bank non-performing loans (NPL) and provisions will have to rise, and bank balance sheets will weaken noticeably. With bank stocks accounting for 38% of the MSCI Turkey equity index, poor banking health will weigh on the stock market. Bottom Line: Asset allocators should stay underweight Turkish stocks and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks. We also recommend maintaining short positions in both the Turkish lira versus the U.S. dollar and Turkish bank stocks. Marko Papic, Managing Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Managing Editor arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Bloomberg, "Once Spurned Turkey Stocks Find Love As Political Risk Ebbs," dated July 13, 2016, available at bloomberg.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Coming Political Recapitalization Rally - Turkey: Canary In The EM Coal Mine?," dated June 13, 2013, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Emerging Markets: No Curtain To Hide Behind," dated September 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

With the broad market poking above the top end of its long-term trading range, investors may be on the lookout for sectors and groups that will benefit from improving market sentiment. While the financial sector has been pounded in the last few months and is due for an oversold rebound, we would prefer making more targeted purchases rather than lifting exposure to the whole sector. The consumer finance group warrants bottom fishing. Credit card interest rate spreads have widened in recent weeks, diverging massively from the overall yield curve and signaling that historically cheap relative valuations are not sustainable. Importantly, consumer income expectations have perked up on the back of labor market tightness, suggesting that revolving consumer credit will continue to grow. We reiterate our overweight stance on this group. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CFIN - AXP, COF, SYF, DFS, NAVI.

Our <i>Cyclical Indicator Update</i> reveals that a defensive portfolio strategy remains the best bet to navigate the crosscurrents of stagnant profit/economic growth yet abundant global liquidity.

A renewed flare-up in euro area banking sector stress will have ramifications for U.S. bank stocks, despite little direct geographic exposure. The chart shows that risk premiums for U.S bank stocks have been tightly correlated with those of the euro area during previous stress episodes, as this represents a deflationary shock that suppresses the global interest rate structure and undermines global economic activity. Our Global Sector Strategy service has been recommending underweight exposure to euro area banks since mid-March in global equity portfolios. Worrisomely, things are about to get worse before any improvement materializes. The Brexit referendum result has served as a catalyst to expose euro area banks as the weak global financials links. Both absolute and relative performance are probing all-time lows (top panel), dropping even below the depths of the Great Recession. Eurozone banks are plagued by compressing net interest margins, courtesy of NIRP and QE, and still elevated non-performing loans (second panel). This is a lethal combination for bank profits as loan growth is failing to provide an offset. What is missing in the Eurozone is a true bank recapitalization, as happened in the U.S. in late-2008 via TARP. On that front, we are eagerly awaiting the EBA/ECB stress test results slated for July 29 for an update on the health of the euro area's banking sector. Beyond any recapitalization efforts, an opening of the fiscal taps would also serve as a potential positive catalyst to help revive moribund loan demand. Until then, global bond yields will likely dive deeper into negative territory, anchoring bank ROE (third panel). Bottom Line: Resist any temptation to bottom fish in euro area, or U.S., banks. For additional details please visit http://gss.bcaresearch.com/

We test three channels of contagion from the Brexit shock: political, banking system, and economic.

Housing activity should accelerate in the back half of the year given the drop in Treasury yields. Buy home improvement retailers and add to long homebuilding positions.

Financial stocks around the world have plunged, with U.S. relative performance on the cusp of setting new cyclical relative performance lows. While the sector is well capitalized and has low balance sheet risk, our negative stance is predicated on income statement concerns. Brexit represents another deflationary shock in a world struggling to generate trend growth. To the extent that faltering economic confidence further undermines business activity and sends capital to the perceived safety of the U.S. dollar, it amounts to a tightening in global financial conditions. Under these conditions, downward pressure on the interest rate structure will persist (second panel), robbing the financial sector of a much needed source of income. Thus, while the financial sector appears 'cheap', it is still too soon to consider bottom fishing, at least until deflationary pressures subside. We reiterate our below-benchmark position. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5FINL.

Post-Brexit uncertainty will continue for some time. But we were already cautiously positioned, and would not go any more defensive.

The financials sector led the recent pullback in the broad market. Rather than view this as a buying opportunity, it is symptomatic of the relentless plunge in global bond yields and an increasing scarcity of financial sector pricing power. For instance, the asset management & custody bank (AMCB) index will struggle to overcome profit margin pressure. Punitively low running yields represent a major challenge for the AMCB industry. Anything that can be capitalized has been re-rated. High valuations mean that prospective long-term equity returns are slim. Against this backdrop, management expense ratios look high in both the equity and bond universes. Fees have already been under structural pressure due to the shift into passive equity products (bottom panel), and outperformance of bonds, which garner even lower margins than equity products. Index funds generate much lower fees than actively managed pools of capital. If bonds continue to outperform stocks as global economic sentiment sours, then performance chasing investors are likely to continue putting more capital into lower margin bond products relative to equity funds. In other words, as the equity risk premium climbs, AMCB profit potential will decline. Stay underweight.

The sinking global credit impulse warns that reflation has not overwhelmed deflationary forces. Financials will continue to suffer, while utilities and retail drug stores will benefit.