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The S&P materials sector has been unable to hold its ground, despite the softening U.S. dollar and boost to global manufacturing output this year. Instead, the sector has taken its cue from commodity prices, and leading indicators thereof, such as the ratio of Latin American to Emerging Asian equities (bottom panel). The latter has collapsed in recent weeks, which is notable because it has been highly correlated with materials sector relative performance for over a decade. While it is tempting to lean into materials sector weakness given that global output growth is on the mend, we are resisting any urge to upgrade given the negative message from commodity-sensitive equities and prospects for a cooling in Chinese economic growth in the second half of the year. Materials sector operating leverage is unlikely to become a positive force until the pricing power outlook brightens. Stay underweight.
Highlights Although it is tempting to argue that emerging markets are in a new era where past correlations no longer matter, our belief is that it is only a matter of time until fundamentals reassert themselves. Several measures of equity markets have reached or are close to their previous structural peaks. In the second half of 1990s, booming U.S. and European growth as well as the tech mania, did not preclude a bear market in commodities and EM financial markets. Overall, EM risk assets will not be immune to selling off considerably from the current overbought levels if Chinese growth and commodities prices surprise to the downside, as we expect. Falling commodities prices will weigh on Indonesia's terms of trade. Equity investors should maintain an underweight position in this market and currency traders should continue shorting the rupiah. Feature A New Era? Money has been flowing into EM financial markets, irrespective of the evolution of many economic and financial variables that have in the past shaped markets dynamics. Indeed, EM share prices and currencies have refused rolling over despite a relapse in a number of variables they have historically been correlated with. EM share prices have continued to surge, even though the aggregate EM manufacturing PMI has rolled over (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Unsustainable Decoupling The recent relapse in the EM manufacturing PMI has not hurt EM currencies either (Chart I-2, top panel). In addition, EM currencies have diverged from commodities prices, an unprecedented historical occurrence (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The same applies to EM versus DM relative equity performance. Chart I-3 demonstrates that EM share prices have outperformed their DM counterparts year to date, even though the EM manufacturing PMI considerably underperformed DM's. Chart I-2Untenable Divergence Chart I-3Relative Share Prices And Relative PMIs Notably, EM stock prices have even defied the recent setback in EM net earnings revisions (Chart I-4). Typically, the latter correlate with swings in share prices, but this time both variables have diverged. Finally, it is important to note that this phenomena of decoupling cannot be explained by the performance of technology stocks. EM share prices excluding technology companies have still rallied, albeit much less, despite the decline in EM net earnings revisions and the EM manufacturing PMI. Remarkably, China's H shares - the index that does not include U.S.-listed Chinese internet/social media companies and is instead "heavy" in banks and "old economy" stocks - have still ignored both the drop in China's manufacturing PMI and rising local interest rates (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Even Analysts' Net EPS ##br##Revisions Have Rolled Over Chart I-5Puzzling... One could argue that the dominant macro drivers of EM in recent months have been the U.S. dollar and U.S. bond yields, both of which have downshifted since mid-December 2016. If the greenback and expectations of Federal Reserve policy continue to shape EM performance, the outlook is not much better. The basis is that the Fed will likely continue to hike interest rates if global stocks continue to rally. Notably, U.S. corporate bond yields/spreads are very low, the dollar is already down quite a bit, U.S. asset prices are reflating and U.S. economic growth is decent. If the Fed does not normalize interest rates now, when and under what conditions will it? Similarly, investor sentiment on the U.S. dollar is no longer bullish, and the market expects only 44 basis points in Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months. The latter is a low bar. We maintain that the dollar's selloff - even though it has lasted longer than we previously expected - is late, especially versus EM currencies. Bottom Line: Although it is tempting to argue that emerging markets are in a new era where past correlations no longer matter, our belief is that it is only a matter of time until fundamentals reassert themselves. As and when this happens - our hunch is that it is a matter of weeks not months - EM risk assets will sell off materially and underperform their DM counterparts. Signs Of A Top? Or Is This Time Different? The EM equity rally has been facilitated by the tech mania occurring worldwide as well as by falling financial market volatility and risk premia - leading investors to bet on EM carry trades. A relevant question is whether these trends are close to the end or have much further to go. We have the following observations: EM share prices in local currency terms, as well as the KOSPI and Taiwanese TSE indexes in U.S. dollar terms, all are testing their previous highs which they have never broken out from (Chart I-6). The question we would ask is: Why should this time be different, or why would these indexes break out this time around? In our opinion, EM fundamentals, including the outlook for EPS growth, remain poor. We have elaborated on this issue at length in previous reports1 and stand by our assessment. On many metrics, the U.S. equity market is expensive, and the rally is overstretched (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Facing A Major ##br##Technical Resistance Chart I-7U.S. Stocks Are Expensive ##br##And Overstretched These charts do not provide clues for the timing of a reversal, but when all these ratios reach their previous secular tops, investors should be critically examining the investment outlook. Our take is as follows: Without a broad-based U.S. corporate profit recession, a major bear market in the S&P 500 is not likely, but share prices could soon hit a major resistance and correct meaningfully from the current expensive and overbought levels. While EM stocks are not expensive, the outlook for their share prices is negative because we expect EM earnings to shrink again by early next year1. Finally, not only is U.S. equity market volatility extremely muted but EM equity as well as U.S. bond market volatility are testing their previous lows (Chart I-8). When implied volatility reached these low levels in the past, it marked a major market reversal. Bottom Line: Several measures of equity market performance have reached or are close to their previous structural peaks and financial markets volatility is at record lows. While one can make the case that this time is different and this EM equity rally will persist, we continue to err on the side of caution. Tech Mania And EM In The 1990s A recent narrative in the marketplace has been as follows: given the share of tech stocks' market cap has risen to 26%, and commodities sectors presently account for only 14% of the EM MSCI benchmark, it makes sense that EM equities have decoupled from commodities prices and have become correlated with tech stocks and DM growth. In this respect, it is instrumental to revisit what happened in the second half of the 1990s, when global tech/internet and telecom stocks were in the midst of a mania like social media/tech stocks nowadays. We have the following observations on this matter: EM share prices, currencies, and bonds plunged in the second half of the 1990s, even though U.S. and European real GDP growth was extremely strong - 4.5% and 3% on average, respectively (Chart I-9, top panel) - and the S&P 500 was in a full-fledged bull market. Chart I-8Volatility: As Low As It Gets Chart I-9EM Stocks And DM Growth In The 1990s EM share prices collapsed in 1997-'98, even though U.S. and European import volumes were expanding at a double-digit rates (Chart I-9, middle panel). Furthermore, the crises originated in emerging Asian countries such as Thailand, Korea and Malaysia that were large exporters to advanced economies. Besides, the share and importance of the U.S. and European economies was much larger 20 years ago than it is now. Back then, China was negligible in terms of its impact on EM in general and commodities in particular. The question is, if an economic boom in the U.S., and Europe in the second half of the 1990s did not preclude crises in export-oriented economies in East Asia, why would moderate DM growth today - as well as their much smaller share of global trade - boost EM share prices from already elevated levels. Twenty years ago, EM share prices fell along with declining U.S. bond yields (Chart I-10). The Fed hiked rates only once by 25 basis points in March 1997. In the past 18 months, the Fed has already hiked 3 times. In fact, the U.S. dollar was in a bull market in the second half of the 1990s, despite falling U.S. bond yields during that period. EM stocks collapsed along with falling commodities prices in 1997-'98 (Chart I-11, top panel) even though the S&P 500 was in the midst of a major bull market (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-10The 1990s: EM Bear Market ##br##Was Not Due To Rising U.S. Bond Yields Chart I-11EM Stocks, Commodities And The S&P 500 Importantly, the mania sectors of the late 1990s - technology and telecom - accounted for approximately 33% of EM market cap in January 2000. Presently, following an exponential rally and outperformance, technology and social media/internet stocks make up 27% of the EM MSCI benchmark. In addition, the market cap of energy and materials companies stood at 19% of the MSCI EM equity benchmark in January 2000, compared with 14% presently (Chart I-12). Hence, the market cap of commodities sectors was not substantially larger in the late 1990s than today. Finally, Korean and Taiwanese bourses have historically had a high positive correlation with both oil and industrial metals prices (Chart I-13). The reason for this relationship is that both economies are leveraged to the global business cycle, and commodities prices are often driven by global trade cycles. Chart I-13Asian Bourses And Commodities Prices Bottom Line: In the late 1990s, EM crises/bear markets occurred despite booming U.S. and European growth, and at a time when these economies were much more important to EM than they are today. The EM bear market also occurred amid the S&P 500 bull market and falling U.S. bond yields. To be sure, we are not suggesting that everything is identical between today and the 1990s, but all the above suggests to us that EM risk assets will not be immune to selling off considerably from the current overbought levels if Chinese growth and commodities prices surprise to the downside, as we expect. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM Profits, China And Commodities Redux", dated May 31, 2017, link available on page 16. Indonesia: Facing Commodities Headwinds (Again) Decelerating Chinese growth and falling commodities prices will weigh on Indonesia's exchange rate (Chart II-1). In turn, not only will the currency depreciation undermine foreign currency returns to investors in stocks and local bonds, but it will also exert upward pressure on local rates. The latter will extend the credit downturn and weigh on domestic demand. Chinese imports of Indonesian coal have begun falling in volume terms (Chart II-2). Consistently, Chinese thermal coal prices - the type of coal that China buys from Indonesia - have also rolled over decisively after rallying sharply in 2016. Chart II-1Indonesia Currency ##br##And Commodities Prices Chart II-2Indonesia's Coal Exports ##br##To China And Coal Prices Indonesia's exports of base metals and oil/gas to China are also declining in U.S. dollar terms. Commodities exports account for around 30% of Indonesia's total exports. As such, falling commodities prices will lead to negative terms of trade for this nation. On the domestic front, consumer demand remains sluggish. Although auto sales have revived, motorcycles sales are still declining for a fourth consecutive year (Chart II-3). Meanwhile, capital expenditures are tame. Capital goods imports are no longer contracting, but there has been no recovery so far (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Consumer Spending: ##br##Auto And Motorcycle Sales Chart II-4Indonesia: Capex Is Sluggish Bank loan growth has not recovered much (Chart II-5) despite low interest rates and a benign external backdrop since early 2016, specifically the revival in commodities prices and large foreign portfolio inflows. NPLs on banks' balance sheet will rise further due to weak growth and lower commodities prices. That, in turn, will dent banks' willingness to grow their loan book. In regard to the credit cycle, Indonesia might be following India's example with a several year lag. In India's banking system, high NPLs have curtailed public banks' desire to lend and, consequently, capital spending has been in disarray. Similarly, Indonesia's credit-sensitive consumer spending and investment expenditure growth will disappoint in the next 12 months as credit growth slows anew. Finally, at a trailing price-earnings ratio of 19.6, equity valuations are not attractive. The poor growth outlook that we foresee does not justify such high multiples. Besides, relative performance of this bourse versus the overall EM equity benchmark is stuck between technical support and resistance (Chart II-6). We are biased to believe that it will relapse from the current juncture. Chart II-5Indonesia's Credit Cycle Is Not Out Of The Woods Chart II-6Indonesian Equity Relative Performance Bottom Line: Weaker commodities prices emanating from slower Chinese growth will hurt Indonesia's currency. We recommend equity investors to keep an underweight position in this bourse. Also, we remain short IDR versus the U.S. dollar and underweight local currency bonds within the EM universe. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Our thesis of a playable rally in energy services stocks (see our Weekly Report of 11 October, 2016 for more details) was based on three key factors: troughing rig counts, cresting global oil inventories and falling production growth. Clearly, our upgrade was early, but a review of leading profit indicators continues to signal that value creation abounds. The global rig count hit its nadir in 2015, and has staged its best recovery since 2009 (second panel), with a greater than 50% increase in oil-directed rig count since November, 2016. Importantly, the growth in total OECD oil inventories is moderating quickly with recent large storage draws. The OPEC 2.0 agreement to extend current production cuts through March 2018 means that non-OPEC production growth will need to accelerate to satisfy climbing global demand. Ongoing inventory rebalancing augurs well for even more robust oil field services demand. The key missing ingredient has been pricing power. The prior cycle's excesses created a large overhang. However, our pricing power proxy is finally exiting the deflation zone, and further gains loom later this year as utilization rates rise with rig counts. This should unlock the industry's substantial operating leverage. We are doubling down on our high-conviction overweight in the S&P energy services index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRE- BHI, CAM, DO, ESV, FTI, HAL, HP, NOV, SLB, RIG.
Our upgrade of packaged food stocks to overweight (see our Weekly Report of 23 May, 2017 for more details) was based on the expectation of near-term margin expansion followed by an eventual sales recovery. This thesis is supported by recent data showing solid consumer outlays on food & beverage and a reacceleration in wholesale food manufacturing prices; both of these indicators have historically heralded positive sales growth. Meanwhile, input costs look well contained as grain, the key commodity input, continues to get cheaper, another indicator that margin expansion is on the horizon. Further, the slide in sales of the past 2 years has reinforced strict industry cost control to maintain margins; these efforts should deliver outsized profits as the top line recovers. Net, we continue to expect domestic demand to lead a sales recovery with above-normal profit contributions and remain overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PACK - MDLZ, SJM, KHC, CPB, MKC, CAG, TSN, MJN, GIS, HSY, HRL, K.
Feature Table 1 Growth And Its Implications We still see little on the horizon to undermine a continued rally in risk assets over the next 12 months. U.S. economic growth will be propelled by an acceleration in both consumption and capex - leading indicators for both point to further upside (Chart 1). The weak U.S. GDP growth in Q1, just 1.2% annualized, was dragged down by two, less meaningful elements: inventories (which fell, deducting 1 ppt from growth) and imports (which rose, deducting 0.6 ppt). Regional Fed GDP "nowcasts" are pointing to 2.2-3.8% growth in Q2. Corporate earnings had their best quarter in five years in Q1, with S&P500 sales up 8% and EPS up 14% - but, despite this, analysts have barely revised up their calendar year EPS growth forecast, which stands at 10%. In Europe, loan growth has picked up to 2.5% YoY, with the credit impulse indicating that GDP growth is likely to remain above trend at around the 2% it achieved in Q1 (Chart 2). But the stronger growth has implications. It suggests the market is too complacent about the probability of Fed tightening. Futures are pricing a hike on June 14 as a near certainty but, after that, imply little more than one further 25bp rise by end-2019 (Chart 3). We expect two hikes before the end of 2017. Not least, the Fed will be cognizant of how financial conditions have recently eased, not tightened, despite its raising rates in December and March (Chart 4) and will want to put in place insurance against inflation rising sharply in 12 months' time, especially given that it may wish to hold back from hikes early next year as it begins to reduce its balance-sheet. Chart 1Consumption And Capex On Track to Rebound Chart 2Euro Credit Growth Looks Good For GDP Chart 3 Will The Fed Really Be This Slow? As a result, 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields are likely to move back up. The 40bp fall from the peak of 2.6% in March was caused partly by softer growth and inflation data, but also reflected a correction after the excessive pace at which rates had run up - the fastest in 30 years (Chart 5). The combination of stronger growth, a 50bp higher Fed Funds Rate, and a moderate acceleration of inflation as wages begin to pick up again, should push the 10-year yield to above 3% by year-end. Chart 4Fed Must Worry About Easing Conditions Chart 5Rates Couldn't Keep Rising This Fast Momentum for risk assets over the coming months is likely to slow a little. Global PMIs have probably peaked for now (Chart 6) and investors should not expect to repeat the 19% total return from global equities they have enjoyed over the past 12 months. And there are potential pitfalls: China could continue to slow, and European politics could come into focus again (with early Austrian and Italian parliamentary elections looking increasingly possible for the fall). Investors may also worry about the chaotic state of the Trump White House. However, we never believed the U.S. presidential election had much impact on markets (the S&P500 has risen by 2% a month since then, whereas it had risen by 4% a month over the previous nine months). If anything, there could still be a positive catalyst if Congress is able to pass a tax cut before year-end - which we see as likely - since this is no longer priced in (Chart 7). Chart 6Momentum For Equities Will Slow A Little Chart 7No One Expects A Corporate Tax Cut On balance, then, we continue to see equities outperforming bonds comfortably over the next 12 months, and so keep an overweight on equities within our asset class recommendations. We also maintain the generally pro-cyclical, pro-risk and higher-beta tilts within our multi-asset global portfolio. Equities: The combination of cyclical economic growth, accelerating earnings, and easy monetary conditions represents a positive environment for global equities. Valuations are not particularly stretched: forward PE for the MSCI All Country World Index is 15.9x, almost in line with the 30-year average of 15.7x (Chart 8). The Vix (30-day implied volatility on S&P500 options) may look low - famously it dipped below 10 last month, raising fears of complacency - but the Vix term structure is fairly steep, implying that investors are hedging exposure three and six months out (Chart 9). Within equities, our preference remains for DM over EM. The latter will be hurt by the slowdown in China (Chart 10), a rising dollar, the ongoing slowdown in credit growth in most EM economies, and continual political disappointments (most recent example: Brazil). We like euro zone equities, on the grounds of their high beta and greater cyclicality of earnings. We are overweight Japan (with a currency hedge), since rising global rates will weaken the yen and boost earnings. Chart 8Global Equity Valuations Are Not So High Chart 10China's Slowdown Should Hurt EM Fixed Income: As described above, we expect the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield to reach 3% by year-end. This should mean a negative return from global sovereign bonds for the year as a whole, for the first time since 1994. Accordingly, we remain underweight duration and prefer inflation-linked over nominal bonds in most markets. In this positive cyclical environment, we continue to overweight credit, with a preference for U.S investment grade (which trades at a 100 bp spread over Treasuries) over high-yield bonds (where valuations are not as attractive) and euro area credit (which will be hurt when the ECB starts to taper its bond purchases). Currencies: The temporary softness in the dollar has probably run its course. Interest rate differentials between the U.S. and other G7 countries point to further dollar appreciation (Chart 11). At the same time as we expect the Fed to tighten more quickly than the market is pricing in, we see the ECB setting monetary policy for the euro periphery (especially Italy) which, given weak fundamentals (Chart 12), cannot bear much tightening. The Bank of Japan, too, will stick to its yield curve control policy which, as global rates rise, ought to significantly weaken the yen. Chart 11Interest Differentials Point To Stronger USD Chart 12Italy Can Not Bear A Rate Hike Chart 13OPEC Cut Agreement Showing Through Commodities: The recently agreed extension of the OPEC agreement should push crude oil prices up to around $60 a barrel in the second half. OPEC production has already fallen noticeably since the start of the year, but the response from non-OPEC producers - including North American shale - to boost output has so far been subdued (Chart 13). Metals prices have fallen sharply over the past two months (iron ore, for example, by 36% since March) as Chinese growth slowed as a result of moderate fiscal and monetary tightening. They could have further to fall. But China, with its key five-year Party Congress scheduled for the fall, is likely to take measures to boost activity if economic growth slows much further, which would help commodities prices stabilize. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation
Highlights In the near term, the PBoC is likely to set a stronger fixing rate against the dollar and dampen market expectations for further RMB declines. The PBoC hinted that the exchange rate can be used as a "countercyclical" policy tool, which could signal a major shift, as previously the central bank had mostly stressed maintaining exchange rate stability as its main policy target. Chinese growth remains reasonably buoyant. Listed firms' Q1 earnings improved significantly, confirming the profit cycle upturn. This bodes well for private sector capex, and supports our positive cyclical stance on H shares. Feature The People's Bank of China (PBoC) last week changed how it sets the RMB's official fixing rate against the dollar, making an already opaque mechanism even less transparent. With the latest tweak, it appears the PBoC intends to assert greater discretion over the RMB exchange rate, a notable departure from its recent moves toward a more market-driven system. Odds are high that the central bank will try to stabilize the trade-weighted RMB around current levels in the near term, unless the dollar takes a sudden sharp turn in either direction. Technical details aside, fundamental factors are no longer unanimously bearish for the RMB, as we discussed in a recent report.1 Meanwhile, most of Chinese-listed firms have reported first quarter earnings, which show strong improvement compared to a year ago. This buttresses our positive stance on Chinese H shares. It also bodes well for capital spending in the private sector as well as overall business activity. Why? And Does It Matter? Technically, the PBoC appears to be trying to correct a problem inherently built into its old exchange rate-setting formula. Up until the recent changes, the RMB official fixing rate was determined by the closing exchange rate of the previous trading day as well as the RMB's performance against a currency basket. As such, a lower onshore spot CNY against the dollar automatically led to a lower official fixing on the following day, which in turn anchored expectations for further RMB depreciation in the spot market - setting in motion a series of self-feeding mini-vicious circles. This became increasingly obvious in recent months (Chart 1). The dollar has depreciated broadly against other currencies since the beginning of the year, which should have led to a higher CNY/USD. In reality, the RMB official fixing rate has been essentially flat, and the onshore CNY spot rate has constantly traded below the official fixing rate, reflecting market expectations of further declines in the RMB. In the new formula, by adding in an unspecified "countercyclical" factor, the PBoC intends to reset market expectations and arrest the automatic extrapolation of the recent RMB trend into the future. More fundamentally, the PBoC hinted that the exchange rate can be used as a "countercyclical" policy tool. If true, this would signal a major shift, as previously the PBoC had mostly stressed maintaining exchange rate stability as its main policy target. In a press release accompanying the latest change, the PBoC argued that China's recent growth improvement suggests that a weaker RMB is no longer warranted, which fits the PBoC's broader policy stance. By the same token, it also suggests the PBoC will actively guide the RMB exchange rate lower at times of weakening growth to reflate the economy. Historically, the PBoC had mostly sat idle with the exchange rate at times of heightened volatility in the global currency market, which exposed the Chinese economy to sharp swings in the trade-weighted RMB (Chart 2). For example, the PBoC effectively pegged the RMB to the dollar during the global financial crisis between mid-2008 and early 2010 - despite the rollercoaster ride other Asian currencies experienced. Similarly, the central bank held the RMB largely steady against the dollar between 2013 and mid-2015 amid sharp declines in other currencies against the dollar, leading to sharp RMB appreciation in trade-weighted terms and creating relentless deflationary pressure for the Chinese economy. The slide of the RMB against the greenback since August 2015 has been a catch-up to its Asian neighbors to the downside. Chart 1The PBoC Wants A Stronger RMB Fixing? Chart 2The RMB: Moving Towards Dirty Float How the PBoC manages the exchange rate under the new mechanism remains to be seen, and it is too soon to draw definite conclusions just yet. In the near term, the PBoC is likely to set a stronger fixing rate against the dollar and dampen market expectations for further RMB declines. Longer term, if the central bank indeed intends to use the exchange rate as a countercyclical macro policy tool, it will have to more actively manage the trade-weighted RMB according to the cyclical profile of the Chinese economy. This will move the RMB closer to a true "dirty float" currency, which also means much greater volatility for the RMB cross rate with the dollar than in the past. The Earnings Scorecard The latest macro numbers confirm that the Chinese economy is losing some steam, but overall growth momentum remains largely stable . Both manufacturing and service PMI numbers released early this week remained in expansionary territory. and some key components such as export orders, orders backlog and employment showed a pick-up compared with the previous month. We expect the economy to remain fairly buoyant in the next two to three quarters, even if year-over-year growth numbers continue to moderate. As far as investors are concerned, the important development is that China's profit cycle upturn remains in place. Total profits of industrial firms increased by 24% in the first four months of 2017 compared with a year ago. In addition, most of domestic-listed firms have released first-quarter earnings, which show similar profit growth (Chart 3). A few observations can be made: Chart 3Profit Acceleration Table 1A-Share Companies' Earnings Scorecard All domestic-listed A-share firms reported a 23% increase in Q1 earnings compared with last year, or 34% if financials and energy companies are excluded. Profit acceleration was more pronounced in the materials and energy sectors, but was also fairly broad-based (Table 1). Top line revenue growth accelerated, a key factor behind rising profits (Chart 4, top panel). Excluding financials and energy, A share-listed firms' total revenue increased by almost 20% from 2016 according to our calculation, a marked acceleration compared with previous years. Profit margins also increased modestly, which helped boost profits (Chart 4, bottom panel). Net margins still pale in comparison to pre-crisis levels, though are now close to their long-term trend line. In short, China's profit cycle upturn reflects a pickup in both price increase and volume expansion in the overall economy, and defies the assertion by some that China's growth improvement since last year has been purely driven by credit. Looking forward, our model suggests that profit growth will likely begin to roll over (Chart 5), but there is no evidence that profits will contract anytime soon. Chart 4Improvement In Both Revenue And Margin Chart 5Profit Growth Is Rolling Over, But No Contraction What does this mean? First, profit growth in the industrial sector is good news for the banking system. Materials producers and energy companies, the major trouble spots in banks' asset quality in recent years, experienced the biggest increase in profit growth among the major sectors. This should reduce non-performing loans (NPL) from these industries. The pace of banks' NPL increase will likely continue to decelerate, and asset quality stress in the banking sector should ease. Second, profit recovery in the industrial sector bodes well for capital spending, which in turn will support overall business activity. Private enterprise investment is mostly profit-driven. Therefore, rising profits should lead to stronger incentive to expand capex. We maintain the view that the multi-year downshift in China's capital spending cycle will likely bottom up going forward (Chart 6). Finally, strong profit growth should also be good news for Chinese equities. Chinese H shares are trading at 32% and 24% discounts compared with the global benchmark, based on trailing and forward price-to-earnings ratios respectively (Chart 7). Without a major profit contraction in Chinese-listed companies, the large valuation gap between Chinese shares and global equities is unreasonable and unsustainable - and will eventually narrow. In short, we remain cyclically positive on H shares, and overweight China against global/EM benchmarks. Chart 6Profit Improvement Bodes Well For Capex Chart 7Mind The Gap Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
The S&P managed care index has steadily outperformed the S&P 500 over the past six months. Despite this outperformance, relative valuations have barely budged, underscoring that gains remain fundamentally-driven. After surging in late-2016, our managed care cost proxy has plunged in recent months (second panel). Premiums are set on a trailing cost basis, underscoring that there should be a window for upside margin surprises as revenue enjoys a pricing power bump from the previous rise in cost inflation, while current cost inflation melts. Importantly, consumer spending on health care is waning as a share of total spending, signaling fewer claims ahead, and an ongoing reduction in cost pressures. Further, an ACA overhaul, in whatever form it takes, is likely to be less restrictive in coverage for higher-risk, higher-cost members than its previous manifestation, implying ongoing earnings improvement. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC.
Highlights Through the 18 years of the euro, growth in 'core' Germany and France and 'periphery' Spain has equalled that in the U.S., U.K. and Canada. But Italy has severely underperformed since 2008. Italy's economic underperformance is due to the uncured malaise in its banks. Fixing Italian banks will fix Italy and reduce euro breakup risk. Euro area equities and periphery bonds do offer long-term relative value on the premise that euro breakup risk does ultimately fade. But for those who can time their entry, await the outcome of the Italian election. Feature The euro recently had its 18th birthday.1 Through the formative, testing and often tempestuous first 18 years of its life, how have the euro area's main economies performed - and how do these performances compare with the developed world's other major economies? The answers might come as a surprise (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekItaly Has Severely Underperformed Since 2008. Why? To allow for the different demographics, we must look at growth in real GDP per head.2 On this metric, the gold medal goes to Japan, with 34% growth. During the euro's lifetime, Japan's real GDP has grown by 18%, but its working age population has shrunk by 12%, resulting in the developed world's best real growth per head.3 The silver medal winner is probably not surprising: Germany, with 28% growth. But the bronze medal winner might surprise you. It is a euro 'periphery' country: Spain, with 26% growth - a medal shared with the U.K. Then come Canada, 24%; the U.S., 22%; and France, 19%. So through the 18 years of the euro, Germany, France and Spain have performed more or less in line with the U.S., U.K. and Canada. Making it very difficult to argue that being in the single currency has penalized the growth of either 'core' Germany and France or 'periphery' Spain. Italy Isn't Partying... But Don't Blame The Euro Unfortunately, there's a problem - Italy. Through the 18 years of the euro, Italy's real GDP per head has grown by just 5%, substantially below any other G10 or G20 economy. If the euro is to blame for the significant underperformance of its third largest economy with 60 million people, then the single currency's long-term viability has to be in serious doubt. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that the euro per se is not to blame for Italy's painful underperformance. First, observe that through 1999-2007, Italian real GDP per head kept up with many of its G10 peers. Even without a substantial tailwind from a credit-fuelled housing boom - which other economies had - Italian real growth per head performed in line with France, the U.S. and Canada (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Through 1999-2007, Italy Grew In Line With France, The U.S. And Canada Second, in the post-crisis years, there was little to distinguish the economic performance of Italy from Spain until 2013 (Chart I-3). Only after 2013 has a huge gap opened up. While Italy has struggled to grow, Spain has taken off, expanding by more than 12%. This recent strong recovery in Spain makes it hard to attribute Italy's underperformance to membership of the single currency (per se). Chart I-3Post-Crisis, There Was Little To Distinguish Italy and Spain Until 2013 Fix Italian Banks To Fix Italy We believe that Italy's economic underperformance is down to the as yet uncured malaise in its banks. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Crucially, the acute financial crises in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland forced their policymakers to recapitalize the banks, and thereby allowed the bank credit flow channel to function again. For example, Spain's turning point came in 2013, when bank equity capital as a multiple of non-performing loans (NPLs) started to recover (Chart I-4), allowing Spanish banks to operate more normally. Chart I-4Spanish Banks' Solvency Recovered In 2013 But Spanish banks' health did not recover because NPLs declined; indeed, if anything, NPLs continued to increase (Chart I-5). Spanish banks' health improved because of a large injection of bailout equity capital (Chart I-6). By contrast, Italian banks have not yet received the injection of equity capital that is desperately needed to fix Italy's bank credit flow channel. Chart I-5NPLs Continued To Rise Everywhere Chart I-6French And Spanish Banks Have Raised Equity. Italian Banks Have Not. To lift Italian banks' equity capital to NPL multiple to the lowest level that Spanish banks reached before recovery would require €80-100 billion of fresh bank equity capital. Which equates to 5-6% of Italian GDP. The good news is that this is an affordable price if it kick starts long-term growth. The bad news is that Italy's avoidance of outright financial crisis (thus far) has now tied its hands. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the state bailout escape route that Spain and Ireland used. Granted, in a crisis, the BRRD would allow Italian government state intervention to aid a troubled bank. But the overarching aim would be to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. "Other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." Without a crisis, the process to recapitalise Italian banks and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Our concern is that such a protracted nursing to health will keep Italy's bank credit channel dysfunctional, thereby leaving economic growth in a 60 million people economy sub-par for an extended period. Only when the Italian banks are adequately recapitalized, will the danger of a financial or political tail-event - and a euro breakup - be fully exorcised. Unfortunately, the danger may first have to rise before policymakers allow the necessary action. But ultimately they will. Some Investment Thoughts If euro breakup risk does ultimately fade, then euro area equities will receive a tailwind relative to other markets. This is because relative to these other markets, euro area equity prices are discounted to generate a 1.5% excess annual return through the next 10 years - as a risk premium for euro breakup.4 So if this risk premium suddenly and fully vanished, relative prices would have to rise by 15%. Likewise, euro area periphery bond yields can compress further - as the yield premium effectively equals the perceived annual probability of euro breakup multiplied by the expected currency redenomination loss after the breakup. So euro area equities and periphery bonds do offer long-term relative value on the premise that the policy steps needed to boost Italian growth are affordable and relatively minor - and that euro breakup risk does ultimately fade. However, for those who can time their entry, await the outcome of the Italian election due to take place within the next year. Breakup risk may flare up again before it does ultimately fade. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The euro was born on January 1st 1999. 2 Zeal GDP divided by working age (15-64) population 3 1.18/(1-0.12)=1.34 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Markets Suspended In Disbelief" published on April 13 2007 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-7 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. 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Communications equipment stocks have diverged negatively from the broad tech sector and now trade broadly in line with telecom carrier stocks - a key end-market, with a slight lag. The latest signal from telecom services stocks is bearish, and we recommend a downgrade to a below-benchmark allocation in the S&P communications equipment group. While valuations look compelling, the risk of further near-term losses and a longer-term value trap remains high; all three key communications equipment end-markets point to additional demand weakness ahead. First, a full blown price war has engulfed the telecom services industry, driving outright deflation. In the absence of revenue growth, telecom capex is unlikely to reaccelerate. Secondly, delays/uncertainty with regard to U.S. fiscal policy and the Trump administration's strict budget control warns that the government's purse strings will remain tight for some time, representing another source of drag. Finally, export markets are unlikely to offset domestic cooling, as soaring Chinese & European telecom equipment exports suggest that U.S. manufacturers are losing competitiveness, and market share. Meanwhile, deflationary industry specific forces such as virtual networking will also contribute to margin pressure. We recommend shifting to underweight. Please see yesterday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for this index are: BLBG: S5COMM - CSCO, HRS, MSI, JNPR, FFIV.