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Executive Summary Loss Of Russian Production Will Lift Brent With German imports of Russian oil close to 10% of its total requirements – following an impressive decline from 35% pre-invasion – we expect the EU to declare an embargo on Russian oil imports this week or next. Smaller states – e.g., Hungary and Slovokia – will be granted embargo waivers; their import volumes will not affect the EU effort. Russia will be forced to shut in ~ 1.6mm b/d of production, rising to 2mm b/d next year (vs. pre-invasion levels). Demand will fall as Brent prices surpass $120/bbl by 2H22, in our revised base case. Prices above $140/bbl are likely if Russia immediately halts EU oil exports. Our revised forecast calls for Brent to average $113/bbl this year, and $122/bbl next year. WTI will trade $3/bbl lower. Per earlier threats, Russia will cut EU natgas exports following the EU embargo. Benchmark euro natgas prices will go back above €225/MWh, and trigger an EU recession. Bottom Line: An EU embargo on Russian oil imports is close. Brent crude will rally above $120/bbl by 2H22, with $140/bbl or higher likely, depending on how quickly Russia reacts to the EU oil embargo. Eurozone natgas will trade above €225/MWh again. We remain long the S&P GSCI index, the COMT ETF, and the XOP and CRAK ETFs to retain exposure to higher prices. We are getting long 1Q23 ICE Brent futures and 4Q22 TTF futures at tonight's close. Feature Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyDie Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise The stage is set for the EU to announce an embargo on Russian oil imports this week or next. Odds of an EU embargo being declared sooner rather than later increased, in our view, in the wake of Germany's success in cutting Russian oil imports by more than half in a very short period – from ~ 35% prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February to ~ 12% earlier this month (Chart 1). Further reductions in Russian oil imports we expect from Germany will make it easier for the EU's largest economy to walk away from Russian crude and product imports sooner rather than later.1 Other EU member states already stand with Germany on the issue of an embargo on Russian imports. Those that do not – Hungary and Slovakia, e.g. – do not import Russian oil on a scale that can meaningfully derail EU solidarity on the embargo, which means waivers for these states can be expected to keep the embargo on track. In addition, four of the Five-Eyes states – the US, UK, Australia and Canada – already have imposed embargoes on Russian oil imports. Chart 1EU Energy Import Dependency (2021) Russian Shut-ins Will Tighten Supply The immediate fallout of the EU embargo will be to accelerate the rate at which Russia is forced to shut in production, as increasing volumes of its oil remain stranded on the water looking for a home. We reckon 1mm b/d or so of Russian crude oil output already has been cut. This will continue to increase. Russia will be forced to shut in ~ 1.6mm b/d of crude output this year, rising to 2mm b/d next year (averages vs. pre-invasion levels), in our modelling. This takes Russian oil production down to 8.4mm b/d this year, on average, and 8.0mm b/d next year.2 As more and more Russian crude is shut in, the pipelines carrying Urals and Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude from the Siberian oil fields to ports will fill, along with inventory in the ports where ships are loaded for export. When storage and pipelines fill, the only alternative Russian producers will have will be to shut in crude and condensate production. While some states obviously will benefit from the increasing availability of Russian crude on offer at 30% discounts or more – e.g., India and China – there is a limit as to how much surplus Russian output they can take in. China, in particular, will not want to jeopardize long-term contracts with key suppliers – e.g., the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) – nor will India, which will limit the total volumes both are willing to take from Russia longer term. Security of supply becomes an increasingly important consideration as Russia's oil output continues a long-term decline going forward: Costs were rising prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine from 2008 to 2019. Falling drilling efficiency and production, were accompanied by rising water cuts – i.e., the amount of water being produced drilling for oil – in Russia's largest fields, which rose to as high as 86%. Shutting production from these older fields will force hard choices as to whether these fields are ever revived.3 Demand Will Be Stressed Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, the country's Energy Ministry Alexander Novak warned the EU it would cut off natural gas pipeline supplies being sent to the continent, in retaliation for embargoing oil imports.4 Oil exports of close to 5mm b/d accounted for just under half of Russia's revenue from energy exports last year, with OECD Europe representing half of that amount.5 For Russia, oil exports are far more important than gas exports, which will incline it to immediately cut pipeline flows to Europe as soon as an oil embargo is announced. For the EU, natgas exports from Russia are critical to the economies of its member states (Chart 2). The EU imported ~ 155 bcm of natgas from Russia in 2021, or just over 40% of its total natgas consumption. Germany's share amounted to 45 bcm, or 45% of domestic gas use . If, as we expect, the EU is close to announcing its oil embargo on Russia, an immediate retaliation from Moscow in the form of a cutoff of pipeline exports to the EU most likely will follow. This will throw the EU into a recession, as natgas prices surge. Chart 2Losing Russia's Natgas Will Be Painful For EU Revised Forecast Reflects Falling Russian Output We are revising our Brent forecast and crude oil balances in line with our expectation Russian oil output will decline meaningfully. As noted above, we now expect Russian crude oil output to fall to 8.4mm b/d this year and 8.0mm b/d in 2023. This pushes non-core OPEC 2.0 production – which now includes Russia – lower, as a result (Chart 3). We moved Russia out of the core OPEC 2.0 producer group, given the production declines we expect this year and next, and into the "Other Guys" group. Our base case demand reflects a shift in OECD vs. non-OECD consumption estimates, with the OECD gaining incrementally, while EM demand (via non-OECD consumption) falls incrementally (Chart 4). Chart 3Falling Russia Output Pushes Non-Core OPEC 2.0 Output Lower Chart 4DM Demand Shifts Higher, EM Shifts Lower The lower EM demand growth reflects weaker China oil consumption resulting from the country's zero-COVID policy. In addition, because we expect Russia to act quickly on cutting off EU natgas exports, benchmark TTF natgas prices will move back above €225/MWh. Higher oil and natgas prices in the EU will lead to recession later this year. How quickly this shows up depends on how quickly Russia reacts to an EU oil embargo. In addition, a strong USD – bid higher by global economic uncertainty and safe-haven demand – will pushing the local-currency costs of refined products like gasoline, diesel and jet fuel higher, also will contribute to lower EM demand (Chart 5). Chart 5USD Remains Well Bid In our base case, we expect a tighter market on balance (Chart 6). Oil inventories remain under pressure, owing to falling as Russian output and declines in production outside core OPEC 2.0 and the US (Chart 7). We cannot rule out additional SPR releases from the US or IEA to offset tightening global inventories. Chart 6Global Balances Tighten Chart 7Inventories Draw As Supply Tightens Our forecast for Brent this year has been lifted on the back of a much stronger expectation of an EU oil embargo against Russia. This will result in 2mm b/d of Russian production being shut in by next year, which will not be fully replaced (Table 1). We are lifting our Brent forecast to $110/bbl for 2022, and $115/bbl for next year as a result (Chart 8). Chart 8Loss Of Russian Production Will Lift Brent Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Investment Implications An EU embargo on Russian oil imports is close at hand, in our view. Brent crude will rally above $120/bbl by 2H22, with $140/bbl or higher possible, depending on Russia's reaction to the EU oil embargo. We expect Brent prices to average $113/bbl this year, and $122/bbl in 2023. WTI will trade $3/bbl lower on average. Eurozone natgas will trade above €225/MWh again and stay at elevated levels, likely moving higher following a Russian cutoff of natgas supplies to the continent. This will throw the EU into recession. We remain long the S&P GSCI index, the COMT ETF, and the XOP and CRAK ETFs to retain exposure to higher prices. We are getting long 1Q23 ICE Brent futures and TTF natgas futures at tonight's close. A word of caution is in order: We are assuming Russia will follow through on its threat to shut off natgas exports to the EU in the event of an embargo against importing its oil is declared. This, we believe, is Russia's red line. If the EU fails to declare an embargo, or if Russia fails to follow through on its threat to cut off gas supplies in the wake of an EU oil embargo of its exports we will have to re-assess our outlook.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish European natural gas inventories are building at a rapid rate, as competition from Asia – typically led by Chinese demand – remains weaker than in previous seasons. EU natgas storage stood at ~446 MWh as of May 16, 2022, the latest available reports indicate (Chart 9). The EU has weathered two extremely difficult winters in 2020-21 and 2021-22. Natgas storage levels were drawn hard to meet space heating demand, which, owing to a winter energy crisis in China at the time, forced European buyers into a competition for liquified natural gas (LNG) during the former period. Following unexpected spring-summer demand in 2021 when cold weather lingered in Europe and wind power generation fell sharply, storage owners again were hard pressed to secure LNG to rebuild storage levels going into this past winter, which caused European TTF natgas prices to soar, as demand surged (Chart 10). With the threat of a cutoff of Russian natgas hanging over the EU, there is a singular focus right now on getting storage as full as possible ahead of next winter. The EU aims to replace two-thirds of Russian gas imports before yearend. Precious Metals: Bullish The Fed has adopted a more hawkish rhetoric, as it acts more aggressively to reduce US inflation. Interest rates have increased from near-zero levels in March to 0.75%, and BCA’s US Bond strategy service expects two more 50 bps rate hikes in June and July. Post July, rate hikes will depend on the Fed’s assessment of inflation, inflation expectations and financial conditions. The Fed faces the risk of either remaining behind the inflation curve or sparking a recession in case it’s either not hawkish enough, or too hawkish. Base Metals: Bullish High power prices in Europe will continue to plague refined base metals production in the continent and keep refined metal prices buoyed. LME Europe aluminum stocks are close to 17-year lows. In China – whose metal smelters were also hit by high power prices in 2021 – aluminum smelting has revived, with the country reportedly producing a record amount of primary aluminum in April. Lockdowns, however, have reduced economic activity, demand for the metal and its domestic price. China has taken advantage of this arbitrage opportunity, sending most of its primary aluminum exports to Europe. This aluminum price spread between the two states has contributed to China’s steady rise in primary aluminum exports this year, after having exported nearly none in 2020 and 2021. Chart 9 Chart 10Dutch Title Transfer Facility Going Down     Footnotes 1     German officials have stated the country will wind down all oil imports from Russia by year end, even if the rest of the EU does not join it in an embargo.  We highly doubt Germany will act alone, given the support an embargo already has received from EU member states.  Please see Germany to Stop Russian Oil Imports Regardless of EU Sanctions, published by bloomberg.com on May 15, 2022. 2     Our expectation for shut-in volumes is lower than the IEA's, which sees Russia being forced to shut in 3mm b/d of production by 2H22.  We continue to monitor this closely via satellite and reporting services and will adjust our estimates as needed.  Obviously, if the IEA is correct oil markets will tighten even more than we expect. 3    Please see "The Future of Russian Oil Production in the Short, Medium, and Long Term," published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in September 2019.  The OIES study notes production in Russia's highest-producing area – the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous (KMA) district – actually fell 15% between 2008-19, even as drilling activity surged 66%.  While output in 2018 rose due to intensified oil recovery (IOR), the OIES noted that the water cut rose sharply in 2018 as well in the KMA district. 4    Please see Russia warns of $300 oil, threatens to cut off European gas if West bans energy imports, published by cnbc.com on March 8, 2022.  The article notes Novak threatened to close the Nord Stream 1 pipeline delivering gas to Germany in retaliation for an EU oil embargo.  Almost three-quarters of Russia's natgas exports were sent to Europe prior to its invasion of Ukraine.  Natgas export revenues accounted for $62 billion of the $242 billion funding Russia's budget last year, while crude oil revenues made up $180 billion (just under 75%). 5    Please see Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise, which we published on May 5, 2022.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary The Fed will continue to hike rates at a time when global trade is contracting. Earlier this week, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell reiterated that the Fed will not hesitate to hike rates until core consumer price inflation gets closer to 2%. Given that US core consumer price inflation is currently at around 5-6%, a mere rollover in core inflation from current levels will not be enough for the Fed to tone down its hawkishness. Besides, according to Powell, US financial conditions are not yet at a level that is consistent with inflation coming down substantially. China will stick to its dynamic zero-COVID policy this year. The economy will continue to underwhelm as the magnitude and nature of stimulus measures announced thus far are not adequate to produce a recovery. Industrial metal prices and global material stocks are at risk of gapping down. Play these markets on the short side. Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices Bottom Line: It is still dangerous to bottom fish in global equities and risk assets in general. The US dollar has more upside. Continue underweighting EM stocks and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. Feature The risks to global and EM risk assets are still skewed to the downside. Although investor sentiment on global equities has soured of late, we do not think global or EM equities have made a bottom, and the US dollar has not yet reached an apex. Consequently, absolute-return investors should stay defensive, and global equity portfolios should continue to underweight EM stocks. The Fed and Equities Are Still On A Collision Course Earlier this week, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell reiterated the Fed’s commitment to hiking interest rates until core consumer price inflation gets closer to 2%. Notably, in his speech at a WSJ event on May 17, Powell noted: “This is not a time for tremendously nuanced readings of inflation”… “We need to see inflation coming down in a convincing way. Until we do, we’ll keep going.” Given that US core consumer price inflation is currently at around 5-6%, a mere rollover in core inflation from current levels will not be enough for the Fed to tone down its hawkishness. Chart 1US Core Inflation Will Roll Over But Stay Above 3.5-4% For Now Chart 1 shows the average of core median CPI, core trimmed-mean CPI and core sticky CPI, which are better indicators of genuine inflationary pressures because they are less affected by outliers. Even though core CPI inflation ticked down in April, other core measures such as core median CPI, core trimmed-mean CPI and core sticky CPI continued to rise. These core inflation measures are not likely to ease back to 2% unless economic growth falls below its potential. In his same speech, Chairman Powell also asserted: “We will go until we feel like we are at a place where we can say, ‘Yes, financial conditions are at an appropriate place. We see inflation coming down.’ We will go to that point, and there will not be any hesitation about that.” This means that US financial conditions have not yet tightened enough for the Fed to back down on its hawkishness. Finally, we have been arguing that a wage-price spiral has developed in the US as the labor market has become very tight (Chart 2, top panel). Wages and unit labor costs have been surging. Unit labor costs are the most important driver of US core CPI (Chart 2, bottom panel). Therefore, it will be impossible for the Fed to bring down core inflation toward 2% without a retrenchment in the labor market, i.e., layoffs. Rising unemployment will in turn weigh on household income growth and consumption. Chart 2The US Labor Market Is Very Tight And Wage Growth Is Accelerating The cost of borrowing for companies is rising globally, and these periods often coincide with equity selloffs. Notably, surging US high-yield ex-energy corporate bond yields herald lower US share prices ahead (Chart 3, top panel). Similarly, rising EM corporate bond yields foreshadow a further decline in EM ex-TMT share prices (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Rising Corporate Bond Yields Are Bearish For Stocks On the whole, the Fed and many other central banks will be hiking interest rates at a time when global trade volumes are contracting in H2 2022. As discussed in our report A Whiff Of Stagflation? US and EU imports of consumer goods are set to shrink following the pandemic boom. Chart 4Global Export/Manufacturing Are Heading Into Contraction Meantime, rolling lockdowns and extremely weak income growth are depressing domestic demand in China. High food and energy prices as well as rising interest rates are weighing on EM ex-China consumption. The sharp underperformance of global cyclicals equities versus global defensive sectors corroborates our expectation that global manufacturing activity will contract (Chart 4). The trade-weighted US dollar typically benefits from both Fed hikes and a global trade slump. As long as the Fed is hawkish and global exports are contracting, the greenback will continue to appreciate. For now, the US dollar remains in a strong position for further appreciation, especially versus EM currencies (Chart 5). Consistently, the selloff in broad EM risk assets is not yet over.  Chart 5EM Currencies: More Downside A major reversal in the trade-weighted dollar will be a signal that the global macro backdrop is improving and that global share prices and EM risk assets are bottoming. Bottom Line: Although equities have become oversold and investor sentiment is depressed, any rebound will prove to be short lived. The Fed will continue to hike rates at a time when global trade is about to shrink. The global/EM equity selloff has further to run. China: Ordinary Stimulus Despite Extraordinary Conditions Only one thing is currently certain in China: authorities are committed to the dynamic zero-COVID policy. However, most experts outside China believe that it will be very difficult to wholly limit the spread of the easily transmissible Omicron variants, even with such stringent mainland containment policies. As a result, rolling lockdowns are the most likely scenario for China’s regions and cities in 2022. These lockdowns will depress household income, confidence and consumption. Private business investment and hiring will also tank. Have authorities provided enough stimulus to support a recovery in H2 2022? We do not think so. Chinese stimulus has so far been ordinary in nature and in magnitude. Policy easing will likely prove to be insufficient to lift the economy out of the current extraordinary slump. First, Chinese exports are set to shrink in H2 as US and EU consumption of consumer goods revert to their pre-pandemic trend. Demand from EM will remain weak. Second, rising unemployment and under-employment is hindering household income. Generous cash transfers are needed to offset this hit to income. Not only did aggregate retail sales collapse in April, but online sales of goods and service also plunged (Chart 6). It is hard to imagine that private businesses will be investing when consumer spending and exports are weak. Our proxies for the marginal propensity to spend for households and enterprises continue to fall (Chart 7). Chart 6China: Even Online Retail Sales Are Shrinking Chart 7China: Household And Enterprise Propensity To Spend Have Been Declining   Critically, China’s credit impulse, excluding government bond issuance, remains in negative territory (Chart 8). Third, China’s property market is frail. Despite modest policy easing for the real estate market, sentiment among home buyers and developers remains downbeat. Given that the housing sector faces structural headwinds, odds are that buyers and developers might not react to the modest property market easing that authorities have so far provided. It is worth noting that Chinese property stocks seem to have had a structural breakdown, and offshore corporate bonds of real estate developers remain in a bear market (Chart 9). These market patterns corroborate that China's housing market has experienced a structural breakdown. Chart 8Chinese Stimulus Has So Far Been Tame Chart 9Chinese Property Market Has Experienced A Structural Breakdown   Finally, even though infrastructure spending is being ramped up, it will prove to be insufficient for the economy to recover from a deep slump. Local governments are facing a major financing shortfall. Land sales – which make up about 40% of local government revenues – have dried up. This will hinder local governments’ ability to finance infrastructure projects. As to Chinese equities, internet/platform stocks have become oversold. However, their long-term outlook remains dismal. As we have been arguing since late 2020, the fundamental case for their de-rating remains intact. This week’s meeting between government officials and technology companies has not produced any positive news. Although the tone from authorities was more balanced, they did not offer any relief from already imposed regulations. Chart 10Implications Of China's Common Prosperity Policies Looking forward, implementing common prosperity policies will be the primary objective of the Communist Party in the coming years. These policies will assure that labor’s share of income will rise further at the expense of corporate profits. Chart 10 demonstrates that the share of labor in national income has been rising since 2011. Conversely, the share operating profits peaked in 2011 and has dropped to a 30-year low. These dynamics will persist as income will continue to be redistributed from shareholders to labor in the majority of industries/companies in China. This is an unfriendly outlook for shareholders, especially foreign ones. Bottom Line: Chinese policy stimulus has so far been insufficient. The economy is in a deep slump, and share prices remain at risk of further decline. Short Industrial Metals And Material Stocks Chart 11Chinese Imports Of Metals Was Shrinking In 2021 Industrial metals’ resilience last year in the face of shrinking Chinese import volumes was unusual (Chart 11). This resilience was probably due to robust DM demand for goods, supply bottlenecks and investors buying commodities as an inflation hedge. As we elaborated in the April 28 report, risks to industrial metals are skewed to the downside. This is despite the fact that agriculture prices will likely rise further, and energy prices will remain volatile due to the geopolitical situation. We continue to recommend investors underweight/short materials stocks and industrial metals for the following reasons: It is ill-advised to play the US inflation story by being long industrial metals and materials stocks. As shown in Chart 2 above, US unit labor costs are driving core inflation, not industrial metals. China accounts for 50-55% of global industrial metal consumption, and since early 2021 the key risk in China has been decelerating demand/deflation not inflation. In fact, commodities have become a crowded hedge against inflation and a global growth slowdown poses a substantial risk to industrial metals. Chart 12 demonstrates that Chinese materials stocks have plunged. We read this as a warning sign for global materials because China is by far the largest consumer of raw materials (excluding energy). Chart 12Chinese Material Stocks Are Signaling Trouble For Global Materials When share prices of customers are falling, equity prices of suppliers will likely follow. Chart 13 shows that over the past 200 years raw material prices in real US dollar terms (deflated by US headline CPI) have oscillated around a well-defined downtrend. The pandemic surge in commodity prices has pushed raw material prices to two standard deviations above this long-term trend. Chart 13Raw Material Prices (In Real Terms) Are At The Upper End Of A 200-Year Downtrend Historically, commodity rallies (and even their secular bull markets) ended when prices reached this threshold. Hence, odds are that industrial commodities might hit a soft spot. Energy prices remain a wild card due to geopolitics. It is critical to note that the raw materials price index shown in Chart 13 does not include energy, gold and semi-precious metals. Finally, shrinking global trade volumes are also negative for raw materials. The average of AUD, NZD and CAD points to lower industrial metal prices (Chart 14). Chart 14Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices Chart 15Bearish Technical Patterns: BHP Share Price And Copper The share price of BHP, the world’s largest mining company, has put in a major top and is now gapping down (Chart 15, top panel). Copper prices have broken below their 200-day moving average that served as a support in the past 12 months (Chart 15, bottom panel). These market profiles point to more downside. We continue to recommend that investors play this theme in the following ways: Short copper or short copper / long gold; Short global materials / long global industrials; Short ZAR / long USD. Also, we downgraded Brazil early this week  partly due to expectations of lower iron ore prices and souring investor attitude toward commodity plays in general. Investment Conclusions Global and EM equities have entered a capitulation phase. It is still dangerous to bottom fish in global equities and risk assets in general. Continue underweighting EM stocks and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. The US dollar has more upside. Continue shorting the following EM currencies versus the USD: ZAR, PLN, HUF, COP, PEN, PHP and IDR. As we discussed in a recent report, we are approaching a major buying opportunity in EM local currency bonds. However, the US dollar needs to peak for that to transpire. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally China’s food price inflation accelerated in April. The rising cost of global agricultural goods and domestic COVID-related disruptions in the supply-chain contributed to a sharp bump in food prices last month. China is not overly reliant on food imports. The country is also well stocked with grain reserves and should weather ongoing global food supply shortages, particularly wheat, better than most emerging economies.  However, China will still be impacted by escalating prices of global agricultural products and energy. Some imported goods (e.g. soybeans and related products) that China relies on, coupled with higher energy costs and a bottoming in China’s pork prices, will continue to push up food prices and headline inflation. Higher reading in headline inflation will not change the direction of the PBoC’s monetary policy. However, more expensive food will dampen Chinese households’ spending power on non-food consumer goods, especially as income growth slows. The food and beverage sector in China’s onshore stocks will benefit from higher food costs. We are initiating a new trade: long domestic consumer staples/broad A-share market. CYCLICAL RECOMMENDATIONS (6 - 18 MONTHS) INITIATION DATE RETURN SINCE INCEPTION (%) COMMENT LONG DOMESTIC CONSUMER STAPLES/BROAD A-SHARE MARKET 05/18/2022     Bottom Line: Despite China’s solid self-sufficiency in food supplies, its food price inflation is not immune from the mounting prices of global agricultural products.   Is China’s Food Price Inflation Transitory? The food component of China’s consumer price index (CPI) increased by 0.9% in April compared with the previous month, a sharp reversal from a 1.2% month-over-month decline in March. Higher food and energy prices pushed headline CPI to 2.1% in April, the fastest year-on-year growth since August 2020. China is not overly reliant on food imports and has abundant grain reserves.  The country is in a better position to weather ongoing global supply shortages in grain compared with other emerging economies, such as the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, agricultural product prices in China have been structurally higher than those traded in the global commodity market. Large margins in China’s bulk agricultural pricing provide a cushion from escalating global food prices. Nonetheless, China remains at risk for higher food prices this year. Elevated oil prices and the war in Ukraine will further lift the price of fertilizers, adding to input costs for agricultural products. A strong USD will add to the price of USD-denominated commodity imports, particularly soybeans. In addition, China’s domestic pork price may have reached its hog cycle bottom and will pick up in the second half of this year. Food Prices Are Driving Up Inflation China’s headline CPI accelerated to 2.1% in April, on a year-on-year basis, from 1.5% in the previous month. Even though pork prices plunged by 33% in April from a year ago, food prices grew by 1.9% and have been boosted by a jump in the cost of fresh food, such as vegetables (+24% year-on-year), fruit (+14%) and eggs (+12%). Prices in other food categories, such as grains and edible oil, also rose, albeit more modestly (Chart 1A and 1B). Chart 1ALarge Jump In Fresh Food Prices In April Chart 1BOther Food Prices Also Picked Up, But More Modestly China’s strict COVID-19 containment measures have had a broad-based impact on food supplies. Mobility restrictions, roadblocks and risk-averse truck drivers introduced significant challenges in food supplies and transportation. Lockdowns in some large urban areas also led to panic buying and stockpiling among consumers, pushing up demand. Chart 2Increase In Chinese Ag Prices Has Been Much More Muted Than Globally Meanwhile, higher global food and energy prices have likely both directly and indirectly contributed to food price inflation in China. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price Index in April this year leapt to its highest level since its inception in 1990; it is 30% higher than last year and nearly double from its trough in mid-2020. Although price increases in China’s domestic agricultural products have been more moderate, the country’s agricultural wholesale prices have jumped by 10% from a year ago (Chart 2). Bottom Line: Food accounts for about 20% of China’s CPI basket (Chart 3).  Climbing food, along with energy, prices are driving up China’s headline inflation. Chart 3Food Accounts For 20% Of Chinese Household Budgets China Is In A Good Position To Weather Global Food Supply Shocks … Chart 4Ex-China Food Inventories Haven’t Been Built China is well stocked with food reserves and does not rely on imports for most of its agricultural supplies. Thus, the country should weather ongoing global shortages in the food supply better than most emerging economies (Chart 4).  China’s food inventories are significantly higher than levels in the 2006-2008 and 2010-2012 global food price hikes (Chart 5). The nation’s inventories have been steadily building up in the past decade to avert potential food supply shortages. Corn and rice stocks are sufficient to cover consumption for nearly three quarters of a year and wheat stocks are at nearly a year’s worth of consumption. Chart 5China Has Been Building Up Inventories To Buffer Against Supply Shortfalls Chart 6China Is Not Overly Dependent On Ag Imports Furthermore, with the exception of soybeans, China is not overly dependent on imports for agricultural supplies (Chart 6). The country is self-sufficient in supplying rice, wheat, and corn, three major staples in China’s grain consumption basket. Less than 5% of China’s total consumption of the three staple grains comes from imports. Bottom Line:  China is well stocked with agriculture products and is not overly dependent on imports for its food supplies. … But Not Immune To Food Price Hikes Worldwide Chart 7Ag Products Are Traded At Higher Prices In China Than In The Global Market Rising global agricultural and energy prices could still push up the country’s food price inflation. In USD terms, prices of China’s domestic agricultural products have been structurally higher than those traded on global commodity markets (Chart 7). The government heavily regulates and subsidizes its agricultural procurement prices as an encouragement to domestic farmers.  When global food supply shocks sharply pushed up agricultural prices worldwide, China’s domestic agricultural prices, with their large buffer versus global food prices, rose more moderately.  Nonetheless, China’s domestic food prices are not insulated from worldwide price hikes. China is facing higher inflation in food prices this year for the following reasons: Pork prices, which account for 13% of China’s CPI food basket, have likely bottomed. Although pork prices remain in a deep contraction year-over-year, they rebounded sharply in April on a month-on-month basis (Chart 8). The number of sows peaked in mid-2021 and has been declining for the past 10 consecutive months. Falling sow numbers have historically led to rising pork prices (Chart 9).   Chart 8Pork Prices May Have Bottomed Chart 9Pork Prices Will Likely Increase In 2H22 Nearly 90% of China’s soybean consumption relies on imports, making the country vulnerable to external price fluctuations. Soybean prices have jumped sharply this year. A stronger USD will also add to the price of USD-denominated commodity imports. About 80% of Chinese soybeans are crushed to produce meal to feed China’s massive pork industry, which means higher soybean prices will indirectly lead to rising pork prices by boosting input costs. Given that pig output is approaching its cyclical bottom, an increase in pig livestock would mean more demand for soybeans.  Chart 10Edible Oil Prices Reached Their Highest In Decades Growing prices in soybeans and corn will lift the cost of cooking oil, which represents about 8% of China’s food CPI basket (Chart 10). Ukraine supplies 30% of China’s corn imports, and Russia and Ukraine together account for nearly 20% of China’s soybean oil imports. China ramped up corn imports from Ukraine through March despite the war and snapped up large volumes of US corn in April after supplies from Ukraine were cut off. Nonetheless, prices of soybeans and corn will likely remain elevated with no end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine war and supply shortages globally. In addition, as global travel becomes more popular and oil prices remain elevated, the demand for corn-based ethanol, which is blended with gasoline, will also expand. Wheat prices will continue to experience upward pressure in the global market, mainly due to reduced production and exports from Ukraine and Russia (these countries account for 30% of world’s wheat exports). The World Bank forecasts that wheat will be 40% more expensive this year, reaching an all-time high in nominal terms.1 Although China is about 96% self-sufficient in wheat, the upsurge in global prices has boosted China’s domestic cost for wheat; it climbed by 15% in May from a year ago (Chart 11). Higher shipping and input costs, especially for fertilizers, will exacerbate the upside price pressures on agricultural goods. China is the world’s largest exporter of phosphate fertilizer, but its domestic fertilizer prices are heavily subsidized and much cheaper than exported ones (Chart 12). However, the domestic cost of fertilizer will likely follow the lead of rising global prices for fertilizers and agricultural products. Chart 11Chinese Wheat Prices Jumped Against The Backdrop Of Global Supply Shortages Chart 12China's Domestic Fertilizer Prices Will Likely Trend Up The relationship between agricultural prices and the dollar broke down early last year (Chart 13). Historically, a strong USD would weigh down agricultural prices by encouraging ex-US producers to raise exports and boost global supplies. However, the COVID pandemic and war in Ukraine have triggered a global surge in government controls on food exports. Such broad enforcement of protectionist measures will continue to exacerbate worldwide inflationary pressures on food. Chart 13The Inverse Relationship Between Global Ag Prices And The Dollar Has Broken Down Bottom Line: China’s food prices face upward pressure. Strengthening global prices in a wide range of agricultural products, coupled with higher energy costs and a bottoming in China’s pork prices, will all contribute to higher food price inflation in the country. Investment Conclusions Chart 14Core CPI Remains Subdued Food price inflation should not constrain the PBoC from further easing monetary policy. As mentioned in previous reports, China’s monetary policy framework has shifted away from headline CPI and has been anchored in core CPI, which has remained subdued  (Chart 14). However, China’s accelerating food and energy prices, as household income growth is slowing, will lower households’ purchasing power and curb their demand for non-food consumer goods and services.  While China’s overall consumption and economy will suffer from higher food price inflation, soaring food prices will help to widen the profit margins among food processing firms (Chart 15).  Furthermore, food and beverage companies in China’s onshore equity market have one of the highest ROAs and the lowest financial leverages (Chart 16). We are initiating a new trade: long Chinese onshore consumer staples/short broad A-share market. Chart 15Long Chinese Onshore Consumer Staples... Chart 16...As The Sector Will Benefit From Rising Food Prices   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     The World Bank’s Commodity Markets Outlook Report, April 2022.     Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

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Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (May 17 at 9:00 AM EDT, 14:00 PM BST, 15:00 PM CEST and May 18 at 9:00 HKT, 11:00 AEST). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

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Executive Summary Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Southeast Asia is suffering from fading macro and geopolitical tailwinds but there are still investment opportunities on a relative basis. The peace dividend, globalization dividend, and demographic dividend are all eroding and will continue to erode, though there are relative winners and losers. The Philippines and Thailand are most secure; the Philippines and Indonesia are least dependent on trade; and the Philippines and Vietnam have the highest potential GDP growth. Geopolitical risk premiums have risen for Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and will rise for the Middle East. This leaves ASEAN states as relatively attractive emerging markets. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG PHILIPPINES / EM EQUITIES 2022-05-12   LONG ASEAN / ACW EQUITIES 2022-05-12   Bottom Line: ASEAN’s geopolitical outlook is less ugly than many other emerging markets. Cyclically, go long ASEAN versus global equities and long Philippine equities versus EM. Feature Chart 1Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States The Philippines elected its second “strongman” leader in a row on May 9, provoking the usual round of editorials about the death of liberalism. Investors know well by now that such political narratives do as much to occlude economic reality as to clarify it. Still, there is a fundamental need to understand the changing global political order since it will ultimately impact the investment landscape. If the global order stabilizes – e.g. US-Russia and US-China relations normalize – then trade and investment may recover from recent shocks. A new era of “Re-Globalization” could ensue. Asia Pacific would be a prime beneficiary as it is full of trading economies (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategySecond Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours By contrast, if Great Power Rivalry escalates further, then trade and investment will suffer, the current paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will continue, and East Asia’s frozen conflicts from 1945-52 will thaw and heat up. Asian states will have to shift focus from trade to security and their economies will suffer relative to previous expectations. How will Southeast Asia fare in this context? Will it fall victim to great power conflict, like Eastern Europe? Or will it keep a balance between the great powers and extract maximum benefits? Three Dividends Three dividends have underpinned Southeast Asia’s growth and prosperity in recent decades: 1.  Peace Dividend – A relative lack of war and inter-state conflict. 2.  Globalization Dividend – Advantageous maritime geography and access to major economies. 3.  Demographic Dividend – Young demographics and strong potential GDP growth. All three of these dividends are eroding, so the macro and geopolitical investment case for ASEAN has weakened relative to twenty years ago. Nevertheless in a world where Russia, China, and the Gulf Arab markets face a higher and persistent geopolitical risk premium, ASEAN still offers attractive investment opportunities, particularly if the most geopolitically insecure countries are avoided. Peace Dividend Favors The Philippines And Thailand Since the end of the US and Chinese wars with Vietnam, military conflicts in Southeast Asia have been low intensity. Lack of inter-state conflict encouraged economic prosperity and security complacency. The five major Southeast Asian nations saw military spending decline since the 1990s and only Vietnam spends more than 2% of GDP (Chart 2). Chart 2Peace Brought Prosperity Unfortunately that is about to change. China has large import dependencies, an insufficient tradition of sea power, and feels hemmed in by its geography and the US alliance system. Beijing’s solution is to build and modernize its navy and prepare for potential conflict with the US, particularly over Taiwan. The result is rising tension across East Asia, including in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The ASEAN states fear China will walk over them, China fears they will league with the US against China, and the US tries to get them to do exactly that. Hence ASEAN’s defense spending has not kept up with its geopolitical importance and will have to rise going forward. Consider the following: Vietnam risks conflict with China. Vietnam has the most capable and experienced naval force within ASEAN due to its sporadic conflicts with China. Its equipment is supplied mainly by Russia, pitting it squarely against China’s Soviet or Soviet-inspired equipment. But Russia-China ties are tightening, especially after Russia’s divorce with Europe. While Vietnam will not reject Russia, it is increasingly partnering with the United States. The pandemic added to the Vietnamese public’s distrust of China, which is ancient but has ramped up in recent years due to clashes in the South China Sea. While Vietnam officially maintains that it will never host the US military, it is tacitly bonding with the US as a hedge against China. Yet Vietnam does not have a mutual defense treaty with the US, so it is vulnerable to Chinese military aggression over time. Indonesia distances itself from China. Rising security tensions are also forcing Indonesia to change its strategy toward China. Indonesia lacks experience in naval warfare and is not a claimant in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is reluctant to take sides due to its traditionally non-aligned diplomatic status, its military culture of prioritizing internal stability (which is hard to maintain across thousands of islands), and China’s investment in its economy. However, China is encroaching on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and Indonesia has signaled its displeasure through diplomatic snubs and high-profile infrastructure contracts. Indonesia is trying to bulk up its naval and air capabilities, including via arms purchases from the West. Malaysia distances itself from China. Malaysia and the Philippines have the weakest naval forces and both face pressure from China’s navy and coast guard due to maritime-territorial disputes. But while the Philippines gets help from the US and its allies and partners, Malaysia has no such allies. Traditionally it was non-aligned. Instead it utilizes economic statecraft, as it has often done against more powerful countries. It recently paused Chinese economic projects in the country to conduct reviews and chose Ericsson over Huawei to build the 5G network. Ongoing maritime and energy disputes will motivate defense spending. The Philippines preserves alliance with United States. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte tried but failed to strengthen ties with China and Russia. Beijing continued to swarm the Philippines’ economic zone with ships and threaten its control of neighboring rocks and reefs. Ultimately Duterte renewed his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in July 2021. The newly elected President “Bong Bong” Marcos is even less likely to try to pivot away from the US. Instead the Philippines will work with the US to try to deter China. Thailand preserves alliance with United States. Thailand is the most insulated from the South China Sea disputes and often acts as mediator between China and other ASEAN states. However, Thailand is also a formal US defense ally and assisted with logistics during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. While US military aid was suspended after the 2014 military coup, non-military aid from the US continued. The State Department certified Thailand’s return to democracy in 2019, relations were normalized, and the annual Cobra Gold exercise resumed in 2020. The US’s hasty normalization shows Thailand’s importance to its regional strategy. On their own, the ASEAN states cannot counter China – they are simply outgunned (Chart 3). Hence their grand strategy of balancing Chinese trade relations with American security relations. Chart 3Outgunned By China Chart 4Opinion Shifts Against China In recent decades, with the US divided and distracted, they sought to entice China through commercial deals, in hopes that it would reduce its encroachments on the high seas. This strategy failed, as China’s expansion of economic and military influence in the region is driven by China’s own imperatives. Beijing’s lack of transparency about Covid-19 also sowed distrust. As a result, public opinion became more critical of China and defensive of national sovereignty (Chart 4). Southeast Asia will continue trading with China but changing public opinion, the US-China clash, and tensions in the South China Sea will inject greater geopolitical risk into this once peaceful and prosperous region. Military weakness will also lead the ASEAN states to welcome the US, EU, Japan, and Australia into the region as economic and security hedges against China. This trend risks inflaming regional tensions in the short run – and China may not be deterred over the long run, since its encroachments in the region are driven by its own needs and insecurities. Decades of under-investment in defense will result in ASEAN rearmament, which will weigh on fiscal balances and potentially economic competitiveness. Investors should not take the past three decades of peace for granted. Bottom Line: Vietnam (like Taiwan) is in a geopolitical predicament where it could provoke China’s wrath and yet lacks an American security guarantee. The Philippines and Thailand benefit from American security guarantees. Indonesia and Malaysia benefit from distance from China. All of these states will attempt to balance US and China relations – but in the future that means devoting more resources to national security, which will weigh on fiscal budgets and take away funds from human capital development. Waning Globalization Dividend Favors Indonesia And The Philippines All the ASEAN states rely heavily on both the US and China for export markets. This reliance grew as trade recovered in the wake of the global pandemic (Chart 5). Now global trade is slowing down cyclically, while US-China power struggle will weigh on the structural globalization process, penalizing the most trade-dependent ASEAN states relative to their less trade-dependent neighbors. So far US-China economic divorce is redistributing US-China trade in a way that is positive for Southeast Asia. China is rerouting exports through Vietnam, for example, while the US is shifting supply chains to other Asian states (Chart 6). The US will accelerate down this path because it cannot afford substantively to reengage with China’s economy for fear of strengthening the Russo-Chinese bloc. Chart 5Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance​​​​​ Chart 6ASEAN’s Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China’s Hence the US will become more reliant on Southeast Asian exporters. Whatever the US stops buying from China will have to be sourced from other countries, so countries that export a similar basket of goods will benefit from the switch. Comparing the types of goods that China and ASEAN export to the US, Thailand is the closest substitute for China, whereas Malaysia is the farthest (Chart 7). That is not to say that Malaysia will suffer from US-China divorce. It is already ahead of China in exporting high-tech goods to the US, which is the very reason its export profile is so different. In 2020, 58% of Malaysia’s exports to the US are high-tech versus 35% for China’s. At the same time, Southeast Asian exports to China may not grow as fast as expected – cyclically China’s economy may accelerate on the back of current stimulus efforts, but structurally China is pursuing self-sufficiency and import substitution via a range of industrial policies (“Made in China 2025,” “dual circulation,” etc). These policies aim to make Chinese industrials competitive with European, US, Japanese, and Korean industrials. But they will also make China more competitive with medium-tech and fledging high-tech exports from Southeast Asia. Thus while China will keep importing low value products and commodities, such as unrefined ores, from Southeast Asia, imports of high-tech products will be limited due to China’s preference for indigenous producers. US export controls will also interfere with ASEAN’s ability to export high-tech goods to China. (In order to retain their US trade, in the face of Chinese import substitution, ASEAN states will have to comply with US export controls at least partially.) Even the low-to-medium tech goods that China currently imports from Southeast Asia may not grow as fast in the coming years as they have in the past. The ten provinces in China with the lowest GDP per capita exported a total of $129 billion to the world in 2020, whereas China’s imports from the top five ASEAN states amounted to $154 billion USD in 2020 (Chart 8). If Beijing insists on creating a domestic market for its poor provinces’ exports, then Southeast Asian exports to China will suffer. China might do this not only for strategic sufficiency but also to avoid US and western sanctions, which could be imposed for labor, environmental, human rights, or strategic reasons. Chart 7The US Sees Thailand And Vietnam As Substitutes For China​​​​​​ Chart 8China Threatens ASEAN With Import Substitution​​​​​​ Chart 9Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China China, unlike the US during the 1990s and 2000s, cannot afford to open up its doors and become a ravenous consumer and importer of all Asia’s goods. This would be a way to buy influence in the region, as the US has done in Latin America. But China still has significant domestic development left to do. This development must be done for the sake of jobs and income – otherwise the Communist Party will face sociopolitical upheaval. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand are the most vulnerable to China’s dual circulation strategy because of their sizeable exports to China, which stand at 12%, 15% and 7.6% of GDP respectively (Chart 9). Even though the Southeast Asian states have formed into a common market, and have joined major new trade blocs such as the CPTPP and RCEP, they will not see unfettered liberalization within these agreements – and they will not be drawn exclusively into China’s orbit. Instead they will face a China that wishes to expand export market share while substituting away from imports. The US and India, which are not part of these new trade blocs, will still increase their trade with ASEAN, as they will seek to substitute ASEAN for China, and ASEAN will be forced to substitute them for China. Thus globalization will weaken into regionalization and will not provide as positive of a force for Southeast Asia as it did over the 1980s-2000s. Going forward, the new paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will weigh on trade-dependent countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand relative to their neighbors. Within this cohort, Malaysia and the Philippines will benefit from selling high-tech goods to the US, while Thailand and Vietnam will benefit from selling low- and mid-tech goods. China will remain a huge and critical market for ASEAN states but its autarkic policies will drive them to pursue other markets. Those with large and growing domestic markets, like Indonesia and the Philippines, will weather hypo-globalization better than their neighbors. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand are all extremely dependent on foreign trade and hence vulnerable if international trade linkages weaken. Bottom Line: Global trade is likely to slow on a cyclical basis. Structurally, Hypo-Globalization is the new paradigm and will remove a tailwind that super-charged Southeast Asian development over the past several decades. Indonesia and the Philippines stand to suffer least and benefit most. Potential Growth Dividend Favors The Philippines And Vietnam Countries that can generate endogenous growth will perform the best under hypo-globalization. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have the largest populations within ASEAN. But we must also take into account population growth, which contributes directly to potential GDP growth. A domestic market grows through population growth and/or income growth. For example, China benefitted from its growing population but now must switch to income generation as its population growth is stagnating. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have the highest population growth, while Thailand has the lowest. Thai population growth is even weak compared to China. The total fertility rate reinforces this trend – it is highest in Philippines but lowest in Thailand (Chart 10). A population that is too young or too old needs significant support that diverts resources away from the most productive age group. Philippines and Indonesia have the lowest median age, while Thailand has the highest. The youth of Indonesia and Philippines will come of age in the next decade, augmenting labor force and potential GDP growth. By contrast, Vietnam and especially Thailand, like China, will be weighed down by a shrinking labor force in the coming decade (Chart 11). Chart 10Fertility Rates Robust In ASEAN ​​​​​​ Chart 11Falling Support Ratio Weighs On Thailand, Vietnam​​​​​​ Hence Indonesia and Philippines will prosper while Thailand, and to some extent Vietnam, lack the ability to diversify away from trade through domestic market growth. Malaysia sits in the middle: it is trade dependent and has the smallest population, but it has a young and growing population, and its labor force is still growing. Yet falling population growth is not a disaster if productivity and income growth are high. Productivity trends often contrast with population trends: Indonesia had the weakest productivity growth despite having a large, young, and growing population, while Vietnam had the strongest growth, despite a population slowdown. In fact Vietnam has the strongest productivity growth in Southeast Asia, at a 5-year, pre-pandemic average of 6.3%, followed by the Philippines (Chart 12A). By comparison China’s productivity growth averaged between 3%-6.6%, depending on the data source. Chart 12AProductivity And Potential GDP​​​​​​ Chart 12BProductivity And Potential GDP​​​​​​ Chart 13Capital Formation Favors Philippines Productivity growth adds to labor force growth to form potential GDP. In 2019, Philippines had the highest potential GDP growth at 6.9%, followed by the Vietnam at 6.8%, Indonesia at 5.6%, Malaysia at 3.9% and Thailand at 2.3%. In comparison China’s potential GDP growth was 3.6%-5.9%, again depending on data. Thailand is undoubtedly the weakest from both a population and productivity standpoint, while the Philippines has strength in both (Chart 12B). Countries invest in their economies to increase productivity. In 2019, Vietnam recorded the highest growth in grossed fixed capital formation at around 10.6%, followed by Indonesia at 6.9%, Philippines at 6.3%, and Thailand at 2.2%. Gross fixed capital formation has rebounded from the contractions countries suffered during the pandemic lockdowns in 2020 (Chart 13). Bottom Line: The Philippines has strong potential GDP growth, but Indonesia is not far behind as it invests in its economy. Vietnam has the highest investment and productivity growth, but its demographic dividend is waning. Malaysia is slightly better than Thailand because it has a growing population, but it has stopped investing and it is as trade dependent as Thailand. Thailand is weak on all accounts: it is trade dependent, has a shrinking population, and has a low potential GDP growth. Investment Takeaways Bringing it all together, ASEAN is witnessing the erosion of key dividends (peace, globalization, and demographics). Yet it offers attractive investment opportunities on a relative basis, given the permanent step up in geopolitical risk premiums for other major emerging markets like Russia, eastern Europe, China, and (soon) the Gulf Arab states (Charts 14A & 14B). Indeed the long under-performance of ASEAN stocks as a bloc, relative to global stocks, has recently reversed. As investors recognize China’s historic confluence of internal and external risks, they increasingly turn to ASEAN despite its flaws. Chart 14AASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China The US and China will use rewards and punishments to try to win over ASEAN states as strategic and economic partners. Those that have a US security guarantee, or are most distant from potential conflict, will see a lower geopolitical risk premium. Chart 14BASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China​​​​​​ Chart 15Favor The Philippines The Philippines is the most attractive Southeast Asian market based on our criteria: it has an American security guarantee, domestic-oriented growth, and high productivity. Populism in the Philippines has come with productivity improvements and yet has not overthrown the US alliance. Philippine equities can outperform their emerging market peers (Chart 15). Indonesia is the second most attractive – it does not have direct territorial disputes with China, maintains defense ties with the West, is not excessively trade reliant, and keeps up decent productivity growth. It is vulnerable to nationalism and populism but its democracy is effective overall and the regime has maintained general political stability after near-dissolution in 1998. Thailand is geopolitically secure but lacking in potential growth. Vietnam has high potential growth but is geopolitically insecure over the long run. Investors should only pursue tactical investments in these markets. We maintain our long-term favorable view of Malaysia, although it is trade dependent and productivity has weakened. In future reports we will examine ASEAN markets in greater depth and with closer consideration of their domestic political risks.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix