戦争/紛争

Feature One of BCA Research’s key geopolitical views since May 2019, outlined recently in our 2020 Outlook, is rapidly materializing: a dramatic escalation in the US-Iran conflict. On January 3 the United States successfully conducted a drone strike against a convoy carrying two high-level targets near the Baghdad International Airport. These were Iranian General Qassim Soleimani and his key Iraqi associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes. The former, Soleimani, was Iran’s most influential military and intelligence leader, and one of its most powerful leaders overall. He was the head of the formidable Quds Force, the overseas arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the staunchest military wing of the regime at home and abroad. The latter target, al-Muhandes, was the head of Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah militia and the broader coalition of pro-Iran Shiite militias in Iraq known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This coalition was partly responsible for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Since then it has sought to consolidate Iranian influence in Iraq, pushing back against Iraqi Sunnis and Shia nationalists, and their allies in the US and Persian Gulf. Chart 1Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions The US assassinations follow a significant increase in Iranian and Iran-backed militant attacks against US allies in the Middle East this year. These stem from a breakdown in the US-Iran diplomatic detente that was enshrined in the 2015 nuclear agreement. President Donald Trump revoked this agreement in 2018 and in May 2019 imposed crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil exports and economy — initiating a “bull market” in US-Iran strategic tensions (Chart 1). Recent events show a clear path of strategic escalation — even in the wake of a summer of “fire and fury” and the extraordinary Iran-backed attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refinery in September. Widespread popular unrest has dissolved the Iraqi government, creating intense competition between Iraqi nationalists, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, and Iran’s proxies, led by al-Muhandes and the PMF. This unrest marked a significant challenge to Iran’s sphere of influence and necessitated an Iranian backlash. For instance, al-Sadr’s enemies attacked his headquarters with a drone in early December. Meanwhile Kataib Hezbollah launched a spate of rocket strikes against US and Iraqi bases that culminated in the death of an American contractor near Kirkuk on December 28 — crossing an American red line. The US retaliated with damaging air strikes against Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria on December 29, prompting a PMF blockade of the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31. While this was a limited blockade, the US has now retaliated by assassinating Soleimani and al-Muhandes, taking the conflict to a new level. There is every reason to expect tensions to escalate further in the new year. First, the Iranian regime is under severe economic stress due to the US sanctions and broader global slowdown (Charts 2A&B). Domestic protests have erupted in recent years, while the regime struggles with economic isolation, a restless youth population, and a looming succession when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei eventually steps down. This is an existential struggle for the regime, while President Trump may only be in office for 12 months. Public opinion polls show that the Iranian populace blames the government for economic mismanagement, and yet that the renewed conflict with the US under the Trump administration is shifting the blame to US sanctions (Chart 3). Hence the regime will continue to distract the populace by resisting Trump’s pressure tactics. Chart 2ARegime Survival ... Chart 2B... An Existential Challenge     Chart 3US Conflict Distracts From Domestic Woes This tendency will be reinforced by the death of Soleimani, which heightens the regime’s vulnerability while rallying domestic support due to Soleimani’s popularity as a leader (Chart 4). The regime is looking to its survival over the long run. It would be a remarkable shift in policy for Tehran to enter negotiations with Trump, since it would then risk vindicating his “maximum pressure” doctrine, possibly helping him secure a second term in office. Chart 4Hard-Line Soleimani Was Popular (Reformist President Rouhani Is Not) Meanwhile President Trump’s circumstances are apparently urging him to double down on his aggressive foreign policy against Iran. First, while he will not be removed from office by a Republican Senate, his impeachment trial threatens to mar his re-election chances. This is a prime motivation to pursue foreign policy objectives to distract the public and seek policy wins. Chart 5Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Second, the Trump administration may feel emboldened by the rise of US shale oil production and decline in US oil import dependency (Chart 5). Simulations we published in our December 6 Strategic Outlook show that Iran would have to sustain an oil supply cutoff as large as the Abqaiq attack for four months in order to drive gasoline prices high enough to harm the US economy as a whole. This buffer may have convinced Trump he has plenty of room for maneuver in confronting Iran. Third, Trump undoubtedly feels the need to maintain the credibility of his threats against Iran, North Korea, and other nations given his impeachment, widely known electoral and economic vulnerability, and his recent capitulation to China in the trade war. The clear threat by Iran to create a humiliating US embassy crisis in Baghdad likely struck a nerve in the White House, reviving memories of Saigon under Gerald Ford, Tehran under Jimmy Carter, and Benghazi under Barack Obama. By taking the offensive, President Trump has reinforced the red line against the death of American citizens or attacks on US assets. Nevertheless he now runs the risk of driving Iran into further escalation rather than negotiation. Iran is not yet likely to court a full-scale American attack by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. It is more likely to retaliate via regional proxy attacks, including cutting off oil production, pipelines, and shipping — at a time of its choosing. If Trump’s pressure tactics succeed, it will advance its nuclear program rather than staging large-scale attacks. Investment Conclusions Iraqi instability will worsen as a result of the past month’s events, bringing 3.5 million barrels of daily oil production under a higher probability of disruption than when we first flagged this risk. Supply disruptions there or elsewhere in the region would hasten the drawdown in global inventories and backwardation of prices occurring due to the revival in global demand on China stimulus and OPEC 2.0 production cuts. Continued oil volatility, as in 2018-19, should be expected, but the risk for now lies to the upside as Middle East tensions could cause an overshoot. We remain long Brent crude and overweight energy sector equities. Second, the US election — and hence US domestic and foreign policy over the next five years — could hang in the balance if the Iran conflict escalates to broader and more open hostilities as we expect. President Trump is favored for re-election. Yet we have contended since 2018 that the revocation of the Iran nuclear deal was a grave geopolitical decision that could jeopardize Trump’s economy and hence re-election — and that remains the case. Chart 6Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump was elected in part because he is viewed as strong on terrorism, and the confrontation with Iran and its proxies will reinforce that reputation in the short run. Iranian attacks will also boost Trump’s approval rating, other things being equal. However, much can change by November. Jimmy Carter’s election troubles with Iran point to a serious risk to Trump, as the initial surge in patriotic support could turn sour over time if unemployment rises as a result of any oil shocks (Chart 6). Even George Bush Jr saw a dramatic fall in approval, from a much higher base than Trump, despite foreign policy conditions that were more transparently favorable to him in 2004 than any conflict with Iran will be to Trump in 2020. Trump has campaigned against Middle Eastern wars to a war-weary public, so the rally around the flag effect will not necessarily play to his favor in the final count. It is too soon to speculate about these matters — our view remains unchanged — but the Iran conflict is now much more likely to be a major factor in the US election and Iran is certainly capable of frustrating US presidents. This reinforces our base case that Trump is only slightly favored to win. Moreover his foreign policy conflicts — in Asia as well as the Middle East — ensure that global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain elevated despite dropping off from the highs reached last year amid the trade war. We remain long pure play global defense stocks on a cyclical and secular basis. We see gold as the appropriate hedge given our expectation that the trade ceasefire and China stimulus will reinforce a global growth recovery despite Middle Eastern turmoil. Higher oil prices push up inflation expectations and limit any benefit to government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

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Highlights Saudi Aramco likely will IPO 1-2% of the company next month on its local bourse; retail investors reportedly will get up to 0.5%. The IPO will value Aramco within a range estimated at less than $1 trillion to more than $2 trillion. China’s interest in Aramco goes back almost four years to when the IPO was first proffered. It reflects an economic and geopolitical calculus encompassing more than an equity claim on the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. Investing in Aramco gives it a stake in producing oil it desperately needs at home – as its imports from KSA attest – and supports its goal of filling some of the power vacuum left by the US pivot away from the Middle East (Chart of the Week). For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), stronger ties with China will ground its Asian marketing efforts, and deepen China’s stake in the unimpeded flow of its exports. With tensions in the Gulf remaining high, this is crucial. In addition to the mutuality of KSA’s and China’s interests, “patriotic participation” by Saudi investors will help push Aramco’s valuation close to $2 trillion. A post-IPO let-down – not unusual by any stretch – is likely. Feature Chart of the WeekChina’s Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge Dear Client, This week, BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy explore the Saudi Aramco IPO scheduled for next month and its larger implications for the global economy. In keeping with our tradition, we take a multidimensional approach – financial, economic and geopolitical – consistent with our unique analytical endowment. We trust you will find this report’s approach and analysis useful in shaping your convictions. Matt Gertken and Bob Ryan The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is in an all-out sprint to diversify its economy away from a near-total dependence on oil exports by 2030 (Chart 2). Time is short. The IPO of Saudi Aramco is the sine qua non of this effort, as it will fund the investment required to effect this transformation’s ambitious goals (Table 1, Chart 3). Investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities is attractive to China. Table 1Vision 2030 Highlights Chart 2Breaking Oil Dependency... China is engaged in an all-out effort to become self-sufficient in oil and gas production, given the vulnerabilities in its hydrocarbon-supply chain.1 Chart 3...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 Local oil-industry executives doubt this is even remotely attainable, which is one reason we believe investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities via the Aramco IPO is so hugely attractive to China. It helps explain why policymakers sanctioned an investment of up to $10 billion in the IPO by various state-owned enterprises and funds.2 Given our expectation the IPO will value Aramco closer to $2 trillion than not, a 1-2% float would amount to between $20-$40 billion, meaning China – via its state-owned Silk Road Fund, Sinopec Group and China Investment Corp., et al – could account for as much as a quarter of the IPO if it prices out as we expect, and these state-owned investors pony up the full $10 billion being discussed in the press.3 Aramco’s Red Herring Released November 9, the Aramco Red Herring is as interesting for what it includes as what it leaves out.4 In the first six months of this year, Aramco production amounted to 13.2mm b/d of oil equivalent, 10.0mm b/d of which was crude oil and condensates. This was down slightly from the 13.6mm b/d of oil equivalent produced last year. The company notes that in 2016-18, it accounted for 12.5% of global crude output, and that its proved liquids reserves were “approximately five times larger than the combined proved liquids reserves of the Five Major IOCs,” or independent oil companies. Aramco’s 3.1mm b/d of refining capacity makes it the fourth largest integrated refiner in the world. In 2018, Aramco’s free cash flow amounted to almost $86 billion. Net income last year was $111 billion, more than the combined profits of the next six largest oil companies in the world (Chart 4). For its first year as a public company, Aramco has indicated it will pay an annual dividend of $75 billion. Investors will not know how that translates to a dividend yield until the actual number of shares floated is known. Chart 4Aramco Profitability Is Huge Chart 5Aramco Absorbs Most Of OPEC 2.0’s Production Cuts, Outside Iran, Venezuela The Red Herring foresees a compound annual growth rate in demand for the Kingdom’s oil, condensate and natural-gas liquids output of 0.9% p.a. between 2015 and 2025. Demand growth is expected to level off some time around 2035. In this baseline scenario, Aramco sees itself gaining market share globally over this period. In an alternative scenario, the company notes that if there is “a more rapid transition away from fossil fuels,” which sees demand for its hydrocarbons starting to decline in the late 2020s, “the Kingdom’s share of global supply is also expected to increase through 2050.” Saudi Arabia and Russia are the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, the producer coalition formed at the end of 2016 to manage global oil supply growth, following a market-share war launched by OPEC in 2014. The coalition has an agreement in place to keep 1.2mm b/d of production off the market until the end of 1Q20. The Kingdom, via Aramco, has been shouldering the lion’s share of OPEC 2.0’s production restraint, outside of Iran and Venezuela, which have seen their production and exports slide due to US sanctions (Chart 5). On Wednesday, KSA informed OPEC (the original Cartel) the IPO of Aramco would not affect its commitments under the OPEC 2.0 deal.5 The IPO Will Bring KSA And China Closer China has been keen to invest in Aramco since the IPO was first floated almost four years ago. This reflects an economic and a geopolitical calculus encompassing more than simply securing an equity claim in the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. An Aramco investment gives China a stake in producing oil it critically needs at home. China’s oil demand has been growing while its domestic production has been stagnating for the most part, despite the new-found emphasis on becoming self-sufficient. This is reflected in surging imports – totaling just over 10mm b/d in September, an 11% increase over August levels. China’s oil demand is expected to grow ~ 3.5% this year and next, averaging ~ 14.8mm b/d. China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) estimates China’s oil demand will peak in 2030 at 16.5mm b/d.6 China’s vulnerability to oil imports – caused by its rising import dependency and US maritime supremacy – has prompted President Xi to order increased exploration and production domestically. The trade war and US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela – two long-time crude-oil suppliers to China – drove this point home: Imports from Iran fell 46% y/y in the January – September period to 357k b/d, while imports from Venezuela fell 15% to 306k b/d.7 For its part, KSA views China as one of its primary growth markets, as its Red Herring attests. It will be investing in additional refining capacity there and view the market as key to its petchems growth. “The Company’s strategy is to continue increasing its in-Kingdom refining capability and expand its strategically integrated downstream business in high-growth economies, such as China, India and Southeast Asia, while maintaining its current participation in material demand centers, such as the United States, and countries that rely on importing crude oil, such as Japan and South Korea.” Both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement. Net, both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement, which the IPO will foster. It is not inconceivable representatives from Chinese state-owned or –affiliated entities could sit on Aramco’s board, which would provide even “greater assurance over its crude oil and refined product supplies going forward,” as we noted in a Special Report published in November 2017.8 This is a critical concern for China, with domestic production stagnating and demand for crude oil, refined products and petchems increasing. Evolution Of China’s Middle East Role While China’s involvement in the Middle East has steadily been growing in energy, trade and investment generally, it has espoused “a vision of a multipolar order in the Middle East based on non-interference in, and partnerships with, other states – one in which the country will promote stability through ‘developmental peace’ rather than the Western notion of ‘democratic peace’,” according to a recent paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations.9 China’s growing interest in the Middle East is fundamentally supportive of the Gulf Arab reform agendas. But geopolitical risk is still elevated in this region (Chart 6), especially over the one- to three-year time frame. This is primarily due to the far-from-settled conflicts between the US and China and the US and Iran. First take the US-China conflict as it pertains to the Middle East. As China’s economy has boomed, so has its import dependency. Over the past two decades Beijing's reliance on Middle Eastern crude oil has ballooned (Chart 7). The result is a deep strategic vulnerability for China. Economic and political stability depend on sea lanes that are, from China’s perspective, implicitly threatened by the United States and its allied maritime powers. Chart 6Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Chart 7Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Hence Beijing has devoted ever greater efforts over the past two decades to building a blue-water navy charged with securing its “lifeline” running from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to China’s hungry coastal cities (Map 1). This naval development is a disruptive process, as the US, Japan, Australia and others are seeking to maintain control of the Indo-Pacific seas along with China’s rivals like India. Map 1The Belt And Road Program Until recently, Beijing proceeded carefully in order not to galvanize efforts to oppose its growing influence. It has only timidly begun establishing forward military bases abroad — namely in Djibouti, Africa — and its activity at key civilian ports such as Gwadar, Pakistan, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka, is developing only gradually. The creation of a new “maritime Silk Road” is a long, drawn-out affair. However, slowly but surely Beijing aims to lessen its vulnerability to the US at strategic chokepoints like Malacca and the Persian Gulf. The US and allies will respond — and this will generate geopolitical risk. Thus naval conflict is a persistent “Black Swan” risk. China’s chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region. Second comes the US-Iran conflict as it pertains to China. In response to US sanctions against Iran, China has had to increase its oil imports from Arab Gulf states. Beijing — inherently a continental power — is seeking overland routes of trade and investment to acquire Siberian, central Asian, and Middle Eastern resources, which cannot be interdicted by the US. Hence the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). US Still Limits China’s Middle East Options The BRI is the umbrella term for a process that began in the 2000s. China recycles its large current account surpluses into land and resources in the rest of Asia so as to maximize supply lines and diversify its savings away from US Treasurys (Chart 8). This is also a way for Beijing to export its industrial overcapacity, particularly in construction. This BRI process faces an important limitation in that Beijing’s current account surpluses have drastically declined (Chart 9). Even so, this decline will result in greater concentration on strategic targets. The Middle East is vital both because its energy could someday be accessed overland and because it could serve as an export market in itself. It could also become a way-station for greater trade to Europe and all of Eurasia. Chart 8China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys Chart 9China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments The instability of BRI countries delays China’s plans for regional investment, construction, transportation, and logistics. And China lacks the appetite for overseas political and military intervention necessary to shape the domestic environment in the relevant countries — especially given that the US remains the dominant power. China’s limited agency in Iraq is case in point. It is even severely limited in allied countries like Pakistan. And it has rocky relations with some of the key regional powers, such as Turkey. Chart 10 Yet the chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region and specifically its conflict with Iran. US foreign policy keeps Iran isolated and frequently forces China to impose sanctions. Since the Trump administration imposed “maximum pressure” on Iran, in May 2019, Beijing has drastically reduced oil imports and withdrawn from the $5 billion South Pars natural gas project (Chart 10). This was partly prompted by Washington’s use of secondary sanctions that threatened to cripple China’s leading tech companies for violating Iranian sanctions. Iran’s inability to open up to the outside world prevents China from fully executing its broader overland strategy. China is not yet capable of confronting Washington over Iran. The 2020 US election is therefore a critical juncture — the re-election of the Trump administration would likely prolong the current conflict with Iran. It is unlikely to lead to full-scale war, but that scenario cannot be fully ruled out given Trump’s lack of constraints in a second term. Whereas a new Democratic administration would almost certainly return to the Obama administration policy of détente with Iran, aimed at containing the country’s nuclear program in exchange for economic opening. Either way, Beijing faces a multi-year period in which it must prepare for US pressure on the high seas and possibly also in Iran. GCC’s Attraction To China The above considerations provide a clear reason for Beijing to deepen its relations with the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These states are increasingly attracted to China not only as an energy customer and investor but also as a provider of high-tech goods, arms, and telecom equipment that is necessary for their productivity and useful for their surveillance and repression of domestic dissent. Deepening its trade relationship with KSA via a meaningful equity position in Aramco would present the perfect opportunity for China to take a meaningful step toward establishing the yuan as a global reserve currency. If KSA and the other GCC states begin accepting yuan as payment for their oil and products, and they begin spending their yuan on Chinese-made goods and services, two-way trade could expand significantly and rapidly. The RMB doesn’t have to be fully convertible to USD or euros for that to happen. Such a yuan-trading bloc would encompass oil and refined products, natural gas and liquids, and goods and services made in the GCC and China. This bilateral trade would provide a base from which to build out the yuan as a global reserve currency. This would neither be a forced evolution nor a hurried one. It would naturally evolve, which would ensure its durability. The US may attempt to prevent China from gaining influence in this way, but that would require a concerted effort. And such an effort is not likely to develop until 2021 or 2022 at the earliest. It will depend on the US election outcome, the 2020-24 administration’s foreign policy, and US-China negotiations. Hence China’s evolving role is positive for its supply security as well as for the reform agendas of the Gulf Arab states as they attempt to shift away from oil dependency. The problem is that China cannot ultimately guarantee the stability of the Arab states while they reform. China and Europe are energy importers that require stability in the Mideast, while Russia and increasingly the US are energy producers that can take actions to destabilize the region — the US by partially withdrawing, Russia by reinserting itself. Chart 11US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East True, the US still broadly shares with China the desire for stable oil prices — but its growing energy independence gives it the ability to reduce its commitments, upset the status quo, and create power vacuums that are detrimental to stability until a new regional equilibrium is established. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have demonstrated this erratic tendency (Chart 11). Russia has gotten closer to China, but it also is regaining strategic influence in the Middle East and has an interest in keeping the region divided and unpredictable. This is advantageous for an oil exporter outside the region with direct overland access to the Chinese market, but not advantageous for China. The above situation encapsulates the Geopolitical Strategy theme of multipolarity, or great power competition. The Middle East is in transition and the US strategic deleveraging ensures there will not be a stable order in the near term. Chinese investment can increase the region’s economic diversification, productivity, and potential GDP. But China’s financial limitations, US foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and the region’s chronic instability will jeopardize those positive effects. Bottom Line: China’s influence in the Middle East is growing, particularly with the Gulf Arab states. However, this process exists within the context of competition with a number of other powers, ensuring that the Gulf Arab states still face extreme uncertainty and instability in attempting to reform. The US election is a critical juncture for US policy toward Iran and hence for the Mideast and China. While the US conflict with China will wax and wane across future administrations, the 2020 election will determine whether the US conflict with Iran gets better or worse in the next 1 – 3 years. Ultimately, we would expect the US to focus on pressuring China. But its latent strength in the Middle East is a tool for doing so. China’s growing role in the region will not ensure stability.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1High Anxiety: The Trade War and China’s Oil and Gas Supply Security, by Dr. Erica Downs, provides an excellent analysis of President Xi Jinping’s all-out drive to make China self-sufficient in oil and gas. It was published by Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy November 12, 2019. The drive toward oil and gas self-sufficiency is described in local media as a war, as Dr. Downs notes: “In August 2018, (China National Petroleum Corp.) leaders met to discuss Xi’s directive and agreed to launch a ‘major offensive war’ on domestic exploration and development to enhance national energy security.” 2 Please see Chinese state firms mull up to US$10 billion investment in Saudi oil giant Aramco’s IPO published by the South China Morning Post November 7, 2019. The article also notes the Russian Direct Investment Fund also is considering taking a stake in the IPO. 3 $2.27 trillion is the upper end of a range generated by Bank of America. Please see Some banks dealing with Saudi Aramco IPO say company may be worth $1.5 trillion or even less, published by The Japan Times November 4, 2019, for additional estimates from banks involved in the deal. 4 The company’s 658-page prospectus also details business risks including terrorism, the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, and market-related financial risks. Not included is the size of the float – presumably that will be sized based on bids received – and how much of it will be allocated to individuals vs. institutions, who will be bidding for shares from November 17th to the 28th, and from the 17th to Dec. 4, respectively, when the issue is expected to price. The shares could be trading on December 11, 2019, on the Saudi stock Exchange, the Tadawul. No mention is made of a listing on an international exchange – e.g., London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, New York. 5 Please see OPEC says Saudi gave assurances Aramco IPO won’t affect commitment to group deals published November 13, 2019, by uk.reuters.com. 6 Please see Glimpses of China’s energy future, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in September 2019. The Institute summarized CNPC’s 2050 outlook to derive these estimates. 7 Please see footnote 1 above. 8 Please see ضد الواسطة , an Arabic phrase meaning “Against Wasta,” a practice that roughly translates as reciprocity in formal and informal dealings. This Special Report was published November 16, 2017, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see China’s Great Game In The Middle East, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations in October. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

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Highlights The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. Feature There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.1 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”2 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”3 Chart II-1Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.4 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart II-1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart II-2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart II-2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart II-3). Chart II-3The Beijing Consensus Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead To Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. Diagram II-1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram II-1Trade War In A Bipolar World However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.5 The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.6 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart II-4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart II-4The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart II-5). This is for three reasons: Chart II-5Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.7 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. Diagram II-2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram II-2Trade War In A Multipolar World Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.8 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts II-1 and II-4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”9 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”10 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”11 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.12 Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.13 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart II-6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart II-7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart II-6The Allies Traded With Germany ... Chart II-7… Right Up To WWI   Chart II-8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart II-8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram II-2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart II-9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart II-9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart II-10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart II-11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing. Marko Papic Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group Footnotes 1   Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 2   Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3   See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017).  4  The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 5   Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 6   We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own.  7   See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 8   Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 9   See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 10   Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 11   Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 12  Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia.  13  See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.

Highlights Declining uncertainty over policy, stabilizing growth in China and improvements in international liquidity, all will allow global economic activity to pick up in the months ahead. A weak dollar will reinforce this positive economic outlook; investors should favor pro-cyclical currencies such as the AUD, NZD and SEK. Bond yields will rise and stocks will outperform bonds on a 12- to 18-month basis. Cyclical stocks are more attractive than defensives. European stocks will outperform U.S. equities and European financials will shine. Copper is a promising buy; stay long the silver-to-gold ratio. Feature The outlook for risk assets and bond yields hinges on global economic activity. The S&P 500 has hit a new high, but our BCA Equity Scorecard Indicator remains non-committal towards stocks (Chart I-1). If global economic activity improves, the Scorecard will begin to flash a clear buy signal, but if growth deteriorates, the indicator will point towards sell. Chart I-1Stocks Could Go Either Way Cautious optimism is in order. Politics, China, liquidity conditions and the dollar collectively will determine the global economic outlook. The liquidity backdrop has significantly improved, political uncertainty should recede and China will morph from a headwind to a modest tailwind. A weak dollar will indicate that the world is healing, and also will ease global financial conditions which will facilitate economic strength. We remain committed to a positive stance on equities on a 12- to 18-month horizon, and recommend below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. Cyclicals should outperform defensives, European banks offer an attractive tactical buying opportunity and European equities will outperform their U.S. counterparts. Heightened Risks… Chart I-2Risks To The Economy And Stocks Many domestic indicators overstate the intrinsic fragility in the U.S. The Duncan LEI, which is the ratio of consumer durable spending and residential and business investment to final sales, has flattened. Therefore, the S&P 500 looks vulnerable and real GDP may contract (Chart I-2). CEO confidence and small business capex intentions warn of a looming retrenchment in household income (Chart I-2, bottom two panels). If consumer spending weakens, then a recession will be unavoidable. As worrisome as these indicators may be, we previously discussed that the major debt imbalances that often precede U.S. recessions are absent,1 the rebound in housing starts and homebuilding confidence is inconsistent with a restrictive monetary stance,2 and pipeline inflationary pressures are absent.3 Instead, business confidence and the Duncan LEI have been eroded by heightened political uncertainty and weak global manufacturing and trade. … Meet Receding Policy Uncertainty … The two biggest sources of policy uncertainty affecting markets, the Sino-U.S. trade war and Brexit, are diminishing. However, the U.S. election will continue to lurk in the background. Chart I-3Weaker Brexit Support = No Hard Brexit Support Brexit Westminster and Britain’s Supreme Court have rebuked U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s threat of a “No-Deal” Brexit. Moreover, parliamentary support for his latest plan, which essentially keeps Northern Ireland’s economy within the EU, indicates that the probability of a “No-Deal” Brexit has collapsed to less than 5%. This assessment is reinforced by the delay of Brexit to January 31, 2020. An election is scheduled for December 12 and the chance of a new referendum to vet the deal is escalating. According to Matt Gertken, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist, an election does not increase the risk of a hard Brexit. Meanwhile, support for Brexit is near its lowest point since the June 2016 referendum (Chart I-3). Thus, a new plebiscite would not favor a “No Deal” Brexit. Sino-U.S. Trade War Chart I-4Why The Trade-War Ceasefire? The trade war truce will also greatly diminish economic uncertainty. Uncertainty created by the China-U.S. conflict accentuated the collapse in business confidence and capex intentions. The “phase one deal” announced earlier this month will likely materialize. The White House’s tactical retreat on trade is tied to U.S. President Donald Trump’s desire for a second term. He cannot risk inflicting further economic pain on his base of constituents.  Weekly earnings are decreasing for workers in swing states located in the industrial rust belt, especially in those areas that Trump carried in 2016 (Chart I-4). Those swing states are most affected by the slowdown in the global manufacturing and trade sectors. Beijing is also motivated to agree to truce due to its soft economy and deflationary pressures. An easing in trade uncertainty will be positive for the domestic economy. China’s willingness to replace Carrie Lam, the embattled Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and to withdraw the extradition bill at the heart of the protests confirms its eagerness to come to an agreement with the U.S. China’s readiness to make a deal is also made evident by its increasing imports of U.S. agricultural products (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Ultimately, the U.S. will not implement tariffs in December on $160 billion of Chinese shipments. Consequently, investors and businesses should become less concerned about the chances of a worsening trade war. Moreover, chances are growing of a decrease (but not a complete annulation) of the previously imposed U.S. tariffs on China. … And A Q1 2020 Acceleration In Global Growth Global economic activity will improve in Q1 2020 because the drag from China will dissipate and global liquidity conditions will improve. Many activity indicators increasingly reflect these fundamental supports. China China’s economy has reached a new low point: Q3 annual GDP growth is at a 27-year low of 6%, capital spending is weak, industrial production and profits show little life, the labor market is soft, and imports and exports continue to contract. However, a turn in policy has materialized, which will protect the domestic economy. Moreover, this summer’s Politburo and State Council statements showed an increased willingness to reflate the economy. The global economy will accelerate in Q1 2020. Credit creation has stabilized and monetary conditions have eased (Chart I-5). Faced with producer price inflation of -1.2% and employment PMIs of 47.3 and 48.2 in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, respectively, authorities have allowed the credit impulse to improve to 26% of GDP from a low of 23.8%. In accordance with this new policy direction, the drag from the shadow banking system’s contraction will slow considerably, thanks to a stabilization in both the growth rate of deposits of non-depository financial institutions and the issuance of bonds by small financial institutions. Additionally, the emission of local government bonds will accelerate. Beijing has also meaningfully eased fiscal policy, which is its preferred reflationary tool. Policymakers have cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP in the past two years. The marginal propensity of households to consume is trying to bottom (Chart I-5, bottom). If history is a guide, the acceleration in the rate of change of public-sector capex will fuel this turnaround in China’s marginal propensity to consume, and push up BCA’s China Activity Indicator (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Overlooked Chinese Improvements Chart I-6Public Investment Matters   Chart I-7A Bottom In Chinese Exports Growth? China’s economy is unlikely to bounce back as violently as in 2009, 2012 or 2016. Authorities are much more circumspect in their use of credit to reflate the economy than they were previously. Moreover, the regulatory environment will prevent a boom in the shadow banking system. Nonetheless, the fiscal push and the end of the decline in aggregate credit growth will allow the Chinese economy to stabilize and maybe pick up a bit. Therefore, China will move from a large headwind to a slight tailwind for global activity (Chart I-7, top panel). Mounting public capex also points toward a modest global recovery (Chart I-7, middle panel). Finally, the upturn in our Chinese reflation indicator, which incorporates both fiscal and monetary policy, points to a re-acceleration in U.S. capex intentions (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Global Liquidity Global liquidity conditions continue to improve and the global economy should soon respond within normal policy lags. 95% of central banks are loosening policy, which normally leads to an escalation in global activity (Chart I-8). The dominant central banks (the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan) will not tighten anytime soon. Inflation expectations in the U.S., the euro area and Japan stand at 1.9%, 1.1%, and 0.2%, respectively, well below levels consistent with a 2% inflation target. Moreover, U.S. core CPI has been perky, but both the ISM and the performance of transportation equities relative to utilities indicate that a deceleration in inflation is imminent (Chart I-9). Salaries are not yet inflationary either because U.S. real wages are growing in line with productivity (Chart I-9, bottom panel). In the euro area and Japan, realized core inflation remains at 1.0% and 0.5%, respectively, and supports the dovish message emanating from inflation expectations. Chart I-8Easier Global Policy Is Important Chart I-9If Inflation Peaks, The U.S. Economy Will Breath A Sigh Of Relief     Liquidity indicators are reflecting this accommodative policy setting. The growth of U.S. and European bank deposits has reaccelerated from 2.5% to 6%, a development linked to the exit of a soft patch (Chart I-10). Moreover, BCA’s U.S. Financial Liquidity Indicator is still moving higher and flashing a resurgence in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI), the ISM Manufacturing Index, commodity prices, and EM export prices (Chart I-11). Finally, U.S. and global excess money reinforce the message of BCA’s U.S. Financial liquidity Indicator (Chart I-12). Chart I-10Deposits Suggest The Worst Of The Slowdown Is Behind Us Chart I-11Continued Pick-Up In Financial Liquidity       The Fed will add to the supply of global liquidity by tackling the repo market’s seize-up. Depleting excess reserves and mounting financing needs among primary dealers resulted in the September surge in the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). The Fed announced three weeks ago it would buy $60 billion per month of T-Bills and T-Notes, which will lead to a climbing stock of excess reserves. Higher excess reserves create a weaker dollar, stronger EM currencies and firming global PMIs (Chart I-13). Ultimately, EM currency strength eases EM financial conditions, which supports global growth (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Excess Liquidity Is Accelerating Chart I-13U.S. Excess Reserves Will Grow Again   Borrowing activity in Advanced Economies is showing signs of life. Bank credit is already responding to the drop in global yields, and global corporate bond issuance in September 2019 rose to $434 billion. In the U.S., new issues of corporate bonds have also reaccelerated (Chart I-14). Global Growth Indicators Crucial indicators of global economic activity are picking up on this improving fundamental backdrop. The list includes: A sharp takeoff in the annualized three-month rate of change of capital goods orders in the U.S., the Eurozone and Japan (Chart I-15, top panel). Improvement in this indicator precedes progress in the annual growth rate of orders and in capex itself. Chart I-14Borrowers Are Responding To Easier Financial Conditions Chart I-15Some Green Shoots Are Coming Through Chart I-16Positive Market Signals A significant upturn in the Philly Fed, Empire State, and Richmond Fed manufacturing surveys for October, which sends a positive signal for the ISM Manufacturing Index (Chart I-15, second panel). Moreover, the new orders and employment components of these surveys indicate that cyclical sectors of the economy will recover and the recent deterioration in employment conditions will be fleeting. A rebound in BCA’s EM economic diffusion index, which incorporates 23 variables. Such an increase usually precedes inflections in global industrial production (Chart I-15, bottom panel). An acceleration – both in absolute and relative terms - in the annual appreciation of Taiwanese stocks. A strong and outperforming Taiwanese equity market is a harbinger of firmer PMIs (Chart I-16, top two panels). A solid performance of EM carry trades financed in yen, European luxury equities, and the relative performance of global semiconductors, materials and industrial stocks, which signal stronger global PMIs (Chart I-16, bottom three panels). Bottom Line: The global economy will accelerate in Q1 2020. A melting probability of a “No-Deal” Brexit and a truce in the Sino-U.S. trade war will allow global uncertainty to recede. Concurrently, China’s economic slowdown is ending and global liquidity conditions are improving. The Dollar As The Arbiter Of Growth Chart I-17The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The dollar faces potent headwinds. The greenback is a countercyclical currency; a business cycle upswing and a weak USD go hand in hand (Chart I-17). The tightness of this relationship results from a powerful feedback loop: weak growth boosts the dollar, but the dollar’s strength foments additional economic slowdown. Global liquidity and activity indicators signal a weaker dollar because they point toward an economic recovery. BCA’s U.S. Financial Liquidity Index, which foresaw a deceleration in the greenback’s rate of appreciation, is calling for an outright depreciation (Chart I-18, top panel). The expanding holdings of securities on U.S. commercial banks’ balance sheets (a key measure of liquidity) corroborates this message. According to a model based on the U.S., Eurozone, Japanese and Chinese broad money supply, the USD should significantly depreciate in the coming 12 months (Chart I-18, third panel). Finally, our EM Economic Diffusion Index validates pressures on the greenback, especially against commodity currencies (Chart I-18, bottom two panels). Chart I-18Liquidity And Growth Indicators Point To A Weaker Dollar Growth differentials support this picture. Late last year, the stimulating effect of President Trump’s tax cuts allowed the U.S. to temporarily diverge from a weak global economy, but the U.S. manufacturing sector is now succumbing to the global slowdown. Once global growth snaps back, the U.S. is likely to lag behind as fiscal policy is becoming more stimulative outside the U.S. than in the U.S. Based on historical delays, this will continue to hurt the dollar (Chart I-19, top panel). Finally, the European economy generally outperforms the U.S. when China reflates, especially if Beijing’s push lifts the growth rate of M1 relative to M2, a proxy for China’s aggregate marginal propensity to consume (Chart I-20). Europe’s greater cyclicality reflects is larger exposure to both trade and manufacturing compared with the U.S. Chart I-19A Global Growth Convergence Will Hurt The Dollar Chart I-20European Growth To Rise Vis-A-Vis The U.S.   The greenback is expensive and technically vulnerable, which compounds its cyclical risk. The trade-weighted dollar is at a 25% premium to its purchasing power parity equilibrium (PPP), an overvaluation comparable to its 1985 and 2002 peaks. Moreover, our Composite Technical Indicator is overextended and has formed a negative divergence with the price of the dollar (see page 54, Section III). Finally, speculators are massively long the U.S. Dollar Index (DXY). Balance-of-payment flows also flash a significant downside in the dollar (Chart I-21). The U.S. current account deficit stands at 2.5% of GDP, but it is widening in response to the dollar’s overvaluation and the White House’s expansive fiscal policy. Since 2011, foreign direct investments (FDI) have been the main driver of the dollar’s gyrations. Last year, net FDI surged in response to profit repatriations encouraged by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, while portfolio flows stayed in neutral territory. This regulatory change had a one-off impact and FDI will begin to dry out. Therefore, financing the widening current account deficit will become harder. Finally, after years in the red, net portfolio flows into Europe have turned positive (Chart I-21, bottom panel). The USD’s depreciation will ease global financial conditions and supports growth further. In this context, interest rate differentials are noteworthy. The two-year spread in real rates between the U.S. and the rest of the G-10 has fallen significantly since October 2018. Reversals in real rates herald a weaker dollar, especially when it faces valuation, technical and flow handicaps. Moreover, European five-year forward short rate expectations are near record lows. If global growth can stabilize, then the five-year forward one-month OIS will pick up, especially relative to the U.S. An uptick will boost the EUR/USD pair and hurt the dollar (Chart I-22). Chart I-21Balance-Of-Payments Dynamics Turning Against The USD Chart I-22Relative Long-Term Rate Expectations And The Euro   The three most pro-cyclical currencies in the G-10 – the AUD, NZD and SEK - strengthen the most when BCA’s Global LEI bottoms but global inflation slows (Chart I-23). The GBP will likely generate a much stronger-than-normal performance next year. Cable trades at a 22% discount to PPP. It is also 19% cheap versus short-term interest rate parity models. The absence of a “No-Deal” Brexit should allow these risk premia to dissipate and the pound to recover. The CAD is also more attractive than Chart I-23 implies. The loonie is trading 10% below its PPP, and the USD/CAD often lags the EUR/CAD, a pair that has broken down (Chart I-24). Chart I-23Currency Performance As A Function Of Growth And Inflation Chart I-24EUR/CAD Flashing A Bearish USD/CAD Signal Bottom Line: A rebound in the global manufacturing sector next year will hurt the USD. The dollar is particularly vulnerable because growth differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world have melted, the greenback is expensive, balance-of-payment dynamics are deteriorating and interest rate differentials are becoming less supportive. The USD’s depreciation will ease global financial conditions and supports growth further. Additional Investment Implications Bond Yields Have More Upside While the short-term outlook for bonds remains murky, the 12- to 18-month outlook is unambiguously bearish. The BCA Bond Valuation Index is still consistent with much higher U.S. yields in the next 12-18 months (see Section III, page 51). BCA’s Composite Technical Indicator for T-Notes is massively overbought and sentiment, as approximated by the Long-Term Interest Rates component of the ZEW survey, is overly bullish (Chart I-25). Thus, bonds represent an attractive cyclical sell. The Fed will not cut rates aggressively enough for bonds to ignore these valuation and technical risks. Treasurys have outperformed cash by 7.5% in the past year. Based on historical relationships, the Fed needs to cut rates to zero for bonds to beat cash in the coming 12 months (Chart I-26). After this week’s Fed cut to 1.75%, our base case is none to maybe one more rate cut. Chart I-25Sentiment Points To Yield Upside Chart I-26The Fed Must Cut To Zero For T-Notes To Outperform Cash Further   Bond yields will need a recession to move lower. The deviation of 10-year Treasury yields from their two-year moving average closely tracks the Swedish Economic Diffusion Index (Chart I-27, top panel). Sweden, a small, open economy highly levered to the global industrial cycle, is a good gauge of the global business cycle. The broad weakness in the Swedish economy is unlikely to worsen unless the global slowdown morphs into a deep recession. Even if global growth remains mediocre, Sweden’s Economic Diffusion Index will rise along with yields. The expansion in securities holdings of U.S. commercial banks and the stabilization in China’s credit flows both support this notion (Chart I-27, bottom panel). Financial market developments also point to higher yields. Sectors that typically capture the momentum in the global economy are perking up. For example, bottoms in the annual performance of European luxury equities or Taiwanese stocks have preceded increases in yields (Chart I-28). Chart I-27Yields Have Upside Chart I-28Key Financial Market Signals For Yields   Stocks Will Outperform Bonds Our conviction is strengthening that equities will outperform bonds. The total return of the stock-to-bond ratio has upside. BCA’s Global Economic and Financial Diffusion Index has rallied sharply, which often precedes an ascent in the stock-to-bond ratio, both in the U.S. and globally (Chart I-29). Bonds are much more expensive than stocks, therefore, only a recession will allow stocks to underperform in the coming 12 to 18 months. The environment is positive for equities. BCA’s Monetary Indicator is very elevated and our Composite Sentiment Indicator shows little complacency toward stocks among investors (see Section III, page 47). Finally, the strength in the U.S. Financial Liquidity Indicator supports the S&P 500’s returns (Chart I-30). Chart I-29Cyclical Indicators Argue In Favor Of Stocks Over Bonds Chart I-30Liquidity Tailwind For The S&P 500   A few market developments are noteworthy. 55.6% of the S&P 500’s constituents have reported Q3 earnings, and 74% of those firms are beating estimates. Moreover, the market is generously rewarding firms with the largest positive earnings surprises. Additionally, the Value Line Geometric Index is forming a reverse head-and-shoulder pattern, while the relative performance of the Russell 2000 has formed a double bottom (Chart I-31). The environment also favors cyclicals relative to defensive equities. By lifting bond yields, stronger economic activity leads to a contraction in the multiples of defensives relative to cyclicals. The latter’s earnings expectations respond more positively to reviving economic activity, which creates an offset to climbing discount rates. As a result, cyclicals often outperform defensives when the stock-to-bond ratio increases, or after Taiwanese equities gain momentum (Chart I-32). Chart I-31Improving Equity Market Dynamics Chart I-32Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives   Compared to other equity markets, the U.S. faces the most challenges. Our model forecasts a 3% annual drop in the S&P 500’s operating earnings in June 2020, and the deviation of U.S. equities from their 200-day moving average has greatly diverged from net earnings revisions (Chart I-33). U.S. equities have already discounted a turnaround in earnings. Moreover, the S&P 500’s margins have downside, a topic covered by BCA’s Chief Equity Strategist Anastasios Avgeriou.4 Our Composite Margin Proxy, Operating Margins Diffusion Index and Corporate Pricing Power Indicator all remain weak (Chart I-34). Downward pressure on margins will limit how rapidly earnings respond when a rebound in global economic activity lifts revenues. Finally, the S&P 500 trades at a historically elevated forward P/E ratio of 18.4, the MSCI EAFE trade at a much more reasonable 14-times forward earnings. Chart I-33Headwinds For U.S. Stocks Chart I-34Headwinds For U.S. Margins   The tech sector will also weigh on the performance of U.S. equities relative to international stocks. Tech stocks represent 22.5% of the U.S. benchmark, compared with 9.7% for the euro area. Anastasios recently argued that software spending has remained surprisingly resilient despite the global economic slowdown; it will likely lag spending on machinery and structures when the cycle picks up.5 Consequently, tech earnings will lag other traditional cyclical sectors. Moreover, tech multiples will suffer when the dollar depreciates and bond yields rise (Chart I-35). As high-growth stocks, tech equities derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows and their terminal value. Thus, tech multiples are highly sensitive to discount factors. Unaffected by those negatives, European equities will benefit most from the outperformance of stocks relative to bonds. A weak dollar will be the first positive for the common-currency returns of European equities. Valuations are the second tailwind. The risk premium for European equities is 300 basis points higher than for U.S. stocks. Moreover, U.S. margins will likely diminish relative to the Eurozone’s because of stronger unit labor costs in the U.S. Sector composition will also dictate the performance of European equities. Compared with the U.S., Europe is underweight tech and healthcare stocks, a defensive sector (Table I-1). Investors who favor Europe will also bet against these two sectors. Europe is a wager on the other cyclical sectors: materials, industrials, energy and financials. Chart I-35Tech P/Es Are At Risk Table I-1Europe Overweights The Correct Cyclicals   European financials are particularly attractive. Negative European yields are a major handicap for European financials, but this handicap is already reflected in their price. European banks trade at a price-to-book ratio of 0.6 versus 1.3 for the U.S. This discount should be narrowing, not widening. Yields are bottoming and European loan growth is contracting at a -2% annual rate relative to the U.S. versus -8.6% five years ago. Meanwhile, the annual rate of change of European deposits is in line with the U.S. The attraction of European banks comes from the outlook for their return on tangible equity. A model shows that three variables govern European banks’ ROE: German yields, Italian spreads and the momentum of the silver-to-gold ratio (SGR). German yields impact net interest margins, Italian spreads drive peripheral financial conditions and thus, loan generation in the European periphery, and the SGR tracks the global manufacturing cycle (silver has more industrial uses than gold, but is equally sensitive to real yields), which affects loan flows in the European core. This model logically tracks the performance of European banks and financials (Chart I-36). Our positive outlook on global growth and yields, along with the fall in Italian spreads, augurs well for cheap European financial equities and banks in particular. Commodities Our constructive stance on the global business cycle and yields, plus our negative view on the greenback, is consistent with higher industrial commodity prices. Copper looks particularly attractive. Speculators are aggressively selling the metal, whose price stands at an important technical juncture (Chart I-37). Chart I-36The Drivers Of RoE Point To Higher European Bank Stock Prices Chart I-37Cooper Is An Attractive Play On Global Growth   Chart I-38Favorable Technical Backdrop For Silver-To-Gold Ratio Finally, we have favored the SGR since late June. Silver is deeply oversold and under-owned relative to the yellow metal (Chart I-38). Consequently, silver’s greater industrial usage should be a potent tailwind for the SGR.6 Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst October 31, 2019 Next Report: November 22, 2019 - Outlook 2020   II. Back To The Nineteenth Century The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.7 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. The U.S.-China conflict will not lead to complete bifurcation of the global economy. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”8 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”9 Chart II-1Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.10 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart II-1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. In a multipolar world, the U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart II-2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart II-2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart II-3). Chart II-3The Beijing Consensus Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead To Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. Diagram II-1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram II-1Trade War In A Bipolar World However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.11 History teaches us that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime. The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.12 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart II-4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart II-4The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart II-5). This is for three reasons: Chart II-5Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.13 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. Diagram II-2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram II-2Trade War In A Multipolar World Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.14 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts II-1 and II-4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”15 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”16 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”17 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.18 Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.19 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart II-6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart II-7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart II-6The Allies Traded With Germany ... Chart II-7… Right Up To WWI   Chart II-8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart II-8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram II-2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart II-9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart II-9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart II-10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart II-11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing. Marko Papic Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group III. Indicators And Reference Charts The S&P 500 is making marginally new all-time highs. Seasonality is becoming very favorable for stock prices. However, our U.S. profit model continues to point south and expanding multiples have already driven this year’s equity gains. The S&P 500 has therefore already priced in a significant improvement in profits. Further P/E expansion will be harder to come by with bond yields set to rise. Thus, until the dollar falls and creates another tailwind for profits, stocks will not be as strong as seasonality suggests and will only make marginal new highs. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) remains cautious towards equities. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive readings from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if strong market momentum is not supported by valuations and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Until global growth bottoms and boosts the earnings forecasts of our models, stock gains will stay limited. The outlook for next year remains constructive for stocks. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. continues to improve. This same indicator has recently turned lower in Japan. Meanwhile, it is deteriorating further in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Global yields have turned higher but they remain at exceptionally stimulating levels. Moreover, money and liquidity growth has picked up around the world, and global central banks continue to conduct very dovish policies. As a result, our Monetary Indicator remains at extremely elevated levels. Furthermore, our Composite Technical Indicator is still flashing a buy signal. Also, our BCA Composite Valuation index is still improving. As a result, our Speculation Indicator is back in the neutral zone. 10-year Treasury yields continue to rise, but they remain very expensive. Moreover, both our Bond Valuation Index and our Composite Technical Indicators are still flashing high-conviction sell signals. If the strengthening of the Commodity Index Advance/Decline line results in higher natural resource prices, then, inflation breakevens will also climb meaningfully. Therefore, the current setup argues for a below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. Weak global growth has been the key support for the dollar in recent months. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar remains extremely expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator has lost momentum and has formed a negative divergence with the Greenback’s level. Moreover, the U.S. current account deficit has begun to widen anew. This backdrop makes the dollar highly vulnerable to a rebound in global growth. In fact, a breakdown in the greenback will be the clearest signal yet that global growth is rebounding for good. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-23Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1   Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "September 2019," dated August 29, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2019," dated May 30, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2019," dated July 25, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4   Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report "Peak Margins," dated October 7, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 5   Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Follow The Profit Trail," dated October 15, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 6   Please see Foreign  Exchange Strategy Weekly Report "On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver," dated October 11, 2019, available on fes.bcaresearch.com 7   Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 8   Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 9   See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017).  10  The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 11   Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 12   We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own.  13   See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 14   Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 15   See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 16   Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 17   Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 18  Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia.  19  See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.

Highlights The U.S. and China are moving toward formalizing a trade ceasefire that reduces geopolitical risk in the near term. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is finished – removing a major downside to European assets. Spanish elections reinforce our narrative of general European political stability. Go long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Geopolitical risks will remain elevated in Turkey, rise in Russia, but remain subdued in Brazil. A post-mortem of Canada’s election suggests upside to fiscal spending but further downside to energy sector investment over the short to medium term. Feature After a brief spike in trade war-related geopolitical risk just prior to the resumption of U.S.-China negotiations, President Trump staged a tactical retreat in the trade war. Chart 1Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Negotiating in Washington, President Trump personally visited the top Chinese negotiator Liu He and the two sides announced an informal “phase one deal” to reverse the summer’s escalation in tensions: China will buy $40-$50 billion in U.S. agricultural goods while the U.S. will delay the October 15 tariff hike. More difficult issues – forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, industrial subsidies – were punted to later. The RMB is up 0.7% and our own measures of trade war-related risk have dropped off sharply (Chart 1). We think these indicators will be confirmed and Trump’s retreat will continue – as long as he has a chance to save the 2020 economic outlook and his reelection campaign. Odds are low that Trump will be removed from office by a Republican-controlled senate – the looming election provides the republic with an obvious recourse for Trump’s alleged misdeeds. However, Trump’s approval rating is headed south. While it is around the same level as President Obama’s at this point in his first term, Obama’s started a steep and steady rise around now and ended above 50% for the election, a level that is difficult to foresee for Trump (Chart 2). So Trump desperately needs an economic boost and a policy victory to push up his numbers. Short of passing the USMCA, which is in the hands of the House Democrats, a deal with China is the only way to get a major economic and political win at the same time. Hence the odds of Presidents Trump and Xi actually signing some kind of agreement are the highest they have been since April (when we had them pegged at 50/50). Trump will have to delay the December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some of the tariffs over next year as continuing talks “make progress,” though we doubt he will remove restrictions on tech companies like Huawei. Still, we strongly believe that what is coming is a détente rather than the conclusion of the Sino-American rivalry crowned with a Bilateral Trade Agreement. Strategic tensions are rising on a secular basis between the two countries. These tensions could still nix Trump’s flagrantly short-term deal-making, and they virtually ensure that some form of trade war will resume in 2021 or 2022, if indeed a ceasefire is maintained in 2020. Both sides are willing to reduce immediate economic pain but neither side wants to lose face politically. Trump will not forge a “grand compromise.” Our highest conviction view all along has been – and remains – that Trump will not forge a “grand compromise” ushering in a new period of U.S.-China economic reengagement in the medium or long term. China’s compliance, its implementation of structural changes, will be slow or lacking and difficult to verify at least until the 2020 verdict is in. This means policy uncertainty will linger and business confidence and capex intentions will only improve on the margin, not skyrocket upward (Chart 3). Chart 2Trump Needs A Policy Win And Economic Boost Chart 3Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat The problem for bullish investors is that even if global trade uncertainty falls, and the dollar’s strength eases, fear will shift from geopolitics to politics, and from international equities to American equities (Chart 4). Trump, hit by impeachment and an explosive reaction to his Syria policy, is entering into dangerous territory for the 2020 race. Trump’s domestic weakness threatens imminent equity volatility for two reasons. Chart 4American Outperformance Falls With Trade Tensions Chart 5Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative First, if Trump’s approval rating falls below today’s 42%, investors will begin pricing a Democratic victory in 2020, i.e. higher domestic policy uncertainty, higher taxes, and the re-regulation of the American economy (Chart 5). This re-rating may be temporarily delayed or mitigated by the fact that former Vice President Joe Biden is still leading the Democratic Party’s primary election race. Biden is a known quantity whose policies would simply restore the Obama-era status quo, which is only marginally market-negative. Contrary to our expectations Biden's polling has not broken down due to accusations of foul play in Ukraine and China. Nevertheless, Senator Elizabeth Warren will gradually suck votes away from fellow progressive Senator Bernie Sanders and in doing so remain neck-and-neck with Biden (Chart 6). When and if she pulls ahead of Biden, markets face a much greater negative catalyst. (Yes, she is also capable of beating Trump, especially if his polling remains as weak as it is.) Chart 6Warren Will Rise To Front-Runner Status With Biden Second, if Trump becomes a “lame duck” he will eventually reverse the trade retreat above and turn into a loose cannon in his final months in office. Right now we see a decline in geopolitical risk, but if the economy fails to rebound or the China ceasefire offers little support, then Trump will at some point conclude that his only chance at reelection is to double down on his confrontation with America’s enemies and run as a “war president.” A cold war crisis with China, or a military confrontation with Iran (or North Korea, Venezuela, or some unexpected target) could occur. But since September we have been confirmed in believing that Trump is trying to be the dealmaker one last time before any shift to the war president. Bottom Line: The “phase one” trade deal is really just a short-term ceasefire. Assuming it is signed by Trump and Xi, it suggests no increase in tariffs and some tariff rollback next year. However, as recessionary fears fade, and if Trump’s reelection chances stabilize, U.S.-China tensions on a range of issues will revive – and there is no getting around the longer-term conflict between the two powers. For this and other reasons, we remain strategically short RMB-USD, as the flimsy ceasefire will only briefly see RMB appreciation. BoJo's Brexit Bluff Is Finished Our U.K. indicator captured a sharp decline in political risk in the past two weeks and our continental European indicators mirrored this move (Chart 7). The risk that the U.K. would fall out of the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed even further than in September, when parliament rejected Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s no-deal gambit and we went long GBP-USD. We have since added a long GBP-JPY trade. Chart 7Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Chart 8Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This The risk of “no deal” is the only reason to care about Brexit from a macro point of view, as the difference between “soft Brexit” and “no Brexit” is not globally relevant. What matters is the threat of a supply-side shock to Europe when it is already on the verge of recession. With this risk removed, sentiment can begin to recover (and Trump’s trade retreat also confirms our base case that he will not impose tariffs on European cars on November 14). Since Brexit was the only major remaining European political risk, European policy uncertainty will continue to fall. The Halloween deadline was averted because the EU, on the brink of recession, offered a surprising concession to Johnson, enabling him to agree to a deal and put it up for a vote in parliament. The deal consists of keeping Northern Ireland in the European Customs Union but not the whole of the U.K., effectively drawing a new soft border at the Irish Sea. The bill passed the second reading but parliament paused before finalizing it, rejecting Johnson’s rapid three-day time table. The takeaway is that even if an impending election returns Johnson to power, he will seek to pass his deal rather than pull the U.K. out without a deal. This further lowers the odds of a no-deal Brexit as it illuminates Johnson's preferences, which are normally hidden from objective analysis. True, there is a chance that the no-deal option will reemerge if Johnson’s deal totally collapses due to parliamentary amendments, or if the U.K. and EU have failed to agree to a future relationship by the end of the transition period on December 31, 2020 (which can be extended until the end of 2022). However, the chance is well below the 30% which we deemed as the peak risk of no-deal back in August. Johnson created the most credible threat of a no-deal exit that we are likely to see in our lifetimes – a government with authority over foreign policy determined to execute the outcome of a popular referendum – and yet parliament stopped it dead in its tracks. Johnson does not want a no-deal recession and his successors will not want one either. After all, the support for Brexit and for the Tories has generally declined since the referendum, and the Tories are making a comeback on the prospect of an orderly Brexit (Chart 8). All eyes will now turn toward the impending election. Opinion polls still show that Johnson is likely to be returned to power (Chart 9). The Tories have a prospect of engrossing the pro-Brexit vote while the anti-Brexit opposition stands divided. No-deal risk only reemerges if the Conservatives are returned to power with another weak coalition that paralyzes parliament. Chart 9Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Chart 10Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Whatever the election result, we maintain our long-held position that Brexit portends greater fiscal largesse (Chart 10). The agitated swath of England that drove the referendum result will not be assuaged by leaving the European Union – the rewards of Brexit are not material but philosophical, so material grievances will return. Voter frustration will rotate from the EU to domestic political elites. Voters will demand more government support for social concerns. Johnson’s own government confirms this point through its budget proposals. A Labour-led government would oversee an even more dramatic fiscal shift. Our GeoRisk indicator will fall on Brexit improvements but the question of the election and next government will ensure it does not fall too far. Our long GBP trades are tactical and we expect volatility to remain elevated. But the greatest risk, of no deal, is finished, so it does make sense for investors with a long time horizon to go strategically long the pound. The greatest risk, of a no deal Brexit, is finished. Bottom Line: Brexit posed a risk to the global economy only insofar as it proved disorderly. A withdrawal agreement by definition smooths the process. Continental Europe will not suffer a further shock to net exports. The Brexit contribution to global policy uncertainty will abate. The pound will rise against the euro and yen and even against the dollar as long as Trump’s trade retreat continues. Spain: Further Evidence Of European Stability We have long argued that the majority of Catalans do not want independence, but rather a renegotiation of the region's relationship with Spain (Chart 11). This month’s protests in Barcelona following the Catalan independence leaders’ sentencing are at the lower historical range in terms of size – protest participation peaked in 2015 along with support for independence (Table 1). Table 1October Catalan Protests Unimpressive Our Spanish risk indicator is showing a decline in political risk (Chart 12). However, we believe that this fall is slightly overstated. While the Catalan independence movement is losing its momentum, the ongoing protests are having an impact on seat projections for the upcoming election.  Chart 11Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Chart 12Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Since the April election, the right-wing bloc of the People’s Party, Ciudadanos, and Vox has been gaining in the seat projections at the expense of the Socialist Party and Podemos. Over the course of the protests, the left-wing parties’ lead over the right-wing parties has narrowed from seven seats to one (Chart 13). If this momentum continues, a change of government from left-wing to right-wing becomes likely. However, a right-wing government is not a market-negative outcome, and any increase in risk on this sort of election surprise would be short-lived. The People’s Party has moderated its message and focused on the economy. Besides pledging to limit the personal tax rate to 40% and corporate tax rate to 20%, the People’s Party platform supports innovation, R&D spending, and startups. The party is promising tax breaks and easier immigration rules to firms and employees pursuing these objectives. Chart 13Spanish Right-Wing Parties Narrow Gap With Left Another outcome of the election would be a governing deal between PSOE and Podemos, along with case-by-case support from Ciudadanos. After a shift to the right lost Ciudadanos 5% in support since the April election, leader Albert Rivera announced in early October that he would be lifting the “veto” on working with the Socialist Party. If the right-wing parties fall short of a majority, then Rivera would be open to talks with Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez. A governing deal between PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos would have 175 seats, as of the latest projections, which is just one seat short of a majority. As we go to press, this is the only outcome that would end Spain’s current political gridlock, and would therefore be the most market-positive outcome. Bottom Line: Despite having a fourth election in as many years, Spanish political risk is contained. This is reinforced by a relatively politically stable backdrop in continental Europe, and marginally positive developments in the U.K. and on the trade front. We remain long European versus U.S. technology, and long EU versus Chinese equities. We will also be looking to go long EUR/USD when and if the global hard data turn. Following our European Investment Strategy, we recommend going long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Turkey, Brazil, And Russia Chart 14Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkey’s political risk skyrocketed upward after we issued our warning in September (Chart 14). We maintain that the Trump-Erdogan personal relationship is not a basis for optimism regarding Turkey’s evading U.S. sanctions. Both chambers of the U.S. Congress are preparing a more stringent set of sanctions, focusing on the Turkish military, in the wake of Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from northeast Syria. At a time when Trump needs allies in the senate to defend him against eventual impeachment articles, he is not likely to veto and risk an override. Moreover, Turkey’s military incursion into Syria, which may wax and wane, stems from economic and political weakness at home and will eventually exacerbate that weakness by fueling the growing opposition to Erdogan’s administration and requiring more unorthodox monetary and fiscal accommodation. It reinforces our bearish outlook on Turkish lira and assets. Chart 15Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazil’s political risk has rebounded (Chart 15). The Senate has virtually passed the pension reform bill, as expected, which raises the official retirement age for men and women to 65 and 63 respectively. This will generate upwards of 800 billion Brazilian real in savings to improve the public debt profile. Of course, the country will still run primary deficits and thus the public debt-to-GDP ratio will still rise. Now the question shifts to President Jair Bolsonaro and his governing coalition. Bolsonaro’s approval rating has ticked up as we expected (Chart 16). If this continues then it is bullish for Brazil because it suggests that he will be able to keep his coalition together. But investors should not get ahead of themselves. Bolsonaro is not an inherently pro-market leader, there is no guarantee that he will remain disciplined in pursuing pro-productivity reforms, and there is a substantial risk that his coalition will fray without pension reform as a shared goal (at least until markets riot and push the coalition back together). Therefore we expect political risk to abate only temporarily, if at all, before new trouble emerges. Furthermore, if reform momentum wanes next year, then Brazil’s reform story as a whole will falter, since electoral considerations emerge in 2021-22. Hence it will be important to verify that policymakers make progress on reforms to tax and trade policy early next year. Our Russian geopolitical risk indicator is also lifting off of its bottom (see Appendix). This makes sense given Russia’s expanding strategic role (particularly in the Middle East), its domestic political troubles, and the risks of the U.S. election. The latter is especially significant given the risk (not our base case, however) that a Democratic administration could take a significantly more aggressive posture toward Russia. Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Bottom Line: Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Russia is a candidate for a “black swan” event, given the eerie quiet that has prevailed as Putin devotes his fourth term to reducing domestic political instability. Brazil, on the other hand, has a 12-month window in which reform momentum can be reinforced, reducing whatever spike in risk occurs in the aftermath of the ruling coalition’s completion of pension reform. Canada: Election Post-Mortem Prime Minister Justin Trudeau returned to power at the head of a minority government in Canada’s federal election (Chart 17). The New Democratic Party (NDP) lost 15 seats from the last election, but will have a greater role in parliament as the Liberals will need its support to pass key agenda items (and a formal governing coalition is possible). The NDP’s result would have been even worse if not for its last-minute surge in the polls after the election debates and Trudeau’s “blackface” scandal. Chart 17Liberals Need The New Democrats Now The Conservative Party won the popular vote but only 121 seats in parliament, leaving the western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan aggrieved. The Bloc Québécois, the Quebec nationalist party, gained 22 seats to become the third-largest party in the House. Energy investment faces headwinds in the near-term. The Liberal Party will face resistance from the Left over the Trans Mountain pipeline. Trudeau will not necessarily have to sacrifice the pipeline to appease the NDP. He may be able to work with Conservatives to advance the pipeline while working with the NDP on the rest of his agenda. But on the whole the election result is the worst-case scenario for the oil sector and political questions will have to be resolved before Canada can take advantage of its position as a heavy crude producer near the U.S. Gulf refineries in an era in which Venezuela is collapsing and Saudi Arabia is exposed to geopolitical risk and attacks. More broadly, the Liberals will continue to endorse a more expansive fiscal policy than expected, given Canada’s low budget deficits and the need to prevent minor parties from eating away at the Liberal Party’s seat count in future. Bottom Line: The Liberal Party failed to maintain its single-party majority. Trudeau’s reliance on left-wing parties in parliament may prove market-negative for the Canadian energy sector, though that is not a forgone conclusion. Over the longer term the sector has a brighter future.   Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Appendix GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

特別レポート

ハイライト 冷戦は米中対立の限定的な類推に過ぎない; 多極化する世界では、貿易の完全な二分化は困難、いや不可能に近い; 歴史は、ライバル同士の貿易は最小限の障害しかなく継続すると示唆している; 長期的には、防衛株、欧州、キャップエックス、非同盟国を買う。 特集 中国と米国が冷戦へ突き進んでいるという見方が強まっている。BCA Researchは、少なくとも投資コミュニティに関しては、この合意形成に一役買った — 2012年9月に「Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?」を掲載したことである。1 この10年の大部分において、ジオポリティカル・ストラテジーは地政学リスクがますます無関係になりつつある中東から、ますます重要性を増すであろう東アジアへと回帰しているという説に焦点を当ててきた。 この仮説はなお示唆に富むが、それが必ずしも「シリコン・カーテン」が世界を二つの分断された資本主義圏に分けることを意味するわけではない。貿易、資本フロー、人の交流は中国と米国の間で継続し、場合によっては拡大するだろう。しかし、軍事的なものを含む紛争のリスクは低下しない。 本報告では、まず米中緊張の背後にある地政学的論理を概観する。次に、貿易および経済関係の観点から両国の関係がどのように展開するかに関する手がかりを得るために学術文献を精査する。政治理論からの証拠は意外であり、投資に極めて関連性が高い。その後、投資家にとって意味するところを探るために歴史を遡る。 結論として、米国と中国が地政学的ライバルであり続ける可能性が高いと考える。ただし、多極化という地政学的文脈のために、結果として「分断された資本主義」が生じるとは考えにくい。むしろ、地政学が評価、モメンタム、ファンダメンタルズ、マクロ経済と並んで投資機会とリスクを決定する要因群の歴史的な位置を占める、刺激的で変動の大きい環境が投資家を待ち受けると予想する。 トゥキディデスの罠は現実である … 1897年にライヒスタークで演説したドイツの外相ベルンハルト・フォン・ビューローは、ドイツが「太陽の下での自らの場所」を要求すべき時であると宣言した。2 これは東アジアに対するドイツの政策を巡る討議の場であった。ビューローは間もなくカイザー・ヴィルヘルム2世の下で首相に就き、ドイツ外交政策をリアルポリティークからヴェルトポリティークへと進化させる過程を監督した。リアルポリティークがビスマルク首相下で慎重に列強の均衡を保つ姿勢を特徴としたのに対し、ヴェルトポリティークはビューローとヴィルヘルム2世が攻撃的な外交・貿易政策を通じて現状を書き換えようとした。 帝政ドイツは、アテネから現代の中華人民共和国に至るまでの敵対者の長いリストに加わり、人類史の悲劇的な劇とも呼べる「トゥキディデスの罠」に名を連ねた。3 Chart 1 帝国の過剰拡張 帝国の過剰拡張 帝国の過剰拡張 この基本概念は世界史を学ぶ者にはよく知られている。その名はギリシャの歴史家トゥキディデスと彼の代表作History of the Peloponnesian Warに由来する。トゥキディデスはなぜスパルタとアテネが戦争に至ったのかを説明するが、同時代の他者のように道徳化したり神々を非難したりはしない。むしろ、改革を志向するアテネと既存勢力であるスパルタの対立が不信の連鎖によって不可避になったことを冷静に描写している。 米国の国際関係論を代表する学者の一人、グラハム・アリソンは、現状勢力と挑戦者の相互作用はほとんど常に紛争を導いたと主張している。彼が調査した16例のうち12例で実際の軍事衝突が発生した。戦争に至らなかった4例のうち3例は、深い文化的親和性と既存の制度への尊重を共有する国間の移行を伴っていた。4 これらのケースでは、移行は新しい経営陣がほぼ同じ組織構造を運営するようなものだった。そして、戦争に至らなかった4例のうちの一つはまさにソ連と米国の冷戦であった。 現状勢力にとって根本的な問題は、その帝国または「勢力圏」が最盛期と同じ大きさのままである点にある。しかし、相対的な衰退は古典的な「帝国の過剰拡張」の問題を引き起こす。覇権的または帝国的な勢力は、もはや維持できない現状を誤って固持しようとする（Chart 1）。 挑戦者側も責めを免れない。挑戦者は覇権国の弱さを感じ取り、地域的な勢力圏を形成し始める。問題は、地域覇権が世界的覇権への跳躍台になり得る点だ。挑戦者の意図が限定的で抑制的であったとしても（しばしば野心的で横柄であるが）、現状勢力は意図ではなく能力に反応せざるを得ない。能力は物質的かつ実在のものであるのに対し、意図は認知された一時的なものである。 挑戦者には常にその野心を正当化する内的論理がある。中国の場合、今日のエリートの間には国家が長い歴史の多くの世紀にわたってあったあり方へ単に平均回帰しているにすぎないという感覚がある（Chart 2）。言い換えれば、中国は過去300年を現状と定義するならば「挑戦者」だが、もっと昔に遡れば「既存」の強国である。したがって、中国の合意形成では、現代の状況は西洋の帝国主義による既存の中国および地域秩序への「挑戦」の結果に過ぎないため、現状に対して従属すべきではないとされる。 Chart 2 中国の平均回帰的な物語 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 加えて、中国は少なくとも米国と同等に世界経済にとって重要であり、したがって国際ガバナンスにおいてより大きな発言権に値するという正当な主張を持っている。米国がなお世界経済のより大きなシェアを占めている一方で、中国は過去20年で世界の増分GDPに対して23％を寄与しており、米国の13％と比べて大きい（Chart 3）。 Chart 3 北京コンセンサス 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 結論： 中国と米国の間で顕在化している緊張は、トゥキディデスの罠の理論的かつ実証的な枠組みにきれいに当てはまる。我々は、両国が世俗的または予測可能な範囲で闘争と対立を回避する方法はないと見ている。 では、投資家にとって何を意味するか。ひとつには、防衛株の背後にある長期的な追い風は持続するだろう。しかしそれ以外は？ 世界経済は完全に二分化され、シリコン・カーテンで隔てられた二つの軍事陣営に分かれる運命にあるのか？ アリババとアマゾンの協定は、冷戦時代のNATOとワルシャワ条約機構のように互いに疑いのまなざしを向け合うのか？ 答えは、慎重に言えば、否である。 …しかし経済の二分化には至らない トランプ大統領の強硬な通商政策も、ある程度までは政治理論に整合する。 政治学におけるリアリズムは、貿易を含むすべての関係において絶対利得より相対利得に焦点を当てる。なぜなら、貿易は経済的繁栄をもたらし、繁栄は経済剰余の蓄積へ、経済剰余は軍事費、研究開発へとつながるからである。競争を重視し相対利得のみを気にする国家同士はゼロサムゲームを生み出し、協力の余地はなくなる。これは協力を選ばないことで両側が非最適な経済結果を招く「囚人のジレンマ」である。 米中対立は世界経済の完全な二分化をもたらさないだろう。 図表1は、国家の貿易行動に対する相対利得計算の影響を示している。地政学が存在しない場合、需要（Q3）は国内生産（Q0）がそれを満たせないため、貿易（Q3-Q0）によって満たされる。 Diagram 1 双極世界における貿易戦争 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る しかし、地政学的外部性—すなわち他国とのライバル関係—は輸入の限界的社会コストを引き上げる。すなわち貿易はライバルにより多くの利得を与え、地政学的能力の面で「追いつかせる」。したがって、貿易する国家はこの外部性を関税（t）で除去し、国内生産をQ1へ引き上げ、需要をQ2へ縮小させ、輸入を（Q2-Q1）のみに削減する。これは地政学が問題とならない世界での水準の一部にすぎない。 相対利得の力学は、弱まって再考を迫られる覇権国にも強く作用する。政治学者ダンカン・スナイダルは1991年の論文で次のように論じた。 世界システムが初めて構築されるとき、覇権国は小国と取引を行う。覇権国は絶対利得をより重視し、小国は相対利得をより重視するため交渉は厳しくなる。小国を有利にする協力体制は相対的な覇権の衰退に寄与する。利益の不均等配分が小国の追いつきを助けると同時に、小国が覇権国に対して相対利得の重みを下げることになる。同時に相対的優越の低下は覇権国の他国、特に台頭する挑戦者に対する相対利得への関心を高める。結果として最大の行為者から既存システムを変えて協力利益のより大きなシェアを得ようとする圧力が増す。5 小国が当初相対利得をより気にする理由は、覇権国よりも国の安全保障に対してはるかに敏感だからだ。覇権国は力の優位性を持ち、安全保障に対して比較的余裕がある。これが、ジョージ・ブッシュ（父）、ビル・クリントン、ジョージ・ブッシュ（子）がいずれも「誤った取引」を中国と行った理由を説明する。 スナイダルは30年近く前に、この米中貿易戦争を的確に描写した。彼は来たる無秩序の十年を記述していると思っていた。しかし彼と同時代の政治学者たちは米国の力を過小評価していた。アメリカの覇権の「一極の瞬間」は終わったのではなく、始まっていただけだった！ したがって、スナイダルが描いた力学は実を結ぶまでに30年を要した。 米国の覇権からの移行を考えるとき、多くの投資家は冷戦にアンカーを置く。冷戦は彼らが知る非一極的世界の唯一の例であり、単純な双極の力配分はゲーム理論で容易にモデル化できるからだ。もし我々がこれから住む世界が米国と中国が米ソのように地球全体を勢力圏に分ける世界ならば、スナイダルの論文から抜き出した段落が結末になるだろう。アメリカはグローバリゼーションを完全に放棄し、中国の周囲に厳しいシリコン・カーテンを敷き、同盟国にそれに従うことを強制するだろう。 しかし、近代史の大部分は双極ではなく多極の勢力配分によって定義されてきた。用語としての「冷戦」は、軍事力の比較的均衡が全面的な「熱戦」を防ぐ可能性があるという意味で米中に適用できる。しかし最終的に、米ソ冷戦は今日の世界に対する貧弱な類推に過ぎない。スナイダルは結論として、「協力しない国家は、互いに協力する他の相対利得最大化者に遅れをとる。これは、ライバルが多国間で協力している場合、協力こそが最良の防御（および最良の攻撃）となる」と述べている。彼はプレイヤー数が2から増えるにつれて相対利得感受性が急速に低下することを形式的モデルで示している。6 米中関係は真空中で起きているわけではなく、世界的文脈によって緩和される。今日の世界的文脈は多極化である。多極化とは、地政学的な力の配分がもはや一つか二つの大国に支配されていないことを指す（Chart 4）。例えば欧州や日本は強力な経済力と軍事能力を有している。ロシアは依然として強力な軍事大国であり、一方でインドは総合的な地政学的力の面でロシアを上回りつつある。 Chart 4 世界はもはや二極ではない 世界はもはや二極化していない 世界はもはや二極化していない 多極化した世界は最も「秩序だっていない」そして最も不安定な世界システムである（Chart 5）。理由は三つである： Chart 5 多極化は混沌としている 多極化は混沌としている 多極化は混沌としている 数学的観点: 多極化は紛争につながり得る潜在的な「紛争ダイアド」をより多く生む。単極の世界では規範と行動規則を決める国は一つだけである。紛争は可能だが、それは覇権国が望む場合に限られる。双極世界では紛争は可能だが、それは二つの支配的勢力の軸に沿わなければならない。多極世界では同盟は常に移り変わり、新たな紛争ダイアドを生む。 調整の欠如: 多極化の時期には「拒否権プレイヤー」が増えるため、世界的な調整が損なわれる。これは攻勢的な改革勢力が武力を使う場合や世界が経済危機に直面する場合など、ストレスの高い時期に特に問題となる。チャールズ・キンドルバーガーは、覇権の不安定性がまさに大恐慌を第二次世界大戦へと陥らせたと指摘している。7 誤算: 単極・双極世界では同時に振られるサイコロの数が非常に限られているため、悲劇的な誤算の確率は低く、複雑な正式関係（例えばゲーム理論に基づく米ソの相互確証破壊）があれば軽減できる。しかし多極世界では、要人の暗殺のようなランダムな出来事が世界大戦の引き金になることがある。多極システムははるかに動的であり、したがって予測不可能である。 多極化した世界では、米国は中国を国際システムから排除することはできない。 図表2は多極化した世界に合わせて修正したものだ。すべては同じだが、我々は他の大国に失われる貿易を強調している。ライバルとの貿易に関する限界的社会コストを下げるために関税を用いることを検討する国家は、この「失われた貿易」を考慮しなければならない。今日の中国との貿易戦争の文脈では、これは欧州のすべてのエアバスやブラジル産大豆が米国の輸出の代わりに中国に販売される分の総和となる。中国にとっては、アジアの残りから生産され米国に出荷されるすべての機械、電子機器、資本財の総和である。 Diagram 2 多極世界における貿易戦争 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る ワシントンは、欧州、日本、韓国、台湾などの同盟国に対して、中国との貿易で失われる（Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1)という潤沢な貿易を利用しないよう要請できるだろうか？ もちろんだ。しかし実証研究は、彼らがそのような結束の訴えを無視する可能性が高いことを示している。同盟が双極システムで生まれると二国間貿易フローに統計的に有意で大きな影響を与える一方で、その関係は多極化の文脈では弱まる。これはジョアン・ゴーワとエドワード・D・マンフィールドが1993年に示した結論である。8 著者らは1905年から始まる80年間の期間を用いて結論を導いており、これは数十年にわたる世界の多極性を含んでいる。 米国が同盟関係を徹底的に締め付け、貿易制裁を強制するという全力の外交努力を行わない限り—現政権下ではほとんど想定しがたい—、米国の同盟国は自らの利害に基づき中国との貿易を継続するだろう。米国は中国を国際システムから排除することはできないし、中国が習近平氏の誇る「自給自足」を達成することもできないだろう。 我々の見方へのリスクは、1990年代初頭の政治学者たちが世界システムを誤判断したのと同様に、我々も世界システムを誤判断している可能性があるという点だ。その点を踏まえ、Chart 1とChart 4が世界が均衡した多極状態にあるという見解を真に支持しているわけではないことを認める。米国は明らかに世界で最も強力な国であり続けている。しかし問題は、相対的な衰退が進んでいること、そしてその勢力圏がグローバルであるため非常に費用がかかる一方で、ライバルは当面地域的な野心しか持っていないということである。したがって、我々はアメリカの覇権が比較的速やかに再主張される可能性は認めるが、それは他の極のどれかで重大な大災害が発生することを必要とするだろう。例えば、中国の国内安定が崩壊し、同時に米国の政治的安定が回復するような場合だ。 結論： 米中間の貿易戦争は地政学的に持続不能である。それが継続し得る唯一の状況は、残りの国家が両超大国の背後に厳密に結集するような双極世界である。我々は現時点で世界が—当面のところ—多極化しているとの確信度が高い見解を持っている。アメリカの同盟国はワシントンの「中国孤立」要求を逃れ、抜け道を探すだろう。これは、米国が1990年代末から2000年代初頭に享受したような圧倒的な力の優位をもはや持っていないからである。 ここまでの洞察は政治学の形式理論に由来する。では歴史は何を教えてくれるか？ 敵と貿易する 1896年、英国でベストセラーとなったパンフレット『Made in Germany』は不吉な絵を描いた: 「巨大な商業国家が台頭して我々の繁栄を脅かし、世界の貿易を巡って我々と争うだろう。」9 著者E.E.ウィリアムズは読者に自宅を見渡すよう促した。「あなたの子供が遊んでいるおもちゃや人形、童話の本はドイツ製だ：いや、あなたのお気に入りの（愛国的な）新聞の紙だって、同じ出生地を持つかもしれない。」ウィリアムズは後に関税が解決策であり、それが「ドイツをひざまずかせ、我々の寛容を乞わせるだろう」と書いた。10 1890年代後半には、ドイツが英国にとって最大の国防上の脅威であることは明らかだった。1898年と1900年のドイツ海軍法は、地理的制約であるユトランド半島からドイツ帝国を解放することを単一の目的として大規模な海軍建造を開始した。1902年までに王立海軍のファースト・ロードは「新しく大きくなったドイツ海軍は我々との戦争の観点から注意深く築かれている」と指摘した。11 ドイツが英国にとって最も深刻な国防上の脅威であったことは疑いようがない。その結果、ロンドンは1904年4月にフランスと一連の協定を締結し、それはエントント・コルディアルとして知られるようになった。このアンタントは1905年の第一次モロッコ危機でドイツにより即座に試され、同盟はむしろ強化された。ロシアは1907年にこの協定に組み込まれ、三国協商が成立した。 振り返れば、この同盟構造は1871年の統一からのドイツの急速な台頭を考えれば明白だった。しかし、英国とフランスが数世紀にわたる対立を解消し、1904年に同盟を正式化したことの規模を過小評価してはならない。それは歴史、根深い敵意、イデオロギーの流れに逆らって行われた地殻変動的なシフトであった。12 歴史は、ライバル間や戦時中でも貿易は行われると教えてくれる。 政治学者と歴史家は、地政学的敵対が冷戦で見られたような経済関係の二分化を生むことは稀であると指摘してきた。実証研究と形式的モデリングの両方が、ライバル同士や戦時中でも貿易は行われることを示している。13 これは英国とドイツの間では確かに当てはまり、両国の貿易は第一次世界大戦勃発直前まで着実に増加した（Chart 6）。これは英国のレッセフェール経済へのイデオロギー的なコミットメントで説明できるのか？ あるいはロンドンは保護主義に転じれば軽装備の植民地に対する動きが起きることを恐れたのか？ これらはもっともな議論だ。しかし、それだけではロシアとフランスが同期間にドイツ帝国との総貿易を伸ばし続けた理由を説明しない（Chart 7）。三国ともに戦争の到来を見抜けなかった無能な政策立案者に率いられていた—というのはありそうにない—か、あるいは互いにドイツとの貿易の利得を奪われる余裕がなかったのだ。 Chart 6 同盟国はドイツと貿易していた… 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る Chart 7 …第一次世界大戦直前まで 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る Chart 8 日本と米国は貿易を落とさなかった 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 第二次世界大戦前も同様の力学が働いていた。1930年代に米国と日本の関係は悪化し、1931年の満州事変が起きた。1935年、日本は1922年のワシントン海軍条約を離脱し、太平洋の勢力均衡の基盤を崩して大規模な海軍建造を開始した。1937年、日本は中国へ侵攻した。明らかな差し迫った危険があったにもかかわらず、米国は1941年7月26日まで日本との貿易を続けた — これは日本がインドシナ南部に侵攻した数日後のことである（Chart 8）。12月7日、日本は米国を攻撃した。 懐疑論者は主張するかもしれない。第一次・第二次世界大戦で政策担当者が戦争に向かって無自覚に進んだのは事実であり、今回は同じ誤りを犯さない（あるいは犯すべきではない）だろう、と。 第一に、我々は政策提言を行う立場ではなく、したがって「あるべき」ことに関心はない。第二に、20世紀前半の政策立案者が現代の啓蒙された指導者と比べて欠陥があったと考える見方には強く懐疑的である。我々の制約に基づくフレームワークは、指導者の行動に対して制度的な理由を求めることを促す。 政治学は、ロンドンやワシントンが明白な脅威にもかかわらず敵と貿易を続けた理由を明確に説明する。答えは制約の制度的性質にある：多極世界は、同盟関係の変化と同盟国の行動を統制する難しさにより集団行動の問題を導入し、政策立案者の相対利得への感受性を低下させる。 米中の場合、これはトランプ大統領が多国間外交を回避し、（貿易赤字への執着のような）重商主義的な力の測定に強く焦点を当てる戦略を採っていることでさらに顕著になっている。もし反中国通商政策が同盟国との寛大な貿易関係を伴っていれば、北京に対する「志願者の連合」を生むことができただろう。しかし、関税とEU、日、カナダへの脅しの2年間を経て、トランプ政権は世界に対して古い同盟と協調の道筋が見直しの対象であることを既に示している。 次の10年の間に現れると我々が見ている結果は二つある。 第一に、米国の指導部は自らが動いている制度的制約を認識し、対中国貿易は制限や変動を伴いながらも継続する。しかし、そのような貿易は地政学的緊張を減少させることはなく、軍事衝突を阻止もしない。実際、貿易が維持される一方で軍事衝突の確率は増す可能性すらある。 第二に、米国の指導部が自らが多極化した世界で行動していることを正しく評価できず、図表2で示した貿易利得を欧州や日本といった経済ライバルに譲り渡すことになる。 我々は制約に基づく予測法を採用しているため、後者のシナリオが起こる可能性は低いと強く考えている。 結論： 米中対立は冷戦の再演ではない。世界的多極性からの制度的圧力は、米国に中国との貿易を続けさせる。とはいえ、中国が他の技術的に先進した国から依然として入手する新興の二重用途技術に関しては交換が制限されるだろう。これは、地政学が投資に対して外生的なものと見なされなくなる複雑で興味深い世界を生み出す。 楽観的な結論に対するリスクは、歴史的記録は今日に適用できるが、時間が遅くなっている可能性があるという点だ。すでに1941年7月26日、すなわち米国が日本とのすべての貿易を破棄した時点に近い — 1930年代の初めではない。したがって、米中間のもう10年の貿易が残されているわけではなく、我々はサイクルの終わりにいるのかもしれない。 これはリスクだが、起こりにくい。米国の政策立案者は、日本に対して行ったのと同等のレベルで貿易戦争を中国に対して拡大するために軍事衝突のリスクを取ることを受け入れる必要があるだろうという点だ。客観的事実として、中国は地域における攻撃的な外交を明確に強化してきた。しかし1941年の日本とは異なり、中国は過去10年で他国を明確に侵略してはいない。したがって、そのような衝突を支持する大衆の意欲は不透明であり、米国民のうち中国を米国にとって最大の脅威と考える者はわずか21％に過ぎない。 投資への示唆 本分析は楽観的であることを意図しているわけではない。第一に、米国と中国は経済関係が世界的な二分化につながらないとしてもライバルであり続ける。ひとつには、中国は20世紀初頭のドイツのように外部市場へのアクセスを懸念しており、その経済の19.5％が依然として外需に依存している。したがって中国は近隣圏を支配しようとして現代的な海軍と軍隊を整備しており、これは世界を支配したいからではなく、むしろ近隣を支配したいからである。これはモンロー主義を始めとする米国の欲求に類似する。このことは南シナ海や東シナ海での中国の攻撃性を引き起こし、米海軍との衝突の確率を高める。 トゥキディデスの罠の物語がなお妥当であることを踏まえ、投資家はグローバル株式市場に対してS&P 500の航空宇宙・防衛株をオーバーウエイトすることを検討すべきである。本仮説を別の方法で活用するならば、グローバルの防衛株のバスケットを構築することだ。多極化は貿易保護主義への制約を生むかもしれないが、地政学的変動性を助長し、防衛支出を支えるだろう。 第二に、グローバリゼーションが再び上昇することは期待しない。多極化は国がライバルとの貿易を完全に閉ざすことを難しくするかもしれないが、グローバリゼーションは単にライバル間の貿易だけで成り立つわけではない。グローバリゼーションは大国間の高度な調整を必要とし、それは覇権的条件下でのみ可能である。Chart 9は、英国とその後のアメリカの覇権が過去200年にわたり貿易に強力な追い風を与えたことを示している。 Chart 9 グローバリゼーションの頂点は過ぎ去った グローバリゼーションの頂点はすでに過ぎている グローバリゼーションの頂点はすでに過ぎている 「Apex of Globalization」は既に過ぎ去った—ここからは下り坂である。しかしこれは二分法的な見方ではない。外国貿易がゼロになることはない。米国と中国が互いの勢力圏をシリコン・カーテンで完全に封鎖することはないだろう。 代わりに、我々は多極化、米中地政学的対立、グローバリゼーションの頂点という三つの潮流によって特徴づけられる世界から派生する五つの投資テーマに注目する。 欧州が利益を得る: 米中の敵対関係が深まるにつれて、いくつかの欧州企業が恩恵を受けると予想する。投資コミュニティはすでにこのトレンドを察知しており、貿易緊張が2019年に高まるたびに欧州株が米国株をややアウトパフォームした証拠がある（Chart 10）。しかし我々の仮説からすると、米国が中国市場で欧州に完全に市場シェアを奪われる可能性は低い。したがって我々は特にテクノロジーに注目している。ここでは、システム上の圧力があっても米中は非関税障壁を強化すると予想するからだ。したがって、欧州のテクノロジー企業を米国の同業と比較して戦略的にロングすることは理にかなっているかもしれない（Chart 11）。 Chart 10 欧州：貿易戦争の避難所 欧州：貿易戦争のセーフヘイブン 欧州：貿易戦争のセーフヘイブン Chart 11 欧州は本当にこれほど無能なのか？ ヨーロッパは本当にここまで無能なのか？ ヨーロッパは本当にここまで無能なのか？ 米ドルの強気相場は終焉する: 貿易戦争は貿易関係を調整する非常に破壊的な手段であり、報復を招き相対的損失を被る可能性がある。したがって我々は、米国が2018年の引き締めを積極的に反転させるか、貿易ライバルに自国通貨を強化させることを強制することで、最終的に米ドルを減価させると予想する。そのような動きは米ドル離れの追い風となり、ユーロに利益をもたらすだろう。 キャップエックスの強気相場: グローバルな製造チェーンの再配線は引き続き行われる。悪いニュースは、多国籍企業が利益率を切り崩してサプライチェーンを移転する必要があることだ。良いニュースは、それを達成するために製造キャップエックスに投資する必要があることである。このテーマの一つの表現は、半導体向け資本財企業の指数を買うことだ（AMAT、LRCX、KLAC、MKSI、AEIS、BRIKS、TERなど）。資本財企業は景気循環性が高いため、エントリーポイントは貿易緊張が緩和し世界成長の芽が見え始めたときに検討することを勧める。 「非同盟」市場が恩恵を受ける: 世界が最後に多極だったとき、大国は帝国主義を通じて競争した。今回は同様のダイナミクスが発展し、中国の「一帯一路」構想を模倣しようとする国々が現れるだろう。これはフロンティア市場にとって好材料である。輸出とサービスを提供するためのラッシュは供給を増やしコストを下げるため、これまで忘れられていた市場に投資のブームをもたらすだろう。インドや中国を除くアジアは、グローバル製造チェーンの再配線を利用するために積極的な改革を行っている現在の政権下で、魅力的な中国の代替先として立っている。 資本市場はグローバル化を維持する: 先進国の多くで金利がゼロ近傍にあり、人口動態上の負担が年金により高いリターンを強く求めさせているため、利回り探索は資本市場をグローバルに保ち続ける強力な動機となるだろう。制限は増える可能性が高く、特に二重用途技術への越境プライベート投資に関してはそうだ。しかし資本市場の完全な二分化はありそうにない。 我々が描写する世界は、地政学がグローバル投資家にとってますます重要な役割を果たす世界である。世界が単純に二つの交戦陣営に分かれ、投資家が地政学を無視できるようなきれいに分かれた区分けができるというのは都合が良いが、それは起こりそうにない。むしろ世界は19世紀末の動的な時代に似ており、粗野で混沌とした時代であって、投資には学際的なアプローチが求められるだろう。   Marko Papic, コンサルティング編集者、BCAリサーチ チーフ・ストラテジスト、Clocktower Group Marko@clocktowergroup.com 脚注 1 BCAリサーチ ジオポリティカル・ストラテジー、「Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?」（2012年9月25日）、「Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think」（2013年10月4日）、「The Great Risk Rotation」（2013年12月11日）、および「Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward」（2014年1月23日）、「Underestimating Sino-American Tensions」（2015年11月6日）、「The Geopolitics Of Trump」（2016年12月2日）、「How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia」（2017年3月1日）など。これらはgps.bcaresearch.comで入手可能、またはリクエストに応じて提供。 2 German Historical Institute、「Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’」（1897年）参照。http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3 Graham Allison、Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?（New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017）参照。 4 戦争とならなかった三例は、16世紀のポルトガルからスペインへの移行、20世紀の英から米への移行、そして21世紀におけるドイツの地域覇権への台頭である。 5 Duncan Snidal、「Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation」、The American Political Science Review, 85:3（1991年9月）、pp. 701-726。 6 本稿ではスナイダルの優れたゲーム理論による形式モデルを詳細に再検討しないが、興味のある読者には原著を推奨する。 7 Charles P. Kindleberger、The World In Depression, 1929-1939（Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013）参照。 8 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield、「Power Politics and International Trade」、The American Political Science Review, 87:2（1993年6月）、pp. 408-420。 9 Ernest Edwin Williams、Made in Germany（再版、Ithaca: Cornell University Press）参照。https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830。 10 Margaret MacMillan、The War That Ended Peace（Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014）に引用。 11 Peter Liberman、「Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains」、International Security, 21:1（1996年夏）、pp. 147-175。 12 フランスとロシアは、共和制と暴力的蜂起に基づく共和国—フランス—と貴族的権威主義体制—ロシア—というイデオロギー的差異を乗り越えた点でさらに大きな溝を克服した。 13 James Morrow、「When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?」、The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1（1997年2月）、pp. 12-37；および Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri、「Trading With the Enemy During Wartime」、Security Studies, 13:3（2004年12月）、pp. 1-47 を参照。

特別レポート

Highlights The chance of a U.S.-China trade agreement by November 2020 is still only 40% – but an upgrade may be around the corner. Trump is on the verge of a tactical trade retreat due to fears of economic slowdown and a loss in 2020. Xi Jinping is now the known unknown. His aggressive foreign policy is a major risk even if Trump softens. Political divisions in Greater China – Hong Kong unrest and Taiwan elections – could harm the trade talks. Maintain tactical caution but remain cyclically overweight global equities. Feature   “I am the chosen one. Somebody had to do it. So I’m taking on China. I’m taking on China on trade. And you know what, we’re winning.” – U.S. President Donald J. Trump, August 21, 2019 On August 1, United States President Donald Trump declared that he would raise a new tariff of 10% on the remaining $300 billion worth of imports from China not already subject to his administration’s sweeping 25% tariff. Then, on August 13, with the S&P 500 index down a mere 2.4%, Trump announced that he would partially delay the tariff, separating it into two tranches that will take effect on September 1 and December 15 (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Six days later Trump’s Commerce Department renewed the 90-day temporary general license for U.S. companies to do business with embattled Chinese telecom company Huawei, which has ties to the Chinese state and is viewed as a threat to U.S. network security. The same pattern played out on August 23 when President Trump responded to China’s retaliatory tariffs by declaring he would raise tariffs to 30% on the first half of imports and 15% on the remainder by December 15. Within a single weekend he softened his rhetoric and said he still wanted a deal. Trump’s tendency to take two steps forward with coercive measures and then one step back to control the damage is by now familiar to global investors. Yet this backpedaling reveals that like other politicians he is concerned about reelection. After all, there is a clear chain of consequence leading from trade war to bear market to recession to a Democrat taking the White House in November 2020. Trump’s approval rating is already similar to that of presidents who fell short of re-election amid recession (Chart II-2) – an actual recession would consign him to history. Will Trump Stage A Tactical Retreat On Trade? Yes. Trump’s predicament suggests that he will have to adjust his policies. Global trade, capital spending, and sentiment have deteriorated significantly since the last escalation-and-delay episode with China in May and June. Beijing’s economic stimulus measures disappointed expectations, exacerbating the global slowdown (Chart II-3). This leaves him less room for maneuver going forward. The fourth quarter of 2019 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. Even “Fortress America” – consumer-driven and relatively insulated from global trade – has seen manufacturing, private investment, and business sentiment weaken. GDP growth is slowing and has been revised downward for 2018 despite a surge in budget deficit projections to above $1 trillion dollars (Chart II-4). Chart II-3China's Gradual Stimulus Yet To Revive Global Economy Chart II-4Trump's Economy Grew Slower Than Thought Despite Fiscal Stimulus   The U.S. Treasury yield curve inversion is deepening. While we at BCA would point out reasons that this may not be a reliable signal of imminent recession, Trump cannot afford to ignore it. He is sensitive to the widening talk of “recession” in American airwaves and is openly contemplating stimulus options (Chart II-5). His approval rating has lost momentum, partly due to his perceived mishandling of a domestic terrorist attack motivated by racist anti-immigrant sentiment in El Paso, Texas, but negative financial and economic news have likely also played a part (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Trump Fears Growing Talk Of Recession In short, the fourth quarter of 2019 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The core predicament for Trump continues to be the divergence in American and Chinese policy. In the U.S., the stimulating effect of Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act is wearing off just as the deflationary effect of his trade policy begins to bite. In China, the lingering effects of Xi’s all-but-defunct deleveraging campaign are combining with the trade war, and slowing trend growth, to produce a drag on domestic demand and global trade. The result is a rising dollar, which increases the trade deficit – the opposite of what Trump wants and needs (Chart II-7). Chart II-7Trump's Fiscal Policy Undid His Trade Policy   The United States is insulated from global trade, but only to a point – it cannot escape a global recession should one develop (Chart II-8). With global and U.S. equities vulnerable to additional volatility in the near term, Trump will have to make at least a tactical retreat on his trade policy over the rest of the year. First and foremost this would mean: Chart II-8If Total Trade War Causes A Global Relapse, The U.S. Economy Cannot Escape Expediting a trade deal with Japan – this should get done before a China deal, possibly as early as September. Ratifying the U.S.-Mexico-Canada “NAFTA 2.0” agreement – this requires support from moderate Democrats in Congress. The window for passage is closing fast but not yet closed. Removing the threat to slap tariffs on European car and car part imports in mid-November. There is some momentum given Europe’s need to boost growth and recent progress on U.S. beef exports to the EU. Lastly, if financial and economic pressure are sustained, Trump will be forced to soften his stance on China. The problem for global risk assets – in the very near term – is that Trump’s tactical retreat has not fully materialized yet. The new tariff on China is still slated to take effect on September 1. This tariff hike or other disagreements could result in a cancellation of talks or failure to make any progress.1 Even if Trump does pivot on trade, China’s position has hardened. It is no longer clear that Beijing will accept a deal that is transparently designed to boost Trump’s reelection chances. Thus, the biggest question in the trade talks is no longer Trump, but Xi. Is Xi prepared to receive Trump kindly if the latter comes crawling back? How will he handle rising political risk in Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan island,2 and will the outcome derail the trade talks? The biggest question in the trade talks is no longer Trump, but Xi. Bottom Line: Global economic growth is fragile and President Trump has only rhetorically retracted his latest salvo against China. Nevertheless, the clear signal is that he is sensitive to the financial and economic constraints that affect his presidential run next year – and therefore investors should expect U.S. trade policy to turn less market-negative on the margin in the coming months. This is positive for the cyclical view on global risk assets. But the risk to the view is China: whether Trump will take a conciliatory turn and whether Xi will reciprocate. Can Xi Jinping Accept A Deal? Yes. It is extremely difficult for Xi Jinping to offer concessions in the short term. He is facing another tariff hike, U.S. military shows of force, persistent social unrest in Hong Kong, and a critical election in Taiwan. Certainly, he will not risk any sign of weakness ahead of the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, which will be a nationalist rally in defiance of imperialist western powers. After that, however, there is potential for Xi to be receptive to any Trump pivot on trade. China’s strategy in the trade talks has generally been to offer limited concessions and wait for Trump to resign himself to them. Concessions thus far are not negligible, but they can easily be picked apart. They consist largely of preexisting trends (large commodity purchases); minor adjustments (e.g. to car tariffs and foreign ownership rules); unverifiable promises (on foreign investment, technological transfer, and intellectual property); or reversible strategic cooperation (partial enforcement of North Korean and Iranian sanctions) (Table II-1). Many of these concessions have been postponed as a result of Trump’s punitive measures. It is unlikely that Beijing will offer much more under today’s adverse circumstances. The exception is cooperation on North Korea, which should improve. So the contours of a deal are generally known. This is what Trump will have to accept if he seeks to calm markets and restore confidence in the economy ahead of his election. But this slate of concessions is ultimately acceptable for the U.S. Chart II-9China's Ultimate Economic Constraint China’s demands are that Trump roll back all his tariffs, that purchases of U.S. goods must be reasonable in scale, and that any agreement be balanced and conducted with mutual respect. Of these three, the tariffs and the “respect” pose the most trouble. Trade balance: Washington and Beijing can agree on the terms of specific purchases. China can increase select imports substantially – it remains a cash-rich nation with a state sector that can be commanded to buy American goods. Tariff rollback: This is tougher but can be done. The U.S. will insist on some tariffs – or the threat of tech sanctions – as an enforcement mechanism to ensure that Beijing implements the structural concessions necessary for an agreement. But China might accept a deal in which tariffs were mostly rolled back – say to the original 25% tariff on $50 billion worth of goods. This would likely offset the degree of yuan appreciation to be expected from the likely currency addendum to any agreement. Balance and respect: This qualitative demand is the sticking point. Fundamentally, China cannot reward Trump for his aggressive and unilateral protectionist measures. This would be to set a precedent for future American presidents that sweeping tariffs on national security grounds are a legitimate way of coercing China into making economic structural reforms. Moreover if the U.S. wants to improve the trade balance, China thinks, it cannot embargo Chinese high-tech imports but must actually increase its high-tech exports. Clearly this is a major impasse in the talks. The last point, mutual respect, is the likeliest deal-breaker. It may ultimately hinge on strategic events outside of the realm of trade. But before discussing it further, it is important to recognize that China is not invincible – it has a pain threshold. Deterioration in China’s labor market is of utmost seriousness to any Chinese leader (Chart II-9). And the economy is still struggling to revive. Xi’s reform and deleveraging campaign of 2017-18 has largely been postponed but the lingering effects are weighing on growth and the property sector remains under tight regulation. Moreover the removal of implicit guarantees, and rare toleration of creative destruction (Chart II-10), have left banks and corporations afraid to take on new risks. The state’s reflationary measures, including a big boost to local government spending, have so far been merely sufficient for domestic stability. Chart II-10Creative Destruction In China These problems can be addressed by additional policy easing. But the domestic political crackdown and the break with the U.S. have shaken manufacturers and private entrepreneurs to the bone, suppressing animal spirits and reducing the demand for loans. Ultimately a short-term trade deal to ease this economic stress would make sense for Xi Jinping, even though he knows that U.S. protectionism and the conflict over technological acquisition will persist beyond 2020 and beyond Trump. The threat of a sharp and destabilizing divorce from the U.S. is a real and present danger to the long-term stability of China’s economy and the Communist regime. Xi is a strongman leader, but is he really ready for Mao Zedong-style austerity? Is he not more like former President Jiang Zemin (ruled 1993-2003), who imposed some austerity while prizing domestic economic and political stability above all? To this question we now turn. Bottom Line: China has become the wild card in the trade war. Trump’s need to prevent a recession is known. Beijing has a higher pain threshold and could walk away from the deal to punish Trump (upsetting the global economy and diminishing Trump’s reelection prospects). This would set the precedent for future American presidents that China will not bow to gunboat diplomacy. Will Xi Jinping Overplay His Hand? Be Afraid. For decades China’s main foreign policy principle has been to “lie low and bide its time,” to paraphrase former leader Deng Xiaoping. In the current context this means maintaining a willingness to engage with the U.S. whenever it engages sincerely. This approach implies making the above concessions to minimize the immediate threat to stability from the trade war, while biding time in the longer run rivalry against the United States. Such an approach would also imply assisting the diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula, avoiding a military crackdown in Hong Kong, and refraining from aggressive military intimidation ahead of Taiwan’s election in January. Chart II-11China's Vast Market Its Most Persuasive Tool After all, there is no better way for the Communist Party to undercut dissidents in Hong Kong and Taiwan than to strike a deal with the United States. This would demonstrate that Xi is a pragmatic leader who is still committed to “reform and opening up.” It would help generate an economic rebound that would bring other countries deeper into Beijing’s orbit (Chart II-11). China’s vast domestic market is ultimately its greatest strength in its contest with the United States. In short, conventional Chinese policy suggests that Xi should perpetuate the long success story since 1978 by striking another deal with another Republican president. The catch is that Xi Jinping is not conventional. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has eschewed the subtle strategies of Sun Tzu and Deng Xiaoping in favor of a more ambitious approach: that of declaring China’s arrival as a major power and leveraging its economic and military heft to pursue foreign policy and commercial interests aggressively. Xi’s reassertion of Communist rule and state-guided technological acquisition is the biggest factor behind the new U.S. political consensus – entirely aside from Trump – that China is foe rather than friend. There are several empirical reasons to think that Xi might overplay his hand: Xi failed to make substantive concessions with President Barack Obama’s administration on North Korea, the South China Sea, and cyber security, resulting in Obama’s decision to harden U.S. policy toward both China and North Korea in 2015 – a trend that predates Trump. Xi formally removed presidential term limits from China’s constitution even though he could have attracted less negative attention from the West by ruling from behind the scenes after his term in office, like Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin. China has mostly played for time in negotiations with the Trump administration, as mentioned, and this aggravated tensions. Deep revisions to the draft agreement, and the  extent of tariff rollback which was supposedly 90% complete, broke the negotiations in May, sparking this summer’s standoff. Aggressive policies in territorial disputes have alienated even China’s potential allies. This includes regional states whose current ruling parties have courted China in recent years, in some cases obsequiously – South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The East and South China Seas remain a genuine source of “black swans” – unpredictable, low-probability, high-impact events – due to their status as critical sea lanes for the major Asian economies. China continues to militarize the islands there and aggressively prosecute its maritime-territorial disputes. We calculate that $6.4 trillion worth of goods flowed through this bottleneck in the year ending April 2019, 8% of which consists of energy goods from the Middle East that are vital to China and its East Asian neighbors, none of whom can stomach Chinese domination of this geographic space (Diagram II-1). Even if Washington abandoned the region, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would see Chinese control as a threat to their security. Ultimately, however, China’s adventures in its neighboring seas are a matter of choice. Not so for Greater China – in Hong Kong and Taiwan, political risk is rapidly mounting in a way that enflames the U.S.-China strategic distrust and threatens to prevent a trade agreement. Hong Kong: The Dust Has Not Settled Mass protests in Hong Kong have lost some momentum, based on the size of the largest rally in August versus June. But do not be fooled: the political crisis is deepening. A plurality of Hong Kongers now harbors negative feelings toward mainland Chinese people as well as the government in Beijing – a trend that is spiking amid today’s protests but began with the Great Recession and has roots in the deeper socioeconomic malaise of this capitalist enclave (Chart II-12A & II-12B).   A majority also lacks confidence in the political arrangement that ensures some autonomy from Beijing – known as “One Country, Two Systems” (Chart II-13). This is a particularly worrisome sign since this is the fundamental basis for stable political relations with Beijing. With clashes continuing between protesters and police, students calling for a boycott of school this fall, and Beijing rotating troops into the city and openly drilling its security forces in Shenzhen for a potential intervention, Hong Kong’s unrest is not yet laid to rest and could flare up again ahead of China’s sensitive National Day celebration. U.S. tariffs and sanctions are already in effect, reducing the ability of the U.S. to deter China from using force if it believes instability has gone too far. And as President Trump has warned – and would be true of any U.S. administration – a violent crackdown on civilian demonstrators would greatly reduce the political viability of a trade deal in the United States. Taiwan: The Black Swan Arrives Since Taiwan’s 2016 election, we have argued that it is a potential source of “black swans.” Mass protests in Hong Kong may have taken the cake. But these protests are now affecting the Taiwanese election dynamic and potentially the U.S.-China trade talks. Chart II-14U.S. Approves Big New Arms Sale To Taiwan On August 20, the United States Department of Defense informed Congress that it is proceeding with an $8 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets and other military arms and equipment to Taiwan – the largest sale in 22 years and the largest aircraft sale since 1992 (Chart II-14). This sale is not yet complete and delivered, but ultimately will be – the question is the timing. Arms sales to Taiwan are a perennial source of tension between the United States and China – and China is increasingly assertive in using economic sanctions to get its way over such issues, as it showed in the lead up to South Korea’s election in 2017. This sale is not a military “game changer” – the U.S. did not send over fifth-generation F-35s, for instance – but China will respond vehemently. It is threatening to impose sanctions on American companies like Lockheed Martin and General Electric for their part in the deal. The sale does not in itself preclude the chance of a trade agreement but it contributes to a rise in strategic tensions that ultimately could. Chart II-15A 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' Would Have A Seismic Equity Impact The context is Taiwan’s hugely important election in January. Four years ago, President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party swept to power on the back of a popular protest movement – the “Sunflower Movement” – that opposed deeper cross-strait economic integration. It dangerously resembled the kind of anti-Communist “color revolutions” that motivate Xi Jinping’s hardline policies. Tsai shocked the world when she called Trump personally to congratulate him after his election, which violated diplomatic protocol given that Taiwan is a territory of China and not an independent nation-state. Since then Trump has largely avoided provoking the Taiwan issue so as not to strike at a core Chinese interest and obliterate the chance of a trade deal. But the U.S. has always argued that the provision of defensive arms to Taiwan is a condition of the U.S.-China détente – and Trump is so far moving forward with the sale. How will Xi Jinping react if the sale goes through? In 1995-96, China’s use of missile tests to try to intimidate Taiwan produced the opposite effect – driving voters into the arms of Lee Teng-hui, the candidate Beijing opposed. This was the occasion of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which U.S. President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the region, one that sailed through the Taiwan Strait. The negative effect on markets at that time was local, whereas anything resembling this level of tensions would today be a seismic global risk-off (Chart II-15). Since the 1990s, leaders in Beijing have avoided direct military coercion ahead of elections. But Xi Jinping has hardened his stance on Taiwan throughout his term. He has dabbled with such coercion in his use of military drills that encircle Taiwan in recent years. While one must assume that he will use economic sanctions rather than outright military threats – as he did with South Korea – saber-rattling cannot be ruled out. The pressure on him is rising. Prior to the Hong Kong unrest, Taiwan’s elections looked likely to return the pro-mainland Kuomintang (KMT) to power and remove the incumbent President Tsai – a boon for Beijing. That outlook has changed and Tsai now has a fighting chance of staying in power (Chart II-16). The prospect of four more years of Tsai would not be too problematic for Beijing if not for the fact that the U.S. political establishment is now firmly in agreement on challenging China. But even if Tsai loses, Taiwan’s outlook is troublesome. And this makes Xi’s decision-making harder to predict. Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis in the long run than Hong Kong. It is not that Tsai or her party will necessarily prevail. The manufacturing slowdown will take a toll and third-party candidates, particularly Ko Wen-je, would likely split Tsai’s vote. Moreover her Democratic Progressives still tie the KMT in opinion polling (Chart II-17). The Taiwanese people are primarily concerned about maintaining the strong economy and cross-strait peace and stability, which her reelection could jeopardize (Chart II-18). Tsai could very well lose, or she could be a lame duck presiding over the KMT in the legislature.   Rather, the problem for Xi Jinping is that the Taiwanese people clearly sympathize with the protesters in Hong Kong (Chart II-19). They fear that their own governance system faces the same fate as Hong Kong’s, with the Communist Party encroaching on traditional political liberties over time.   While Hong Kong ultimately has zero choice as to whether to accept Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan has much greater autonomy – and the military support of outside forces. It is not a foregone conclusion that Taiwan must suffer the same political dependency as Hong Kong. Indeed, Taiwan has a long history of exercising the democratic vote and has even dabbled into the realm of popular referendums. In short, Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis in the long run than Hong Kong. But the Hong Kong events have accentuated this fact, for two key reasons: First, Taiwanese people identify increasingly as exclusively Taiwanese, rather than as both Taiwanese and Chinese (Chart II-20). The incidents in Hong Kong reveal that this sentiment is tied to immediate political relations and therefore deterioration would encourage further alienation from the mainland. Second, while a strong majority of Taiwanese wish to maintain the political status quo to avoid conflict with the mainland, a substantial subset – approaching one-fourth – supports eventual or immediate independence (Chart II-21).   This means that relations with the mainland will eventually deteriorate even if the KMT wins the election. The KMT itself must respond to popular demand not to cozy up too much with Beijing, which is how it fell from power in 2016. Meanwhile, under KMT rule, Taiwan’s progressive-leaning youth are likely to set about reviving their protest movement in the subsequent years and imitating their Hong Kong peers, especially if the KMT warms up relations too fast with the mainland. Ultimately these points suggest that Xi Jinping will strive to avoid a violent crackdown in Hong Kong. A crackdown would be the surest way for him to harm the KMT in the Taiwanese election and to hasten the rebuilding of U.S.-Taiwan security ties. Call The President The best argument for Xi to lie low and avoid a larger crisis in Greater China is that it would unify the West and its allies against China. So far Xi’s foreign policy has not been so aggressive as to lead to diplomatic isolation. Europe is maintaining a studied neutrality due to its own differences with the United States; Asian neighbors are wary of provoking Chinese sanctions or military threats. A humanitarian crisis in Hong Kong or a “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” would change that. For markets, the best-case scenario is that Xi Jinping exercises restraint. This would help Hong Kong protests lose steam, North Korean diplomacy get back on track, and Taiwanese independence sentiment simmer down. China would be more likely to halt U.S. tariffs and tech sanctions, settle a short-term trade agreement, and delay the upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. China would still face adverse long-term political trends in both the U.S. and Taiwan, but an immediate crisis would be averted. The worst-case scenario is that Xi indulges his ambition. Hong Kong protests could explode, relations with Taiwan would deteriorate, and U.S.-China relations would move more rapidly in their downward spiral. Trade talks could collapse. Xi Jinping would face the possibility of a unified Western front, instability within Greater China, and a global recession. This might get rid of Donald Trump, but it would not get rid of the U.S. Congress, Navy, or Department of Defense. The choice seems pretty clear. Xi, like Trump, faces constraints that should motivate a tactical retreat from confrontation, at least after October 1. While this does not necessarily mean a settled trade agreement, it does suggest at least a ceasefire or truce. Our GeoRisk indicators show that market-based political risk in Taiwan – and less so South Korea – moves in keeping with global economic policy uncertainty. The underlying U.S.-China strategic confrontation and trade war are driving both (Chart II-22). A deterioration in this region has global consequences. Chart II-22U.S.-China Strategic Conflict Fuels Global Economic Uncertainty And Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk In Tandem Xi is a markedly aggressive “strongman” Chinese leader who has not been afraid to model his leadership on that of Chairman Mao. He could still overplay his hand. This is why we maintain that the odds of a U.S.-China trade agreement remain 40%, though we are prepared to upgrade that probability if Trump and Xi make pro-market decisions. Investment Implications On the three-month tactical horizon, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy is paring back our tactical safe-haven trades: we are closing our “Doomsday Basket” of long gold and Swiss bonds for a gain of 13.6%, while maintaining our simple gold portfolio hedge going forward.  Trump has not yet decisively staged his tactical retreat on trade policy, while rising political risk in Greater China increases uncertainty over Xi Jinping’s next moves. On the cyclical horizon, the above suggests that there is a light at the end of the tunnel – if both Trump and Xi recognize their political constraints. This means that there is still a political and geopolitical basis to reinforce BCA’s House View to remain optimistic on global and U.S. equities over the next 12 months, with the potential for non-U.S. equities to recover and bond yields to reverse their deep dive.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy   Footnotes 1     Negotiations between Trump and Xi are slated for September in Washington. There is a prospect for Trump to hold another summit with Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September and at the APEC summit in Chile in mid-November. 2     Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, while Taiwan is recognized as a province or territory.

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Highlights The chance of a U.S.-China trade agreement is still only 40% – but an upgrade may be around the corner. Trump is on the verge of a tactical trade retreat due to fears of economic slowdown and a loss in 2020. Xi Jinping is now the known unknown. His aggressive foreign policy is a major risk even if Trump softens. Political divisions in Greater China – Hong Kong unrest and Taiwan elections – could harm the trade talks. Maintain tactical caution but remain cyclically overweight global equities. Feature “I am the chosen one. Somebody had to do it. So I’m taking on China. I’m taking on China on trade. And you know what, we’re winning.” – U.S. President Donald J. Trump, August 21, 2019 On August 1, United States President Donald Trump declared that he would raise a new tariff of 10% on the remaining $300 billion worth of imports from China not already subject to his administration’s sweeping 25% tariff. Then, on August 13, with the S&P 500 index down a mere 2.4%, Trump announced that he would partially delay the tariff, separating it into two tranches that will take effect on September 1 and December 15 (Chart 1). Chart 1Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Six days later Trump’s Commerce Department renewed the 90-day temporary general license for U.S. companies to do business with embattled Chinese telecom company Huawei, which has ties to the Chinese state and is viewed as a threat to U.S. network security. Trump’s tendency to take two steps forward with coercive measures and then one step back to control the damage is by now familiar to global investors. Yet this backpedaling reveals that like other politicians he is concerned about reelection. After all, there is a clear chain of consequence leading from trade war to bear market to recession to a Democrat taking the White House in November 2020. Trump’s approval rating is already similar to that of presidents who fell short of re-election amid recession (Chart 2) – an actual recession would consign him to the dustbin of history. Will Trump Stage A Tactical Retreat On Trade? Yes. Trump’s predicament suggests that he will have to adjust his policies. Global trade, capital spending, and sentiment have deteriorated significantly since the last escalation-and-delay episode with China in May and June. Beijing’s economic stimulus measures disappointed expectations, exacerbating the global slowdown (Chart 3). This leaves him less room for maneuver going forward. Chart 3China's Gradual Stimulus Yet To Revive Global Economy Chart 4Trump's Economy Grew Slower Than Thought Despite Fiscal Stimulus Even “Fortress America” – consumer-driven and relatively insulated from global trade – has seen manufacturing, private investment, and business sentiment weaken. GDP growth is slowing and has been revised downward for 2018 despite a surge in budget deficit projections to above $1 trillion dollars (Chart 4).   Q4 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The U.S. Treasury yield curve inversion is deepening. While we at BCA would point out reasons that this may not be a reliable signal of imminent recession, Trump cannot afford to ignore it. He is sensitive to the widening talk of “recession” in American airwaves and is openly contemplating stimulus options (Chart 5). His approval rating has lost momentum, partly due to his perceived mishandling of a domestic terrorist attack motivated by racist anti-immigrant sentiment in El Paso, Texas, but negative financial and economic news have likely also played a part (Chart 6). Chart 5Trump Fears Growing Talk Of Recession In short, the fourth quarter of 2019 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The core predicament for Trump continues to be the divergence in American and Chinese policy. Chart 7Trump's Fiscal Policy Undid His Trade Policy In the U.S., the stimulating effect of Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act is wearing off just as the deflationary effect of his trade policy begins to bite. In China, the lingering effects of Xi’s all-but-defunct deleveraging campaign are combining with the trade war, and slowing trend growth, to produce a drag on domestic demand and global trade. The result is a rising dollar, which increases the trade deficit – the opposite of what Trump wants and needs (Chart 7). The United States is insulated from global trade, but only to a point – it cannot escape a global recession should one develop, given that its economy is still closely linked to the rest of the world (Chart 8). With global and U.S. equities vulnerable to additional volatility in the near term, Trump will have to make at least a tactical retreat on his trade policy over the rest of the year. First and foremost this would mean: Chart 8If Total Trade War Causes A Global Relapse, The U.S. Economy Cannot Escape Expediting a trade deal with Japan – this should get done before a China deal, possibly as early as September. Ratifying the U.S.-Mexico-Canada “NAFTA 2.0” agreement – this requires support from moderate Democrats in Congress. The window for passage is closing fast but not closed. Removing the threat to slap tariffs on European car and car part imports in mid-November. There is some momentum given Europe’s need to boost growth and recent progress on U.S. beef exports to the EU. Lastly, if financial and economic pressure are sustained, Trump will be forced to soften his stance on China. The problem for global risk assets – in the very near term – is that Trump’s tactical retreat has not fully materialized yet. The new tariff on China is still slated to take effect on September 1. This tariff hike or other disagreements could result in a cancellation of talks or failure to make any progress.1 Even if Trump does pivot on trade, China’s position has hardened. It is no longer clear that Beijing will accept a deal that is transparently designed to boost Trump’s reelection chances. Thus, the biggest question in the trade talks is no longer Trump, but Xi. Is Xi prepared to receive Trump kindly if the latter comes crawling back? How will he handle rising political risk in Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan island,2 and will the outcome derail the trade talks? Bottom Line: Global economic growth is fragile and President Trump has only tentatively retracted his latest salvo against China. Nevertheless, the clear signal is that he is sensitive to the financial and economic constraints that affect his presidential run next year – and therefore investors should expect U.S. trade policy to turn less market-negative on the margin in the coming months. This is positive for the cyclical view on global risk assets. But the risk to the view is China: whether Trump will take a conciliatory turn and whether Xi will reciprocate. Can Xi Jinping Accept A Deal? Yes. It is extremely difficult for Xi Jinping to offer concessions in the short term. He is facing another tariff hike, U.S. military shows of force, persistent social unrest in Hong Kong, and a critical election in Taiwan. Certainly, he will not risk any sign of weakness ahead of the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, which will be a nationalist rally in defiance of imperialist western powers. After that, however, there is potential for Xi to be receptive to any Trump pivot on trade. China’s strategy in the trade talks has generally been to offer limited concessions and wait for Trump to resign himself to them. Concessions thus far are not negligible, but they can easily be picked apart. They consist largely of preexisting trends (large commodity purchases); minor adjustments (e.g. to car tariffs and foreign ownership rules); unverifiable promises (on foreign investment, technological transfer, and intellectual property); or reversible strategic cooperation (partial enforcement of North Korean and Iranian sanctions) (Table 1). Many of these concessions have been postponed as a result of Trump’s punitive measures. Table 1China’s Offers Thus Far In The Trade War It is unlikely that Beijing will offer much more under today’s adverse circumstances. The exception is cooperation on North Korea, which should improve. So the contours of a deal are generally known. This is what Trump will have to accept if he seeks to calm markets and restore confidence in the economy ahead of his election. But this slate of concessions is ultimately acceptable for the U.S. China’s demands are that Trump roll back all his tariffs, that purchases of U.S. goods must be reasonable in scale, and that any agreement be balanced and conducted with mutual respect. Of these three, the tariffs and the “balance” pose the most trouble. Trade balance: Washington and Beijing can agree on the terms of specific purchases. China can increase select imports substantially – it remains a cash-rich nation with a state sector that can be commanded to buy American goods. Tariff rollback: This is tougher but can be done. The U.S. will insist on some tariffs – or the threat of tech sanctions – as an enforcement mechanism to ensure that Beijing implements the structural concessions necessary for an agreement. But China might accept a deal in which tariffs were mostly rolled back – say to the original 25% tariff on $50 billion worth of goods. This would likely offset the degree of yuan appreciation to be expected from the likely currency addendum to any agreement. Balance and respect: This qualitative demand is the sticking point. Fundamentally, China cannot reward Trump for his aggressive and unilateral protectionist measures. This would be to set a precedent for future American presidents that sweeping tariffs on national security grounds are a legitimate way of coercing China into making economic structural reforms. Moreover if the U.S. wants to improve the trade balance, China thinks, it cannot embargo Chinese high-tech imports but must actually increase its high-tech exports. Clearly this is a major impasse in the talks. The last point is the likeliest deal-breaker. It may ultimately hinge on strategic events outside of the realm of trade. But before discussing it further, it is important to recognize that China is not invincible – it has a pain threshold. The threat of a divorce from the U.S. is a danger to China’s economy and the Communist regime. Chart 9China's Ultimate Economic Constraint Deterioration in China’s labor market is of utmost seriousness to any Chinese leader (Chart 9). And the economy is still struggling to revive. Xi’s reform and deleveraging campaign of 2017-18 has been postponed but the lingering effects are weighing on growth and the property sector remains under tight regulation. Moreover the removal of implicit guarantees, and rare toleration of creative destruction (Chart 10), have left banks and corporations afraid to take on new risks. The state’s reflationary measures, including a big boost to local government spending, have so far been merely sufficient for domestic stability. These problems can be addressed by additional policy easing. But the domestic political crackdown and the break with the U.S. have shaken manufacturers and private entrepreneurs to the bone, suppressing animal spirits and reducing the demand for loans. Chart 10Creative Destruction In China Ultimately a short-term trade deal to ease this economic stress would make sense for Xi Jinping, even though he knows that U.S. protectionism and the conflict over technological acquisition will persist beyond 2020 and beyond Trump. The threat of a sharp and destabilizing divorce from the U.S. is a real and present danger to the long-term stability of China’s economy and the Communist regime. Xi is a strongman leader, but is he really ready for Mao Zedong-style austerity? Is he not more like former President Jiang Zemin (ruled 1993-2003), who imposed some austerity while prizing domestic economic and political stability above all? To this question we now turn. Bottom Line: China has become the wild card in the trade war. Trump’s need to prevent a recession is known. Beijing has a higher pain threshold and could walk away from the deal to punish Trump (upsetting the global economy and diminishing Trump’s reelection prospects). This would set the precedent for future American presidents that China will not bow to gunboat diplomacy. Will Xi Jinping Overplay His Hand? Be Afraid. For decades China’s main foreign policy principle has been to “lie low and bide its time,” to paraphrase former leader Deng Xiaoping. In the current context this means maintaining a willingness to engage with the U.S. whenever it engages sincerely. This approach implies making the above concessions to minimize the immediate threat to stability from the trade war, while biding time in the longer run rivalry against the United States. Such an approach would also imply assisting the diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula, avoiding a military crackdown in Hong Kong, and refraining from aggressive military intimidation ahead of Taiwan’s election in January. Chart 11China's Vast Market Its Most Persuasive Tool After all, there is no better way for the Communist Party to undercut dissidents in Hong Kong and Taiwan than to strike a deal with the United States. This would demonstrate that Xi is a pragmatic leader who is still committed to “reform and opening up.” It would help generate an economic rebound that would bring other countries deeper into Beijing’s orbit (Chart 11). China’s vast domestic market is ultimately its greatest strength in its contest with the United States. In short, conventional Chinese policy suggests that Xi should perpetuate the long success story since 1978 by striking another deal with another Republican president. The catch is that Xi Jinping is not conventional. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has eschewed the subtle strategies of Sun Tzu and Deng Xiaoping in favor of a more ambitious approach: that of declaring China’s arrival as a major power and leveraging its economic and military heft to pursue foreign policy and commercial interests aggressively. Xi’s reassertion of Communist rule and state-guided technological acquisition is the biggest factor behind the new U.S. political consensus – entirely aside from Trump – that China is foe rather than friend. There are several empirical reasons to think that Xi might overplay his hand: Xi failed to make substantive concessions with President Barack Obama’s administration on North Korea, the South China Sea, and cyber security, resulting in Obama’s decision to harden U.S. policy toward both China and North Korea in 2015 – a trend that predates Trump. Xi formally removed presidential term limits from China’s constitution even though he could have attracted less negative attention from the West by ruling from behind the scenes after his term in office, like Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin. China has mostly played for time in negotiations with the Trump administration, as mentioned, and this aggravated tensions. Deep revisions to the draft agreement, which was supposedly 90% complete, broke the negotiations in May, sparking this summer’s standoff. Aggressive policies in territorial disputes have alienated even China’s potential allies. This includes regional states whose current ruling parties have courted China in recent years, in some cases obsequiously – South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The East and South China Seas remain a genuine source of “black swans” – unpredictable, low-probability, high-impact events – due to their status as critical sea lanes for the major Asian economies. China continues to militarize the islands there and aggressively prosecute its maritime-territorial disputes. We calculate that $6.4 trillion worth of goods flowed through this bottleneck in the year ending April 2019, 8% of which consists of energy goods from the Middle East that are vital to China and its East Asian neighbors, none of whom can stomach Chinese domination of this geographic space (Diagram 1). Even if Washington abandoned the region, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would see Chinese control as a threat to their security. Diagram 1The South China Sea As The World’s Traffic Roundabout Ultimately, however, China’s adventures in its neighboring seas are a matter of choice. Not so for Greater China – in Hong Kong and Taiwan, political risk is rapidly mounting in a way that enflames the U.S.-China strategic distrust and threatens to prevent a trade agreement. Hong Kong: The Dust Has Not Settled Mass protests in Hong Kong have lost some momentum, based on the size of the largest rally in August versus June. But do not be fooled: the political crisis is deepening. A plurality of Hong Kongers now harbors negative feelings toward mainland Chinese people as well as the government in Beijing – a trend that is spiking amid today’s protests but began with the Great Recession and has roots in the deeper socioeconomic malaise of this capitalist enclave (Chart 12A & 12B). A majority also lacks confidence in the political arrangement that ensures some autonomy from Beijing – known as “One Country, Two Systems” (Chart 13). This is a particularly worrisome sign since this is the fundamental basis for stable political relations with Beijing. With clashes continuing between protesters and police, students calling for a boycott of school this fall, and Beijing openly drilling its security forces in Shenzhen for a potential intervention, Hong Kong’s unrest is not yet laid to rest and could flare up again ahead of China’s sensitive National Day celebration. U.S. tariffs and sanctions are already in effect, reducing the ability of the U.S. to deter China from using force if it believes instability has gone too far. And as President Trump has warned – and would be true of any U.S. administration – a violent crackdown on civilian demonstrators would greatly reduce the political viability of a trade deal in the United States. Taiwan: The Black Swan Arrives Since Taiwan’s 2016 election, we have argued that it is a potential source of “black swans.” Mass protests in Hong Kong may have taken the cake. But these protests are now affecting the Taiwanese election dynamic and potentially the U.S.-China trade talks. Chart 14U.S. Approves Big New Arms Sale To Taiwan On August 20, the United States Department of Defense informed Congress that it is proceeding with an $8 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets and other military arms and equipment to Taiwan – the largest sale in 22 years and the largest aircraft sale since 1992 (Chart 14). This sale is not yet complete and delivered, but ultimately will be – the question is the timing. Arms sales to Taiwan are a perennial source of tension between the United States and China – and China is increasingly assertive in using economic sanctions to get its way over such issues, as it showed in the lead up to South Korea’s election in 2017. This sale is not a military “game changer” – the U.S. did not send over fifth-generation F-35s, for instance – but China will respond vehemently. It is threatening to impose sanctions on American companies like Lockheed Martin and General Electric for their part in the deal. The sale does not in itself preclude the chance of a trade agreement but it contributes to a rise in strategic tensions that ultimately could. The context is Taiwan’s hugely important election in January. Four years ago, President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party swept to power on the back of a popular protest movement – the “Sunflower Movement” – that opposed deeper cross-strait economic integration. It dangerously resembled the kind of anti-Communist “color revolutions” that motivate Xi Jinping’s hardline policies. Tsai shocked the world when she called Trump personally to congratulate him after his election, which violated diplomatic protocol given that Taiwan is a territory of China and not an independent nation-state. Since then Trump has largely avoided provoking the Taiwan issue so as not to strike at a core Chinese interest and obliterate the chance of a trade deal. But the U.S. has always argued that the provision of defensive arms to Taiwan is a condition of the U.S.-China détente – and Trump is so far moving forward with the sale. Chart 15A 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' Would Have A Seismic Equity Impact How will Xi Jinping react if the sale goes through? In 1995-96, China’s use of missile tests to try to intimidate Taiwan produced the opposite effect – driving voters into the arms of Lee Teng-hui, the candidate Beijing opposed. This was the occasion of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which U.S. President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the region, one that sailed through the Taiwan Strait. The negative effect on markets at that time was local, whereas anything resembling this level of tensions would today be a seismic global risk-off (Chart 15). Since the 1990s, leaders in Beijing have avoided direct military coercion ahead of elections. But Xi Jinping has hardened his stance on Taiwan throughout his term. He has dabbled with such coercion in his use of military drills that encircle Taiwan in recent years. While one must assume that he will use economic sanctions rather than outright military threats – as he did with South Korea – saber-rattling cannot be ruled out. The pressure on him is rising. Prior to the Hong Kong unrest, Taiwan’s elections looked likely to return the pro-mainland Kuomintang (KMT) to power and remove the incumbent President Tsai – a boon for Beijing. That outlook has changed and Tsai now has a fighting chance of staying in power (Chart 16). The prospect of four more years of Tsai would not be too problematic for Beijing if not for the fact that the U.S. political establishment is now firmly in agreement on challenging China. But even if Tsai loses, Taiwan’s outlook is troublesome. And this makes Xi’s decision-making harder to predict. It is not that Tsai or her party will necessarily prevail. The manufacturing slowdown will take a toll and third-party candidates, particularly Ko Wen-je, would likely split Tsai’s vote. Moreover her Democratic Progressives still tie the KMT in opinion polling (Chart 17). The Taiwanese people are primarily concerned about maintaining the strong economy and cross-strait peace and stability, which her reelection could jeopardize (Chart 18). Tsai could very well lose, or she could be a lame duck presiding over the KMT in the legislature. Rather, the problem for Xi Jinping is that the Taiwanese people clearly sympathize with the protesters in Hong Kong (Chart 19). They fear that their own governance system faces the same fate as Hong Kong’s, with the Communist Party encroaching on traditional political liberties over time. While Hong Kong ultimately has zero choice as to whether to accept Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan has much greater autonomy – and the military support of outside forces. It is not a foregone conclusion that Taiwan must suffer the same political dependency as Hong Kong. Indeed, Taiwan has a long history of exercising the democratic vote and has even dabbled into the realm of popular referendums. In short, Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis in the long run than Hong Kong. But the Hong Kong events have accentuated this fact, for two key reasons: First, Taiwanese people identify increasingly as exclusively Taiwanese, rather than as both Taiwanese and Chinese (Chart 20). The incidents in Hong Kong reveal that this sentiment is tied to immediate political relations and therefore deterioration would encourage further alienation from the mainland. Second, while a strong majority of Taiwanese wish to maintain the political status quo to avoid conflict with the mainland, a substantial subset – approaching one-fourth – supports eventual or immediate independence (Chart 21). This means that relations with the mainland will eventually deteriorate even if the KMT wins the election. The KMT itself must respond to popular demand not to cozy up too much with Beijing, which is how it fell from power in 2016. Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis than Hong Kong. Meanwhile, under KMT rule, Taiwan’s progressive-leaning youth are likely to set about reviving their protest movement in the subsequent years and imitating their Hong Kong peers, especially if the KMT warms up relations too fast with the mainland. Ultimately these points suggest that Xi Jinping will strive to avoid a violent crackdown in Hong Kong. A crackdown would be the surest way for him to harm the KMT in the Taiwanese election and to hasten the rebuilding of U.S.-Taiwan security ties. Call The President The best argument for Xi to lie low and avoid a larger crisis in Greater China is that it would unify the West and its allies against China. So far Xi’s foreign policy has not been so aggressive as to lead to diplomatic isolation. Europe is maintaining a studied neutrality due to its own differences with the United States; Asian neighbors are wary of provoking Chinese sanctions or military threats. A humanitarian crisis in Hong Kong or a “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” would change that. For markets, the best-case scenario is that Xi Jinping exercises restraint. This would help Hong Kong protests lose steam, North Korean diplomacy get back on track, and Taiwanese independence sentiment simmer down. China would be more likely to halt U.S. tariffs and tech sanctions, settle a short-term trade agreement, and delay the upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. China would still face adverse long-term political trends in both the U.S. and Taiwan, but an immediate crisis would be averted. The worst-case scenario is that Xi indulges his ambition. Hong Kong protests could explode, relations with Taiwan would deteriorate, and U.S.-China relations would move more rapidly in their downward spiral. Trade talks could collapse. Xi Jinping would face the possibility of a unified Western front, instability within Greater China, and a global recession. This might get rid of Donald Trump, but it would not get rid of the U.S. Congress, Navy, or Department of Defense. The choice seems pretty clear. Xi, like Trump, faces constraints that should motivate a tactical retreat from confrontation, at least after October 1. While this does not necessarily mean a settled trade agreement, it does suggest at least a ceasefire or truce. Our GeoRisk indicators show that market-based political risk in Taiwan – and less so South Korea – moves in keeping with global economic policy uncertainty. The underlying U.S.-China strategic confrontation and trade war are driving both (Chart 22). A deterioration in this region has global consequences. Chart 22U.S.-China Strategic Conflict Fuels Global Economic Uncertainty And Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk In Tandem Xi is a markedly aggressive “strongman” Chinese leader who has not been afraid to model his leadership on that of Chairman Mao. He could still overplay his hand. This is why we maintain that the odds of a U.S.-China trade agreement remain 40%, though we are prepared to upgrade that probability if Trump and Xi make pro-market decisions. Investment Implications On the three-month tactical horizon, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy is paring back our tactical safe-haven trades: we are closing our “Doomsday Basket” of long gold and Swiss bonds for a gain of 13.6%, while maintaining our simple gold portfolio hedge going forward. Trump has not yet decisively staged his tactical retreat on trade policy, while rising political risk in Greater China increases uncertainty over Xi Jinping’s next moves. On the cyclical horizon, the above suggests that there is a light at the end of the tunnel – if both Trump and Xi recognize their political constraints. This means that there is still a political and geopolitical basis to reinforce BCA’s House View to remain optimistic on global and U.S. equities over the next 12 months, with the potential for non-U.S. equities to recover and bond yields to reverse their deep dive.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Negotiations between Trump and Xi are slated for September in Washington. There is a prospect for Trump to hold another summit with Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September and at the APEC summit in Chile in mid-November. 2 Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, while Taiwan is recognized as a province or territory.

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Highlights So What? Maintain a cautious stance on Turkish currency and risk assets. Why? Following the AKP’s defeat in Istanbul, Erdogan has doubled down on unorthodox economic policies. Improvements in the current account balance are temporary. Unless investor sentiment is meaningfully repaired, the lira will resume its decline in 2020. In the meantime, tensions with the West – especially the U.S. – will remain elevated. The imposition of secondary sanctions from the U.S. is likely. Feature U.S. President Donald Trump is wavering in the trade war, which is ostensibly positive news for global risk assets that are selling off dramatically amid very gloomy expectations about the near future. The question is whether the delay is too little, too late to halt the slide in financial markets in the near term. The reason to be optimistic is that interest rates have fallen and the global monetary policy “put” is fully in effect. Moreover, it is irrefutable now that President Trump is sensitive to the negative financial effects of the trade war. He is delaying new tariffs on some of the remaining $300 billion worth of imports from China not simply because consumer price inflation has ticked up but more fundamentally because the tightening of financial conditions increases the risk of a recession. A president can survive a small increase in inflation but not a big increase in unemployment. The reason to be pessimistic is that global economic expectations are threatening the crisis levels of 2008 (Chart 1) and Trump’s tariff delay offers cold comfort. His administration has not delayed all the tariffs, and the delay lasts only three months. Rather than renew the license for U.S. companies to do business with Chinese telecom giant Huawei, his Commerce Department has deferred any decision – leaving uncertainty to fester in the all-important tech sector. Chart 1Global Economic Expectations Near Crisis Levels Chart 2More China Stimulus Needed To Prevent EM Breakdown Beneath the surface is the fact that China’s money-and-credit growth faltered in July, suggesting that negative sentiment is still suppressing credit demand and preventing policy stimulus from having as big of a bang as in 2015-16. The late-July Politburo meeting signaled a more accommodative turn in policy, as we have expected, and BCA’s China strategist Jing Sima expects more fiscal stimulus to be announced after the October 1 National Day celebration. But high-beta economies and assets will suffer in the meantime – especially emerging market assets (Chart 2). Emerging markets are also seeing geopolitical risks rise across the board – and with the exception of China and Brazil, these risks are underrated by markets: Greater China: Beijing is getting closer to intervening in Hong Kong with police or military force. Such a crackdown will increase the odds of a confrontation with Taiwan and a backlash across the region and world, meaning that East Asian currencies in particular have more room to break down. India: The escalation in Kashmir is not a “red herring.” A single terrorist attack in India blamed on Pakistan could trigger a dangerous military standoff that hurts rather than helps Indian equities, unlike the heavily dramatized standoff ahead of the election earlier this year. Russia: Large-scale protests, overshadowed by Hong Kong, highlight domestic instability amid falling oil prices. These developments bode ill for Russian currency and equities. We will return to these risks in the coming weeks. This week we offer a special report on Turkey, where political risk is becoming extremely underrated as the lira rallies despite a further deterioration in governance (Chart 3). Chart 3Political Risks Are Underrated In Turkey Too Early To Write Off Erdogan “Whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey … Whoever loses Istanbul, loses Turkey.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has had a tough year. The March 31 local elections – especially the rerun election for mayor of Istanbul – dealt the party its biggest electoral losses since it emerged as the country’s dominant political force in 2002 (Chart 4). The elections came to be seen as a referendum on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and thus raise the question of whether the party’s strongman leader is in decline – and what that might mean for emerging market investors. Erdogan’s grip on power has long been overrated – it is his vulnerability that has driven him to such extremes of policy over the past decade. The Gezi Park protests of 2013 and the attempted military coup of 2016 revealed significant strains of internal opposition in the aftermath of the Great Recession. With each case of dissent, the AKP responded by stimulating the economy and tightening state control over society (Chart 5). But this strategy faltered last year when monetary policy finally became overextended, the currency collapsed, and the country slid into recession. The opposition finally had its moment. The AKP is less a source of unity. As a consequence, the AKP is less a source of unity among Turkish voters. Both its share of seats in parliament and the overall level of party concentration in the Turkish parliament have declined since 2002 (Chart 6). Were it not for its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the AKP would not have gained a majority in the 2018 parliamentary election. The AKP’s popular base consists of conservative, rural, and religious voters. This bloc is losing influence in parliament relative to centrist and left-wing parties (Chart 7). Moreover, the share of Turks identifying with political Islam, while still the largest grouping, is declining. Those who identify with more secular Turkish nationalism are on the rise (Chart 8). Does this shift entail a major turn in national policy? Will a new party emerge to challenge the AKP at last? Chart 8Secular Nationalism Is On The Rise There has long been speculation that former AKP leaders such as former Turkish president Abdullah Gul, former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and former deputy prime minister Ali Babacan might form a political alternative. The latter resigned from the AKP on July 8, reviving speculation that a rival party could emerge that is capable of combining disillusioned AKP voters with the broader opposition movement at a time when Erdogan’s vulnerability has been made plain. However, the opposition is likely getting ahead of itself. The ruling party still has many tools at its disposal. Its share of seats in parliament is more than double that of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). It is also viewed favorably in rural areas, and support for Erdogan there will not shift easily. Moreover, despite the negative electoral trend, the AKP has a lot of enthusiasm among its supporters – it is the party with the highest favorability among its own voters (Chart 9). The March election served as a wakeup call for the AKP – a warning not to take its power for granted. Erdogan can still salvage his position. The next election is not due until June 2023, leaving the party with four years to recuperate. While polls for the 2023 parliamentary election paint an ominous sign (Chart 10), they are very early, and the key will be whether Erdogan can divide the opposition and reconnect with his voter base. Above all, this will depend on what changes he makes to economic policy. Chart 10Erdogan Needs To Reconnect With Voter Base Bottom Line: Erdogan’s and the AKP’s popularity is waning, but it is too soon to write them off. The key question is how Erdogan will handle economic policy now that there are chinks in his armor. Doubling Down On Erdoganomics The fluctuation in the lira “is a U.S.-led operation by the West to corner Turkey … The inflation rate will drop as we lower interest rates.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan Erdogan needs to see the economy back to recovery in order to secure his success in the next election. A survey conducted early this year reveals that Turks view unemployment, the high cost of living, and the depreciation of the lira as the most significant problems facing Turkey, with 27% of respondents indicating that unemployment is the most important problem facing the country (Chart 11). More importantly, Turks do not have much confidence in the government’s ability to manage this pain – only one-third of respondents viewed economic policies as successful, a 14pp decline from the previous year. This highlights the need for Erdogan to revive confidence in Turkey’s policymaking institutions and to deliver on the economic front.     The key is how Erdogan will handle economic policy. However, it is still too early to call for a sustainable improvement in the Turkish economy as many of the same fundamental imbalances continue to pose risks. While the current account has improved significantly – even registering a surplus in May – the improvement will not endure (Chart 12). On the one hand, the weaker lira has made exports more attractive relative to global competition. However, the improvement in the external balance is in large part due to weaker imports which are now more expensive for Turkey’s residents and have fallen by 19% y/y in 1H2019. Shrinking imports also reflect weak domestic demand which has been weighed down by tight monetary conditions (Chart 13). Chart 12Current Account Improvement Will Not Endure Chart 13Tight Monetary Conditions Weighed On Domestic Demand What is more, portfolio inflows which in the past were necessary to offset the large current account deficit, have collapsed (Chart 14). Were it not for the improvement in the trade balance, the central bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) would have experienced a pronounced decline in its foreign reserves, and currency pressures would have been significant. A meaningful improvement in investor sentiment – which will remain cautious on the back of economic and geopolitical risks – is a necessary precondition for the return of these inflows. Nevertheless, the current account deficit will likely remain narrow in the second half of the year as the trade balance improves on the back of a weak lira and imports remain depressed due to soft domestic demand. This will keep the lira supported over this period. Although risks from a wide current account deficit have been temporarily put off, years of foreign debt accumulation are a hazard to a sustainable improvement in the lira. Foreign debt obligations (FDO) due over the coming 12 months are extremely elevated at $167 billion (Chart 15). It is not clear that they can be paid off. While the FDO figure is overly pessimistic as some of these debts will be rolled over, net central bank foreign exchange reserves can cover only 2.7% of these obligations. This poses downside risks on the lira at a time when inflows have not yet recovered.1 Moreover, unorthodox economic policies will eventually reverse any improvement in the currency. Chart 14Financial Account Does Not Lend Support Chart 15FDO Pose A Risk To The Currency While the 4 years between now and the next election could be an opportunity to embark on unpopular structural reforms that will improve the outlook by the time voting season rolls in, Erdogan has instead doubled down on his current strategy. Less than two weeks after the results of the Istanbul election rerun, CBRT governor Murat Cetinkaya was removed by presidential decree. A month later, key CBRT staff were dismissed.2 At his first monetary policy committee meeting as governor on July 25, Murat Uysal slashed the one-week repo rate by 425bps. Given Erdogan’s outspoken distaste for high interest rates, the president’s consolidation of power over economic decision making implies that the outlook for easier monetary policy is now guaranteed. However, the ramifications of this dovish shift will be concerning for voters. The depreciating lira was singled out as the most important economic problem facing Turkey by the largest number of survey respondents (Chart 16). Erdogan’s pursuit of dovish policies despite popular opinion shows that he is doubling down on unorthodox policy despite popular opinion. Monetary easing threatens to unwind the current account improvement and ultimately de-stabilize the lira. Assuming that the banking sector does not hold back the supply of credit to the private sector, lower rates will generate a pickup in demand which will raise imports and widen the current account deficit. Unless there is a marked improvement in investor sentiment – which will remain tainted by the erosion of central bank independence and increased tensions with the West – a return in portfolio inflows to pre-2018 levels is unlikely. As a consequence the lira will begin to soften anew in 2020. The lira will soften anew in 2020. While inflation will subside as the lira stabilizes this year, it will likely remain elevated relative to pre-2018 levels – in the 10% to 15% range. Contrary to Erdoganomics, traditional economic theory postulates that interest rate cuts pose upside pressure on prices. The resurgence in domestic demand will occur against a backdrop of rising wages (Chart 17). Chart 17Price Pressures Will Persist With foreign currency reserves running low, the CBRT recently adopted several measures to discourage locals from exchanging their liras for foreign currency. These efforts reflect attempts to mitigate the negative impact of monetary easing on the lira, and to ensure FX reserves are supported: A 1-percentage point increase in the reserve requirement ratio for foreign currency deposits and participation funds. A 1-percentage point reduction in the interest rate on dollar-denominated required reserves, reserve options and free reserves held at the bank. An increase in the tax on some foreign exchange sales to 0.1% from zero. These measures make it more expensive for banks to hold foreign currency, incentivizing lira holdings instead. They also raise the CBRT’s foreign reserves highlighting the downside risks on these holdings and the lira. However, given that these measures boost CBRT reserves only superficially – rather than mirroring an improvement in the underlying economic conditions – they highlight that need for policy tightening to defend the lira, even as the CBRT officially pursues an accommodative path. Bottom Line: The Turkish economy will be extremely relevant to Erdogan’s fate in 2023. However with large foreign debt obligations, a rate cutting cycle underway, and foreign investors who remain uneasy, the case for Turkey’s economic recovery – especially amid turbulent global conditions – is weak. In the meantime, Erdogan will continue to blame external factors for the nation’s malaise. Don’t Bet On Trump-Erdogan Friendship “Being Asian and in Asia is as important as being European and in Europe for us.” Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu For several years Erdogan has attempted to distract the populace from the country’s economic slide by adopting an aggressive foreign policy, particularly toward the West. The immediate cause is Syria, where Turkey has fundamental security interests that clash with those of the U.S. and Europe. But tensions also stem from Erdogan’s economic and political instability. This aggressive foreign policy has not changed in the wake of the AKP’s electoral loss. Erdogan is continuing to test the U.S.’s and EU’s limits and the result is likely to be surprise events, such as U.S.-imposed sanctions, that hurt Turkey’s economy and financial assets. Erdogan clashes with the West both because of substantive regional disagreements and because it plays well domestically. Turks increasingly see the U.S. and other formal NATO allies as a threat, while looking more favorably upon American rivals like Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela (Chart 18). The U.S., meanwhile, is expanding the use of “secondary sanctions” to impose costs on states that make undesirable deals with its rivals, and Turkey is now in its sights. The reason is Erdogan’s decision to purchase the S400 missile defense system from Russia. This decision exemplifies the breakdown in the U.S.-Turkish alliance and Turkey’s search for alternative partners and allies. The arms sale is likely – eventually – to trigger secondary sanctions under the U.S. International Emergency Economic Powers Act and especially the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Washington has already imposed sanctions on China for buying the same weapons from Russia. Erdogan recently accepted the first delivery of components for the S400s, which are supposed to go live by April 2020. He stuck with this decision in disregard of Washington’s warnings. He has a solid base of popular support across political parties for this act of foreign policy and military independence from the U.S. (Chart 19). But the full consequences have not yet been felt. President Trump’s response is muted thus far. He banned Turkish pilots from the U.S. F-35 program and training but has not yet imposed sanctions due to his special relationship with Erdogan and ongoing negotiations over Syria. Syria is the root of the breakdown in Turkish-American relations since 2014. Washington and Ankara have clashed repeatedly over their preferred means of intervening into the Syrian civil war and fighting the Islamic State. The U.S. relies on the Syrian Democratic Forces, led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which are affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK is based in Turkey and both the U.S. and Turkey designate it as a “terrorist organization” due to its militant activities in its long-running struggle for autonomy from Turkey. Turkey has intervened in Syria west of the Euphrates River and has repeatedly threatened to conduct deeper strikes against the Kurds. The latter would put U.S. troops in harm’s way and could result in lost leverage for Western forces seeking to maintain their YPG allies and force an acceptable settlement to the Syrian conflict. There is a basis for a deal between Presidents Trump and Erdogan that could keep sanctions from happening. Trump is attempting to wash its hands of Syria to fulfill a promise of limiting U.S. costs in wars abroad. Meanwhile an aggressive intervention in Syria is not a popular option in Turkey, which is why Erdogan has not acted on threats to seize a larger swath of territory (Chart 20). As a result, the U.S. and Turkey recently formed a joint operation center to coordinate and manage “safe zones” for Syrian refugees. If they can manage the gray area on the Turkish-Syrian border, the Trump administration can continue to prepare for withdrawal while preventing Erdogan from taking too much Kurdish territory. The tradeoff is clear, but similar agreements have fallen apart. First, the U.S. Congress is ready to impose sanctions over the S400s and Trump is under pressure to punish Turkey for undermining NATO and dealing with the Russians. Second, the Trump administration has not found an acceptable solution to the Syrian imbroglio that makes full withdrawal possible. If Trump becomes convinced that the risks of a total and rapid withdrawal from Syria are greater than the rewards (as many of his GOP allies staunchly believe), then he has less incentive to protect Erdogan. Meanwhile Erdogan could still decide he needs to plunge deeper into Syria to counteract the YPG. Or he could retaliate against any sanctions over the S400s and provoke a broader tit-for-tat exchange. He has threatened to cancel orders for Boeing aircraft worth $10 billion. Clearly U.S. sanctions will cause the lira to fall and send Turkey into another bout of financial turmoil. In the meantime Turkey’s relations with Europe also pose risks. While the refugee crisis has abated, in great part due to Turkish cooperation, other disagreements are still problematic: The EU is not upgrading Turkey’s customs union and both sides know that Turkey is not eligible for EU membership anytime soon. In response to what the EU has deemed as illegal drilling for oil and gas off the coast of Cyprus, the EU called off high-level political meetings with Turkey and suspended EUR 145.8 million in pre-accession aid. EU foreign ministers have also put off talks on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement between the two parties which would have led to an increase in passengers using Turkish airports as a transit hub. In addition, EU ministers asked the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey, which amounted to EUR 358.8 million last year. Erdogan is taking a bolder approach to Cyprus. He has decided to send a fourth ship to drill for natural gas in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Eastern Mediterranean. The purpose is to rally support for his government by calling on the public’s strong allegiance to Turkish Cypriots (Chart 21). The problem is that a confrontation sought as a domestic distraction could provoke negative policy reactions from the EU (or the U.S., which is reconsidering its arms embargo on the Greek Cypriot side). Relations with the West would get worse. Chart 22... But Turkey Cannot Afford To Flout The EU Turkey cannot afford to flout the U.S. and EU. Its economy is dependent on Europe (Chart 22). And the U.S. still underwrites Turkey’s NATO membership and access to the global financial system. The problem is that Erdogan is an ambitious and unorthodox leader and he has clearly wagered that he can rally domestic support through various confrontations with Western policies. This means that for the immediate future the country is more likely to clash with Western nations than it is to recognize its own limits. Political risks are frontloaded and investors should be cautious before trying to snap up the depressed lira or Turkish government bonds. Bottom Line: Tensions with the West – especially the U.S. – will likely lead to economic sanctions. While there is a basis for Presidents Trump and Erdogan to avoid a falling out, it is not reliable enough to underpin a constructive investment position – especially given Erdogan has not changed course in the wake of this year’s significant electoral loss. Investment Conclusions Chart 23Optimism On Lira Amid Unresolved Risks The lira has rallied by 3.6% since the Istanbul election. It has risen 0.3% since the replacement of CBRT Governor Murat Cetinkaya and rallied further despite the sacking of the central bank’s chief economist and other high-level staff (Chart 23). Given that the market knows that the central bank reshuffle entails interest rate cuts, is this a clear signal that the lira has hit a firm bottom and cannot fall further? Turkey is more likely to clash with Western nations.  We doubt it. First, Erdogan’s doubling down on unorthodox policy threatens the recovery in the currency and risk assets and his aggressive foreign policy raises the risk of sanctions and further economic pain. Second, although Turkey is not overly exposed to China, it is heavily exposed to Europe, which is on the brink of a full-fledged recession and depends heavily on the Chinese credit cycle – which had another disappointment in July. German manufacturing PMI has been sinking further below the 50 boom-bust mark since the beginning of the year, and the economy contracted in 2Q2019 (Chart 24). Chart 24Global Backdrop Not Yet Supportive Chart 25Improvement In Spread Will Be Fleeting Given these domestic and global economic risks and geopolitical tensions, we expect any improvement in the sovereign spread to be fleeting (Chart 25). While the lira may experience temporary improvement, pressures will re-emerge in 2020 as the lagged impact of Erdogan’s pursuit of growth at all costs re-emerge. Stay on the sidelines as any improvement in the near term is fraught with risk.     Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy roukayai@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Country Insights: Indonesia, Turkey, And The UAE” May 2, 2019, ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Among those removed are the central bank’s chief economist Hakan Kara as well as the research and monetary policy general manager, markets general manager, and banking and financial institutions general manager.