固定収入

Highlights Today, we are sending out a previously scheduled Special Report, highlighting our thoughts on the how to assess the impact of China on global bond markets. This is an important topic that we hope you will find of great interest. We will not be offended, however, if that report sits in your inboxes for a day or two while the world awaits the results of today's U.S. Presidential election. Feature Global financial markets have been subject to extraordinary volatility over the past couple of weeks as the election campaign has drawn to a close. Investors have had to deal with the steady inflow of shifting poll results, overbearing media punditry, surprising FBI letters and wild conspiracy theories, all while trying to price the risks associated with two of the most polarizing presidential candidates in U.S. history. The recent narrowing of Hillary Clinton's lead in the polls has forced investors to seriously consider the possibility of a President Donald J. Trump, with all the change from the status quo that he represents. Given how markets have reacted to Trump closing the gap with Clinton - falling equity prices, higher volatility, lower bond yields and a weaker U.S. dollar - a Trump win could trigger a true risk-off market rout, with global investors wanting to avoid been burned by another political surprise after Brexit. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy still view a narrow Clinton victory as the most likely outcome, with admittedly lower conviction levels than usual for such an important election. Such is the problem of making predictions when polls are within margins of error. However, given the well-understood realities of the U.S. Electoral College map and the still-uphill climb needed for Trump to win, the result that would catch investors most off-guard would be The Donald pulling off the upset. From our perspective at BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy, a Clinton victory would keep the global economy on its current positive growth track in the near-term. This would shift bond investors' focus back over to the Fed and a likely December rate hike. However, a risk-off market move after a Trump win would represent the biggest risk to our current portfolio recommendations: We are positioned for rising global bond yields via an overall below-benchmark duration stance, given our view that we are in a cyclical growth upturn that is also pushing global inflation higher (more details on China's contribution to that can be found in the Special Report sent out today). In terms of regional bond allocation, we are favoring the areas with the lowest inflation rates and most credible dovish central banks, via an above-benchmark tilt in core Europe and a neutral stance on Japan and Canada. We are underweight the countries where central bankers are either in the process of raising rates (the U.S.) or will soon face a decision to tighten policy in the face of strong growth and rising inflation pressures (the U.K., Australia). We are also underweight Peripheral European debt (Italy, Spain, Portugal) versus Germany due to our concerns over decelerating growth in the Periphery combined with the ongoing stresses on Euro Area banks. We are overweight inflation protection (via linkers and CPI swaps) in the U.S. and U.K. where we see the greatest potential for rising inflation expectations. Within global credit markets, we are maintaining a defensive stance via underweights in U.S., Euro Area and Emerging Markets High-Yield (which are all overvalued and overlevered). Within Investment Grade corporates, we are only maintaining a neutral stance in the U.S. and above-benchmark tilts in the Euro Area and U.K. We are also neutral on Emerging Market hard currency debt, both sovereigns and corporates. In the event that Trump pulls out the win tonight, we would expect our overall below-benchmark duration call to suffer if bond yields declines in a risk-off move. However, our "break-even" level on that call allows some cushion to stick with the underweight, as we initiated the recommendation back in July when the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield was just below 1.60%. A return to those levels would be a 25bp decline from yesterday's closing level of 1.83%, which would be a massive move if it happened in a short period of time immediately after Trump was declared the winner. Yet if such large move in yields were to occur, it would almost certainly be in the context of a rout in global equity markets. Our underweight stance on high-yield corporates and Peripheral Europe would perform very well there. Our generally cautious stance on higher-quality corporates and Emerging Markets would likely cause minor hits only via our overweights in Europe, but with those markets supported by the ongoing central bank buying by the ECB and Bank of England, the losses should be relatively well-contained. There is also a risk that our overweights in inflation protection in the U.S. and U.K. would underperform, especially if the market rout turns into a lasting shock to global growth and inflation expectations. That will be difficult to determine in the immediate aftermath of a Trump win. Summing it all up, there are enough offsetting positions within our recommended portfolio to not suggest any changes into tonight's election. Let us hope that the election result is decisive enough that a winner can be declared tonight and this period of U.S. political uncertainty can end, whoever wins. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product

特別レポート

Highlights There is an eternal duality between bulls and bears on the Chinese economy. We prefer to stay away from the debate, and simply monitor the situation while adjusting our portfolio recommendations as the situation evolves. From the perspective of BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS), and in the short term, five key questions on China influence our duration stance and our core bond portfolio allocation recommendations. To answer these questions, we are following specific indicators, laid out in this Special Report. Together, those form the "GFIS China Checklist". Several of our financial stress indicators reveal the possibility that China's macro stability could be starting to fray a bit at the edges. These trends could become worrisome if they linger or re-appear. China's cyclical growth impulses are positive, suggesting a tailwind for the global economy, and upward pressure on inflation and bond yields in the near-term. At the moment, the "China Factor" reinforces our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance and our bias towards underweighting bond markets that are most exposed to Chinese demand and higher commodity prices (i.e. Australian government debt), while also favoring inflation-linked bonds over nominals across the developed world. Table 1The GFIS China Checklist Feature Chart 1Getting China Right Is Crucial At the macro level, several factors have a disproportionate impact on the direction of global bond yields. The evolution of monetary policies in the developed economies, globalization, new technologies, demographic changes and productivity trends are among the themes that top our list. A positive or negative shift in these factors could significantly alter the path of global growth and inflation and, by the same token, bond yields. In this Special Report, we will address the "China factor". Through its massive aggregate demand, this huge country can tip the global macro landscape into equilibrium or disequilibrium (Chart 1).1 As such, closely monitoring its developments is crucial for investors to correctly position for/against the cyclical drivers of bond markets. Unfortunately, understanding China's dynamics and seeing through the opacity of its policy-setting process is extremely challenging. Experts on the matter often disagree (even here at BCA!) on the complex issues, and sometimes even the most basic assumptions, underlying a view on China. In this Special Report, our goal is not to try to untangle the ultimate truth about China. Instead, we will cut through the fog and offer a simple framework to monitor its economy and associated risks. From an investment perspective, getting China right comes down to answering five keys questions: Is China's macro stability starting to deteriorate? Are China's growth impulses positive? Is Chinese economic momentum accelerating? Are China's business fundamentals evolving positively? Is the outlook for Chinese household consumption improving? To answer those, we follow simple indicators, laid out in this Report. Together, they form the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) "China Checklist" (Table 1). The Eternal Duality In Chinese philosophy, the Yin - the dark swirl - represents shadows, the moon and the trough of a wave. In the investment world, members of the Yin camp view China's great accomplishments of the last 30 years with a doubtful eye. In its economic miracle, they see fragility and unsustainability. Those doubters are quick to raise the multiple structural problems such as regional disparities, income inequality, pollution, workers' dissatisfaction, and the unfair hukou2 system, among others. China' high debt levels and widespread, institutionalized misallocation of capital usually anchor their gloomy view. On the other end of the spectrum, the Yang - the light swirl - represents the sun and growth. For members of the Yang camp, China's policymakers have a grand master plan that will lead China to dominate economically and geopolitically for decades to come. Discarding the potential credit addiction problem, they believe that China should continue to invest at a record pace, arguing that investments will eventually lead to faster productivity, which will lift potential growth and overall prosperity. They posit that leveraging is simply a natural process for a fast-growing country with massive excess savings. To their despondency, China bears fail to recognize the merits of the country's un-paralleled meritocratic political system and the communal dynamic that makes it unique. Where does GFIS stand in this debate? Both camps have legitimate arguments and could be right in the end. The key thing about the Yin/Yang symbol is that both the black and white contain a little bit of each other. In the end, this duality might just be a healthy dynamic where one cannot exist without its opposite. For us, it leaves an important dilemma. On one hand, betting on a Chinese hard landing that never materializes could turn out to be a widow-maker trade.3 On the other hand, ignoring China's structural issues and assuming that everything will be all right is a strategy that can be prone to devastating disappointments. Instead of trying to predict the end game, we will focus our efforts on assessing how the economic momentum and the risks are evolving at each particular moment. This will inform our overall views on global growth and inflation and, in the end, the direction of bond yields and credit spreads. Bottom Line: There is eternal debate between the Yin and Yang camp in regards to China's future. We prefer to stay away from the debate, and will monitor the situation through specific indicators and adjust our investment recommendations accordingly. Is China's Macro Stability Starting To Deteriorate? Maybe Nobody knows for sure when or if China will go through an acute period of turbulence related to stresses in its financial system. Nonetheless, to properly calibrate our duration call and the pro-cyclical bets in our recommended fixed income portfolio, we need to assess if the stress points are flashing red, and to what degree. Below, we propose a set of indicators that could eventually signal a bubbling credit-related event (Chart 2 & Chart 3). Chart 2Is China's Macro Stability Deteriorating? Part I Chart 3Is China's Macro Stability Deteriorating? Part II In aggregate, they warn that China has been experiencing some instability lately. This should be taken seriously and temper any China optimism. The Renminbi If China goes through a period of instability, its currency, the Renminbi (RMB), would deteriorate as money tries to escape through any cracks in the financial system or real economy. The RMB has had several episodes of rapid depreciation (by China's standards) over the past 18 months which could be a bad omen. That said, since China's policymakers still largely have the capacity to control the evolution of its currency, the RMB could end up reflecting a serious capital outflow problem only far after the fact. Nonetheless, it is still something to follow closely. Hibor/Shibor rates When a financial system goes through episodes of turbulence, lenders tend to freeze operations until the cause is clear. Banks stop lending to each other and overnight interest rates tend to spike. It is possible that the RMB-based Hong Kong Interbank Offered rate (Hibor) or the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (Shibor) can offer such a signal. Since mid-2015, the Hibor has experienced three such episodes. In each case, they proved to be temporary - rates came down shortly after each spike - but we still view this with a wary eye. Since China has a closed capital account and maintains a stable currency through several interlinked instruments, it is possible that the overnight lending market might not be as relevant a signal as it would be for countries with open capital accounts. Our colleagues at the BCA China Investment Strategy have recently been sanguine about the significance of those spikes.4 Regardless, we will keep this indicator on our list of possible China stress points. Equity prices of global banks with heavy links to China & Emerging Markets Capital market data are often the first to hint that financial stress is rising. In China's case, the stock prices of major global banks that are highly exposed to China and, more broadly, emerging markets might play that role. Two such banks are Standard Chartered and HSBC. If China's internal dynamic eventually becomes shaky, the relative equity performance of those banks could quickly erode.5 For now, this does not seem to be the case, as their stocks are performing well; the stress appears to be contained. Capital outflows If China's economy is about to crumble under a pile of debt, money will leak through the cracks. Part of the money flowing out will eventually trickle through to safe assets in the rest of the world, like U.S. Treasuries and non-Chinese property markets. Since mid-2014, China capital flight has been large and clearly represents a potential source of worry. Official Holdings of U.S. Treasuries If the Chinese economy were to deteriorate meaningfully, or if there were potential undercapitalization issues stemming from any buildup of bad loans within the Chinese banking system, the authorities might be driven to sell some of China's enormous stock of U.S. Treasuries and "invest" the money domestically. Lately, China has been a net seller of U.S. Treasuries, which could be a potential sign of trouble but could also simply be the result of China having less of a need to accumulate U.S. dollar assets to fight inherent appreciation pressures on the RMB. Policy Uncertainty Capital flight out of China could be related to many factors. Pessimism towards the future or lack of domestic investment opportunities could force savings outward. Another possibility is increasing policy uncertainty and/or brewing political instability among China's leadership. Lately, China's Policy Uncertainty Index has skyrocketed.6 Before pushing the panic button, however, one has to consider mitigating factors. It is possible, considering the after-effects of the shocking U.K. Brexit referendum and the increased odds of a Donald Trump U.S. Presidency, that this jump in the China uncertainty index has been more externally than domestically driven. Bottom Line: Several of our financial stress indicators reveal the possibility that China's macro stability could be starting to fray a bit at the edges. These trends could become worrisome if they linger or re-appear. Are China's Growth Impulses Positive? Yes Economic momentum can develop as a result of several growth impulses. Below, we propose five of them (Chart 4 & Chart 5). Currently, they are trending favorably, for the most part, and suggest that China is in the expansionary phase of its economic cycle. If sustained, this tendency should have a considerable impact on global growth, inflation and bond yields. Chart 4Are The Growth Impulses Positive? Part I Chart 5Are The Growth Impulses Positive? Part II The monetary conditions index Both the movement in policy interest rates and the currency can influence a country's monetary conditions, which in turn impact the backdrop for growth. Since the beginning of 2015, China's policy interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio for banks have been cut several times. The Renminbi has also depreciated during the same period. Combined, these factors have eased monetary conditions, which has been a positive development for the Chinese economy. Money supply growth In most countries, a more rapidly growing money supply usually leads to greater credit expansion, which eventually leads to faster economic growth. Again, since the beginning of 2015, Chinese money supply growth has shot up markedly. This should sustain credit/growth expansion in the coming months. Corporate bond yields An abundance of money can be of little help to an economy if corporations cannot finance themselves at a reasonable yield. Historically, the average Chinese corporate bond yield has been a leading indicator of industrial output growth. As the corporate yield decreases, financing becomes more attractive and a credit boom could follow, resulting in increased economic activity. Since 2015, Chinese corporate bond yields have literally collapsed, seemingly following the trend in non-Chinese corporate bond yields. If history is any guide, this should be setting the stage for accelerating output growth. One caveat: China's private sector debt servicing ratio might have reached too high a level, such that it has reduced the ability for companies to benefit from lower corporate bond yields moving forward. This could explain why industrial output growth has not gained ground as corporate bond yields have fallen. The credit impulse Credit origination has been a vital part of China's economic success since 2000 and even more so since the 2008 global financial crisis. Our Emerging Markets Strategy team has created the credit impulse indicator - which is the second derivative of credit growth - to assess the condition of the credit impulse.7 This simple indicator has proven to be one of our more reliable leading indicators of economic growth (for China and for many other countries) Of late, this indicator has moved into positive territory. Possibly, easy monetary conditions, stronger money supply growth and lower corporate bond yields have helped push the impulse upward. We interpret that as a very powerful signal for future Chinese growth. Again, a cautionary note is warranted. For a while now, Chinese credit growth has been faster than nominal GDP growth, potentially representing an unsustainable dynamic. Hence, it is likely that the latest surge proves to be only temporary, as credit growth slows to a more desirable pace.8 So, we won't get too excited just yet. Fiscal thrust Outside the credit channel, the Chinese government embodies another major contributor to the growth impulse. Considering its relatively low debt levels, the government has the means to sustain the economy via increased fiscal expenditures, especially via infrastructure investments. Lately, to alleviate the pain from the reforms and restructuring of certain parts of the economy,9 the government has engineered a decent fiscal thrust. Many infrastructure projects have been laid out, growing at a rate up of 15% in the last four years. As long as China continues along a long-term restructuring path, reducing that rapid pace of government spending will prove to be difficult. Bottom Line: Chinese growth impulses are currently positive. Is Chinese Economic Momentum Accelerating? Yes An open liquidity tap and a positive fiscal thrust should lead to increased Chinese demand. Below, we provide six indicators showing that this occurred lately (Chart 6 and Chart 7). The synchronicity of their upward acceleration reinforces our optimism about the Chinese cyclical outlook. Chart 6Is Chinese Economic Momentum Accelerating? Part I Chart 7Is Chinese Economic Momentum Accelerating? Part II Keqiang index Since Chinese economic growth data could be described as "man-made" and potentially unreliable, an index of Premier Li Keqiang's favorite economic indicators has been used, since it was leaked to the press several years ago, to appraise the true state of the economy. Cargo volumes, electricity consumption and loans disbursed by banks comprise this indicator. In the last twelve months, the Keqiang index has hooked decisively higher. The index has a flaw - the declining role of banks loans in overall new credit - but it is still useful, and it corroborates the positive signal sent by the growth impulses mentioned previously in this report. Excavator sales Traditionally, the construction sector has been at the core of China's growth miracle. To gauge the evolution of this sector, the growth rate of excavator sales has been very reliable. After being negative since mid-2011, it has surged in 2016. With a lift off of such magnitude, one could doubt the validity of this data. However, it has followed a similar spurt seen in money supply and a burst in the "projects started" capital spending growth rate. Residential floor space sold The state of the construction sector can also be assessed through the time series of residential floor space sold, which tends to lead new housing starts by several months. Again, since the beginning of the year, this indicator has been trending higher, echoing the message sent by excavator sales growth. Import volume growth No other time series better expresses the state of China's demand than its import volume growth. If the global growth and inflation outlook were to get a boost, Chinese imports would need to gain positive momentum. Lately, they have accelerated; this constitutes a very positive sign. CRB Raw Industrials prices Since China is by far the biggest consumer of commodities globally (see Chart 1, on page 2), China's demand indicators should be correlated with global commodity prices. In theory, both should move in a similar fashion to validate one another. This year, the CRB Raw Industrials price index has indeed stabilized and confirmed the positive growth dynamic observed through other indicators. The Chinese yield curve The yield curve has traditionally been recognized as an excellent leading indicator for most economies. It usually signals slowing growth when it flattens and steepens when growth gains momentum. China's yield curve has been especially well correlated with the Chinese PMI data, for example. Lately, China's yield curve has flattened a bit, which is not a good sign. However, until it inverts, like in 2011, 2013 and 2015, we will treat its message as neutral. Bottom Line: Chinese economic momentum is accelerating. A flattening yield curve tempers our optimism to some degree, however. Chart 8Are The Business Fundamentals Evolving Positively? Are The Business Fundamentals Evolving Positively? Yes If Chinese economic momentum truly accelerates, domestic businesses should reap the benefits and their internal dynamics should improve. As per the business indicators presented below, this is currently the case (Chart 8). Final goods producer prices Producer pricing power is crucial and it has been lacking over the last few years on a global scale. Without pricing power, capital investment and employment growth tend to stay depressed, and vice versa. Since 2012, China's final goods producer prices have been contracting. This started before the beginning of the commodities collapse in 2014 and has been hugely deflationary for the rest of the world. But this might be a story of the past; final goods producer prices have turned positive lately. This could prove a major development, if it lasts. The risk here is that the U.S. dollar appreciates - due to a Fed hike and/or a more hawkish tone going forward - pushing global commodity prices lower, which has historically depressed global producer prices. However, if the Fed treads carefully after the December rate hike that we expect, waiting for the rest of the global economy to catch up to a U.S. acceleration, the dollar could end up trending sideways. Commodity prices could then continue on the current upward trend, preventing producer price growth from relapsing back into negative territory. Cash flow ratio Leveraging during the 2009-2011 period has left many Chinese firms highly indebted, especially in the industrials, materials and real estate sectors. As debts increased, debt servicing cash flows substantially shrank during the 2011-2014 period. Fortunately, since mid-2015, this situation has reversed, with the cash flow/total liabilities ratio having increased steadily. Net earnings revisions In the end, strong profits are necessary for a healthy economy. This has been lacking globally, but even more so in China; most China MSCI equity index sectors suffer from contracting earnings per share, except consumer staples. Nonetheless, the jump higher in net earnings revisions seen this year is encouraging. Bottom Line: China's business fundamentals are evolving positively. Chart 9 Is Chinese Consumption Outlook Improving? Is the Outlook For Chinese Household Consumption Improving? Yes Ultimately, improved business conditions should lead to better job creation, strong workers' income and more robust final consumer spending. Lately, the virtuous cycles in credit, demand and the business sector have indeed trickled down to the consumers. Employment and consumption are synchronously accelerating (Chart 9). PMI Employment Index Despite the questionable quality of China's employment data - making it difficult to assess the true picture of the labor market - the employment sub-index of the overall China Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) gives a relatively reasonable reading. Since 2012, it has been trending downward. However, the fact that the latest data point rose sharply above the 12-month moving average is a good sign, perhaps indicating the cyclical downtrend in Chinese employment growth truly bottomed in 2015. Auto sales If employment growth and wages are indeed in a cyclical upturn, Chinese retail consumption growth should be thriving. This has been the case in 2016, with auto sales growth shooting up sharply. Bottom Line: The outlook for Chinese household consumption is improving. Investment Implications Chart 10Investment Implications In the analysis above, we concluded that: The possibility of eroding Chinese macro stability cannot be discarded, as financial stress points are rising. This needs close monitoring. Chinese growth impulses are, for the most part, positive. Chinese economic momentum is accelerating, but a flattening yield curve tempers our optimism. China's business fundamentals are evolving positively. The outlook for Chinese household consumption is improving. In sum, despite the reigning policy uncertainty and persistent capital outflows, the current short-term dynamics are surprisingly positive. Accordingly, and taking the overall "China factor" in isolation, the following fixed income investment recommendations should be implemented (Chart 10): Maintain a below-benchmark duration bias. There is a meaningful positive contribution to global growth and inflation from China. If the Chinese economy gathers more steam, global bond yields and inflation will also move higher. Maintain low exposure to bond markets most negatively exposed to faster Chinese growth & rising commodity prices. Our positive cyclical view on China has an impact on our core recommended bond portfolio allocation. We have been underweight Australian government bonds versus global hedged benchmarks since the summer, and China's improving demand constitutes a definite plus to this view, as it is Australia's largest export destination. We have also maintained a bias to favor inflation-linked bonds versus nominals in the major developed markets. A faster pace of Chinese goods inflation should translate into an acceleration in global traded goods prices (and inflation rates) in the coming months, to the benefit of the relative performance of linkers. Maintain a neutral stance on Emerging Market hard currency bonds. Due to a very unappealing structural backdrop, we have a negative longer-term bias towards Emerging Markets sovereign and corporate bonds. However, in July, we turned neutral, from underweight, due to the improving global cyclical outlook, especially based on what was happening in China. This move has paid off so far and the position should be maintained, even if there is some upward pressure on the U.S. dollar from a Fed rate hike next month.10 Overweight Australian Semis. Since March 2016, we have had a positive bias towards Australian Semi-government debt.11 Semis outperform Australia federal government debt during global expansionary phases, and China will continue to support the current cyclical growth upturn. Finally, the biggest risk to our view is that China's structural fragilities won't allow the current cyclical recovery to be sustained beyond the next year. Our GFIS China Checklist will help us to detect any downturn if and when it becomes apparent. Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com 1 Furceri, Jalles, and Zdzienicka (2016) perform time-varying coefficient analysis using local projection methods on a sample of 148 countries over 1990-2014, and show that spillovers from a 1 percentage point shock to China's final demand growth now have a cumulative impact on global GDP of about 0.25 percent, after one year. Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/pdf/c4.pdf 2 The hukou system was originally introduced to register China's households as part of an effort to gather population statistics. It has morphed into a government tool to control rural-urban migration flows that has made it more difficult for migrant workers to access health care or education services in China's cities. For more information, please see: http://thediplomat.com/2016/02 chinas-plan-for-orderly-hukou-reform/ 3 Here we have a thought for all those who have bet on the demise of the Japanese bond market over the years without glory. 4 For details on this issue, please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "HIBOR, Liquidity And Chinese Stocks", dated September 22, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5 For details on this issue, please see http://www.imf.org/~/media/files/publications/spillovernotes/spillovernote5 6 This is part of a global suite of indicators produced by researchers Baker, Bloom and Davis, designed to measure economic policy uncertainty for the major economies. For more information, please go to www.policyuncertainty.com. 7 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Gauging EM/China Credit Impulses", dated August 31, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 For more perspective on this idea, please see BCA Emerging Market Strategy Special Report "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 9 Massively decreased output and increased employee layoffs in the steel industry, for example. 10 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Emerging Markets Hard Currency Debt: Time For More Optimism?", dated July 12, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australian Credit: Time To Test The Waters", dated March 29, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Chart 1Targeting 2% The Fed did its best to avoid roiling markets so close to today's election, but still managed to hint at a December rate hike. The post-meeting statement was tweaked so that now only "some further evidence" rather than "further evidence" is required in order to lift the funds rate. We remain below benchmark duration in anticipation of a December rate hike. Before the end of the year we expect our 12-month discounter to reach at least 40-50bps (meaning the market will expect a further 1-2 hikes in 2017) from its current level of 28bps, and for the 10-year Treasury yield to reach 1.95-2%. While our global PMI model pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.27%, the uptrend in the 10-year yield will face severe technical resistance as it approaches 2% (Chart 1). Positioning has already moved to net short duration, signaling that the bond sell-off is becoming stretched. While a Clinton victory would all but ensure a December rate hike, a Trump victory could cause a large enough market riot that the Fed delays until 2017. This would only be a brief hiccup in the return of the 10-year yield to the 1.95-2% range, and would not signal a long-lasting trend reversal. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +56bps in October, but have already given back -26bps of those gains so far this month (Chart 2). The index option-adjusted spread is -2bps tighter than at the end of September and, at 136bps, it remains very close to its historical average. Corporate credit performance faces two immediate risks. The first is today's election and the second is the prospect of a Fed rate hike in December. A Clinton victory would likely prompt a knee-jerk rally in risk assets and virtually ensure a rate hike next month. In that case we would be inclined to further trim exposure to credit risk in the coming weeks as the rate hike approaches. Already, we recommend investors avoid the Baa credit tier within a neutral allocation to investment grade corporates. In a recent report we pointed out that highly-rated credit (A-rated and above) performed well in the initial stages of last year's run-up in rate hike expectations, but then started to suffer once market-implied rate hike probabilities approached 100%.1 Conversely, a Trump victory would likely prompt a flight-to-safety event in markets which, depending on its severity, could also cause the Fed to delay the next rate hike into 2017. In that event, the prospect of delayed Fed tightening would make us more likely to increase credit exposure in the near term, especially if any knee-jerk sell-off in risk assets creates better value in corporates. Table 3Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* (Continued) Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Maximum Underweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +92bps in October, but has already underperformed the Treasury benchmark by -108bps so far in November. The index option-adjusted spread is +25bps wider since the end of September and, at 505bps, it is 16bps below its historical average. In a Special Report2 published last week we noted that while the default rate will not re-visit its previous lows (at least until after the next recession), it should decline from 5.4% to close to 4% during the next 12 months (Chart 3). However, even a slightly brighter default outlook will not be enough for junk bonds to sustain their current pace of outperformance. A simple model of lagged junk spreads and default losses explains more than 50% of the variation in 12-month high-yield excess returns. This model suggests that even with lower default losses, excess junk returns will be +264bps during the next 12 months (panel 3). The reason is that lower default losses are more than offset by the lower starting point for spreads. Junk spreads should also come under widening pressure in the very near term, as a December Fed rate hike spurs an increase in implied volatility. Maintain a maximum underweight allocation to high-yield and await a better entry point for spreads in the New Year. MBS: Overweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +2bps in October, but are underperforming the benchmark by -7bps so far in November. Year-to-date, MBS have outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by a mere +22bps. Since the end of September, the conventional 30-year MBS yield has risen +23bps, driven by a +21bps increase in the rate component. The option-adjusted spread has widened +2bps, while the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) has remained flat. Unattractive option-adjusted spreads and the prospect of further increases in issuance make for bleak long-run return prospects in MBS. However, the likelihood that Treasury yields will continue to rise in the near-term means that MBS could outperform due to a decline in the option cost component of spreads (Chart 4). We will likely reduce exposure to MBS once a December rate hike has been fully digested by the market, and the uptrend in Treasury yields starts to taper off. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for the third quarter, released yesterday, showed that banks continue to ease standards on GSE-eligible mortgage loans, while demand for these same loans continues to increase. The combination of easing lending standards and strengthening demand means that issuance is likely to continue its march higher, as does the persistent uptrend in existing home sales (bottom panel). Government Related: Overweight Chart 5Government Related Market Overview The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +5bps in October, but has already underperformed the Treasury benchmark by -9bps so far in November. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sub-sectors drove October's outperformance, returning +24bps and +14bps in excess of Treasuries respectively. Domestic Agency debt outperformed the Treasury benchmark by +3bps, while Supranationals (-7bps) and Sovereigns (-10bps) both underperformed. After adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration, Foreign Agency and Local Authority bonds still appear attractive relative to investment grade U.S. corporate debt. Sovereigns, on the other hand, appear modestly expensive. We continue to recommend avoiding Sovereign issues while remaining overweight the other sub-sectors of the government related index. In a recent report,3 we observed that the performance of sovereign debt relative to equivalently-rated and duration-matched U.S. corporate credit tends to track movements in the U.S. dollar. As such, a continued bull market in the U.S. dollar will remain a significant headwind for sovereigns. At the country level, the only nations whose USD-denominated debt offers a spread advantage over Baa-rated U.S. corporate debt are Hungary, South Africa, Colombia and Uruguay. Unusually, bullet agency debt outperformed callable agency debt last month even though Treasury yields moved higher (Chart 5). Within Domestic Agency bonds, we continue to favor callable over bullet issues on the expectation that this divergence will not persist. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by -12bps in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -152bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio is largely unchanged since the end of September, and remains close to its post-crisis average. In recent months, trends in M/T yield ratios have fluctuated alongside the betting market odds for today's Presidential election. A Trump victory would cause yield ratios to widen sharply, as President Trump's promised tax cuts would substantially de-value the tax advantage in municipal bonds. We expect yield ratios to tighten in the event that Clinton prevails, as any expectation of a Trump victory works its way out of the price. Due to attractive yield ratios relative to recent history, we are inclined to remain overweight municipal bonds in the near-term. However, we will likely downgrade the sector if yield ratios move back to previous lows. As we detailed in a recent Special Report,4 historical lags between the corporate and municipal credit cycles suggest that municipal bond downgrades will start to increase in the second half of next year, alongside a deterioration in state & local government balance sheets. Further, state & local government investment spending is poised to move higher next year, regardless of the election result, leading to even greater muni issuance (Chart 6). Elevated fund flows have offset the impact of strong issuance this year, the risk is that they will not keep pace going forward. Treasury Curve: Stay In Flatteners Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve has bear-steepened significantly since the end of September. The 2/10 Treasury slope has steepened +16bps and the 5/30 slope has steepened +14bps. As a result, our two curve flattener trades have struggled. Our 2/10 Treasury curve flattener has returned -41bps since initiation on September 6. Our 10/30 Treasury curve flattener has returned -25bps since initiation on September 20. Our other tactical trade - short December 2017 Eurodollar - has returned +16bps since initiation on July 12. All three of the above tactical trades are premised on the view that the Fed will deliver a rate hike in December, and that such a rate hike has not yet been fully discounted by the market. At present, we calculate that the market-implied probability of a December rate hike is 62%, as discounted in fed funds futures. The historical pattern suggests the yield curve should bear flatten as the rate hike probability approaches 100%. Unusually, the correlations between both the 2/10 and 10/30 Treasury slopes and the level of Treasury yields have moved into positive (bear-steepening) territory (Chart 7). This is especially unusual for the 10/30 slope, where the correlation has been firmly in negative (bear-flattening) territory since 2013. We continue to recommend holding curve flatteners, and expect both correlations to revert into negative (bear-flattening) territory in advance of a December rate hike, as they did last year. Any surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would only increase the flattening pressure on the curve (bottom panel). So far bullish dollar sentiment has remained relatively flat, but we cannot discount a large increase in the run-up to the next rate hike, as occurred last year. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by +112bps in October. The 10-year breakeven rate has increased +8bps since the end of September, and currently sits at 1.68%. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate has increased substantially during the past couple months, and has now converged with the fair value reading from our TIPS Financial model (Chart 8). Rising expectations of a Fed rate hike and a flatter Treasury curve will weigh on TIPS during the next month, and we would not be surprised to see breakevens temporarily cease their uptrend as attention turns to Fed hawkishness following today's election. But we also expect that TIPS breakevens will resume their uptrend heading into next year. As we flagged in a recent report,5 the sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation has increased since the financial crisis. We posit that the reason for this increased sensitivity is that the Fed's ability to control long-dated inflation expectations has been impaired by the zero-lower bound on rates. As a result, the trend in breakevens is increasingly taking its cue from the realized inflation data. Realized inflation continues to trend steadily higher (bottom two panels), and diffusion indexes suggest that further gains are ahead (panel 4). Given that breakevens remain well below pre-crisis levels, we intend to remain overweight TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries and ride out any near-term volatility related to a Fed rate hike. ABS: Maximum Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +10bps in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +101bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by +8bps on the month, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by +24bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS has tightened -3bps since the end of September and, at 45bps, is considerably below its pre-crisis average (Chart 9). According to our days-to-breakeven measure, there still exists a valuation advantage in Aaa-rated auto ABS relative to Aaa-rated credit card ABS, but that advantage is rapidly evaporating (panel 3). We calculate that it will take 12 days of average spread widening for Aaa-rated auto ABS to underperform Treasuries on a 6-month horizon and 10 days of average spread widening for Aaa-rated credit card ABS to underperform. Moreover, credit card ABS exhibit superior collateral credit quality relative to autos. Credit card charge-offs remain near all-time lows, while the auto net loss rate appears to have bottomed (bottom panel). Further, the Fed's senior loan officer survey shows that auto lending standards have tightened for two consecutive quarters, while credit card lending standards were unchanged in Q3 following 25 consecutive quarters of net easing (panel 4). We recommend investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans within a maximum overweight allocation to consumer ABS. CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +4bps in October, bringing year-to-date outperformance up to +194bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS has tightened -3bps since the end of September, and remains very close to its pre-crisis average (Chart 10). The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for the third quarter, released yesterday, showed that banks continue to tighten standards on all classes of commercial real estate (CRE) loans (panel 3). The survey also shows that CRE loan demand continues to increase, though at a less rapid pace than in prior quarters. While CRE prices continue to march higher (bottom panel), tightening lending standards and a rising delinquency rate (panel 4) make us cautious on non-agency CMBS. Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +4bps in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +105bps. Agency CMBS still offer 56bps of option-adjusted spread. This is greater than what is offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS (45bps) and conventional 30-year MBS (19bps) for a similar amount of spread volatility. We continue to recommend overweight positions in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Global PMI Model The current reading from our Global PMI Treasury model places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.27% (Chart 11). This model is based on a linear regression of the 10-year Treasury yield on three factors, using a post-financial crisis time interval.6 The three factors are: Global Growth: Measured using the Global Manufacturing PMI (sourced from JP Morgan and Markit) Global Growth Divergences: Proxied by bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar (sourced from Marketvane.net) Economic Uncertainty: Measured using the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (sourced from policyuncertainty.com) The correlation between the global PMI and the 10-year Treasury yield is strongly positive (panel 3). However, improving global growth is offset by any increase in bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. For a given level of global growth any increase in bullish sentiment toward the dollar represents a drag on interest rate expectations. As such, bullish dollar sentiment enters our model with a negative sign (panel 4). The final component of our model - global economic policy uncertainty - captures changes in Treasury yields related to headline risk and "flights to quality". This factor enters our model with a negative sign - more uncertainty correlates with lower bond yields (bottom panel). Monetary Conditions And Rate Expectations The BCA Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) combines changes in the fed funds rate with changes in the trade-weighted dollar using a 10:1 ratio. Historically, economic downturns have been preceded by a break in this index above its equilibrium level - calculated using the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of potential GDP growth (Chart 12). Using assumptions for the time until the MCI converges with equilibrium and the annual appreciation of the trade-weighted dollar, it is possible to calculate the expected change in the fed funds rate for the cycle. The shaded region in Chart 13 shows the expected path for the federal funds rate assuming that the MCI reaches equilibrium at the end of 2019. The upper-end of the region corresponds to a scenario where the trade-weighted dollar depreciates by 2% per year and the lower-end of the region corresponds to a scenario where the dollar appreciates by 2% per year. The thick line through the middle of the region corresponds to a flat dollar. Chart 12Monetary Conditions Vs. Equilibrium Chart 13Fed Funds Rate Scenarios Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching", dated September 13, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Don't Chase The Rally In Junk", dated November 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: An Update", dated October 25, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Trading The Municipal Credit Cycle", dated October 18, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: An Update", dated October 25, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For additional details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights Bond yields have room to move higher in the near run, but a move above 2% would represent a buying opportunity. U.S. elections are too close to call. Even if Trump wins, we caution that federal fiscal spending programs will have to work hard to offset the ongoing drag from sluggish state and local spending. Economic and inflation data will not stand in the way of a Fed rate hike in December. But heightened market volatility associated with the elections could still derail their plans. Feature October was a tough month for Treasuries, as the 10-year climbed 25 basis points since October 1. The sell-off puts Treasury yields closely in line with our bond strategists' estimate of fair value. This week, we review the factors that argue for or against a further rise in bond yields. Our conclusion is that the Treasury sell-off is likely to continue in the near run. Yields above 2% would represent a buying opportunity. The primary bearish driver for Treasuries in the next two months is the Fed. As we discuss below, recent economic data has been decent enough to meet the Fed's threshold for a rate hike and inflation indicators are moving towards the Fed's 2% target. Indeed, the FOMC statement released last Wednesday sent a mildly hawkish signal by highlighting that growth has improved, while both inflation expectations and realized inflation are tracking higher. The statement very much keeps a December rate hike in play, but it does not elevate the odds. In the FOMC meeting just prior to last year's rate hike, the Fed specifically mentioned the "next meeting" as a possibility for a rate increase. The Fed did not go as far this time around1 as policymakers are no doubt wary of spooking the markets when uncertainty is running high ahead of the U.S. election. Whether the Fed actually pulls the trigger in December will continue to hinge on the incoming economic data and the behavior of the markets following the election, but our base case remains that the Fed will follow through with a rate hike. The market is currently priced for a 65% chance of a rate move before the end of the year. This is roughly the same as the probability of a 2015 rate hike at this time last year (Chart 1). As long as the economic data remain reasonably firm, as we expect, then rate hike probabilities should follow last year's path and move to 100% by the December 13-14 FOMC meeting. Last year, the revision in the rate hike probability from November-December corresponded with a 35 bps rise in the 10-year Treasury. Chart 1Room For Expectations To Move Higher Since last year, the Fed has drastically downgraded its long-term rate projections. Recall that ahead of the December 2015 FOMC meeting, the Fed projected that the Fed funds rate would reach 1.4% in 2016. Since then, the Fed has revised downward its interest rate forecast to two rate hikes in 2017. Assuming the Fed does not revise these forecasts, it is unlikely that Treasuries respond as negatively as they did in 2015. Moreover, as we noted above, at 1.8% today, Treasuries are already roughly at fair value. During last year's sell-off, bond yields were starting from a substantially overbought level. This argues for a somewhat more muted reaction to a Fed rate hike, although we still expect yields could move higher. Beyond December, i.e. once the rate hike is priced in, our base case is that yields trend sideways for a time. The Fed's forecast for growth in 2017 is 2.0%, which would represent an increase of 0.5% from the first three quarters of 2016. If economic growth meets the Fed's expectation of 2%, then it is reasonable to expect that policymakers would increase twice next year, i.e. in line with their current forecasts. As shown in Chart 1, the Treasury market is not yet priced for this outcome: market participants currently assign only 80% odds to one rate hike by the end of 2017. The message is that the Fed, even with a reasonable (for the first time in years!) forecast for growth, will end up being a source of upward pressure on bond yields beyond 2017. There is nonetheless an important mitigating factor for bond yields: the U.S. dollar. A stronger currency represents a tightening of financial conditions that acts to depress expectations of future economic growth. This can spell trouble for risk assets and also lower the market-implied odds of future rate hikes. Indeed, a central bank can tighten monetary conditions, but does not have control over how much of the tightening comes via interest rates and how much through currency appreciation. In the current environment, the Fed knows that the process of normalizing interest rates will trigger bouts of volatility, because its actions will be exaggerated by movements in the currency. The bottom line is that we expect the Fed to tighten in December, followed by two more quarter-point hikes in 2017. Given that the bond market is not yet priced for this, the recent sell-off in bond yields will continue, perhaps to as high as 2%. Thereafter, we would expect Treasuries to trade in a fairly narrow range, with 2% representing the higher end of the band. A Coin Toss Election In the very near term, the U.S. elections pose an important risk to the view expressed above. For the past several months, market odds of a Trump Presidency have been positively correlated with the uncertainty index and negatively correlated with Treasury yields (Chart 2 and Chart 3). On the eve of the election, the race is once again too close to call. Our expectation has been that any flight-to-quality related to a Trump victory will be short-lived. However, with equity market multiples stretched and the earnings outlook still leaving much to be desired, equity markets are ripe for a correction. Chart 2Bond Market Tracks Uncertainty Chart 3Trump And Uncertainty In our September 26 Weekly Report, we warned that investors may be assigning too low odds of a Trump Presidential win. We posited that if the polls remained tight, the potential for further volatility was high. We followed up in mid-October, advising clients how to implement portfolio insurance against downside market risks, and specifically against a Trump election win. One recommended vehicle for insurance that we highlighted was the U.S. dollar, which is part of our Protector Portfolio (Chart 4 and Chart 5). We believe the currency will rally due to the combination of coming fiscal expansion and risk aversion flows on the back of a Trump win. True, this strategy has not held up in recent days, as the U.S. dollar has softened while Trump improves in the polls and risk assets have corrected. Still, the dollar's reputation as a safe-haven currency is well-deserved. It has consistently outperformed during times of crisis - even when the U.S. itself was the source, as most recently demonstrated during the summer 2011 budget impasse. Chart 4Protector Portfolio Components Chart 5Protector Portfolio Returns In a recent report,2 our geopolitical strategists outline several things to watch for on November 8, the day of the election, and in its immediate aftermath. The immediate developments most relevant for investors are anything that prolongs the period of uncertainty regarding voting. For example, the 2000 election is a reminder that the results may not be clear immediately. Although the 2000 election was held on November 7, the official result was not declared until November 26; Al Gore did not concede until December 12. This time, any number of things could delay declaring a winner, including a tie in the electoral college, or a "faithless elector," i.e. an electoral college member that does not cast his/her ballot for the candidate chosen by popular vote, and therefore causes the Supreme Court to intervene. A delay in declaring the election result would increase uncertainty and therefore be negative for risk assets. Longer term, the margin of victory has become important for policy. It is now clear that a Clinton win, if it were to happen, will be a narrow one. According to our Geopolitical Strategy team, it is almost guaranteed at this point that the chances of a Democratic sweep in the House of Representatives are zero. This is a positive development for the market as a Democratic sweep would mean a slew of anti-business regulation out of Congress. Nonetheless, a narrow win - with sub-50% of the vote - would give Hillary Clinton an extremely weak mandate. The probability of a compromise between the White House and GOP in Congress is therefore declining and puts in jeopardy any possibility of modest fiscal stimulus under a Clinton White House, or of corporate tax reforms. The likelihood of more fiscal spending in 2017 has become common lore among investors. Thus, a disappointment on that front would be negative for risk assets. Post-Election Government Spending Throughout the twists and turns of the U.S. election campaign, one higher conviction view that has endured at BCA is that popular sentiment is shifting away from fiscal austerity and that 2017 would feature more ambitious spending programs. That would be quite welcome, given that real government consumption and investment - at all levels of government - has been a drag on growth during most of the recovery since the Great Recession. Ongoing weakness at the Federal level is due to restraint in defense expenditure, while state and local spending has been weak due to a significant downtrend in tax revenues. It is notable that the decline in state tax revenues is not confined to oil-producing states. A recent report by the Rockefeller Institute compiled state tax revenue forecasts for 2017 and concludes that the decline in tax revenues from all sources (sales, income and corporate) will be slow to recover next year.3 Remember that states can only spend what they take in outside of infrastructure spending. If state and local governments can manage to cut the drag on real GDP to 0%, that would still leave a major onus for government spending on the federal government. Assuming the contribution to real GDP from state and local spending is zero, it would require a 6% annual growth in federal spending to return total government spending as a contribution to GDP back to its historic average of 0.4% (Chart 6). As Chart 7 shows, fiscal spending of that magnitude rarely occurs outside of recession. Chart 6(Part 1) How Much Fiscal Spending? Chart 7(Part 2) How Much Fiscal Spending? Importantly, how much long-term effect a fiscal boost will deliver depends on how well fiscal multipliers - which measure how much a dollar of increased government spending or reduced taxes raises output - are working. Indeed, the magnitude of fiscal multipliers continues to be a massive source of disagreement in policy circles. Recent work by the IMF suggests that the multiplier, in some economies and under certain interest rate settings, could be as high as four: for each dollar the U.S. government spends, it will generate another $4 dollars of GDP!4 Other academics put the fiscal multiplier at less than 0.5. The wide range of forecasts is due to several factors, but there are nonetheless some generally held principles: Fiscal stimulus tends to be more effective when the output gap is large: when output is well below its potential, the monetary policy response to an increase in spending is likely to be limited. In other words, fiscal multipliers are larger in recessions than in expansions.5 The type of fiscal stimulus matters, a lot. Table 1 shows a range of CBO estimates for different types of government activity. For example, income tax cuts on high income earners tend to have a low multiplier effect (well below 1), while direct spending by government, e.g. infrastructure outlays, tends to have a much higher multiplier (above 1). Multiplier effects tend to last no more than eight quarters when output is close to potential. Fiscal stimulus tends to have a more impressive impact, although short-lived (four quarters) when the output gap is large. Table 2 shows the CBO-estimated effect of an increase in demand over eight quarters under two different economic scenarios. The first is when monetary policy is constrained, and the second is when monetary policy responds to the increase in demand from government stimulus. Our guess is that we are currently somewhere in between the two economic scenarios presented: there is still an output gap and monetary policy is already off the zero bound. Thus, the fiscal multiplier is likely a little above than one, meaning that government spending does not "crowd out" private spending. Table 1Ranges For U.S. Fiscal Multipliers Table 2The Effect Of A $1 Increase In Aggregate Demand Over Eight Quarters Overall, government expenditures will contribute positively to GDP next year, though the amount of fiscal expansion is dependent on the political configuration in Washington after the elections. Similarly, the impact of any spending will depend on what form new fiscal measures takes. CBO research suggests that the fiscal multiplier will be slightly above 1. Business Sentiment: Neither Euphoria Nor Misery Without further participation from the government sector, the economy is likely to achieve above 2% real GDP growth. A more optimistic scenario could unfold if capex improves substantially and/or a Trump win significantly opens the fiscal taps. Recent private sector data shows that businesses are continuing on a mild expansion path. The ISM surveys of business confidence were little changed in October - sentiment among manufacturers is broadly unchanged, while respondents from the service sector were slightly less optimistic than the previous month (Chart 8). Still, the major indices remain above their boom/bust lines and respondents' comments suggest neither euphoria nor misery. Meanwhile, payrolls increased by 161,000 in October. Although this was slightly below the consensus forecast of 175,000, there was a cumulative 44,000 in upward revisions to the prior two months. Elsewhere, wages accelerated more than expected and average hourly earnings rose 0.4% m/m, pushing the annual growth rate to a new cyclical high of 2.8% (Chart 9). Chart 8ISM Surveys Are Steady Chart 9Wage Growth Is Perking Up To paraphrase from this week's FOMC statement, the employment report provides some further evidence that the U.S. economy is progressing towards the Fed's dual mandate. In itself, it reinforces the case for the Fed raise interest rates in December. It seems now that the only thing that could derail the Fed is an election surprise and related heightened market volatility. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151028a.htm 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "It Ain't Over 'Till The Fat Man Sings," dated November 1, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/state_revenue_report/2016-09-21-SRR_104_final.pdf 4 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1493.pdf 5 "How Powerful Are Fiscal Multipliers In Recessions? Alan Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, NBER Reporter 2015, http://www.nber.org/reporter/2015number2/auerbach.html

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Highlights Lesson 1: Don't fear the end of the debt super cycle. Lesson 2: The ECB will ultimately target the long-term bond yield. Lesson 3: Financials will structurally underperform. Lesson 4: Personal Products (Beauty) will structurally outperform. Feature Striking similarities exist between the post debt super cycle economies in the euro area and Japan. Feature ChartPersonal Products Will Outperform Structurally... Financials Will Not In many regards, the euro area looks remarkably like Japan with a 17 year lag. Line up the 2007 peak in the euro area credit boom with the 1990 peak in the Japan credit boom - and the subsequent evolutions of many economic and financial metrics also line up almost perfectly: for example, the policy interest rate; the 10-year bond yield; inflation; and nominal GDP (Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5). Chart 2Striking Similarities Between The Euro Area... Chart 3...And Japan, Advanced By 17 Years Chart I-4Striking Similarities Between The Euro Area... Chart I-5...And Japan, Advanced By 17 Years This is very useful because if the euro area continues in Japan's footsteps, Japan's experience can teach us several important lessons about the euro area economy and financial markets out to the year 2034. Lesson 1: Don't Fear The End Of The Debt Super Cycle Does the euro area economy have "lost decades" ahead of it? Not exactly. Japan's so-called lost decades describe its stagnant nominal GDP since the mid-1990s. But this emphasis on nominal income is misleading (Chart I-6). The average citizen's standard of living does not depend on nominal GDP or even on real GDP. What truly matters is real GDP per head combined with the absence of extreme income inequality. Real incomes must grow and the growth must be reasonably distributed across society. On both counts, the euro area can be encouraged by Japan's experience. Since the late 1990s, Japan's real GDP per head has averaged close to 1% growth a year, broadly in line with the expected real productivity growth in a developed economy. This is exactly the real growth rate to be expected when there is no artificial and unsustainable tailwind from credit expansion. It is an economy's natural state of growth when the debt super cycle comes to an end, as it did in Japan more than 20 years ago.1 And it is good growth because it comes entirely from productivity improvements. Mankind's persistent ability to learn, experiment, and innovate produces more and/or better output from a fixed set of inputs. Furthermore, unlike other major economies, income inequality in Japan has not increased through the past 20 years and remains amongst the lowest in the developed world (Chart I-7). Again, this is not surprising. It is credit expansions that inflate bubbles in financial assets and exacerbate income and wealth inequalities. Therefore, unlike bad growth fuelled by credit booms, real growth that comes from productivity improvements is sustainable and unpolarising. The first lesson from Japan is that the euro area can expect structural growth in real GDP per head of around 1% a year. Chart I-6What ##br##"Lost Decades"? Chart I-7Income Inequality In Japan ##br##Has Not Increased Lesson 2: The ECB Will Ultimately Target The Long-Term Bond Yield One objection to Lesson 1 is that in a highly indebted economy, nominal GDP growth does matter. As debt is a nominal amount, it is nominal incomes that determine the ability to service and repay the high level of debt. So given a free choice, policymakers would prefer to have inflation at 2% or 4% rather than at -1%; and nominal GDP growth at 3% or 5% rather than zero. Unfortunately, policymakers do not have this free choice. Contrary to what central bankers promise, inflation and nominal GDP growth cannot be dialled up or down at will to hit a point-target. As we explained in The Case Against Helicopters,2 inflation is a notoriously non-linear phenomenon which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control. As a reminder, look at the standard identity of monetary economics: MV = PT M is the broad money supply, V is its velocity of circulation, P is the price level and T is the volume of transactions. PT is effectively nominal GDP. The big problem is that both the broad money supply M and its velocity V - whose product determines nominal GDP - are highly non-linear. M is non-linear because the commercial banking system money multiplier - the ratio of loans to reserves - is non-linear (Chart I-8). At a tipping point of inflation, the onus suddenly flips from lending as little as possible to lending as much as possible. Chart I-8The Money Multiplier Is Non-Linear Admittedly, the central bank (in cahoots with the government) could by-pass the commercial banking system to control the money supply M directly. But it can do nothing to change the extreme non-linearity of the other driver of nominal GDP, the velocity of money V. Again, at a tipping point of inflation, the onus suddenly flips to spending money - both newly created and pre-existing balances - as fast as possible. At which point, nominal GDP growth and inflation suddenly and uncontrollably phase-shift from ice to fire with little in between. Therefore in the highly indebted euro area economy with near-zero inflation, the prudent course of action is not to risk uncontrolled inflation with so-called "helicopter money". Instead, the second lesson from Japan is to expect the ECB ultimately to emulate the BoJ and target the long-term bond yield. But which bond yield? Most likely, it would be the euro area synthetic 10-year yield, which the ECB already calculates and publishes, or a close proxy. In combination with the ECB's (as yet unused) OMT program - whose mere presence limits individual sovereign yield spreads - expect euro area government bond yields to remain structurally well anchored. Lesson 3: Financials Will Structurally Underperform Japanese financial sector profits today stand at less than half their level in 1990. For euro area financial sector profits, the concerning thing is that their evolution is tracking the Japanese experience with a 17 year lag. If euro area financial profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect no sustained growth over the next 17 years (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Euro Area Financial Profits May Experience No Sustained Growth In a post debt super cycle world, banks lose the lifeblood of their business: credit creation. And this becomes a multi-decade headwind to financial sector profit growth and share price performance. Euro area financials face two other headwinds similar to those in post debt super cycle Japan. As explained in Lesson 2, high indebtedness makes the economy hyper-sensitive to rising bond yields. The upshot is that the interest rate term-structure, which drives banks' net lending margins, cannot sustainably steepen. Also, just like Japan's 'zombie' banks, many European banks will take a long time to fully recognise the extent of their non-performing loans. The consequent squeeze on new lending combined with a requirement for additional capital further weighs down banks' return on equity. So the third lesson from Japan is that euro area financials is not a sector to buy and hold for the long term. Rather, it is a sector to play for periodic strong countertrend rallies. Now is not the time for such a play. Lesson 4: Personal Products (Beauty) Will Structurally Outperform Over the past 20 years, Japan's nominal GDP has gone sideways. But over this same period, the sales of skin cosmetics and beauty products have almost tripled (Chart I-10). This has helped the personal products sector to outperform very strongly. While Japanese financial profits have halved since 1990, Japanese personal products profits have quintupled (Feature Chart). Once again, the useful thing is that euro area personal product profits are uncannily tracking the Japanese experience with a 17 year lag. If euro area personal product profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect them to almost triple over the next 17 years (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Beauty Sales Have Boomed In Japan Chart I-11Euro Area Personal Products Profits Might Triple The very strong growth in beauty sales and profits in Japan is an extended example of the phenomenon known as the lipstick effect. Our Special Report Buy Beauty: The Lipstick Effect Stays Put3 provides the detail. But in a nutshell, the demand for beauty products and cosmetics - epitomised by lipstick - experiences a surge when the economic environment feels harsh. For many people, the post debt super cycle world of 1% real income growth with high indebtedness and no more bingeing on credit does feel like an extended hangover - at least compared to the spendthrift era that preceded it. Hence, it creates the ideal backdrop for an extended play of the lipstick effect, as witnessed in Japan. The fourth lesson from Japan is that euro area personal products is a sector to buy and hold for the long term. Expect profits to trend up at around 6% a year, and the sector to strongly outperform the broader market. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Admittedly, after the debt super cycle ended in Japan, government levering was needed to counter the impact of aggressive de-levering in the private sector. But in the euro area, this will not be needed to the same extent as the de-levering in the private sector is not as aggressive. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'The Case Against Helicopters' published on May 5, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Buy Beauty: The Lipstick Effect Stays Put' published on April 14, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model This week's recommended trade is to go short French banks versus the CAC40. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Chile's economy is headed for recession. Facing strong external and domestic headwinds, any policy stimulus will be too late to prevent the impending contraction in economic activity. Investors should receive 3-year interest swaps and stay short CLP / long USD. South Africa's cyclical and structural outlook remains bleak. Banks have been selling foreign assets and repatriating capital which has helped the rand to appreciate. However, as this capital repatriation tapers, the rand will enter a renewed bear market. Stay short the rand versus the U.S. dollar and long MXN / short ZAR. Feature Chile: Stimulus Will Arrive Too Late To Prevent Recession Chart I-1Chile: From Stagflation To Recession? The stagflationary environment in Chile over the past two years - a combination of sluggish growth and high inflation - will give way to outright recession (Chart I-1). As economic activity downshifts further, we are doubtful that policymakers will be able to push through stimulus measures in time, and of sufficient size, to stave off recession. On the fiscal front, the government is unlikely to preemptively engage in a significant spending push. The deceleration in economic activity will soon translate into lower fiscal revenue at a time when the fiscal deficit is already quite wide, at 2.8% of GDP. Furthermore, a renewed fall in copper prices (more on this below) means mining revenue will also be weaker than currently expected, inflicting substantial damage on the government's budget. Meanwhile, monetary policy is unlikely to become stimulative in the near term. Having concluded a two-year battle to tame sticky core inflation, the central bank is unlikely cut interest rates too fast. Besides, as the current term of Central Bank President Rodrigo Vergara ends in December, chances of a new rate cut cycle before he is replaced are low. On the whole, the lack of imminent policy stimulus means economic growth is set to fall much further. Investors can profit by receiving 3-year swap rates (Chart I-2). Although the central bank will be late to cut rates, long-term interest rates will fall because Chilean growth is facing strong headwinds on several fronts: Copper prices have failed to rally amid the reflation trade of the past nine months, and are set to drop to new lows as Chinese property construction and demand for industrial metals contracts anew (Chart I-3). As a result, copper exports will continue to act as a serious drag on Chilean growth (Chart I-4). Chart I-2Receive 3-Year Interest ##br##Rate Swaps In Chile Chart I-3China's Industrial Metals ##br##Demand To Contract Chart I-4Exports Will Remain ##br##A Drag On Growth Capital expenditures will contract, partially due to very downbeat business confidence owing to the uncertain political environment created by the government's reforms agenda since 2014 (Chart I-5, top panel). As discussed in detail in our December 2014 Special Report on Chile,1 from a big-picture perspective, these reforms have shifted the structure of the economy toward higher government expenditures at the expense of the private sector. This has severely eroded business confidence. In addition, the downturn in the housing market will gain momentum, further depressing activity (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Meanwhile, employment growth has been weak and income growth has been decelerating steadily - and we foresee further downside ahead (Chart I-6). Importantly, the economy's credit impulse is now turning negative (Chart I-7). Higher delinquencies in turn will force banks to curtail lending going forward. Chart I-5Chile: Capex To Remain Weak Chart I-6Chile: Labor Market Will Weaken Further Chart I-7Negative Credit Impulse##br## Will Weigh On Growth Finally, narrow (M1) money supply growth, a very good leading indicator for economic activity, is now decelerating sharply (Chart I-8). Consistently, our marginal propensity to consume proxy points to weak spending and lower consumer price inflation (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Chile: Narrow Money Growth, ##br##Economic Activity And Inflation Chart I-9Consumption Is Set ##br##To Decelerate Further The economy has developed considerable downward momentum. Any policy stimulus is likely to come too late to prevent the economy from falling into recession. Therefore, local interest rates in Chile are headed to new lows. An economic recession and lower copper prices are clearly bearish for the Chilean peso, and we maintain that its 8.5% rally this year versus the U.S. dollar will be followed by new lows (Chart I-10). Turning to equities, lower interest rates will help only marginally as equity valuations are not cheap (Chart I-11). Moreover, as Chilean banks account for 20% of the MSCI market cap and, while they are better run and more conservative than many others in the EM, they are not immune to a decelerating credit and business cycle. Besides, this bourse's Latin American consumer plays will also likely disappoint. As such, dedicated EM investors should stay neutral on Chilean stocks relative to the EM equity benchmark (Chart I-12). Chart I-10Chilean Peso Valuation Chart I-11Chilean Equities Are At Fair Value Chart I-12Chilean Equities: Stay ##br##Neutral Relative To EM Benchmark Lastly, as highlighted in our recent in-depth Special Report on EM corporate credit,2 credit investors should stay long Chilean and Russian corporate debt versus China. Chilean corporate credit will likely outperform Chinese corporate credit, as the latter is more frothy - overbought and expensive. Bottom Line: The Chilean economy is heading into recession, and policymakers will be late with stimulus to prevent it. Fixed-income investors should receive 3-year interest rate swaps. Dedicated EM equity investors should maintain a neutral stance on the Chilean bourse versus the EM equity benchmark. Stay short CLP / long USD. Santiago E. Gomez Associate Vice President santiago@bcaresearch.com South Africa: Flows Versus Fundamentals Chart II-1Improving Trade Has Helped The ZAR The South African rand has rallied since the start of the year on the back of an improving trade balance (Chart II-1) and strong capital inflows. However, it is facing a key technical resistance level, as are many other EM assets. We expect these resistance levels to hold for EM risk assets in general and the South African rand in particular. The underlying reasons behind our outlook center around our expectations of a stronger U.S. dollar, rising U.S. and G7 bond yields and a relapse in commodities prices. This is in addition to a lack of cyclical recovery and poor structural fundamentals in South Africa. A well-known explanation as to how South Africa has been able to finance its wide current account deficit is that there have been strong foreign portfolio inflows stemming from the global search for yield. What is less known is that South African banks have in the past year been selling foreign assets and repatriating capital back into South Africa (Chart II-2). Over the past 12 months, this repatriation of capital has amounted to US$ 6.5 billion, which effectively allowed the country to fund 50% of its current account deficit. While there is no doubt that this repatriation of capital has aided the rally in the rand and domestic bonds, it remains to be seen whether these flows will continue. Our suspicion is that with South African banks' holdings of foreign bonds dropping from US$ 18 billion in December 2015 to US$ 12 billion at the end of June 2016, and G7 bond yields rising, the speed of capital repatriation will likely slow. In the meantime, fundamentals in South Africa remain weak: The household sector, which accounts for 60% of GDP, has been sluggish. Private consumption growth has been anemic and credit growth to households has been falling rapidly (Chart II-3). Chart II-2South Africa: Banks Have Been ##br##Repatriating Capital Enormously Chart II-3South African ##br##Consumption Is Anemic The corporate sector is not painting a reassuring picture either. South African firms are not investing; real gross fixed capital formation is contracting (Chart II-4, top panel) and business confidence is at an all-time low (Chart II-4, bottom panel). The ongoing dynamic of persistently high wage growth - despite negative productivity growth - only reinforces the gloomy outlook as it creates downward pressure on corporate profit margins, or upward pressure on inflation (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Contracting Capex And ##br##Record-Low Business Confidence Chart II-5Toxic Structural Dynamics: Contracting ##br##Productivity And High Wage Growth Along with renewed weakness in the rand, higher wage growth will raise interest rate expectations. The fixed-income market is currently discounting no policy rate hikes during the next 12 months making it vulnerable to potential depreciation in the rand. In addition to a poor economic backdrop, uncertainty regarding economic policy is considerable. Chart II-6South Africa's Central ##br##Bank's Liquidity Injections First, fiscal policy will not be market friendly. The poor performance of the ANC in the last municipal elections shows the ANC is clearly losing support from the population. This will lead President Zuma and ANC to adopt even more populist policies. This is bearish for both the fiscal accounts and the structural growth outlook. As such, this will cap the upside in the rand and put a floor under domestic bond yields. Second, the central bank will not defend the exchange rate if the latter comes under selling pressure anew. In fact, monetary policy remains somewhat unorthodox. Specifically, the Reserve Bank of South Africa continues to inject liquidity into the system to cap interbank rates (Chart II-6). This will facilitate ZAR depreciation. Investment Conclusions Stay short the rand versus the U.S. dollar. Three weeks ago we also initiated a long MXN / short ZAR trade, and this trade remains intact as the MXN is oversold and the ZAR is overbought. Dedicated EM equity investors should maintain a neutral allocation to South African stocks. On the back of a fragile and deteriorating consumer sector, we recommend staying short general retailer stocks. Their share prices seem to be breaking down despite the rebound in the rand and a drop in domestic bond yields (Chart II-7). Policy uncertainty and pressure for populist policies is still an overarching issue for South Africa, especially compared to Russia. As such we suggest fixed income investors continue to underweight South African sovereign credit within the EM sovereign credit universe (Chart II-8), and maintain the relative trade of being long South African CDS / short Russian CDS. Chart II-7Stay Short South ##br##African General Retailers Chart II-8Stay Underweight South ##br##African Credit And Short Rand Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy & Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled, "Chile: A New Economic Model?," dated December 3, 2014 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "EM Corporate Health Is Flashing Red," dated September 14, 2016. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights U.S. Corporates: U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade and High-Yield, is fully priced for an improvement in economic growth and profits. Tight valuations offer no yield cushion before the expected December Fed rate hike. Maintain a defensive up-in-quality stance on U.S. corporates, favoring Investment Grade over junk. Euro Area Corporates: Euro Area corporate bonds are not as expensive as U.S. equivalents, but are by no means cheap. The likely extension of the ECB QE program until at least the latter half of 2017 will help keep valuations at rich levels, especially for Investment Grade issuers where the ECB is directly buying bonds. Stay defensive in Euro Area corporates, favoring Investment Grade over High-Yield. Feature Better Global Growth Not Necessarily Better For Corporate Bonds Back in July of this year, BCA put its flag in the ground and called an end to the 35-year global bond bull market after government bond yields hit historic lows following the shocking U.K. Brexit vote.1 Yields have steadily crept up since we made that declaration, due to a combination of changing cyclical factors (improving global growth, modest increases in inflation), some signs of diminished political concerns (no immediate global spillovers from a more drawn-out Brexit process, the fall in the odds of victory of the "anti-status-quo" candidate in the U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump) and structural factors (worries about less accommodative monetary policies, a political shift towards greater deficit-financed government spending). While government bond yields have been rising from depressed levels, corporate bond returns on either side of the Atlantic Ocean have at the same time lost considerable momentum, both in absolute terms and relative to sovereign debt (Chart of the Week). This is a bit of a surprise given the recent improvement in global growth data that is now appearing in a broadening number of countries (Chart 2), which would suggest a potential brighter outlook for corporate earnings. However, credit valuations and the liquidity backdrop matter, and a potential cyclical improvement in profits may not benefit corporate bond performance at a time of tight spreads and greater uncertainty about future central bank policies. Chart of the WeekIs The Party Ending For Corporate Bonds? Chart 2A Broadening Pickup In Global Growth With credit spreads currently priced for a near-perfect backdrop of low volatility and highly accommodative central banks, we continue to recommend an overall defensive posture in "Trans-Atlantic" corporate bonds, favoring Investment Grade (IG) over High-Yield (HY) in both the U.S. and Euro Area. Chart 3U.S. Corps Are Now ONLY A 'Tina' Trade U.S. Corporates: Stretched Valuations, Especially For Junk Bonds U.S. corporate bonds have been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the so-called "TINA" (There Is No Alternative) trade, where investors have been forced into riskier assets out of low-yielding government bonds. The return performance for both investment grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) debt has been outstanding, with the former up 8.2% year-to-date and the latter up +15.9%. The fundamental backdrop for corporate debt, however, has shown few signs of any improvement that would justify such strong returns, according to our U.S. Corporate Bond Checklist (Chart 3): 1.Corporate balance sheets are deteriorating: Our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor (CHM), an amalgamation of various bottom-up credit metrics applied to top-down corporate profit data, continues to signal that balance sheets are worsening. This trend has been ongoing for more than two years and shows no signs of slowing, with companies continuing to ramp up leverage to record highs at a time of increasing downward pressure on profit margins. 2.Bank lending standards are slowly tightening: The U.S. Federal Reserve's Senior Bank Loan Officer Survey has begun to flash that a greater number of U.S. banks are tightening lending standards on commercial & industrial loans. The net number is still low within the history of this series, and is largely the result of tightening standards on domestic energy companies suffering from the lower oil prices of the past two years. Nonetheless, the highly cyclical nature of lending standards suggests that a move back to easier standards may not happen at this advanced stage of the multi-year credit cycle. 3.Monetary conditions are tighter, but remain stimulative: Our U.S. Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which is a weighted combination of short-term interest rates and the U.S. dollar, remains at an accommodative level, even after the 18% rise in the trade-weighted dollar since the trough in 2014 and the Fed's lone rate hike last year.2 Interest rates are far more important in our MCI calculation than the dollar (by a 10/1 ratio), however, so it would take an exceptionally large move in the dollar to push the MCI to restrictive territory after just a single 25bp rate hike. Yet with the Fed clearly in a slow hiking cycle that could deliver at least another 75bps of rate hikes by the end of 2017, the MCI will continue in a tightening direction that has historically been correlated with wider corporate bond spreads. With only an easy money backdrop supportive of narrower credit spreads, there is a growing risk that U.S. corporates could respond poorly to a December Fed rate hike that we expect - especially if that also coincides with renewed strength in the U.S. dollar. Already, the Fed's trade-weighted dollar index has risen by 3.2% during the recent Treasury market selloff, as the market-determined probability of a December hike has risen to 66%. This remains below the peaks seen in the run-up to the rate hike at the end of 2015, which coincided with a big widening of corporate credit spreads (Chart 4). One major difference from a year ago is that the Fed is not signaling the same degree of monetary tightening after the next hike. The FOMC median interest rate projections (the "dots") were indicating another 100bps of hikes following the December 2015 rate increase, and are now only signaling another 50bps of hikes after the Fed's expected next move in December. This is keeping both the 2-year Treasury yield and the dollar well below the peaks seen at the end of last year, helping prevent a breakout in market volatility and credit spreads. So if there is a fresh spike in volatility and/or the dollar, it would be striking the corporate credit markets at a time when valuations look stretched. We can see that in a number of indicators. U.S. corporate bond excess returns have far exceeded the levels suggested by domestic capacity utilization, which are relevant for corporates given their long-standing correlation to profit margins (Chart 5). Our colleagues at our sister publication, U.S. Bond Strategy, have calculated that a 0.4% improvement in capacity utilization has historically coincided with a 100bps tightening in HY bond spreads over a 1-year period; thus, utilization would have to rise to 77.2% by next February (a level last seen in March 2015 when the annual growth rate of Industrial Production was 2.5 percentage points faster than the current pace) to justify HY spreads at current levels.3 In other words, junk bonds are already priced for a significant recovery in U.S. economic growth and corporate profits. Chart 4U.S. Corps Not Responding To A Rising USD...Yet Chart 5Ignoring The Signal From Capacity Utilization U.S. corporate bond excess returns over duration-matched Treasuries during the past twelve months have been strongly positive: +316bps for IG and +844bps for HY. Our past work analyzing U.S. credit cycles has shown that such a positive return performance usually occurs during the deleveraging stage of the corporate credit cycle, typically during recessions when profits are falling and growth in company debt stalls or even contracts (Charts 6 & 7). Chart 6Investment Grade Corporate Annual Excess Return* Chart 7High-Yield Annual Excess Return* Chart 8Spreads Ignoring The Usual Credit Cycle The current environment is one of declining corporate profits but with debt growth still expanding, similar to the credit spread widening backdrop around the 2000 and 2008 U.S. recessions (Chart 8). This sends a similar message to the relationship of credit returns with capacity utilization, with corporate bonds now priced for a strong rebound in profit growth that may be difficult to achieve over the next year. A similar situation exists in the equity market, where the consensus bottom-up expectation is for overall profit growth to surge to +13% in 2017 and +11% in 2018.4 That would represent a sharp rebound from the profit declines witnessed in 2015 and the first half of 2016. Chart 9A Stretched Rally In U.S. Junk Some may argue that such a significant rebound in overall corporate earnings could happen just from the impact of better outlook for profits in the Energy sector given the recent recovery in oil prices. However, it appears that U.S. corporate bond valuations already more than fully discount a higher crude price. The 2016 rally in U.S. junk bonds has been led by the massive tightening of spreads of oil-related names, with the benchmark Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield Energy index returning 33% year-to-date as spreads have collapsed. However, the current Energy index OAS is at 550bps - levels last seen during the 2015 counter-trend rally in oil prices after the 2014 plunge (Chart 9, middle panel) That rally took the Brent crude price of oil up to $67/bbl, well above the current price hovering around $50/bbl. Our Commodity strategists continue to see $60/bbl as being the ceiling for the oil price range over the next year, as prices above that would begin to draw supply back into the market from U.S. shale companies and other global oil producers with higher break-even prices. Thus, U.S. HY energy debt already discounts an oil price that is unlikely to be achieved in the medium-term. A similar situation exists when looking at non-Energy junk spreads, which are highly correlated with macro volatility measures like the VIX index and which already fully reflect the current low volatility backdrop (Chart 9, bottom panel). We are concerned about a pick-up in volatility in the near-term from either a political surprise like a Trump victory on November 8 or, more likely, market jitters when the Fed delivers on a rate hike in December. With our fundamental VIX model, which is based off the lagged impact of rising corporate leverage and tightening monetary conditions, continuing to signal that the fair value level of the VIX is around 20, credit markets are not prepared for a potential rise in volatility in the next few months. Challenging Valuations At All Levels When we look at our various valuation gauges for U.S. corporate debt, it is difficult to find many areas where credit looks cheap. With regards to IG debt, our preferred measure of valuation is the 6-month breakeven spread, which shows how much spreads would need to widen to full offset the carry advantage of owning IG debt over duration-matched U.S. Treasuries, assuming spread volatility is maintained at recent levels. That breakeven spread now sits at a mere 9bps (Chart 10, top panel), well below the long-run mean. In other words, IG excess returns can easily turn negative with only a modest widening of spreads. For HY debt, our preferred valuation metric is the default-adjusted spread, where we subtract expected default losses estimated by our default rate and recovery rate models from the current junk spread. That adjusted spread is now only 69bps - a level more than one standard deviation below the long-run mean that we consider to be overvalued (bottom panel). With spreads at such depressed levels relative to expected default losses, the historical probability of junk delivering positive excess returns over the next year is extremely low. We see a similar stretched valuation backdrop when looking at credit spreads among sectors and ratings cohorts. Within the IG universe, the OAS for Financials, Industrials and Utilities have fully converged (Chart 11, top panel), while credit spread curves are near the tranquil 2005-2007 period of historically low volatility that we do not expect to be repeated (bottom panel). Within sectors, our U.S. IG relative value model only sees attractive spreads in the debt of Banks, Energy, Metals & Mining, Building Materials, Technology and Airlines. Chart 10Expensive Valuations, Especially For Junk Chart 11Not Much Difference To Choose From Here Bottom Line: U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade and High-Yield, is fully priced for an improvement in economic growth and corporate profits. Tight valuations offer no yield cushion before the expected December Fed rate hike. Maintain a defensive up-in-quality stance on U.S. corporates, favoring Investment Grade over junk. Euro Area Corporates: ECB Buying Keeping IG Rich While Junk Fundamentals Worsen Turning towards Europe, a similar story of expensive corporate credit valuations exists, although not to the same magnitude as in the U.S. Of course, valuations may not matter for Euro Area IG with the European Central Bank (ECB) buying corporate debt as part of their quantitative easing (QE) asset purchase program. That surge in QE buying (both real and anticipated by investors) helped drive both yields and spreads for Euro Area IG sharply lower between March and June of this year. Since then, however, both yields and spreads have gone up moderately (Chart 12), reflecting both the rising global yield backdrop and the worsening situation for Euro Area banks whose debt dominates the IG market. Chart 12Euro Area Corporate Bond Rally Has Stalled Chart 13Euro Area Valuations Are Not That Cheap The rise in Euro Area corporate credit spreads comes at a time when investors have grown increasingly concerned about a potential tapering of the ECB's QE when the current program expires in March of next year. As we discussed in our previous Weekly Report, we expect the ECB to announce in December an extension of the government bond QE to at least September 2017, likely with some additional changes to the rules of the QE program to avoid hitting any self-imposed purchase limits.5 This could help keep spreads anchored near current levels, all else equal. Of course, all else is never equal, and the liquidity story can be trumped by expensive valuations, as we currently see in U.S. junk bonds. Using the same metrics for U.S. IG and HY credit spreads that we presented earlier shows that both the breakeven spread for Euro Area IG, and the default-adjusted spread for Euro Area HY, are below the long-run mean (Chart 13). Euro Area junk valuations are not as stretched as U.S. junk valuations on this basis, but they are hardly cheap. A similar story exists when looking at Euro Area IG corporates grouped by credit rating, with spread curves looking as flat as the U.S. curves shown earlier (Chart 14). Our Euro Area IG sector relative value model (Table 1 on Page 11) is also showing a handful of sectors with comparatively cheap spreads, ranging from commodity-focused industries (Energy, Metals & Mining) to financial groups (Insurers, Banks). However, the "cheapness" in the latter likely represents some degree of risk premium on Euro Area banks, whose poor profitability and capital adequacy issues are now well known to investors. Euro Area bank spreads may stay cheaper for longer until those problems begin to be addressed. Chart 14Euro Area Credit Spread Curves Are Flat Table 1Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Sector Spread Valuations One final note on the relative value between Euro Area and U.S. corporates: the bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors for both regions that we introduced earlier this year continue to show gaps favoring Euro Area IG over U.S. equivalents (Chart 15), and U.S. HY over Euro Area equivalents (Chart 16). The relative balance sheet trends are showing up in the relative investment performance across the Atlantic, with Euro Area IG starting to outperform U.S. IG, and Euro Area HY lagging the returns in U.S. HY. We continue to recommend allocations based on these relative valuation trends, keeping the lightest weighting on Euro Area junk bonds that score poorly on all relative balance sheet metrics. Chart 15Favor Euro Area IG Over U.S. IG Chart 16Euro Area Junk Is Unattractive Vs. The U.S. Bottom Line: Euro Area corporate bonds are not as expensive as U.S. equivalents, but are by no means cheap. The likely extension of the ECB QE program until at least the latter half of 2017 will help keep valuations at rich levels, especially for Investment Grade issuers where the ECB is directly buying bonds. Stay up in quality in Euro Area corporates, favoring Investment Grade over High-Yield. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy/U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "A Note On The Long-Term Outlook For Global Bonds", dated July 27, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com and usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 A neutral reading of the MCI is the zero line is consistent with a U.S. economy without any output gap, growing at its potential rate, and with unemployment at full employment levels. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Don't Chase The Rally In Junk", dated Nov 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Source: Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The ECB's Next Move: Extend & Pretend", dated Oct 25, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

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Highlights Defaults: The default outlook is improving alongside a brighter forecast for economic growth. The corporate default rate will fall from 5.4% to close to 4% during the next 12 months. Valuation: The low starting point for spreads means the risk/reward trade-off in junk bonds remains poor, despite a more encouraging default outlook. Strategy: In addition to a poor longer run risk/reward trade-off, the risk of a Fed rate hike in December makes us extremely cautious on junk in the near term. Maintain a maximum underweight allocation to high-yield and await a better entry point for spreads in the New Year. Feature This year's rally in High-Yield has been nothing short of impressive. The average spread on the Barclays High-Yield index has narrowed to 467bps from a February high of 839bps, and excess junk returns have now recovered all the ground lost since the mid-2014 peak (Chart 1). Chart 1Back In The Black When considering the potential for further spread tightening we first observe that, despite this year's rally, the average junk spread remains 144bps above the cycle lows reached in June 2014. However, the credit cycle is also two years older, corporations are more highly levered and the default rate has started to increase. The dramatic sell-off and subsequent recovery in the price of oil has also had a large impact on junk bond performance since mid-2014, but now that the average spread on energy debt is within 100bps of the overall index (Chart 1, bottom panel), its influence will be much smaller going forward. In this week's report we consider the potential for further junk bond outperformance through three different analytical approaches. We conclude that: Junk spreads already discount a significant improvement in capacity utilization Junk spreads do not adequately reflect the risks from higher implied equity volatility Although the outlook for default losses has improved, current spreads do not offer adequate compensation Growth Rebound Is In The Price As we anticipated,1 last Friday's preliminary Q3 GDP print exceeded expectations. Further, we expect that a number of headwinds which have held back U.S. growth in 2016 will give way next year, generating 2.5% - 3% real GDP growth in 2017.2 This should bode well for junk bond performance, except that a relatively large growth acceleration has already been incorporated into high-yield spreads. Of all economic indicators high-yield spreads correlate most closely with capacity utilization (Chart 2), which bottomed in March of this year shortly after the peak in junk spreads. But capacity utilization has not kept pace with the tightening in junk spreads since then. Historically, a 100bps tightening in junk spreads during a 12-month period has coincided with a 0.4% improvement in capacity utilization. This would suggest that even if junk spreads remain flat, capacity utilization should reach 77.2% by next February (Chart 2, bottom panel). While industrial production will continue to improve, in large part because of rebounds in the oil price and rig count (Chart 3), it will be difficult for any rebound to surpass the expectations that have already been baked into the high yield market. Chart 2Junk Spreads & Capacity Utilization Chart 3Drag From Energy Has Dissipated The Risk From Rising Vol Is Understated Another well-known correlation is between junk spreads and the VIX. As was observed by Robert Merton in 1974,3 corporate bond investors effectively bear the risk from equity investors who own portfolio insurance against downside tail risk (see Box). In other words, an increase in the price of volatility can be thought of as a transfer of default risk from equity holders to bondholders. Unusually, junk spreads have tightened during the past three months while the price of volatility (VIX) has risen (Chart 4). Box - Merton Model Of Corporate Debt Robert Merton pointed out that holding a corporate bond is equivalent to holding a risk-free security plus a short put option on the value of the assets of the corporation. For a corporation with zero default risk, the option is worthless and the bondholder owns a risk-free security. However, the closer a corporation comes to default, the put option (which the bondholder is short and the equity holder is long) increases in value. If the value of assets of the corporation falls below the value of the debt outstanding, then the equity holders are better off defaulting on the debt than repaying it. The act of defaulting on debt is analogous to exercising the put option in that the shareholders put the assets of the corporation to the debt holders rather than repay the debt. Higher volatility increases the value of this put option, effectively reducing the value of corporate debt relative to equity. In other words, higher asset price volatility increases the risk of default. Similarly, a drop in volatility makes default less likely and so increases the value of corporate debt. Although asset volatility and equity volatility are not identical, they are closely related. Therefore, declining equity implied volatility is positive for corporate bonds since it reduces the value of the implicit short put option embedded in corporate debt. This divergence is not sustainable, and the near-term risks clearly favor a convergence via wider spreads rather than a lower VIX. A Trump victory in this month's election would obviously surprise markets and prompt a flight to safety. But the polling data suggest this is a low probability event. More likely is that the VIX rises in anticipation of a Fed rate hike in December. This process could begin as early as tomorrow afternoon, if the Fed teases a December rate hike in the statement from this week's meeting. We anticipate a December rate hike and would expect investors to bid up the price of vol between now and then. As a rate hike becomes more likely, investors will become increasingly worried about a repeat of last year when a Fed rate hike precipitated a large sell-off in risk assets. The trend in equity volatility is also biased higher in the longer run. While it is impossible to accurately forecast all of the wiggles in the VIX index, its long-run underlying trend tends to be driven by corporate health and monetary conditions (Chart 5). Chart 4Higher Vol A Near-Term Risk Chart 5Long Run Vol Drivers Easier monetary conditions tend to reduce investor risk aversion and send the VIX lower. But easy money also encourages the corporate sector to take on debt. Initially, a virtuous circle is created between a lower VIX and a re-levering corporate sector. To the extent that corporate credit growth fuels aggregate demand, risk aversion will decline even further leading to even lower volatility. Eventually, the virtuous circle is broken when either monetary conditions are tightened or leverage increases so much that investors question the sustainability of corporate balance sheets. Chart 5 suggests that the current level of the VIX does not reflect the reality of tightening monetary conditions or deteriorating corporate balance sheets. Bottom Line: A sizeable improvement in capacity utilization and persistently cheap equity volatility are required to sustain junk spreads at current levels. A Brighter Outlook For Defaults Around this time last year we called the beginning of the default cycle,4 and our view remains that we are one year into a prolonged grind higher in corporate defaults. Typically, once corporate defaults start to trend higher they do not peak until the next recession and we do not expect this cycle to be any different. This is because firms tend not to engage in voluntary de-leveraging. Rather, they tend to continue to add leverage until the economy forces retrenchment upon them. One exception to this trend is the small increase and subsequent reversal in defaults that occurred in the mid-1980s (Chart 6). In this instance it was not an improvement in corporate balance sheets that caused the uptrend in defaults to reverse. Instead, it was a dramatic easing of monetary conditions that gave banks the necessary confidence to keep the credit taps open, despite worsening corporate health. This episode can be contrasted with the mid-1990s cycle when corporate health continued to deteriorate but monetary conditions did not ease. This resulted in a persistent grind higher in defaults. Chart 6Defaults Will Moderate Next Year, But Long-Run Uptrend Is Still Intact In our view, the current cycle has the most in common with the mid-1990s. Corporate balance sheets are deteriorating and no monetary relief should be expected with the Fed in the midst of a rate hike cycle, albeit a shallow one. However, the prolonged nature of the recovery also means that the rise in corporate defaults will also be shallow and drawn out, with some fluctuations around an upward trend. Chart 7The Reason For Low Recoveries On that note, we forecast that the default rate will moderate during the next twelve months. Our default rate model is shown in the top panel of Chart 6. This model is based on industrial production growth, corporate profit growth, times-interest earned and lending standards. We forecast that both industrial production and corporate profit growth will improve next year, in large part due to the end of the drag from falling oil prices. The red line in the top panel of Chart 6 shows the Moody's baseline forecast for future defaults. This forecast calls for the default rate to be 4.09% during the next 12 months, down from 5.4% during the past 12 months. This forecast is consistent with our own base case expectation that calls for a return to modestly positive growth in both industrial production and corporate profits (on the order of 5% annualized). The thick grey line in the top panel of Chart 6 shows what the default rate would be in a pessimistic scenario where industrial production and corporate profit growth are held flat at current levels. This forecast has the default rate rising to 6.5% during the next 12 months. In order to forecast default losses we also need a forecast for the recovery rate. In the past we have modeled recoveries using the output from our default rate model. This simple observation that recoveries tend to fall when defaults rise, and vice-versa, had been sufficient to capture the major swings in recoveries, but has not performed well during the current cycle (Chart 7). In fact, recoveries have lagged well below levels that would be expected given the number of corporate defaults we have seen. The reasons for the low recovery rate are not well known, but we have collected some bottom-up data that may offer a partial explanation. The bottom two panels of Chart 7 show the Tobin's Q and net debt-to-assets ratio for the bottom decile of firms in our sample going back to 1990.5 We note that the Tobin's Q - the ratio of market value to replacement value of a firm's assets - has fallen to recessionary levels. Meantime, while net debt-to-assets is in a clear uptrend, it does not appear stretched relative to the early stages of past default cycles. This suggests that low recoveries are not the result of too much debt being supported by too few assets, but are the result of a low market value being placed on the assets in question. More fundamentally, we suspect that low recovery rates are actually explained by the divergence between the monetary and credit cycles (Chart 8). In past cycles, Fed tightening has tended to occur alongside a deterioration in corporate health. However, in this cycle corporate balance sheet re-leveraging is well advanced compared to monetary tightening. If we accept the premise that defaults themselves are caused by tighter money and tightening lending standards, while recoveries are more related to the state of corporate balance sheets at the time of default, then it makes sense that recoveries would be lower in this cycle since corporate balance sheets had been aggressively levering-up for several years before monetary conditions began to tighten and defaults started to rise. Chart 8The Diverging Credit And Monetary Cycles In both our baseline and pessimistic forecasts we assume that the recovery rate increases somewhat (from 28% to 35%), but remains low relative to where we would expect it to be based on the default rate alone. Adding it all up, our base case scenario calls for default losses of 266bps during the next 12 months. This results from a default rate of 4.09% and a recovery rate of 35%. Our pessimistic scenario calls for default losses of 423bps during the next 12 months. This results from a default rate of 6.5% and a recovery rate of 35%. The Default-Adjusted Spread & Expected Returns Individually, neither the average junk spread nor future default losses offer much explanatory power when it comes to forecasting high-yield returns. Rather, it is the combination of both - the default-adjusted spread - that explains the bulk of variation in junk returns. The top panel of Chart 9 shows 12-month high-yield returns in excess of duration-matched Treasuries alongside the average option-adjusted spread from the Barclays index, advanced by 12 months. The chart shows that there is some correlation between today's average junk spread and excess returns during the following 12 months, but the correlation is very weak. Chart 9Default-Adjusted Spread Predicts Lower Excess Returns The second panel of Chart 9 adjusts the average junk spread by realized default losses. Here we see a much stronger correlation. In fact, the starting spread on the High-Yield index less realized default losses during the next 12 months explains more than 50% of the variation in excess junk returns. This means that with knowledge of today's junk spread and an accurate forecast of future default losses, we can have a reasonably good idea about what excess junk returns will be during the next year. The bottom panel shows the results of a regression of excess junk returns versus the default-adjusted spread. It also shows what the default-adjusted spread implies in term of excess junk returns using both our base case and pessimistic default loss scenarios. In our base case scenario where the default rate improves during the next year, excess junk returns are predicted to be close to zero. In other words, the anticipated improvement in defaults is not sufficient to offset the low level of starting spreads. In our pessimistic scenario, where the default rate rises to 6.5%, excess returns during the next 12 months are predicted to be deeply negative. Bottom Line: The default outlook is improving alongside a brighter outlook for economic growth, but wider spreads are still required to make the risk/reward trade-off in junk bonds attractive. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching", dated September 13, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The November 2016 Bank Credit Analyst, dated October 27, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Merton, Robert C. 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates." Journal of Finance 29, pp. 449-470. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Rising Risk Of Corporate Default", dated October 20, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We create a sample consisting of all the firms included in either the Barclays Corporate or High-Yield index (excluding financials) for which bottom-up data are available from Bloomberg. Data are retrieved on a quarterly basis and the sample is adjusted once per year based on changes in the composition of the Barclays indexes. The lowest sample size in any quarter is 53 firms, the largest is 101. On average, the sample size is 68 firms. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights A poor fundamental backdrop for high yield is being offset by easy monetary conditions. A prolonged shallow uptrend in corporate defaults - and therefore spreads - is most likely. The relative performance of equities versus corporate credit has not been distorted by monetary policy: the high-yield debt market will remain a reliable indicator for equity market vulnerability. A December rate hike will not be problematic for the residential real estate market. Plenty of pent-up demand for housing exists, and this will provide long-term support, so long as the labor market remains robust. Feature High-yield (HY) corporate bond spreads have dramatically narrowed throughout 2016 (Chart 1). This trend should not go unnoticed, since beyond being an important asset class in its own right, we have long viewed the high-yield debt market as an early warning system for equities. The current message suggests an all-clear for stocks. Chart 1Dramatic Spread Narrowing In 2016, But... We have had a cautious stance on U.S. high yield since August 2015, based on the view that corporate balance sheet health has deteriorated to the point where defaults would continue to rise on a cyclical basis. This week, we explore whether this remains the right strategy, and also whether junk bond spreads are still a relevant leading indicator for the equity market. Our answer to both questions is: Yes. In our view, the HY comeback can be explained by three main factors. First, the recovery in energy-related junk bonds has led the rally, as rising oil prices have helped diminish the default risks among U.S. shale issuers. Second, the 2015 spike in junk bond yields - mainly due to contagion from energy-sector bankruptcy fears - created tactical value in high-yield. Throughout most of 2016, we have seen an unwinding of these previously oversold positions. And third, the high-yield market benefits from an ongoing and intense search for yield in a world of unattractive higher-quality interest rates. Looking ahead, the first two forces are unlikely to play much of a role in the outcome for junk bonds. Oil prices are likely to trade in narrow range, allowing energy-related company fundamentals to stabilize. The rally in junk bonds over the past several months has removed any perceived value in this sector. Thus, it is only the search for yield/accommodative monetary policy that still supports a narrowing in spreads. Over time, we believe junk bond performance will once again be aligned with balance sheet fundamentals, i.e. high-yield spreads will gradually widen. A Review Of Our HY Indicators Our fixed income strategists have developed three key indicators to gauge major turning points in corporate spreads (Chart 2): Corporate Health Monitor (CHM): An aggregate indicator of non-financial corporate balance sheet health. The CHM deteriorated further in the second quarter, and has reached levels that historically tend to only be seen during recessions. Of the indicator's six components, most of the weakness has occurred in measures of corporate profitability (Chart 3). One caveat is that our measure of leverage in the CHM remains low, but this understates the risks because it measures total debt as a percent of market value of equity. Leverage looks decidedly worse if measured using net debt/book value. Chart 2Key Corporate Credit Indicators Chart 3Corporate Health Monitor Components C&I bank lending standards: A Fed survey that measures how easy/difficult it is for the corporate sector to access bank loans. According to this gauge, banks have already been tightening credit conditions for the past three quarters. Deviation in monetary conditions from equilibrium: We use our Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which incorporates movements in both the dollar and interest rates. Due to a very accommodative Fed, monetary conditions remain very easy according to this measure. At present, two of these three indicators are sending negative signals for corporate spreads. Our corporate health monitor is decidedly bearish, as are lending standards. Indeed, focusing on corporate balance sheets and fundamental credit quality metrics would almost unanimously lead investors to recognize that the credit cycle is in its late stages and to expect spreads to move wider. After all, spreads have widened in every episode of deteriorating balance sheet health since the mid-1990s. Or to put it more simply, a default cycle - leading to spread widening - has occurred each time that year-on-year profit growth has gone negative since 1984 (Chart 4). Chart 4Profit Contraction Spells Trouble For Junk Bonds Our Bank Credit Analyst service came to the same conclusion earlier this year. In a Special Report, our colleagues analyzed financial ratios for 770 companies from across the industrial and quality spectrum. Their work uncovered that the corporate re-leveraging cycle is far more advanced than is widely believed and that key financial ratios and overall corporate health look only mildly better excluding the troubled energy and materials sectors. Of course, there is an important salve this cycle at work and it is captured in our third indicator - monetary policy. As shown in Chart 2, easy monetary conditions have never persisted for this long and low rates have driven a colossal search for yield, causing high-yield bonds to become ever more divorced from fundamentals. This divergence between corporate bond spreads and balance sheet fundamentals is likely to persist for as long as monetary conditions remain supportive. Adding it up, a poor fundamental backdrop for high-yield is being offset by easy monetary conditions. This combination argues for a cautious long-term bias toward lower-quality corporate credit because a prolonged shallow uptrend in corporate defaults (and spreads) is most likely. Nimble investors may look to tactically buy junk bonds when spreads overshoot our forecast of default losses, although such an opportunity is not present at the moment (Chart 5). The equity market is suffering from the same dynamic. Chart 5No Value Here Will Junk Bond Yields Still Warn Of Stock Bear Markets? Junk bond yields have long been one of our early warning indicators for equity bear markets. Since the 1980s, junk yields (shown inverted in Chart 6) have consistently broken out to new highs 3-6 months before stock bear markets take hold. This is because in a typical cycle, junk yields tend to respond more quickly to an erosion in corporate health fundamentals and/or a credit event. Chart 6Junk Bonds Provide Early Warning For Stocks Chart 7Typical Behavior Here But, as we note above, in the current cycle, the reaction to worsening corporate health fundamentals has been far more subdued than historical relationships would have predicted, due to the salve effect of easy monetary policy. If corporate bonds are in a "bubble", does it mean that the behavior of junk bond spreads will no longer be an early predictor of stocks returns? We believe corporate bonds will still be a useful timing tool for equities. If equities are experiencing the same divorcing from fundamentals, courtesy of central bank largesse, then it stands to reason that what pops the bond bubble will also burst the equity balloon. The search for yield has affected the behavior of investors, and therefore returns, in a fairly systematic way. Due to the current extended period of ultra-low interest rates and central bank asset purchases, government bond prices have been pushed sky high (yields have sunk to rock-bottom lows). As a shortage of government bonds has taken hold, investors have sought to invest in "Treasury-like" products, first seeking out the safest corporate bonds, but eventually reaching further out on the risk spectrum to include high-yield bonds and (dividend yielding) stocks. Indeed, asset prices of all stripes have been distorted by the search for yield, which has fueled a broad inflation in all asset classes. The behavior of stocks relative to corporate bonds is telling (Chart 7). Since 2010, and until very recently, stocks outperformed junk bonds on a total return basis. Junk bonds outperformed investment-grade bonds over roughly the same period (although junk underperformed investment-grade in most of 2015 due to the collapse in energy prices and related energy company defaults). This is exactly what has occurred during every recovery phase since the 1980s. Over the past forty years, investment-grade bonds tended to outperform junk bonds and equities during economic recessions. Junk bonds beat equities during the early phases of recovery (i.e. when economic growth turns positive) and for as long as companies continue to repair balance sheets. And equity returns trump both investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds when our Corporate Health Monitor is deteriorating, i.e. in the latter half of the economic cycle, such as now. This suggests that the relative performance of equities versus corporate credit has not been distorted by monetary policy. One key takeaway is that, although very easy monetary conditions mean that corporate credit performance is becoming divorced from fundamentals, monetary policy has had a similar effect on equity prices (we have written at length in past reports about equity market performance diverging from profit indicators). As in past cycles, once the monetary cover fades, it is most likely that corporate credit markets will once again respond most quickly to balance sheet fundamentals. The bottom line is that we believe the high-yield debt market will remain a reliable indicator for equity market vulnerability. The current message is that a bear market in stocks will be averted, although as we have written in recent reports, earnings disappointments amid dollar strength represent a potential trigger for a near-term correction. Housing Outlook: Room To Expand Over the past quarter, residential real estate data has been slightly disappointing. September housing starts slipped to the bottom end of the range that has held this year and are only marginally above year-ago levels. House price inflation, as measured by the Case Shiller index, is negative on a 3-month basis. Despite this mild disappointment, we continue to believe the housing market is a relative bright light and will continue to be a significant positive contribution to GDP growth. Most indicators show that the housing market continues to recover along the typical path of the classic boom/bust real estate cycle (Chart 8). Chart 8Housing And Its History Chart 9First-Time Homebuyers Entering The Market Moreover, both supply and demand conditions are supportive of further construction activity and upward pressure on house prices over the next several quarters. On the demand side, household formation and a pick-up in interest from first-time buyers are the largest positives. Household formation: The number of households being formed is the most basic measure of marginal new demand for housing units. Household formation was suppressed during the Great Recession and early recovery years, because very poor job prospects and restricted access to credit sorely limited prospective new households from entering both the rental and ownership market. From 2007-2013, the annual household formation rate was 625,000, compared to over 1.1 million in the pre-crisis period.1 Now that the unemployment rate is at 5% and job security is improving, household formation rates are accelerating, particularly among young adults who have hitherto delayed moving out on their own. Monthly numbers are choppy, but household formation could easily run on average at 1.1 million per year for the next few years, simply to make up for muted rates post-housing crisis. First-time buyers: After years of putting off purchases, first-time buyers appear to be finally coming back to the housing market (Chart 9). According to the National Association of Realtors, the proportion of first-time homebuyers for existing home sales has reached its highest mark since July 2012 (34%). But there is still room for this share to improve, as prior to 2007, first-time homebuyers averaged about 40% of total purchases. Once again, persistent income gains and job security will be the driving factors behind first-time homebuyers' decisions. Could a Fed interest rate rise slow housing demand? We don't think so. Mortgage payments relative to income will remain well below their long-term average even if rates are increased by 200bps, an extreme case scenario. Even under this scenario, housing affordability would still be above average, conservatively assuming that income is held constant (Chart 10). Income and employment prospects will continue to trump mortgage rates for consumers making housing decisions; the current employment backdrop is positive for continued housing market activity. Chart 10December Rate Hike Won't Bother The Housing Market Chart 11Supply Is Tight From a supply perspective, conditions remain ripe for more robust construction activity. As Chart 11 shows, the supply of new homes remains low both in absolute, and in terms of months of supply. The bottom line is that we do not fear that a December rate hike will be particularly onerous for the residential real estate market. Plenty of pent-up demand for housing still exists, and this will provide long-term support, so long as the labor market remains robust, as we expect. The recent soft patch in housing will give way to stronger home building activity in the coming months, helping to boost real GDP growth in 2017. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 The State Of the Nation's Housing 2016, Joint Centre For Housing Studies of Harvard University http://jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/state-nations-housing-2016

Recommended Allocation Central Banks Still In The Driving Seat Markets continue to obsess about every move from the three major DM central banks. With two of them (the Fed and the ECB) likely to withdraw accommodation cautiously over the coming 12 months, the upside for risk assets is limited. The Fed is signaling that it will probably hike in December and the futures market is pricing in a 70% probability of that happening (roughly the probability one month before the rate rise in December last year). Inflation expectations have picked up recently (Chart 1) and core PCE inflation ticked up to 1.7% in August, within "hailing distance", as Fed vice-chair Stanley Fischer put it, of the Fed's 2% target. There is a political angle, too: having forecast four rate rises for the year, the Fed would endanger its credibility (and risk an audit from Congress) if it failed to deliver even one. At the same time, with growth in the Eurozone running a little above trend, the ECB is likely to announce in December an extension to its asset purchase program beyond March 2017 but eventually at a slower pace (a "tapering"). Reflecting these factors, government bond yields have moved up in recent months (Chart 2), and the trade-weighted dollar has strengthened by 4% since mid-August. None of these moves are good for risk assets, which have consequently moved sideways since August. But neither do they presage a big selloff since central banks will err on the side of caution. Inflation in the U.S. is unlikely to jump: wage growth will be kept under control by a gradual rise in the participation rate, which will prevent unemployment falling much further (Chart 3). The Fed's leaders continue to sound dovish. Janet Yellen even raised the question in a recent speech of "whether it might be possible to reverse these adverse supply-side effects [from the 2007-9 Global Financial Crisis] by temporarily running a 'high-pressure economy'", though she emphasized this was a suggestion for further economic research not her view. More practically, the FOMC will have a more dovish tilt in 2017, as the three regional Fed presidents who voted for a hike in September rotate out. Chart 1Have Inflation Expectations Bottomed? Chart 2Bond Yields Moving Higher Chart 3Core Workers Reentering The Labor Force Meanwhile, economic data remain somewhat sluggish. The U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs both rebounded sharply in September, suggesting that the very weak August prints were, as we suggested, an anomaly. Q3 U.S. real GDP growth come in at 2.9%, but the New York Fed's NowCast points to a slowdown to 1.4% in Q4. The Citi Economic Surprise Index (Chart 4) has also turned down again recently, with notable weakness in consumer spending and housebuilding. We expect this sluggish pace to continue through 2017: consumption should hold up as wage rises come through, but it is hard to forecast a strong recovery in capex, given the low capacity utilization rate (Chart 5), even if investment in the mining and energy sectors bottoms out next year. Eurozone growth could stutter too. It is driven substantially by credit growth, but historically European banks have tended to curtail lending after their share prices have fallen, as has been the case recently (Chart 6). Chinese growth has stabilized (at least in the GDP data, which seems to come in regularly at 6.7%, bang in the middle of the government's target range), thanks to the government's reflation policy from earlier this year. While the Chinese authorities have now reined back a little on stimulus, given their worries about the run-up in house prices,1 they offer an option since they would undoubtedly reflate again should growth slow. Chart 4Data Surprising Negatively Again Chart 5Hard To See More CAPEX Indeed Chart 6Share Prices Influence Lending All this suggests that returns from investment assets will be low, but positive, over the coming 12 months. With economic growth anemic but stable, bond yields prone to drift up, and equities expensive (but not as expensive as bonds), we expect risk-adjusted returns from the major asset classes to be broadly similar. We continue to recommend therefore a neutral weighting between bonds and equities, and suggest that investors look to pick up extra return through tilts to investment-grade corporate credit, inflation-linked over nominal bonds, and alternative assets such as real estate and private equity. Equities: Our preference remains for U.S. equities over European ones in USD terms. The dollar is likely to strengthen further, and the worst is not over for Eurozone banks - the time to buy into them will be at the point of maximum pain, which may come if German or Italian banks have to be bailed out by their governments. We continue to recommend a small (currency-hedged) overweight on Japan. The Bank of Japan's new policy to cap 10-year government bond yields at 0% has worked so far: the yen has weakened to JPY 104 to the dollar and equities have risen moderately. We expect further fiscal or wage-control measures from the government to give inflation an extra push. We remain wary of EM equities: earnings growth is negative, loan growth has started to slow (with the credit impulse having a high correlation with earnings and economic growth), and there is still little sign of structural reform. Some sectors in EM - notably IT and Healthcare - are attractive, however. Fixed Income: U.S. Treasury bond yields are likely to rise further - our model suggests fair value is a little below 2% (Chart 7) - and so we remain underweight duration. A moderate pickup in inflation suggests that TIPs will outperform nominal bonds (as described in detail in our recent Special Report).2 We lowered our recommendation in high-yield corporate debt to neutral last month because, at 65 BPs, the default-adjusted spread no longer offers sufficient return to justify the risk. At the start of the year it was 400 BPs (Chart 8). We continue to like investment-grade debt, where the spread over government bonds is 120 BPs in the U.S. and 100 BPs in the Eurozone, higher than at any point in 2005-2006 during the last expansion. Chart 7Treasury Yields Could Rise Further Chart 8Junk No Longer Offers Enough Return Currencies: We expect the U.S. dollar to continue to appreciate given the differential in growth and monetary conditions between the U.S. and other developed economies. The dollar looks expensive, but is nowhere near the over-bought levels it got to at the peak of previous rallies in 1985 and 2002 (Chart 9). China seems likely to allow a further weakness of the RMB against the dollar, repegging it to a trade-weighted currency basket. This could push down other emerging market currencies too particularly if, like Brazil recently, they try to cut rates to boost growth. Chart 9USD Not As Overvalued As In The Past Commodities: Oil has probably overshot in the short-term on expectations that Saudi Arabia and Russia will cap, or even cut, production. We think this talk has been overhyped and that the OPEC meeting in November could prove a disappointment. Nonetheless, we still see the equilibrium level for crude over the next two years at USD 50 a barrel, the marginal cost for U.S. shale producers. Industrial commodities are likely to fall further (they peaked in June) if we are right that the dollar appreciates. We continue to like gold as an inflation hedge, but short-term are nervous because it, too, is negatively correlated with the dollar. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy "Housing Tightening: Now And 2010" dated October 13, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "TIPS For Inflation-Linked Bonds," dated October 28, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)