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Highlights ‘Value’ sector profits are in terminal decline. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain. Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources. Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources. As such, structurally overweighting the value-heavy European market versus the growth-heavy US market is a ‘widow maker’ trade. The caveat is that a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. This would create a burst of outperformance from Europe, but any such snapback would be a brief interruption to the mega downtrend. Fractal trade: Long RUB/CZK. Feature Chart of the WeekValue' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over I have just returned from a summer holiday, on which I took a clean break from the financial markets. A clean break that is highly recommended for anybody who looks at the markets day in, day out. Nevertheless, I made two market-relevant observations. First, that having to wear a face mask on an aeroplane was an unpleasant experience. Tolerable for a short-haul flight lasting a couple of hours, but something that would be unbearable for the duration of a long-haul flight. Second, that even the most popular bars and restaurants in the most popular places were operating at half capacity. They were fully booked, yet the requirements of physical distancing at the bar, and between tables, meant that their operating capacity and revenues had collapsed. Worse, the owners feared a further hit in the winter when eating and drinking in their outdoors spaces became impossible. The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others. These first-hand experiences simply confirm the message in An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs.1 The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others – like flying, or drinking and eating out. Hence, if governments remove the financial incentives for employers to retain workers while the pandemic is still rampant, expect structural unemployment to rise sharply. In which case, expect bond yields to remain ultra-low, and where possible, go even lower. And expect ‘growth’ sectors to continue outperforming ‘value’ sectors. Explaining Recent Market Action Returning to the financial markets after a break, several things stood out. Apple has become America’s first $2 trillion company, while HSBC’s share price is within a whisker of its 2008 crisis low. This vignette encapsulates that growth sectors – broadly defined as tech and healthcare – have been roaring ahead, while value sectors – broadly defined as banks, oil and gas, and basic resources – have been struggling. Hence, the growth-heavy S&P500 has reached a new all-time high, while the value-heavy FTSE100 and other European indexes are still deeply in the red for 2020 and have recently drifted lower (Chart I-2). The combined effect is that the strong recovery in global stocks has taken a breather. Chart I-2US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red In turn, the breather in the stock market explains the recent support to the dollar. Significantly, the 2020 evolution of the dollar is a perfect mirror-image of the stock market. Nothing more, nothing less. If the stock market gives back some of its gains, expect the countertrend strengthening in the dollar to continue (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market Yet the best performing major asset-class in 2020 is not growth equities, nor is it gold. Instead, it is the US 30-year T-bond, which has returned a spectacular 32 percent (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond Suddenly, everything becomes crystal clear. If the ultra-long bond has surged, then other ultra-long duration investments must also surge. Within equities, this means that growth sectors, whose profits are skewed to the very distant future, must receive a huge boost to their valuations. Whereas value sectors whose profits are not growing will receive a smaller (or no) valuation boost. In fact, the value sectors have a much bigger structural problem. Not only are their profits not growing. Their profits are in terminal decline. Since 2008, Overweighting Value Has Been A ‘Widow Maker’ In the 34 years through 1975-2008, value trebled relative to growth.2 Albeit, with the occasional vicious countertrend move, such as the dot com bubble. But through 2009-2020, the tables turned. For the past 12 years, value has structurally underperformed growth and given back around half of its 1975-2008 outperformance (Chart of the Week). This means that for the past 12 years ‘proxy’ value versus growth positions have also structurally underperformed. The best example of such a proxy position is overweighting the value-heavy European market or Emerging Markets versus the growth-heavy US market. Since 2008, underweighting the US market has been a ‘widow maker’ trade. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. It is a widow maker because it can kill your career, or your finances, or both. The big danger is that a widow maker trade can last for decades. As the uptrend in value versus growth lasted more than three decades, there is no reason to suppose that the downtrend cannot also last a very long time. What drove value’s outperformance for 34 years, and what is driving its underperformance for the past 12 years? The simple answer is the structural trend in profits. Until 2008, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources kept up with, or even beat, the profits of technology and healthcare. This, combined with the higher yield on these value sectors, resulted in the multi-decade 200 percent outperformance of value versus growth. But since 2008, while the profits of technology and healthcare have continued their strong uptrends, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources have entered major structural downtrends. It is our high conviction view that these declines are terminal, and the reasons are nothing to do with the pandemic (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend Sector Profit Outlooks In One Sentence Each When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Essentially, the sector has entered a terminal decline. As strong believers in brevity, we can summarise the reason for the terminal declines in one sentence per sector, as follows: When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Bank Profits In Terminal Decline Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline Conversely: Technology profits can grow, because we now rely more on information, ideas, and advice, and over half of the world’s population is still not connected to the internet (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Technology Profits Continue To Grow Healthcare profits can grow, because as economies (and people) mature, they spend a much greater proportion of their income on healthcare to improve the quality and quantity of life (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow Nevertheless, a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible. Indeed, it is to be expected when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. But any such snapback, even if vicious, will be a brief countertrend rally in a terminal decline. This is because the megatrends driving down value sector profits were already in place long before the pandemic hit. The pandemic just gave the megatrends an extra nudge. This is our high conviction view. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is long RUB/CZK, with the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss set at 5 percent. In other trades, the explosive rallies in precious metals reached exhaustion as anticipated by their fragile fractal structures. This has taken our short gold versus lead position into profit. However, short silver was stopped out before its rally eventually ended. The rolling 1 year win ratio now stands at 60 percent. Chart I-11RUB/CZK When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs", dated July 30, 2020 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 In total return terms. 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Yesterday’s Ifo survey of German Business Confidence was promising. The business climate index rose for the fourth consecutive month in August to 92.6, topping the 92.1 consensus forecast. The current assessment component rebounded smartly from 84.5 in July…
German assets maintain the most appealing risk profile in the euro area. The DAX’s attraction reflects two forces. First, German equities are heavily overweight industrial stocks. The global manufacturing sector is experiencing a sharp rebound thanks to…
Highlights Global Credit Spreads: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the rout in February and March has driven corporate spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the coronavirus and US politics. Credit Strategy: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both. Feature Chart of the WeekA Pandemic? Credit Markets Are Not Concerned Global credit markets have enjoyed a spectacular recovery from the carnage seen just five months ago when investors realized the magnitude of the COVID-19 shock. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the Bloomberg Barclays Global Investment Grade Corporate index has tightened from the 2020 high of 326bps to 130bps, while the OAS on the Global High-Yield index has narrowed from the 2020 high of 1192bps to 556bps. Unsurprisingly, those spread peaks both occurred on the same day: March 23, the day the US Federal Reserve announced their corporate bond buying programs. We have described the Fed’s actions as effectively removing the “left tail risk” of investing in credit, and not just in the US, by introducing a central bank liquidity backstop to the US corporate bond market. The backdrop for global credit markets, on the surface, seems typical for sustained spread compression (Chart of the Week). Economic optimism is buoyant, with the global ZEW expectations index now at the highest level since 2014. Monetary conditions are highly supportive, with near-0% policy rates across all developed economies and the balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England growing at a combined year-over-year pace of 46%. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US. The next moves in credit will be more challenging and less rewarding than the past five months. Investment grade corporate credit spreads no longer offer compelling value in most developed economies, while high-yield spreads are tightening in the face of rising default rates in the US and Europe. While additional spread tightening is not out of the question in these markets, investors should consider rotating into credit sectors that still offer some relative value – like emerging market (EM) hard currency corporates. A World Tour Of Our Spread Valuation Indicators The sharp fall in global bond yields over the past several months has not just been confined to government debt. Yields have fallen toward, and even below, pre-virus lows for a variety of sectors ranging from US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to EM USD-denominated sovereign debt (Chart 2). Investors are clearly reaching for yield in the current environment of tiny risk-free government bond yields, with no greater sign of this than the recent new issue by a US sub-investment grade borrower of a 10-year bond with a coupon below 3%.1 The drop in credit yields has also occurred alongside tightening credit risk premiums, although spreads remain above the pre-virus lows for most sectors in the US, Europe and EM (Chart 3). The degree of correlation across global credit markets has been intense, with very little differentiation between countries. Investment grade corporate spreads in the US, UK and euro area are all closing in on 100bps; high-yield spreads in those same regions are all around 500bps. Chart 2Global Credit Yields Are Low Chart 3Global Credit Spreads Are Getting Tight Last week, we introduced the concept of “yield chasing” to describe how the ranking of returns in developed market government bonds was becoming increasingly correlated to the ranking of outright yield levels.2 We have seen a similar dynamic unfold in global credit markets, especially since that peak in spreads in late March. In Chart 4 and Chart 5, we present the relationship between starting benchmark index yields, and the subsequent excess returns over risk-free government bonds, for a variety of developed market and EM credit products. The first chart covers the time from start of 2020 to the March 23 peak in spreads, while the second chart shows the relationship since then. The two charts are mirror images of each other. Chart 4Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (January 1 To March 20) Chart 5Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (Since March 23) The worst performing markets in the first three months of the year were those with the highest yield to begin 2020: high-yield corporates in the US and Europe along with EM credit, which have been the best performing markets since late March. The opposite is true for lower yielders like investment grade credit in Japan, the euro area and Australia, which were among the top performers before March 23 and have lagged sharply since then. While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Chart 6Lower Vol = Lower Credit Risk Premia While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Measures of bond volatility like the MOVE index of US Treasury options prices have declined to pre-pandemic lows, while the VIX index of US equity volatility is now down to 22 from the 2020 peak around 80 (Chart 6). The excess return volatility of US corporate bond markets has followed suit, thus allowing for lower US credit spreads. Even allowing for the lower levels of overall market volatility, corporate credit spreads do look relatively tight in the US and Europe. The ratio of the US investment grade index OAS to the VIX is now one standard deviation below the median since 2000 (Chart 7). A similar reading exists for the ratio of the US high-yield index OAS to the VIX, which is also one standard deviation below the long-run average (bottom panel). In the euro area, the ratios of investment grade and high-yield OAS to European equity volatility, the VStoxx index, are not as stretched as in the US, but remain below long-run median levels (Chart 8). Chart 7Very Tight US Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Chart 8Tight Euro Area Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol While these simple comparisons of spread to market volatility suggest that corporate credit spreads are tight in most major markets, other indicators paint a more nuanced picture of cross-market valuations. Our preferred measure of the attractiveness of credit spreads is the 12-month breakeven spread. That measures the amount of spread widening that must occur over a one-year horizon for a credit product to have the same return as government bonds. In other words, how much must spreads increase to eliminate the carry advantage of a credit product over a risk-free bond, after accounting for the volatility of that product. We compare those 12-month breakeven spreads with their own history in a percentile ranking, which determines the attractiveness of spreads. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. A look at breakeven spread percentile rankings for the major credit groupings in the US (Chart 9), euro area (Chart 10) and EM (Chart 11) shows more diverging spread valuations. Chart 9US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 10Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 11EM USD Credit Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings The US investment grade breakeven spread is just below the 25th percentile of their long-run history, although the high-yield breakeven spread remains in the top quartile of its history. Euro area breakeven spreads are “fairly” valued, both sitting around the 50th percentile. The EM USD-denominated sovereign breakeven spread is in the third quartile below the 50th percentile, while the EM USD-denominated corporate breakeven spread looks better, sitting just at the 75th percentile. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. We would not be surprised to see US investment grade spreads tighten back to the previous cyclical low at some point in the next 6-12 months. There are more compelling opportunities in other global credit markets, however, especially on a risk-adjusted basis. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. Bottom Line: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the out in February and March has driven credit spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the virus and US politics. Spread valuations are looking more stretched, but “yield chasing” and “spread chasing” behavior will remain dominant with central banks encouraging risk-seeking behavior with easy money policies. Putting It All Together: Recommended Allocations One way to look at the relative attractiveness of global spread product sectors is to compare them all by 12-month breakeven spread percentile rankings. We show that in Chart 12, not just for the overall credit indices by country but also among credit tiers within each country. Sectors rated below investment grade are in red to differentiate from higher-quality markets. Chart 12Global Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads, Ordered By Percentile Ranks The main conclusion form the chart is that there is a lot of red on the left side and none on the right side. That means junk bonds in the US and Europe have relatively high breakeven spreads, while investment grade credit in most countries have relatively lower breakeven spreads. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. To further refine the cross-country comparisons, we must look at those breakeven spreads relative to the riskiness of each sector. In Chart 13, we present a scatter graph plotting the 12-month breakeven spreads versus our preferred measure of credit risk, duration-times-spread (DTS), for all developed market corporate credit tiers, as well as EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. The shaded region represents all values within +/- one standard error of the fitted regression line. Thus, sectors below that shaded region have breakeven spreads that are low relative to its DTS, suggesting a poor valuation/risk tradeoff. The opposite is true for sectors above the shaded region. Chart 13Comparing Value (Breakeven Spreads) With Risk (Duration Times Spread) The sectors that stand out as most attractive in this framework are B-rated and Caa-rated US high-yield, and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The least attractive sectors are US investment grade corporates, for both the overall index and the Baa-rated credit tier. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. Looking beyond the spread and volatility measures presented in this report, we must consider the default risk of high-yield bonds. Our preferred measure of valuation that incorporates default risk is the default-adjusted spread, which measures the current high-yield index spread net of default losses. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. The current US high-yield default-adjusted spread is now well below its long-run average (Chart 14). We expect a peak US default rate over the next year between 10-12% (levels seen after past US recessions) and a recovery rate given default between 20-25% (slightly below previous post-recession levels). That combination would mean that expected default loses from the COVID-19 recession could exceed the current level of the US high-yield index spread by as much as 400bps (see the bottom right of the chart). Given that risk of default losses overwhelming the attractiveness of US high-yield as measured by the 12-month breakeven spread, we prefer to stay up in quality by focusing on Ba-rated names within an overall neutral allocation to US junk bonds. For euro area high-yield, where default-adjusted spreads are also projected to be negative next year but with less attractive 12-month breakeven spreads, we recommend a cautious up-in-quality allocation to Ba-rated names only but within an overall underweight allocation. After ruling out increasing allocations to US B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield, that leaves the two remaining valuation outliers from Chart 13 - US investment grade and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The gap between the index OAS of the two has narrowed from the March peak of 446bps to the latest reading of 259bps (Chart 15). We believe that gap can narrow further towards 200bps, especially given the supportive EM backdrop of USD weakness and China policy stimulus – both factors that were in place during the last sustained period of EM corporate bond outperformance in 2016-17. Chart 14No Cushion Against Credit Losses For US & Euro Area HY Chart 15EM IG Corporates Remain Attractive Vs US IG We upgraded our recommended allocation to EM USD-denominated credit out of US investment grade back in mid-July, and we continue to view that as the most attractive relative value opportunity in global spread product on a risk/reward basis. Bottom Line: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-10/u-s-junk-bond-market-sets-record-low-coupon-in-relentless-rally 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "We’re All Yield Chasers Now", dated August 11, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy service recommends that long-term investors overweight French equities over other developed market bourses. French equities have underperformed developed market equities by 12% this year. The post-February equity rally,…
Please note that we will be on our summer holidays next week. Our next report will come out on August 20. Highlights The 30-year bond yield is the puppet master pulling the strings of all other investments. Where 30-year bond yields are still far from the lower bound, they will ultimately get a lot closer. Continue to overweight 30-year bonds in the US and periphery Europe versus 30-year bonds in core Europe. Continue to overweight the US stock market versus the European stock market. An expected near-term setback to stocks versus bonds will briefly pause the European currency rally. The gold rally is also due a pause, given that it is overstretched relative to the decline in the real bond yield. Fractal trade: Long USD/PLN. Feature Chart I-1AThe Collapsed 30-Year Bond Yield Explains The Collapse Of Banks... Chart I-1B...And The Collapsed Earnings Yield (Surging Valuation) Of Tech And Healthcare The abiding mantra of this publication is that investment is complex, but it is not complicated. By complex, we mean that the financial markets are not fully predictable or analysable. By not complicated, we mean that the relative prices of everything are inextricably connected, rather like the movements of a puppet. All you need to do is find the puppet master pulling the strings. Right now, the puppet master is the 30-year bond. The Real Action Is In 30-Year Bonds While most people are focussing on the 10-year bond yield, the real action has been at the ultra-long 30-year maturity. In the US and periphery Europe, 30-year yields are within a whisker of all-time lows. Yet these ultra-long bond yields are still well above those in core Europe which are much closer to the lower bound. The upshot is that while all yields have equal scope to rise, yields have more scope to fall further in the US and periphery Europe than in core Europe (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-230-Year Yields In The US And Periphery Europe... Chart I-3...Are Still Well Above Those In ##br##Core Europe This simple asymmetry has created a winning relative value strategy that will keep on winning. Overweight 30-year bonds in the US and periphery Europe versus 30-year bonds in core Europe. Our preferred expression is to overweight 30-year bonds in the US and Spain versus Germany and France. Bond yields have more scope to fall further in the US and periphery Europe than in core Europe. Remarkably, in the US, the 10-year real yield is also tightly tracking the 30-year nominal yield (minus a constant 2.2 percent) (Chart I-4). Using a little algebra, this means that the market’s 10-year inflation expectation is just a steady-state value of 2.2 percent minus a shortfall equalling the shortfall in the 10-year nominal yield versus the 30-year nominal yield (Chart I-5). Chart I-4The 10-Year Real Yield Is Just ##br##Tracking The 30-Year Nominal ##br##Yield Chart I-5The 10-Year Inflation Expectation Can Be Derived From The 30-Year And 10-Year Nominal Yields 10-year inflation expectation = 2.2 – (30-year nominal yield – 10-year nominal yield) The reason that this is remarkable is we can explain the trend in inflation expectations from just the 30-year and 10-year nominal yields, and nothing more. In turn, gold is tightly tracking the inverted real yield, as it theoretically should. Gold, which generates no yield, becomes relatively more valuable as the real yield on other assets diminishes (Chart I-6). Having said that, the most recent surge in the gold price is stretched relative to its relationship with the real bond yield, suggesting that the strong rally in gold is due a pause (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Gold Is Just Tracking The (Inverted) Real Yield... Chart I-7...But Gold's Most Recent Surge Is ##br##Stretched The 30-Year Bond Is Driving Stock Markets Moving to the stock market, bank relative performance has closely tracked the collapse in the 30-year yield, because the collapsed bond yield signals both weaker bank credit growth and a likely increase in banks’ non-performing loans (Chart of the Week, left panel). Banks and other ‘value cyclicals’ whose cashflows are in terminal decline are highly sensitive to the prospects for near-term cashflows, which are under severe pressure in the pandemic era. At the same time, as the distant cashflows are small, the banks’ share prices are less sensitive to the uplifted net present values of these distant cashflows that come from lower bond yields. In contrast, technology, healthcare and other ‘growth defensives’ generate a growing stream of cashflows. Making their net present values highly sensitive to a change in the bond yield used to discount those large distant cashflows. The profits of the tech and healthcare sectors are proving to be highly resilient in the pandemic era. Through 2018, the 30-year yield went up by 1 percent, so the forward earnings yield of growth defensives went up by 1 percent (their valuations fell). Subsequently, the 30-year yield has collapsed by 2 percent, so unsurprisingly the forward earnings yield of growth defensives has also collapsed by 2 percent (their valuations have surged). To repeat, financial markets are not complicated (Chart of the Week, right panel). Moreover, the profits of the growth defensives are proving to be highly resilient in the pandemic era, holding up well in the worst shock to demand since the Great Depression. The combination of resilient profits with higher valuations explains why the technology and healthcare sectors are reaching new highs, while the rest of the stock market is going nowhere (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Tech And Healthcare At New Highs While The Rest Of The Market Languishes Meanwhile, the relative performance of stock markets is also uncomplicated. It just stems from the relative exposure to the high-flying growth defensive sectors. Compared with Europe, the US has a 20 percent larger exposure to technology and healthcare (Chart I-9). Which is all you need to explain the consistent outperformance of the US versus Europe (Chart I-10). Chart I-9The US Is 20 Percent Over-Exposed To Tech And Healthcare... Chart I-10...Which Explains Its Consistent Outperformance Versus Europe A Quick Comment On European Currencies And The Dollar Turning to the foreign exchange market, the recent rally in European currencies can at least partly be explained as a sell-off in the dollar. Begging the question, what is behind the dollar’s recent weakness? The dollar has moved as a mirror-image of the global stock market. For the broad dollar index, the explanation is quite straightforward. True to its traditional role as a haven currency, the dollar has moved as a mirror-image of the global stock market, measured by the MSCI All Country World Index (in local currencies). Simply put, as the stock market has shaken off its year-to-date losses, the dollar has shaken off its year-to-date gains (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Dollar Has Just Tracked The (Inverted) Stock Market Looking ahead, we can link the prospects of currencies to the outlook for 30-year bond yields. A further compression in yields will weaken the dollar, and help European currencies, in two ways. First, as already mentioned, yields have more scope to decline in the US than in core Europe, and a fading US yield premium will weigh on the dollar. Second, to the extent that the lower yields can prevent a protracted bear market in stocks and other risk-assets, non-haven currencies can perform well versus the haven dollar. Having said that, an expected near-term setback to stocks versus bonds will briefly pause the European currency rally. Concluding Remarks The charts in this report should leave you in no doubt that the 30-year bond yield – particularly in the US – is the puppet master pulling the strings of all investments: bond market relative performance, real bond yields, gold, banks, growth defensives, equity market relative performance, and major currencies. Which raises the crucial question, can the downtrend in 30-year bond yields continue? Yes, absent an imminent vaccine or treatment for Covid-19, the downtrend in yields can continue. As we explained last week in An Economy Without Mouths And Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs, the spectre of mass unemployment is looming large. Specifically, the major threat to the jobs market lies in the coming months when government lifelines to employers – such as state-subsidised furlough schemes – are cut or weakened. Where 30-year bond yields are still far from the lower bound, they will ultimately get a lot closer. Hence, it is inevitable that those central banks that can become more dovish will become more dovish. Given the political difficulties of using fiscal policy bullets, the lessons from Japan and Europe are that the monetary policy bullets get fully expended first. In practical terms, this means that where 30-year bond yields are still far from the lower bound, they will ultimately get a lot closer. The upshot is that core European bonds will continue to underperform US bonds, and that the European stock market will continue to underperform the US stock market. European currencies will trend higher versus the dollar, albeit a setback to stocks versus bonds is a near-term risk to the European currency uptrend. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is to play a potential countertrend move in the dollar via long USD/PLN. The profit target and symmetrical stop-loss is set at 4 percent. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 57 percent. Chart I-12USD/PLN When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Global Bond Yields: The growing divide between falling negative real bond yields and rising inflation expectations in the US and other major developed economies may be a sign of investors pricing in slower long-run potential economic growth in the aftermath of the COVID-19 recession – and, thus, lower equilibrium real interest rates. Stay overweight inflation-linked bonds versus nominal equivalents. Currency-hedged spread product: A broad ranking of currency-hedged global spread product yields, adjusted for volatility and credit quality, shows that the most attractive yields (hedged into USD, EUR, GBP and JPY) are on offer in emerging market USD-denominated investment grade corporates and high-yield company debt in the US and UK. Feature Global bond yields are testing the downside of the narrow trading ranges that have persisted since May. As of last Friday, the yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index was at 0.41%, only 3 basis points (bps) above the 2020 low seen back in March. The 10-year US Treasury yield closed yesterday at 0.56%, only 6bps above the year-to-date low. Chart of the Week Concerns about global growth, with the number of new COVID-19 cases still surging in the US and new breakouts occurring in countries like Spain and Australia, would seem to be the logical culprit for the decline in yields. The first reads on global GDP data for the 2nd quarter released last week were historically miserable, with declines of -33% (annualized) in the US and -10% in the euro area (non-annualized). That represents a very deep hole of lost output, literally wiping out several years of growth. Even with the sharp improvements seen recently in cyclical indicators like global manufacturing PMIs, especially in China and Europe, a return to pre-pandemic levels of global economic output is many years away. Central banks will have no choice but to keep policy rates near 0% for at last the next couple of years, as is the current forward guidance provided by the Fed, ECB and others. Lower global bond yields may simply be reflecting the reality that it will take a long time to heal the economic wounds from the pandemic. However, there may be a more insidious reason why bond yields are falling. Investors may be permanently marking down their expectations for long-term potential economic growth, and equilibrium interest rates, in response to the devastation caused by the COVID-19 recession. Last week, Fitch Ratings lowered its estimates for long-term potential GDP growth, used to determine sovereign credit ratings, by 0.5 percentage points for the US (now 1.4%), 0.5 percentage points for the euro area (now 0.7%) and 0.7 percentage points in the UK (now 0.7%).1 These are declines similar in magnitude to the plunge in the OECD’s potential growth rate estimates seen after the 2009 Great Recession (Chart of the Week). Bond yields in the US and Europe witnessed a fundamental repricing in response, with nominal 5-year yields, 5-years forward breaking 200bps below the 4-6% range that prevailed in the US and Europe during the decade prior to the Great Recession. A similar re-rating of global bond yields to structurally lower levels may now be happening, with investors now believing that central banks will have difficulty raising rates much (if at all) in the future - even after the pandemic has ended. The Message From Declining Negative Real Bond Yields Chart 2The Real Rate/Breakevens Divergence Continues The typical signals about economic growth from government bond yields are now less clear because of the aggressive policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis. 0% policy rates, dovish forward guidance on the timing of any future rate increases, large scale asset purchases (QE), and more extreme measures like yield curve control to peg bond yields, have all acted to suppress the level and volatility of nominal global bond yields. Within those calm nominal yields, however, the dynamic that has been in place since May - rising inflation breakevens and falling real bond yields – is growing in intensity. The 10-year US TIPS real yield is now at a new all-time low of -1.02%, while the 10-year TIPS breakeven is now up to 1.58%, the highest since February before the pandemic began to roil financial markets (Chart 2). Similar trends are evident in most other major developed economy bond markets, with the gap between falling real yields and widening breakevens growing at a notably faster pace in Canada and Australia. More often than not, longer-term real yields tend to move in the same direction as inflation expectations when economic growth is improving. The former responds to faster economic activity, often with an associated pick up in private sector credit demand. At the same time, rising inflation expectations discount higher economic resource utilization (i.e. lower unemployment) and confidence that inflation will start to pick up. A deeply negative correlation between longer-term real yields and inflation expectations is unusual, but not unprecedented. A deeply negative correlation between longer-term real yields and inflation expectations is unusual, but not unprecedented. In Chart 3, we show the range of rolling three-year correlations between 10-year inflation-linked (real) government bond yields and 10-year inflation breakevens in the US, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia for the post-crisis period. The triangles in the chart are the latest three-year correlation, while the diamonds are a more recent measure showing the 13-week correlation. There are a few key takeaways from this chart: Chart 3Negative Real Yield/Breakevens Correlations Are Not Unprecedented All countries shown have experienced a sustained period of negative correlation between real yields and inflation breakevens; The correlation has mostly been positive in Australia and has always been negative in Japan; Most importantly, the deeply negative correlations seen over the past three months – with rising breakevens all but fully offsetting falling real yields – are at or below the range of historical experience for all countries shown. Chart 4TIPS Yields May Stay Negative For Some Time In the current virus-stricken world, where many businesses that have closed during the pandemic may never reopen, there will be abundant spare global economic capacity for several years. In the US, measures of spare capacity like the unemployment gap (the unemployment rate minus the full-employment NAIRU rate) have been a reliable leading directional indicator of the long-run correlation between real TIPS yields and TIPS breakevens over the past decade (Chart 4). The surge in US unemployment seen since the spring, which has pushed the jobless rate into double-digit territory, suggests that the current deeply negative correlation between US real yields and inflation breakevens can persist over the next 6-12 months. Given the large increases in unemployment seen in other countries, the negative correlations between real yields and inflation breakevens should also continue outside the US. As for inflation expectations, those remain correlated in the short-run to changes in oil prices and exchange rates in all countries. On that front, there is still some room for breakevens to widen to reach the fair value levels implied by our models.2 A good conceptual way to think about inflation breakevens on a more fundamental level, however, is as a “vote of confidence” in a central bank’s monetary policy stance. If investors perceive policy settings to be too tight, markets will price in slower growth and lower inflation expectations, and vice versa. Every developed market central bank is now setting policy rates near or below 0% - and promising to keep them there until at least the end of 2022. Thus, the trend of rising global inflation breakevens can continue as a reflection of very dovish central banks that will be more tolerant of increases in inflation and not tighten policy pre-emptively. Currently, real 10-year inflation-linked bond yields are below the New York Fed’s estimates of the neutral real short-term rate, or “r-star”, in the US and the UK (Chart 5), as well as in the euro area and Canada (Chart 6).3 In the US and euro area, real yields have followed the broad trend of r-star, but the gap between the two is relatively moderate with r-star estimated to be only 0.5% in the US and 0.2% in the euro zone (where the ECB is setting a negative nominal interest rate on European bank deposits at the central bank – a policy choice that the Fed has been very reluctant to consider). Chart 5Negative Real Bond Yields Are Below R* In The US & UK ... Chart 6... As Well As In The Euro Area & Canada A more interesting study is in the UK where 10yr inflation-linked Gilt yields have fallen below -2.5%, but without the Bank of England implementing any negative nominal policy rates. In the UK, inflation expectations have been relatively high – running in the 2.5-3% range prior to the COVID-19 recession – as the Bank of England has consistently kept overnight interest rates below actual CPI inflation since the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, nominal Gilt yields have stayed relatively low for longer, as real yields and inflation expectations have remained negatively correlated for a long period with the Bank of England maintaining a consistently negative real policy rate. Chart 7Spillovers From Negative TIPS Yields Into Other Assets If the Fed were to do the same in the US, keeping the funds rate very low even as inflation rises, then a similar dynamic could take place where real TIPS yields continue to fall and TIPS breakevens continue to rise as the market prices in a sustained negative real fed funds rate. That may already be happening, with Fed Chair Jerome Powell hinting last week that the Fed is in the process of completing its inflation strategy review – with a shift towards rate hikes occurring only after realized inflation has sustainably increased to the Fed’s 2% target. A forecast of inflation heading to 2% because of falling unemployment will no longer be enough.4 Other factors may be at work depressing real bond yields while boosting inflation expectations, such as the massive QE bond buying programs of the Fed, ECB and other central banks. Yet even QE programs are essentially an aggressive form of forward guidance designed to drive down longer-term bond yields by lowering expectations of future interest rates. In sum, it is increasingly likely that the current phase of negative global real bond yields may become longer lasting if markets believe that equilibrium real policy rates are now negative. Bond investors will expect central banks to sit on their hands and do nothing in that environment, even if inflation starts to increase. This not only has implications for bond markets, but other asset classes as well based on what is happening in the US. The steady decline in the in the 10-year US TIPS yield has boosted the valuation of assets that typically have been considered inflation hedges, like equities and gold (Chart 7). The fall in TIPS yields also suggests that more weakness in the US dollar is likely to come over the next 6-12 months – another reflationary factor that should help lift global inflation expectations and boost the attractiveness of inflation-linked bonds. The current phase of negative global real bond yields may become longer lasting if markets believe that equilibrium real policy rates are now negative. Bottom Line: The growing divide between falling negative real bond yields and rising inflation expectations in the US and other major developed economies may be a sign of investors pricing in slower long-run potential economic growth in the aftermath of the COVID-19 recession – and, thus, lower equilibrium real interest rates. Stay overweight inflation-linked bonds versus nominal equivalents. Searching For Value In Global Spread Product Last week, we looked at the impact of currency hedging on the attractiveness of government bond yields across the developed markets.5 We concluded that US Treasuries still offered superior yields to most other countries’ sovereign bonds, even with the US dollar in a weakening trend and after hedging out currency risk. We also presented a cursory look at the relative attractiveness of the major global spread product categories in that report, but without factoring in any considerations on the relative credit quality or volatility between sectors. This week, we will look at the relative value of global spread products hedged into USD, GBP, EUR and JPY, but after controlling for those credit and volatility risks. We conducted a similar analysis in early 2018,6 ranking the currency-hedged yields for a wide variety of global spread products by the ratio of yields to trailing volatility. This time, instead of looking at the just that simple valuation metric, we use regression models to make a judgment on how under- or over-valued spread products are relative to their “fair value”. To recap the methodology of this analysis, we take the Bloomberg Barclays index yield-to-maturity (YTM) for each spread product category, hedged into the four currencies used in this analysis, and divide it by the annualized trailing volatility of those yields over both short-term (1-year) and long-term (3-year) windows. In order to hedge the yields into each currency, we used the annualized differentials between spot and 3-month forward exchange rates, which is the all-in cost of hedging. We then compare those currency-hedged, volatility-adjusted yields to two measures of risk: the index credit rating and duration times spread (DTS) for each spread product. Table 1 summarizes the attractiveness of each product when hedged into different currencies. The rank is based on the average of four different valuation measures.7 The higher the rank, the more attractive the sector is in terms of yield relative to risk measures such as both short-term and long-term volatilities, credit ratings, and DTS. Table 1Ranking Currency-Hedged, Risk-Adjusted Global Spread Product Yields A few interesting points come from the table: Emerging market (EM) USD-denominated investment grade (IG) corporate debt ranks at or near the top of the rankings, for all currencies; the opposite holds true for EM USD-denominated sovereign bonds Almost all European spread products rank poorly for non-euro denominated investors US & UK high-yield (HY) rank highly for all currencies US real estate related assets (MBS and CMBS) also rank well for all investor groups In general, US products are more attractive than European credit sectors. This is mainly because US spread products offer higher yields than European ones even after accounting for volatility and the weakening US dollar. Almost all European spread products rank poorly for non-euro denominated investors. Chart 8 shows the unhedged YTM on the x-axis and the option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the y-axis (Table 2 contains the abbreviations used in this chart and all remaining charts in this report). Unsurprisingly, the YTM and OAS follow a very tight linear relationship. However, when yields are hedged into different currencies and risk measures are factored in, the result changes. Chart 8Global Spread Product Yields & Spreads Charts 9A to 12B show the details of spread product analysis with different currency hedges and risk factors. To limit the number of charts shown, we show only currency-hedged yields adjusted by long-term trailing volatility (the rankings do not change significantly when using a shorter-term volatility measure). The y-axis in all charts shows the volatility-adjusted yields, while the x-axis shows credit ratings and DTS. Sectors that are close to upper-right in each chart are more attractive (undervalued), while spread products that are close to bottom-left are less attractive (overvalued). Chart 9AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into USD, Adjusted For Credit Quality Chart 9BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into USD, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Chart 10AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into EUR, Adjusted For Credit Quality Chart 10BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into EUR, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Chart 11AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into GBP, Adjusted For Credit Quality Chart 11BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into GBP, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Chart 12AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into JPY, Adjusted For Credit Quality Chart 12BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into JPY, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Table 2Global Spread Products In Our Analysis An interesting result is that when comparing the three major high-yield products (US-HY, EMU-HY and UK-HY), US-HY is the most attractive in USD terms, but UK-HY is more attractive when hedged into GBP, EUR, and JPY. Another observation is that higher quality bonds such as government-related and agency debt in the US and euro area are overvalued and less attractive given how low their yields are, regardless of their low volatility. The results from this analysis may differ from our current recommendations. For example, we currently only have a neutral recommendation on EM corporates, but based on this analysis, EM corporates offer the most attractive return in USD terms. This analysis is purely based on YTM and traditional risk factors without considering other concerns that could make EM assets riskier such as the spread of COVID-19 in major EM countries. However, these rankings do line up with our major spread product call of overweighting US IG and HY corporate debt versus euro area equivalents. Based on this analysis, EM corporates offer the most attractive return in USD terms. Bottom Line: A broad ranking of currency-hedged global spread product yields, adjusted for volatility and credit quality, shows that the most attractive yields (hedged into USD, EUR, GBP and JPY) are on offer in emerging market USD-denominated investment grade corporates and high-yield company debt in the US and UK. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/coronavirus-impact-on-gdp-will-be-felt-for-years-to-come-27-07-2020 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresarch.com. 3 We use the French 10-year inflation-linked bond as the proxy for the entire euro area, as this is the oldest inflation-linked bond market in the region and thus has the most data history. 4https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-weighs-abandoning-pre-emptive-rate-moves-to-curb-inflation-11596360600?mod=hp_lead_pos6 5 Please see BCA Research Weekly Report, “What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors”, dated July 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresarch.com. 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Policymakers Are Now Selling Put Options On Volatility, Not Asset Prices", dated March 6, 2018, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. 7 Hedged YTM/Short-term trailing volatility vs. Credit Rating; Hedged YTM/Long-term trailing volatility vs. Credit Rating; Hedged YTM/Long-term trailing volatility vs. Duration; Hedged YTM/Long-term trailing volatility vs. Duration. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

