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Highlights The financial landscape has shifted over the past month with the arrival of some inflation 'green shoots' and a major shift in U.S. fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is shaping up to be a major source of demand and a possible headache for the FOMC. Tax cuts and the spending deal will result in fiscal stimulus of about 0.8% of GDP in 2018 and 1.3% in 2019. The latest U.S. CPI and average hourly earnings reports caught investors' attention. However, most other wage measures are consistent with our base-case view that inflation will trend higher in an orderly fashion. If correct, this will allow the FOMC to avoid leaning heavily against the fiscal stimulus. Stronger nominal growth and a patient Fed are a positive combination for risk assets such as corporate bonds and equities. The projected peak in S&P profit growth now occurs later in the year and at a higher level compared with our previous forecast. The bad news is that the fiscal stimulus and budding inflation signs imply that investors cannot count as much on the "Fed Put" to offset negative shocks. Our fixed income strategists have raised their year-end target for the 10-year Treasury yield from around 3% to the 3.3-3.5% range, partly reflecting the U.S. fiscal shock. That said, extreme short positioning and oversold conditions suggest that a consolidation phase is likely in the near term. Loose fiscal and tight money should be bullish for the currency. However, angst regarding the U.S. "twin deficits" problem appears to be weighing on the dollar. We do not believe that fiscal largesse will cause the current account deficit to blow out by enough to seriously undermine the dollar. We still expect a bounce in the dollar, but we cannot rule out further weakness in the near term. Fiscal stimulus could extend the expansion, but the more important point is that faster growth in the coming quarters will deepen the next recession. For now, stay overweight risk assets (equities and corporate bonds), and below benchmark in duration. Feature The financial landscape has shifted over the past month with the arrival of some inflation 'green shoots' and a major shift in U.S. fiscal policy. This has not come as a surprise to BCA's Geopolitical Strategy, which has been flagging the shift away from fiscal conservatism and towards populism for some time, particularly in the U.S. context.1 The move is wider than just in the U.S. In Germany, the Grand Coalition deal was only concluded after Chancellor Merkel conceded to demands for more spending on everything from education to public investment in technology and defense. The German fiscal surplus will likely be fully spent. There is no fiscal room outside of Germany, but the austerity era is over. Japan is also on track to ease fiscal policy this year. The big news, however, is in the U.S. President Trump is moving to the middle ground in order to avoid losing the House in this year's midterm elections. Deficit hawks have mutated into doves with the passage of profligate tax cuts, and Congress is now on the brink of a monumental two-year appropriations bill that will add significantly to the Federal budget deficit (Chart I-1). The deficit will likely rise to about 5½% of GDP in FY2019, up from 3.3% in last year's CBO baseline forecast for that year. This includes the impact of the tax cuts, as well as outlays for disaster relief ($45 billion), the military ($165 billion) and non-defense discretionary items ($131 billion), spread over the next two years. A deal on infrastructure spending would add to this already-lofty total. Chart I-1U.S. Budget Deficit To Reach 5 1/2 % In 2019 There is also talk in Congress of re-authorizing "earmarks" - legislative tags that direct funding to special interests in representatives' home districts. Earmarks could add another $50 billion in spending over 2018 and 2019. While not a major stimulative measure, earmarks could further reduce Congressional gridlock and underscore that all pretense of fiscal restraint is gone. Chart I-2Substantial Stimulus In The Pipeline Chart I-2 presents an estimate of U.S. fiscal thrust, which is a measure of the initial economic impulse of changes in government tax and spending policies.2 The IMF's baseline, done before the tax cuts were passed, suggested that policy would be contractionary this year (about ½% of GDP), and slightly expansionary in 2019. Incorporating the impact of the tax cuts and the Senate deal on spending, the fiscal impulse will now be positive in 2018, to the tune of 0.8% of GDP. Next year's impulse will be even larger, at 1.3%. These figures are tentative, because it is not clear exactly how much of the spending will take place this year versus 2019 and 2020. A lot can change in the coming months as Congress hammers out the final deal. Moreover, the impact on GDP growth will be less than these figures suggest, because the economic multipliers related to tax cuts are less than those for spending. Nonetheless, the key point is that fiscal policy is shaping up to be a major source of demand and a possible headache for the FOMC. The Fed's Dilemma Chart I-3U.S. Inflation Green Shoots Textbook economic models tell us that the combination of expansionary fiscal policy and tightening monetary policy is a recipe for rising interest rates and a stronger currency. However, it is not clear how much of the coming pickup in nominal GDP growth will be due to inflation versus real growth, given that the U.S. already appears to be near full employment. How will the Fed respond to the new fiscal outlook? We do not believe policymakers will respond aggressively, but much depends on the evolution of inflation. January's 0.3% rise in the core CPI index grabbed investors' attention, coming on the heels of a surprisingly strong average hourly earnings report (AHE). The 3-month annualized core inflation rate surged to 2.9% (Chart I-3). Among the components, the large rent and owners' equivalent rent indexes each rose 0.3% in the month, while medical care services jumped by 0.6%. Also notable was the 1.7% surge in apparel prices, which may reflect 'catch up' with the perky PPI apparel index. More generally, it appears that the upward trend in import price inflation is finally leaking into consumer prices. That said, investors should not get carried away. Most other wage measures, such as unit labor costs, are not flashing red. This is consistent with our base-case view that inflation will trend higher in an orderly fashion over the coming months. Moreover, the Fed's preferred measure, core PCE inflation, is still well below 2%. If our 'gradual rise' inflation view proves correct, it will allow the FOMC to avoid leaning heavily against the fiscal stimulus. We argued in last month's Overview that the new FOMC will strive to avoid major shifts in policy, and that Chair Powell has shown during his time on the FOMC that he is not one to rock the boat. It is doubtful that the FOMC will try to head off the impact of the fiscal stimulus on growth via sharply higher rates, opting instead to maintain the current 'dot plot' for now and wait to see how the stimulus translates into growth versus inflation. Stronger nominal growth and a patient Fed is a positive combination for risk assets such as corporate bonds and equities. Chart I-4 provides an update of our top-down S&P operating profit forecast, incorporating the economic impact of the new fiscal stimulus. We still expect profit growth to peak this year as industrial production tops out and margins begin to moderate on the back of rising wages. However, the projected peak now occurs later in the year and at a higher level compared with our previous forecast, and the whole profile is shifted up. Most of this improvement in the profit outlook is already discounted in prices, but the key point is that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for stocks at least into early 2019. Chart I-4The Profile For S&P EPS Growth Shifts Up The End Of The Low-Vol Period That said, the U.S. is in the late innings of the expansion and risk assets have entered a new, more volatile phase. We have been warning of upheaval when investor complacency regarding inflation is challenged, because the rally in risk assets has been balanced precariously on a three-legged stool of low inflation, depressed interest rates and modest economic volatility. All it took was a couple of small positive inflation surprises to spark a reset in the market for volatility. The key question is whether February's turmoil represented a healthy market correction or a signal that a bear market is approaching. The good news is that the widening in high-yield corporate bond spreads was muted (Chart I-5). This market has often provided an early warning sign of an approaching major top in the stock market. The adjustment in other risk gauges, such as EM stocks and gold, was also fairly modest. This suggests that equity and volatility market action was largely technical in nature, in the context of extended investor positioning, crowded trades and elevated valuations. There has been no change in the items on our checklist for trimming equity exposure. We presented the checklist in last month's Overview. Our short-term economic growth models for the major countries remain upbeat and our global capital spending indicators are also bullish (Chart I-6). Industrial production in the advanced economies is in hyper-drive as global capital spending growth accelerates (Chart I-7). Chart I-5February's Volatility Reset Chart I-6Near-Term Growth Outlook Still Solid... Chart I-7... Partly Due To Capex Acceleration Nonetheless, it will be difficult to put the 'vol genie' back into the bottle. The surge in bond yields has focused market attention on the leverage pressure points in the system. One potential source of volatility is the corporate bond space. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 17, analyses the vulnerability of the U.S. corporate sector to rising interest rates. We conclude that higher rates on their own won't cause significant pain, but the combination of higher rates and a downturn in earnings would lead to a major deterioration in credit quality. Moreover, expansionary fiscal policy and recent inflation surprises have limited the Fed's room to maneuver. Under Fed Chairs Bernanke and Yellen, markets relied on a so-called "Fed Put". When inflation was low and stable, economic slack was abundant and long-term inflation expectations were depressed then disappointing economic data or equity market setbacks were followed by an easing in the expectations for Fed rate hikes. This helped to calm investors' nerves. We do not think that the Powell FOMC represents a regime shift in terms of the Fed's reaction function, but the rise in long-term inflation expectations and the January inflation report have altered the Fed's calculus. The new Committee will be more tolerant of equity corrections and tighter financial conditions than in the past. Indeed, some FOMC members would welcome reduced frothiness in financial markets, as long as the correction is not large enough to undermine the economy (i.e. a 20% or greater equity market decline). The implication is that we are unlikely to see a return of market volatility to the lows observed early this year. Bonds: Due For Consolidation Chart I-8Market Is Converging With Fed 'Dots' A lot of adjustment has already taken place in the bond market. Market expectations for the Fed funds rate have moved up sharply since last month (Chart I-8). The market now discounts three rate hikes in 2018, in line with the Fed 'dot plot'. Expectations still fall short of the Fed's plan in 2019, but the market's estimate of the terminal fed funds rate has largely converged with the Fed's dots. Meanwhile, the latest Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey revealed that investors cut bond allocations to the lowest level in the 20-year history of the report. All of this raises the odds that the rise in U.S. and global bond yields will correct before the bear phase resumes. Our fixed income strategists have raised their year-end target for the 10-year Treasury yield from around 3% to the 3.3-3.5% range. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate has jumped to 2.1% even as oil prices have softened, signaling that the market is seeing more evidence of underlying inflationary pressure. This breakeven rate will likely rise by another 30 basis points and settle back into its pre-Lehman trading range of 2.3-2.5%. Importantly, the latter range was consistent with stable inflation expectations in the pre-Lehman years. The upward revision to our 10-year nominal yield target is due to a higher real rate assumption. In part, this reflects the fact that we have been impressed by last year's productivity performance. We are not expecting a major structural upshift in underlying productivity growth, for reasons cited by our colleague Peter Berezin in a recent report.3 Nonetheless, capital spending has picked up and Chart I-9 suggests that productivity growth should move a little higher in the coming years based on the acceleration in growth of the capital stock. Equilibrium interest rates should rise in line with slightly faster potential economic growth. Should we worry about a higher fiscal risk premium in bond yields? In the pre-Lehman era, academic studies suggested that every percentage point rise in the government's debt-to-GDP ratio added three basis points to the equilibrium level of bond yields. We shouldn't think of this as a 'default risk premium', because there is little default risk for a country that can print its own currency. Rather, higher yields reflect a crowding-out effect; since growth is limited in the long run by the supply side of the economy, a larger government sector means that some private sector demand needs to be crowded out via higher real interest rates. Plentiful economic slack negated the need for any crowding out as government debt exploded in aftermath of the Great Recession. Moreover, quantitative easing programs soaked up more than all of net government issuance for the major economies. Chart I-10 shows that the flow of the major economies' government bonds available for the private sector to purchase was negative in each of 2015, 2016 and 2017. The flow will swing to a positive figure of US$957 billion this year and US$1,127 billion in 2019. Real interest rates may therefore be higher to the extent that government bonds will have to compete with private sector issuance for available savings. Chart I-9U.S. Productivity Should Improve Modestly Chart I-10Government Bond Supply Is Accelerating The bottom line is that duration should be kept short of benchmarks within fixed-income portfolios, although we would not be surprised to see a consolidation phase or even a counter-trend rally in the near term. Dollar Cross Currents As mentioned earlier, standard theory suggests that loose fiscal policy and tight money should be bullish for the currency. However, the U.S. situation is complicated by the fact that fiscal stimulus will likely worsen the "twin deficits" problem. The current account deficit widened last year to 2.6% of GDP (Chart I-11). The fiscal measures will result in a jump in the Federal budget deficit to roughly 5½% in 2019, up from 3½% in last summer's CBO baseline projection. As a ballpark estimate, the two percentage point increase will cause the current account deficit to widen by only 0.3 percentage points. Of course, this will be partly offset by the continued improvement in the energy balance due to surging shale oil production. The poor international investment position is another potential negative for the greenback. Persistent U.S. current account deficits have resulted in a huge shortfall in the country's international investment account, which has reached 40% of GDP (Chart I-12). This means that foreign investors own a larger stock of U.S. financial assets than U.S. investors own abroad. Nonetheless, what matters for the dollar are the returns that flow from these assets. U.S. investors have always earned more on their overseas investments than foreigners make on their U.S. assets (which are dominated by low-yielding fixed-income securities). Thus, the U.S. still enjoys a 0.5% of GDP net positive inflow of international income (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Chart I-11A U.S. Twin Deficits Problem? Chart I-12U.S. Net International Investment Interest income flowing abroad will rise along with U.S. bond yields. This will undermine the U.S. surplus on international income to the extent that it is not offset by rising returns on U.S. investments held abroad. We estimate that a further 60 basis point rise in the U.S. Treasury curve (taking the 10-year yield from 2.9% to our target of 3½%) would cause the primary income surplus to fall by about 0.7 percentage points (Chart I-13). Adding this to the 0.3 percentage points from the direct effect of the increased fiscal deficit, the current account shortfall would deteriorate to roughly 3½% of GDP. While the deterioration is significant, the external deficit would simply return to 2009 levels. We doubt this would justify an ongoing dollar bear market on its own. Historically, a widening current account deficit has not always been the dominant driver of dollar trends. What should matter more is the Fed's response to the fiscal stimulus. If the FOMC does not immediately respond to head off the growth impulse, then rising inflation expectations could depress real rates at the short-end of the curve and undermine the dollar temporarily, especially in the context of a deteriorating external balance. The dollar would likely receive a bid later, when inflation clearly shifts higher and long-term inflation expectations move into the target zone discussed above. At that point, policymakers will step up the pace of rate hikes in order to get ahead of the inflation curve. The bottom line is that we still believe that the dollar will move somewhat higher on a 12-month horizon, but we can't rule out a continued downtrend in the near term until inflation clearly bottoms. It will also be difficult for the dollar to rally in the near term in trade-weighted terms if our currency strategists are correct on the yen outlook. The Japanese labor market is extremely tight, industrial production is growing at an impressive 4.4% pace, and the OECD estimates that output is now more than one percentage point above its non-inflationary level (Chart I-14). Investors are betting that a booming economy will give the monetary authorities the chance to move away from extraordinarily accommodative conditions. Investors are thus lifting their estimates of where Japanese policy will stand in three or five years. Chart I-13U.S. Fiscal Stimulus ##br##Impact On External Deficit Chart I-14Yen Benefitting From ##br##Domestic And Foreign Growth Increased volatility in global markets is also yen-bullish, especially since speculative shorts in the yen had reached near record levels. The pullback in global risk assets triggered some short-covering in yen-funded carry trades. Finally, the yen trades at a large discount to purchasing power parity. A strong Yen could prevent dollar rally in trade-weighted terms in the near term. Finally, A Word On Oil Oil prices corrected along with the broader pullback in risk assets in February. Nonetheless, the fundamentals point to a continued tightening in crude oil markets in the first half of 2018 (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Oil Inventory Correction Continuing OPEC's goal of reducing OECD inventories to five-year average levels will likely be met late this year. OPEC and Russia's production cuts are pretty much locked in to the end of June, when the producer coalition will next meet. Even with U.S. shale-oil output increasing, solid global demand will ensure that OECD inventories will continue to draw through the spring period. Over the past week, comments from Saudi and Russian oil ministers indicate they are more comfortable with extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018, which, along with strong global demand growth, raises the odds Brent crude oil prices will exceed $70/bbl this year and possibly next year. Whether this is the result of the Saudi's need for higher prices to support the Aramco IPO, or it reflects an assessment by OPEC 2.0 that the world economy can absorb such prices without damaging demand too much, is not clear. Markets have yet to receive forward guidance from OPEC 2.0 leadership indicating this is the coalition's new policy, but our oil analysts are raising the odds that it is, and will be adjusting their forecast accordingly this week. Investment Conclusions The combination of an initially plodding Fed and faster earnings growth this year provides a bullish backdrop for the equity market. Treasury yields will continue to trend higher but, as long as the Fed sticks with the current 'dot plot', the pain in the fixed-income pits will not prevent the equity bull phase to continue for a while longer. Nonetheless, the fiscal stimulus is arriving very late in the U.S. economic cycle. The fact that there is little economic slack means that, rather than extending the expansion and the runway for earnings, stimulus might simply generate a more exaggerated boom/bust scenario; the FOMC sticks with the current game plan in the near term, but ends up falling behind the inflation curve and then is forced to catch up. The implication is 'faster growth now, deeper recession later'. Timing the end of the business cycle keeps coming back to the inflation outlook. If the result of the fiscal stimulus is more inflation but not much more growth, then the Fed will be forced to step harder and earlier on the brakes. Our base case is that inflation rises in a gradual way, but it has been very difficult to forecast inflation in this cycle. The bottom line is that our recommended asset allocation is unchanged for now. We are overweight risk assets (equities and corporate bonds), and below benchmark on duration. We will continue to watch the items in our Exit Checklist for warning signs (see last month's Overview). We are likely to trim corporate bond exposure within fixed-income portfolios to neutral or underweight in advance of taking profits on equities. The dollar should head up at some point, although not in the near term. The yen should be the strongest currency of the majors in the next 3-6 months. In currency-hedged terms, our fixed-income team still believes that JGBs are the best place to hide from the bond bear market. Gilts and Aussie governments also provide some protection. The worst performers will likely be government bonds in the U.S., Canada and Europe. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst February 22, 2018 Next Report: March 29, 2018 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 The fiscal thrust is defined as the change in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, expressed as a percent of GDP. 3 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Structural Bear Market In Bonds," dated February 16, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. II. Leverage And Sensitivity To Rising Rates: The U.S. Corporate Sector We estimate the corporate sector's vulnerability to rising interest rates and a weaker economic environment, highlighting the industries that will be hit the hardest. Both our top-down and bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors show that overall corporate finances improved last year on the back of a mini profit boom. Nonetheless, leverage remained on the up-escalator. The re-leveraging of the corporate sector has been widespread across industries and ratings. The credit cycle has entered a late stage and we are biased to take profits early on our overweight corporate bond positioning. Rising interest rates will not, on their own, trigger a downgrade and default wave in the next few years. Nonetheless, the starting point for interest coverage ratios is low. The interest coverage ratio for the U.S. non-financial corporate sector will likely drop to all-time lows even in a mild recession. Downgrades will proliferate when the rating agencies realize that the economy is turning south. Our profit indicators are more likely to give an early warning sign than the economic data. We remain overweight corporates within fixed income portfolios for now, but a downgrade would be warranted given some combination of rising core consumer price inflation, a further increase in the 10-year TIPS breakeven to 2.3%, and/or a deterioration in our margin proxy. February's "volatility" tremors focused investor attention on leveraged pressure points in the financial system, at a time when valuation is stretched and central banks are turning down the monetary thermostat. The market swoon may have simply reflected the unwinding of crowded volatility-related trades, but the risk is that there are other landmines lurking just ahead. The corporate sector is one candidate. Equity buybacks have not been especially large compared to previous cycles after adjusting for the length of the expansion (i.e. adjusting for cumulative GDP over the period, Chart II-1).1 But the expansion has gone on for so long that cumulative buybacks exceed the previous three expansions in absolute terms (Chart II-1, bottom panel). One would expect a lot of financial engineering to take place in an environment where borrowing costs are held at very low levels for an extended period. But, of course, one should also expect there to be consequences. Chart II-1Cycle Comparison: Corporate Finance Trends Chart II-2Corporate Bond Spreads And Leverage As Chart II-2 shows, corporate spreads tend to follow the broad trends in leverage, albeit with lengthy periods of divergence. The chart suggests that current spreads are far too narrow given the level of corporate leverage. Balance sheet health is obviously not the key driver of corporate bond relative returns at the moment. Nonetheless, this will change as interest rates rise and investors begin to worry about the growth outlook rather than squeezing the last drop of yield out of spread product. In this Special Report, we estimate the corporate sector's vulnerability to rising interest rates and a weaker economic environment, highlighting the industries that will be hit the hardest. But first, we review recent trends in leverage and overall balance sheet health. BCA's Corporate Health Monitors BCA's top-down Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) has been a workhorse for our corporate bond strategy for almost 20 years (Chart II-3). It is based on six financial ratios constructed from the U.S. Flow of Funds data for the entire non-financial corporate sector (Table II-1). The top-down CHM shifted into "deteriorating health" territory in 2014 on the back of rising leverage and an eroding return on capital.2 Chart II-3Top Down U.S. Corporate Health Monitor Table II-1Definitions Of Ratios That Go Into The CHMs The downward trend in the return on capital since 2007 is disturbing, as it suggests that there is a surplus of capital on U.S. balance sheets that is largely unproductive and not lifting profits. This can also be seen in the run-up in corporate borrowing in recent years that has been used to undertake share buybacks. If a company's best investment idea is to take on debt to repurchase its own stock, rather than borrow to invest in its own business, then the expected internal rate of return on investment must be quite low. This is a longer-term problem for corporate health. Alternatively, financial engineering may reflect misaligned incentives, such as stock options, rather than poor investment opportunities. The good news is that profit margins bounced back in 2017, which was reflected in a small decline in our top-down CHM toward the zero line over the past year (although it remained in 'deteriorating' territory). While the top-down CHM has been a useful indicator to time bear markets in corporate bond relative performance, it tells us nothing about the distribution of credit quality. In 2016 we looked at the financials of 1,600 U.S. companies to obtain a more detailed picture of corporate health. After removing ones with limited history or missing data, our sample shrank to a still-respectable 770 companies from across the industrial and quality spectrum. We then constructed an overall Corporate Health Monitor for all companies in the sample, as well as for the nine non-financial industries. We refer to these indicators as bottom-up CHMs, which we regard as complements to our top-down Health Monitor. The companies selected for our universe provided a sector and credit-quality composition that roughly matched the Barclays corporate bond indexes. In our first report, published in the February 2016 monthly Bank Credit Analyst, we highlighted that the financial ratios and overall corporate health looked only a little better excluding the troubled energy and materials sectors. The level of debt/equity was even a bit higher outside of the commodity industries. The implication was that, at the time, corporate credit quality had deteriorated across industrial sectors and levels of credit quality. Profitability Drove Improving Health In 2017... An update of the bottom-up CHMs shows that corporate financial health improved in 2017 for both the investment-grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) sectors (Chart II-4 and Chart II-5). The IG bottom-up Monitor remains in "deteriorating health" territory, but HY Monitor moved almost all the way back to the neutral line by year end. Leverage continued to trend higher last year for both IG and HY, but this was more than offset by a strong earnings performance that was reflected in rising operating margins, interest coverage and debt coverage. Chart II-4Bottom-Up IG CHM Chart II-5Bottom-Up HY CHM These improvements were particularly evident in the sub-investment grade universe. Our industry high-yield CHMs fell significantly in 2017 from elevated (i.e. poor) levels all the way back to the neutral line for Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Industrials, Materials and Utilities (not shown). The high-yield Technology and Health Care sector CHMs are also close to neutral. ...But The Earnings Runway Is Limited Unfortunately, the profit tailwind won't last forever. At some point, earnings growth will stall and this cycle's debt accumulation will start to bite in the context of rising interest rates. While interest coverage (EBIT divided by interest payments) improved last year for most industries, it remains depressed by historical standards. This is despite ultra-low borrowing rates and a robust earnings backdrop. U.S. companies are not facing an imminent cash crunch that would raise downgrade/default risk, but depressed interest coverage suggests that there is less room for error than in previous years. Table II-2Widespread Re-Leveraging Now that government bond yields have bottomed for the cycle and the "green shoots" of inflation are beginning to emerge, it begs the question of corporate sector exposure to rising interest costs. The sensitivity is important because Moody's assigns a weight of between 20% and 40% for the leverage and coverage ratios when rating a company, depending on the industry. Downgrade risk will escalate if corporate borrowing rates continue rising and, especially, if the U.S. economy enters a downturn. Comparing the level of debt or leverage across industries is complicated by the fact that some industries perpetually carry more debt than others due to the nature of the business. Moody's uses different thresholds for leverage when rating companies, depending on the industry. Thus, the change in the leverage ratio is perhaps more important than its level when comparing industries. Table II-2 shows the change in the ratio of debt to the book value of equity from our bottom-up universe of companies from 2010 to 2017. Leverage rose sharply in all sectors except Utilities. The worse two sectors were Communications and Consumer Discretionary, where leverage rose by 81 and 104 percentage points, respectively. Highest Risk Sectors We expect a traditional end to the business cycle; the Fed overdoes the rate hike cycle, sending the economy into recession. The industrial sectors with the poorest financial health and the greatest earnings "beta" to the overall market are most at risk in this macro scenario. We first estimate earnings betas by comparing the peak-to-trough decline in EPS for each sector to the overall decline in the non-financial S&P 500 EPS, taking an average of the last two recessions (we could not include the early 1990s recession due to data limitations). Not surprisingly, Materials, Technology, Consumer Discretionary and Energy sport the highest earnings beta based on this methodology (Chart II-6). Chart II-6Earnings Beta Chart II-7 presents a scatter plot of 2017 leverage versus the industry's earnings beta. Consumer Discretionary stands out on the high side on both counts. Materials and Energy are also high-beta industries, but have lower leverage. Communications is a high-debt industry with a medium earnings beta. These same industries stand out when comparing the earnings beta to the interest coverage ratio (the lower the interest coverage ratio the more risky in Chart II-8). Chart II-7Leverage Vs. Earnings Beta Chart II-8Interest Coverage Ratio Vs. Earnings Beta Of course, a sector's sensitivity to rising interest rates will depend on both the level of debt and its maturity distribution. Higher rates will not have much impact in the near term for firms that have little debt to roll over in the next couple of years. Chart II-9 presents the percentage of total debt that will come due over the next three years by industry. Consumer Discretionary, Tech, Staples and Industrials are the most exposed to debt rollover. To further refine the analysis, we estimate the change in the interest coverage ratio over the next three years for a 100 basis point rise in interest rates across the corporate curve, taking into consideration the maturity distribution of the debt. We make the simplifying assumptions that companies do not issue any more debt over the three years, and that EBIT is unchanged, in order to isolate the impact of higher interest rates. For the universe of our companies, the interest coverage ratio would drop from about 4 to 2½, well below the lows of the Great Recession (denoted as "x" in Chart II-10). The Consumer Staples, Tech and Health Care are affected most deeply (Chart II-11 and Chart II-12). Chart II-9Debt Maturing In Next ##br##Three Years (% Of Total) Chart II-10Interest Coverage Ratio ##br##Headed To New Lows Chart II-11Interest Coverage By ##br##Sector (IG Plus HY) Chart II-12Interest Coverage By ##br##Sector (IG Plus HY) Recession Shock Of course, the decline in interest coverage will be much worse if the Fed steps too far and monetary tightening sparks a recession. Looking again at Charts II-10 to II-12, "o" denotes the combination of a 100 basis point interest rate shock and a mild recession in which the S&P 500 suffers a 25% peak-to-trough decline in EPS. We estimate the decline in EPS based on the industry's earnings beta to the overall market. The overall interest coverage ratio falls even further into uncharted territory below two. The additional shock of the earnings recession makes little difference to earnings coverage for the low beta sectors such as Consumer Staples and Health Care. The coverage ratio falls sharply for the Communications and Industries, although not to new lows. It is a different story for Consumer Discretionary and Materials. The combination of elevated debt and a high earnings beta means that the interest coverage ratio would likely plunge to levels well below previous lows for these two industries. Corporate bond investors and rating agencies will certainly notice. Signposts Our top-down Corporate Health Monitor is one of the key indicators we use to identify cyclical bear phases for corporate bond excess returns. A shift from "improving" to "deteriorating" health has been a reliable confirming indicator for periods of sustained spread widening. The other two key indicators are (Chart II-13): Chart II-13Key Cyclical Drivers Of Corporate Excess Returns Bank lending standards for Commercial & Industrial loans: Banks begin to tighten up on lending standards when they realize that the economy is slowing and credit quality is deteriorating as a result. By making it more difficult for firms to roll over bank loans or replace bond financing, more restrictive standards reinforce the negative trend in corporate credit quality. We traditionally view lending standards as a confirming indicator for a turn in the credit cycle, since tightening standards are typically preceded by deteriorating corporate health and restrictive monetary policy. Restrictive monetary policy: This is the most difficult of the three indicators for which to determine critical values. We had a good idea of the level of the neutral real fed funds rate prior to 2007. Since then, our monetary compass is far less certain because the neutral rate has likely declined for cyclical and structural reasons. The real fed funds rate has moved just slightly into restrictive territory if we take the Laubach-Williams estimate at face value (Chart II-13, third panel). That said, we would expect the 2/10 Treasury yield curve to be closer to inverting if real short-term interest rates are indeed in restrictive territory. Taking the two indicators together, we conclude that monetary policy is not yet outright restrictive. Historically, all three indicators had to be flashing red in order to justify a shift to below-benchmark on corporate bonds within fixed-income portfolios. Only the CHM is negative at the moment, but this time we are unlikely to wait for all three signals to take profits. Poor valuation, lopsided positioning, financial engineering and uncertainty regarding the neutral fed funds rate all argue in favor of erring on the side of caution and not trying to closely time the peak in excess returns. The violent unwinding of short-volatility trades in January highlighted the potential for a quick and nasty repricing of corporate bonds spreads on any disappointments regarding the default rate outlook. Conclusion Both our top-down and bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors show that overall corporate finances improved last year on the back of a mini profit boom. Nonetheless, leverage remained on the up-escalator as businesses continued to pile up debt and return cash to shareholders. Our sample of individual companies reveals that the re-leveraging of the corporate sector has been widespread across industries and ratings. We have clearly entered the late stage of the credit cycle. Rising interest rates will not, on their own, trigger a downgrade and default wave in the next few years. However, debt levels are elevated and the starting point for interest coverage ratios is low. This means that, for any given size of recession, the next economic downturn will have a larger negative impact on corporate health than in the past. The interest coverage ratio for the non-financial corporate sector will likely drop to all-time lows even in a mild recession. Downgrades will proliferate when the rating agencies realize that the economy is turning and the profit boom is over. Last month's Overview listed the top economic indicators we are watching in order to time our exit from risky assets. Inflation expectations will be key; A rise in the 10-year inflation breakeven rate above 2.3% would be a warning that the FOMC will need to ramp up the speed of rate hikes to avoid a large inflation overshoot. While we are also watching a list of economic indicators, they have not provided any lead time for corporate spreads in the past (since the latter are themselves leading indicators). Our profit indicators are probably more likely to give an early warning sign than the economic data. Indeed, the profit outlook will be particularly important in this cycle because of the heightened sensitivity of corporate financial health changes in the macro backdrop. None of our earnings indicators are flashing a warning sign at the moment. A recent Special Report on corporate pricing power found that almost 80% of the sectors covered are lifting selling prices, at a time when labor costs are still subdued.3 These trends are captured by our U.S. Equity Strategy service's margin proxy, which remains in positive territory (Chart II-14). The margin proxy fell into negative territory ahead of the start of the last three sustained widening phases in U.S. corporate bonds. Chart II-14For Corporate Spreads, Watch Our Margin Proxy The bottom line is that we remain overweight corporates within fixed income portfolios for now, but a downgrade would be warranted given some combination of rising core consumer price inflation, a further increase in the 10-year TIPS breakeven to 2.3%, and/or a deterioration in our margin proxy. We expect to pull the trigger later this year but the timing is uncertain. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 The accumulation of equity buybacks, net equity withdrawal, dividends and capital spending are all adjusted by the accumulation of GDP during the expansion to facilitate comparison across business cycles. 2 The Monitor is an average of six financial ratios that are used by rating agencies to rate individual companies. We have applied the approach to the entire non-financial corporate sector, using the Fed's Flow of Funds data. To facilitate comparison with corporate spreads, the ratios are inverted so that a rising CHM indicates deteriorating health. The CHM has a very good track record of heralding trend changes in investment-grade and high-yield spreads over many cycles. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Service Weekly Report, "Corporate Pricing Power Update," dated January 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Volatility returned to financial markets in February. The good news is that it appears to have been a healthy technical correction that has tempered frothy market conditions, rather than the start of an equity bear phase. The VIX has shot from very low levels to above the long-term mean, indicating that there is less complacency among investors. This is confirmed by the pullback in our Composite Sentiment Indicator, although it remains at the high end of its historical range. Our Composite Speculation Indicator is also still hovering at a high level, suggesting that frothiness has not been fully washed out. Similarly, our Equity Valuation Indicator has pulled back, but remains close to our threshold for overvaluation at +1 standard deviations. Our Equity Technical Indicator came close, but did not give a 'sell' signal in February (i.e. it remained above its 9-month moving average). Our Monetary Indicator moved slightly further into 'restrictive' territory in February. We highlight in the Overview section that monetary policy will become a significant headwind once long-term inflation expectations have fully normalized. It is constructive that the indicators for near-term earnings growth remain upbeat; both the net revisions ratio and the earnings surprise index continue to point to further increases in 12-month forward earnings estimates. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) returned to its bullish equity signal in February, following a temporary shift to neutral in January. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are bullish on stocks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. However, the WTP for the U.S. market appears to have rolled over, suggesting that flows are becoming less constructive for U.S. stocks. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. At the margin, the WTP indicator suggest that flows favor the European and Japanese markets to the U.S. Treasurys moved closer to 'inexpensive' territory in February, but are not there yet. Extended technicals suggest a period of consolidation, but value is not a headwind to a continuation in the cyclical bear phase. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst
特別レポート Highlights Following the establishment of an interest rate corridor system in 2015, the 1-week interbank repo rate is the new de jure policy rate in China. However, the massive rise in interbank repo rate spreads that has occurred over the past 18 months means that the 3-month repo rate has become the new de facto policy rate. This is the key rate that investors should be watching in order to predict the impact of monetary policy on average or effective interest rates in the real economy. Roughly 3/4ths of the tightening in monetary policy that has occurred since late-2016 has actually been regulatory/macro-prudential in nature. This raises the possibility that interbank spreads may rise outside of the central bank's comfort zone, but the PBOC appears to have the appropriate tools to respond to such an event. Concerns that rising inflation and a recent surge in monthly bank lending may spur tighter monetary policy over the coming 6-12 months are a red herring. Recent trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease monetary policy than the need to tighten. Investors should continue to maintain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks, excluding the tech sector. Feature We examined the question of how to judge the stance of China's monetary policy in a Weekly Report published last month.1 In today's Special Report we answer seven questions about China's monetary policy framework, in order to clarify the transmission mechanism between the PBOC's interest rate corridor and the real economy and to help investors understand how to measure and track changes to the Chinese monetary policy landscape. Today's report makes several important conclusions. First, it underscores that while the 1-week interbank repo rate is the new de jure policy rate in China, a sharp rise in interbank spreads that began in late-2016 has caused the 3-month rate to become the de facto policy rate. This is the key rate that investors should be watching in order to predict the impact of monetary policy on average or effective interest rates in the real economy. Second, it highlights that roughly 3/4ths of China's monetary policy tightening since late-2016 has actually been caused by macro-prudential changes made by the PBOC, rather than due to direct interest rate hikes. Third, while the PBOC's rhetoric about inflation and the recent pickup in bank loans ostensibly suggests that further tightening is forthcoming, the reality is that recent trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease monetary policy than the need to tighten. From the perspective of investment strategy, our analysis continues to suggest that investors should maintain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks excluding the tech sector. We outlined how the outlook for monetary policy fits into our "decision tree" for Chinese stocks in our first report of the year,2 and we continue to expect that the PBOC will refrain from significant further tightening over the coming 6-12 months. Our answers to the seven questions below should provide investors with a strong sense of how to predict potential inflection points in Chinese monetary policy, and whether it remains supportive of our recommended investment strategy over the coming year. Q: What is the PBOC's new policy framework, and how does it differ from the bank's traditional monetary policy tools? A: The PBOC has established a corridor system similar to that of many other countries, and now aims to control market-based interest rates as opposed to the old system of regulated interest rates. Chart 1China's Policy Rate: New Vs Old The PBOC's long, ongoing effort to liberalize its interest rate environment reached a new stage in mid-2015, when the central bank shifted to a corridor system similar to that observed in several other countries. Like in other nations, the objective of the corridor is to guide short-term interest rates towards a particular policy rate, which since late-2016 has been officially recognized as the 1-week interbank repo rate. Chart 1 illustrates this corridor, which is bounded by the PBOC's 1-week reverse repo rate on the lower end and by the 1-week standing lending facility rate on the upper end. The chart also shows the benchmark lending rate, which is China's "old" policy rate. For global investors who are more familiar with U.S. monetary policy, this corridor is conceptually equivalent to the target range for the federal funds rate, with the 1-week interbank repo rate acting as the effective fed funds rate. The key difference between China's old and new monetary policy framework is that the former is based heavily on regulated interest rates (and changes in the reserve requirement ratio), whereas the latter rests on manipulating market-based interest rates using a variety of tools. China's "old" policy tools still exist and may be employed if Chinese policymakers wish to rapidly shift the monetary policy stance. But more importantly, they continue to influence the monetary environment in a way that is important for investors to understand, even if they are not the day-to-day focus of policymakers (see next question). Q: What is the relationship between the new PBOC policy rate and the old one? A: The PBOC's corridor system influences 3-month interbank repo rates, which directly impact how many loans are issued at an interest rate above the old, benchmark policy rate (and by what magnitude). Chart 1 highlighted that the midpoint of the PBOC's interest rate corridor has been consistently and meaningfully below that of the old benchmark lending rate over the past two years, but the adoption of the corridor system did not instantly ease monetary policy in China. The reason is that the vast majority of loans in China are issued at rates above the benchmark rate, and the link between the PBOC's old and new monetary policy framework appears to be how the interbank market influences the breadth and depth of this loan rate premium above the old benchmark. Chart 2A Strong Link Between 3-Month Repo Rates ##br##And Economy-Wide Rates Chart 2 highlights that there is a strong (and leading) relationship between changes in China's 3-month interbank repo rate and 1) changes in the percentage of loans issued above the benchmark rate and 2) the changes in the gap between the weighted-average interest rate and the benchmark rate. While the 1-week interbank repo rate has only increased by around 50 bps since late-2016, the 3-month rate has risen about 200 bps, which explains the extent of the rise in the share of loans issued at above-benchmark rates and the rise in average interest rates relative to the benchmark. This relationship is crucial for investors to understand, since we noted in our January 18 Weekly Report that the midpoint of the 2014-2016 range for average interest rates represents our best estimate of the threshold between easy and tight monetary policy in China.3 Charts 1 and 2 also underscore another very important point: while the 1-week interbank repo rate is the new de jure policy rate, the 3-month rate is the new de facto policy rate as long as interbank repo spreads remain elevated. Q: Why have 3-month interbank repo rates risen so much relative to the 1-week rate? Is this a sign of serious interbank stress? A: No, the rise has been intentionally caused by changes in macro-prudential policy. But the rise in spreads has made up a significant portion of monetary tightening in China since late-2016. By the standards of developed markets, China's interbank repo spreads are extraordinarily high. Chart 3 presents China's 3-month / 1-week interbank repo spread since the PBOC established its new monetary policy framework versus the U.S. 3-month / 1-week LIBOR and repo rate spreads. During the worst of the U.S. subprime financial crisis, these spreads peaked at 182 and 105 bps, respectively. By contrast, China's repo rate spread currently stands at 200 bps. Part of this difference is likely explained by the fact that repos in China tend to be conducted on a 'pledged' basis (where ownership of the collateral remains with the cash borrower but is pledged to the lender),4 but we strongly doubt that it explains a majority of the difference given how low Chinese interbank repo spreads were prior to Q4 2016. Chart 3Chinese Repo Rate Spreads Are Outsized##br## Compared With The U.S. As there are no other signs of an outright banking crisis in China, it follows that China's interbank repo spreads have risen due to a distortion in the market. We reject expectations of further increases in the interest rate corridor as an explanation, given that the rise in spreads has occurred at what is still the short-end of the interbank repo market and that it has persisted for more than a year in the face of very minor changes to the corridor. It is difficult to judge the ultimate cause of the rise in repo spreads with a high degree of confidence, because it began in late-November 2016 when global financial markets were in a high state of flux. Government bond yields rose globally following the U.S. election in early-November in response to (ultimately validated) expectations of stimulative fiscal policy from the Trump administration, and the 1-week repo rate itself was rising during the period. But to us, two pieces of evidence suggest that the rise in interbank repo spreads was caused by the PBOC's decision to include banks' off-balance sheet holdings of wealth management products into its macro-prudential assessment (MPA): The Timing of the MPA Decision: While the PBOC's inclusion of WMPs in its MPA only began in the first quarter of 2017, news that the PBOC had begun a trial of the program broke in mid-November, in advance of the sharp rise in spreads.5 The Rise In 7-Day Depository / Non-Depository Repo Spreads: Chart 4 shows the difference between the 7-day interbank repo rate for all financial institutions and that for depository corporations only (the latter being the new, de jure policy rate). The chart shows that the spread between these two same-maturity rates began a significant uptrend around the same time that the 3-month / 1-week repo spread started to rise. Since non-depository financial institutions appear to have been more active in issuing WMPs over the past several years, this rise in 7-day depository / non-depository repo spreads is consistent with a liquidity squeeze (in anticipation of an upcoming MPA "stress test") among heavy issuers of WMPs. Chart 4Repo Rate Spreads Have Risen ##br##Due To Shadow Banking Crackdown While the rise in the 3-month / 1-week interbank repo spread does therefore appear to represent a "liquidity event" that is squeezing some Chinese banks, it does not seem to meet the description of real banking "stress". True financial system stress tends to occur when banks become wary of lending to each other due to solvency concerns, whereas the current rise in interbank spreads has occurred entirely due to regulatory changes (i.e. the Xi administration's crackdown on shadow banking). As such, while the rise in spreads undoubtedly represents tighter monetary policy, we have already incorporated this development into our framework for China's economy and its financial markets and see no reason to make any changes to our recommended investment strategy unless interbank spreads were to rise sharply further from here. Q: What can the PBOC do to control interbank spreads if they rise significantly from current levels? A: It can use open market operations to inject liquidity into the banking system. Our discussion above highlights that most of the tightening in Chinese market interest rates that has occurred since late-2016 has been regulatory in nature rather than due to direct increases in the PBOC's new policy rate. In fact, since the 3-month interbank repo rate has risen approximately 200 bps because of a 150 bps rise in 3-month / 1-week repo spreads, then it would appear that a full 75% of China's recent monetary policy tightening is attributable to the PBOC's decision to crack down on WMP issuance and shadow lending more generally. This undoubtedly showcases the potential for macro-prudential policies to significantly influence monetary policy in China, but it also raises the question of whether the crackdown may unintentionally tighten financial conditions by more than the PBOC expects. For example, while the PBOC likely knew that increasing its scrutiny over WMPs would impact the interbank market, it is not likely that they were able to predict the magnitude of the impact with any precision. Chart 5The PBOC Has Ample Room ##br##To Inject Liquidity If Needed Chart 5 presents one monetary policy tool that the PBOC can use to try to reduce spreads in the interbank repo market were they to rise outside of the central bank's comfort zone. The chart shows the rolling 1-year net liquidity injection into the banking system from the PBOC's open market operations (OMOs), and highlights that the period of rising interbank repo spreads has generally corresponded with declining net liquidity injections. In fact, the chart shows that the PBOC injected no net liquidity into the banking system in 2017, which likely increased the magnitude of the rise in interbank repo spreads. More recently, net liquidity injections have fallen quite sharply, but this appears to have been caused by the PBOC's use of a different policy tool, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, to inject a substantial amount of liquidity to help meet cash demand during the Chinese New Year. In short, while it is possible that interbank repo spreads could rise significantly and unexpectedly from current levels, the fact that spreads have been elevated but stable over the past year when the PBOC injected no net liquidity into the banking system suggests that monetary authorities should be able to reign in any outsized rise back to levels within the central bank's comfort zone. Q: Is the PBOC likely to tighten aggressively further to control inflation? A: No. The PBOC specifically noted in their latest monetary policy report that inflation needs to be "closely watched", so further tightening to control inflation cannot be ruled out. However, several observations suggest that the risk of aggressive further tightening to control inflation is moderate at most: We have highlighted in past reports that Chinese core consumer prices have recently been correlated with past values of the Li Keqiang index, which has declined meaningfully from its high early last year (Chart 6). The most recent inflation release suggests that the rate of appreciation in core prices is indeed rolling over, suggesting that inflationary pressure is set to ease (rather than intensify) over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 7 presents the BCA China Regional CPI Diffusion Index, which is made up of headline inflation data from 31 first-level administrative divisions. The index is shown alongside overall headline inflation, and while it does confirm that there has been some increase in inflation pressure, the index has not decisively risen above the boom/bust line. Chart 8 illustrates the measure of household inflation expectations that the PBOC cited along with headline CPI. While it is true that the measure has increased, it has done so from a below-median level, and the relationship shown in the chart suggests that further increases would be needed simply to have headline CPI accelerate. Given that headline inflation is 150 bps below the central bank's stated target, it appears that the PBOC is exaggerating the risk of an inflationary breakout to maintain hawkish rhetoric as part of its efforts to reduce the presence of moral hazard in financial markets and the real economy.6 Chart 6Ebbing Inflationary Risk Chart 7No Decisive Outbreak Chart 8Rising, But From A Low Level To be clear, we agree that the PBOC will likely raise its interest rate corridor (potentially significantly) further if core inflation re-accelerates and the disinflationary impact of food & energy prices dissipates. However, we see low odds of such a scenario over the coming 6-12 months barring a material re-acceleration of the economy. Q: Does the spike in new RMB loans in January raise the risk of further monetary tightening? A: No. Credit trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease than the need to tighten. Chart 9 shows the monthly increase in new RMB loans, which rose massively in January. Some market commentators have suggested that the January increase in this series carries special significance for loan growth over the remainder of the year, and that the rise suggests that further monetary tightening is forthcoming. But a closer examination of the data highlights that these concerns are unfounded. Panel 2 of Chart 9 shows the domestic bank loan component of total social financing, which is nearly identical to the new RMB loans series shown in panel 1. When presented as the YoY growth rate of a stock rather than a monthly flow,7 it is clear that bank loan growth did not meaningfully accelerate in January. In fact, Chart 10 shows that the YoY growth rate of total social financing (adjusted for equity and municipal bond issuance) continues to decelerate, highlighting that credit trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease monetary policy rather than tighten. Chart 9A Sharp MoM Rise... Chart 10...But Not In YoY Terms Q: What market-based indicators can investors use to tell if Chinese monetary policy is becoming restrictive? A: Watch the correlation between the 3-month interbank repo rate and China's relative sovereign CDS spread vs Germany. Chart 11A Market-Based Indicator ##br##Of The Restrictiveness Of Monetary Policy Besides a generalized selloff in Chinese risky financial assets, one warning sign that investors can use to monitor whether monetary policy has become restrictive is the rolling 1-year correlation between the 3-month interbank repo rate and the relative sovereign CDS spread between China and a large, fiscally sound developed economy (such as Germany). Despite the fact that actual sovereign credit risk in China is extremely low, Chart 11 shows that the relative CDS spread has acted as a good bellwether for growth conditions in the Chinese economy. It shows that the correlation between this spread and the 3-month interbank repo rate was initially positive in late-2016 (representing concern on the part of investors that monetary policy is restrictive), but has since come back down into negative territory. Interestingly, the correlation was consistently positive from mid-2011 to mid-2014, when average lending rates averaged 7% or higher and the benchmark lending rate exceeded the IMF's Taylor Rule estimate by about 1%.8 So while this is but one measure that we will be tracking, it's performance over the past several years as an indicator for restrictive policy appears to accord with our ex-post understanding of the impact of monetary conditions on the Chinese economy. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Tightening In China: How Much Is Too Much?" dated January 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'Decision Tree' For Chinese Stocks", dated January 4, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Tightening In China: How Much Is Too Much?" dated January 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 For more information on the structure of China's repo market, please see "The Chinese Interbank Repo Market" by Ross Kendall and Jonathan Lees, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, June 2017. 5 "China's tightened rules on wealth management products having little effect", Cathy Zhang, South China Morning Post, November 17, 2016 6 Please see our January 25 webcast for our geopolitical team's perspective on the potential impact of Governor Xiaochuan's approaching retirement on the PBOC's policy bias: https://gps.bcaresearch.com/webcasts/index/178# 7 We cumulate the social financing series using the best available estimates of the initial starting point of each component series. 8 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Tightening In China: How Much Is Too Much?" dated January 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Managements continue to guide higher for 2018 as the Q4 earnings season draws to a close. It is too soon for investors to be concerned about higher inflation. Investors are still uneasy that either the age of the current expansion or a bubble will trigger the next recession. Feature U.S. equity prices rallied last week as 10-year Treasury yields stabilized near 2.90%, just shy of BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service's fair value of 3.02%.1 Our Global Investment Strategy service notes that the ascent in Treasury yields is likely to flatten out over the coming months, now that rate expectations have almost converged to the Fed dots. This should provide some near-term support for stocks. However, the structural outlook for bonds remains quite bearish.2 Credit spreads narrowed and the VIX settled back down below 20, but volatility remains elevated versus the start of 2018. BCA's U.S. Bond strategists remain overweight investment-grade and high-yield credit, but note that both municipal bonds and Agency MBS are starting to look attractive relative to investment-grade corporate bonds.3 The dollar caught a bid late in the week, but closed the week lower and has lost 4% this year. Gold rallied last week, aided by the weaker dollar and another stronger than expected reading on inflation. In this case, the January core CPI ticked up to +1.8% year-over-year versus expectations of a 1.7% reading. The Q4 earnings reporting season is nearly over, and both the results and guidance for 2018 have been spectacular, thanks to surging global growth and share buybacks related to the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017. Realized inflation is moving higher, but it is too soon for investors to worry about an aggressive Fed. Moreover, the latest Household Debt and Credit Report from the New York Fed suggests that the odds of a consumer debt led recession remain low. A Higher Bar The Q4 earnings reporting season is nearly over and it shows that EPS and sales growth are well ahead of consensus expectations at the start of January. Moreover, the counter-trend rally in margins remains in place. We previewed the Q4 2017 S&P 500 earnings season earlier this year.4 Nearly 80% of companies have reported results so far, with 76% beating consensus EPS projections, slightly above the long-term average of 69%. Furthermore, 78% have posted Q4 revenues that topped expectations, which exceeded the long-term average of 56%. The surprise factor for year-over-year numbers in Q4 stands at 4.6% for EPS and 1.2% for sales. Both readings are right at the average surprise in the past five years. The surprise figures are even more impressive given that the analysts' views of Q4 results increased between the start of Q4 2017 and the actual Q4 reporting season. Analysts' estimates typically move lower as a quarter unfolds, in effect lowering the bar for results. Table 1S&P 500: Q4 2017 Results We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning in late 2018. Nonetheless, the results to date suggest that Q4 will be another quarter of margin expansion. Average earnings growth (Q4 2017 versus Q4 2016) is outstanding at 15% with revenue growth at 8%. However, on a four-quarter moving total basis, U.S. margins dipped in the fourth quarter, but are still high on the back of decent corporate pricing power. An improvement in productivity growth into year-end also helped. Strength in earnings and revenues is broadly based (Table 1). Earnings per share increased in Q4 2017 versus Q4 2016 in 10 of the 11 sectors. EPS results are particularly outstanding in energy (119%), and strong in materials (35%), technology (20%) and financials (15%). Energy-sector sales climbed by 20% in Q4 2017 versus Q4 2016. The 12% revenue gains in the materials and technology sectors were impressive. Excluding energy, S&P 500 profits in Q4 2017 versus Q4 2016 are a robust 13%. In the past few months, upbeat managements have raised the bar significantly for 2018 results (Chart 1). On October 1, 2017, before the GOP introduced the Tax Cut and Jobs Act bill, the bottom-up estimate for 2018 S&P 500 EPS growth stood at 11%. As of February 16, 2018, the estimate is 19%. Moreover, the upward revisions are widespread. 2018 EPS growth rate estimates are higher today than at the start of October in every sector, with the exception of real estate (Table 2). 2018 consensus projections increased the most for telecom, financials, energy and consumer discretionary. Chart 1Buybacks, Surging Capex And Stout Global Growth Raising The Bar For 2018 EPS Growth Our U.S. Equity Strategy service introduced profit models for all 11 S&P 500 sectors in January.5 Encouragingly, an equal weight of the 10 GICS sector model outputs (we are excluding real estate due to lack of history), accurately forecasts the S&P 500's profit growth, and currently also confirms our U.S. Equity Strategy service's upbeat four factor macro EPS model. Our U.S. Equity Strategy team's model for the U.S. financials sector is expanding at twice the current profit growth rate and 10 percentage points above the Street's 12-month forward estimates. The S&P financials sector remains a core portfolio overweight and we reiterate our high-conviction overweight status in the heavyweight S&P banks index. Moreover, BCA's industrials sector EPS model suggests that industrials profits will easily surpass the low (and below the overall market) analysts' EPS growth. The late-cyclical S&P industrials sector remains an overweight. Chart 2Profit Growth Will Peak In Late 2018 The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 is behind most of this ebullience, but improving global growth, a steeper yield curve and higher energy prices are also responsible. The legislation lowered the corporate tax rate for 2018 and the repatriation holiday provides firms with excess cash. Companies will likely return almost all of that cash to shareholders via increased buybacks.6 Moreover, a few firms are marking up their 2018 estimates in anticipation of a surge in capital spending, as managements move up planned investments into 2018 to benefit from the bill's provisions. Analysts expect EPS growth to slow significantly in 2019 (10%) from the anticipated 2018 clip, which matches BCA's view. However, unlike estimates for 2017 and 2018, we believe that EPS forecasts for 2019 will move lower through 2018 and into 2019, ahead of a recession in late 2019/early 2020. Bottom Line: The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking on a four-quarter, moving total basis, and should begin to decelerate in late 2018/early 2019 to a level commensurate with 3½-4% nominal GDP growth (Chart 2). However, after-tax earnings growth will be higher than that due to the recently passed tax cuts. Margins will crest in late 2018, but BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will continue to be a tailwind for the equity market. The Tax Cut and Job Act raised expectations for 2018 in most sectors; it is yet to be seen whether managements can match the lofty projections. BCA expects expansion outside the U.S. to remain robust, an additional support for EPS growth in the coming quarters. Further weakness in the dollar, counter to our call for a 5% gain in the DXY, would provide a modest lift to this year's S&P 500 figures. Strong domestic economic activity will also boost the 2018 top-line results. The Inflation Situation BCA expects inflation to hit the Fed's 2% target by year-end and then exceed the goal in 2019. That said, the 2.9% year-over-year reading on January's headline average hourly earnings overstates wage inflation and overall inflationary pressures. Consumers' inflation expectations ticked down in early 2018, and are still well anchored. The implication for investors is that it is too soon to be concerned that the Fed is behind the curve on inflation. Nonetheless, with elevated valuations on both U.S. equities and credit, market participants should not be complacent either. Average hourly earnings for all employees accelerated to +2.9% in January, a 9-year high (Chart 3, panel 1). However, the New York Fed notes that a drop in hours worked in January may have influenced the wage figure. The FOMC will focus on the trend in wages and employee compensation rather than on one data point. Committee members will want to see a sustained pickup in wages before they change their view on inflation and the path for this year's rate hikes. Nonetheless, hawkish FOMC voters will note that both the ECI and average hourly earnings have trended higher since 2012 (Chart 4). The most strident hawks could make a case that the 3-month change in AHE for all workers hit a 10-year high at 4% in January (Chart 3, panel 2). Doves, on the other hand, will state that at only 2.65% in Q4, the rise in ECI is still below the lows seen from the 1980s to the early 2000s. Chart 3Average Hourly Earnings Has Something For Both Hawks And Doves Chart 4Labor Costs Remain Subdued Survey-based inflation expectations are contained as indicated in Chart 5, showing the outlook of professional forecasters, consumers and primary dealers in the U.S. The implication for investors is that the center of gravity of inflation expectations is well anchored. That said, New York Fed President Bill Dudley's preferred measure of inflation expectations climbed in 2H 2017 (Chart 6). However, this metric remains far below the highs seen earlier in the business cycle. Market based inflation expectations may provide guidance to investors worried that the Fed is behind the curve on inflation. At 2.08% on February 16, the 10-year TIPS breakeven spread was still below the key 2.4% to 2.5% range (Chart 7). Ominously, the recent equity market correction did not alter investors' assessment of inflationary pressures. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates eased only modestly during the recent selloff in stocks and moved up again following last week's January CPI report. Chart 5Inflation Expectations##BR##Still Well Contained Chart 6Market And Consumer##BR##Inflation Expectations Chart 7Watch The 2.4 To 2.5% Level##BR##On TIPS Breakevens This market action is worrying for risk assets because it could signal an end to the 'Fed put'. When inflation was low and stable, and economic slack was abundant, disappointing economic data or equity market setbacks were followed by an easing in the expectations for Fed rate hikes, which helped to stabilize risk assets. However, with some nascent inflation emerging, the Fed may not be quick to deviate from its 'dot plot' path for rates. In other words, the recent equity correction did not give our overweight spread product and equity market positions any further room to run. Bottom Line: Our sense is that the market and the Fed will hash out a new equilibrium in the near term and that the true bear market in risk assets will not occur until inflationary pressures are more developed. We will continue to look for a range of 2.4% to 2.5% on long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates before we scale back our cyclical overweight exposure to spread product. The Next Recession Revisited Chart 8Odds Of A Recession Remain Low BCA's stance is that the next recession will be sparked by the Fed overtightening in 2019 as it finds itself behind the curve on inflation. Chart 8 shows that the odds of a recession in the next 12 months are low. The fiscal impulse provided by the tax legislation and the lifting of spending caps imposed by the 2013 fiscal cliff will lift growth this year.7 Still, investors are uneasy that either the age of the current expansion or a bubble will trigger then next recession. A study8 released last week by the St. Louis Fed notes that there are several instances in the past 40 years where expansions in developed market economies have lasted 15 years or more. Canada's economy avoided recession between 1992 and 2007. Japan's economy expanded for 17 years between 1975 and 1992 and Australia has not had an economic downturn since the early 1990s. Moreover, the New York Fed's Q4 report on Household Debt and Credit9 supports BCA's stance that there were few signs of froth at the end of 2017 in the housing, consumer debt or auto sectors. Banks remain prudent with mortgage lending. The share of mortgages issued to subprime borrows is far below the mid-2000s level (Chart 9, panel 1). Moreover, the share of mortgages originated by borrowers with a credit score over 780 soared in recent years and has nearly tripled since 2004-2006 when the seeds of the housing bubble were sown. Furthermore, at 755, the median credit score at origination for all mortgages in Q4 was more than 48 points higher than the lows reached in the mid-2000s (panel 2). Prudent lending in the auto sector suggests there are low odds of a bubble forming in subprime auto lending. At 19%, the share of auto loans made to borrowers with credit scores of 620 or less is well below the 32% of loans made to that cohort of borrowers in the mid-2000s (Chart 10, panel 1). Furthermore, the median credit score of auto loans has moved steadily higher in the past few years; this metric deteriorated between the early- and mid-2000s (panel 2). Chart 9Credit Standards For Mortgages... Chart 10...And Autos Is Improving As The Cycle Ages Student loan delinquency rates are stable, although they are elevated relative to other types of consumer debt (Chart 11). The student loan delinquency rate ticked down from 11.17 in Q3 2017 to 10.96 in Q4. A stronger labor market and accelerating wage growth provide stability to this market, but high debt levels affect the ability of these borrowers to access credit in other areas (e.g. auto, home, credit card) and may become a bigger issue for consumer spending when the labor market deteriorates. Chart 11Consumer Loan Metrics Bottom Line: The Fed, not a bubble nor the advanced age of the current expansion, will cause the next recession. The added support to the economy from the tax bill makes it more likely that the economy will overheat, and lead to higher inflation and faster rate hikes than expected by either the market or the Fed, especially in 2019. Stay underweight duration and overweight stocks versus bonds for now, although we will take some risk off the table later this year. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Warning Signs", February 6, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Structural Bear Market In Bonds" , February 16, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "One The MOVE" February 13, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "A Smooth Transition," published January 15, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "White Paper: Introducing Our U.S. Equity Sector Earnings Models," published January 16, 2018. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Variations On A Theme," published January 22, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Bear Hunting And Brexit Update", published February 14, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/february/us-due-recessions 9 https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2017Q4.pdf
Highlights The best recession indicators are not flashing red, but volatility is rising as the end of the cycle approaches; U.S. fiscal policy is surprising to the upside, as we expected; The next recession will usher in an inflationary political paradigm shift, with wealth transferred from Baby Boomers to Millennials; Expect a new U.K. election ahead of March 2019, but do not expect a second referendum unless popular opinion swings decisively against Brexit; Stay short U.S. 10-year Treasuries versus German bunds; short Fed Funds Dec 2018 futures; and initiate a short GBP/USD trade. Feature February has been tough for global markets, with the S&P 500 falling by 5.9% since the beginning of the month. Several clients have pointed out that the market may be sniffing out a recession and that the "buy the dip" strategy is therefore no longer applicable. It is true that markets and recessions go together (Chart 1), but it is not clear from the data that the equity market alone predicts recessions correctly. Chart 1Bear Markets & Recessions: Unclear Which One Leads The Other BCA's House View is that a recession is likely at the end of 2019.1 This view is in no small part based on our political analysis.2 President Trump ran on a populist electoral platform and populist policymakers globally have a successful track record of delivering higher nominal GDP growth than their non-populist counterparts (Chart 2). We assume that the Powell Fed will respond to such higher growth and inflation prospects no differently from the Yellen Fed and that it will restrict monetary policy to an extent that will usher in a mild recession by the end of next year. Chart 2Populists Deliver (Nominal) GDP Growth Of course, predicting recessions is extraordinarily difficult. Being six months early or late would still be an achievement, but the implications for the equity market would likely be considerably different. If our "late 2019" call is actually an "early 2019" recession, then equity markets may indeed be at or near their cyclical peaks. A "buy on dips" strategy may work for the next quarter or so, but superior returns over the course of the year may be achieved with a bearish strategy. To help guide clients through the uncertainty, our colleague Doug Peta, chief strategist of BCA's Global ETF Strategy, has recently updated BCA's methodology for identifying the inflection points that usher in a recession.3 In our 70-year history as an investment research house, we have picked up two definitive truths: valuation and technical indicators cannot call a recession. So what can? We encourage clients to pick up a copy of Doug's analysis.4 The report highlights the three BCA Research recession indicators: the orientation of the yield curve, the year-over-year change in the leading economic indicator (LEI),5 and the monetary policy backdrop. Charts 3, 4, and 5 show how successful the three indicators are in calling recessions. In our 50-year sample period, the yield curve has successfully called all seven recessions with just one false positive. However, it tends to be overly eager, preceding the onset of a recession by an average of nearly twelve months. When we combine the yield curve indicator with the LEI, the false positives go away. Chart 3The Yield Curve Has Called Seven Of The Last Eight Recessions... Chart 4... And So Has The Leading Economic Indicator To confirm the recession signal and make it more robust, we also consider the monetary policy backdrop. Over the nearly 60 years for which BCA's equilibrium fed funds rate model has calculated an estimate of the equilibrium policy rate, every recession has occurred when the fed funds rate exceeded our estimate of equilibrium. In other words, recessions only occur when monetary policy settings are restrictive. Today, none of the indicators are even close to pointing to a recession, with the LEI at a cyclical peak. However, the yield curve and monetary policy are directionally moving towards the end of the cycle. Taken together, they suggest that the only controversy about our late 2019 recession call is that it is so early. So why the market volatility? Because wage growth in the U.S. has begun to pick up in earnest (Chart 6), revealing that BCA's concerns about inflation may at last be coming true. Investors, after more than a year of rationalizing weak inflation by means of dubious concepts (Amazon, AI, robots, etc.), may be reassessing their forecasts in real time, causing market turbulence. Chart 5Tight Policy Is A Necessary,##br## If Not Sufficient, Recession Ingredient Chart 6Wages Picking##br## Up In Earnest There is of course a political explanation as well. Our colleague Peter Berezin correctly called the end of the 35-year bond bull market on July 5, 2016.6 The timing of the call - mere days after the U.K. EU membership referendum - was not a coincidence. As Peter mused at the time, "the post-Brexit shock running through policy circles leads to a further easing in fiscal and monetary policy." He was not speaking about the U.K. alone, but in global terms. Indeed, the populists have begun to deliver. Ever since President Trump's election, we have cautioned clients not to doubt the White House's populist credentials.7 After a surge in bond bearishness immediately following the election, investors lost faith in the populist narrative due to the failure of Congress to pass any significant legislation, as if Congress has ever been a nimble institution under previous presidents. But investors are beginning to realize that their collective political analysis was extremely wrong. Not only have profligate tax cuts been passed, as we controversially expected throughout 2017, but Congress is now on the brink of a monumental two-year appropriations bill that will add nearly 1% of GDP worth of fiscal thrust in 2018 higher than what the IMF expected for the U.S. (Chart 7). In addition, Congress has set in motion the process to re-authorize the use of "earmarks" - i.e. legislative tags that direct funding to special interests in representatives' home districts (Chart 8).8 Chart 72018 Fiscal Thrust Was Unexpected Chart 8Here Comes Pork! By our back-of-the-envelope accounting, Congress is about to authorize just shy of $400bn in extra spending over the next two years.9 If earmarks are allowed back into the legislative process, we could see up to another $50bn in spending. An infrastructure deal, which now also looks likely given that the Democrats have realized that their "resistance"/ "outrage" strategy does not work against the Trump White House, could add significantly to that total. We are already positioned for these political developments through two fixed-income recommendations. We are short U.S. 10-year Treasuries vs. German Bunds, a recommendation that has returned 27.7 bps since September 2017. In addition, we are short the Fed Funds December 2018 futures, a recommendation that has returned 43.17 bps since the same initiation date. In addition, we went long the U.S. dollar index (DXY) on January 31, right before the stock market correction and precisely when the greenback appeared to bottom. Should investors prepare for runaway inflation this cycle? Is it time to load up on gold? We do not think so. The fiscal impulse from the two-year budget deal will become negative in 2020. The capex incentives from the tax cut plan are also front-loaded. The paradigm-shifting impact on inflation will require a policy paradigm shift. And we expect such a shift only after the next recession. To put it bluntly, U.S. voters elected a TV game show host due to angst at a time when unemployment stood at 4.6% (the rate on November 2016). Who will they elect with unemployment rising to 6% in the aftermath of the next recession, or God forbid if that next recession is worse than we think it will be? Policymakers are unlikely to sit around and wait for an answer to that question. Extraordinary measures will be taken to prevent the median voter from lashing out against the system when the next recession hits. Inflation, which is a redistributive mechanism, will be employed to transfer wealth from savers (mainly well-to-do retirees) to consumers (their children). In large part, this will be a generational wealth transfer between Baby Boomers (or at least those with some savings) and their Millennial children. Given that Millennials have become the largest voting bloc in the U.S. as of the 2016 election, this will be a populist policy with firm backing in the electorate. The next recession will therefore usher in the inflationary era of the next decade, regardless of how painful the actual recession is. In the meantime, we recommend that clients with a 9-to-12 month horizon continue to "buy on dips," given that a recession is not on the horizon. However, with the U.S. 10-year yield approaching 3%, China moderately slowing down (with considerable risk to the downside), and the U.S. dollar slide arrested, we think that the outperformance of EM equities is over. Brexit: We Can't Work It Out10 The EU agreed on January 29 to its negotiation guidelines for the temporary transition period after the U.K. officially leaves the bloc in March 2019.11 The British press predictably balked at the conditions - the term "vassal state" has been liberally bandied about - which in our view included absolutely nothing out of the expected. The EU conditions for the transition period are not the fundamental problem. Rather, the problem is that the "Vote Leave" campaign was never honest with its promises. Boris Johnson, the most prominent supporter of Brexit ahead of the vote and now the foreign minister in Prime Minister Theresa May's cabinet, famously quipped after the referendum that "there will continue to be free trade and access to the single market."12 The problem with that promise, however, was that it was predicated on using London's "superior negotiating position" vis-à-vis the EU in order to force the Europeans to redefine what membership in the Common Market means. As we pointed out in our net assessment ahead of the Brexit referendum, the problem with exiting the EU but remaining in the Common Market is that the issue of sovereignty is not resolved (Diagram 1).13 As such, Johnson and other Brexit supporters argued that they could change the relationship by forcing the EU to change how the Common Market works. Diagram 1Common Market Membership Is Illogical Except for one problem: the U.K.'s negotiating position is not, never was, nor ever will be, superior. Anyone with a rudimentary understanding of how trade works can understand this. For example, the U.K. is a significant market for Germany, at 6% of German exports (right in line with the 6% of total EU exports that go to the U.K.). However, the EU is a far greater destination for British exports, with 47% of all exports going to the bloc.14 As we expected, the EU has surprised the conventional wisdom by remaining united in the face of negotiations. And as we also predicted, the Tories are now completely divided.15 PM May will attempt to hammer out an internal deal on how to approach the transition deal. But her political capital is so drained by the disastrous early election results that there is practically no way that she can produce a set of negotiating guidelines that will not be pilloried in the press. As such, we expect a new election to take place in the U.K. ahead of March 2019, perhaps sooner. We do not see how May's negotiating position will satisfy all wings of the Conservative Party. In addition, we see no scenario by which the ultimate exit deal with the EU gets enough votes in Westminster. Investors betting on that election replacing a second Brexit referendum would be wrong. A Jeremy Corbyn-led, Labour government will only turn against Brexit once the polls definitively turn against it. This has not yet happened, as the gap between supporters and opponents of Brexit in the polls, while widening in favor of opponents, remains within a margin of error (Chart 9). As such, Corbyn would scrap the Tory-led negotiations with the EU and ask Brussels for even more time - and thus more market uncertainty! - in order to produce a Labour-led Brexit deal.16 In order for the probability of Brexit to definitively decline, the polls have to show that "Bregret" or "Bremorse" is setting in. Without a move in the polls, U.K. politicians will continue to pursue Brexit, no matter how flawed their tactics may be. Policymakers are ultimately not the price makers but the price takers. On the issue of Brexit, the U.K. median voter is only slightly miffed regarding the outcome. Current polls suggest that Labour could win the next election, albeit needing to rule with a coalition (Chart 10). This would prolong the uncertainty facing the economy. Not only is Corbyn the most left-leaning politician in a major European economy since François Mitterand, but also his coalition would likely include the Scottish National Party and potentially the Liberal Democrats. Keeping all their priorities aligned could be even more difficult than the balancing act PM May is performing between soft-Brexiters, hard-Brexiters, and the Democratic Unionist Party. Chart 9Bremorse: Rising, But Not Definitive Chart 10Anti-Brexit Forces On The Rise Meanwhile, on the economic front, the situation is not much better. Our colleague Rob Robis, BCA's chief bond strategist, recently penned a critical assessment of the U.K. economy.17 As Rob pointed out, the OECD leading economic indicator is decelerating steadily and pointing to a real GDP growth rate below 2% in 2018 (Chart 11). The biggest factors that will weigh on growth will be a sluggish consumer and softer capex. Household consumer growth has been slowing since early 2017, driven by diminishing consumer confidence (Chart 12, top panel). High realized inflation, which has sapped the purchasing power of U.K. workers who have not seen matching increases in wages, is weighing on confidence (third panel). Consumers were able to maintain a decent pace of spending during a period of stagnant real income growth by drawing on savings, but that looks to be tapped out now with the saving rate down to a 19-year low of 5.5% (bottom panel). Chart 11U.K. Growth Set To Slow Chart 12The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out Making matters worse, U.K. consumers are not seeing much of a wealth effect from the housing market. The January 2018 readings of the year-over-year growth rate of U.K. house prices from the Halifax and Nationwide indexes came in at 1.9% and 3.1% respectively (Chart 13). In addition, the net balance of national house price expectations from the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) has steadily declined since mid-2016 and now sits just above zero (i.e. equal number of respondents expecting higher prices and falling prices). The same indicator for London was a staggering -47% in January 2018. Apparently, foreigners are no longer interested in a Brexit discount. Our global bond team goes on to point out that political uncertainty is also weighing on U.K. business investment spending. Capital expenditure growth slowed to 4.3% year-over-year in nominal terms in Q3 2017 and is even lower in real terms (Chart 14). Chart 13No Wealth Effect ##br## From Housing Chart 14Brexit Gloom Trumps ##br##Export Boom For U.K. Companies Putting all of this together, neither our global bond team nor our foreign exchange team expect the Bank of England to raise interest rates, despite the market pricing in 36 bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months. As Chart 15 illustrates, inflation across a broad swath of components is likely to slow sharply in the coming months as the trade-weighted pound has stopped depreciating. Thus, the pass-through from a lower exchange rate is beginning to dissipate.18 In the long-term, we understand why investors are itching to bet on Brexit never happening. But to get from here to there, the market will have to riot. And that means more downside to U.K. assets. Chart 15U.K. Inflation:##br## Less Pass-Through From The Pound Chart 16GBP:##br## Stuck In A Rut Bottom Line: BCA's FX strategist, Mathieu Savary, has pointed out that the trade-weighted pound is testing the upper bound of its post-Brexit trading range (Chart 16). As our FX and bond teams show in their respective research, the economics currently at play make it unlikely that the pound will be able to punch above the ceiling of this range. Our political assessment adds to this view. In fact, we expect that the coming political uncertainty, including an early election prior to March 2019, is likely to take the pound back to the floor of its trading range. As such, we are recommending that clients short cable, GBP/USD. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Timing Of The Next Recession," June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," dated March 7, 2017, and "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, available at bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Special Report, "Timing The Next Equity Bear Market," dated January 24, 2014, and "Timing Equity Bear Markets," dated April 6, 2011, available at bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy Special Report, "A Guide To Spotting And Weathering Bear Markets," dated August 16, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com. 5 The ten components of leading economic index for the U.S. include: 1. Average weekly hours, manufacturing; 2. Average weekly initial claims for unemployment insurance; 3. Manufacturers' new orders, consumer goods and materials; 4. ISM® Index of New Orders; 5. Manufacturers' new orders, nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft orders; 6. Building permits, new private housing units; 7. Stock prices, 500 common stocks; 8. Leading Credit Index TM; 9. Interest rate spread, 10-year Treasury bonds less federal funds; and 10. Index of consumer expectations. Source: The Conference Board. 6 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Outcomes & Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, and "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 We are referring to the Senate deal struck last week to authorize additional military spending ($80bn in FY2018 and $85bn in FY2019) and discretionary spending ($63bn in FY2018 and $68bn in FY2019), as well as to provide disaster relief in the amount of $45bn for both fiscal years. 10 Life is very short, and there's no time ... For fussing and fighting, my friend ... 11 Please see European Council, "Brexit: Council (Article 50) adopts negotiating directives on the transition period," dated January 29, 2018, available at consilium.europa.eu. 12 Please see "UK will retain access to the EU single market: Brexit leader Johnson," Reuters, dated June 26, 2016, available at uk.reuters.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 This is not a coincidence. The whole point of the EU is that it is the world's richest consumer market. As such, it has massive negotiating leverage with all trade partners. As a side note, this throws into doubt the logic that the U.K. can get better trade deals by leaving the bloc. The first test of that premise will be its negotiations with the EU itself. 15 Please see BCA Special Report, "Break Glass To Brexit: A Fact Sheet," dated June 17, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 16 Investors should remember that Westminster voted decisively 319 to 23 to reject the Liberal Democrats' amendment seeking a referendum on the final Brexit agreement. Only nine Labour MPs voted in favor of the amendment after Jeremy Corbyn instructed his party to abstain. 17 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "A Melt-Up In Equities AND Bond Yields?" dated January 23, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Euro's Tricky Spot," dated February 2, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com.
特別レポート Highlights Japan Economy & Inflation: Japan is in the midst of a solid cyclical upturn, driven by strong exports and rising investment spending. Yet despite signs that the economy is running at an above-potential pace with no spare capacity in labor or product markets, inflation remains tame. This puts no immediate pressure on the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to move away from its easy policy stance. Future BoJ Options: When the BoJ does finally consider a shift in its monetary policy, the first thing it will do is raise its yield target on the 10-year JGB. Before doing that, three things must happen - yen weakness, higher core Japanese inflation and much higher non-Japanese global bond yields. Feature Chart 1A 'Non-Systemic' Vol Spike Global financial markets appear to be calming down a bit after the Great Volatility Scare of 2018. While the equity market sell-off and spike in volatility was intensely compacted into a brief period of time, the changes has been relatively modest when looked at against the broader history of the past decade (Chart 1). This may have been a serious market tremor, but it is not clear that this was the beginning of "The Big One." What could turn investor sentiment into a more permanently bearish state would be a sign of a coordinated move to tighter monetary policy by all the major global central banks. The Federal Reserve is in the midst of a prolonged tightening cycle, while the European Central Bank (ECB) is more openly debating the future of its asset purchase program. Yet amidst all the current investor worries about higher inflation and rising global bond yields, any sign that the hyper-easy BoJ is openly moving to a less accommodative monetary policy could be the trigger for the next wave of market volatility. The BoJ's current policy is to manage short-term interest rates and asset purchases to keep the benchmark 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yield around 0%. What would it take for the BoJ to make a change to that policy? In this Special Report, we take a look at the current cyclical dynamics for Japanese economic growth and inflation, and determine what it would take to force the BoJ to consider altering its current policy. We conclude that three things that must ALL happen before the BoJ could possibly change its strategy: The USD/JPY exchange rate must increase back to at least the 115-120 range Japanese core CPI inflation and nominal wage inflation must both rise sustainably above 1.5% The 10-year JGB yield must reach an overvalued extreme versus the 10-year U.S. Treasury Strong Japanese Growth, But Where's The Inflation? If it was strictly a growth story, the BoJ could have a case to begin formally removing monetary accommodation relatively soon. The Japanese economy is enjoying a broad-based upturn led by robust export demand and a pickup in capital spending (Chart 2). Private consumption and government spending have also provided smaller, but still positive, contributions to Japanese GDP growth in the current cycle. The BoJ stated in its latest Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (January 2018) that Japan's economy has entered a virtuous cycle from income to spending that would support continued growth this year. The leading economic indicator estimated by Japan's Cabinet Office is expanding at a solid rate that suggests real GDP growth could accelerate to a well-above potential pace around 2.5% in 2018. The manufacturing PMI is now at the highest level in four years, while the December Tankan survey was the highest reading since Japan's asset bubble burst in the early 1990s. The cyclical upturn in growth has boosted corporate profits, business confidence and capital spending (Chart 3). This is especially so on the manufacturing side of the Japanese economy, where machinery orders and capacity utilization are at the highest levels in almost three years and the level of industrial production is now back to pre-crisis highs. The high level of capacity utilization is a boost both to the economy - through capital spending, as firms need to invest to keep up with underlying demand - and to corporate profits as companies can spread their fixed costs of production over more units sold. Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that Japanese business confidence is solid (bottom panel). Chart 2Lots Of Good Economic News In Japan Chart 3A Cyclical Rise In Production & Confidence Japan's economy remains highly levered to global growth, as the pickup in machinery orders has been focused on foreign demand (Chart 4, bottom panel). With the global leading economic indicator still in a steady uptrend, however, overall export growth should remain in good shape in the next few quarters. For most countries, a solid economic upturn like Japan is currently enjoying would potentially trigger some inflationary pressures. Alas, Japan is not most countries. Over the past several years, the BoJ has consistently projected that Japanese inflation will be on a path to reach its 2% target. That can be seen in Chart 5, which shows Japanese core CPI inflation (ex fresh food) with the annual forecasts produced by the BoJ each year (the dotted lines). Yet the only time that core inflation got remotely close to that level was in 2014 - and, only then, after global oil prices had breached the $100/bbl level. Inflation expectations momentarily rose at that time, but plunged in 2015 as oil prices collapsed. Since then, CPI swaps have struggled to trade much above 0%, only starting to perk up last year as oil prices began rising once again (bottom panel). Chart 4Japan Is Benefiting From##BR##Strong Global Growth Chart 5Watch Oil & The Yen,##BR##Not The BoJ Inflation Forecasts Having inflation consistently below its target rate is frustrating to the BoJ. By its own estimates, Japan's output gap closed in 2016 and now sits at +1.35% - levels that have been consistent with headline CPI inflation rates of 2% or greater since the mid-1980s (Chart 6, top panel). Our own Japan headline CPI diffusion index, which measures the breadth of the moves in inflation across ten CPI sectors, is struggling to stay above the 50 line, unlike those previous periods where Japan had a large positive output gap. The main reason for this is that Japanese service sector inflation, consisting of around ½ of the total Japanese CPI index, remains anemic at 0.8% or a massive 2.3 percentage points below the rate of goods inflation (bottom panel). The odds of the BoJ successfully seeing Japanese inflation reach its target are low without any meaningful pickup in services inflation. The latter requires a boost to household purchasing power, which is next to impossible without faster wage growth. One of the fundamental reasons for Japan's low inflation continues to be the surprising lack of wage inflation despite strong Japanese profitability and a very tight labor market. Japanese firms are enjoying an extended period of robust earnings growth, with corporate profits up nearly 500% since the trough during the 2009 recession (Chart 7, top panel). Moreover, firms have not been cutting back on labor over that period. The jobs-to-applicant ratio has steadily climbed and is now at the highest level since 1974, and while the annual rate of employment growth remains well above the historical average (2nd panel). The result is an unemployment rate that is currently at 2.8%, well below the OECD's estimate of the full employment NAIRU at 3.6% (3rd panel). Yet despite firms remaining desperate to hire new employees to fill empty or newly created positions, at a time when there is no spare labor capacity, wage growth remains stagnant. Nominal wage growth is only 0.6%, or -0.6% in real terms. The problem of low real wage growth is not unique to Japan, of course (bottom panel), but it is unusual given how far the Japanese unemployment rate is below NAIRU. The subject of persistent low wages has become an important political matter for Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, given that breaking Japan out of its low inflation trap has become critical to the long-term success of his "Abenomics" program. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy discussed this exact topic in a Special Report published last week, noting that: Wages will be a decisive factor in Abe's economic success .... In this spring's "shunto" negotiations between businesses and unions, both the Abe administration and Keidanren, the top business group, are asking for 3% wage increases. The biggest union, Rengo, is only asking for one percentage point more. Abe has dedicated the current Diet session, beginning January 22, to "work-style reforms" that should be, on net, positive for wage growth. He wants to remove disparities between regular and irregular workers, particularly regarding wages, training opportunities, and welfare benefits. He also wants to impose limits on the workweek - putting a cap on the average 80-hour workweek of Japan's full-time workers so as to force companies to hire more irregular workers on a full-time basis (and to encourage employed people to have children). Companies that raise wages by 3% or more will see a cut in the corporate tax rate from around 30% to 25%.1 If Abe is successful in convincing Japanese companies to boost wages, this can help broaden the current cyclical economic upturn in Japan through faster consumer spending. Consumption has lagged other more robust parts of the economy during the current cycle (Chart 8, top panel), even though consumer confidence has surged in response to the healthy labor market (middle panel). Real disposable income growth has been unable to exceed 1% since 2010, a problem for consumer spending that has been exacerbated by the five percentage point rise in the household saving rate since 2013 (bottom panel). Chart 6Domestic Inflation,##BR##Like Services, Is Anemic Chart 7Japanese Companies##BR##Are Not Sharing The Wealth Chart 8Poor Fundamentals For##BR##The Japanese Consumer Putting it all together, the Japanese economy is in good shape, but inflation continues to undershoot the BoJ's goals. Bottom Line: Japan is in the midst of a solid cyclical upturn, driven by strong exports and rising investment spending. Yet despite signs that the economy is running at an above-potential pace with no spare capacity in labor or product markets, inflation remains tame. This puts no immediate pressure on the BoJ to move away from its easy policy stance. Plausible Next Steps For The BoJ The BoJ is in a difficult spot at the moment. The underwhelming pace of inflation is forcing the central bank to continue committing to its aggressive monetary easing programs, which include large-scale purchases of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) and Japanese equities via ETFs. Yet the BoJ already shifted from a quantity target for its JGB purchases to a price target back in September 2016 when it introduced the "Yield Curve Control" (YCC) element to its overall Quantitative & Qualitative Easing (QQE) program. By switching to a price level on the 10-year, the BoJ was aiming to reduce the amount of JGBs it was buying from 80 trillion yen per year to whatever level was required to keep the 10-year yield at 0%. After switching to the YCC framework, the growth in the BoJ's JGB holdings slowed sharply to a pace that is now below the pace of new JGB issuance for the first time since the QQE program started in 2013 (Chart 9). It is no coincidence that the peak in the pace of BoJ buying coincided with the cyclical trough in our own BoJ Central Bank Monitor, which suggests that tighter monetary policy is now required in Japan (top panel). The BoJ has been successful in keeping the 10-year JGB yield near its 0% target, but that outcome will be operationally harder to achieve in the future. The BoJ currently holds about 70% of all 10-year JGBs outstanding, and the increase in ownership has risen by 5-7% in each quarter (Chart 10). In other words, if this pattern lasts, without a major increase in issuance at that maturity, the BoJ will effectively own all the 10-year JGBs outstanding by the middle of 2019. Already, the BoJ owns around 43% of the entire stock of JGBs, draining liquidity away from the market for the risk-free asset (government bonds) that is needed by Japanese banks and major investors like pension funds and insurance companies (Chart 11). Chart 9BoJ Has Already 'Tapered'##BR##Its Bond Purchases Chart 10The BoJ Is Cornering##BR##The JGB Market With the BoJ unwilling to continue impairing the liquidity in the JGB market, it will be forced to consider alternatives to its current YCC program settings. Last week, the Japanese government nominated BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda for another five-year term as the head of the central bank. Kuroda has received the full trust from PM Abe in his handling of monetary policy. However, maintaining the current monetary policy has some limitations. What can the BoJ realistically do? Until realized inflation reaches the BoJ target, there can be no shift to a less accommodative monetary policy involving a full tapering of asset purchases or interest rate increases. Yet the BoJ cannot continue to buy bonds at the current pace without essentially "cornering the market" for 10-year JGBs. The solution that would be the least disruptive, in our view, would be increasing the YCC yield target from the current 0%. It has been rumored over the past year that the BoJ would consider raising that yield curve target, although that idea has been repeatedly shot down by Governor Kuroda - no surprise, given how far inflation is from the BoJ target. The BoJ has been already been effectively "tapering" by buying fewer bonds under YCC than QQE. An explicit announcement to reduce the pace of bond buying, however, would be taken as a hawkish sign by the markets. Just ask the ECB, who is dealing with its own communication problems with the markets as it tries to prepare for the inevitable exit from its bond buying program. Explicitly raising the yield curve target would only be an option for the BoJ if it felt that a) the domestic economy could tolerate some increase in longer-term bond yields; b) Japanese inflation was likely to reach (or even surpass) the BoJ's 2% target; and c) the global economy was strong enough to push global bond yields to a sustained higher trajectory. We see the following as being a necessary "checklist" of events that must occur before the BoJ would even contemplate a more to a higher target on the 10-year JGB yield (Chart 12): Chart 11JGB Ownership Shares##BR##By Investor Category Chart 12These Must ALL Happen Before##BR##The BoJ Lifts Its JGB Yield Target 1) The USD/JPY exchange rate must increase back to at least the 115-120 range The recent rise in the yen versus the U.S. dollar has flied in the face of interest rate differentials that should be highly supportive of the U.S. dollar (top panel). This is not the only currency pair where this has happened, of course, but it matters far more for Japan given the low readings on headline inflation. A strengthening yen makes a difficult job - boosting Japanese inflation sustainably to 2% - almost impossible. 2) Japanese core CPI inflation and nominal wage inflation must both rise sustainably above 1.5% This is fairly obvious, but the BoJ cannot be confident that its 2% inflation target can be reached if core inflation continues to muddle along at levels well below that target. If wage growth were to also rise at the same time and pace as core inflation, both within hailing distance of 2%, then the BoJ would be even more convinced that some modest change to its yield target was required. 3) The 10-year JGB yield must reach an overvalued extreme versus U.S. Treasuries Table 1JGB Yield Model Or put more simply, global bond yields must rise by enough for the BoJ to say that there has been a shift in the global growth/inflation backdrop, justifying a structurally higher level of bond yields. The BoJ could then point to non-Japanese factors as the reason to bump up the target for 10-year JGB yields. We can evaluate this using the BoJ's own model for the 10-year JGB yield that was introduced back in 2016 (Table 1). This model includes Japanese potential GDP growth, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and the share of JGBs owned by the BoJ (along with "dummy variables" to identify the dates of the BoJ's QQE and negative interest rate policy). In the bottom two panels of Chart 12, we show a scenario that would lower the residual of the model (i.e. how far JGB yields are below fair value) to the same extremes seen during the QQE era since 2013. That would require a move in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield to 3.5% AND an increase in the BoJ ownership share of the entire stock of JGBs to 50%. That would increase the fair value of the 10-year JGB yield to 0.18%, leaving the current yield around 10bps too expensive. Importantly, all three items in our checklist would have to happen at the same time for the BoJ to contemplate any shift in its yield curve target. That is especially true for USD/JPY. Japan would face considerable international pressure if the yen was held at undervalued levels by an overly accommodative BoJ policy that was no longer needed with Japanese inflation approaching the 2% target. What are the odds of all three of these items in our checklist being reached in 2018? Quite low, perhaps no more than 20%. For that reason, we do not see the BoJ being a new reason for frazzled global investors to worry about another spike in volatility. Bottom Line: When the BoJ does finally consider a shift in its monetary policy stance, the first thing it will do is raise its yield target on the 10-year JGB. Before doing that, three things must happen - yen weakness, higher core Japanese inflation and much higher non-Japanese global bond yields. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst Ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Kuroda Or No Kuroda, Reflation Ahead", dated February 7th 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The end of the low volatility regime could mark a leadership change in global equities away from EM to DM. The near-term risk to our negative stance on EM risk assets is a scenario where Beijing allows RMB appreciation to head off major protectionist threats from the U.S. This could delay the U.S. dollar rally and support EM risk assets. The EM and commodities equity rallies might be facing formidable technical resistances. These equity segments have to break out these technical resistances decisively to confirm the sustainability of the bull market. Feature Global stocks have corrected, and volatility measures have surged. The low volatility regime appears to have come to a decisive end. Even though in the short run volatility measures could well decline after their steep surge of the past week, the cyclical outlook points to higher volatility relative to last year. Financial markets are likely to be re-priced to adjust to the end of this low-volatility period. This entails more stress, and an additional selloff in risk assets. Periods of low volatility historically sow the seeds of their own reversal. Investors tend to embrace high-risk strategies amid low volatility, and take on more leverage. As a result, market excesses and froth arise, increasing the market's vulnerability in the event of a reversal. The latest period of low volatility lasted for more than a year, and no doubt facilitated the build-up of froth and excesses in global financial markets. Chart I-1 illustrates that the aggregate volatility measure of various financial markets was at its lows of the past 12 years before surging in recent days. Chart I-1Rising Volatility Coincides With A U.S. Dollar Rally What does rising volatility mean for emerging market (EM) relative performance vis a vis developed markets (DM)? It is primarily contingent on the U.S. dollar. If the U.S. dollar rebounds along with the rise in volatility, as it has done in the past (Chart I-1), EM equities will commence underperforming DM bourses. If the U.S. dollar fails to rebound and drifts lower, EM stocks are likely to outperform DM equities. With respect to exchange rates, we believe one of the major driving forces for currencies is the relative growth trajectory. The latter can be approximated by relative equity market performance in local currency terms. Chart I-2 shows that U.S. share prices - of both large and small caps - have been outperforming their global counterparts in local currency terms. Persisting periods of outperformance of U.S. stocks versus their global peers eventually, albeit sometimes with a considerable time lag, instigates a stronger trade-weighted U.S. dollar. U.S. large-cap share prices are making new highs versus their global peers in local currency terms. This entails that the selloff in the broad trade-weighted dollar is at a very late stage. The dollar rebound is a missing trigger for EM relative equity outperformance to reverse. A Risk To Our View: The U.S. Dollar One risk to our negative stance on EM risk assets and our recommendation of underweighting EM versus DM is the continuation of the U.S. dollar selloff. The greenback has been trading very poorly despite jitters in global equity markets. The recent surge in the RMB versus the U.S. dollar may be indicative that the Chinese authorities are tolerating RMB appreciation to defuse a threat of major protectionist measures from the U.S. (Chart I-3). If the RMB continues to appreciate versus the greenback, Asian and other EM currencies will stay well supported, and EM outperformance will persist. Chart I-2U.S. Relative Equity Outperformance ##br##Warrants A Stronger Dollar Chart I-3Will Beijing Tolerate A Stronger RMB? We suspect that Chinese policymakers are reluctantly allowing the RMB to appreciate. Indeed, Chinese policymakers have been both vocal and public about their understanding of Japan's experience with deleveraging, and specifically the mistake made by Japanese policymakers of allowing the yen to appreciate in the early 1990s. As most know, deflationary forces stemming from the combined effects of deleveraging and currency appreciation set off a formidable deflationary adjustment in Japan in the 1990s. Given Japan's experience, our conjecture is that Chinese policymakers would rather opt for a stable-to-mildly weaker currency. This has been one of the cornerstones of our bullish bias on the U.S. dollar versus emerging Asian currencies. If China allows the RMB to appreciate further versus the U.S. dollar, a potential U.S. dollar rally versus EM currencies will be delayed. In turn, this will likely allow EM equity, currency and credit markets to outperform their DM peers. That said, a strong currency will add to the ongoing policy tightening in China. The cumulative impact of this policy tightening combined with currency appreciation will weigh on China's growth later this year. As such, our fundamental thesis on China-slowdown is still valid in the medium term. However, political interference in the currency markets could delay EM risk assets' response to it. Bottom Line: The near-term risk to our negative stance on EM risk assets is a scenario where Beijing allows further RMB appreciation to head off potentially major protectionist threats from the U.S. May 2006 Redux? The current riot in global stocks resembles the May 2006 correction to a certain extent. Back in the spring of 2006, then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke had just taken the helm at the Fed. Global growth was strong, the U.S. dollar was selling off, and global share prices were surging and overbought. Chart I-4May 2006 And Now: EM Stocks, ##br##U.S. Bond Prices And U.S. Dollar In May-June 2006, markets sold off because of the then-prevailing narrative that Chairman Bernanke would be too dovish and would allow U.S. inflation to get out of hand. U.S. bond yields spiked, inflicting particular damage on EM. It seems that February 2018 may play out like May 2006. It will not be exactly the same, but there are enough similarities to draw parallels: Global growth is robust, inflationary pressures are accumulating. DM bond yields are rising and the greenback is selling off. The new Fed Chairman, Jerome Powell, just took over the reins at the Fed, and there are growing odds that U.S. inflation will soon begin to rise, justifying more Fed rate hikes. Chart I-4 illustrates the similarities between financial market dynamics in 2005-2006 and now. If we take 2006 as a guide, we can infer that the selloff is not yet over. In a matter of only five weeks EM share prices plunged by 25% in U.S. dollar terms, and the S&P 500 dropped by 7%. From a big-picture perspective, the May 2006 selloff was a sharp correction in a bull market that lasted for another year or so. Importantly, the 25% plunge in EM share prices that took place in 2006 occurred despite EM corporate profit growth expanding at a double-digit rate in 2006-'07. All that said, the 2006 selloff marked an important regime shift in the global economic landscape - the rate of U.S. growth peaked in the second quarter 2006, and began to decelerate. We believe that the current equity market riot will likely mark a bottom in U.S. inflation and the beginning of a slowdown in China. The U.S. Bond Market Selloff Is Not Over... Yet The selloff in the U.S./DM bond markets has not yet run its course: The U.S. inflation model - constructed by our colleagues in the Foreign Exchange Strategy service and based on U.S. capacity utilization and broad money supply - is pointing to higher inflation in the months ahead (Chart I-5). U.S. bond yields will likely move higher as forthcoming inflation prints validate our expectations for higher U.S. inflation. Fiscal stimulus amid robust growth and a tight labor market in the U.S. as well as record-high optimism among consumers and businesses have created fertile ground for rising inflation. The weak dollar of the past 12 months will also manifest in rising inflationary pressures. The U.S. bond term premium is still extremely low. Yet, budding uncertainty over inflation and the gradual end of QE programs in DM, will likely cause the U.S. bond term premium to rise from current depressed levels. Finally, simple DM bond markets technicals are still pointing to higher yields ahead (Chart I-6). Chart I-5U.S. Core Inflation Set To Rise Chart I-6U.S. Bond Yields: The Path ##br##Of Least Resistance Is Up Overall, the path of least resistance for DM bond yields is up. This will make EM local currency bond yields less attractive versus DM and especially versus U.S. Treasurys. Yield differentials between EM and the U.S. are already at a 10-year low (Chart I-7). Low risk premiums on EM local bonds and rising global financial market volatility suggest that flows to EM fixed income markets will slow over the course of this year. That said, near-term risks still remain due to the massive inflows that previously went into EM funds, and might not have been deployed yet. China's Tightening And Pending Slowdown It is not unusual for an equity market riot to begin with inflation and high-interest-rate fears and then culminate with a growth scare - with a rebound in between. 2018 may shape up to fit this pattern. Global equity markets seem to be immersed with inflation and policy tightening in the U.S. - and potentially in China. At some point, share prices could well stage a rebound but then relapse again as materially slower Chinese growth spills over to global trade.1 We have discussed our view on China and its spillover effect on EM in past reports, and will not reiterate our views and analysis here. We will only bring to clients' attention that manufacturing production volume in Asia has already been weakening for a couple of months (Chart I-8). Chart I-7EM Local Currency Bonds Over ##br##U.S. Treasurys: Yield Differential Chart I-8Asia's Manufacturing ##br##Production Growth Is Slowing Leadership changes in the equity markets occur amid selloffs. Hence, it is reasonable to expect a leadership shift within global equity market sectors and countries as well as currency markets. One major equity leadership shift could be that EM begins underperforming DM. A combination of rising U.S. inflation and bond yields and a slowdown in China are negative for EM financial markets, especially relative to DM ones. Reading Markets' Tea Leaves It remains to be seen how much further this selloff in global equities will last and whether this is the beginning of a major downtrend in EM risk assets. It is impossible to have perfect foresight. To help investors in their portfolio decisions, we combine our fundamental analysis with tools that assist us in forecasting business cycles as well as various chart patterns that may be indicative of the market's potential trajectory. The following charts illustrate that the EM and commodities equity rally may be facing formidable technical resistance. These equity markets have to break out decisively through these technical resistance lines to confirm the sustainability of the bull market. Global energy stocks have corrected after reaching their long-term moving average (Chart I-9, top panel). The latter served as a floor in the 2008 crash. It was a key technical level in the 2014-'15 bear market that did not hold up and was followed by a collapse in crude prices. Similarly, global steel stocks are exhibiting the same pattern (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Relative performance of emerging Asian share prices versus the global equity benchmark is also at a similar critical juncture (Chart I-10, top panel). Chart I-9Global Energy And Steel Stocks: ##br##A Technical Resistance Chart I-10Select EM Equity Markets ##br##Are Facing A Critical Test Finally, Brazilian share prices in U.S. dollar terms have also reached a crucial technical threshold (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Share prices of a few equity sectors and markets that are imperative to the EM equity outlook are at important technical junctures. Failure to break above these technical resistance lines will corroborate our negative stance on EM/China growth and related financial markets. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 We elaborated the relationship between China/EM and DM growth in November 29, 2017 Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, the link is available on page 12. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
特別レポート Highlights Japan's reflationary economic policies will be reinforced ahead of the constitutional referendum; The Bank of Japan is a long way from a 2% inflation overshoot; Fiscal thrust will continue to surprise to the upside; Wage law revisions are significant and, on net, inflationary; Go long JPY/EUR as a tactical play on the countertrend yen rally. Feature Despite a 8.5% selloff in Japanese equities over the past week amid the global equity pullback, Japan's underlying economic growth is strong. The unemployment rate has collapsed to 2.8%, the economy is humming along at an impressive 2.1% clip, and inflationary pressures are building at last. A variety of indicators - from sentiment surveys to household incomes to manufacturing output - attest to the fact that "Abenomics" is keeping the fire well lit (Chart 1). Before the pullback began, investors were wondering whether the BoJ's reduction of long-term government bond purchases signaled that a less dovish turn in monetary policy was underway (Chart 2). BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda tried to quiet these rumors by reiterating the need to keep current, easy monetary policy in place. The latest financial shakeup reinforces this message. Chart 1Japan's Macro Fundamentals Are Strong Chart 2The BoJ Has Cut Back Asset Purchases Over the long run, the BoJ's moves, and "Abenomics" in general, should be assessed from the perspective of Japan's broader geopolitical revival.1 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe needs reflation to continue for a range of reasons. Policymakers are not constrained by inflation; rather, inflation is constrained by the yen, global growth, and the increasing danger of a Chinese policy mistake. The BoJ Will Not Betray Abenomics Japan's strong consumer and business confidence, white-hot economic growth, and multi-year equity rally have stemmed from three factors: positive fiscal thrust, an EM rebound, and a weak yen.2 As a result, real interest rates have fallen (Chart 3), prompting the BoJ to downgrade its quantitative and qualitative easing policy (QQE). But cutting back bond-buying does not mean that the BoJ is removing accommodative policy. The central bank stopped targeting the quantity of asset purchases when it introduced its "yield curve control" policy in September 2016. Yield curve control ensures that long-term JGB yields stay around 0%, with a de facto cap of 10 basis points that can be adjusted as needed. Therefore the gross amount of asset purchases is arbitrary; it only needs to be sufficient to achieve the yield target. In fact, the BoJ's official annual target of asset purchases, 80 trillion yen, was until recently well above the annual net issuance of JGBs at 35 trillion yen (Chart 4). Fiscal policy, while surprising upward as expected, has not produced the volumes of new bond issuance that would be necessary to justify such a lofty target. Hence the BoJ can reduce bond-buying without turning more hawkish. As for inflation, the core price level has only barely begun to perk up (Chart 5) - and that has occurred after five years of reflationary efforts, which, in turn, followed a sea change in Japanese politics. Prime Minister Abe came to power by declaring war on deflation, putting Governor Kuroda in charge of the BoJ, and seeking a broad-based revival of Japan from the "lost decades" of the 1990s and 2000s. Neither Abe nor Kuroda can afford to remove accommodation too soon and snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Chart 3Real Interest##br## Rates Have Fallen Chart 4Bond Purchases Had ##br##Exceeded New Issuances Chart 5Weak Yen, Easier Financial ##br##Conditions Pushed Up Inflation Kuroda has repeatedly stressed that he will allow inflation to "overshoot" the 2% target before normalizing policy.3 While it is possible that he will step down when his first term ends on April 8, it is neither required nor probable. We highly doubt that he will. Further, the likeliest candidates to replace him are those that would maintain policy continuity.4 Hence the wind-down of QQE does not portend any additional moves away from easy policy. Any such moves would drive the yen upward, and neither Kuroda nor his acolytes at the BoJ can allow yen strength to undermine their quest to whip deflation. Bottom Line: The BoJ's yield curve control framework will remain intact even if the quantity of asset purchases remains much smaller. No leadership change at the BoJ will alter this new monetary policy framework. With the Fed and other central banks in the midst of rate-hike cycles, and the ECB winding down its QE, the persistent dovishness of the BoJ will act as a depressant on the yen as it experiences upward pressure from abroad. Policy Is Inflationary... Significant inflationary pressures are building in Japan, and reflationary policy will be resolute in the face of any headwinds. First, Abe's political career depends on maintaining the economic revival. His most treasured policy objective - reforming the Japanese constitution to revise the pacifist Article Nine and clear the legal path for the normalization of the country's military - ultimately requires a majority vote in a popular referendum.5 This is no easy task. Abe will almost certainly win the leadership poll within the Liberal Democratic Party in September this year, but he may not wait till then to try to push a constitutional amendment through the Diet. The tentative plan is to present a bill in March and proceed to the national referendum in late 2018. Certainly it is imperative for him to secure two-thirds majority votes in each chamber before the House of Councillors elections in July 2019, since that event puts his near-supermajority in the upper house at risk (Chart 6). The constitutional referendum could coincide with that vote or precede it, but Abe wants the process finished before the 2020 Tokyo summer Olympics. It will be a stretch but it is feasible. Chart 6Abe Has A Virtual Supermajority In Both Houses, Necessary For Constitutional Change Chart 7A Popular Referendum Will Be Very Close Opinion polls have consistently showed the public almost evenly split on the topic of revising Article Nine, with the hawkish advocates of revision usually trailing dovish opponents (Chart 7). While Abe's approval rating ranges in the high forties, his constitutional tinkering has similar, sub-50% levels of support. Pacifism runs deep in Japan. The LDP and New Komeito ruling coalition has not won more than 47% of the popular vote in the 2012, 2014, and 2017 general elections (Chart 8). And it has never scored above 50% in popular opinion polls over the course of Abe's term (Chart 9). Chart 8Abe's Coalition Has Not Won 50% Of The Vote... Chart 9...Nor Polled Above 50% In Popular Opinion Abe will not have forgotten Italy's former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who gambled his political career on controversial constitutional reforms in 2016 only to fall from power when he lost the popular referendum. More to the point, Abe knows that large-scale protests - bigger than those he faced in 2015 - could attend his final push to secure the constitutional revision. After all, Abe's grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, faced mass protests in 1960 and was forced to resign upon concluding a new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States. This was a consequential update to the "U.S.-Japan Security Treaty" that enabled Japan to build up de facto military forces despite its pacifist constitution. Kishi fell from power even though he had presided over a rapid expansion of real GDP and real wages and a steep drop in unemployment (Chart 10). True, Japan was a very different place in 1960. At that time, the Cold War was raging, and a large and restless youth population energized the protests. Today's youth are complacent and outnumbered by comparison. Nevertheless, Kishi did not need to put his treaty to a popular vote, unlike Abe's constitutional revisions. His grandson has a higher threshold to overcome. It follows that Japan will maintain dovish monetary policy and will continue to outperform conventional estimates of fiscal thrust (Chart 11).6 Abe's decision to abandon the goal of achieving a primary balance budget surplus by 2020 is a clear indication of this policy direction.7 Chart 10Treaty Protests In 1960 Despite Strong Economy Chart 11Fiscal Thrust Surprises To Upside Wages will be a decisive factor in Abe's economic success.8 Wage growth has remained in the black for most of his term, marking a contrast with the past twenty years of at best sporadic and short-lived wage rises (Chart 12). This is likely to continue. In this spring's "shunto" negotiations between businesses and unions, both the Abe administration and Keidanren, the top business group, are asking for 3% wage increases. The biggest union, Rengo, is only asking for one percentage point more.9 Abe has dedicated the current Diet session, beginning January 22, to "work-style reforms" that should be, on net, positive for wage growth.10 He wants to remove disparities between regular and irregular workers, particularly regarding wages, training opportunities, and welfare benefits. He also wants to impose limits on the workweek - putting a cap on the average 80-hour workweek of Japan's full-time workers so as to force companies to hire more irregular workers on a full-time basis (and to encourage employed people to have children). Companies that raise wages by 3% or more will see a cut in the corporate tax rate from around 30% to 25%. Economic conditions should push wages up regardless of central government policies. The jobs-to-applicants ratio is at the highest level since 1990. The labor participation rate is 60.8%, with female participation at 51.3%, up from 47.8% when Abe took power in 2012. Neither does the adoption of robotics, for which Japan is famous, counteract the tight labor market and inflationary consequences over time.11 In short, wages and core inflation should rise as long as the economic expansion is not derailed. As our colleague Peter Berezin of BCA's Global Investment Strategy has shown, the Phillips Curve will eventually kick in - and it even looks like Japan (Chart 13)!12 Chart 12Wage Growth Is The Key To Abe's Success Chart 13The Phillips Curve In Japan Looks Like Japan Bottom Line: A growing economy with real wage growth is Abe's only hope not only of beating deflation but also of getting his planned constitutional amendments over the line. Reflationary policy is essential to his legacy and vision of reviving Japan. ... But Not Too Inflationary Still, fiscal thrust is hardly going to explode unless an economic slowdown calls for it. Despite Abe's adoption of a twenty first-century "Takahashi Plan," i.e. simultaneous monetary and fiscal expansion, his administration's fiscal spending has remained relatively restrained. Strong revenue growth has actually improved the primary balance (Chart 14). Until very recently, Abe's "fiscal arrow" has disappointed his cheerleaders - he even raised the consumption tax from 5% to 8% in 2014, undermining his pro-growth fiscal packages. By law Abe is required to raise the consumption tax again, from 8% to 10%, in October 2019. In the latest election he campaigned on using the proceeds of this tax increase to expand social spending.13 Of course, he reserves the option of postponing this decision if he should deem a tax hike detrimental to the economic recovery (or to his odds of revising the constitution). But this flexibility means that any and all inflationary pressures in 2018-19 will increase under the shadow of a statutorily scheduled slug to consumer spending. There are also some constraints on wage growth. First, the reforms are intended to liberalize the labor market, which means their effects are not likely to be exclusively inflationary. "Performance" metrics that put less emphasis on seniority and working overtime, insofar as they are successful, could weigh on wage growth, at least initially. Second, Japan is starting to allow immigration - the number of foreign workers hit a record of 1.28 million total in October 2017 (Chart 15).14 This trend runs contrary to Japan's long status as the least hospitable destination for migrants in the developed world. The influx is apparently not limited to construction workers for the 2020 Olympics, as manufacturing is still the sector with the largest number of foreign workers. The Abe administration is committed to breaking the mold in the name of pro-growth structural reform and immigration is a meaningful change, albeit still in its early stages. Given existing labor market tightness and rising labor costs for companies, we expect this trend to outrun expectations, nudging up labor force growth and at least mildly counteracting wage rises, especially in low-skill sectors.15 Chart 14Primary Balance Improves On Growth Chart 15Japan Finally Allowing Immigration Bottom Line: Inflation will continue building if the global economy continues expanding and additional fiscal thrust and wage hikes are added to Japan's negative output gap, tight labor market, and rock-bottom unemployment rate. Nevertheless Japan is far from runaway inflation, and fiscal and labor market policies are nuanced. The BoJ's desired inflation overshoot is still a long way off. China And EM Pose Deflationary Risks Meanwhile deflationary forces lurk in China and emerging markets, which have been key factors in Japan's recent economic outperformance. Japan's trade exposure to China is substantial: The latter accounts for 18% of Japan's total exports, 2.7% of Japan's GDP (Chart 16). At the moment, Japanese manufacturing appears resilient in the face of China's slowdown, especially relative to the "newly industrialized" Asian neighbors. But Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's famous proxy for economic activity is closely correlated with Japanese export growth, and it is slowing. China's monetary conditions and credit and fiscal spending impulse - key leading indicators - also bode ill for Japanese exports (Chart 17). Chart 16Japan Exposed To Chinese Economy Chart 17China Policy Will Hit Japan Directly Beijing has so far tightened policy into the slowdown. It is adding new financial, environmental, and property sector regulations while expanding its anti-corruption campaign into finance, industry, and local government.16 Central government regulatory discipline - and reforms meant to reduce capital and energy intensity - will weigh on China's monetary and credit growth, capex, capital and commodity imports, and hence EM as a whole (Chart 18). And EM ex-China accounts for a further 25% of Japanese exports. In other words, Chinese reforms will bite in 2018-19 and thus encourage Japan to maintain loose fiscal and monetary policy. Recent market turbulence may add to this predicament as it is not easy for China to abandon its newly launched economic reforms - meaning China may ease policy too late if conditions worsen. We put the risk of a policy induced mistake in China at 30%. There are also significant geopolitical risks in East Asia that could cause headwinds to Japan's economy. China's strategic challenge is the key driver of Japan's attempts to revive its economy (including through higher military spending) and normalize its military operations (Chart 19). With Japan re-arming, China and Japan could easily suffer a breakdown in diplomatic relations - and China has already shown the willingness to use sanctions to punish Japan when strategic spats occur.17 Frictions over the Koreas or Taiwan could also encourage safe-haven flows into the yen. In short, Abe and Kuroda must be prepared for any eventuality, which is another reason to expect policy to stay looser for longer. Chart 18China Policy Will Hit Japan Via EM Chart 19Strategic Tensions Still A Serious Risk Bottom Line: Japan's exposure to both China and EM ex-China makes it vulnerable to growth wobbles as China intensifies reforms. Meanwhile Japan's constitutional revisions and remilitarization could spark a spat with China. These are compelling reasons for policymakers to stay the course with loose monetary and fiscal policies. Investment Recommendations In the short run, we would suggest clients go long JPY/EUR. The euro is expensive relative to fair value and purchasing-power-parity models (Chart 20). And investor positioning is skewed heavily in favor of the euro versus the yen (Chart 21).18 Chart 20EUR/JPY Is Expensive Chart 21Skewed Positioning In EUR/JPY We are closing our long USD/JPY for a loss of 3.23%. In the long run, as long as global growth holds up, any yen rally is likely to be a countertrend one, as a stronger yen will exert deflationary pressures and reinforce persistent, easy policy. Japanese policymakers have little need to fear inflation; they will focus on nurturing the country's economic and strategic rebound. Therefore, investors need not worry about the BoJ pulling the rug out from under the equity and bond markets. While BCA's House View favors Japanese equities over the U.S., BCA Geopolitical Strategy's China view prevents us from sharing this conviction in 2018. We would favor U.S. equities, which are low-beta and poised for continued strong earnings growth due to tax cuts and growth. The big risk for Japanese equities comes if China's central government makes a policy mistake and "overcorrects," triggering a precipitous drop in Chinese imports. We put a 30% subjective probability to such a scenario given the difficulty of reforming the financial sector in a highly leveraged economy. The yen would rally on safe-haven flows and Japanese markets would sell off. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan's Political Paradigm Shift: Investment Implications," dated December 21, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!" dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 See for example Haruhiko Kuroda, "Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing and Economic Theory," speech at the University of Zurich, Bank of Japan, November 13, 2017, available at www.boj.or.jp. 4 Technically, Kuroda's term ends on April 8, 2018 but he can be reappointed by the prime minister for another five-year term. Please see "Experts say Haruhiko Kuroda likely to remain at BOJ helm despite failures," Japan Times, October 7, 2017, available at www.japantimes.co.jp. Both of Kuroda's deputies, Hiroshi Nakaso and Kikuo Iwata, as well as other possible successors (Masayoshi Amamiya, Etsuro Honda, and Takatoshi Ito) are dovish candidates likely to maintain continuity with his policies if at the BoJ helm. Nobuchika Mori is the only potential exception but it is still not clear that he would deviate from Abe's and Kuroda's framework if given the top job. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016; and Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Abe abandoned the 2020 budget target while campaigning in the general election of October 2017 and has stuck with his higher spending proposals. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Retribution," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see "Japan business lobby seconds call for 3% pay hikes," Nikkei Asian Review, January 17, 2018, available at asia.nikkei.com. 10 Abe is attempting to amend the Labor Standards Law. Please see Heizo Takenaka, "A prologue to work-style reforms," Japan Times, January 30, 2018, available at www.japantimes.co.jp. 11 Despite labor shortages, Japanese firms are using robots less often. Also, companies with high technology and robot usage are actually companies that tend to pay higher wages, contrary to popular belief. Please see BCA's The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "The Impact Of Robots On Inflation," dated January 25, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy, "Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On," dated January 19, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 13 Abe reiterated his plans for more social spending, for instance on expanded child care support and free preschool education, in his policy speech ahead of the opening Diet session this year. Please see "Abe delivers policy speech," NHK, January 22, 2018, available at www3.nhk.or.jp. 14 Please see "Number of Foreign Workers in Japan at Record High," NHK, January 26, 2018, available at www3.nhk.or.jp. 15 Please see "Japan quietly accepting foreign workers -- just don't call it immigration," Japan Times, November 3, 2016, available at www.japantimes.co.jp 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Does It Pay To Pivot To China?" dated July 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 For full discussion, see footnote 2 above. Geopolitical Calendar
特別レポート Dear Client, In light of recent market turbulence, we are publishing our weekly report earlier than usual. Caroline Miller, Garry Evans, and I will also be hosting a webcast Wednesday morning at 10am EST to discuss the investment outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Monday's stock market rout was largely driven by technical factors. Strong economic growth and positive earnings surprises should keep the equity bull market intact. Nevertheless, investors need to adjust to the fact that volatility is likely to pick up, just as it did in the last few years of the 1990s bull market. The market's expectations of where the funds rate will be over the next two years have almost converged with the Fed dots. In the near term, this will limit the ability of the 10-year Treasury yield to rise much above 3%. Looking further out, inflation is likely to move above the Fed's target early next year, setting the stage for a recession starting in late 2019. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Feature VIX Kicks Last week's Global Investment Strategy report, entitled "Take Out Some Insurance," argued that equities had become dangerously overbought and were highly vulnerable to a correction.1 We noted that the VIX had likely bottomed for the cycle and that going long volatility had now become an attractive hedge against stock market declines. As many of my colleagues have noted, betting on continued low volatility had become an increasingly crowded trade in recent years. Back in January, we observed that net short volatility positions had reached record-high levels (Chart 1). We warned that "traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility."2 Precisely such a vicious cycle erupted on Monday, causing the S&P 500 to suffer its worst daily percentage loss since August 18, 2011. The question is where do we go from here? So far, the sell-off in stocks looks largely technical in nature. Chart 2 shows that the VIX soared by roughly four times more on Monday than one would have expected based solely on the decline in equity prices. This suggests that the spike in volatility caused the stock market plunge, rather than the other way around. The relatively muted reaction of other "risk gauges" such as junk bonds, EM stocks, and gold prices over the past few days is consistent with this thesis. Chart 1Volatility Is Back Chart 2Monday's VIX Spike Was Abnormally Large Cyclical Outlook Still Solid It is impossible to know if today's rebound will persist or if the correction still has further to run. What we do know is that the cyclical underpinnings for the bull market remain intact. Leading economic data remain buoyant (Chart 3). Corporate earnings continue to come in above expectations (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Chart 4Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth None of our recession-timing indicators are flashing red (Chart 5). The Conference Board's LEI is rising at a healthy 5.5% y/y pace. Historically, a decisive break below zero in the year-over-year change in the LEI has been a reliable recession indicator. Likewise, while the U.S. 2/10-year Treasury curve has flattened, it has not inverted yet. Moreover, even once the yield curve inverts, the lags can be quite long before the recession begins. For example, in the last cycle, the yield curve inverted in early 2006, but the recession did not begin until December 2007. This does not mean that everything will be smooth sailing from here. Monday's sell-off marked an inflection point in the low-volatility world that has prevailed over the past few years. The VIX Humpty-Dumpty has been irrevocably broken. Going forward, volatility will remain elevated relative to what investors have come to expect. As the experience of the 1990s shows, stocks can still go up when volatility is trending higher (Chart 6), but this is going to make for a much more challenging investment environment. Chart 5No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle Chart 6Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise The Powell Put? How the Fed and other central banks react to this new world will be critical. It is perhaps not a complete coincidence that Monday's crash occurred on the first day that Jay Powell took over the helm of the Fed. Investors are increasingly worried that the Fed will turn from friend to foe. The faster-than-expected increase in average hourly earnings in January put those fears in stark relief. Accelerating wage growth suggests supply-side constraints are beginning to bite. This, in turn, means that the runway for low inflation and easy monetary policy may not be as long as some had hoped. As BCA editors discussed in our 2018 Outlook, "Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," central banks are in the process of winding down the extraordinary stimulus that investors have gotten used to.3 Whether this undermines the case for holding stocks and other risk assets depends on how quickly the adjustment occurs. On the plus side, we continue to think the adjustment will be fairly gradual, at least for the time being. Core CPI inflation outside of shelter is still running at 0.7% (Chart 7). This gives the Fed plenty of wiggle room. Just like Janet Yellen, Jay Powell will seek to build a consensus among his colleagues. Granted, the composition of the FOMC is likely to shift in a somewhat more hawkish direction. However, the evolution will be slow. In the meantime, the recommendations of career Fed staff will represent an important, and often underappreciated, source of continuity. As in the past, the Fed will continue to monitor incoming economic and financial data and react accordingly. The stock market rout has led to some tightening in financial conditions, but FCIs in the U.S. and most other countries remain more expansionary than they were six months ago (Chart 8). Chart 7Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Chart 8Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Just as importantly, the implosion of volatility funds is unlikely to reverberate across the financial system in the same way as it did during the financial crisis. What made the mortgage crisis so toxic was that the losses were concentrated in the books of highly leveraged financial institutions. In the case of volatility funds, that does not appear to be the case. Investment Implications Global bond yields remain quite low by historic standards and this should continue to support stocks. Indeed, even after the recent bond sell-off, average global bond yields are still close to half of what they were in 2011 - a time when global excess capacity was much greater than it is today (Chart 9). In keeping with our structurally bearish view on bonds, which we first articulated on July 5, 2016 in a note entitled "The End of 35-Year Bond Bull Market," we expect global bond yields to grind higher.4 However, in rate-of-change terms, the swift repricing of yields over the past few months has likely run its course. Chart 10 shows that market expectations of where the funds rate will be at the end of 2018 and 2019 have almost converged with the Fed dots. This convergence helped our short December-2018 fed funds futures trade, which we closed at our stop for a gain of 70 bps last Friday. A sustained move above 3% on the 10-year Treasury yield will require a more durable increase in inflation. Ultimately, we do expect core inflation to move above 2%, forcing the Fed to lift interest rates into restrictive territory. However, this is likely to be a story for 2019 rather than 2018. Stocks tend to peak about six months before the start of recessions (Table 1). If the next recession occurs in late 2019, as we expect, the equity bull market could last a while longer. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Chart 9Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Chart 10Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed?" dated January 12, 2018. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
特別レポート Dear Client, In light of recent market turbulence, we are publishing our weekly report earlier than usual. Caroline Miller, Garry Evans, and I will also be hosting a webcast Wednesday morning at 10am EST to discuss the investment outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Monday's stock market rout was largely driven by technical factors. Strong economic growth and positive earnings surprises should keep the equity bull market intact. Nevertheless, investors need to adjust to the fact that volatility is likely to pick up, just as it did in the last few years of the 1990s bull market. The market's expectations of where the funds rate will be over the next two years have almost converged with the Fed dots. In the near term, this will limit the ability of the 10-year Treasury yield to rise much above 3%. Looking further out, inflation is likely to move above the Fed's target early next year, setting the stage for a recession starting in late 2019. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Feature VIX Kicks Last week's Global Investment Strategy report, entitled "Take Out Some Insurance," argued that equities had become dangerously overbought and were highly vulnerable to a correction.1 We noted that the VIX had likely bottomed for the cycle and that going long volatility had now become an attractive hedge against stock market declines. As many of my colleagues have noted, betting on continued low volatility had become an increasingly crowded trade in recent years. Back in January, we observed that net short volatility positions had reached record-high levels (Chart 1). We warned that "traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility."2 Precisely such a vicious cycle erupted on Monday, causing the S&P 500 to suffer its worst daily percentage loss since August 18, 2011. The question is where do we go from here? So far, the sell-off in stocks looks largely technical in nature. Chart 2 shows that the VIX soared by roughly four times more on Monday than one would have expected based solely on the decline in equity prices. This suggests that the spike in volatility caused the stock market plunge, rather than the other way around. The relatively muted reaction of other "risk gauges" such as junk bonds, EM stocks, and gold prices over the past few days is consistent with this thesis. Chart 1Volatility Is Back Chart 2Monday's VIX Spike Was Abnormally Large Cyclical Outlook Still Solid It is impossible to know if today's rebound will persist or if the correction still has further to run. What we do know is that the cyclical underpinnings for the bull market remain intact. Leading economic data remain buoyant (Chart 3). Corporate earnings continue to come in above expectations (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Chart 4Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth None of our recession-timing indicators are flashing red (Chart 5). The Conference Board's LEI is rising at a healthy 5.5% y/y pace. Historically, a decisive break below zero in the year-over-year change in the LEI has been a reliable recession indicator. Likewise, while the U.S. 2/10-year Treasury curve has flattened, it has not inverted yet. Moreover, even once the yield curve inverts, the lags can be quite long before the recession begins. For example, in the last cycle, the yield curve inverted in early 2006, but the recession did not begin until December 2007. This does not mean that everything will be smooth sailing from here. Monday's sell-off marked an inflection point in the low-volatility world that has prevailed over the past few years. The VIX Humpty-Dumpty has been irrevocably broken. Going forward, volatility will remain elevated relative to what investors have come to expect. As the experience of the 1990s shows, stocks can still go up when volatility is trending higher (Chart 6), but this is going to make for a much more challenging investment environment. Chart 5No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle Chart 6Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise The Powell Put? How the Fed and other central banks react to this new world will be critical. It is perhaps not a complete coincidence that Monday's crash occurred on the first day that Jay Powell took over the helm of the Fed. Investors are increasingly worried that the Fed will turn from friend to foe. The faster-than-expected increase in average hourly earnings in January put those fears in stark relief. Accelerating wage growth suggests supply-side constraints are beginning to bite. This, in turn, means that the runway for low inflation and easy monetary policy may not be as long as some had hoped. As BCA editors discussed in our 2018 Outlook, "Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," central banks are in the process of winding down the extraordinary stimulus that investors have gotten used to.3 Whether this undermines the case for holding stocks and other risk assets depends on how quickly the adjustment occurs. On the plus side, we continue to think the adjustment will be fairly gradual, at least for the time being. Core CPI inflation outside of shelter is still running at 0.7% (Chart 7). This gives the Fed plenty of wiggle room. Just like Janet Yellen, Jay Powell will seek to build a consensus among his colleagues. Granted, the composition of the FOMC is likely to shift in a somewhat more hawkish direction. However, the evolution will be slow. In the meantime, the recommendations of career Fed staff will represent an important, and often underappreciated, source of continuity. As in the past, the Fed will continue to monitor incoming economic and financial data and react accordingly. The stock market rout has led to some tightening in financial conditions, but FCIs in the U.S. and most other countries remain more expansionary than they were six months ago (Chart 8). Chart 7Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Chart 8Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Just as importantly, the implosion of volatility funds is unlikely to reverberate across the financial system in the same way as it did during the financial crisis. What made the mortgage crisis so toxic was that the losses were concentrated in the books of highly leveraged financial institutions. In the case of volatility funds, that does not appear to be the case. Investment Implications Global bond yields remain quite low by historic standards and this should continue to support stocks. Indeed, even after the recent bond sell-off, average global bond yields are still close to half of what they were in 2011 - a time when global excess capacity was much greater than it is today (Chart 9). In keeping with our structurally bearish view on bonds, which we first articulated on July 5, 2016 in a note entitled "The End of 35-Year Bond Bull Market," we expect global bond yields to grind higher.4 However, in rate-of-change terms, the swift repricing of yields over the past few months has likely run its course. Chart 10 shows that market expectations of where the funds rate will be at the end of 2018 and 2019 have almost converged with the Fed dots. This convergence helped our short December-2018 fed funds futures trade, which we closed at our stop for a gain of 70 bps last Friday. A sustained move above 3% on the 10-year Treasury yield will require a more durable increase in inflation. Ultimately, we do expect core inflation to move above 2%, forcing the Fed to lift interest rates into restrictive territory. However, this is likely to be a story for 2019 rather than 2018. Stocks tend to peak about six months before the start of recessions (Table 1). If the next recession occurs in late 2019, as we expect, the equity bull market could last a while longer. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Chart 9Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Chart 10Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed?" dated January 12, 2018. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. Strategy & Market Trends* Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed In 2015-2018
Highlights Market participants should be asking why yields are higher, and not worry about how much they have climbed. While the bond market has begun to price in higher inflation (via the move in the TIPS breakeven rate), wage and price inflation remains muted for now. Sentiment has deteriorated more than valuations or technicals as the S&P 500 climbed to fresh all-time highs in December and January. Our U.S. Equity Strategy service downgraded small caps to neutral from overweight. Feature Chart 1The January Jobs Report Keeps The Fed##BR##On Track For Gradual Hikes This Year Last week marked Janet Yellen's final FOMC meeting and the first week in many years that the U.S. Treasury and equity markets worried about inflation. The strongest year-over-year reading in average hourly earnings in 9 years (+2.9% in January) added to the market's inflation concerns (Chart 1). The 10-year Treasury yield climbed 15 bps to 2.84%, while the S&P 500 moved lower by 2.5% as of midday on Friday, February 2. It was the worst week for the stock market since September 2016. Individual investor sentiment on the equity market has surged recently, and valuations are at extremes. However, BCA's technical indicator for U.S. stocks is not at an extreme. BCA's stance is that while the risk/reward for stocks over bonds has narrowed, it is too soon to call an end to the bull market. However, we are monitoring real yields closely. At 2.13% on Friday morning, February 2, the 10-year TIPS breakeven yield was still below the 2.4 to 2.5% range where markets should begin to worry about the Fed falling behind the curve. While the acceleration in average hourly earnings in January cements the case for continued gradual Fed rate hikes this year, inflation is not about to spiral higher. Wage inflation remains muted, and patience is still required as market participants await signs of a pickup in broader measures of consumer price inflation. The market is now fully priced for three rate hikes this year. Also, longer-term rate expectations have moved close to the Fed's estimate of the terminal rate. It would be reasonable to expect some short-term pause to recent near-relentless uptrend in rate expectations. For the market to price tightening beyond the Fed's dots, the economy and inflation would need to outperform the Fed's forecasts (which are 2.5% GDP growth, 1.9% core inflation and 3.9% unemployment for 2018). For now at least, it's not clear that is the case. Why Rates Are Rising Matters The relentless increase in 10-year Treasury yields spooked investors early last week, but it is too soon for equity investors to worry about an overly aggressive Fed. At 2.84%, the 10-year Treasury yield is above the FOMC's view of the neutral Fed funds rate, and has moved nearly 80 bps higher since early September. Market participants should be asking why yields are higher, and not worry about how much they have climbed. Chart 2Breaking Down The Rise In Yields BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service noted in mid-January1 that in the current environment, it is useful to split the nominal 10-year yield into its two main components - the compensation for inflation protection and the real yield (Chart 2). The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has moved from 1.66% last June to 2.13% late last week, but is still too low. Historically, the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate has traded in a range between 2.4 and 2.5% when inflation is well-anchored near the Fed's 2% target. BCA's stance is that inflation will move back to the Fed's target soon. The implication is that there is still another 25 to 35 bps of upside in the 10-year breakeven rate. The reason why this threshold is important is because a rise in inflation expectations to that level would be a signal that the FOMC will need to become more aggressive in slowing economic growth. This could occur even if actual inflation is below the 2% target, as long as it is rising toward the target. This will be especially true if the unemployment rate is heading to 3.5%, as we suspect. BCA's U.S. Bond strategists' model of real yields2 projects that real yields will rise 4 bps by the end of the year to 0.61%, but it could be more depending on how quickly the Fed wants to slow growth. Bottom Line: BCA expects that the nominal Treasury yield should move into a range between 3.0 and 3.25% by the time inflation reaches the Fed's target. BCA's stance is that risk assets will get into trouble once inflation expectations rise above 2.4%. Bond yields will presumably be moving higher along with inflation expectations. However, investors should not ignore higher Treasury yields rates. That said, equity investors do not need to be too concerned until inflation expectations hit that 2.4% threshold. Inflation itself may not be at 2% as this occurs, but if inflation is climbing and the unemployment rate is still falling, then the market will believe that the Fed is behind the curve. That is a bearish environment for equities. Inflation: Still A Waiting Game While the bond market has begun to price in higher inflation (via the move in the TIPS breakeven rate), wage and price inflation remains muted for now. Chart 3 illustrates various measures of wage inflation. Panel 1 shows that the Employment Cost Index (ECI) is in a clear uptrend. The acceleration in the wages and salaries component of ECI is broad-based across geography and industry (Chart 4, panel 1). Moreover, at 86%, the percentage of states reporting unemployment rates below NAIRU suggests that wage gains are imminent (Chart 4, panels 2 and 3). Chart 3Most Wage Metrics Are Rolling Over Chart 4The Employment Cost Index Is In A Definitive Uptrend... Although the year-over-year increase in average hourly earnings accelerated to 2.9% in January, many other wage indicators have stalled out recently (Chart 3, panel 4). The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker rolled over recently along with weekly usual earnings (Chart 3, panels 2 and 3). In short, despite a robust global economy, a U.S. economy running above its long term potential and the unemployment rate (4.1% in January) below NAIRU (4.6%), labor shortages are not yet strong enough to push up wage inflation. Chart 5Shift Towards Service Economy Led##BR##To Shift Away From Capacity Utilization That said, the historical evidence suggests that once the labor market tightens, inflation eventually does accelerate. However, wages do not always lead inflation at bottoms and may be a lagging indicator in this cycle.3 In long economic cycles (1980s and 1990s), wage inflation was a lagging indicator. BCA recommends that investors should monitor a broad range of inflation indicators. Most of these indicators show that inflation pressures are building, but only gradually. The low readings on manufacturing capacity utilization suggest low odds of a rapid acceleration in inflation. Furthermore, the shift in composition of the U.S. economy in the past three decades suggests that the metric is no longer an accurate measure of wage or price bottlenecks in the economy (Chart 5, panels 1 and 2). Manufacturing capacity utilization hit a post WWII low in mid-2009 at 63.5%, before recovering to a well below average 75%-76% range for the past half-decade. In December 2017, utilization hit a 9-year high at 77%. Chart 5, (panels 3 and 4) shows that prior to 1980, inflation accelerated and the output gap closed as utilization breached 80%. Since early 1990s, the relationship is not as clear. Is 5% The Magic Number On Rates? History suggests that rising rates are not an impediment to higher stock prices, as long as rates remain below 5%. Chart 6 is a reminder that the 10-year yield and stock prices climbed together in the 1950s. The rise in yields in the 50s primarily reflected better economic growth rather than fears of inflation. Nonetheless, investors are concerned that a rise in yields will flip the positive correlation between bond yields and stock prices. Table 1 shows that since 1980, long treasury yields and stock prices move in the same direction until the 10-year moves above 5%. Chart 7 shows the relationship between the level of nominal bond yields and stock to bond yield correlations back to 1874. Moreover, since 1980, a move from 2 to 3% on the 10-year is accompanied by an average gain for the S&P 500 of 1.2%, with a median move of 1.8%. On average, the S&P 500 posts a modest decline (24 bps) as the 10-year Treasury elevates from 3 to 4%, but the median return (98 bps) is still positive. Our July 2016 Special Report provides an in-depth discussion of the impact of rates and inflation on equity prices. Historically, even the move from 4 to 5% on the 10-year is not an impediment to higher stock prices.4 Moreover, in a 2016 report our Global ETF Strategy service provides a detailed overview of equity returns in various phases of the Fed cycle.5 Chart 6Stock Can Rise##BR##With Bond Yields Table 13-Year Correlation* Between Stock Prices##BR##And Bond Yield Level (1980-2018) BCA's stance is that the stock-to-bond ratio will climb this year. However, the risk/reward embedded in that stance has shifted given the move in both bond yields and stock prices in the past few months. Our U.S. bond strategists peg fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 3.0%, just 18 bps above the yield last Friday morning. Chart 8 illustrates this point across three time horizons given our view of fair value on the 10-year Treasury yield (3.0%). Our analysis assumes a 1.75% annualized dividend yield on the S&P 500. Panel 1 illustrates that the ratio between now and mid-year will remain positive if stocks are flat. The same holds true though September 2018 and year end. Just a 5% drop in the S&P 500 by year-end 2018 signals a localized peak in the stock-to-bond ratio. Declines of 10 or 20% indicate a reversal of the uptrend in stocks versus bonds that has been in place since early 2016. Chart 7Stock To Bond Correlations Remain Positive With Nominal Yields Below 4.25% Chart 8Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio Bottom Line: BCA's view is that Treasury yields will top out at around 3 to 3.25% in this cycle, as inflation returns to the Fed's 2% target. Our base case is that stocks will do well in 2018, and will not be subject to concerns over an aggressive Fed until 2019. However, investors should closely monitor the 10-year TIPs spread, as noted above. We do not expect to breech 2.4% this year, but the timing is unclear. Moreover, we may take profits on our overweight stance well before the market senses the Fed is behind the curve, earlier than that, especially given stretched valuation and stretched market sentiment. Seismic Sentiment Shift Rising rates are not the only concern for U.S. equities. In late November, we noted6 that our technical and sentiment indicators are not flashing red as in previous bear markets, but neither are they giving an all-clear for U.S. equity investors. Sentiment levels are a bigger concern than technical indicators, and investors should monitor both for signs of an equity sell-off. These indicators have become even more stretched since we highlighted them in November and more clearly since the most recent equity market lull in late August 2017. BCA's technical indicator deteriorated since our late November report, but remains below levels that, in the past, have preceded bear markets (Chart 9, panel 1). The S&P 500 is testing the top end of the recovery trend channel in place since 2009 (Panel 2). A break above that level suggests more upside to stocks. However, a definitive failure to breakout may signal a period of consolidation for equities. BCA's equity valuation metric pushed further into extreme overvalued territory. Stretched valuations say more about medium- and long-term returns than near-term performance.7 However, the shift in the equity sentiment indicators we track is notable. BCA's investor sentiment composite index is at an all-time high (Chart 10, panel 1). Moreover, the surge in sentiment is led by individual investors and advisors who serve them (panels 2 and 4). Traders are a bit more complacent. Furthermore, individuals' optimism toward stocks is at an all-time high in surveys conducted by the Conference Board and the University of Michigan (Chart 11, panels 1 and 2). Chart 9Technical Picture For##BR##Equities Still Looks OK Chart 10Investor Sentiment##BR##Is Flashing Red Chart 11Surge In Consumer Optimism##BR##Toward Year Ahead Returns For Equities A similar survey from Yale University suggests that consumers' expectations about future equity market returns remains subdued. However, this may be due to the fact that the Yale survey is only available to December, and thus misses the equity 'melt up' in January that followed the news of the U.S. tax cuts. The other surveys mentioned are up to January. Notably, the Yale panel includes wealthy individual investors and a sample of institutions. The respondents in the Michigan and Conference Board surveys are more representative of the average U.S. household. Despite elevated attitudes toward equities, readings from the Fed's Flow of Funds on household ownership of stocks suggest that individuals may still have room in their portfolios for equities. Chart 12 shows that as of Q3 2017, equity holdings as a share of total household financial assets remains below prior peaks. As the U.S. stock market soared in the late 1990s, equities accounted for 31% of assets at the peak. Just before the global financial crisis, the figure was 23%. Today, equities account for just 25% of households' financial portfolios. The bottom panel of Chart 12 illustrates that individuals have allocated away from debt securities in the past half-decade. Chart 12Household Holdings Of Equities Still Below Prior Peaks Bottom Line: Sentiment has deteriorated more than valuations or technicals as the S&P 500 climbed to fresh all-time highs in December and January. While we are sticking with our stance that stocks will beat bonds in 2018, we are concerned about small caps. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service notes8 that rising interest rates and a flattening yield curve, coupled with increasing relative indebtedness and lack of relative profit growth, signal that the time is right to shift from overweight to neutral on U.S. small caps. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "The Long And Short Of It", published January 23, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Ill Placed Trust?", published December 19, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's The Bank Credit Analyst "Monthly Report", published September 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "Stock-To-Bond Correlation: When Will Good News Be Bad News?", published July 6, 2015. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's Global ETF Strategy Special Report "Equity Factors And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle", published December 21, 2016. Available at getf.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Technically Speaking", published November 27, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Global Asset Allocation Special Report "What Returns Can You Expect?", published November 15, 2017. Available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Too Good To Be True?", published January 22 , 2018. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com.