Guerra/Conflicto

Aspectos destacados Hay una disminución tentativa del riesgo geopolítico: un Brexit ordenado o la ausencia de Brexit es el resultado final más probable y las conversaciones entre EE. UU. y China se están acercando. Los riesgos geopolíticos pendientes todavía justifican cautela sobre las acciones globales en el corto plazo. La inestabilidad interna y externa en Arabia Saudita, cualquier persistencia estadounidense con sanciones de máxima presión sobre Irán y la inestabilidad doméstica en Irak representan un riesgo para el suministro mundial de petróleo. Tomar posiciones largas en crudo al contado y en GBP/JPY. Análisis Gráfico 1 Un descenso tentativo del riesgo geopolítico Un descenso tentativo del riesgo geopolítico Un descenso tentativo del riesgo geopolítico Nuestras opiniones sobre Brexit y las conversaciones comerciales entre EE. UU. y China se están alineando, lo que resulta en una disminución tentativa del riesgo geopolítico (Gráfico 1). El parlamento británico aún debe ratificar el acuerdo de salida de Boris Johnson, negociado laboriosamente con la UE en una cumbre sorpresa esta semana. Es posible que no tenga los votos. Si fracasa, entonces tendrá una base para solicitar una extensión del plazo del Brexit hasta el 31 de octubre. Pero está claro que la UE está dispuesta a permitir compromisos para evitar que una salida sin acuerdo agrave la desaceleración de la economía europea. Un Brexit ordenado es el resultado final (o la ausencia de Brexit si unas elecciones y un nuevo referéndum así lo decidieran). Estamos eliminando el objetivo de $1.30 en nuestra apuesta larga sobre GBP/USD a la luz de estos acontecimientos y tomando posiciones largas en GBP/JPY. De manera similar, aunque persiste la incertidumbre sobre las relaciones EE. UU.-China, está claro que el presidente Trump es sensible al impacto de la recesión manufacturera y al riesgo de una recesión general sobre sus perspectivas de reelección. Por lo tanto, busca una tregua y está retrasando aranceles. China está recíprocamente respondiendo mínimamente para evitar un colapso en las relaciones. El aumento de aranceles del 15 de diciembre será aplazado y, si una tregua no mejora las perspectivas económicas, esperamos que Trump lleve a cabo algún retroceso de aranceles con el pretexto de que las conversaciones “están mostrando avances”. Sin embargo, no esperamos un acuerdo comercial bilateral ni una eliminación total de los aranceles. Y otros factores (como riesgos políticos en la Gran China) aún podrían descarrilar el proceso. Los riesgos geopolíticos pendientes todavía justifican cautela sobre las acciones globales en el corto plazo. Estos riesgos incluyen un colapso en las conversaciones EE. UU.-China (por ejemplo, debido a Hong Kong, Taiwán o la carrera tecnológica) y el ascenso de Elizabeth Warren como favorita en las primeras primarias del Partido Demócrata. También existe el riesgo de otro shock en el precio del petróleo originado en Oriente Medio, que discutimos en este informe. Las secuelas de Abqaiq Ha sido un verano geopolíticamente agitado en Oriente Medio (Diagrama 1). Aunque hubo muchas advertencias, los ataques con drones y misiles del 14 de septiembre contra la infraestructura de Saudi Aramco fueron la gran explosión: eliminaron 5.7 mm b/d de suministros de crudo de la noche a la mañana (Gráfico 2). Los ataques fueron significativos no solo por su impacto en los mercados petroleros globales, sino también porque expusieron la renuencia de EE. UU. y Arabia Saudita a entablar una confrontación militar a gran escala con Irán. Es demasiado pronto para declarar que se han alcanzado las tensiones máximas en el Golfo Pérsico. Diagrama 1 Cronología: Fuegos artificiales veraniegos en el Golfo Pérsico Por todo el Medio Oriente Por todo el Medio Oriente Gráfico 2 Cerrar el estrecho de Ormuz sería el mayor shock petrolero de la historia Por todo Oriente Medio Por todo Oriente Medio Es demasiado pronto para declarar que se han alcanzado las tensiones máximas en el Golfo Pérsico. El ataque del 11 de octubre contra un petrolero iraní en el Mar Rojo y los informados ciberataques estadounidenses contra medios iraníes bien podrían marcar la “venganza limitada” que esperábamos. No obstante, los eventos del mes pasado descubrieron vulnerabilidades que sugieren que, incluso si EE. UU. y sus aliados del Golfo retroceden, el riesgo geopolítico permanecerá elevado. Gráfico 3 Los saudíes son derrochadores en gasto en defensa Alrededor del Oriente Medio Alrededor del Oriente Medio El resultado más obvio del ataque del 14 de septiembre es la constatación de cuán vulnerable es Arabia Saudita frente a ataques de sus enemigos regionales. A pesar de ser el tercer país que más gasta en defensa en el mundo —y el primero en relación con el PIB (Gráfico 3)—, Arabia Saudita fue incapaz de proteger su infraestructura crítica. Por ello, el príncipe heredero Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) seguramente enfrentará presión interna. Tras cinco años, Arabia Saudita tiene poco que mostrar de su guerra en Yemen, aparte de una crisis humanitaria que ha dañado su posición internacional. En cambio, la operación ha sido una carga para las finanzas del reino y una molestia para la seguridad en las provincias del suroeste de Najrán, Jizán y Asir, donde los hutíes aliados de Irán han llevado a cabo ataques regulares contra infraestructuras petroleras y aeropuertos. Parte del descontento interno se aliviará si la guerra en Yemen se rebaja de categoría o se resuelve. Arabia Saudita aceptó recientemente la rama de olivo extendida por los hutíes y, según se informa, está en conversaciones para desescalar. Pero esto no eliminará por completo la incertidumbre interna. Después de todo, otras iniciativas de MBS —en Siria, en Irak y en sus gestiones ante EE. UU.— también están en peligro. La teoría de la conspiración en torno al asesinato del 29 de septiembre del general Abdulaziz al-Faghem, el antiguo guardaespaldas personal del rey Salman, es un ejemplo. Se rumorea que el rey se enfureció al enterarse de la captura por parte del movimiento hutí, el 28 de septiembre, de tres brigadas militares saudíes, y decidió revocar el título del príncipe heredero, nombrando en su lugar al hermano sudairi más joven, el príncipe Ahmed bin Abdulaziz.1 El plan habría sido supuestamente descubierto, lo que resultó en el asesinato del general al-Faghem.2 Todo esto es pura especulación y consideramos altamente dudosa la idea de la remoción de MBS. La aparición conjunta del rey y del príncipe heredero durante la visita del presidente Vladimir Putin al reino a principios de esta semana debería disipar la especulación sobre un golpe palaciego en preparación. No obstante, el asesinato en sí es extremadamente preocupante y refuerza motivos independientes de inquietud sobre la estabilidad interna. Gráfico 4 La diversificación impaciente amenaza la estabilidad interna La diversificación apresurada amenaza la estabilidad interna La diversificación apresurada amenaza la estabilidad interna La búsqueda de la agenda de reformas saudí, “Visión 2030,” se basa, ante todo, en la consolidación del poder en manos de MBS y su facción. El nombramiento del hijo del rey Salman, el príncipe Abdulaziz, como ministro de Energía fue motivado por el deseo de acelerar la oferta pública inicial de la gigante estatal petrolera Saudi Aramco, que podría comenzar tan pronto como en noviembre. Esto fue precedido por el nombramiento de Yasir Al-Rumayyan, jefe del fondo soberano y cercano a MBS, como presidente de Aramco. Además, se informa que saudíes adinerados —algunos de los cuales fueron detenidos en el Ritz Carlton en noviembre de 2017— están siendo presionados para comprar participaciones en la OPI pendiente. Aunque desvincular la economía saudí del crudo es la mejor medida para la estabilidad a largo plazo (Gráfico 4), la transición amenazará la estabilidad interna. Mientras tanto, el conflicto con Irán está lejos de resolverse. Conclusión: Los ataques con drones del 14 de septiembre contra infraestructuras petroleras clave saudíes revelaron tanto la renuencia de Arabia Saudita como la de EE. UU. a emprender acciones militares y una confrontación total con Irán. Esto aumentará las dudas sobre la capacidad del reino para defenderse. Además, Arabia Saudita sigue siendo vulnerable a presiones internas mientras MBS se esfuerza por mantener la consolidación de su poder en los últimos años y persigue Visión 2030. La inestabilidad interna o externa en Arabia Saudita representa un riesgo para el suministro mundial de petróleo. La economía de resistencia de Irán puede soportar la máxima presión de Trump Gráfico 5 La economía de Irán está sintiendo el impacto La economía de Irán siente el golpe La economía de Irán siente el golpe En el otro lado del Golfo Pérsico, los iraníes muestran una mayor tolerancia al dolor que sus enemigos. La economía está sufriendo bajo las sanciones paralizantes de EE. UU., con exportaciones en su nivel más bajo desde 2003 (Gráfico 5). El FMI espera que la economía iraní se contraiga un 9.5% este año, con una inflación anual prevista del 35.7%. Las exportaciones de petróleo, la savia de su economía, han caído un 89% interanual. No obstante, Irán domina el juego de la gallina, muestra metódicamente su capacidad para crear caos en toda la región y no ha vacilado en su postura de que el presidente Trump debe aliviar las sanciones y reincorporarse al acuerdo nuclear de 2015 si quiere entablar conversaciones bilaterales. Mientras tanto, Irán continúa reduciendo sus compromisos nucleares. El 5 de septiembre, Rohani indicó planes para abandonar completamente los compromisos de investigación y desarrollo bajo el Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto (PAIC) y comenzar a trabajar en centrifugadoras de enriquecimiento de uranio más avanzadas, que estaban limitadas al 3.7% bajo el PAIC (Tabla 1). También esperamos que Irán concrete su amenaza de retirarse del Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (TNP) si Trump mantiene las sanciones. Tabla 1 Irán se está alejando del acuerdo nuclear de 2015 Por todo el Medio Oriente Por todo el Medio Oriente La misma firmeza no puede demostrarse por parte de Estados Unidos o Arabia Saudita. Gráfico 6 Los estadounidenses no apoyan una guerra con Irán Por el Medio Oriente Por el Medio Oriente El presidente Trump está limitado por el riesgo de un shock petrolero inducido por Irán antes de las elecciones de 2020. Por ello, está ansioso por desescalar las tensiones con Irán. Está abandonando el campo en Siria (sobre lo cual más abajo), optando por añadir simbólicamente 1.800 tropas a Arabia Saudita con fines disuasorios. Esta postura defensiva se adopta en el contexto de la opinión pública estadounidense, que se opone a la guerra con Irán o a nuevas aventuras militares en Oriente Medio (Gráfico 6). Esto significa el desapalancamiento estratégico de EE. UU. desde Oriente Medio para desplazar su enfoque al Pacífico Asiático, donde Estados Unidos tiene una mayor prioridad en gestionar el ascenso de China. Al mismo tiempo, las negociaciones entre los saudíes y los hutíes yemeníes sugieren la falta de apetito saudí por un conflicto total con Irán, allanando el camino para una solución diplomática. Como declaró Rohani, “poner fin a la guerra en Yemen abrirá el camino para la desescalada en la región”, específicamente entre Arabia Saudita e Irán. Los saudíes han señalado abundantemente, a raíz del ataque a Abqaiq, que desean evitar una confrontación directa, particularmente dado que la administración Trump aparentemente no está dispuesta (por limitaciones electorales) a seguir proporcionando un “cheque en blanco” a MBS para llevar a cabo una política exterior agresiva. Ya los Emiratos Árabes Unidos —un actor clave en la coalición liderada por Arabia Saudita contra Yemen— se han distanciado de Riad y han buscado reducir tensiones con Irán. Recientemente redujo su compromiso con la guerra en Yemen y sostuvo reuniones de alto nivel con Irán. El asesor de seguridad nacional de los EAU, Tahnoun bin Zayed, visitó Teherán en una misión secreta, la más reciente en una serie de esfuerzos a puerta cerrada para mediar entre Arabia Saudita e Irán. Otros esfuerzos diplomáticos informados incluyen visitas de funcionarios iraquíes y paquistaníes. La incertidumbre restante es si Trump aliviará discretamente las sanciones sobre Irán, y si Irán se retirará mientras está en ventaja. Si Trump mantiene la presión máxima, Irán podría necesitar llevar a cabo nuevos ataques y alteraciones en el petróleo para amenazar la economía de Trump y fomentar el alivio de sanciones. De lo contrario, Irán, percibiendo el miedo americano y saudí, podría excederse y cometer una provocación que requiera una respuesta estadounidense mayor, reescalando así las tensiones. Aunque las limitaciones económicas y electorales de Trump sugieren que él aflojará las sanciones de forma encubierta, el apetito por el riesgo de Irán es aparentemente muy alto: Abqaiq podría haber salido terriblemente mal. También tiene la oportunidad de mostrar músculo y demostrar la inconstancia estadounidense ante la región. Esto podría llevar a un error de cálculo y a un shock petrolero más significativo del que ya se ha visto. Conclusión: Irán se ha mantenido firme en su posición mientras Estados Unidos, Arabia Saudita y sus aliados parecen estar capitulando. Tienen más que perder que ganar de un conflicto total. Pero la toma de decisiones de Irán es opaca y cualquier persistencia estadounidense con sanciones de máxima presión motivará provocaciones adicionales, escalada y interrupciones en el suministro de petróleo. ¿Haciendo a Rusia grande otra vez? Los eventos recientes en Turquía y Siria no son una sorpresa. Hemos destacado durante mucho tiempo una intervención turca más profunda en Siria como un evento regional “cisne negro”. En agosto advertimos a los clientes que la relación personal Trump-Erdogan no salvaría a Turquía de las sanciones estadounidenses inminentes. En septiembre advertimos que la prima de riesgo geopolítico turca había colapsado, según nuestro indicador GeoRisk basado en el mercado, y que este colapso seguramente se revertiría de manera importante, enviando a la lira a la baja. Al cierre de este informe, los turcos han declarado una tregua para evitar sanciones, pero nada es seguro. Putin ha aprovechado la oportunidad para capitalizar el retroceso de EE. UU. Si Turquía es la perdedora, ¿quién es la ganadora? Primero, Trump, que se beneficia de cumplir una promesa de campaña de reducir la implicación estadounidense en guerras extranjeras, una postura que finalmente será recompensada (o al menos no castigada) por un público cansado de guerras. Segundo, Irán y Rusia, los principales aliados de Siria, que han invertido mucho en mantener el régimen de Bashar al-Assad durante la guerra civil y ahora enfrentan la retirada estadounidense y tensiones elevadas con los aliados y socios de la región como resultado. Irán se beneficia al poder ampliar su arco estratégico, el llamado “Creciente Chiíta”, hasta el mar Mediterráneo. Rusia se beneficia al solidificar su estatus recuperado como actor principal en Oriente Medio —una indicación de la multipolaridad global. El presidente Vladimir Putin ha aprovechado la oportunidad para capitalizar el retroceso de EE. UU. con visitas oficiales tanto a Arabia Saudita como a los EAU esta semana. Prometió tanto lazos económicos más fuertes como la capacidad de mediar en el poder regional. En el frente económico, el Fondo Ruso de Inversión Directa (RDIF) eligió Arabia Saudita como sede de su primera oficina extranjera, señalando su interés en la región. Ya aprobó 25 proyectos conjuntos con inversiones valoradas en más de $2,5 mil millones. También se hablan de proyectos RDIF-Aramco en el sector de servicios petroleros por más de $1.000 millones y proyectos de conversión de petróleo y gas por más de $2.000 millones. Además, RDIF firmó múltiples acuerdos por $1,4 mil millones con socios emiratíes. Gráfico 7 Rusia ha estado cumpliendo con los recortes de OPEP 2.0 Rusia Ha Estado Cumpliendo Con Los Recortes De La OPEP 2.0 Rusia Ha Estado Cumpliendo Con Los Recortes De La OPEP 2.0 Lo más importante es que saudíes y rusos comparten el mismo objetivo de apoyar los precios globales del petróleo y han estado gestionando conjuntamente la oferta de OPEP 2.0 desde 2017 (Gráfico 7). El enfoque de Rusia en la región se centra en aumentar su influencia estratégica en todos los frentes. Gráfico 8 Erdogan está jugando con las preocupaciones turcas sobre los refugiados sirios Alrededor de Oriente Medio Alrededor de Oriente Medio Aunque los aliados de Rusia incluyen a Irán y Siria —rivales de Arabia Saudita—, se ha presentado como un socio pragmático para otras potencias, incluidas Turquía e incluso los saudíes y los estados del Golfo. Como tal, el Kremlin tiene influencia en ambos lados de la división regional, dándole el potencial de fungir como mediador de poder. Sin embargo, cualquier compra saudí del sistema de defensa ruso S-400, largamente negociada, inquietaría a Estados Unidos. Turquía corre el riesgo de sufrir sanciones estadounidenses por la compra del mismo sistema.3 EE. UU. podría estar dispuesto a tolerar cierta influencia rusa incrementada en Oriente Medio, pero un acuerdo de defensa podría ser su línea roja. La administración Trump aún empuña el garrote de las sanciones económicas. La creciente influencia rusa se extiende más allá de los estados del Golfo. La retirada estadounidense del noreste de Siria la semana pasada y la invasión turca son un regalo para los rusos. Ahora son la única gran potencia externa involucrada en Siria. Han abrazado esta posición, colocándose como mediadores entre el régimen sirio, con el que están aliados, y Turquía, así como con el archienemigo turco, los kurdos, que ahora carecen de apoyo estadounidense y deben recurrir a Siria y Rusia para algún tipo de arreglo que los proteja. Rusia, por tanto, ha consolidado su regreso como jugador estratégico en la región, tras su intervención inicial en Siria en 2015. La incursión de Turquía en Siria es un intento del presidente Erdogan de enfrentarse a los kurdos sirios curtidos en batalla y evitar una frontera continua controlada por kurdos con Siria, además de distraer de su debilitada posición doméstica. Está esforzándose por ganar apoyo apelando a preocupaciones turcas más amplias sobre los refugiados sirios en Turquía (Gráfico 8). La intervención buscará crear un espacio para que los refugiados sean ubicados en el lado sirio de la frontera. Sin embargo, dado que hay poco apoyo popular interno para una intervención militar, corre el riesgo de alienar aún más a los votantes, que ya están perdiendo la paciencia con su partido gobernante, el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP). Hasta ahora, la incursión cuenta con el apoyo oficial de todos los partidos políticos de Turquía excepto del Partido Democrático de los Pueblos kurdo (HDP). Sin embargo, esto cambiará a medida que la intervención conlleve sanciones económicas occidentales, un conflicto militar prolongado y beneficios concretos limitados aparte de la retirada de refugiados. Gráfico 9 La ya vulnerable economía de Turquía sufrirá un golpe La economía de Turquía, ya vulnerable, sufrirá un golpe. La economía de Turquía, ya vulnerable, sufrirá un golpe. La economía, ya vulnerable, probablemente sufrirá un golpe (Gráfico 9). Los mercados han reaccionado a las sanciones impuestas por EE. UU. hasta ahora con un suspiro de alivio, ya que no han sido tan dañinas como podrían haber sido —por ejemplo, los bancos turcos fueron perdonados.4 Sin embargo, este es solo el primer salvo y más sanciones están en camino: el Congreso se está moviendo para imponer sanciones por su cuenta, las cuales Trump probablemente no vete. Además, la Unión Europea está siguiendo el ejemplo e imponiendo sus propias sanciones, incluidas las relativas a material militar. Volkswagen ya anunció que pospone la decisión final sobre si construir una planta de $1.100 millones en Turquía. Esto ocurre en un momento de sensibilidades ya existentes con la UE por las actividades de perforación de petróleo y gas de Turquía en aguas cercanas a Chipre. Los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la UE están respondiendo elaborando una lista de sanciones económicas. Estos riesgos económicos probablemente frenarán el ciclo de recorte de tasas del banco central, ya que la lira y los activos financieros sufrirán un golpe. Conclusión: El giro de EE. UU. lejos de Oriente Medio es un beneficio para Moscú, que busca mayor cooperación en el Golfo y gana influencia en Siria. Rusia se promociona como un jugador estratégico y un mediador eficaz. La incursión de Erdogan en Siria, aunque motivada por la debilidad doméstica, perjudicará a la economía turca. Mantener una postura cautelosa sobre la moneda turca y los activos de riesgo. Irak es el fulcro La posición geográfica de Irak, encajada entre Arabia Saudita e Irán, lo convierte en el epicentro de la lucha por el poder regional. A raíz de la campaña de máxima presión de la administración Trump sobre Irán, hemos destacado con frecuencia que un medio dramático de represalia iraní, sin llegar a cerrar el tránsito en el Estrecho de Ormuz, es fomentar disturbios en un Irak ya inestable. Esto sería una amenaza tanto para la estrategia estadounidense como para los suministros petroleros mundiales. Irak es el epicentro de la lucha por el poder regional. En este contexto, la visita del reverenciado clérigo chiíta iraquí Muqtada al-Sadr a Irán el 10 de septiembre, apenas cuatro días antes del ataque a Saudi Aramco en septiembre, suscita interrogantes. Sadr es el actor clave en Irak hoy y, en los últimos dos años, había adoptado una posición de independencia nacional para Irak, evitando la dependencia excesiva de Irán. Un acercamiento entre Sadr e Irán es un desarrollo doméstico negativo para Irak, que recientemente ha avanzado en reducir el control político y militar de Irán. Esto socavaría la estabilidad iraquí al aumentar las divisiones por ideología, secta, patrocinio económico y seguridad nacional. Se especula que el viaje de Sadr tenía la intención de discutir al primer ministro Adel Abdul Mahdi, percibido como débil e incapaz de manejar los diversos poderes en la escena política iraquí. Las protestas violentas que sacuden Irak desde principios de septiembre respaldan esta evaluación. Los manifestantes están motivados por el descontento con el desempleo, los servicios deficientes y la corrupción gubernamental, que se percibe que han empeorado sobre todo desde el inicio del mandato de Abdul Mahdi (Gráfico 10). Aunque Abdul Mahdi ha anunciado algunas reformas en respuesta al descontento popular, incluidas una reestructuración del gabinete y promesas de ayudas para los pobres, han hecho poco para calmar las protestas. Las demandas populares son solo una de las amenazas existenciales que enfrenta el gobierno. El segundo y potencialmente más serio riesgo es la amenaza de seguridad. Irak ha fracasado en sus intentos de integrar formalmente a las Unidades de Movilización Popular (PMU), grupos paramilitares respaldados por Irán que fueron fundamentales en la derrota del ISIS, en las fuerzas de seguridad nacionales. Esto es esencial para evitar que Irán mantenga el control directo de las fuerzas de seguridad dentro de Irak. Una mayoría del público está de acuerdo en que las PMU no deberían desempeñar un papel en la política (Gráfico 11), reflejando la tendencia subyacente que demanda autonomía iraquí frente a Irán. Gráfico 10 Aumento del descontento en Irak Alrededor del Medio Oriente Alrededor del Medio Oriente Gráfico 11 Poco apoyo a un papel político para las PMU Por todo el Medio Oriente Por todo el Medio Oriente Dado que las PMU son, en efecto, un término paraguas para ~50 grupos paramilitares predominantemente chiítas, existen divisiones internas dentro de las fuerzas que compiten por poder, legitimidad y recursos. Recientemente, han estado depurando a líderes de grupo percibidos como una amenaza para las fuerzas generales y el liderazgo superior que mantiene fuertes vínculos con Irán. Gráfico 12 Irak está dividido por afiliación política Alrededor del Medio Oriente Alrededor del Medio Oriente Esta lucha interna también refleja la lucha intra-chiíta por el poder entre los principales partidos políticos de Irak. Por un lado está el bloque conservador pro-Khamenei liderado por el ex primer ministro Nouri al-Maliki y el comandante de las PMU Hadi al-Ameri, y por otro está el líder reformista y nacionalista Muqtada al-Sadr, unido a Ammar al-Hakim. Dado que la mayoría de los iraquíes consideran que su país está dividido por afiliación política, esto representa un riesgo para la estabilidad interna (Gráfico 12). Así, incluso si el riesgo más amplio de tensiones regionales disminuye y reduce la amenaza de sabotaje a la infraestructura y el transporte petrolero, la situación doméstica actual en Irak sigue siendo inquietante. Pero dado que no vemos aún una disminución de las tensiones regionales —ya sea por la máxima presión estadounidense o por la arrogancia iraní— esta dinámica se traduce en una amenaza activa para los suministros de petróleo, con 3.4 mm b/d de exportaciones concentradas en la ciudad sureña de Basora. Conclusión: La mayor inestabilidad doméstica en Irak supone una amenaza no desdeñable para los suministros petroleros. Este riesgo se ve agravado por la ubicación de Irak como amortiguador geográfico entre los rivales regionales Irán y Arabia Saudita, y por el interés de Irán en fomentar disturbios para presionar a EE. UU. a relajar las sanciones. Conclusiones de inversión El hilo común en Oriente Medio es una amenaza persistente para el suministro mundial de petróleo tras el extraordinario ataque a Abqaiq. Primero, no se puede afirmar con confianza que Irán se abstendrá de causar nuevas interrupciones petroleras, ya que está convencido de que el apetito de conflicto del presidente Trump es pequeño (y Trump está, de hecho, limitado por el temor a un shock petrolero). Al presidente Rohani le interesa desalojar a Trump del poder, algo que un shock petrolero podría lograr, y el Líder Supremo podría incluso estar dispuesto a arriesgar un conflicto con Estados Unidos como medio para aumentar el apoyo al régimen e infundir a una nueva generación un espíritu revolucionario. Irán pierde en una guerra total, pero Teherán está convencido de que EE. UU. no tiene la voluntad de emprender una guerra total. Segundo, el interés de Rusia en la región no es generar una paz duradera sino llenar el vacío dejado por Estados Unidos y convertirse en mediador. Cualquier inestabilidad simplemente aumenta los precios del petróleo, lo cual es positivo para Rusia. Tercero, la inestabilidad de Irak está impulsada tanto por factores domésticos como internacionales. Es casi imposible diferenciar entre ambos. La arrogancia iraní podría manifestarse en sabotajes en Irak. O Irak podría desestabilizarse bajo las presiones regionales con mínima incitación iraní. De una u otra manera, la escasa capacidad de producción de reserva mundial actual podría verse afectada antes de lo esperado si se producen escaseces. Tomar posiciones largas en crudo al contado. En cuanto a las acciones, con una tregua EE. UU.-China en marcha y poca probabilidad de un Brexit sin acuerdo, vemos reforzada nuestra perspectiva cíclicamente positiva, aunque mantenemos cautela a corto plazo debido a la política interna estadounidense. En términos de enfoque de acciones, tenemos sobrepeso en acciones europeas en mercados desarrollados y en acciones del sudeste asiático en mercados emergentes.   Roukaya Ibrahim, Editora/Estratega Estrategia geopolítica RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Notas al pie 1 La rama sudairi de la familia al-Saud está compuesta por los siete hijos del difunto rey Abdulaziz y Hussa al-Sudairi de la poderosa tribu de Najd. 2 Véase TRT World “Killing of Saudi King’s Personal Bodyguard Triggers Speculation,” 2 de octubre de 2019, disponible en https://www.trtworld.com. 3 A raíz del ataque a las instalaciones petroleras de Saudi Aramco, el presidente Putin se burló de EE. UU. recomendando que Arabia Saudita siguiera los pasos de Irán y Turquía en la compra de los sistemas de defensa aérea rusos S-300 o S-400. 4 Las penalizaciones de EE. UU. incluyen sanciones contra funcionarios actuales y anteriores del gobierno turco, un aumento de aranceles sobre las importaciones de acero turco hasta el 50 por ciento y la suspensión de las negociaciones sobre un acuerdo comercial de $100.000 millones.

Informe especial

Aspectos destacados La Guerra Fría es una analogía limitada para el conflicto EE. UU.-China; En un mundo multipolar, la bifurcación completa del comercio es difícil si no imposible; La historia sugiere que el comercio entre rivales continuará, con obstáculos mínimos; En un horizonte secular, compre acciones de defensa, Europa, capex y países no alineados. Artículo Existe un consenso creciente de que China y EE. UU. se precipitan hacia una Guerra Fría. BCA Research contribuyó en cierta medida a este consenso –al menos en lo que respecta a la comunidad de inversión– al publicar “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” en septiembre de 2012.1 Durante gran parte de esta década, Geopolitical Strategy se centró en la tesis de que el riesgo geopolítico se estaba desplazando fuera del Medio Oriente, donde cada vez era más irrelevante, hacia Asia Oriental, donde se volvería cada vez más relevante. Esta tesis sigue siendo convincente, pero no significa que un “Cortina de Silicio” dividirá necesariamente al mundo en dos zonas bifurcadas de capitalismo. El comercio, los flujos de capital y los intercambios humanos entre China y EE. UU. continuarán e incluso pueden crecer. Pero el riesgo de conflicto, incluido uno militar, no disminuirá. En este informe, primero revisamos la lógica geopolítica que sustenta las tensiones sino-estadounidenses. Luego revisamos la literatura académica en busca de pistas sobre cómo se desarrollará esa relación vis-à-vis el comercio y las relaciones económicas. La evidencia de la teoría política es sorprendente y de gran relevancia para la inversión. A continuación miramos la historia para obtener indicios sobre lo que esto significa para los inversores. Nuestra conclusión es que es muy probable que EE. UU. y China continúen siendo rivales geopolíticos. Sin embargo, debido al contexto geopolítico de la multipolaridad, es improbable que el resultado sea un “Capitalismo Bifurcado”. Más bien, esperamos un entorno emocionante y volátil para los inversores donde la geopolítica ocupará su lugar histórico junto con la valoración, el momentum, los fundamentales y la macroeconomía en el panteón de factores que determinan las oportunidades y riesgos de inversión. La trampa de Tucídides es real … Hablando en el Reichstag en 1897, el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores alemán Bernhard von Bülow proclamó que era hora de que Alemania reclamara “su propio lugar al sol”.2 La ocasión fue un debate sobre la política de Alemania hacia Asia Oriental. Bülow pronto ascendió a la Cancillería bajo el káiser Guillermo II y supervisó la evolución de la política exterior alemana de la Realpolitik a la Weltpolitik. Mientras que la Realpolitik se caracterizaba por el equilibrio cauteloso de Alemania entre las potencias mundiales bajo el canciller Otto von Bismarck, la Weltpolitik vio a Bülow y a Guillermo II intentar redibujar el status quo mediante una política exterior y comercial agresiva. La Alemania imperial se unió a una larga lista de antagonistas, desde Atenas hasta la actual República Popular China, en la trágica obra de la historia humana denominada “Trampa de Tucídides”.3 Gráfico 1 Sobreesfuerzo imperial Sobreextensión Imperial Sobreextensión Imperial El concepto subyacente es bien conocido por todos los estudiantes de la historia mundial. Toma su nombre del historiador griego Tucídides y su seminal Historia de la guerra del Peloponeso. Tucídides explica por qué Esparta y Atenas entraron en guerra pero, a diferencia de sus contemporáneos, no moraliza ni culpa a los dioses. En su lugar, describe con desapego cómo el conflicto entre una Atenas revisionista y la estable Esparta se volvió inevitable debido a un ciclo de desconfianza. Graham Allison, uno de los más destacados estudiosos estadounidenses de las relaciones internacionales, ha argumentado que la interacción entre una potencia del status quo y un retador casi siempre ha conducido al conflicto. En 12 de los 16 casos que examinó, estalló un conflicto militar real. De los cuatro casos en los que no se desarrolló la guerra, tres implicaron transiciones entre países que compartían una profunda afinidad cultural y un respeto por las instituciones preexistentes.4 En esos casos, la transición fue un caso de nueva dirección que gestionaba en gran medida la misma estructura organizativa. Y uno de los cuatro resultados sin guerra fue nada menos que la Guerra Fría entre la Unión Soviética y EE. UU. El problema fundamental para una potencia del status quo es que su imperio o “esfera de influencia” permanece del mismo tamaño que cuando ostentaba el cenit del poder. Sin embargo, su declive en sentido relativo conduce a un clásico problema de “sobreesfuerzo imperial”. La potencia hegemónica o imperial insiste erróneamente en mantener un status quo que ya no puede permitirse (Gráfico 1). La potencia retadora no es inocente. Percibe la debilidad del hegemón y comienza a desarrollar una esfera de influencia regional. El problema es que la hegemonía regional es un punto de partida perfecto hacia la hegemonía global. Y mientras las intenciones del retador pueden ser limitadas y contenidas (aunque a menudo son ambiciosas y desmesuradas), la potencia del status quo debe reaccionar ante las capacidades, no ante las intenciones. Las primeras son materiales y reales, mientras que las segundas son percibidas y efímeras. La potencia desafiante siempre tiene una lógica interna que justifica sus ambiciones. En el caso de China hoy, existe entre la élite la sensación de que el país simplemente está revirtiendo a la media de cómo fueron las cosas durante muchos siglos en la larga historia de China y Asia (Gráfico 2). En otras palabras, China es una potencia “retadora” solo si uno describe el status quo como los últimos trescientos años. Es la potencia “establecida” si se retrocede a un estado de cosas anterior. Como tal, el consenso en China es que no debería tener que rendir pleitesía al status quo imperante dado que el contexto contemporáneo es meramente el resultado de los “desafíos” imperialistas occidentales al orden chino y regional establecido. Gráfico 2 La narrativa de reversión a la media de China De regreso al siglo XIX De regreso al siglo XIX Además, China tiene una reivindicación legítima de que es al menos tan relevante para la economía global como EE. UU. y, por lo tanto, merece tener una mayor voz en la gobernanza global. Si bien EE. UU. sigue acaparando una mayor parte de la economía mundial, China ha contribuido con el 23% al incremento del PIB global en las últimas dos décadas, frente al 13% de EE. UU. (Gráfico 3). Gráfico 3 El consenso de Pekín De vuelta al siglo XIX De vuelta al siglo XIX Conclusión: Las tensiones emergentes entre China y EE. UU. encajan perfectamente en los contornos teóricos y empíricos de la Trampa de Tucídides. No vemos ninguna vía para que los dos países eviten la lucha y el conflicto en un horizonte secular o previsible. ¿Qué significa esto para los inversores? Por un lado, los vientos de cola seculares detrás de las acciones de defensa persistirán. ¿Pero qué más? ¿Está destinada la economía global a presenciar una bifurcación completa en dos campos armados separados por una Cortina de Silicio? ¿Se mirarán con recelo los Pactos Alibaba y Amazon de la misma manera que se miraban mutuamente el Pacto de la OTAN y el Pacto de Varsovia en la Guerra Fría? La respuesta, tentativamente, es no. … Pero no conducirá a una bifurcación económica La agresiva política comercial del presidente Trump también encaja en la teoría política, hasta cierto punto. El realismo en la ciencia política se centra en las ganancias relativas por sobre las absolutas en todas las relaciones, incluido el comercio. Esto se debe a que el comercio conduce a la prosperidad económica, la prosperidad a la acumulación de excedentes económicos, y el excedente económico al gasto militar, la investigación y el desarrollo. Dos estados que solo se preocupan por las ganancias relativas debido a la rivalidad producen un juego de suma cero sin espacio para la cooperación. Es un “Dilema del prisionero” que puede llevar a resultados económicos subóptimos en los que ambos actores eligen no cooperar. El conflicto EE. UU.-China no conducirá a una bifurcación completa de la economía mundial. Diagrama 1 ilustra los efectos de los cálculos de ganancias relativas sobre el comportamiento comercial de los estados. En ausencia de geopolítica, la demanda (Q3) se satisface mediante el comercio (Q3-Q0) debido a la incapacidad de la producción doméstica (Q0) para cubrirla. Diagrama 1 Guerra comercial en un mundo bipolar De regreso al siglo XIX De regreso al siglo XIX Sin embargo, la externalidad geopolítica –una rivalidad con otro estado– eleva el coste social marginal de las importaciones –es decir, el comercio permite que el rival obtenga más del comercio y “se ponga al día” en términos de capacidades geopolíticas. El estado que comercia elimina tales externalidades con un arancel (t), elevando la producción doméstica a Q1, mientras que reduce la demanda a Q2, con lo que las importaciones se reducen a meramente Q2-Q1, una fracción de lo que serían en un mundo donde la geopolítica no importa. La dinámica de las ganancias relativas también puede ejercer una poderosa atracción sobre el hegemón a medida que comienza a debilitarse y replantearse sus relaciones comerciales originalmente magnánimas. Como argumentó el politólogo Duncan Snidal en un artículo de 1991, Cuando el sistema global se establece por primera vez, el hegemón hace acuerdos con estados más pequeños. El hegemón está más preocupado por las ganancias absolutas; los estados más pequeños están más preocupados por las relativas, por lo que son negociadores más duros. Los arreglos cooperativos que favorecen a los estados más pequeños contribuyen al declive relativo del hegemon. A medida que la distribución desigual de beneficios a favor de los estados más pequeños les ayuda a ponerse al día con el actor hegemónico, también disminuye el peso que dan al factor de ganancias relativas del actor hegemónico. Al mismo tiempo, la disminución de la preponderancia relativa aumenta la preocupación del estado hegemónico por las ganancias relativas con otros estados, especialmente con cualquier retador en ascenso. El resultado neto es una presión creciente del actor más grande para cambiar el sistema vigente y obtener una mayor parte de los beneficios cooperativos.5 La razón por la que los estados pequeños inicialmente se preocupan más por las ganancias relativas es porque se preocupan mucho más por la seguridad nacional que el hegemón. El hegemón tiene una preponderancia de poder y, por lo tanto, está más relajado respecto a sus necesidades de seguridad. Esto explica por qué los presidentes George Bush padre, Bill Clinton y George Bush hijo hicieron “malos acuerdos” con China. Escribiendo hace casi treinta años, Snidal describió de manera lúcida la actual guerra comercial entre EE. UU. y China. Snidal pensó que estaba describiendo una década venidera de anarquía. Pero él y otros politólogos de principios de los años noventa subestimaron el poder estadounidense. ¡El “momento unipolar” del predominio estadounidense no había terminado, solo estaba comenzando! Como tal, la dinámica que describió Snidal tardó treinta años en fructificar. Al pensar en la transición fuera de la hegemonía estadounidense, la mayoría de los inversores se anclan a la Guerra Fría, ya que es el único mundo que han conocido que no fue unipolar. Además, la Guerra Fría proporciona una distribución bipolar simple del poder que es fácil de modelar mediante la teoría de juegos. Si éste fuera el mundo que estamos a punto de habitar, con EE. UU. y China dividiendo todo el planeta en esferas como EE. UU. y la Unión Soviética, entonces el párrafo que citamos del artículo de Snidal sería el final del asunto. América abandonaría la globalización en su totalidad, impondría una draconiana Cortina de Silicio alrededor de China y coaccionaría a sus aliados a hacer lo mismo. Pero la mayor parte de la historia humana reciente se ha definido por una distribución multipolar del poder entre estados, no por una bipolar. El término “guerra fría” es aplicable a EE. UU. y China en el sentido de que el poder militar comparable puede impedir que luchen una “guerra caliente” a gran escala. Pero en última instancia la Guerra Fría entre EE. UU. y la URSS es una mala analogía para el mundo actual. En un mundo multipolar, concluye Snidal, “los estados que no cooperan se quedan atrás frente a otros maximizarores de ganancias relativas que cooperan entre sí. Esto hace de la cooperación la mejor defensa (así como la mejor ofensiva) cuando tus rivales cooperan en un mundo multilateral de ganancias relativas.” Snidal demuestra mediante modelado formal que a medida que aumenta el número de actores desde dos, la sensibilidad a las ganancias relativas cae bruscamente.6 La relación EE. UU.-China no ocurre en el vacío —está moderada por el contexto global. El contexto global actual es el de la multipolaridad. La multipolaridad se refiere a la distribución del poder geopolítico, que ya no está dominada por una o dos grandes potencias (Gráfico 4). Europa y Japón, por ejemplo, tienen economías y capacidades militares formidables. Rusia sigue siendo una potencia militar potente, incluso cuando India la supera en términos de poder geopolítico global. Gráfico 4 El mundo ya no es bipolar El mundo ya no es bipolar El mundo ya no es bipolar Un mundo multipolar es el menos “ordenado” y el más inestable de los sistemas mundiales (Gráfico 5). Esto se debe a tres razones: Gráfico 5 La multipolaridad es desordenada La multipolaridad es un lío La multipolaridad es un lío Matemáticas: La multipolaridad genera más posibles “díadas de conflicto” que pueden llevar al enfrentamiento. En un mundo unipolar, solo hay un país que determina las normas y reglas de conducta. El conflicto es posible, pero solo si el hegemón lo desea. En un mundo bipolar, el conflicto es posible, pero debe alinearse a lo largo del eje de las dos potencias dominantes. En un mundo multipolar, las alianzas cambian constantemente y producen nuevas díadas de conflicto. Falta de coordinación: La coordinación global sufre en períodos de multipolaridad ya que hay más “jugadores con poder de veto”. Esto es particularmente problemático durante tiempos de tensión, como cuando una potencia revisionista agresiva usa la fuerza o cuando el mundo enfrenta una crisis económica. Charles Kindleberger ha argumentado que fue precisamente esa inestabilidad hegemónica la que causó que la Gran Depresión descendiera hacia la Segunda Guerra Mundial en su seminal The World In Depression.7 Errores: En un mundo unipolar y bipolar, se están lanzando un número muy limitado de dados a la vez. Como tal, las probabilidades de errores trágicos son bajas y pueden mitigarse con relaciones formales complejas (como la Destrucción Mutua Asegurada EE. UU.-URSS, basada en el modelado formal de la teoría de juegos). Pero en un mundo multipolar, algo tan aleatorio como el asesinato de un dignatario puede poner en marcha una guerra global. El sistema multipolar es mucho más dinámico y, por tanto, impredecible. En un mundo multipolar, EE. UU. no podrá excluir a China del sistema global. Diagrama 2 está modificado para un mundo multipolar. Todo es igual, salvo que destacamos el comercio perdido a favor de otras grandes potencias. El estado que considera usar aranceles para reducir el coste social marginal de comerciar con un rival debe tener en cuenta este “comercio perdido”. En el contexto de la actual guerra comercial con China, esto sería la suma de todos los Airbuses europeos y la soja brasileña vendida a China en lugar de exportaciones estadounidenses. Para China, sería la suma de toda la maquinaria, electrónica y bienes de capital producidos en el resto de Asia y enviados a Estados Unidos. Diagrama 2 Guerra comercial en un mundo multipolar De regreso al siglo XIX De regreso al siglo XIX ¿Podría Washington pedir a sus aliados –Europa, Japón, Corea del Sur, Taiwán, etc.– que no aprovechen el lucrativo comercio (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) perdido debido a su disputa comercial con China? Claro, pero la investigación empírica muestra que probablemente ignorarían tales súplicas por la unidad. Las alianzas producidas por un sistema bipolar generan un impacto bilateral significativo y grande en los flujos comerciales, una relación que se debilita en un contexto multipolar. Esta es la conclusión de un artículo de 1993 de Joanne Gowa y Edward D. Mansfield.8 Los autores sacan su conclusión de un período de 80 años comenzando en 1905, que captura varias décadas de multipolaridad global. A menos que EE. UU. produzca un esfuerzo diplomático de pleno derecho para reforzar sus alianzas y hacer cumplir sanciones comerciales –algo difícilmente previsible bajo la administración actual–, el interés propio de los aliados estadounidenses les llevará a seguir comerciando con China. EE. UU. no podrá excluir a China del sistema global; ni China podrá lograr la presunta “autosuficiencia” de Xi Jinping. Un riesgo para nuestra opinión es que hayamos juzgado mal el sistema global, tal como hicieron los politólogos a principios de los años noventa. En ese sentido, aceptamos que los Gráficos 1 y 4 no apoyan realmente la vista de que el mundo está en un estado multipolar equilibrado. EE. UU. claramente sigue siendo el país más poderoso del mundo. El problema es que también está claramente en declive relativo y que su esfera de influencia es global –y por tanto muy cara– mientras que sus rivales tienen meras ambiciones regionales (por ahora). Como tal, concedemos que la hegemonía estadounidense podría reasegurarse relativamente rápido, pero requeriría una calamidad significativa en uno de los otros polos de poder. Por ejemplo, un colapso de la estabilidad interna de China junto con la recuperación de la estabilidad política en EE. UU. Conclusión: La guerra comercial entre EE. UU. y China es geopolíticamente insostenible. La única manera de que pudiera continuar es si los dos estados existieran en un mundo bipolar donde el resto de los estados se alinearan estrechamente detrás de las dos superpotencias. Tenemos una convicción alta de que el mundo actual es –por el momento– multipolar. Los aliados estadounidenses harán trampas y esquivarán las demandas de Washington de aislar a China. Esto se debe a que EE. UU. ya no tiene la preponderancia de poder que disfrutó en la última década del siglo XX y la primera del XXI. Las ideas presentadas hasta ahora provienen de la teoría formal en ciencia política. ¿Qué nos enseña la historia? Comerciar con el enemigo En 1896, un panfleto superventas en el Reino Unido, “Made in Germany”, pintó un panorama ominoso: “Un Estado comercial gigantesco está surgiendo para amenazar nuestra prosperidad y competir con nosotros por el comercio del mundo”.9 Mire alrededor de sus propias casas, instó el autor E. E. Williams a sus lectores. “Los juguetes, las muñecas y los libros de cuentos que sus hijos maltratan en la guardería están hechos en Alemania: incluso el material de su periódico favorito (patriótico) tuvo el mismo lugar de origen con alta probabilidad.” Williams escribió luego que los aranceles eran la respuesta y que “ponerlos de rodillas, suplicando por nuestra clemencia.”10 A finales de la década de 1890, para el Reino Unido estaba claro que Alemania era su mayor amenaza para la seguridad nacional. Las Leyes Navales alemanas de 1898 y 1900 lanzaron un enorme rearme naval con el objetivo singular de liberar al Imperio Alemán de las limitaciones geográficas de la península de Jutlandia. Para 1902, el Primer Lord de la Marina Real señaló que “la gran nueva marina alemana se está construyendo cuidadosamente desde el punto de vista de una guerra con nosotros”.11 No hay absolutamente duda de que Alemania era la más grave amenaza para la seguridad nacional del Reino Unido. Como resultado, Londres firmó en abril de 1904 una serie de acuerdos con Francia que llegaron a conocerse como la Entente Cordiale. La entente fue puesta a prueba inmediatamente por Alemania en la Primera Crisis Marroquí de 1905, lo que solo sirvió para fortalecer la alianza. Rusia fue incorporada al pacto en 1907, creando la Triple Entente. A la vista de retrospectiva, la estructura de alianzas era obvia dado el meteórico ascenso de Alemania desde la unificación en 1871. Sin embargo, no debe subestimarse la magnitud de estos acontecimientos geopolíticos. Que el Reino Unido y Francia resolvieran siglos de diferencias y formalizaran una alianza en 1904 fue un cambio tectónico —uno que emprendieron contra la corriente de la historia, la enemistad arraigada y la ideología.12 La historia nos enseña que el comercio se mantiene incluso entre rivales y durante tiempos de guerra. Los politólogos y los historiadores han observado que la enemistad geopolítica rara vez produce las relaciones económicas bifurcadas exhibidas durante la Guerra Fría. Tanto la investigación empírica como el modelado formal muestran que el comercio ocurre incluso entre rivales y durante tiempos de guerra.13 Esto fue ciertamente el caso entre el Reino Unido y Alemania, cuyo comercio aumentó constantemente hasta el estallido de la Primera Guerra Mundial (Gráfico 6). ¿Puede esto explicarse por el compromiso ideológico del Reino Unido con la economía laissez-faire? ¿O tal vez Londres temía un movimiento contra sus colonias poco defendidas en caso de volverse proteccionista? Estos son argumentos razonables. Sin embargo, no explican por qué Rusia y Francia vieron también un comercio total en aumento con el Imperio Alemán durante el mismo período (Gráfico 7). O bien los tres estados estaban dirigidos por responsables políticos incompetentes que de algún modo no vieron venir la guerra –lo cual es improbable dado el registro empírico–, o simplemente no podían permitirse perder las ganancias del comercio con Alemania frente a entre ellos. Gráfico 6 Los Aliados comerciaron con Alemania… De regreso al siglo XIX De regreso al siglo XIX Gráfico 7 … Hasta la Primera Guerra Mundial De regreso al siglo XIX De regreso al siglo XIX Gráfico 8 Japón y EE. UU. nunca redujeron el comercio Regreso al siglo XIX Regreso al siglo XIX Una dinámica similar se dio antes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Las relaciones entre EE. UU. y Japón se deterioraron en la década de 1930, con la invasión japonesa de Manchuria en 1931. En 1935, Japón se retiró del Tratado Naval de Washington de 1922 –la base del equilibrio de poder en el Pacífico– y comenzó una enorme carrera naval. En 1937, Japón invadió China. A pesar del peligro claro y presente, EE. UU. continuó comerciando con Japón hasta el 26 de julio de 1941, pocos días después de que Japón invadiera el sur de Indochina (Gráfico 8). El 7 de diciembre, Japón atacó a EE. UU. Un escéptico puede argumentar que precisamente porque los responsables políticos avanzaron con los ojos cerrados hacia la guerra en la Primera y Segunda Guerra Mundial, no lo harán (o no deberían) repetir el mismo error esta vez. Primero, nosotros no hacemos prescripciones de política y por tanto no nos importa lo que debería suceder. Segundo, somos muy escépticos respecto a la idea de que los responsables políticos de principios y mediados del siglo XX fueran de algún modo defectuosos (en contraposición a los dirigentes iluminados de hoy). Nuestro marco basado en restricciones nos insta a buscar razones sistémicas para el comportamiento de los líderes. La ciencia política ofrece una explicación teórica clara de por qué Londres y Washington continuaron comerciando con el enemigo a pesar de la claridad de la amenaza. La respuesta radica en la naturaleza sistémica de la restricción: un mundo multipolar reduce la sensibilidad de los responsables políticos a las ganancias relativas al introducir un problema de acción colectiva gracias a las cambiantes alianzas y la dificultad de disciplinar el comportamiento de los aliados. En el caso de EE. UU. y China, esto se acentúa aún más por la estrategia del presidente Trump de eludir la diplomacia multilateral y su intenso enfoque en medidas mercantilistas del poder (es decir, la obsesión con el déficit comercial). Una política anti-China acompañada de un enfoque magnánimo hacia las relaciones comerciales con los aliados podría haber producido una “coalición de los dispuestos” contra Pekín. Pero tras dos años de aranceles y amenazas contra la UE, Japón y Canadá, la administración Trump ya ha señalado al resto del mundo que las viejas alianzas y las vías de coordinación están sujetas a revisión. Vemos dos resultados que podrían surgir en el transcurso de la próxima década. Primero, el liderazgo estadounidense se dará cuenta de las restricciones sistémicas bajo las que opera, y el comercio con China continuará –aunque con limitaciones y variaciones. Sin embargo, tal comercio no reducirá las tensiones geopolíticas, ni impedirá un conflicto militar. De hecho, la probabilidad de conflicto militar puede aumentar incluso cuando el comercio entre China y EE. UU. se mantenga estable. Segundo, el liderazgo estadounidense no evaluará correctamente que opera en un mundo multipolar y renunciará a las ganancias comerciales destacadas en el Diagrama 2 a rivales económicos como Europa y Japón. Dada nuestra adhesión metodológica a la previsión basada en restricciones, dudamos mucho que el segundo escenario sea probable. Conclusión: El conflicto China-EE. UU. no es una repetición de la Guerra Fría. Las presiones sistémicas de la multipolaridad global obligarán a EE. UU. a seguir comerciando con China, con limitaciones en los intercambios de tecnologías emergentes de doble uso que China, sin embargo, obtendrá de otros países tecnológicamente avanzados. Esto creará un mundo complicado pero emocionante donde la geopolítica dejará de verse como algo exógeno a la inversión. Un riesgo para la conclusión optimista es que el registro histórico sea aplicable hoy, pero que la hora sea tardía, no temprana. Ya es el 26 de julio de 1941 –cuando EE. UU. anuló todo comercio con Japón– no 1930. Como tal, puede que no tengamos otra década de comercio entre EE. UU. y China por delante, sino que estemos al final del ciclo. Si bien esto es un riesgo, es improbable. Los responsables políticos estadounidenses tendrían esencialmente que estar dispuestos a arriesgar un conflicto militar con China para llevar la guerra comercial al mismo nivel que con Japón. Es un hecho objetivo que China ha intensificado significativamente su política exterior agresiva en la región. Pero, a diferencia de Japón en 1941, China no ha invadido abiertamente a ningún país en la última década. Por tanto, la disposición del público a apoyar tal conflicto es incierta, con solo el 21% de los estadounidenses considerando a China una amenaza principal para EE. UU. Implicaciones para la inversión Este análisis no pretende ser optimista. Primero, EE. UU. y China continuarán siendo rivales incluso si la relación económica entre ellos no conduce a la bifurcación global. Por un lado, China sigue estando –mucho como Alemania a principios del siglo XX– preocupada por el acceso a mercados externos de los que aún depende el 19,5% de su economía. China está, por lo tanto, desarrollando una marina y un ejército modernos no porque quiera dominar al resto del mundo sino porque quiere dominar su vecindario cercano, al igual que EE. UU. lo quiso, empezando con la Doctrina Monroe. Esto seguirá provocando la agresión china en los mares del Sur y del Este de China, aumentando las probabilidades de un conflicto con la Marina de EE. UU. Dado que la narrativa de la Trampa de Tucídides sigue siendo convincente, los inversores deberían sobreponderar acciones aeroespaciales y de defensa del S&P 500 en relación con los mercados de renta variable globales. Una forma alternativa de jugar esta tesis es desarrollando una canasta de acciones de defensa globales. La multipolaridad puede crear restricciones al proteccionismo comercial, pero genera volatilidad geopolítica y, por tanto, sostiene el gasto en defensa. En segundo lugar, no esperaríamos otro repunte de la globalización. La multipolaridad puede dificultar que los países cierren completamente el comercio con un rival, pero la globalización se sostiene en más que el comercio entre rivales. La globalización requiere un alto nivel de coordinación entre las grandes potencias que solo es posible bajo condiciones de hegemonía. El Gráfico 9 muestra que la hegemonía de los imperios británico y luego estadounidense creó un potente viento de cola para el comercio en los últimos doscientos años. Gráfico 9 El apogeo de la globalización quedó atrás El apogeo de la globalización ha quedado atrás El apogeo de la globalización ha quedado atrás El Apex of Globalization ha venido y se ha ido –a partir de ahora es cuesta abajo. Pero esto no es una visión binaria. El comercio exterior no llegará a cero. EE. UU. y China no se cerrarán completamente las esferas de influencia detrás de una Cortina de Silicio. En su lugar, nos enfocamos en cinco temas de inversión que fluyen de un mundo caracterizado por las tres tendencias de multipolaridad, rivalidad geopolítica sino-estadounidense y el apogeo de la globalización: Europa se beneficiará: A medida que EE. UU. y China profundicen su enemistad, esperamos que algunas empresas europeas se beneficien. Hay alguna evidencia de que la comunidad inversora ya ha detectado esta tendencia, con las acciones europeas superando modestamente a sus homólogas estadounidenses siempre que surgieron tensiones comerciales en 2019 (Gráfico 10). Dada nuestra tesis, sin embargo, es improbable que EE. UU. pierda completamente cuota de mercado en China a manos de Europa. Por tanto, nos centramos específicamente en tecnología, donde esperamos que EE. UU. y China aumenten las barreras no arancelarias al comercio independientemente de las presiones sistémicas para seguir comerciando. Una posición estratégica larga en las empresas tecnológicas europeas, que secularmente han estado en declive frente a sus homólogas estadounidenses, puede por tanto tener sentido (Gráfico 11). Gráfico 10 Europa: un refugio seguro en la guerra comercial Europa: un refugio seguro frente a una guerra comercial Europa: un refugio seguro frente a una guerra comercial Gráfico 11 ¿Es Europa realmente tan incompetente? ¿Europa es realmente tan incompetente? ¿Europa es realmente tan incompetente? El mercado alcista del USD terminará: Una guerra comercial es una forma muy disruptiva de ajustar una relación comercial. Te expone a represalias y, por tanto, a las pérdidas relativas descritas en este análisis. Por ello, esperamos que el USD se deprecie eventualmente, ya sea revirtiendo agresivamente el endurecimiento de 2018 o coercitando a sus rivales comerciales para que fortalezcan sus monedas. Tal movimiento será otra fuerza a favor de la diversificación fuera del USD como moneda de reserva, una tendencia que debería beneficiar al euro. Mercado alcista en capex: La reconfiguración de las cadenas de manufactura globales seguirá teniendo lugar. La mala noticia es que las multinacionales tendrán que mermar sus márgenes para trasladar sus cadenas de suministro y ajustarse a la nueva realidad geopolítica. La buena noticia es que deberán invertir en capex manufacturero para lograr la tarea. Una forma de articular este tema es comprar un índice de compañías de capital semiconductoras (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS y TER). Dada la naturaleza altamente cíclica de las empresas de capital, recomendaríamos un punto de entrada una vez que las tensiones comerciales se atenúen y aparezcan brotes verdes de crecimiento global. Los mercados “no alineados” se beneficiarán: La última vez que el mundo fue multipolar, las grandes potencias compitieron a través del imperialismo. Esta vez, se desarrollará una dinámica similar a medida que los países buscan replicar la “Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta” de China. Esto es positivo para los mercados frontera. Una carrera por proveerles exportaciones y servicios aumentará la oferta y, por tanto, reducirá los costos, proporcionando a mercados hasta ahora olvidados un auge de inversiones. India y Asia fuera de China más en general se presentan como alternativas intrigantes a China, especialmente con la administración actual reformando agresivamente para aprovechar la reconfiguración de las cadenas de manufactura global. Los mercados de capital seguirán globalizados: Con tasas de interés cerca de cero en gran parte del mundo desarrollado y la carga demográfica ejerciendo una presión cada vez mayor sobre los planes de pensiones para generar rendimientos, la búsqueda de rentabilidad continuará siendo un poderoso motor que mantiene la globalización de los mercados de capital. Es probable que las limitaciones crezcan, especialmente en lo que respecta a las inversiones privadas transfronterizas en tecnologías de doble uso. Pero una bifurcación completa de los mercados de capital es improbable. El mundo que describimos es uno donde la geopolítica jugará un papel cada vez más prominente para los inversores globales. Sería conveniente si el mundo simplemente se dividiera en dos campos beligerantes, dejando a los inversores con compartimentos claramente separados que les permitieran volver a ignorar la geopolítica. Esto es improbable. Más bien, el mundo se parecerá a los años dinámicos a fines del siglo XIX, una era dura y brusca que requerirá un enfoque multidisciplinario para invertir.   Marko Papic, Editor consultor, BCA Research Estratega jefe, Clocktower Group Marko@clocktowergroup.com Notas al pie 1 Consulte BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” 25 de septiembre de 2012, “Conflicto sino-estadounidense: más probable de lo que piensa,” 4 de octubre de 2013, “La gran rotación del riesgo,” 11 de diciembre de 2013, y “Perspectiva estratégica 2014 – Mantener el rumbo: riesgo EM – recompensa DM,” 23 de enero de 2014, “Subestimando las tensiones sino-estadounidenses,” 6 de noviembre de 2015, “La geopolítica de Trump,” 2 de diciembre de 2016, “Cómo jugar las batallas por poder en Asia,” 1 de marzo de 2017, y otros disponibles en gps.bcaresearch.com o a petición. 2 Consulte el Instituto Histórico Alemán, “Bernhard von Bülow sobre el ‘lugar en el sol’ de Alemania” (1897), disponible en http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3 Véase Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Nueva York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017). 4 Los tres casos son España sustituyendo a Portugal en el siglo XVI, EE. UU. sustituyendo al Reino Unido en el siglo XX, y Alemania ascendiendo a hegemonía regional en Europa en el siglo XXI. 5 Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (septiembre de 1991), pp. 701-726. 6 No revisamos el excelente modelado formal de teoría de juegos de Snidal en este documento ya que es complejo y detallado. Sin embargo, animamos mucho al lector intrigado a investigar el estudio por su cuenta. 7 Véase Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 8 Joanne Gowa y Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (junio de 1993), pp. 408-420. 9 Véase Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reimpresión, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), disponible en https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 10 Citado en Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 11 Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (verano de 1996), pp. 147-175. 12 Aunque Francia y Rusia superaron resentimientos aún mayores debido a las diferencias ideológicas entre una república fundada en un levantamiento violento contra su aristocracia –Francia– y un régimen autoritario aristocrático –Rusia. 13 Véase James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (febrero de 1997), pp. 12-37; y Jack S. Levy y Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (diciembre de 2004), pp. 1-47.

Informe especial

Highlights The chance of a U.S.-China trade agreement by November 2020 is still only 40% – but an upgrade may be around the corner. Trump is on the verge of a tactical trade retreat due to fears of economic slowdown and a loss in 2020. Xi Jinping is now the known unknown. His aggressive foreign policy is a major risk even if Trump softens. Political divisions in Greater China – Hong Kong unrest and Taiwan elections – could harm the trade talks. Maintain tactical caution but remain cyclically overweight global equities. Feature   “I am the chosen one. Somebody had to do it. So I’m taking on China. I’m taking on China on trade. And you know what, we’re winning.” – U.S. President Donald J. Trump, August 21, 2019 On August 1, United States President Donald Trump declared that he would raise a new tariff of 10% on the remaining $300 billion worth of imports from China not already subject to his administration’s sweeping 25% tariff. Then, on August 13, with the S&P 500 index down a mere 2.4%, Trump announced that he would partially delay the tariff, separating it into two tranches that will take effect on September 1 and December 15 (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Six days later Trump’s Commerce Department renewed the 90-day temporary general license for U.S. companies to do business with embattled Chinese telecom company Huawei, which has ties to the Chinese state and is viewed as a threat to U.S. network security. The same pattern played out on August 23 when President Trump responded to China’s retaliatory tariffs by declaring he would raise tariffs to 30% on the first half of imports and 15% on the remainder by December 15. Within a single weekend he softened his rhetoric and said he still wanted a deal. Trump’s tendency to take two steps forward with coercive measures and then one step back to control the damage is by now familiar to global investors. Yet this backpedaling reveals that like other politicians he is concerned about reelection. After all, there is a clear chain of consequence leading from trade war to bear market to recession to a Democrat taking the White House in November 2020. Trump’s approval rating is already similar to that of presidents who fell short of re-election amid recession (Chart II-2) – an actual recession would consign him to history. Will Trump Stage A Tactical Retreat On Trade? Yes. Trump’s predicament suggests that he will have to adjust his policies. Global trade, capital spending, and sentiment have deteriorated significantly since the last escalation-and-delay episode with China in May and June. Beijing’s economic stimulus measures disappointed expectations, exacerbating the global slowdown (Chart II-3). This leaves him less room for maneuver going forward. The fourth quarter of 2019 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. Even “Fortress America” – consumer-driven and relatively insulated from global trade – has seen manufacturing, private investment, and business sentiment weaken. GDP growth is slowing and has been revised downward for 2018 despite a surge in budget deficit projections to above $1 trillion dollars (Chart II-4). Chart II-3China's Gradual Stimulus Yet To Revive Global Economy Chart II-4Trump's Economy Grew Slower Than Thought Despite Fiscal Stimulus   The U.S. Treasury yield curve inversion is deepening. While we at BCA would point out reasons that this may not be a reliable signal of imminent recession, Trump cannot afford to ignore it. He is sensitive to the widening talk of “recession” in American airwaves and is openly contemplating stimulus options (Chart II-5). His approval rating has lost momentum, partly due to his perceived mishandling of a domestic terrorist attack motivated by racist anti-immigrant sentiment in El Paso, Texas, but negative financial and economic news have likely also played a part (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Trump Fears Growing Talk Of Recession In short, the fourth quarter of 2019 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The core predicament for Trump continues to be the divergence in American and Chinese policy. In the U.S., the stimulating effect of Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act is wearing off just as the deflationary effect of his trade policy begins to bite. In China, the lingering effects of Xi’s all-but-defunct deleveraging campaign are combining with the trade war, and slowing trend growth, to produce a drag on domestic demand and global trade. The result is a rising dollar, which increases the trade deficit – the opposite of what Trump wants and needs (Chart II-7). Chart II-7Trump's Fiscal Policy Undid His Trade Policy   The United States is insulated from global trade, but only to a point – it cannot escape a global recession should one develop (Chart II-8). With global and U.S. equities vulnerable to additional volatility in the near term, Trump will have to make at least a tactical retreat on his trade policy over the rest of the year. First and foremost this would mean: Chart II-8If Total Trade War Causes A Global Relapse, The U.S. Economy Cannot Escape Expediting a trade deal with Japan – this should get done before a China deal, possibly as early as September. Ratifying the U.S.-Mexico-Canada “NAFTA 2.0” agreement – this requires support from moderate Democrats in Congress. The window for passage is closing fast but not yet closed. Removing the threat to slap tariffs on European car and car part imports in mid-November. There is some momentum given Europe’s need to boost growth and recent progress on U.S. beef exports to the EU. Lastly, if financial and economic pressure are sustained, Trump will be forced to soften his stance on China. The problem for global risk assets – in the very near term – is that Trump’s tactical retreat has not fully materialized yet. The new tariff on China is still slated to take effect on September 1. This tariff hike or other disagreements could result in a cancellation of talks or failure to make any progress.1 Even if Trump does pivot on trade, China’s position has hardened. It is no longer clear that Beijing will accept a deal that is transparently designed to boost Trump’s reelection chances. Thus, the biggest question in the trade talks is no longer Trump, but Xi. Is Xi prepared to receive Trump kindly if the latter comes crawling back? How will he handle rising political risk in Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan island,2 and will the outcome derail the trade talks? The biggest question in the trade talks is no longer Trump, but Xi. Bottom Line: Global economic growth is fragile and President Trump has only rhetorically retracted his latest salvo against China. Nevertheless, the clear signal is that he is sensitive to the financial and economic constraints that affect his presidential run next year – and therefore investors should expect U.S. trade policy to turn less market-negative on the margin in the coming months. This is positive for the cyclical view on global risk assets. But the risk to the view is China: whether Trump will take a conciliatory turn and whether Xi will reciprocate. Can Xi Jinping Accept A Deal? Yes. It is extremely difficult for Xi Jinping to offer concessions in the short term. He is facing another tariff hike, U.S. military shows of force, persistent social unrest in Hong Kong, and a critical election in Taiwan. Certainly, he will not risk any sign of weakness ahead of the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, which will be a nationalist rally in defiance of imperialist western powers. After that, however, there is potential for Xi to be receptive to any Trump pivot on trade. China’s strategy in the trade talks has generally been to offer limited concessions and wait for Trump to resign himself to them. Concessions thus far are not negligible, but they can easily be picked apart. They consist largely of preexisting trends (large commodity purchases); minor adjustments (e.g. to car tariffs and foreign ownership rules); unverifiable promises (on foreign investment, technological transfer, and intellectual property); or reversible strategic cooperation (partial enforcement of North Korean and Iranian sanctions) (Table II-1). Many of these concessions have been postponed as a result of Trump’s punitive measures. It is unlikely that Beijing will offer much more under today’s adverse circumstances. The exception is cooperation on North Korea, which should improve. So the contours of a deal are generally known. This is what Trump will have to accept if he seeks to calm markets and restore confidence in the economy ahead of his election. But this slate of concessions is ultimately acceptable for the U.S. Chart II-9China's Ultimate Economic Constraint China’s demands are that Trump roll back all his tariffs, that purchases of U.S. goods must be reasonable in scale, and that any agreement be balanced and conducted with mutual respect. Of these three, the tariffs and the “respect” pose the most trouble. Trade balance: Washington and Beijing can agree on the terms of specific purchases. China can increase select imports substantially – it remains a cash-rich nation with a state sector that can be commanded to buy American goods. Tariff rollback: This is tougher but can be done. The U.S. will insist on some tariffs – or the threat of tech sanctions – as an enforcement mechanism to ensure that Beijing implements the structural concessions necessary for an agreement. But China might accept a deal in which tariffs were mostly rolled back – say to the original 25% tariff on $50 billion worth of goods. This would likely offset the degree of yuan appreciation to be expected from the likely currency addendum to any agreement. Balance and respect: This qualitative demand is the sticking point. Fundamentally, China cannot reward Trump for his aggressive and unilateral protectionist measures. This would be to set a precedent for future American presidents that sweeping tariffs on national security grounds are a legitimate way of coercing China into making economic structural reforms. Moreover if the U.S. wants to improve the trade balance, China thinks, it cannot embargo Chinese high-tech imports but must actually increase its high-tech exports. Clearly this is a major impasse in the talks. The last point, mutual respect, is the likeliest deal-breaker. It may ultimately hinge on strategic events outside of the realm of trade. But before discussing it further, it is important to recognize that China is not invincible – it has a pain threshold. Deterioration in China’s labor market is of utmost seriousness to any Chinese leader (Chart II-9). And the economy is still struggling to revive. Xi’s reform and deleveraging campaign of 2017-18 has largely been postponed but the lingering effects are weighing on growth and the property sector remains under tight regulation. Moreover the removal of implicit guarantees, and rare toleration of creative destruction (Chart II-10), have left banks and corporations afraid to take on new risks. The state’s reflationary measures, including a big boost to local government spending, have so far been merely sufficient for domestic stability. Chart II-10Creative Destruction In China These problems can be addressed by additional policy easing. But the domestic political crackdown and the break with the U.S. have shaken manufacturers and private entrepreneurs to the bone, suppressing animal spirits and reducing the demand for loans. Ultimately a short-term trade deal to ease this economic stress would make sense for Xi Jinping, even though he knows that U.S. protectionism and the conflict over technological acquisition will persist beyond 2020 and beyond Trump. The threat of a sharp and destabilizing divorce from the U.S. is a real and present danger to the long-term stability of China’s economy and the Communist regime. Xi is a strongman leader, but is he really ready for Mao Zedong-style austerity? Is he not more like former President Jiang Zemin (ruled 1993-2003), who imposed some austerity while prizing domestic economic and political stability above all? To this question we now turn. Bottom Line: China has become the wild card in the trade war. Trump’s need to prevent a recession is known. Beijing has a higher pain threshold and could walk away from the deal to punish Trump (upsetting the global economy and diminishing Trump’s reelection prospects). This would set the precedent for future American presidents that China will not bow to gunboat diplomacy. Will Xi Jinping Overplay His Hand? Be Afraid. For decades China’s main foreign policy principle has been to “lie low and bide its time,” to paraphrase former leader Deng Xiaoping. In the current context this means maintaining a willingness to engage with the U.S. whenever it engages sincerely. This approach implies making the above concessions to minimize the immediate threat to stability from the trade war, while biding time in the longer run rivalry against the United States. Such an approach would also imply assisting the diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula, avoiding a military crackdown in Hong Kong, and refraining from aggressive military intimidation ahead of Taiwan’s election in January. Chart II-11China's Vast Market Its Most Persuasive Tool After all, there is no better way for the Communist Party to undercut dissidents in Hong Kong and Taiwan than to strike a deal with the United States. This would demonstrate that Xi is a pragmatic leader who is still committed to “reform and opening up.” It would help generate an economic rebound that would bring other countries deeper into Beijing’s orbit (Chart II-11). China’s vast domestic market is ultimately its greatest strength in its contest with the United States. In short, conventional Chinese policy suggests that Xi should perpetuate the long success story since 1978 by striking another deal with another Republican president. The catch is that Xi Jinping is not conventional. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has eschewed the subtle strategies of Sun Tzu and Deng Xiaoping in favor of a more ambitious approach: that of declaring China’s arrival as a major power and leveraging its economic and military heft to pursue foreign policy and commercial interests aggressively. Xi’s reassertion of Communist rule and state-guided technological acquisition is the biggest factor behind the new U.S. political consensus – entirely aside from Trump – that China is foe rather than friend. There are several empirical reasons to think that Xi might overplay his hand: Xi failed to make substantive concessions with President Barack Obama’s administration on North Korea, the South China Sea, and cyber security, resulting in Obama’s decision to harden U.S. policy toward both China and North Korea in 2015 – a trend that predates Trump. Xi formally removed presidential term limits from China’s constitution even though he could have attracted less negative attention from the West by ruling from behind the scenes after his term in office, like Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin. China has mostly played for time in negotiations with the Trump administration, as mentioned, and this aggravated tensions. Deep revisions to the draft agreement, and the  extent of tariff rollback which was supposedly 90% complete, broke the negotiations in May, sparking this summer’s standoff. Aggressive policies in territorial disputes have alienated even China’s potential allies. This includes regional states whose current ruling parties have courted China in recent years, in some cases obsequiously – South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The East and South China Seas remain a genuine source of “black swans” – unpredictable, low-probability, high-impact events – due to their status as critical sea lanes for the major Asian economies. China continues to militarize the islands there and aggressively prosecute its maritime-territorial disputes. We calculate that $6.4 trillion worth of goods flowed through this bottleneck in the year ending April 2019, 8% of which consists of energy goods from the Middle East that are vital to China and its East Asian neighbors, none of whom can stomach Chinese domination of this geographic space (Diagram II-1). Even if Washington abandoned the region, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would see Chinese control as a threat to their security. Ultimately, however, China’s adventures in its neighboring seas are a matter of choice. Not so for Greater China – in Hong Kong and Taiwan, political risk is rapidly mounting in a way that enflames the U.S.-China strategic distrust and threatens to prevent a trade agreement. Hong Kong: The Dust Has Not Settled Mass protests in Hong Kong have lost some momentum, based on the size of the largest rally in August versus June. But do not be fooled: the political crisis is deepening. A plurality of Hong Kongers now harbors negative feelings toward mainland Chinese people as well as the government in Beijing – a trend that is spiking amid today’s protests but began with the Great Recession and has roots in the deeper socioeconomic malaise of this capitalist enclave (Chart II-12A & II-12B).   A majority also lacks confidence in the political arrangement that ensures some autonomy from Beijing – known as “One Country, Two Systems” (Chart II-13). This is a particularly worrisome sign since this is the fundamental basis for stable political relations with Beijing. With clashes continuing between protesters and police, students calling for a boycott of school this fall, and Beijing rotating troops into the city and openly drilling its security forces in Shenzhen for a potential intervention, Hong Kong’s unrest is not yet laid to rest and could flare up again ahead of China’s sensitive National Day celebration. U.S. tariffs and sanctions are already in effect, reducing the ability of the U.S. to deter China from using force if it believes instability has gone too far. And as President Trump has warned – and would be true of any U.S. administration – a violent crackdown on civilian demonstrators would greatly reduce the political viability of a trade deal in the United States. Taiwan: The Black Swan Arrives Since Taiwan’s 2016 election, we have argued that it is a potential source of “black swans.” Mass protests in Hong Kong may have taken the cake. But these protests are now affecting the Taiwanese election dynamic and potentially the U.S.-China trade talks. Chart II-14U.S. Approves Big New Arms Sale To Taiwan On August 20, the United States Department of Defense informed Congress that it is proceeding with an $8 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets and other military arms and equipment to Taiwan – the largest sale in 22 years and the largest aircraft sale since 1992 (Chart II-14). This sale is not yet complete and delivered, but ultimately will be – the question is the timing. Arms sales to Taiwan are a perennial source of tension between the United States and China – and China is increasingly assertive in using economic sanctions to get its way over such issues, as it showed in the lead up to South Korea’s election in 2017. This sale is not a military “game changer” – the U.S. did not send over fifth-generation F-35s, for instance – but China will respond vehemently. It is threatening to impose sanctions on American companies like Lockheed Martin and General Electric for their part in the deal. The sale does not in itself preclude the chance of a trade agreement but it contributes to a rise in strategic tensions that ultimately could. Chart II-15A 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' Would Have A Seismic Equity Impact The context is Taiwan’s hugely important election in January. Four years ago, President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party swept to power on the back of a popular protest movement – the “Sunflower Movement” – that opposed deeper cross-strait economic integration. It dangerously resembled the kind of anti-Communist “color revolutions” that motivate Xi Jinping’s hardline policies. Tsai shocked the world when she called Trump personally to congratulate him after his election, which violated diplomatic protocol given that Taiwan is a territory of China and not an independent nation-state. Since then Trump has largely avoided provoking the Taiwan issue so as not to strike at a core Chinese interest and obliterate the chance of a trade deal. But the U.S. has always argued that the provision of defensive arms to Taiwan is a condition of the U.S.-China détente – and Trump is so far moving forward with the sale. How will Xi Jinping react if the sale goes through? In 1995-96, China’s use of missile tests to try to intimidate Taiwan produced the opposite effect – driving voters into the arms of Lee Teng-hui, the candidate Beijing opposed. This was the occasion of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which U.S. President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the region, one that sailed through the Taiwan Strait. The negative effect on markets at that time was local, whereas anything resembling this level of tensions would today be a seismic global risk-off (Chart II-15). Since the 1990s, leaders in Beijing have avoided direct military coercion ahead of elections. But Xi Jinping has hardened his stance on Taiwan throughout his term. He has dabbled with such coercion in his use of military drills that encircle Taiwan in recent years. While one must assume that he will use economic sanctions rather than outright military threats – as he did with South Korea – saber-rattling cannot be ruled out. The pressure on him is rising. Prior to the Hong Kong unrest, Taiwan’s elections looked likely to return the pro-mainland Kuomintang (KMT) to power and remove the incumbent President Tsai – a boon for Beijing. That outlook has changed and Tsai now has a fighting chance of staying in power (Chart II-16). The prospect of four more years of Tsai would not be too problematic for Beijing if not for the fact that the U.S. political establishment is now firmly in agreement on challenging China. But even if Tsai loses, Taiwan’s outlook is troublesome. And this makes Xi’s decision-making harder to predict. Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis in the long run than Hong Kong. It is not that Tsai or her party will necessarily prevail. The manufacturing slowdown will take a toll and third-party candidates, particularly Ko Wen-je, would likely split Tsai’s vote. Moreover her Democratic Progressives still tie the KMT in opinion polling (Chart II-17). The Taiwanese people are primarily concerned about maintaining the strong economy and cross-strait peace and stability, which her reelection could jeopardize (Chart II-18). Tsai could very well lose, or she could be a lame duck presiding over the KMT in the legislature.   Rather, the problem for Xi Jinping is that the Taiwanese people clearly sympathize with the protesters in Hong Kong (Chart II-19). They fear that their own governance system faces the same fate as Hong Kong’s, with the Communist Party encroaching on traditional political liberties over time.   While Hong Kong ultimately has zero choice as to whether to accept Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan has much greater autonomy – and the military support of outside forces. It is not a foregone conclusion that Taiwan must suffer the same political dependency as Hong Kong. Indeed, Taiwan has a long history of exercising the democratic vote and has even dabbled into the realm of popular referendums. In short, Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis in the long run than Hong Kong. But the Hong Kong events have accentuated this fact, for two key reasons: First, Taiwanese people identify increasingly as exclusively Taiwanese, rather than as both Taiwanese and Chinese (Chart II-20). The incidents in Hong Kong reveal that this sentiment is tied to immediate political relations and therefore deterioration would encourage further alienation from the mainland. Second, while a strong majority of Taiwanese wish to maintain the political status quo to avoid conflict with the mainland, a substantial subset – approaching one-fourth – supports eventual or immediate independence (Chart II-21).   This means that relations with the mainland will eventually deteriorate even if the KMT wins the election. The KMT itself must respond to popular demand not to cozy up too much with Beijing, which is how it fell from power in 2016. Meanwhile, under KMT rule, Taiwan’s progressive-leaning youth are likely to set about reviving their protest movement in the subsequent years and imitating their Hong Kong peers, especially if the KMT warms up relations too fast with the mainland. Ultimately these points suggest that Xi Jinping will strive to avoid a violent crackdown in Hong Kong. A crackdown would be the surest way for him to harm the KMT in the Taiwanese election and to hasten the rebuilding of U.S.-Taiwan security ties. Call The President The best argument for Xi to lie low and avoid a larger crisis in Greater China is that it would unify the West and its allies against China. So far Xi’s foreign policy has not been so aggressive as to lead to diplomatic isolation. Europe is maintaining a studied neutrality due to its own differences with the United States; Asian neighbors are wary of provoking Chinese sanctions or military threats. A humanitarian crisis in Hong Kong or a “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” would change that. For markets, the best-case scenario is that Xi Jinping exercises restraint. This would help Hong Kong protests lose steam, North Korean diplomacy get back on track, and Taiwanese independence sentiment simmer down. China would be more likely to halt U.S. tariffs and tech sanctions, settle a short-term trade agreement, and delay the upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. China would still face adverse long-term political trends in both the U.S. and Taiwan, but an immediate crisis would be averted. The worst-case scenario is that Xi indulges his ambition. Hong Kong protests could explode, relations with Taiwan would deteriorate, and U.S.-China relations would move more rapidly in their downward spiral. Trade talks could collapse. Xi Jinping would face the possibility of a unified Western front, instability within Greater China, and a global recession. This might get rid of Donald Trump, but it would not get rid of the U.S. Congress, Navy, or Department of Defense. The choice seems pretty clear. Xi, like Trump, faces constraints that should motivate a tactical retreat from confrontation, at least after October 1. While this does not necessarily mean a settled trade agreement, it does suggest at least a ceasefire or truce. Our GeoRisk indicators show that market-based political risk in Taiwan – and less so South Korea – moves in keeping with global economic policy uncertainty. The underlying U.S.-China strategic confrontation and trade war are driving both (Chart II-22). A deterioration in this region has global consequences. Chart II-22U.S.-China Strategic Conflict Fuels Global Economic Uncertainty And Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk In Tandem Xi is a markedly aggressive “strongman” Chinese leader who has not been afraid to model his leadership on that of Chairman Mao. He could still overplay his hand. This is why we maintain that the odds of a U.S.-China trade agreement remain 40%, though we are prepared to upgrade that probability if Trump and Xi make pro-market decisions. Investment Implications On the three-month tactical horizon, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy is paring back our tactical safe-haven trades: we are closing our “Doomsday Basket” of long gold and Swiss bonds for a gain of 13.6%, while maintaining our simple gold portfolio hedge going forward.  Trump has not yet decisively staged his tactical retreat on trade policy, while rising political risk in Greater China increases uncertainty over Xi Jinping’s next moves. On the cyclical horizon, the above suggests that there is a light at the end of the tunnel – if both Trump and Xi recognize their political constraints. This means that there is still a political and geopolitical basis to reinforce BCA’s House View to remain optimistic on global and U.S. equities over the next 12 months, with the potential for non-U.S. equities to recover and bond yields to reverse their deep dive.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy   Footnotes 1     Negotiations between Trump and Xi are slated for September in Washington. There is a prospect for Trump to hold another summit with Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September and at the APEC summit in Chile in mid-November. 2     Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, while Taiwan is recognized as a province or territory.

Informe especial

Highlights The chance of a U.S.-China trade agreement is still only 40% – but an upgrade may be around the corner. Trump is on the verge of a tactical trade retreat due to fears of economic slowdown and a loss in 2020. Xi Jinping is now the known unknown. His aggressive foreign policy is a major risk even if Trump softens. Political divisions in Greater China – Hong Kong unrest and Taiwan elections – could harm the trade talks. Maintain tactical caution but remain cyclically overweight global equities. Feature “I am the chosen one. Somebody had to do it. So I’m taking on China. I’m taking on China on trade. And you know what, we’re winning.” – U.S. President Donald J. Trump, August 21, 2019 On August 1, United States President Donald Trump declared that he would raise a new tariff of 10% on the remaining $300 billion worth of imports from China not already subject to his administration’s sweeping 25% tariff. Then, on August 13, with the S&P 500 index down a mere 2.4%, Trump announced that he would partially delay the tariff, separating it into two tranches that will take effect on September 1 and December 15 (Chart 1). Chart 1Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Six days later Trump’s Commerce Department renewed the 90-day temporary general license for U.S. companies to do business with embattled Chinese telecom company Huawei, which has ties to the Chinese state and is viewed as a threat to U.S. network security. Trump’s tendency to take two steps forward with coercive measures and then one step back to control the damage is by now familiar to global investors. Yet this backpedaling reveals that like other politicians he is concerned about reelection. After all, there is a clear chain of consequence leading from trade war to bear market to recession to a Democrat taking the White House in November 2020. Trump’s approval rating is already similar to that of presidents who fell short of re-election amid recession (Chart 2) – an actual recession would consign him to the dustbin of history. Will Trump Stage A Tactical Retreat On Trade? Yes. Trump’s predicament suggests that he will have to adjust his policies. Global trade, capital spending, and sentiment have deteriorated significantly since the last escalation-and-delay episode with China in May and June. Beijing’s economic stimulus measures disappointed expectations, exacerbating the global slowdown (Chart 3). This leaves him less room for maneuver going forward. Chart 3China's Gradual Stimulus Yet To Revive Global Economy Chart 4Trump's Economy Grew Slower Than Thought Despite Fiscal Stimulus Even “Fortress America” – consumer-driven and relatively insulated from global trade – has seen manufacturing, private investment, and business sentiment weaken. GDP growth is slowing and has been revised downward for 2018 despite a surge in budget deficit projections to above $1 trillion dollars (Chart 4).   Q4 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The U.S. Treasury yield curve inversion is deepening. While we at BCA would point out reasons that this may not be a reliable signal of imminent recession, Trump cannot afford to ignore it. He is sensitive to the widening talk of “recession” in American airwaves and is openly contemplating stimulus options (Chart 5). His approval rating has lost momentum, partly due to his perceived mishandling of a domestic terrorist attack motivated by racist anti-immigrant sentiment in El Paso, Texas, but negative financial and economic news have likely also played a part (Chart 6). Chart 5Trump Fears Growing Talk Of Recession In short, the fourth quarter of 2019 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The core predicament for Trump continues to be the divergence in American and Chinese policy. Chart 7Trump's Fiscal Policy Undid His Trade Policy In the U.S., the stimulating effect of Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act is wearing off just as the deflationary effect of his trade policy begins to bite. In China, the lingering effects of Xi’s all-but-defunct deleveraging campaign are combining with the trade war, and slowing trend growth, to produce a drag on domestic demand and global trade. The result is a rising dollar, which increases the trade deficit – the opposite of what Trump wants and needs (Chart 7). The United States is insulated from global trade, but only to a point – it cannot escape a global recession should one develop, given that its economy is still closely linked to the rest of the world (Chart 8). With global and U.S. equities vulnerable to additional volatility in the near term, Trump will have to make at least a tactical retreat on his trade policy over the rest of the year. First and foremost this would mean: Chart 8If Total Trade War Causes A Global Relapse, The U.S. Economy Cannot Escape Expediting a trade deal with Japan – this should get done before a China deal, possibly as early as September. Ratifying the U.S.-Mexico-Canada “NAFTA 2.0” agreement – this requires support from moderate Democrats in Congress. The window for passage is closing fast but not closed. Removing the threat to slap tariffs on European car and car part imports in mid-November. There is some momentum given Europe’s need to boost growth and recent progress on U.S. beef exports to the EU. Lastly, if financial and economic pressure are sustained, Trump will be forced to soften his stance on China. The problem for global risk assets – in the very near term – is that Trump’s tactical retreat has not fully materialized yet. The new tariff on China is still slated to take effect on September 1. This tariff hike or other disagreements could result in a cancellation of talks or failure to make any progress.1 Even if Trump does pivot on trade, China’s position has hardened. It is no longer clear that Beijing will accept a deal that is transparently designed to boost Trump’s reelection chances. Thus, the biggest question in the trade talks is no longer Trump, but Xi. Is Xi prepared to receive Trump kindly if the latter comes crawling back? How will he handle rising political risk in Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan island,2 and will the outcome derail the trade talks? Bottom Line: Global economic growth is fragile and President Trump has only tentatively retracted his latest salvo against China. Nevertheless, the clear signal is that he is sensitive to the financial and economic constraints that affect his presidential run next year – and therefore investors should expect U.S. trade policy to turn less market-negative on the margin in the coming months. This is positive for the cyclical view on global risk assets. But the risk to the view is China: whether Trump will take a conciliatory turn and whether Xi will reciprocate. Can Xi Jinping Accept A Deal? Yes. It is extremely difficult for Xi Jinping to offer concessions in the short term. He is facing another tariff hike, U.S. military shows of force, persistent social unrest in Hong Kong, and a critical election in Taiwan. Certainly, he will not risk any sign of weakness ahead of the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, which will be a nationalist rally in defiance of imperialist western powers. After that, however, there is potential for Xi to be receptive to any Trump pivot on trade. China’s strategy in the trade talks has generally been to offer limited concessions and wait for Trump to resign himself to them. Concessions thus far are not negligible, but they can easily be picked apart. They consist largely of preexisting trends (large commodity purchases); minor adjustments (e.g. to car tariffs and foreign ownership rules); unverifiable promises (on foreign investment, technological transfer, and intellectual property); or reversible strategic cooperation (partial enforcement of North Korean and Iranian sanctions) (Table 1). Many of these concessions have been postponed as a result of Trump’s punitive measures. Table 1China’s Offers Thus Far In The Trade War It is unlikely that Beijing will offer much more under today’s adverse circumstances. The exception is cooperation on North Korea, which should improve. So the contours of a deal are generally known. This is what Trump will have to accept if he seeks to calm markets and restore confidence in the economy ahead of his election. But this slate of concessions is ultimately acceptable for the U.S. China’s demands are that Trump roll back all his tariffs, that purchases of U.S. goods must be reasonable in scale, and that any agreement be balanced and conducted with mutual respect. Of these three, the tariffs and the “balance” pose the most trouble. Trade balance: Washington and Beijing can agree on the terms of specific purchases. China can increase select imports substantially – it remains a cash-rich nation with a state sector that can be commanded to buy American goods. Tariff rollback: This is tougher but can be done. The U.S. will insist on some tariffs – or the threat of tech sanctions – as an enforcement mechanism to ensure that Beijing implements the structural concessions necessary for an agreement. But China might accept a deal in which tariffs were mostly rolled back – say to the original 25% tariff on $50 billion worth of goods. This would likely offset the degree of yuan appreciation to be expected from the likely currency addendum to any agreement. Balance and respect: This qualitative demand is the sticking point. Fundamentally, China cannot reward Trump for his aggressive and unilateral protectionist measures. This would be to set a precedent for future American presidents that sweeping tariffs on national security grounds are a legitimate way of coercing China into making economic structural reforms. Moreover if the U.S. wants to improve the trade balance, China thinks, it cannot embargo Chinese high-tech imports but must actually increase its high-tech exports. Clearly this is a major impasse in the talks. The last point is the likeliest deal-breaker. It may ultimately hinge on strategic events outside of the realm of trade. But before discussing it further, it is important to recognize that China is not invincible – it has a pain threshold. The threat of a divorce from the U.S. is a danger to China’s economy and the Communist regime. Chart 9China's Ultimate Economic Constraint Deterioration in China’s labor market is of utmost seriousness to any Chinese leader (Chart 9). And the economy is still struggling to revive. Xi’s reform and deleveraging campaign of 2017-18 has been postponed but the lingering effects are weighing on growth and the property sector remains under tight regulation. Moreover the removal of implicit guarantees, and rare toleration of creative destruction (Chart 10), have left banks and corporations afraid to take on new risks. The state’s reflationary measures, including a big boost to local government spending, have so far been merely sufficient for domestic stability. These problems can be addressed by additional policy easing. But the domestic political crackdown and the break with the U.S. have shaken manufacturers and private entrepreneurs to the bone, suppressing animal spirits and reducing the demand for loans. Chart 10Creative Destruction In China Ultimately a short-term trade deal to ease this economic stress would make sense for Xi Jinping, even though he knows that U.S. protectionism and the conflict over technological acquisition will persist beyond 2020 and beyond Trump. The threat of a sharp and destabilizing divorce from the U.S. is a real and present danger to the long-term stability of China’s economy and the Communist regime. Xi is a strongman leader, but is he really ready for Mao Zedong-style austerity? Is he not more like former President Jiang Zemin (ruled 1993-2003), who imposed some austerity while prizing domestic economic and political stability above all? To this question we now turn. Bottom Line: China has become the wild card in the trade war. Trump’s need to prevent a recession is known. Beijing has a higher pain threshold and could walk away from the deal to punish Trump (upsetting the global economy and diminishing Trump’s reelection prospects). This would set the precedent for future American presidents that China will not bow to gunboat diplomacy. Will Xi Jinping Overplay His Hand? Be Afraid. For decades China’s main foreign policy principle has been to “lie low and bide its time,” to paraphrase former leader Deng Xiaoping. In the current context this means maintaining a willingness to engage with the U.S. whenever it engages sincerely. This approach implies making the above concessions to minimize the immediate threat to stability from the trade war, while biding time in the longer run rivalry against the United States. Such an approach would also imply assisting the diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula, avoiding a military crackdown in Hong Kong, and refraining from aggressive military intimidation ahead of Taiwan’s election in January. Chart 11China's Vast Market Its Most Persuasive Tool After all, there is no better way for the Communist Party to undercut dissidents in Hong Kong and Taiwan than to strike a deal with the United States. This would demonstrate that Xi is a pragmatic leader who is still committed to “reform and opening up.” It would help generate an economic rebound that would bring other countries deeper into Beijing’s orbit (Chart 11). China’s vast domestic market is ultimately its greatest strength in its contest with the United States. In short, conventional Chinese policy suggests that Xi should perpetuate the long success story since 1978 by striking another deal with another Republican president. The catch is that Xi Jinping is not conventional. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has eschewed the subtle strategies of Sun Tzu and Deng Xiaoping in favor of a more ambitious approach: that of declaring China’s arrival as a major power and leveraging its economic and military heft to pursue foreign policy and commercial interests aggressively. Xi’s reassertion of Communist rule and state-guided technological acquisition is the biggest factor behind the new U.S. political consensus – entirely aside from Trump – that China is foe rather than friend. There are several empirical reasons to think that Xi might overplay his hand: Xi failed to make substantive concessions with President Barack Obama’s administration on North Korea, the South China Sea, and cyber security, resulting in Obama’s decision to harden U.S. policy toward both China and North Korea in 2015 – a trend that predates Trump. Xi formally removed presidential term limits from China’s constitution even though he could have attracted less negative attention from the West by ruling from behind the scenes after his term in office, like Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin. China has mostly played for time in negotiations with the Trump administration, as mentioned, and this aggravated tensions. Deep revisions to the draft agreement, which was supposedly 90% complete, broke the negotiations in May, sparking this summer’s standoff. Aggressive policies in territorial disputes have alienated even China’s potential allies. This includes regional states whose current ruling parties have courted China in recent years, in some cases obsequiously – South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The East and South China Seas remain a genuine source of “black swans” – unpredictable, low-probability, high-impact events – due to their status as critical sea lanes for the major Asian economies. China continues to militarize the islands there and aggressively prosecute its maritime-territorial disputes. We calculate that $6.4 trillion worth of goods flowed through this bottleneck in the year ending April 2019, 8% of which consists of energy goods from the Middle East that are vital to China and its East Asian neighbors, none of whom can stomach Chinese domination of this geographic space (Diagram 1). Even if Washington abandoned the region, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would see Chinese control as a threat to their security. Diagram 1The South China Sea As The World’s Traffic Roundabout Ultimately, however, China’s adventures in its neighboring seas are a matter of choice. Not so for Greater China – in Hong Kong and Taiwan, political risk is rapidly mounting in a way that enflames the U.S.-China strategic distrust and threatens to prevent a trade agreement. Hong Kong: The Dust Has Not Settled Mass protests in Hong Kong have lost some momentum, based on the size of the largest rally in August versus June. But do not be fooled: the political crisis is deepening. A plurality of Hong Kongers now harbors negative feelings toward mainland Chinese people as well as the government in Beijing – a trend that is spiking amid today’s protests but began with the Great Recession and has roots in the deeper socioeconomic malaise of this capitalist enclave (Chart 12A & 12B). A majority also lacks confidence in the political arrangement that ensures some autonomy from Beijing – known as “One Country, Two Systems” (Chart 13). This is a particularly worrisome sign since this is the fundamental basis for stable political relations with Beijing. With clashes continuing between protesters and police, students calling for a boycott of school this fall, and Beijing openly drilling its security forces in Shenzhen for a potential intervention, Hong Kong’s unrest is not yet laid to rest and could flare up again ahead of China’s sensitive National Day celebration. U.S. tariffs and sanctions are already in effect, reducing the ability of the U.S. to deter China from using force if it believes instability has gone too far. And as President Trump has warned – and would be true of any U.S. administration – a violent crackdown on civilian demonstrators would greatly reduce the political viability of a trade deal in the United States. Taiwan: The Black Swan Arrives Since Taiwan’s 2016 election, we have argued that it is a potential source of “black swans.” Mass protests in Hong Kong may have taken the cake. But these protests are now affecting the Taiwanese election dynamic and potentially the U.S.-China trade talks. Chart 14U.S. Approves Big New Arms Sale To Taiwan On August 20, the United States Department of Defense informed Congress that it is proceeding with an $8 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets and other military arms and equipment to Taiwan – the largest sale in 22 years and the largest aircraft sale since 1992 (Chart 14). This sale is not yet complete and delivered, but ultimately will be – the question is the timing. Arms sales to Taiwan are a perennial source of tension between the United States and China – and China is increasingly assertive in using economic sanctions to get its way over such issues, as it showed in the lead up to South Korea’s election in 2017. This sale is not a military “game changer” – the U.S. did not send over fifth-generation F-35s, for instance – but China will respond vehemently. It is threatening to impose sanctions on American companies like Lockheed Martin and General Electric for their part in the deal. The sale does not in itself preclude the chance of a trade agreement but it contributes to a rise in strategic tensions that ultimately could. The context is Taiwan’s hugely important election in January. Four years ago, President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party swept to power on the back of a popular protest movement – the “Sunflower Movement” – that opposed deeper cross-strait economic integration. It dangerously resembled the kind of anti-Communist “color revolutions” that motivate Xi Jinping’s hardline policies. Tsai shocked the world when she called Trump personally to congratulate him after his election, which violated diplomatic protocol given that Taiwan is a territory of China and not an independent nation-state. Since then Trump has largely avoided provoking the Taiwan issue so as not to strike at a core Chinese interest and obliterate the chance of a trade deal. But the U.S. has always argued that the provision of defensive arms to Taiwan is a condition of the U.S.-China détente – and Trump is so far moving forward with the sale. Chart 15A 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' Would Have A Seismic Equity Impact How will Xi Jinping react if the sale goes through? In 1995-96, China’s use of missile tests to try to intimidate Taiwan produced the opposite effect – driving voters into the arms of Lee Teng-hui, the candidate Beijing opposed. This was the occasion of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which U.S. President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the region, one that sailed through the Taiwan Strait. The negative effect on markets at that time was local, whereas anything resembling this level of tensions would today be a seismic global risk-off (Chart 15). Since the 1990s, leaders in Beijing have avoided direct military coercion ahead of elections. But Xi Jinping has hardened his stance on Taiwan throughout his term. He has dabbled with such coercion in his use of military drills that encircle Taiwan in recent years. While one must assume that he will use economic sanctions rather than outright military threats – as he did with South Korea – saber-rattling cannot be ruled out. The pressure on him is rising. Prior to the Hong Kong unrest, Taiwan’s elections looked likely to return the pro-mainland Kuomintang (KMT) to power and remove the incumbent President Tsai – a boon for Beijing. That outlook has changed and Tsai now has a fighting chance of staying in power (Chart 16). The prospect of four more years of Tsai would not be too problematic for Beijing if not for the fact that the U.S. political establishment is now firmly in agreement on challenging China. But even if Tsai loses, Taiwan’s outlook is troublesome. And this makes Xi’s decision-making harder to predict. It is not that Tsai or her party will necessarily prevail. The manufacturing slowdown will take a toll and third-party candidates, particularly Ko Wen-je, would likely split Tsai’s vote. Moreover her Democratic Progressives still tie the KMT in opinion polling (Chart 17). The Taiwanese people are primarily concerned about maintaining the strong economy and cross-strait peace and stability, which her reelection could jeopardize (Chart 18). Tsai could very well lose, or she could be a lame duck presiding over the KMT in the legislature. Rather, the problem for Xi Jinping is that the Taiwanese people clearly sympathize with the protesters in Hong Kong (Chart 19). They fear that their own governance system faces the same fate as Hong Kong’s, with the Communist Party encroaching on traditional political liberties over time. While Hong Kong ultimately has zero choice as to whether to accept Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan has much greater autonomy – and the military support of outside forces. It is not a foregone conclusion that Taiwan must suffer the same political dependency as Hong Kong. Indeed, Taiwan has a long history of exercising the democratic vote and has even dabbled into the realm of popular referendums. In short, Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis in the long run than Hong Kong. But the Hong Kong events have accentuated this fact, for two key reasons: First, Taiwanese people identify increasingly as exclusively Taiwanese, rather than as both Taiwanese and Chinese (Chart 20). The incidents in Hong Kong reveal that this sentiment is tied to immediate political relations and therefore deterioration would encourage further alienation from the mainland. Second, while a strong majority of Taiwanese wish to maintain the political status quo to avoid conflict with the mainland, a substantial subset – approaching one-fourth – supports eventual or immediate independence (Chart 21). This means that relations with the mainland will eventually deteriorate even if the KMT wins the election. The KMT itself must respond to popular demand not to cozy up too much with Beijing, which is how it fell from power in 2016. Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis than Hong Kong. Meanwhile, under KMT rule, Taiwan’s progressive-leaning youth are likely to set about reviving their protest movement in the subsequent years and imitating their Hong Kong peers, especially if the KMT warms up relations too fast with the mainland. Ultimately these points suggest that Xi Jinping will strive to avoid a violent crackdown in Hong Kong. A crackdown would be the surest way for him to harm the KMT in the Taiwanese election and to hasten the rebuilding of U.S.-Taiwan security ties. Call The President The best argument for Xi to lie low and avoid a larger crisis in Greater China is that it would unify the West and its allies against China. So far Xi’s foreign policy has not been so aggressive as to lead to diplomatic isolation. Europe is maintaining a studied neutrality due to its own differences with the United States; Asian neighbors are wary of provoking Chinese sanctions or military threats. A humanitarian crisis in Hong Kong or a “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” would change that. For markets, the best-case scenario is that Xi Jinping exercises restraint. This would help Hong Kong protests lose steam, North Korean diplomacy get back on track, and Taiwanese independence sentiment simmer down. China would be more likely to halt U.S. tariffs and tech sanctions, settle a short-term trade agreement, and delay the upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. China would still face adverse long-term political trends in both the U.S. and Taiwan, but an immediate crisis would be averted. The worst-case scenario is that Xi indulges his ambition. Hong Kong protests could explode, relations with Taiwan would deteriorate, and U.S.-China relations would move more rapidly in their downward spiral. Trade talks could collapse. Xi Jinping would face the possibility of a unified Western front, instability within Greater China, and a global recession. This might get rid of Donald Trump, but it would not get rid of the U.S. Congress, Navy, or Department of Defense. The choice seems pretty clear. Xi, like Trump, faces constraints that should motivate a tactical retreat from confrontation, at least after October 1. While this does not necessarily mean a settled trade agreement, it does suggest at least a ceasefire or truce. Our GeoRisk indicators show that market-based political risk in Taiwan – and less so South Korea – moves in keeping with global economic policy uncertainty. The underlying U.S.-China strategic confrontation and trade war are driving both (Chart 22). A deterioration in this region has global consequences. Chart 22U.S.-China Strategic Conflict Fuels Global Economic Uncertainty And Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk In Tandem Xi is a markedly aggressive “strongman” Chinese leader who has not been afraid to model his leadership on that of Chairman Mao. He could still overplay his hand. This is why we maintain that the odds of a U.S.-China trade agreement remain 40%, though we are prepared to upgrade that probability if Trump and Xi make pro-market decisions. Investment Implications On the three-month tactical horizon, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy is paring back our tactical safe-haven trades: we are closing our “Doomsday Basket” of long gold and Swiss bonds for a gain of 13.6%, while maintaining our simple gold portfolio hedge going forward. Trump has not yet decisively staged his tactical retreat on trade policy, while rising political risk in Greater China increases uncertainty over Xi Jinping’s next moves. On the cyclical horizon, the above suggests that there is a light at the end of the tunnel – if both Trump and Xi recognize their political constraints. This means that there is still a political and geopolitical basis to reinforce BCA’s House View to remain optimistic on global and U.S. equities over the next 12 months, with the potential for non-U.S. equities to recover and bond yields to reverse their deep dive.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Negotiations between Trump and Xi are slated for September in Washington. There is a prospect for Trump to hold another summit with Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September and at the APEC summit in Chile in mid-November. 2 Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, while Taiwan is recognized as a province or territory.

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Highlights So What? Maintain a cautious stance on Turkish currency and risk assets. Why? Following the AKP’s defeat in Istanbul, Erdogan has doubled down on unorthodox economic policies. Improvements in the current account balance are temporary. Unless investor sentiment is meaningfully repaired, the lira will resume its decline in 2020. In the meantime, tensions with the West – especially the U.S. – will remain elevated. The imposition of secondary sanctions from the U.S. is likely. Feature U.S. President Donald Trump is wavering in the trade war, which is ostensibly positive news for global risk assets that are selling off dramatically amid very gloomy expectations about the near future. The question is whether the delay is too little, too late to halt the slide in financial markets in the near term. The reason to be optimistic is that interest rates have fallen and the global monetary policy “put” is fully in effect. Moreover, it is irrefutable now that President Trump is sensitive to the negative financial effects of the trade war. He is delaying new tariffs on some of the remaining $300 billion worth of imports from China not simply because consumer price inflation has ticked up but more fundamentally because the tightening of financial conditions increases the risk of a recession. A president can survive a small increase in inflation but not a big increase in unemployment. The reason to be pessimistic is that global economic expectations are threatening the crisis levels of 2008 (Chart 1) and Trump’s tariff delay offers cold comfort. His administration has not delayed all the tariffs, and the delay lasts only three months. Rather than renew the license for U.S. companies to do business with Chinese telecom giant Huawei, his Commerce Department has deferred any decision – leaving uncertainty to fester in the all-important tech sector. Chart 1Global Economic Expectations Near Crisis Levels Chart 2More China Stimulus Needed To Prevent EM Breakdown Beneath the surface is the fact that China’s money-and-credit growth faltered in July, suggesting that negative sentiment is still suppressing credit demand and preventing policy stimulus from having as big of a bang as in 2015-16. The late-July Politburo meeting signaled a more accommodative turn in policy, as we have expected, and BCA’s China strategist Jing Sima expects more fiscal stimulus to be announced after the October 1 National Day celebration. But high-beta economies and assets will suffer in the meantime – especially emerging market assets (Chart 2). Emerging markets are also seeing geopolitical risks rise across the board – and with the exception of China and Brazil, these risks are underrated by markets: Greater China: Beijing is getting closer to intervening in Hong Kong with police or military force. Such a crackdown will increase the odds of a confrontation with Taiwan and a backlash across the region and world, meaning that East Asian currencies in particular have more room to break down. India: The escalation in Kashmir is not a “red herring.” A single terrorist attack in India blamed on Pakistan could trigger a dangerous military standoff that hurts rather than helps Indian equities, unlike the heavily dramatized standoff ahead of the election earlier this year. Russia: Large-scale protests, overshadowed by Hong Kong, highlight domestic instability amid falling oil prices. These developments bode ill for Russian currency and equities. We will return to these risks in the coming weeks. This week we offer a special report on Turkey, where political risk is becoming extremely underrated as the lira rallies despite a further deterioration in governance (Chart 3). Chart 3Political Risks Are Underrated In Turkey Too Early To Write Off Erdogan “Whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey … Whoever loses Istanbul, loses Turkey.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has had a tough year. The March 31 local elections – especially the rerun election for mayor of Istanbul – dealt the party its biggest electoral losses since it emerged as the country’s dominant political force in 2002 (Chart 4). The elections came to be seen as a referendum on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and thus raise the question of whether the party’s strongman leader is in decline – and what that might mean for emerging market investors. Erdogan’s grip on power has long been overrated – it is his vulnerability that has driven him to such extremes of policy over the past decade. The Gezi Park protests of 2013 and the attempted military coup of 2016 revealed significant strains of internal opposition in the aftermath of the Great Recession. With each case of dissent, the AKP responded by stimulating the economy and tightening state control over society (Chart 5). But this strategy faltered last year when monetary policy finally became overextended, the currency collapsed, and the country slid into recession. The opposition finally had its moment. The AKP is less a source of unity. As a consequence, the AKP is less a source of unity among Turkish voters. Both its share of seats in parliament and the overall level of party concentration in the Turkish parliament have declined since 2002 (Chart 6). Were it not for its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the AKP would not have gained a majority in the 2018 parliamentary election. The AKP’s popular base consists of conservative, rural, and religious voters. This bloc is losing influence in parliament relative to centrist and left-wing parties (Chart 7). Moreover, the share of Turks identifying with political Islam, while still the largest grouping, is declining. Those who identify with more secular Turkish nationalism are on the rise (Chart 8). Does this shift entail a major turn in national policy? Will a new party emerge to challenge the AKP at last? Chart 8Secular Nationalism Is On The Rise There has long been speculation that former AKP leaders such as former Turkish president Abdullah Gul, former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and former deputy prime minister Ali Babacan might form a political alternative. The latter resigned from the AKP on July 8, reviving speculation that a rival party could emerge that is capable of combining disillusioned AKP voters with the broader opposition movement at a time when Erdogan’s vulnerability has been made plain. However, the opposition is likely getting ahead of itself. The ruling party still has many tools at its disposal. Its share of seats in parliament is more than double that of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). It is also viewed favorably in rural areas, and support for Erdogan there will not shift easily. Moreover, despite the negative electoral trend, the AKP has a lot of enthusiasm among its supporters – it is the party with the highest favorability among its own voters (Chart 9). The March election served as a wakeup call for the AKP – a warning not to take its power for granted. Erdogan can still salvage his position. The next election is not due until June 2023, leaving the party with four years to recuperate. While polls for the 2023 parliamentary election paint an ominous sign (Chart 10), they are very early, and the key will be whether Erdogan can divide the opposition and reconnect with his voter base. Above all, this will depend on what changes he makes to economic policy. Chart 10Erdogan Needs To Reconnect With Voter Base Bottom Line: Erdogan’s and the AKP’s popularity is waning, but it is too soon to write them off. The key question is how Erdogan will handle economic policy now that there are chinks in his armor. Doubling Down On Erdoganomics The fluctuation in the lira “is a U.S.-led operation by the West to corner Turkey … The inflation rate will drop as we lower interest rates.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan Erdogan needs to see the economy back to recovery in order to secure his success in the next election. A survey conducted early this year reveals that Turks view unemployment, the high cost of living, and the depreciation of the lira as the most significant problems facing Turkey, with 27% of respondents indicating that unemployment is the most important problem facing the country (Chart 11). More importantly, Turks do not have much confidence in the government’s ability to manage this pain – only one-third of respondents viewed economic policies as successful, a 14pp decline from the previous year. This highlights the need for Erdogan to revive confidence in Turkey’s policymaking institutions and to deliver on the economic front.     The key is how Erdogan will handle economic policy. However, it is still too early to call for a sustainable improvement in the Turkish economy as many of the same fundamental imbalances continue to pose risks. While the current account has improved significantly – even registering a surplus in May – the improvement will not endure (Chart 12). On the one hand, the weaker lira has made exports more attractive relative to global competition. However, the improvement in the external balance is in large part due to weaker imports which are now more expensive for Turkey’s residents and have fallen by 19% y/y in 1H2019. Shrinking imports also reflect weak domestic demand which has been weighed down by tight monetary conditions (Chart 13). Chart 12Current Account Improvement Will Not Endure Chart 13Tight Monetary Conditions Weighed On Domestic Demand What is more, portfolio inflows which in the past were necessary to offset the large current account deficit, have collapsed (Chart 14). Were it not for the improvement in the trade balance, the central bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) would have experienced a pronounced decline in its foreign reserves, and currency pressures would have been significant. A meaningful improvement in investor sentiment – which will remain cautious on the back of economic and geopolitical risks – is a necessary precondition for the return of these inflows. Nevertheless, the current account deficit will likely remain narrow in the second half of the year as the trade balance improves on the back of a weak lira and imports remain depressed due to soft domestic demand. This will keep the lira supported over this period. Although risks from a wide current account deficit have been temporarily put off, years of foreign debt accumulation are a hazard to a sustainable improvement in the lira. Foreign debt obligations (FDO) due over the coming 12 months are extremely elevated at $167 billion (Chart 15). It is not clear that they can be paid off. While the FDO figure is overly pessimistic as some of these debts will be rolled over, net central bank foreign exchange reserves can cover only 2.7% of these obligations. This poses downside risks on the lira at a time when inflows have not yet recovered.1 Moreover, unorthodox economic policies will eventually reverse any improvement in the currency. Chart 14Financial Account Does Not Lend Support Chart 15FDO Pose A Risk To The Currency While the 4 years between now and the next election could be an opportunity to embark on unpopular structural reforms that will improve the outlook by the time voting season rolls in, Erdogan has instead doubled down on his current strategy. Less than two weeks after the results of the Istanbul election rerun, CBRT governor Murat Cetinkaya was removed by presidential decree. A month later, key CBRT staff were dismissed.2 At his first monetary policy committee meeting as governor on July 25, Murat Uysal slashed the one-week repo rate by 425bps. Given Erdogan’s outspoken distaste for high interest rates, the president’s consolidation of power over economic decision making implies that the outlook for easier monetary policy is now guaranteed. However, the ramifications of this dovish shift will be concerning for voters. The depreciating lira was singled out as the most important economic problem facing Turkey by the largest number of survey respondents (Chart 16). Erdogan’s pursuit of dovish policies despite popular opinion shows that he is doubling down on unorthodox policy despite popular opinion. Monetary easing threatens to unwind the current account improvement and ultimately de-stabilize the lira. Assuming that the banking sector does not hold back the supply of credit to the private sector, lower rates will generate a pickup in demand which will raise imports and widen the current account deficit. Unless there is a marked improvement in investor sentiment – which will remain tainted by the erosion of central bank independence and increased tensions with the West – a return in portfolio inflows to pre-2018 levels is unlikely. As a consequence the lira will begin to soften anew in 2020. The lira will soften anew in 2020. While inflation will subside as the lira stabilizes this year, it will likely remain elevated relative to pre-2018 levels – in the 10% to 15% range. Contrary to Erdoganomics, traditional economic theory postulates that interest rate cuts pose upside pressure on prices. The resurgence in domestic demand will occur against a backdrop of rising wages (Chart 17). Chart 17Price Pressures Will Persist With foreign currency reserves running low, the CBRT recently adopted several measures to discourage locals from exchanging their liras for foreign currency. These efforts reflect attempts to mitigate the negative impact of monetary easing on the lira, and to ensure FX reserves are supported: A 1-percentage point increase in the reserve requirement ratio for foreign currency deposits and participation funds. A 1-percentage point reduction in the interest rate on dollar-denominated required reserves, reserve options and free reserves held at the bank. An increase in the tax on some foreign exchange sales to 0.1% from zero. These measures make it more expensive for banks to hold foreign currency, incentivizing lira holdings instead. They also raise the CBRT’s foreign reserves highlighting the downside risks on these holdings and the lira. However, given that these measures boost CBRT reserves only superficially – rather than mirroring an improvement in the underlying economic conditions – they highlight that need for policy tightening to defend the lira, even as the CBRT officially pursues an accommodative path. Bottom Line: The Turkish economy will be extremely relevant to Erdogan’s fate in 2023. However with large foreign debt obligations, a rate cutting cycle underway, and foreign investors who remain uneasy, the case for Turkey’s economic recovery – especially amid turbulent global conditions – is weak. In the meantime, Erdogan will continue to blame external factors for the nation’s malaise. Don’t Bet On Trump-Erdogan Friendship “Being Asian and in Asia is as important as being European and in Europe for us.” Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu For several years Erdogan has attempted to distract the populace from the country’s economic slide by adopting an aggressive foreign policy, particularly toward the West. The immediate cause is Syria, where Turkey has fundamental security interests that clash with those of the U.S. and Europe. But tensions also stem from Erdogan’s economic and political instability. This aggressive foreign policy has not changed in the wake of the AKP’s electoral loss. Erdogan is continuing to test the U.S.’s and EU’s limits and the result is likely to be surprise events, such as U.S.-imposed sanctions, that hurt Turkey’s economy and financial assets. Erdogan clashes with the West both because of substantive regional disagreements and because it plays well domestically. Turks increasingly see the U.S. and other formal NATO allies as a threat, while looking more favorably upon American rivals like Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela (Chart 18). The U.S., meanwhile, is expanding the use of “secondary sanctions” to impose costs on states that make undesirable deals with its rivals, and Turkey is now in its sights. The reason is Erdogan’s decision to purchase the S400 missile defense system from Russia. This decision exemplifies the breakdown in the U.S.-Turkish alliance and Turkey’s search for alternative partners and allies. The arms sale is likely – eventually – to trigger secondary sanctions under the U.S. International Emergency Economic Powers Act and especially the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Washington has already imposed sanctions on China for buying the same weapons from Russia. Erdogan recently accepted the first delivery of components for the S400s, which are supposed to go live by April 2020. He stuck with this decision in disregard of Washington’s warnings. He has a solid base of popular support across political parties for this act of foreign policy and military independence from the U.S. (Chart 19). But the full consequences have not yet been felt. President Trump’s response is muted thus far. He banned Turkish pilots from the U.S. F-35 program and training but has not yet imposed sanctions due to his special relationship with Erdogan and ongoing negotiations over Syria. Syria is the root of the breakdown in Turkish-American relations since 2014. Washington and Ankara have clashed repeatedly over their preferred means of intervening into the Syrian civil war and fighting the Islamic State. The U.S. relies on the Syrian Democratic Forces, led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which are affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK is based in Turkey and both the U.S. and Turkey designate it as a “terrorist organization” due to its militant activities in its long-running struggle for autonomy from Turkey. Turkey has intervened in Syria west of the Euphrates River and has repeatedly threatened to conduct deeper strikes against the Kurds. The latter would put U.S. troops in harm’s way and could result in lost leverage for Western forces seeking to maintain their YPG allies and force an acceptable settlement to the Syrian conflict. There is a basis for a deal between Presidents Trump and Erdogan that could keep sanctions from happening. Trump is attempting to wash its hands of Syria to fulfill a promise of limiting U.S. costs in wars abroad. Meanwhile an aggressive intervention in Syria is not a popular option in Turkey, which is why Erdogan has not acted on threats to seize a larger swath of territory (Chart 20). As a result, the U.S. and Turkey recently formed a joint operation center to coordinate and manage “safe zones” for Syrian refugees. If they can manage the gray area on the Turkish-Syrian border, the Trump administration can continue to prepare for withdrawal while preventing Erdogan from taking too much Kurdish territory. The tradeoff is clear, but similar agreements have fallen apart. First, the U.S. Congress is ready to impose sanctions over the S400s and Trump is under pressure to punish Turkey for undermining NATO and dealing with the Russians. Second, the Trump administration has not found an acceptable solution to the Syrian imbroglio that makes full withdrawal possible. If Trump becomes convinced that the risks of a total and rapid withdrawal from Syria are greater than the rewards (as many of his GOP allies staunchly believe), then he has less incentive to protect Erdogan. Meanwhile Erdogan could still decide he needs to plunge deeper into Syria to counteract the YPG. Or he could retaliate against any sanctions over the S400s and provoke a broader tit-for-tat exchange. He has threatened to cancel orders for Boeing aircraft worth $10 billion. Clearly U.S. sanctions will cause the lira to fall and send Turkey into another bout of financial turmoil. In the meantime Turkey’s relations with Europe also pose risks. While the refugee crisis has abated, in great part due to Turkish cooperation, other disagreements are still problematic: The EU is not upgrading Turkey’s customs union and both sides know that Turkey is not eligible for EU membership anytime soon. In response to what the EU has deemed as illegal drilling for oil and gas off the coast of Cyprus, the EU called off high-level political meetings with Turkey and suspended EUR 145.8 million in pre-accession aid. EU foreign ministers have also put off talks on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement between the two parties which would have led to an increase in passengers using Turkish airports as a transit hub. In addition, EU ministers asked the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey, which amounted to EUR 358.8 million last year. Erdogan is taking a bolder approach to Cyprus. He has decided to send a fourth ship to drill for natural gas in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Eastern Mediterranean. The purpose is to rally support for his government by calling on the public’s strong allegiance to Turkish Cypriots (Chart 21). The problem is that a confrontation sought as a domestic distraction could provoke negative policy reactions from the EU (or the U.S., which is reconsidering its arms embargo on the Greek Cypriot side). Relations with the West would get worse. Chart 22... But Turkey Cannot Afford To Flout The EU Turkey cannot afford to flout the U.S. and EU. Its economy is dependent on Europe (Chart 22). And the U.S. still underwrites Turkey’s NATO membership and access to the global financial system. The problem is that Erdogan is an ambitious and unorthodox leader and he has clearly wagered that he can rally domestic support through various confrontations with Western policies. This means that for the immediate future the country is more likely to clash with Western nations than it is to recognize its own limits. Political risks are frontloaded and investors should be cautious before trying to snap up the depressed lira or Turkish government bonds. Bottom Line: Tensions with the West – especially the U.S. – will likely lead to economic sanctions. While there is a basis for Presidents Trump and Erdogan to avoid a falling out, it is not reliable enough to underpin a constructive investment position – especially given Erdogan has not changed course in the wake of this year’s significant electoral loss. Investment Conclusions Chart 23Optimism On Lira Amid Unresolved Risks The lira has rallied by 3.6% since the Istanbul election. It has risen 0.3% since the replacement of CBRT Governor Murat Cetinkaya and rallied further despite the sacking of the central bank’s chief economist and other high-level staff (Chart 23). Given that the market knows that the central bank reshuffle entails interest rate cuts, is this a clear signal that the lira has hit a firm bottom and cannot fall further? Turkey is more likely to clash with Western nations.  We doubt it. First, Erdogan’s doubling down on unorthodox policy threatens the recovery in the currency and risk assets and his aggressive foreign policy raises the risk of sanctions and further economic pain. Second, although Turkey is not overly exposed to China, it is heavily exposed to Europe, which is on the brink of a full-fledged recession and depends heavily on the Chinese credit cycle – which had another disappointment in July. German manufacturing PMI has been sinking further below the 50 boom-bust mark since the beginning of the year, and the economy contracted in 2Q2019 (Chart 24). Chart 24Global Backdrop Not Yet Supportive Chart 25Improvement In Spread Will Be Fleeting Given these domestic and global economic risks and geopolitical tensions, we expect any improvement in the sovereign spread to be fleeting (Chart 25). While the lira may experience temporary improvement, pressures will re-emerge in 2020 as the lagged impact of Erdogan’s pursuit of growth at all costs re-emerge. Stay on the sidelines as any improvement in the near term is fraught with risk.     Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy roukayai@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Country Insights: Indonesia, Turkey, And The UAE” May 2, 2019, ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Among those removed are the central bank’s chief economist Hakan Kara as well as the research and monetary policy general manager, markets general manager, and banking and financial institutions general manager.

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Dear Client, Instead of our regular report, this week we are sending you a Special Report penned by Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist of our sister Geopolitical Strategy service, titled “The Polybius Solution.” In this report Matt argues that a full-fledged cold war with China would put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. We trust that you will find this Special Report useful and insightful. Best regards, Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist Highlights So What? U.S.-Iran risk is front-loaded, but U.S.-China is the greater risk overall. A full-fledged cold war with China will put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. War with Iran or trade war escalation with China are both ultimately dollar bullish – even though tactically the dollar may fall.  Feature The idea of the “Thucydides Trap” has gone viral in recent years – for good reason. The term, coined by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, refers to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (460-400 BC), author of the seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. The “trap” is the armed conflict that most often develops when a dominant nation that presides over a particular world order (e.g. Sparta, the U.S.) faces a young and ambitious rival that seeks fundamental change to that order (e.g. Athens, China).1 This conflict between an “established” and “revisionist” power was highlighted by the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his translation of Thucydides in the seventeenth century; every student of international relations knows it. Allison’s contribution is the comparative analysis of various Thucydides-esque episodes in the modern era to show how today’s U.S.-China rivalry fits the pattern. The implication is that war (not merely trade war) is a major risk. We have long held a similar assessment of the U.S.-China conflict. It is substantiated by hard data showing that China is gaining on America in various dimensions of power (Chart 1). Assuming that the U.S. does not want to be replaced, the current trade conflict will metastasize to other areas. If the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. There is an important but overlooked corollary to the Thucydides Trap: if the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. Polarization fell dramatically during the Great Depression and World War II and remained subdued throughout the Cold War. It only began to rise again when the Soviet threat faded and income inequality spiked circa 1980. Americans were less divided when they shared a common enemy that posed an existential threat; they grew more divided when their triumph proved to benefit some disproportionately to others (Chart 2). Chart 1China Is Gaining On The U.S. Chart 2U.S. Polarization Falls During Crisis   If the U.S. and China continue down the path of confrontation, a similar pattern is likely to emerge in the coming years – polarization is likely to decline. China possesses the raw ability to rival or even supplant the United States as the premier superpower over the very long run. Its mixed economy is more sustainable than the Soviet command economy was, and it is highly integrated into the global system, unlike the isolated Soviet bloc. As long as China’s domestic demand holds up and Beijing does not suppress its own country’s technological and military ambitions, Trump and the next president will face a persistent need to respond with measures to limit or restrict China’s capabilities. Eventually this will involve mobilizing public opinion more actively. Further, if the U.S.-China conflict escalates, it will clarify U.S. relations with the rest of the world. For instance, Trump’s handling of trade suggests that he could refrain from trade wars with American allies to concentrate attention on China, particularly sanctions on its technology companies. Meanwhile a future Democratic president would preserve some of these technological tactics while reinstituting the multilateral approach of the Barack Obama administration, which launched the “Pivot to Asia,” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and intensive freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. These are all aspects of a containment strategy that would reinforce China’s rejection of the western order. Bottom Line: If the White House, any White House, were to pursue a consistent strategy to contain China, the result would be a major escalation of the trade conflict that would bring Americans together in the face of a common enemy. It would also encourage the U.S. to form alliances in pursuit of this objective. So far these things have not occurred, but they are logical corollaries of the Thucydides Trap and they will occur if the Thucydides thesis is validated. How Would China Fare In The Thucydides Trap? China would be in trouble in this scenario. The United States, if the public unifies, would have a greater geopolitical impact than it currently does in its divided state. And a western alliance would command still greater coercive power than the United States acting alone (Chart 3). External pressure would also exacerbate China’s internal imbalances – excessive leverage, pollution, inefficient state involvement in the economy, poor quality of life, and poor governance (Chart 4). China has managed to stave off these problems so far because it has operated under relative American and western toleration of its violations of global norms (e.g. a closed financial system, state backing of national champions, arbitrary law, censorship). This would change under concerted American, European, and Japanese efforts. Chart 3China Fears A Western 'Grand Alliance' Chart 4China's Domestic Risks Underrated Concerted external pressure would make it harder for China to manage its internal imbalances. How would the Communist Party respond? First, it could launch long-delayed and badly needed structural reforms and parlay these as concessions to the West. The ramifications would be negative for Chinese growth on a cyclical basis but positive on a structural basis since the reforms would lift productivity over the long run – a dynamic that our Emerging Markets Strategy has illustrated, in a macroeconomic context, in Diagram 1. This is already an option in the current trade war, but China has not yet clearly chosen it – likely because of the danger that the U.S. would exploit the slowdown. Diagram 1Foreign Pressure And Structural Reform = Short-Term Pain For Long-Term Gain Alternatively the Communist Party could double down on confrontation with the West, as Russia has done. This would strengthen the party’s grip but would be negative for growth on both a cyclical and structural basis. The effectiveness of China’s fiscal-and-credit stimulus would likely decline because of a drop in private sector activity and sentiment – already a nascent tendency – while the lack of “reform and opening up” would reduce long-term growth potential. This option makes structural reforms look more palatable – but again, China has not yet been forced to make this choice. None of the above is to say that the West is destined to win a cold war with China, but rather that the burden of revolutionizing the global order necessarily falls on the country attempting to revolutionize it. Bottom Line: If the Thucydides Trap fully takes effect, western pressure on China’s economy will force China into a destabilizing economic transition. China could lie low and avoid conflict in order to undertake reforms, or it could amplify its aggressive foreign policy. This is where the risk of armed conflict rises. Introducing … The Polybius Solution The problem with the above is that there is no sign of polarization abating anytime soon in the United States. Extreme partisanship makes this plain (Chart 5). Rising polarization could prevent the U.S. from responding coherently to China. The Thucydides Trap could be avoided, or delayed, simply because the U.S. is distracted elsewhere. The most likely candidate is Iran. A lesser known Greek historian – who was arguably more influential than Thucydides – helps to illustrate this alternative vision for the future. This is Polybius (208-125 BC), a Greek who wrote under Roman rule. He described the rise of the Roman Empire as a result of Rome’s superior constitutional system. Polybius explains domestic polarization whereas Thucydides explains international conflict. Polybius took the traditional view that there were three primary virtues or powers governing human society: the One (the king), the Few (the nobles), and the Many (the commons). These powers normally ran the country one at a time: a dictator would die; a group of elites would take over; this oligarchy would devolve into democracy or mob-rule; and from the chaos would spring a new dictator. His singular insight – his “solution” to political decay – was that if a mixture or balance of the three powers could be maintained, as in the Roman republic, then the natural cycle of growth and decay could be short-circuited, enabling a regime to live much longer than its peers (Diagram 2). Diagram 2Polybius: A Balanced Political System Breaks The Natural Cycle Of Tyranny And Chaos In short, just as post-WWII economic institutions have enabled countries to reduce the frequency and intensity of recessions (Chart 6), so Polybius believed that political institutions could reduce the frequency and intensity of revolutions. Eventually all governments would decay and collapse, but a domestic system of checks and balances could delay the inevitable. Needless to say, Polybius was hugely influential on English and French constitutional thinkers and the founders of the American republic. Chart 6Orthodox Economic Policy Has Made Recessions Less Frequent And Less Acute What is the cause of constitutional decay, according to Polybius? Wealth, inequality, and corruption, which always follow from stable and prosperous times. “Avarice and unscrupulous money-making” drive the masses to encroach upon the elite and demand a greater share of the wealth. The result is a vicious cycle of conflict between the commons and the nobles until either the constitutional system is restored or a democratic revolution occurs. Compared to Thucydides, Polybius had less to say about the international balance of power. Domestic balance was his “solution” to unpredictable outside events. However, states with decaying political systems were off-balance and more likely to be conquered, or to overreach in trying to conquer others. Bottom Line: The “Polybius solution” equates with domestic political balance. Balanced states do not allow the nation’s leader, the elite, or the general population to become excessively powerful. But even the most balanced states will eventually decline. As they accumulate wealth, inequality and corruption emerge and cause conflict among the three powers. Why Polybius Matters Today It does not take a stretch of the imagination to apply the Polybius model to the United States today. Just as Rome grew fat with its winnings from the Punic Wars and decayed from a virtuous republic into a luxurious empire, as Polybius foresaw, so the United States lurched from victory over the Soviet Union to internal division and unforced errors. For instance, the budget surplus of 2% of GDP in the year 2000 became a budget deficit of 9% of GDP after a decade of gratuitous wars, profligate social spending and tax cuts, and financial excesses. It is on track to balloon again when the next recession hits – and this is true even without any historic crisis event to justify it. U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. The rise in polarization has coincided with a rise in wealth inequality, much as Polybius would expect (Chart 7). In all likelihood the Trump tax cuts will exacerbate both of these trends (Chart 8). Even worse, any attempts by “the people” to take more wealth from the “nobles” will worsen polarization first, long before any improvements in equality translate to a drop in polarization. Chart 7Polarization Unlikely To Drop While Inequality Rises Chart 8Trump Tax Cuts Fuel Inequality Most importantly, from a global point of view, U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. Just as the George W. Bush administration launched a preemptive war in Iraq, destabilizing the region, so the Obama administration precipitously withdrew from Iraq, destabilizing the region. And just as the Obama administration initiated a hurried détente with Iran in order to leave Iraq, the Trump administration precipitously withdrew from this détente, provoking a new conflict with Iran and potentially destabilizing Iraq. Major foreign policy initiatives have been conducted, and revoked, on a partisan basis under three administrations. And a Democratic victory in 2020 would result in a reversal of Trump’s initiatives. In the meantime Trump’s policy could easily entangle him in armed conflict with Iran – as nearly occurred on June 21. Iranian domestic politics make it very difficult, if not impossible, to go back to the 2015 setting. Despite Trump’s recent backpedaling, his administration runs a high risk of getting sucked into another Middle Eastern quagmire as long as it enforces the sanctions on Iranian oil stringently. China would be the big winner if such a war occurred, just as it was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the long American distraction in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would benefit from another 5-10 years of American losses of blood and treasure. It would be able to pursue regional interests with less Interference and could trade limited cooperation with the U.S. on Iran for larger concessions elsewhere. And a nuclear-armed Iran – which is a long-term concern for the U.S. – is not in China’s national interest anyway. Bottom Line: The U.S. is missing the “Polybius solution” of balanced government; polarization is on the rise. As a result, the grand strategy of “pivoting to Asia” could go into reverse (Chart 9). If that occurs, the conflict with China will be postponed or ineffective. Chart 9Will The Pivot To Asia Reverse? Iran Is The Wild Card If the U.S. gets bogged down in the Middle East yet again, the “Pivot To Asia” will go into reverse and the “Thucydides Trap” with China will be delayed. A war with Iran manifestly runs afoul of the Trump administration’s and America’s national interests, whereas a trade war with China does not. First, although an Iranian or Iranian-backed attack on American troops would give Trump initial support in conducting air strikes, the consequences of war would likely be an oil price shock that would sink his approval rating over time and reduce his chances of reelection (Chart 10). We have shown that such a shock could come from sabotage in Iraq as well as from attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could be driven to attack if it believes the U.S. is about to attack. Second, not only would Democrats oppose a war with Iran, but Americans in general are war-weary, especially with regard to the Middle East (Chart 11). President Trump capitalized on this sentiment during his election campaign, especially in relation to Secretary Hillary Clinton who supported the war in Iraq. Over the past two weeks, he has downplayed the Iranian-backed tanker attacks, emphasized that he does not want war, and has ruled out “boots on the ground.” Chart 10Carter Gained Then Lost From Iran Oil Shock Third, it follows from the above that, in the event of war, the United States would lack the political will necessary to achieve its core strategic objectives, such as eliminating Iran’s nuclear program or its power projection capabilities. And these are nearly impossible to accomplish from the air alone. And U.S. strategic planners are well aware that conflict with Iran will exact an opportunity cost by helping Russia and China consolidate spheres of influence. The wild card is Iran. President Hassan Rouhani has an incentive to look tough and push the limits, given that he was betrayed on the 2015 deal. And the regime itself is probably confident that it can survive American air strikes. American military strikes are still a serious constraint, but until the U.S. demonstrates that it is willing to go that far, Iran can test the boundaries. In doing so it also sends a message to its regional rivals – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab monarchies, and Israel – that the U.S. is all bark, no bite, and thus unable to protect them from Iran. This may lead to a miscalculation that forces Trump to respond despite his inclinations. The China trade war, by contrast, is less difficult for the Trump administration to pursue. There is not a clear path from tariffs to economic recession, as with an oil shock: the U.S. economy has repeatedly shrugged off counter-tariffs and the Fed has been cowed. While Americans generally oppose the trade war, Trump’s base does not, and the health of the overall economy is far more important for most voters. And a majority of voters do believe that China’s trade practices are unfair. Strategic planners also favor confronting China – unlike Trump they are not concerned with reelection, but they recognize that China’s advantages grow over time, including in critical technologies. Bottom Line: While the media and market focus on China and Iran risks can alternate in the short run, the Trump administration is likely to continue downgrading the conflict with Iran and upgrading the conflict with China over the next six-to-18 months. Neither politics nor grand strategy support a war with Iran, whereas politics might support a trade war with China and grand strategy almost certainly does. China Could Learn From Polybius Too China also lacks the Polybius solution. It suffers from severe inequality and social immobility, just like the Latin American states and the U.S., U.K., and Italy (Chart 12). But unlike the developed markets, it lacks a robust constitutional system. Political risks are understated given the emergence of the middle class, systemic economic weaknesses, and poor governance. Over the long run, Xi Jinping will need to step down, but having removed the formal system for power transition, a succession crisis is likely. China’s imbalances could cause domestic instability even if the U.S. becomes distracted by conflict in the Middle East. But China has unique tools for alleviating crises and smoothing out its economic slowdown, so the absence of outside pressure will probably determine its ability to avoid a painful economic slump. China also lacks the “Polybius solution” of balanced government – and it even lacks a robust constitutional system. This helps to explain China’s interest in dealing with the U.S. on North Korea. President Xi Jinping’s first trip to Pyongyang late last month helped pave the way for President Trump to resume negotiations with the North’s leader Kim Jong Un at the first-ever visit of an American president north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). China does not want an unbridled nuclear North Korea or an American preventative war on the peninsula. If Beijing could do a short-term deal with the U.S. on the basis of assistance in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it could divert U.S. animus away from itself and encourage the U.S. to turn its attention toward the next rogue nuclear aspirant, Iran. It would also avoid structural economic concessions. Of course, a smooth transition today means short-term gain but long-term pain for Chinese and global growth. Productivity and potential GDP will decline if China does not reform (Diagram 3). But this kind of transition is the regime’s preferred option since Beijing seeks to minimize immediate threats and maintain overall stability. Diagram 3Stimulus And Delayed Reforms = Socialist Put = Stagflation If Chinese internal divisions do flare up, China’s leaders will take a more aggressive posture toward its neighbors and the United States in order to divert public attention and stir up patriotic support. Bottom Line: China suffers from understated internal political risk. While U.S. political divisions could lead to a lack of coherent strategy toward China, a rift in China could lead to Chinese aggression in its neighborhood, accelerating the Thucydides Trap. Investment Conclusions If the U.S. reverses the pivot to Asia, attacks Iran, antagonizes European allies, and exhausts its resources in policy vacillation, its budget deficit will balloon (Chart 13), oil prices will rise, and China will be left to manage its economic transition without a western coalition against it. The implication is a weakening dollar, at least initially. But the U.S. is nearing the end of its longest-ever business expansion and an oil price spike would bring forward the next recession, both of which will push up the greenback. Much will depend on the extent of any oil shock – whether and how long the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. Beyond the next recession, the dollar could suffer severe consequences for the U.S.’s wild policies. Chart 13An Iran War Will Bust The Budget Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, U.S.-China conflict will be the dominant marketmover. If the U.S. continues the pivot to Asia, and the U.S. and China proceed with tariffs, tech sanctions, saber-rattling, diplomatic crises, and possibly even military skirmishes, China will be forced into an abrupt and destabilizing economic transition. The U.S. dollar will strengthen as global growth decelerates. Developed market equities will outperform emerging market equities, but equities as a whole will underperform sovereign bonds and other safe-haven assets. Our highest conviction call on this matter is that any trade deal before the U.S. 2020 election will be limited in scope. It will fall far short of a “Grand Compromise” that ushers in a new era of U.S.-China engagement – and hence it will be a disappointment to global equities. Our trade war probabilities, updated on July 26, can be found in Diagram 4. The combined risk of further escalation is 60% -- meaning that the U.S. will either implement the final batch of tariffs or refuse to renew Huawei’s trade license, or both. We are maintaining our risk-off trades: long JPY/USD, long gold, long Swiss bonds, and long USD/CNY. Diagram 4U.S.-China Trade War Decision Tree (Updated July 26, 2019)   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, and Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

Highlights So What? Tariffs and currency depreciation will likely lead to military saber-rattling in Asia Pacific. Why? President Trump is not immune to the market’s reaction to his trade war escalation. Yet China’s currency depreciation is a major escalation and the near-term remains fraught with danger for investors. Military shows of force and provocations could crop up across Asia Pacific, further battering sentiment or delaying trade talks. Remain short CNY-USD, short the Hang Seng index, long JPY-USD, and long gold. Overweight the U.S. defense sector relative to global stocks. Feature The Osaka G20 tariff ceasefire has collapsed; U.S. President Donald Trump is threatening tariffs on all Chinese imports; the People’s Bank of China has allowed the renminbi to depreciate beneath the important 7.0 exchange rate to the dollar; and the United States has formally labeled China a “currency manipulator.” What a week! The spike in volatility is likely to be accompanied by a rise in credit risk, as measured by the TED spread (Chart 1). Safe havens like gold, treasuries, and the Japanese yen are rallying in a classic risk-off episode, while messengers of global growth like copper, the Australian dollar, and the CRB raw industrials index are stumbling (Chart 2). Only green shoots in Chinese trade and German manufacturing have kept the selloff in check this week by improving the cyclical outlook despite elevated near-term risks. Chart 1So Much For The Osaka G20 Tariff Ceasefire! Chart 2Key Risk-On/Risk-Off Indicators Breaking Down While we anticipated the re-escalation of U.S.-China tensions, now is the time to take stock and reassess. President Trump is a political animal. While he has demonstrated a voracious risk appetite throughout the year, he is ultimately focused on reelection in November 2020. The United States will survive without a trade deal by then, but Trump may not. Presumably, Trump’s reason for increasing pressure on China throughout 2019 is to secure a deal by the end of the year. This would be to see China’s concessions translate into trade perks for the U.S. markets and economy in 2020 by the time he hits the campaign trail. The experience of Q4 2018 suggests that Trump changed his negotiating tack after U.S. equities fell by only 4% from their peak – but we consider an equity correction a clear pain threshold (Chart 3). Trump is closely associated with the economic fortunes of the country, even more so than the average president. Bear markets tend to coincide with recessions. Trump – beset by controversy and scandal at home – must assume that a recession will be the coup de grâce. Chart 3Where Is President Trump's Pain Threshold? Chart 4Will Huawei Ban Hit The Tech Sectors? Investors will get some clarity next week when the Commerce Department decides whether to renew the general temporary license for American companies to trade with Chinese telecoms giant Huawei. A full denial of the license would signal that Trump is unconcerned with recession and reelection probabilities and focusing exclusively on the national security threat from China. It would send technology sectors and the broader equity market into a plunge on both sides of the Pacific (Chart 4) and could significantly increase the risk that the global economy begins a downturn. Positive signals are scarce as we go to press: New tariff is on track: The U.S. Trade Representative is preparing a final list of $300 billion in goods to fall under a new 10% tariff, despite reports that Trump overrode USTR Robert Lighthizer in announcing the new tariff. This does not guarantee that the tariff will go into effect on September 1 but it does make it more likely than not. Huawei is under pressure: Office of Management and Budget has disqualified Huawei from any U.S. government contracts as of August 13 – a ban to be extended to any third parties contracting Huawei as of the same date next year. This is not encouraging for Huawei but it is a separate and more limited determination from that of the Commerce Department. Still, we expect the Trump administration to take some moves to offset the ongoing trade escalation. While we are inclined to think the new tariff will take effect, Huawei will likely get a reprieve in the meantime. This will help to ensure that the September trade talks in Washington, DC go forward. The administration has an interest in keeping the trade negotiations alive. Furthermore, there is some evidence that President Trump is recognizing the need to calm other “trade wars” to mitigate the impact of the central China trade war. In September the administration will attempt ratification of the USMCA in Congress – we still think this is slightly favored to go through. We also expect a U.S.-Japan trade agreement to materialize rapidly – likely at the UN General Assembly from September 17-30. Another positive sign is that the European Union has agreed to expand beef imports from the United States. Real movement on agriculture, while China cancels U.S. ag imports, implies that President Trump is less likely to impose car tariffs on Europe for national security reasons on November 13-14.1 The problem is that the fallout from China’s currency depreciation and the new tariffs will hit the market before anything else, which means we remain tactically bearish. Heightened trade tensions are also likely to spill into the strategic sphere in the near term. Saber-rattling – military shows of force and provocations – will increase the geopolitical risk premium across the globe, especially in East Asia. A frightening U.S.-China clash may ultimately encourage real compromises in the trade negotiations, but the market would get the negative news first. If Washington does not make any reassuring moves but expands the current policy assault on China – including through a Huawei ban – then we will consider shifting to a defensive posture cyclically as well as tactically. Bottom Line: We recognize that President Trump may be forced by the risk of a recession to relax the trade pressure and accept some kind of China deal – we may upgrade this 40% chance if and when the U.S. veers toward an equity bear market. In the meantime we expect further negative fallout from the past week’s aggressive maneuvers by both sides. Currency War Assuming that an equity correction is inevitable at some point and that Trump goes crawling back to the Chinese for trade talks: How will they respond? Will Xi Jinping, the strongman general secretary of a resurgent Communist Party, return to talks and reassure global markets at Trump’s beck and call? Or will he refuse, let the market do what it will, and let Trump hang? By letting the currency drop … Beijing is expressing open defiance. The renminbi’s depreciation – through PBoC inaction on August 5, then through action on August 8 – is a warning that Trump is approaching the point of no return. His initial grievance has always been Chinese “currency manipulation” but until now he has refrained from formally leveling this accusation (only using it on Twitter). By letting the currency drop well beneath the level at which Trump was inaugurated (6.8 CNY-USD), and beyond the global psychological threshold, Beijing is expressing open defiance and threatening essentially to break off negotiations. Chart 5China Sends Warning Via Currency Depreciation The effect of continued depreciation would be to offset the effect of tariffs and ease financial conditions in China. This is fully in keeping with our view that China has opted for stimulus over reform this year. China is likely to follow up with further cuts to banks’ reserve requirement ratios and a cut to the benchmark policy interest rate (Chart 5). The July Politburo statement showed a greater willingness to stimulate the economy and it occurred prior to Trump’s new volley of tariffs. Currency appreciation is the surest way to rebalance China’s economy toward household consumption and obviate a strategic conflict with the United States. By contrast, yuan depreciation will exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit and give Trump’s Democratic rivals convenient evidence that the “Art of the Deal” is counterfeit. How far will the renminbi fall? Chart 6 updates our back-of-the-envelope calculation of the implication from different tariff scenarios assuming that the equilibrium bilateral exchange rate depreciation will equal the tariffs collected as a share of total exports to the United States. (10% tariff on $259 billion = $25.9 billion, which is 5% of $509 billion total.) The yuan is now approaching Scenario D, 25% tariffs on the first half of imports and 10% on the second half, which points toward 7.6 CNY-USD. There are reasons to believe that this simple framework won’t apply, at least in terms of the magnitude of the impact, but it gives an indication of considerable downward pressure. Chart 6The Yuan Will Fall, But Not Freely Chester Ntonifor of our Foreign Exchange Strategy sees the yuan falling to around 7.3-7.4 if the new tariffs are applied based on the fact that the 25% tariff on $250 billion worth of goods produced a roughly 10% decline in the bilateral exchange rate. Our Emerging Markets Strategy also expects about a 5% drop in the CNY-USD. Having tightened capital controls during the last bout of depreciation in 2015-16, China is probably capable of controlling the pace of depreciation, preventing capital outflows from becoming a torrent, by selling foreign exchange reserves, further tightening capital controls, or utilizing foreign currency forward swaps. But Asian currencies, global trade revenues in dollars, and EM currencies and risk assets will suffer – and they have more room to break down from current levels.2 Meanwhile even a modest drop in the renminbi – amid a return to dovish monetary policy in global central banks – has revived concerns about a global currency war. A rising dollar is anathema to President Trump, who aims to reduce the trade deficit, encourage the on-shoring of manufacturing, and maintain easy financial conditions for the U.S. economy. Table 1U.S. Demands On China In Trade Talks Chart 7U.S. Allies' Share Of Treasuries Rises Trump’s decision to slap a sweeping new tariff on China – reportedly at the objection of all of his trade advisers except the ultra-hawkish Peter Navarro (Table 1) – was at least partly driven by his desire to see the Fed cut rates beyond the 25 basis point cut on July 31 and weaken the dollar. Yet the escalation of the trade war weighs on global trade and growth, which will push the dollar up. This reinforces the above argument that Trump will probably seek to offset the recent trade war escalation with some mitigating moves. Beyond inducing the Fed to cut further, it is difficult for President Trump to drive the dollar down. The Treasury Department can intervene in foreign exchange markets, but direct intervention does not have a successful track record. Interventions usually have to be sterilized (expansion of the money supply externally must be addressed at home by mopping up the new liquidity), which in the context of free-moving global capital means that any depreciation will be short-lived. An unsterilized intervention would be extremely unorthodox and is unlikely short of a major crisis and breakdown in institutional independence. The U.S. could attempt to engineer an internationally coordinated currency intervention, as we have highlighted in the past. But it is highly unlikely to succeed this time around. The U.S. is less dominant of a military and economic power than it was when it orchestrated the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971 and the Plaza Accord of 1985. Neither the European nor the Japanese economies are in a position to tighten monetary policy or financial conditions through currency appreciation. While China weans itself off treasuries, U.S. allies and others fill the void. Indeed, after a long period in which American allies declined as a share total holders of treasuries – as China and emerging markets increased their forex reserves and treasury holdings momentously – allies are now taking a greater share (Chart 7). Chart 8China Diversifies While It Depreciates China is driving down the yuan not by buying more treasuries but by buying other things – diversifying away from the USD into alternative reserve currencies and hard assets, such as gold and resources tied to the Belt and Road Initiative (Chart 8). As trade, globalization, and global growth have slowed down, and as China’s growth model and the U.S.-China special relationship expire, global dollar liquidity is shrinking. Dollar liquidity is the lifeblood of the global financial system and the consequence is to tighten financial conditions, including via equity markets (Chart 9). The solution would be a trade deal in which China agrees to reforms to pacify the U.S., including an appreciation renminbi, while the U.S. abandons tariffs, enabling global trade, growth, commodity prices, and dollar liquidity to recover. Yet China was never likely to agree to a new Plaza Accord because it is delaying reform to its economy in order to maintain overall political stability – and the financial turmoil of 2015-16 only hardened this position. Chart 9Dollar Liquidity A Risk To Global Equities Moreover Japan in 1985 was already a subordinate ally and had a security guarantee from the United States that was not in question. By contrast, China today is asserting its “equality” as a nation with the U.S., and has no guarantee that Americans are not demanding economic reforms so as to debilitate China’s political stability and strategic capability. After tariffs and currency war comes saber-rattling. Comparing China to Japan in the decades leading up to the Plaza Accord shows how remote of a possibility this solution is: China’s currency has been moving in precisely the opposite direction (Chart 10). Chart 10So Much For Plaza Accord 2.0 The Plaza Accord is a useful analogy for another reason: it marked the peak in Japanese market share in the U.S. economy. In Japan’s case, currency appreciation was the primary mover, while Japan also relocated production to the United States. Chart 11The Real Analogy With The Plaza Accord In China’s case, if currency appreciation is ruled out and production is not relocated due to a failure to secure a trade agreement, then U.S. protectionism will remain the primary means of capping China’s share of the market (Chart 11). The dollar will remain strong and this will continue to weigh on global markets. Bottom Line: China’s recent currency depreciation is a warning signal to the U.S. that the trade negotiations could be broken off. There is further downside if the U.S. implements the new tariffs or hikes tariff rates further. The renminbi is unlikely to enter a freefall, however, because China maintains tight capital controls and is stimulating its economy. It is doubtful that the Trump administration can engineer a depreciation of the dollar through a multilateral agreement. It lacks the geopolitical heft of the 1970s-80s, and it does not have a strategic understanding with China that would enable Beijing to make the same degree of concessions that Tokyo made in 1985. Saber-Rattling After tariffs and currency depreciation, the next likeliest manifestation of strategic tensions lies in the military sphere. While the U.S. threatens to cut off Chinese tech companies like Huawei, Beijing has signaled that countermeasures would include an embargo on U.S. imports of rare earth elements and products.3 When China implemented a partial rare earth export ban on Japan (Chart 12), the context was a maritime-territorial dispute in the East China Sea in which military and strategic tensions were also escalating. The threat to industry only amplified these tensions. There are several locations in East Asia where conditions are ripe for clashes and incidents that could add to negative global sentiment. Indeed, saber-rattling has already begun in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Koreas, and the East and South China Seas. The following areas are the most likely to darken the outlook for U.S.-China negotiations: Direct U.S.-China tensions: The U.S. and China have experienced several minor clashes since the beginning of the Trump administration. The near-collision of a Chinese warship with the USS Decatur occurred in October 2018, after the implementation of the first sweeping tariff on $200 billion worth of goods – a period of tensions very similar to that of today.4 October 1 marks the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, an event that will be marked by outpourings of nationalism and a flamboyant military parade displaying advanced new weapons. The government in Beijing will be extremely sensitive in the lead-up to this anniversary, leading to tight domestic controls of news and media, hawkish rhetoric, and the potential for provocations on the high seas. Hong Kong and Taiwan: Chinese officials, including the People’s Liberation Army garrison commander in Hong Kong, the director of the Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, and the city’s embattled Chief Executive Carrie Lam have warned in various ways that if unrest spirals out of control, it could result in mainland China’s intervention. A large-scale police exercise in Shenzhen, Guangdong, just across the water, has highlighted Beijing’s willingness to take forceful action. The deployment of mainland troops would likely lead to casualties and could trigger sanctions from western countries that would have common cause on this issue. The Tiananmen Square incident shows that such an event could lead to a non-negligible hit to domestic demand and foreign exports under sanctions (Chart 13). Hong Kong is obviously a much smaller share of total exports to China these days, but when combined with Taiwan – where there could also be a hit to sentiment from Hong Kong unrest and possibly separate economic sanctions – the impact could be substantial (Chart 14). Chart 13Mainland Intervention In Hong Kong Could Prompt Sanctions Chart 14HK/Taiwan A Significant Share Of Greater China Trade Why would Taiwan get worse as a result of Hong Kong? Unrest in Hong Kong has already galvanized opposition to the mainland’s policies in Taiwan, where the presidential election polling has shifted in incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen’s favor (Chart 15). Beijing has imposed new travel restrictions and held a number of intimidating military exercises, while the U.S. has increased freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait. These trends could worsen over the next year. Japan and the East China Sea: Japan’s top military official – General Koji Yamazaki – recently warned that Chinese military intrusions are increasing around the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea. He called particular attention to China’s change of the Coast Guard from civilian to military control, which he said posed new risks of escalation in disputed waters. Japan itself may have an interest in a more confrontational stance over the coming year. The Japanese government has seen a rise in public opposition to its plan to revise the constitution to enshrine the Self-Defense Forces and thus move toward a more “normal” Japanese military and security posture (Chart 16). A revival of trouble in the South China Sea: China has not reduced its assertive foreign policy in order to win regional allies amid its conflict with the United States. On the contrary, it has continued asserting itself to the point of alienating governments that have largely sought to warm up to the Xi administration, including both Vietnam and the Philippines. The Vietnamese have engaged in a month-long standoff over alleged Chinese encroachments in its Exclusive Economic Zone. And a clash near Sandy Cay in the Spratly Islands is forcing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who has otherwise avoided confrontation with China, to address President Xi over the international court decision in 2016 that ruled out China’s claims of sovereignty over the disputed islands. The South China Sea is important because it is a vital supply line for all of the countries in the region. Even if the United States washed its hands of Beijing’s efforts to control the sea lanes, U.S. allies would still face a security threat that would drive tensions in these waters. This is a formidable group of Asian nations that China fears will seek to undermine it (Chart 17). And of course the Americans are not washing their hands of the region but actually reasserting their interest in maintaining a western Pacific defense perimeter. The Korean peninsula: North Korea has resumed testing short-range missiles, causing another hiccup in U.S. attempts at diplomacy (Chart 18). These tensions have the potential to flare as the U.S.-China trade talks deteriorate, since Beijing has offered cooperation on North Korea’s missile and nuclear program as a concession. Chart 17U.S. Asian Allies Formidable Chart 18North Korean Provocations Still Low-Level Ultimately North Korea needs to be part of the U.S.-China solution, so as long as tensions rise it sends a negative signal regarding the status of talks. And vice versa. South Korea is another case in which China is not reducing its foreign policy aggressiveness in order to win friends. On July 23, a combined Russo-Chinese bomber exercise over the disputed Dokdo (Takeshima) islands in the Sea of Japan led to interception by both Korean and Japanese fighter jets and the firing of hundreds of warning shots. The incident reveals that South Korean President Moon Jae-in is not seeing an improvement in relations with these countries despite his more pro-China orientation and his attempt to engage with North Korea. It also shows that while South Korea’s trade spat with Japan can persist for some time, it may take a back seat to these rising security challenges. As long as North Korean tensions rise it sends a negative signal regarding U.S.-China talks. Chart 19Russia May Need To Distract From Domestic Unrest Russia, like China, is feeling immense domestic political pressure, including large protests, that may result in greater foreign policy aggression (Chart 19). And as China and Russia tighten their informal alliance in the face of a more aggressive U.S., American allies face new operational pressures and the potential for geopolitical crises will rise. Bottom Line: The whole panoply of East Asian geopolitical risks is heating up as U.S.-China tensions escalate. While the U.S. and China may engage in direct provocations or miscalculations, their East Asian neighbors are implicated in the breakdown of the regional strategic order. A crisis in any of these hotspots could jeopardize the already unfavorable context for any U.S.-China trade deal over the next year, especially during rough patches like the very near term. Investment Implications Chart 20A Strategic Investment The potential for saber-rattling in the near term – on top of a series of critical U.S. decisions that could mitigate or exacerbate the increase in tensions surrounding the new tariff hike – argues strongly against altering our tactically defensive positioning at the moment. In this environment we advise clients to stick with our two strategic defense plays – long the BCA global defense basket in absolute terms, and long S&P500 Aerospace and Defense equities relative to global equities. The U.S. Congress’s newly agreed bipartisan budget deal provides a substantially improved fiscal backdrop for American defense stocks, which are already breaking out amid positive fundamentals. A host of non-negligible geopolitical risks speaks to the long-term nature of this trade (Chart 20). Our U.S. Equity Strategy recently reaffirmed its bullish position on this sector. We maintain that the U.S. and China have a 40% chance of concluding a trade agreement by November 2020. Note, however, that even a “no deal” scenario does not entail endless escalation. Presidents Trump and Xi could agree to another tariff ceasefire; negotiations could even lead to some tariff rollback in 2020. That would be, after all, Trump’s easiest way to “ease” trade policy amid recession risks. Nevertheless, our highest conviction call is not about whether there will be a deal, but that any trade truce that is reached will be shallow – an attempt to mitigate the trade war’s damage, save face, and bide time for the next round in U.S.-China conflict. We give only a 5% chance of a “Grand Compromise” by November 2020 that greatly expands the U.S.-China economic and corporate earnings outlook over the long haul. In this sense the ultimate trade deal will be a disappointment for markets.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 At the signing ceremony President Trump reminded his European interlocutors that the risk of car tariffs is not yet off the table. He concluded the celebration saying, “Congratulations. And we’re working on deal where the European Union will agree to pay a 25 percent tariff on all Mercedes-Benz’s, BMWs, coming into our nation. So, we appreciate that. I’m only kidding. (Laughter.) They started to get a little bit worried. They started — thank you. Congratulations. Best beef in the world. Thank you very much.” 2 See Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “EM: Into A Liquidation Phase?” August 8, 2019, ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 The national rare earth association holding a special working meeting and pledging to support any countermeasures China should take against U.S. tariffs. See Tom Daly, “China Rare Earths Group Supports Counter-Measures Against U.S. ‘Bullying,’” Reuters, August 7, 2019. 4 Military tensions are already heating up as Beijing criticizes the U.S. over the new Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s claim during his Senate confirmation hearings that new missile defense may be installed in the region in the coming years. This comes in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, partly due to China’s not being a signatory of the agreement. Missile defense is a long-term issue but these developments feed into the current negative atmosphere.

Informe especial

Highlights So What? Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical risks and still-elevated domestic risks reinforce our cyclically constructive view on oil prices. Why? Saudi Arabia is still in a “danger zone” of internal political risk due to the structural transformation of its economy and society. External risks arising from the Iran showdown threaten to cutoff oil production or transportation, adding to the oil risk premium. We expect oil price volatility to persist, but on a cyclical basis we are constructive on prices. We are maintaining our long EM oil producer equities trade versus the EM equity benchmark excluding China. This basket includes Saudi equities, although in the near term these equities face downside risks. Feature The pace of change in Saudi Arabia has been brisk. Women are driving, the IPO of Aramco is in the works, and the next monarch is likely to be a millennial. Changes to the global energy economy have raised the urgency for an economic transformation that will have political and social consequences, forcing a structural transformation. While the results thus far are attractive, the adjustment phase will be rocky. Saudi Arabia’s successful transition depends on its ability to navigate three main threats: Chart 1The Epic Shale Shake-Up Continues The growth of U.S. shale producers and the dilution of Saudi Arabia’s pricing power: Since the emergence of shale technology, Saudi Arabia faces a new reality in oil markets (Chart 1). Even in the current environment of supply disruptions from major producers such as Iran, Venezuela, and Libya, Brent prices have averaged just $66/bbl so far this year, weighed down by the global slowdown, and the macro context of rising U.S. production. Saudi Arabia has had to enlist the support of Russia in the production management agreement (OPEC 2.0) in effort to support oil prices. But continued oil production cuts come at the expense of the coalition’s market share, and crude exports are no longer a dependable source of revenue for Saudi Arabia. Domestic social and political uncertainties: The successful functioning of the political system has been dependent on the government’s ability to support the lifestyles of its citizens, who have grown accustomed to the generosity of their rulers. But economic challenges bring fiscal challenges. Moreover, shifting powers within the state raise the level of uncertainty and risks during the transition phase. Saber-rattling in the region: Heightened tensions with arch-enemy Iran are posing significant risks of instability and armed conflict that could affect oil production and transportation. And as the war in Yemen enters its fifth year, it poses risks to Saudi finances and oil infrastructure – as highlighted by the multiple drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities in May. These structural risks now dominate Saudi Arabia’s policy-making. OPEC 2.0’s decision at the beginning of this month to extend output cuts into 2020 aims to smooth the economic transition by maintaining a floor under oil prices. Meanwhile Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s Vision 2030 is underway – it is a blueprint for a future Saudi Arabia less dependent on oil (Table 1). Table 1Vision 2030 Highlights Saudi leadership will struggle to minimize near term instability without jeopardizing necessary structural change. In addition to an acute phase of tensions with Iran that could lead to destabilizing surprises this year or next, Saudi Arabia’s economy has just bottomed and is not yet out of the woods. Saudi Arabia’s Economy And Global Oil Markets: Adapting To The New Normal The trajectory of Saudi Arabia’s economic performance has improved since the U-turn in its oil-price management. From 2014-16 Riyadh attempted to drive U.S. shale producers out of business by cranking up production and running prices down. Since then it has supported prices through OPEC 2.0’s production cuts (Chart 2). Export earnings have rebounded over the past two years, reversing the current account deficit (Chart 3). Although net inflows from trade in real terms contribute a much smaller share of overall economic output compared to the mid-2000s, the good news is that the trade balance is back in surplus. Chart 2Return To Cartel Tactics Boosted Economy Nevertheless, the external balance remains hostage to oil prices and may weaken anew over a longer time horizon. Chart 3Current Account Balance Has Improved Chart 4Oil Revenues Easing Budget Strain ... For Now Greater government revenues are helping to improve the budget (Chart 4), but it remains in deficit. Moreover, we do not expect Saudi Arabia to flip the budget to a surplus over the coming two years. Despite our Commodity & Energy Strategy team’s expectation of higher oil prices in 2019 and 2020,1 Saudi Arabia will struggle to balance its budget in the coming 18 months (Chart 5). Their average Brent projection of $73-$75/bbl over the next 18 months still falls short of Saudi’s fiscal breakeven oil price. Most importantly, the kingdom’s black gold is no longer a reliable source of income. Weak oil revenues create a “do-or-die” incentive for Saudi policymakers to diversify the economy. As Chart 1 above illustrates, Saudi Arabia is losing global oil influence to U.S. shale producers. While OPEC 2.0 restrains production, the U.S. will continue dominating production growth, with shale output expected to grow ~1.2mm b/d this year and ~1 mm b/d in 2020.2 Saudi Aramco has been the driving force behind the production cuts (Chart 6), yielding more and more of its market share to American producers. The bad news for Saudi Arabia is that shale producers are here to stay. The kingdom is poorly positioned for this loss of control over oil markets (Chart 7) and is being forced to adapt by diversifying its economy at long last. Chart 7A Long Way To Go In Diversifying Exports Little progress has been made on this front, despite the fanfare surrounding the Vision 2030 plan. 70% of government revenues were derived from the oil sector last year, an increase from the 64% share from two years prior, and Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil trade has actually increased over the past year (Chart 8).3 This week’s announcement of Aramco’s plans to increase output capacity by 550k b/d does not support the diversification strategy. Nevertheless, the Saudis appear to be redoubling their efforts on Aramco’s delayed initial public offering. The IPO is an important aspect of the diversification process. It is also a driver of Saudi oil price management – other things equal, higher prices support the Saudis’ rosy assessments of the company’s total worth. While an excessively ambitious timeline and indecision over where to list the shares have been setbacks to the plan, last weekend’s meeting between King Salman and British finance minister Philip Hammond follows Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s reassertion last month that the IPO would take place in late 2020 or early 2021.4 On the non-oil front, given that Saudi Arabia’s fiscal policy is procyclical, activity in that sector is dependent on the performance of the oil sector. Strong oil sales not only improve liquidity, but also allow for greater government expenditures – both of which stimulate non-oil activity (Chart 9). This means the improvement in the non-oil sector is more a consequence of the rebound in oil revenues than an indication of successful diversification. Chart 8Saudi Reliance On Oil Not Falling Yet Yet the reform vision is not dead. Weak oil revenues may be a blessing in disguise, presenting Saudi policymakers with a “do-or-die” incentive to intensify diversification efforts. Chart 9Non-Oil Activity Still Depends On Oil Sales Bottom Line: By enlisting the support of Russia, Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain a floor beneath oil prices. However, this comes at the expense of falling market share. This leaves authorities with no choice but to diversify the economy – a feat yet to be performed. Domestic Instability Is A Potential Threat Political and social instability in Saudi Arabia is the second derivative of the new normal in global oil markets. So far instability has been limited, but the transition phase is ongoing and the government may not always manage the rapid pace of structural change as effectively as it has over the past two years. Traditionally, Saudi decision-making has comprised the interests of three main social actors: (1) the ruling al Saud family and Saudi elites (2) religious rulers, and (3) Saudi citizens. In the past, the royal family has been able to mitigate social dissent and maintain stability by ensuring that the financial interests of its citizens are satisfied while granting extensive authority to religious groups. The government has transferred profits amassed from oil to Saudi citizens in the form of subsidies for housing, fuel, water, and electricity; public services; and employment opportunities in bloated and inefficient bureaucracies. Going forward, pressure on Riyadh to reduce expenditures and adapt its budget to the changing oil landscape will persist. The authorities will have to continue to shake down elites for funds, or make cuts to these entitlements, or both. Hence policymakers are attempting to walk a thin line between near-term stability and long-term structural change. Several instances of official backtracking show that authorities fear the potential backlash. Following mass discontent in 2017, the Saudi government rolled back most of a series of cuts to public sector wages and benefits that would have led to massive fiscal savings. Instead, the government raised revenue by increasing prices of subsidized goods and services, including fuel, while doling out support to low-income families. The government also introduced a 5% value-added tax in January 2018. Unemployment – especially youth unemployment – is elevated. This is frightening for the authorities. What about the guarantee of cushy government jobs? 45% of employed Saudis work in the public sector. The consequence is an unproductive labor force lacking the skills necessary to succeed in the private sector. Declining oil revenues remove the luxury of supporting a large, unproductive labor force. Chart 10Youth And Woman Unemployment A Structural Constraint Against this backdrop, unemployment – especially youth unemployment – is elevated (Chart 10). This is frightening for the authorities as over half of Saudi citizens are below 30 years of age and the fertility rate is above replacement level implying continued rapid population growth. It will be a challenge to find employment for the rising number of young people. All the while, jobs in the private sector – which will need to take in the growing labor force – are dominated by expatriate workers. Saudi citizens hold only 20% of jobs in the private sector – but this sector makes up 60% of the country’s employment. Fixing these distortions is challenging. Overall, monthly salaries of nationals are more than double those of expatriates (Chart 11). High wage gaps also exist among comparably skilled workers, reducing the incentive to hire nationals. With non-Saudis holding over 75% of the jobs, the incentive to employ low-wage expatriate workers has also weighed on the current account balance through large remittance outflows (Chart 12). And while the share of jobs held by Saudi citizens increased, this is not on the back of an increase in the number of employed Saudis. Rather, while the number of nationals with jobs contracted by nearly 10% in 2018, jobs held by non-Saudis declined at a faster pace. The absolute number of employed Saudis is down 37% since 2015. “Saudization” efforts are aimed at reducing the wage gap – such as a monthly levy per worker on firms where the majority of workers are non-Saudi; wage subsidies for Saudi nationals working in the private sector; and quotas for hiring nationals. But these have mixed results. While Saudi employment has improved, the associated reduced productivity and higher costs have been damaging. Thus, these labor market challenges pose risks to both domestic stability, and the economy. Moreover, even though improved liquidity conditions have softened interbank rates, loans to government and quasi-government entities still outpace loans to the private sector (Chart 13). This “crowding out” effect is not conducive to a private sector revival. It is conducive to central government control, which the leadership is tightening. Chart 12Jobs For Expatriate Workers Have Declined Chart 13Monetary Conditions Ease But Private Credit Lags Facing these structural factors, authorities are attempting to appease the population through social change. There has been a marked relaxation in the ultra-conservative rules governing Saudi society. Permission for women to drive cars has been granted and the first cinemas and music venues opened their doors last year. Critically, religious rulers are seeing their wide-ranging powers curtailed. The hai’a or religious police are now only permitted to work during office hours. They no longer have the authority to detain or make arrests, and may only submit reports to civil authorities. While these changes appeal to the new generation, they also run the risk of provoking a “Wahhabi backlash.” This risk is still alive despite the past two years of policy change. The recently approved “public decency law” – which requires residents to adhere to dress codes and bans taking photos or using phrases deemed offensive – reveals the authorities’ need to mitigate this risk. Popular social reforms are occurring against a backdrop of an unprecedented centralization of power. Mohammad bin Salman will be the first Saudi ruler of his millennial generation. The evolving balance of power between the 15,000 members of the royal family will hurl the kingdom into the unknown. The concentration of power into the Sudairi faction of the ruling family, through events such as the 2017 Ritz Carlton detentions, is still capable of provoking a destabilizing backlash. Discontent among royal family members and Saudi elites may give rise to a new, fourth faction, resentful of the social and political changes. At the moment, the state’s policies have generated some momentum. A number of major hardline religious scholars and clerics have apologized for past extremism and differences over state policy and have endorsed MBS’s vision of a modern Saudi state and “moderate” Islam – the crackdown on radicalism has moved the dial within the religious establishment.5 But structural change is not quick and the social pressures being unleashed are momentous. Saudi Arabia’s oil production and transportation infrastructure are currently in danger from saber-rattling or conflict in the region. The government is guiding the process, but the consensus is correct that internal political risk remains extremely high. There has been a structural increase in that risk, as outlined in this report – and it is best to remain cautious even regarding the cyclical increase in political risk over the past two years. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia’s new economic reality is ushering in social and political change at an unprecedented pace. Unless the interests of the three main social actors – the royal family, religious elites, and Saudi citizens – are successfully managed, a new faction comprised of disaffected elites may arise. A Dangerous Neighborhood Putting aside the longer term threat from U.S. energy independence, Saudi Arabia’s oil production and transportation infrastructure are currently in danger from saber-rattling or conflict in the region. Saudi officials originally expected the war in Yemen to last only a few weeks, but the conflict is now in its fifth year and still raging. The claim by the Iran-backed Houthi insurgents that a recent drone attack on Saudi oil installations was assisted by supporters in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province – home to the majority of the country’s 10%-15% Shia population and oil production – is also troubling as it shows that the above domestic risks can readily combine with external, geopolitical risks. The U.S. is also joining Israel and Saudi Arabia in applying increasing pressure on Iran, which risks sparking a war. Our Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree illustrates that the probability of war between the U.S. and Iran – which would involve the Saudis – is as high as 40% (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree We are not downgrading this risk in the wake of President Trump’s decision not to conduct strikes on Iranian radars and missile launchers on June 20. President Trump claims he wants negotiations instead of war, but his administration’s pressure tactics have pushed Iran into a corner. The Iranian regime is capable of pushing the limits further (both in terms of its nuclear program as well as regional oil production and transport), which could easily lead to provocations or miscalculation. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is structurally unstable as a result of Iran’s capitalization on major strategic movements of the past two decades. The Saudis have lost a Sunni-dominated buffer in Iraq, they have lost influence in Syria and Yemen, and their aggressive military efforts to counter these trends have failed.6 The Israelis are equally alarmed by these developments and trying to persuade the Americans to take a much more aggressive posture to contain Iran. As a result, the Trump administration reneged on the 2015 U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement and broader détente – intensifying a cycle of distrust with Iran that will be difficult to reverse even if the Democratic Party takes the White House in 2020. Hence there is a real possibility of attacks on Saudi oil production facilities, domestic pipelines, and tankers in transit in the near term. Moreover, the majority of Saudi Arabia’s exports transit through two major chokepoints making these barrels vulnerable to sabotage: The Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has resumed threatening to block; The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, located between Yemen and East Africa, which was the site of an attack on two Saudi Aramco tankers last year, forcing a temporarily halt in shipments. Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of these risks. It is the top buyer of U.S. arms and, as a result of the dramatic strategic shifts since the American invasion of Iraq, it is the world’s leading spender on military equipment as a share of GDP (Chart 14). One of our key “Black Swan” risks of the year is that the Saudis may be emboldened by the Trump administration’s writing them a blank check. Bottom Line: In addition to the structural risks associated with Saudi Arabia’s economic, social and political transition, geopolitical tensions in the region are elevated. Warning shots are still being fired by Iran and their proxies (such as the Houthis), and oil supplies are at the mercy of additional escalation. Investment Implications Saudi Arabia’s equity market is halfway through the process of joining the benchmark MSCI EM index. The process will finish on August 29, 2019 with Saudi taking up a total 2.9% weighting in the index. Research by our colleague Ellen JingYuan He at BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy shows that in the case of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Pakistan, inclusion into MSCI created a “buy the rumor, sell the news” phenomenon and suggested that a top of the market was at hand.7 Saudi equities have recently peaked in absolute terms and relative to the emerging market benchmark, supporting this thesis. Saudi equity volatility has especially spiked relative to the emerging market average, which is appropriate. We expect ongoing bouts of volatility due to the immediate, market-relevant political risks outlined above. The risk of a disruptive conflict stemming from the Saudi-Iran and U.S.-Iran confrontation is significant enough that investors should, at minimum, expect minor conflicts or incidents to disrupt oil markets in the immediate term. We expect oil price volatility to persist. Because Riyadh is maintaining OPEC 2.0 discipline in this environment, oil prices should experience underlying upward pressure. It is not that the Saudis are refusing to support the Trump administration’s maximum pressure against Iran but rather that they are calibrating their support in a way that hedges against the risk that Trump will change his mind, since that risk is quite high. This is the 55% chance of an uneasy status quo in U.S.-Iran relations in Diagram 1, which requires at least secret U.S. relaxation of oil sanction enforcement. Moreover, the Saudis want to reduce the downside risk of weak global growth and support their national interest in pushing Brent prices toward $80/bbl for fiscal and strategic purposes. Our pessimistic assessment of the Osaka G20 tariff truce between the U.S. and China is more than offset by our expectation since February that China’s economic policy has shifted toward stimulus rather than the deleveraging of 2017-18. We assign a 68% probability to additional trade war escalation in Q4 this year or at least before November 2020. But since a dramatic trade war escalation would lead to even greater stimulus, we still share our Commodity & Energy Strategy’s cyclical view that the underlying trend for oil prices is up. We are maintaining our recommendation of being long EM oil producers’ equities relative to EM-ex-China. This trade includes Saudi Arabian equities, but as a whole it has upside in the near-term as Brent prices are below our expected average and Chinese equities are still down 10% from their April highs.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Our Commodity & Energy Strategy team expects Brent prices to average $73/bbl this year and $75/bbl in 2020. For their latest monthly balances assessment, please see “Supply-Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices,” dated June 20, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Supply-Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices,” dated June 20, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 The higher export dependence on oil reflects the rebound in oil prices in 2018, rather than a decline in non-oil exports. Given the strong relationship between activity in the oil and non-oil sectors, non-oil exports also increased in 2018. 4 Saudi Aramco’s purchase of a 70 percent stake in SABIC from the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) earlier this year reportedly contributed to the IPO delay. The deal will capitalize the PIF, enabling it to diversify the economy. 5 See, for example, James M. Dorsey, “Clerics and Entertainers Seek to Bolster MBS’s Grip on Power,” BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1220, July 7, 2019, available at besacenter.org. 6 The U.S., Saudi Arabia, and their allies are trying to restore Iraq as a geopolitical buffer by cultivating an Iraq that is more independent of Iranian influence – and this is part of rising regional frictions. Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s recently issued decree to reduce the power of Iraq’s Iran-backed milita, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and integrate them into Iraq’s armed forces by forcing them to choose between either military or political activity. Just over a year ago, Iraq’s previous Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi issued a decree granting members of the PMF many of the same rights as members of the military. 7 Please see BCA Frontier Markets Strategy, “Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand,” March 13, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com.

Informe especial

Highlights So What? U.S.-Iran risk is front-loaded, but U.S.-China is the greater risk overall. In the medium-to-long run the trade war with China should reaccelerate while the U.S. should back away from war with Iran. But for now the opposite is happening. A full-fledged cold war with China will put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. War with Iran or trade war escalation with China are both ultimately dollar bullish – even though tactically the dollar may fall. Feature Two significant geopolitical events occurred over the past week. First, U.S. President Donald Trump declared his third pause to the trade war with China. The terms of the truce are vague and indefinite, but it has given support to the equity rally temporarily. Second, Iran edged past the limits on uranium stockpiling, uranium enrichment, and the Arak nuclear reactor imposed by the 2015 nuclear pact. Trump instigated this move by walking away from the pact and re-imposing oil sanctions. If these events foreshadow things to come, global financial markets should position for lower odds of a deflationary trade shock and higher odds of an inflationary oil shock in the coming six-to-18 months. But is this conclusion warranted? Is the American “Pivot to Asia” about to shift into reverse? If the White House pursued a consistent strategy to contain China, it would bring Americans together and require forming alliances. In the short run, perhaps – but the conflict with China is ultimately the greater of the two geopolitical risks. We expect it to intensify again, likely in H2, but at latest by Q3 of 2020, ahead of the U.S. presidential election. Our highest conviction call on this matter, however, is that any trade deal before that date will be limited in scope. It will fall far short of a “Grand Compromise” that ushers in a new era of U.S.-China engagement – and hence it will be a disappointment to global equities. Our trade war probabilities, updated on June 14 to account for the expected resumption of negotiations at the G20, can be found in Diagram 1. The combined risk of further escalation is 68%. Diagram 1Trade War Decision Tree (Updated June 13, 2019 To Include G20 Tariff Pause) The risk to the view? The U.S.-Iran conflict could spiral out of control and the Trump administration could get entangled in the Middle East. This would create a very different outlook for global politics, economy, and markets over the next decade than a concentrated conflict with China.  The Missing Corollary Of The “Thucydides Trap” The idea of the “Thucydides Trap” has gone viral in recent years – for good reason. The term, coined by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, refers to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (460-400 BC), author of the seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. The “trap” is the armed conflict that most often develops when a dominant nation that presides over a particular world order (e.g. Sparta, the U.S.) faces a young and ambitious rival that seeks fundamental change to that order (e.g. Athens, China).1  This conflict between an “established” and “revisionist” power was highlighted by the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his translation of Thucydides in the seventeenth century; every student of international relations knows it. Allison’s contribution is the comparative analysis of various Thucydides-esque episodes in the modern era to show how today’s U.S.-China rivalry fits the pattern. The implication is that war (not merely trade war) is a major risk. We have long held a similar assessment of the U.S.-China conflict. It is substantiated by hard data showing that China is gaining on America in various dimensions of power (Chart 1). Assuming that the U.S. does not want to be replaced, the current trade conflict will metastasize to other areas. There is an important but overlooked corollary to the Thucydides Trap: if the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. Polarization fell dramatically during the Great Depression and World War II and remained subdued throughout the Cold War. It only began to rise again when the Soviet threat faded and income inequality spiked circa 1980. Americans were less divided when they shared a common enemy that posed an existential threat; they grew more divided when their triumph proved to benefit some disproportionately to others (Chart 2).    Chart 1China Is Gaining On The U.S. Chart 2U.S. Polarization Falls During Crisis   If the U.S. and China continue down the path of confrontation, a similar pattern is likely to emerge in the coming years – polarization is likely to decline. China possesses the raw ability to rival or even supplant the United States as the premier superpower over the very long run. Its mixed economy is more sustainable than the Soviet command economy was, and it is highly integrated into the global system, unlike the isolated Soviet bloc. As long as China’s domestic demand holds up and Beijing does not suppress its own country’s technological and military ambitions, Trump and the next president will face a persistent need to respond with measures to limit or restrict China’s capabilities. Eventually this will involve mobilizing public opinion more actively. Further, if the U.S.-China conflict escalates, it will clarify U.S. relations with the rest of the world. For instance, Trump’s handling of trade suggests that he could refrain from trade wars with American allies to concentrate attention on China, particularly sanctions on its technology companies. Meanwhile a future Democratic president would preserve some of these technological tactics while reinstituting the multilateral approach of the Barack Obama administration, which launched the “Pivot to Asia,” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and intensive freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. These are all aspects of a containment strategy that would reinforce China’s rejection of the western order.   Bottom Line: If the White House, any White House, were to pursue a consistent strategy to contain China, the result would be a major escalation of the trade conflict that would bring Americans together in the face of a common enemy. It would also encourage the U.S. to form alliances in pursuit of this objective. So far these things have not occurred, but they are logical corollaries of the Thucydides Trap and they will occur if the Thucydides thesis is validated. How Would China Fare In The Thucydides Trap? China would be in trouble in this scenario. The United States, if the public unifies, would have a greater geopolitical impact than it currently does in its divided state. And a western alliance would command still greater coercive power than the United States acting alone (Chart 3). External pressure would also exacerbate China’s internal imbalances – excessive leverage, pollution, inefficient state involvement in the economy, poor quality of life, and poor governance (Chart 4).  China has managed to stave off these problems so far because it has operated under relative American and western toleration of its violations of global norms (e.g. a closed financial system, state backing of national champions, arbitrary law, censorship). This would change under concerted American, European, and Japanese efforts. Chart 3China Fears A Western 'Grand Alliance' Chart 4China's Domestic Risks Underrated How would the Communist Party respond? First, it could launch long-delayed and badly needed structural reforms and parlay these as concessions to the West. The ramifications would be negative for Chinese growth on a cyclical basis but positive on a structural basis since the reforms would lift productivity over the long run – a dynamic that our Emerging Markets Strategy has illustrated, in a macroeconomic context, in Diagram 2. This is already an option in the current trade war, but China has not yet clearly chosen it – likely because of the danger that the U.S. would exploit the slowdown. Diagram 2Foreign Pressure And Structural Reform = Short-Term Pain For Long-Term Gain Alternatively the Communist Party could double down on confrontation with the West, as Russia has done. This would strengthen the party’s grip but would be negative for growth on both a cyclical and structural basis. The effectiveness of China’s fiscal-and-credit stimulus would likely decline because of a drop in private sector activity and sentiment – already a nascent tendency – while the lack of “reform and opening up” would reduce long-term growth potential. This option makes structural reforms look more palatable – but again, China has not yet been forced to make this choice. None of the above is to say that the West is destined to win a cold war with China, but rather that the burden of revolutionizing the global order necessarily falls on the country attempting to revolutionize it. Bottom Line: If the Thucydides Trap fully takes effect, western pressure on China’s economy will force China into a destabilizing economic transition. China could lie low and avoid conflict in order to undertake reforms, or it could amplify its aggressive foreign policy. This is where the risk of armed conflict rises. Introducing … The Polybius Solution The problem with the above is that there is no sign of polarization abating anytime soon in the United States. Extreme partisanship makes this plain (Chart 5). Rising polarization could prevent the U.S. from responding coherently to China. The Thucydides Trap could be avoided, or delayed, simply because the U.S. is distracted elsewhere. The most likely candidate is Iran. A lesser known Greek historian – who was arguably more influential than Thucydides – helps to illustrate this alternative vision for the future. This is Polybius (208-125 BC), a Greek who wrote under Roman rule. He described the rise of the Roman Empire as a result of Rome’s superior constitutional system. Polybius explains domestic polarization whereas Thucydides explains international conflict. Polybius took the traditional view that there were three primary virtues or powers governing human society: the One (the king), the Few (the nobles), and the Many (the commons). These powers normally ran the country one at a time: a dictator would die; a group of elites would take over; this oligarchy would devolve into democracy or mob-rule; and from the chaos would spring a new dictator. His singular insight – his “solution” to political decay – was that if a mixture or balance of the three powers could be maintained, as in the Roman republic, then the natural cycle of growth and decay could be short-circuited, enabling a regime to live much longer than its peers (Diagram 3). Diagram 3Polybius: A Balanced Political System Breaks The Natural Cycle Of Tyranny And Chaos In short, just as post-WWII economic institutions have enabled countries to reduce the frequency and intensity of recessions (Chart 6), so Polybius believed that political institutions could reduce the frequency and intensity of revolutions. Eventually all governments would decay and collapse, but a domestic system of checks and balances could delay the inevitable. Needless to say, Polybius was hugely influential on English and French constitutional thinkers and the founders of the American republic. Chart 6Orthodox Economic Policy Has Made Recessions Less Frequent And Less Acute What is the cause of constitutional decay, according to Polybius? Wealth, inequality, and corruption, which always follow from stable and prosperous times. “Avarice and unscrupulous money-making” drive the masses to encroach upon the elite and demand a greater share of the wealth. The result is a vicious cycle of conflict between the commons and the nobles until either the constitutional system is restored or a democratic revolution occurs. Compared to Thucydides, Polybius had less to say about the international balance of power. Domestic balance was his “solution” to unpredictable outside events. However, states with decaying political systems were off-balance and more likely to be conquered, or to overreach in trying to conquer others. Bottom Line: The “Polybius solution” equates with domestic political balance. Balanced states do not allow the nation’s leader, the elite, or the general population to become excessively powerful. But even the most balanced states will eventually decline. As they accumulate wealth, inequality and corruption emerge and cause conflict among the three powers.  Why Polybius Matters Today It does not take a stretch of the imagination to apply the Polybius model to the United States today. Just as Rome grew fat with its winnings from the Punic Wars and decayed from a virtuous republic into a luxurious empire, as Polybius foresaw, so the United States lurched from victory over the Soviet Union to internal division and unforced errors. For instance, the budget surplus of 2% of GDP in the year 2000 became a budget deficit of 9% of GDP after a decade of gratuitous wars, profligate social spending and tax cuts, and financial excesses. It is on track to balloon again when the next recession hits – and this is true even without any historic crisis event to justify it. The rise in polarization has coincided with a rise in wealth inequality, much as Polybius would expect (Chart 7). In all likelihood the Trump tax cuts will exacerbate both of these trends (Chart 8). Even worse, any attempts by “the people” to take more wealth from the “nobles” will worsen polarization first, long before any improvements in equality translate to a drop in polarization. Chart 7Polarization Unlikely To Drop While Inequality Rises Chart 8Trump Tax Cuts Fuel Inequality Most importantly, from a global point of view, U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. Just as the George W. Bush administration launched a preemptive war in Iraq, destabilizing the region, so the Obama administration precipitously withdrew from Iraq, destabilizing the region. And just as the Obama administration initiated a hurried détente with Iran in order to leave Iraq, the Trump administration precipitously withdrew from this détente, provoking a new conflict with Iran and potentially destabilizing Iraq. Major foreign policy initiatives have been conducted, and revoked, on a partisan basis under three administrations. And a Democratic victory in 2020 would result in a reversal of Trump’s initiatives. In the meantime Trump’s policy could easily entangle him in armed conflict with Iran – as nearly occurred on June 21. Iranian domestic politics make it very difficult, if not impossible, to go back to the 2015 setting. Despite Trump’s recent backpedaling, his administration runs a high risk of getting sucked into another Middle Eastern quagmire as long as it enforces the sanctions on Iranian oil stringently. Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, U.S.-China conflict will be the dominant market-mover. China would be the big winner if such a war occurred, just as it was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the long American distraction in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would benefit from another 5-10 years of American losses of blood and treasure. It would be able to pursue regional interests with less Interference and could trade limited cooperation with the U.S. on Iran for larger concessions elsewhere. And a nuclear-armed Iran – which is a long-term concern for the U.S. – is not in China’s national interest anyway. Chart 9Will The Pivot To Asia Reverse? Bottom Line: The U.S. is missing the “Polybius solution” of balanced government; polarization is on the rise. As a result, the grand strategy of “pivoting to Asia” could go into reverse (Chart 9). If that occurs, the conflict with China will be postponed or ineffective. Iran Is The Wild Card A war with Iran manifestly runs afoul of the Trump administration’s and America’s national interests, whereas a trade war with China does not. First, although an Iranian or Iranian-backed attack on American troops would give Trump initial support in conducting air strikes, the consequences of war would likely be an oil price shock that would sink his approval rating over time and reduce his chances of reelection (Chart 10). We have shown that such a shock could come from sabotage in Iraq as well as from attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could be driven to attack if it believes the U.S. is about to attack. Second, not only would Democrats oppose a war with Iran, but Americans in general are war-weary, especially with regard to the Middle East (Chart 11). President Trump capitalized on this sentiment during his election campaign, especially in relation to Secretary Hillary Clinton who supported the war in Iraq. Over the past two weeks, he has downplayed the Iranian-backed tanker attacks, emphasized that he does not want war, and has ruled out “boots on the ground.” Chart 10Carter Gained Then Lost From Iran Oil Shock Third, it follows from the above that, in the event of war, the United States would lack the political will necessary to achieve its core strategic objectives, such as eliminating Iran’s nuclear program or its power projection capabilities. And these are nearly impossible to accomplish from the air alone. And U.S. strategic planners are well aware that conflict with Iran will exact an opportunity cost by helping Russia and China consolidate spheres of influence. The wild card is Iran. President Hassan Rouhani has an incentive to look tough and push the limits, given that he was betrayed on the 2015 deal. And the regime itself is probably confident that it can survive American air strikes. American military strikes are still a serious constraint, but until the U.S. demonstrates that it is willing to go that far, Iran can test the boundaries. In doing so it also sends a message to its regional rivals – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab monarchies, and Israel – that the U.S. is all bark, no bite, and thus unable to protect them from Iran. This may lead to a miscalculation that forces Trump to respond despite his inclinations. The China trade war, by contrast, is less difficult for the Trump administration to pursue. There is not a clear path from tariffs to economic recession, as with an oil shock: the U.S. economy has repeatedly shrugged off counter-tariffs and the Fed has been cowed. While Americans generally oppose the trade war, Trump’s base does not, and the health of the overall economy is far more important for most voters. And a majority of voters do believe that China’s trade practices are unfair. Strategic planners also favor confronting China – unlike Trump they are not concerned with reelection, but they recognize that China’s advantages grow over time, including in critical technologies. Bottom Line: While short-term events are pushing toward truce with China and war with Iran, the Trump administration is likely to downgrade the conflict with Iran and upgrade the conflict with China over the next six-to-18 months. Neither politics nor grand strategy support a war with Iran, whereas politics might support a trade war with China and grand strategy almost certainly does. China Could Learn From Polybius Too China also lacks the Polybius solution. It suffers from severe inequality and social immobility, just like the Latin American states and the U.S., U.K., and Italy (Chart 12). But unlike the developed markets, it lacks a robust constitutional system. Political risks are understated given the emergence of the middle class, systemic economic weaknesses, and poor governance. Over the long run, Xi Jinping will need to step down, but having removed the formal system for power transition, a succession crisis is likely. China’s imbalances could cause domestic instability even if the U.S. becomes distracted by conflict in the Middle East. But China has unique tools for alleviating crises and smoothing out its economic slowdown, so the absence of outside pressure will probably determine its ability to avoid a painful economic slump. This helps to explain China’s interest in dealing with the U.S. on North Korea. President Xi Jinping’s first trip to Pyongyang late last month helped pave the way for President Trump to resume negotiations with the North’s leader Kim Jong Un at the first-ever visit of an American president north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). China does not want an unbridled nuclear North Korea or an American preventative war on the peninsula. If Beijing could do a short-term deal with the U.S. on the basis of assistance in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it could divert U.S. animus away from itself and encourage the U.S. to turn its attention toward the next rogue nuclear aspirant, Iran. It would also avoid structural economic concessions. Of course, a smooth transition today means short-term gain but long-term pain for Chinese and global growth. Productivity and potential GDP will decline if China does not reform (Diagram 4). But this kind of transition is the regime’s preferred option since Beijing seeks to minimize immediate threats and maintain overall stability. Diagram 4Stimulus And Delayed Reforms = Socialist Put = Stagflation If Chinese internal divisions do flare up, China’s leaders will take a more aggressive posture toward its neighbors and the United States in order to divert public attention and stir up patriotic support. Bottom Line: China suffers from understated internal political risk. While U.S. political divisions could lead to a lack of coherent strategy toward China, a rift in China could lead to Chinese aggression in its neighborhood, accelerating the Thucydides Trap. Investment Conclusions Chart 13An Iran War Will Bust The Budget If the U.S. reverses the pivot to Asia, attacks Iran, antagonizes European allies, and exhausts its resources in policy vacillation, its budget deficit will balloon (Chart 13), oil prices will rise, and China will be left to manage its economic transition without a western coalition against it. The implication is a weakening dollar, at least initially. But the U.S. is nearing the end of its longest-ever business expansion and an oil price spike would bring forward the next recession, both of which will push up the greenback. Much will depend on the extent of any oil shock – whether and how long the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. Beyond the next recession, the dollar could suffer severe consequences for the U.S.’s wild policies. If the U.S. continues the pivot to Asia, and the U.S. and China proceed with tariffs, tech sanctions, saber-rattling, diplomatic crises, and possibly even military skirmishes, China will be forced into an abrupt and destabilizing economic transition. The U.S. dollar will strengthen as global growth decelerates. Developed market equities will outperform emerging market equities, but equities as a whole will underperform sovereign bonds and other safe-haven assets. Over the past week, developments point toward the former scenario, meaning that Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, we think the latter scenario will prevail.  We are maintaining our risk-off trades: long JPY/USD, long gold, long Swiss bonds, and long USD/CNY.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, and Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).  

Highlights So What? Geopolitical risks are not about to ease. Why? Fiscal policy becomes less accommodative next year unless politicians act. Financial conditions give President Trump room to expand his tariff onslaught. Our Iran view is confirmed by rapid escalation of tensions – war risk is high. The odds of a no-deal Brexit have risen. Feature The AUD-JPY cross and copper-to-gold ratio – two market indicators that flag global growth and risk-on sentiment – are hovering over critical points at which a further breakdown would catalyze a renewed flight to quality (Chart 1). Chart 1Risk-On Indicators Breaking Down? Global sentiment remains depressed amid a rash of negative economic surprises and bonds continue to rally despite a more dovish outlook from the Fed (Chart 2). Chart 2Global Sentiment Remains Depressed The cavalry is on the way: European Central Bank President Mario Draghi oversaw a dramatic easing of monetary policy on June 18, driving the Italian-German sovereign bond spread down to levels not seen since before the populist election outcome of March 2018 (Chart 2, bottom panel). The Federal Reserve adjusted its policy rate projections to countenance an interest rate cut in the not-too-distant future. More needs to be done, however, to sustain the optimism that has propelled the S&P 500 and global equities upward since the volatility catalyzed by President Donald Trump’s announcement of a tariff rate hike on May 6. Political and geopolitical risks are higher, not lower, since that time as market-negative scenarios are playing out with U.S. policy, Iran, and Brexit, while we take a dim view of the end-game of the U.S.-China negotiations despite recent improvements. Fiscal And Trade Uncertainties This year’s growth wobbles have occurred in the context of expansive fiscal policy in the developed markets. Next year, however, the fiscal thrust (the change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance) is projected to decline in the U.S. and Japan and nearly to do so in Europe (Chart 3). We expect President Trump and the House Democrats to raise spending caps (or at least keep spending at current levels) and thus prevent the budget deficit from contracting in FY2020 – this is their only substantial point of agreement. But this at best neutralizes what would otherwise be a negative fiscal backdrop. Meanwhile it is not at all clear that Brussels will relax its scrutiny of member states seeking to cut taxes and boost spending, such as Italy. Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo would need to arrange for the Diet to pass a new law to avoid the consumption tax hike from 8% to 10% on October 1. He can pull this off, especially if the U.S. trade war escalates – or if he decides to turn next month’s upper house election into a general election and needs to boost his popularity. But as things currently stand in law, the world’s third biggest economy will face a deep fiscal pullback next year (Chart 3, bottom panel). In short, DM fiscal policy will not really become contractionary in 2020, but this is a view and not yet a reality (Chart 4). Chart 3Fiscal Pullback Likely Next Year Chart 4Only The U.S. Is Profligate Meanwhile China’s stimulus is still in question – in fact it remains the major macro question this year. The efficacy of China’s stimulus is declining ... An escalating trade war will bring greater stimulus but also greater transmission problems.  Since February we have argued that the Xi administration has shifted to sweeping fiscal-and-credit stimulus in the face of the unprecedented external threat posed by the Trump administration (Charts 5A and 5B). We expect China’s credit growth to continue its upturn in June and in H2. Ultimately, we think the whole package will be comparable to 2015-16 – and anything even close to that will prolong the global economic expansion. We do not see a massive 2008-style stimulus occurring unless relations with the U.S. completely collapse and a global recession occurs. Chart 5AStimulus Amid The Trade War The catch – as we have shown – is that the efficacy of China’s stimulus is declining over time because of over-indebtedness and bearish sentiment in China’s private sector. These tepid animal spirits stem from epochal changes: Xi’s reassertion of communism and America’s withdrawal of strategic support for China’s rise. An escalating trade war will bring greater stimulus but also greater transmission problems. The magnitude of the tariffs that President Trump is threatening to impose on China, Mexico, the EU, and Japan is mind-boggling. We illustrate this with a simple simulation of duties collected as a share of total imports under different scenarios (Chart 6). China and Mexico are fundamentally different from the EU and Japan and hence the threat of tariffs will continue to weigh on markets for Trump’s time in office – China because of a national security consensus and Mexico because of the Trump administration’s existential emphasis on curbing illegal immigration. But we still put the risk of auto tariffs (or other punitive measures) on Europe at 45% if Trump seals a China deal. The odds are lower for Japan but it is still at risk. Global supply chains are shifting – a new source of costs and uncertainty for companies – as a slew of recent news has highlighted. Already 40% of companies surveyed by the American Chamber of Commerce in China say they are relocating to Southeast Asia, Mexico, and elsewhere (Chart 7). If the G20 is a flop – or results in nothing more than a pause in tariffs for another three-month dialogue – relocations will gain steam, forcing companies’ bottom lines to take a hit. Even in the best case, in which the Trump-Xi summit produces a joint statement outlining a “deal in principle” accompanied by a rollback of the May 10 tariff hike, uncertainty will persist due to President Trump’s unpredictability, China’s incentive to wait until after the U.S. election, and Trump’s incentive to corner the “China hawk” platform prior to the election. We maintain that, by November 2020, there is a roughly 70% chance of further escalation. At least the U.S.-China conflict is nominally improving. The same cannot be said for other geopolitical risks discussed below: the U.S. and Iran are flirting with war; the U.S. presidential election is injecting a steady trickle of market-negative news; the chances of a no-deal Brexit are rising; and Trump may turn on Europe at a moment when it lacks leadership. This list assumes that Russia takes advantage of American distraction by improving domestic policy rather than launching into a new foreign adventure – say in Ukraine or Kaliningrad. If there is any doubt as to whether political risk can outweigh more accommodative monetary policy, remember that President Trump actually can remove Chairman Jerome Powell. Legally he is only allowed to do so “for cause” as opposed to “at will.” But the meaning of this term is a debate that would go to the Supreme Court in the event of a controversial decision. Meanwhile the stock market would dive. Now, this is precisely why Trump will not try. But the implication, as with Congress and the border wall, is that Trump is constrained on domestic policy and hence tariffs are his most effective tool to try to achieve policy victories. With an ebullient stock market and a Fed that is adjusting its position, Trump can try to kill two birds with one stone: wring concessions from trade partners while forcing the FOMC to keep responding to rising external risks. Bottom Line: Central banks are riding to the rescue, but there is only so much they can do if global leaders are tightening budgets and imposing barriers on immigration and trade. We remain tactically cautious. Oh Man, Oh Man, Oman Iran has swiftly responded to the Trump administration’s imposition of “maximum pressure” on oil exports. The shooting down of an American drone that Tehran claims violated its airspace on June 20 is the latest in a spate of incidents, including a Houthi first-ever cruise missile attack on Abha airport in Saudi Arabia. Two separate attacks on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz (Map 1) demonstrate that Iran is threatening to play its most devastating card in the renewed conflict with the U.S. Hormuz ushers through a substantial share of global oil demand and liquefied natural gas demand (Chart 8). The amount of spare pipeline capacity that the Gulf Arab states could activate in the event of a disruption is merely 3.9 million barrels per day, or 6 million if questionable pipelines like the outdated Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia prove functional (Table 1). Table 1No Sufficient Alternatives To Hormuz A conflict with Iran could cause the biggest oil shock of all time. Even if this spare capacity were immediately utilized, a conflict could cause the biggest oil shock of all time – considerably bigger than that of the Iranian Revolution (Chart 9). We have shown in the past that Iran has the military capability of interrupting the flow of traffic in Hormuz for anywhere from 10 days to four months. A preemptive strike by Iran would be most effective, whereas a preemptive American attack would include targets to reduce Iran’s ability to retaliate via Hormuz. The impact on oil prices ranges from significant to devastating. Needless to say, blocking the Strait of Hormuz would initiate a war so Iran is attempting to achieve diplomatic goals with the threats themselves – it will only block the strait as a last resort, say if it is convinced that the U.S. is about to attack anyway. As the experience of President Jimmy Carter shows, Americans may rally around the flag during a crisis but they will also kick a president out of office for higher prices and an economic slowdown. President Trump cannot be unaware of this precedent. The intention of his Iran policy is to negotiate a “better deal” than the 2015 one – a deal that includes Iran’s regional power projection and ballistic missile capabilities as well as its nuclear program. The problem is that Trump has already been forced to deploy a range of forces to the region, including additional troops (albeit so far symbolic at 2,500) (Chart 10). He is also sending Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, to the region to rally support among Gulf Cooperation Council. The week after Hook will court Britain, Germany, and France, three of the signatories of the 2015 deal. Trump ran on a campaign of eschewing gratuitous wars in the Middle East – a popular stance among war-weary Americans (Chart 11) – but there is a substantial risk that he could get entangled in the region. First, he is adopting a more aggressive foreign policy to attempt to compensate for the lack of payoff in public opinion from the strong economy. Second, Iran is not shrinking from the fight, which could draw him deeper into conflict. Third, there is always a high risk of miscalculation when nations engage in such brinkmanship. Chart 10Is The 'Pivot To Asia' About To Reverse? The Iranian response has been, first, to reject negotiations. When Trump sent a letter to Rouhani via Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Abe was rebuffed – and one of the tankers attacked near Oman was a Japanese flagged vessel, the Kokuka Courageous. This is a posture, not a permanent position, as the Iranian release of an American prisoner demonstrates. But the posture can and will be maintained in the near term – with escalation as the result. Second, Iran is increasing its own leverage in any future negotiation by demonstrating that it can sow instability across the region and bring the global economy grinding to a halt. Iran cannot assume that Trump means what he says about avoiding war but must focus on the United States’ actions and capabilities. Cutting off all oil exports is a recipe for extreme stress within the Iranian regime – it is an existential threat. Therefore, the Iranians have signaled that the cost of a total cutoff will be a war that will cause a global oil price shock. The Iranian leaders are also announcing that they are edging closer to walking away from the 2015 nuclear pact (Table 2). If so, they could quickly approach “breakout” capacity in the uranium enrichment – meaning that they could enrich to 20% and then in short order enrich to 90% and amass enough of this fuel to make a nuclear device one year thereafter. The Trump administration has reportedly reiterated that this one-year limit is the U.S. government’s “red line,” just as the Obama administration had done. Table 2Iran Threatens To Walk Away From 2015 Nuclear Deal This Iranian threat is a direct reaction to Trump’s decision in May not to renew the oil sanction waivers. Previously the Iranians had sought to preserve the 2015 deal, along with the Europeans, in order to wait out Trump’s first term. These developments push us to the brink of war. Iran is retaliating with both military force and a nuclear restart. This comes very close to meeting our conditions for an American (and Israeli) retaliation that is military in nature. Diagram 1 is an update of our decision tree that we have published since last year when Trump reneged on the 2015 deal. The window to de-escalate is closing rapidly. The Appendix provides a checklist for air strikes and/or the closure of Hormuz. Diagram 1Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree At very least we expect to see the U.S. attempt to create a large international fleet to assert freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. While Iran may lay low during a large show of force, it will later want to demonstrate that it has not been cowed. And it has the capacity to retaliate elsewhere, including in Iraq, an area we have highlighted as a major geopolitical risk to oil supply. The U.S. government has already reacted to recent threats there from Iranian proxies by pulling non-essential personnel. Iran has several incentives to test the limits of conflict if the U.S. insists on the oil embargo. First, tactically, it seeks to deter President Trump, take advantage of American war-weariness, drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe, and force a relaxation of the sanctions. This would also demonstrate to the region that Iran has greater resolve than the United States of America. This goal has not been achieved by the recent spate of actions, so there is likely more conflict to come. Second, President Hassan Rouhani’s government is also likely to maintain a belligerent posture – at least in the near term – to compensate for its loss of face upon the American betrayal of the 2015 nuclear deal. Rouhani negotiated the deal against the warnings of hardline revolutionaries. The 2020 majlis elections make this an important political goal for his more reform-oriented faction. Negotiations with Trump can only occur if Rouhani has resoundingly demonstrated his superiority in the clash of wills. Structurally, Iran faces tremendous regime pressures in the coming years and decades because of its large youth population, struggling economy, and impending power transition from the 80 year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei. A patriotic war against America and its allies – while not desirable – is a risk that Khamenei can take, as an air war is less likely to trigger regime change than it is to galvanize a new generation in support of the Islamic revolution. For oil markets the outcome is volatility in the near term – reflecting the contrary winds of trade war and global growth fears with rising supply risks. Because we expect more Chinese stimulus, both as the trade talks extend and especially if they collapse, we ultimately share BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy view that the path of least resistance for oil prices is higher on a cyclical horizon, as demand exceeds supply (Chart 12). We remain long EM energy producers relative to EM ex-China. Chart 12Crude Oil Supply-Demand Balance Should Send Prices Higher Bottom Line: The risk of military conflict has risen materially. This also drastically elevates the risk of a supply shock in oil prices that would kill global demand. The U.S. Election Adds To Geopolitical Risk The 2020 U.S. election poses another political risk for the rising equity market. The Democratic Party’s first debate will be held on June 26-27. The leftward shift in the party will be on full display, portending a possible 180-degree reversal in U.S. policy if the Democrats should win the election, with the prospect of a rollback of Trump’s tax cuts and deregulation of health, finance, and energy. The uncertainty and negative impact on animal spirits will be modest if current trends persist through the debates. Former Vice President Joe Biden remains the frontrunner despite having naturally lost the bump to his polling support after announcing his official candidacy (Chart 13). Biden is a known quantity and a centrist, especially compared to the farther left candidates ranked second and third in popular support– Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren. Biden is not only beating Sanders in South Carolina, which underscores the fact that he is competitive in the South and hence has a broader path to the White House, but also in New Hampshire, where the Vermont native should be ahead (Chart 14). These states hold the early primaries and caucuses and if Biden maintains his large lead then he will start to appear inevitable very early in the primary campaign next year. Hence a poor showing in the debate on June 27 is a major risk to Biden – he should be expected to be eschew the limelight and play the long game. Elizabeth Warren, by contrast, has the most to gain as she appears on the first night and does not share a stage with the other heavy hitters. If she or other progressive candidates outperform then the market will be spooked. The market could begin to trade off the polls. All of these candidates are beating Trump in current head-to-head polling – Biden is even ahead in Texas (Chart 15). This means that any weakness from Biden does not necessarily offer the promise of a Trump victory and policy continuity. The Democrats also have a powerful demographic tailwind. The just-released projections from the U.S. Census Bureau reveal how Trump’s narrow margins of victory in the swing states in 2016 are in serious jeopardy in 2020 as a result of demographics if he does not improve his polling among the general public (Chart 16). We still give Trump the benefit of the doubt as the incumbent president amid an expanding economy, but it is essential to recognize that his popular approval rating is reminiscent of a president during recession – i.e. one who is about to lose the White House for his party (Chart 17). Even if there is not a recession, an increase in unemployment is likely to cost him the election – and even a further decrease in unemployment cannot guarantee victory (Chart 18). This is why we see Trump making a bid to become a foreign policy president and seek reelection on the basis that it is unwise to change leaders amid an international crisis. We still give Trump the benefit of the doubt ... but his popular approval rating is reminiscent of a president during recession. The race for the U.S. senate is extremely important for the policy setting from 2021. If Republicans maintain control, they will be able to block sweeping Democratic legislation – which is particularly relevant if a progressive candidate should win the White House. However, if Democrats can muster enough votes to remove a sitting president with a strong economy – including a strong economy in the key senate swing races (Chart 19) – then they will likely win over the senate as well. Chart 19Hard To Win The Senate In 2020 While Key States Prosper Bottom Line: The 2020 election poses a double risk to the bull market. First, the Democratic primary campaign threatens sharp policy discontinuity, especially if and when developments cause Biden to drop in the polls (dealing a blow to centrism or the political establishment). Second, Trump’s vulnerability makes him more likely to act aggressive on the international stage, whether on trade, immigration, or national security, reinforcing the risks outlined above with regard to China, Iran, Mexico, and even Europe. Rising Odds Of A No-Deal Brexit Former Mayor of London and former foreign secretary Boris Johnson looks increasingly likely to seal the Conservative Party leadership contest in the United Kingdom. It is not yet a done deal, but the shift within the party in favor of accepting a “no deal” exit is clear. None of the remaining candidates is willing to forgo that option. The newest development advances us along our decision tree in Diagram 2, altering the conditional probabilities for this year’s events. We expect the next prime minister to try to push a deal substantially similar to outgoing Prime Minister Theresa May before attempting any kamikaze run as the October 31 deadline approaches. The attempt to leverage the EU’s economic weakness will not produce a fundamental renegotiation of the exit deal, but some element of diplomatic accommodation is possible as the EU seeks to maintain overall stability and a smooth exit if that is what the U.K. is determined to accomplish. Diagram 2Brexit Decision Tree Hence the prospect of passing a deal substantially similar to outgoing Prime Minister Theresa May’s deal is about 30%, roughly equal to the chance of a delay (28%). These options are believable as the new leader will have precious little time between taking the reins and Brexit day. The EU can accept a delay because it ultimately has an interest in keeping the U.K. bound into the union. Public opinion polling is not conducive to the new prime minister seeking a new election unless the change of face creates a massive shift in support for the Conservatives, both by swallowing the Brexit Party and outpacing Labour. If the purpose is to deliver Brexit, then the risk of a repeat of the June 2017 snap election would seem excessive. Nevertheless, the Tories’ working majority in parliament is vanishingly small, at five MPs, so a shift in polling could change the thinking on this front. The pursuit of a no-deal exit would create a backlash in parliament that we reckon has a 21% chance of ending in a no-confidence motion and new election. Bottom Line: The odds of a crash Brexit have moved up from 14% to 21% as a result of the leadership contest. The threat that the U.K. will crash out of the EU is not merely a negotiating ploy, although it will be a last resort even for the new hard-Brexit prime minister. Public opinion is against a no-deal Brexit, as is the majority of parliament, but the risk to the U.K. and EU economies will loom large over global risk assets in the coming months. Investment Conclusions Political and geopolitical risks to the late-cycle expansion are rising, not falling. U.S. foreign policy remains the dominant risk but U.S. domestic policy pre-2020 is an aggravating factor. Easing financial conditions give President Trump more ammunition to use tariffs and sanctions. Meanwhile our view that this summer will feature “fire and fury” between the U.S. and Iran has been confirmed by the tanker attacks in Oman. Tensions will likely escalate from here. Ultimately, we believe Trump is more likely to back off from the Iran conflict than the China conflict. This is part of our long-term theme that the U.S. really is pivoting to China and geopolitical risk will rotate from the Middle East to East Asia. But as highlighted above, the risk of entanglement is very high due to Trump’s approach and Iran’s incentives to raise the stakes. Oil prices will not resume their upward drift until Chinese stimulus is reconfirmed – and even then they will continue to be volatile. We remain cautious and are maintaining our safe-haven tactical trades of long gold and long JPY/USD.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix