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Highlights The global economy is slowing. However, growth should stabilize at an above-trend pace over the next few months, as fiscal policy turns more stimulative and interest rates remain in accommodative territory. President Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. Fortunately, Trump appears willing to cut a deal on trade, even if it is on terms that are not nearly as favorable to the U.S. as he might have touted. The recently renegotiated South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is a case in point. We remain cyclically overweight global equities, but acknowledge that valuations are stretched and the near-term market environment could remain challenging until leading economic indicators improve. Feature Global Equities: Near-Term Outlook Is Still Hazy We published a note on February 2nd entitled "Take Out Some Insurance" warning investors that the stock market had become highly vulnerable to a correction.1 The VIX spike began the next day. Although volatility has fallen and equities have rebounded so far in April, we are reluctant to sound the all-clear. The near-term signal from the beta version of our MacroQuant model has improved a bit but remains in bearish territory, as it has for over two months now (Chart 1). Chart 1MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted The model is highly sensitive to changes in growth. Starting early this year, it began to detect a weakening in a variety of leading economic indicators in the U.S. and, to an even greater degree, abroad. Most notably, global PMIs and the German IFO have dipped, Korean and Taiwanese exports have decelerated, Japanese machinery orders have fallen, and the Baltic Dry Index has swooned by 36% from its December high (Chart 2). The model also noted an increase in inflationary pressures, suggesting that monetary policy would likely end up moving in a less accommodative direction. The emergence of stagflationary concerns came at a time when bullish stock market sentiment stood at very elevated levels (Chart 3). Our empirical work has shown that equities perform worst when sentiment is deteriorating from bullish levels and perform best when sentiment is improving from bearish levels (Chart 4). Chart 2Growth Has Peaked Chart 3Stock Market Sentiment Was Very ##br##Bullish Earlier This Year Chart 4Swings In Sentiment And ##br##Stock Market Returns Waiting For The Economic Data To Stabilize The good news is that the drop in equity prices has caused sentiment to return to more normal levels. The bad news is that the activity data has continued to disappoint at the margin, as evidenced by the weakness in economic surprise indices and various "nowcasts" of real-time growth (Chart 5). Ultimately, we expect global growth to stabilize at an above-trend pace over the coming months, which should allow equities to grind higher. Monetary policy is still quite accommodative. The yield on the JP Morgan Global Bond Index has averaged 1.88% since the end of the Great Recession (Chart 6). We do not know where the "neutral" level of bond yields has been over this period. However, we do know that unemployment in the major economies has been falling, which suggests that monetary policy has been in expansionary territory. Despite the move away from quantitative easing by many central banks, the yield on the JP Morgan Global Bond Index is only 1.53% today. This implies a fortiori that bond yields today are well below restrictive levels. The conclusion is further strengthened if one assumes, as seems highly plausible, that the neutral bond yield has risen over the past few years, as deleveraging headwinds have abated and fiscal policy has turned more stimulative (Chart 7). Chart 5Unexpected Slowdown In Growth Chart 6Interest Rates Are Off Their Bottom, ##br##But Are Not Restrictive Chart 7Fiscal Policy Will Be Stimulative ##br##This Year And Next The Protectionism Bugbear Global growth has not been the only thing on investors' minds. The specter of a trade war has also loomed large. It is true that the standard early-19th century Ricardian model that first-year economics students learn predicts very small welfare losses from increased protectionism.2 The model, however, makes highly antiquated assumptions about how trade works. Trade today bears little resemblance to the world in which David Ricardo lived - the one where England exchanged cloth for Portuguese wine (the example Ricardo used to illustrate his famous principle of comparative advantage). Chart 8Trade In Intermediate Goods Dominates To an increasingly large extent, countries do not really trade with one another anymore. One can even go as far as to say that different companies do not really trade with each other in the way they once did. A growing share of international trade is between affiliates of the same companies. Trade these days is dominated by intermediate goods (Chart 8). The exchange of goods and services takes place within the context of a massive global supply chain, where such phrases as "outsourcing," "vertical integration" and "just-in-time inventory management" have entered the popular vernacular. This arrangement has many advantages, but it also harbors numerous fragilities. A small fire at a factory in Japan that manufactured 60 percent of the epoxy resin used in chip casings led to a major spike in RAM prices in 1993. Flooding in Thailand in 2011 wreaked havoc on the global auto industry.3 The global supply chain is highly vulnerable to even small shocks. Now imagine an across-the-board trade war. Equities represent a claim on the existing capital stock, not the capital stock that might emerge after a trade war has been fought. A trade war would result in a lot of stranded capital. It is not surprising that investors are worried. Trump's Dubious Trade Doctrine The psychology of a trade war today is not that dissimilar to that of an actual war among the great powers. It would be immensely damaging if it were to happen, but because everyone knows it would be so damaging, it is less likely to occur. How then should one interpret President Trump's tweet that "Trade wars are good, and easy to win?" One possibility is that he is bluffing. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year, which is less than the $150 billion in Chinese imports that Trump has already targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Unfortunately, there is also a less charitable interpretation, as revealed by the second part of Trump's tweet, where he said, "When we are down $100 billion with a certain country and they get cute, don't trade anymore - we win big. It's easy!" Trump seems to equate countries with companies: Exports are revenues and imports are costs. If a country is exporting less than it is importing, it must be losing money. This is deeply flawed reasoning. I run a trade deficit with the place where I eat lunch, but I don't go around complaining that they are ripping me off. One would think that Trump - whose businesses routinely spent more than they earned, accumulating debt in the process - would understand this. But apparently not. As we discussed two weeks ago, the U.S. runs a trade deficit mainly because its deep and open financial markets, along with a relatively high neutral rate of interest, make it an attractive destination for foreign capital.4 If a country runs a capital account surplus with the rest of the world - meaning that it sells more assets to foreigners than it buys from foreigners - it will necessarily run a current account deficit. Trump's Macro Policy Colliding With His Trade Policy In this respect, President Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. By definition, the current account balance is the difference between what a country saves and what it invests. The U.S. fiscal position is set to deteriorate over the coming years, even if the unemployment rate continues to fall - an unprecedented occurrence (Chart 9). A bigger budget deficit will drain national savings. Chart 9The U.S. Budget Deficit Is Set To Widen Even If The Unemployment Rate Continues To Decline Meanwhile, an overheated economy will cause capital spending to rise as firms run out of low-cost workers. If Trump succeeds in boosting infrastructure spending, aggregate U.S. investment will rise even more. The current account deficit is highly likely to widen in this environment. A Temporary Reprieve? Chart 10Trump's Protectionist Agenda Is A ##br##Popular One Among Republican Voters The prospect of a wider trade deficit means that Trump's protectionist wrath will not go quietly into the night. It may, however, go into remission for a little while. Trump's approval rating has managed to rise over the past few months because his protectionist agenda is popular with a large segment of the population (Chart 10). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks resume their decline - Trump will change his tune. This is especially true if a trade war threatens to hurt U.S. agricultural interests. Rural areas have been a key source of support for Trump's populist rhetoric. Trump has shown a willingness to cut a deal on trade even if the negotiated outcome falls well short of his bluster. Consider the agreement between the U.S. and Korea in late March to amend their existing trade pact. Trump had called the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement an "unacceptable, horrible deal" and a "job killer." After the agreement was renegotiated, the President described it as a "wonderful deal with a wonderful ally." What did Trump get that was so wonderful? The Koreans agreed to double the ceiling on the number of U.S. automobiles that can be exported to Korea without having to meet the country's tough environmental standards to 50,000. The problem is that the U.S. only shipped 11,000 autos to Korea last year, so the original quota was nowhere close to binding. The Koreans also agreed to reduce steel exports to the U.S. to about 70% of the average level of the past three years in exchange for a permanent exemption from Trump's 25% steel tariff. That may sound like a major concession, but keep in mind that only 12% of Korea's steel exports go to the United States. Korea also re-exports steel from other countries. These re-exports can be curtailed without causing major damage to Korea's steel industry. The shares of Korea's largest publicly-listed steel companies jumped by 1.7% on the first trading day after news of the deal broke, eclipsing the 0.8% rise in the KOSPI index. Investment Conclusions The global economy is going through a soft patch and this could weigh on stocks in the near term. However, if trade frictions fade into the background and global growth stabilizes over the coming months, as we expect will be the case, global equities should rally to fresh cycle highs. Granted, we are in the late stages of the business-cycle expansion. U.S. interest rates are likely to move into restrictive territory in the second half of 2019. Given the usual lags between changes in monetary policy and the real economy, this would place the next recession in 2020. By then, barring any fresh stimulus, the U.S. fiscal impulse will have dropped below zero. It is the change in the fiscal impulse that matters for growth. If growth has already slowed to a trend-like pace by late 2019 due to a shortage of workers, the economy could easily stall out in 2020. Given the still-dominant role played by U.S. financial markets, a recession in the U.S. would quickly be transmitted to the rest of the world. Stocks will peak before the next recession starts, but if history is any guide, this will only happen six months or so before the economic downturn begins (Table 1). This suggests that the equity bull market still has another 12-to-18 months of life left. The extent to which investors may wish to participate in any blow-off rally this year is a matter of personal preference. As was the case in the late 1990s, long-term expected returns have fallen to fairly low levels. A comparison between the Shiller P/E ratio and subsequent 10-year returns over the past century suggests that the S&P 500 will deliver a total nominal annualized return of only 4% during the next decade (Chart 11). A composite valuation measure incorporating both the trailing and forward P/E ratio, price-to-book, price-to-cash flow, price-to-sales, market cap-to-GDP, dividend yield, and Tobin's Q shows only modestly higher expected returns for stock markets outside the U.S. (Appendix A). Table 1Cyclically, It Is Too Soon To Get Out... Chart 11...But Long-Term Investors, Take Note As such, while we recommend overweighting global equities over a 12-month horizon, we would not fault long-term investors for taking some money off the table now. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. 2 Roughly speaking, the Ricardian model predicts that the welfare loss from protectionism will be one-half times the average percentage-point increase in tariffs times the change in the import-to-GDP ratio. Imports are about 15% of U.S. GDP. Consider a 10 percent across-the-board increase in tariffs. Assuming a price elasticity of import demand of 4, this would reduce trade by 1-0.96^10=0.33 (i.e., 33%), which would take the import-to-GDP ratio down from 15% to 10%. As such, the welfare loss would be 0.5*0.1*(15%-10%)=0.25%, or just one quarter of one percent of GDP. 3 James Coates, "Real Chip Shortage Or Just A Panic, Crunch Is Likely To Boost Pc Prices," Chicago Tribune, dated August 6, 1993. "Thailand Floods Disrupt Production And Supply Chains," BBC.com, dated October 13, 2011; Ploy Ten Kate, and Chang-Ran Kim, "Thai Floods batter Global Electronics, Auto Supply Chains," Reuters.com, dated October 28, 2011. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S.-China Trade Spat: Is R-Star To Blame?" dated April 6, 2018. APPENDIX A Chart 1Long-Term Real Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Underweight When we downgraded the S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines index to underweight last year, it was because the index's outperformance to that date had been due to the cruise line component companies (second panel) and we believed a mean reversion in profits was in the offing. Margins had been steadily climbing (third panel), a result of rising occupancy rates (a number which cannot rise ad infinitum) and, eventually, a capacity growth cycle would have to begin anew with all the associated negative margin implications. Margins have, in fact, tightened considerably, but not for the reasons we had expected. Rather, fuel prices have been soaring and, given that these can represent 30-40% of total operating expenses, have been significantly cutting into profitability. Carnival Corp., with an off-cycle year-end, has given us a preview on at least the first two months of the year and the outlook is grim; unit profits dropped by nearly 90% year-on-year in Q1. Meanwhile, in the hotel component of the index, cutthroat competition is continuing to drive pricing power deflation and the industry is trying to compensate with huge capacity additions (bottom panel); this should eventually show up in earnings and take some of the exuberance out of thus far resilient hotel stock prices (second panel). Overall, we reiterate our underweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL - MAR, CCL, RCL, HLT, WYN, NCLH.
Overweight CSX Corp led off the S&P railroads index in reporting results for the first quarter of 2018 yesterday; the markets were not disappointed and the stock jumped substantially higher. Most notably, the company's operating ratio (the ratio of operating expenses to revenues and a standard measure of industry profitability) leaped down by nearly 10% from 73.2% to 63.7% (lower means better profitability) year-over-year. Further, the company was able to increase prices in the key intermodal segment without impacting volumes; the resilience of the current business cycle should support more of the same for the rest of the year (second panel). Unsurprisingly, there is a tight correlation between the S&P railroads index relative performance and the industry’s operating ratio (operating ratio shown inverted in top panel). We expect ongoing efficiency gains and exceptionally strong demand to keep the latter suppressed (possibly delivering the most profitable year in railroad history), implying outsized EPS gains. With a valuation only slightly above the 16-year average and in line with the market multiple (bottom panel), such EPS strength should point to stock price outperformance; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU.
Overweight Shares of the S&P drug retail index shot higher this week after reports surfaced that Amazon had shelved plans for a long-considered entry into the prescription drug business. Such a move seemed logical following the company's move into private-label over-the-counter medicines last year and the more recent announcement of a partnership with JPMorgan and Berkshire Hathaway to enter the health insurance business. We have argued in the past that the competitive threat was overblown and, accordingly, argue that the removal of such a threat is no reason to be overly excited. Rather, we think investor focus should remain squarely on the fundamentals that have remained strong despite the index's fall. The sector's share of the consumer's wallet has barely changed since the share price slide began in 2015 (second panel) and both pharma manufacturing shipments and retail sales appear to have turned the corner (bottom panel). The resulting earnings growth should be the remedy to the index's ills; stay overweight The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5DRUG - CVS, WBA.
Highlights Midterm election is yet another geopolitical headwind to the markets this summer; A "lame duck" Trump could seek relevance abroad, with aggressive foreign and trade policy; Investors would be right to fret about a hard turn to the left by the Democratic Party; Democrats have 60% probability of taking the House and 45% probability of taking the Senate; On a cyclical horizon, midterm election will not undermine pro-business policies of the Trump administration, but may signal a paradigm shift over a more structural time horizon. Feature Geopolitical winds have turned from tailwinds to headwinds. This is as we expected last April, when we correctly forecast that geopolitical risks were overstated in 2017 but understated for 2018.1 This January we focused on several key risks for 2018: trade protectionism, Iran-U.S. geopolitical tensions, and a potential black swan risk in Taiwan.2 In our 2018 Strategic Outlook, we also pointed out that if Donald Trump becomes an early "lame duck" president, he will seek relevance abroad.3 It is therefore time to turn to the question of the upcoming midterm election, set to take place on November 6. For most of our clients, the midterm election is another volatile political event to add to an already long list (Table 1). True, the midterm election could produce a gridlocked Congress - which we recently showed quantitatively is marginally negative for the markets - and a potential push to impeach President Trump.4 However, this is not the worst of it. As November approaches, through a tumultuous summer full of headline risks, President Trump may double-down on his doctrine of "maximum pressure" - which objectively succeeded in the case of North Korea. This could produce more aggressive rhetoric and policy in the ongoing trade skirmish with China, further sanctions against Iran, and tensions with Russia. Table 1Protectionism: Upcoming Dates To Watch President Trump would not be the first U.S. president to seek relevance abroad, although he may be the earliest, and potentially the lamest, lame duck president in recent U.S. history.5 As such, the real risk is not the Democrats taking over the House, but rather how the Trump administration reacts to a sudden loss of legislative initiative. While a Democratic House would dramatically increase domestic political constraints on President Trump, there are few constitutional constraints on U.S. presidents when it comes to foreign policy. As such, the midterm election is market relevant, but not because Democratic Party control will be able to impact domestic policy. Investors should remember why markets cheered President Trump in the first place: Chart 1Trump: A Boon For Main Street And Wall Street Chart 2Easy Fiscal + Tight Money = Buy SPX Deregulation: Business confidence soared even before Donald Trump was inaugurated as president, especially among small businesses, while regulatory worries melted away (Chart 1).6 The executive branch controls the regulatory process, which means that the Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives, or even the Senate, will have little impact. Tax cuts: Fears that the Democrats will be able to reverse the tax cuts are overstated. Without a veto-proof majority in both chambers of Congress - two-thirds of the seats - the Democrats cannot regain legislative initiative or reverse President Trump's accomplishments. Table 2ADXY Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Table 2BSPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Fiscal policy: Markets are currently pricing in a rare mix of tightening monetary policy and stimulative fiscal policy, a bullish combination (Chart 2) that tends to boost both equities and the dollar (Table 2). While there is no need for fiscal profligacy at the current point in the cycle (Chart 3), we would think that investors would recoil at any sign of fiscal conservativism. But looking for austerity within the current Democratic Party - whose official party platform calls for universal health coverage, for example - is a mistake. Chart 3An Odd Time For Fiscal Profligacy As such, the Democratic Party's control of the House - or even the Senate, given that a filibuster-proof majority is out of reach in 2018 - is unlikely to reverse the policy and regulatory backdrop that has been so beneficial for equities over the past 18 months. Instead, the risks are twofold. First, that President Trump reacts to the coming electoral bloodbath well ahead of November with aggressive foreign and trade policy that plays to his base. Second, that markets begin pricing in impeachment risk. Although we do not think that impeachment would have a major or direct impact on earnings and the real economy, it could add to volatility and could imply higher odds of a Democratic win in 2020 (think Gerald Ford). This would present a scenario in which the Democrats would be more likely to reverse Trump's policies in 2020, thus increasing uncertainty. As such impeachment could start being priced in well ahead of the November election. We would therefore expect midterm-related volatility to rise before the election. The election itself could likely be a time to buy risk assets, provided that fundamentals, the macro backdrop, and geopolitical risks all combine into a bullish signal, as long as President Trump makes an effort to move to the middle and work with either a split Congress, or even a potentially Democratic-led legislature. These are all sources of uncertainty and therefore provide plenty of reasons for the markets to fret ahead of the election. Who Will Win The Midterm Election? It is too early to have a high conviction view on the midterm election, which is still over six months away. Betting markets give Democrats roughly 70% probability of winning the House and just 40% of winning the Senate (Chart 4). We roughly agree with those odds, but would give the Democrats a lower chance of winning the House and a slightly higher chance of winning the Senate. There are broadly five reasons why the Democratic Party has a very good chance of winning the House of Representatives in November: Chart 4GOP Odds Have Fallen, But Stabilized Chart 5GOP Trails In Polls, But Still Close Polling: The generic congressional ballot (Chart 5) has the Democrats up 6.7% on the Republicans. The generic ballot has a decent predictive track record. Basically, the party that is up tends to perform well in the election. Meanwhile, Trump's approval rating, despite its recent recovery in support, remains at the lower end of presidential approval ratings ahead of midterm elections, predicting a 35-seat loss for Republicans in the House (Chart 6). On the whole, the Democrats' polling advantage is modest-to-strong. True, it could unravel over the summer. But at current levels, it is still a respectable advantage. Chart 6Republican Presidents And Midterm Results Retirements: Republicans in the House and the Senate are retiring at an alarming pace, one never seen in the modern political context (Chart 7). We cannot overstate how important this is, especially given that there has been a 20% swing against non-incumbent Republicans in deeply conservative districts that have held special elections thus far (Table 3). Most worrying for the GOP is that, of the 42 Republicans who have announced retirement, 18 sit in seats that are not "solidly" held by the GOP.7 These are seats that only elected the Republican candidate by an average of at most 5% more than the overall Republican vote in the 2012 and 2016 election. Chart 7GOP Retirements Are Unprecedented Table 32017 Special Elections Are Ominous For The GOP History: Of the 18 midterm elections since World War II, the sitting president's party only retained congressional control four times (Chart 8). The only president to win congressional control during the midterm election was Bush Jr., an election that was held a year after the September 11 terrorist attack (i.e., an exception). Americans like checks and balances and abhor hubris. Redistricting: Gerrymandering - politically motivated redrawing of district electoral maps - has mainly favored Republicans over the past decade.8 It has also significantly reduced the number of competitive districts available to electoral swings (Chart 9). Recently, however, the Pennsylvania state Supreme Court invoked the state constitution and struck down the congressional map that favored the GOP. The Supreme Court of the U.S. then refused an emergency request from Pennsylvania Republicans to block the new, non-partisan map drawn by the state court. This decision followed several decisions in 2016-17 that saw congressional maps in North Carolina, Virginia, Texas, Wisconsin, and Alabama either thrown out or questioned. The changes will help the Democrats at the margin, potentially making the difference between a majority and a minority position in the House. Chart 8Trump Is ##br##Fighting History Chart 9Gerrymandering Reduces##br## Competitive House Seats Momentum: Shouldn't a strong economy and sub-4% unemployment rate help the Republicans in November? The simple answer is not much. Just as a strong economy and a 4.7% unemployment rate did not help the incumbent party and its candidate Secretary Hillary Clinton fend off the inexperienced challenger, Donald Trump, in 2016. Simply put, economics is relative and partisan. While Republican voters suddenly became very happy about the economy after Trump's election - having been miserable merely days before- it is now the Democrats who believe that the economy is in a downward spiral (Chart 10). It is therefore difficult to see how the current economic performance makes enough of a difference to swing voters away from the trends we describe above. Further supporting this view is the fact that economic issues, broadly defined, are declining in terms of relevance in the upcoming election (Chart 11).9 Chart 10Politics Trumps Data! Chart 11It's Not Necessarily The Economy The trend is clear: Republicans are in trouble when it comes to the House of Representatives (Chart 12). Democrats need to win only 25 seats in November and there are now 29 Republicans representing seats that The Cook Political Report, the expert political analysis shop when it comes to predicting individual House races, classifies as "toss-up or worse." Our call, at this point, is that the Democrats have a 60% probability of winning the House of Representatives. We hesitate to set our odds at the higher end, near where the betting markets are pricing it, as there is still a long time until the election. In addition, the Democrats' lead in the generic congressional ballot has halved from 13% since December. What about the Senate? We modeled the individual Senate races by combining the state and national economic and political variables with the latest available opinion polling.10 We only focused on the races that we believe are currently competitive and we may change the mix as new information becomes available. Our model is a work in progress and we will update our clients as it develops. The results of our "beta" model, expressed as a margin of victory by the GOP candidate (GOP total vote minus Democrat total vote), show that the Democrats have a surprisingly decent chance of picking up the Senate (Chart 13).11 This is astonishing given that the Democrats are defending nine seats in "red states," whereas Republicans are only defending one seat in a "blue state" (Nevada). Basically, our model predicts that Republicans would lose Nevada and Tennessee. Meanwhile, of the five Senate races that are ranked as "toss ups" and that are currently held by Democrats, our model predicts that Republicans will only win Indiana. Given that current polling is highly unreliable, we would take all predictions of our model with a healthy dose of skepticism. Nonetheless, the results are surprisingly bullish for the Democrats. Chart 12The Number Of "At-Risk" GOP Seats Has Doubled Chart 13BCA Senate Model Says: Election Is Too Close To Call Our call, at this point, is that the Democrats have a 45% probability of winning the Senate; essentially the election is too close to call. This is higher than where the betting markets are pricing the election and an astonishing turnaround from 12 months ago, when most forecasts ignored Democrat chances in the Senate given how unfavorable the math was for their odds of winning. What does it all mean for the markets? Chart 14Midterm Elections Are A Boon For The S&P 500... Chart 15...But Really, It's All About The Fed Generally speaking, the market has performed very well following midterm elections during a Republican presidency (Chart 14). At closer inspection, however, it appears that this may have been because monetary policy has almost always been easy during these periods (Chart 15). As fate would have it, Republican presidents have been generally blessed with easy monetary policy. As such, we do not think that investors should take anything from this data. Table 4Democratic Primaries To Watch Rather than rely on uncertain empirical results, we would simply point out that the run-up to the midterm election, this coming summer, looks packed with geopolitical risks and uncertainty. President Trump is facing a potential defeat in Congress and will want to ensure that his base turns out for the election. This could mean doubling down on those parts of his policy agenda where the constitutional constraints are the weakest: foreign and trade policy. This is a recipe for more volatility. The midterm election is therefore a catalyst, if not the source, of near-term volatility. Furthermore, investors should carefully observe the results of key Democratic primary races (Table 4). Any sign that the Democratic Party is fielding left-wing candidates, as opposed to centrists, would have two implications. On one hand, it would lower our odds of the Democrats winning the House and definitely the Senate. On the other hand, it would increase the odds that the U.S. will have a political paradigm shift over the next electoral cycle. If the Democrats swing hard to the left and win the midterm election, the implications for investors would be hard to overstate. As a point of reference, investors should remember that Republicans swung hard to the right in 2010-14, presaging the rise of Trump. Yet these Republican victories took place in the face of long-term demographic and social headwinds, whereas comparable Democratic victories today would take place in the face of long-term demographic and social tailwinds. American policy can shift harder to the left over the coming decade than it did to the right over the past eight years.12 As Charts 16 and 17 show, the U.S. is at "peak inequality." As the example of France illustrates, income inequality does not necessarily go up. In the early 1960s, France had a larger share of the national income apportioned to the wealthy than the U.S. does today. Since then, it has fallen. In other words, societal decisions on wealth redistribution vary over time. The concern for investors would be if any Democratic party move to the far left is rewarded at the polls in November. If this were to happen, it would be appropriate to begin pricing in a significant decline in the share of national income that goes to corporate profits, if not yet a decline in social unrest. As Chart 17 illustrates, a significant decline in wealth concentration in France occurred right around the late 1960s. The May 1968 revolution was one of the most paradigm-shifting moments in France's post-World War II history. If the markets begin pricing in anything close to this degree of change in the U.S., the S&P 500 could enter a bear market. Chart 16GOP Tax Cuts: Same Old Story Chart 17Beware May 1968 Bottom Line: Our odds of the Democrats winning the House are 60%, below market expectations. Our odds of the Democrats winning the Senate are 45%, above market expectations. While we do not think that Democratic control of Congress, or just the House, will be negative for earnings on a cyclical time horizon, we do understand why investors would price in higher volatility. First, President Trump may respond to a loss of congressional control by seeking relevance abroad through hawkish foreign and trade policy. Second, investors may sense a paradigm shift occurring in the U.S. if left-wing Democrats start winning primary races and then go on to win the House. Is Impeachment A Risk? In a report titled Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment, we argued that investors should fade impeachment-related volatility.13 Equity markets are driven by earnings. As such, there has to be a direct relationship between political volatility and company earnings. Impeachment has rarely produced such a link. Chart 18 looks at market performance during the Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974), and President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999). Of the three, the Teapot Dome scandal did not result in impeachment proceedings, but only because President Harding died in office in 1923 - and neither his death nor the unfolding scandal prevented the stock market from "roaring" through the mid-1920s.14 Chart 18AVolatility Amid Three U.S. Scandals Chart 18BEquities Amid Three U.S. Scandals The market reaction to the Lewinsky Affair was also highly muted. Like the Teapot Dome incident, it occurred amidst one of the greatest bull markets in U.S. history. Of course, U.S. equities did fall 19% mid-way through the Clinton impeachment process, but this was more due to global risk factors than domestic politics. Watergate appears to have affected both equity markets and volatility. The S&P 500 fell 39% from February 7, 1973 - when the Senate established a select committee to investigate Watergate - until Nixon's resignation on August 9, 1974. That said, the scandal alone did not cause the correction; rather, it was a combination of factors, including the second devaluation of the dollar, rapid increases in price inflation, and a massive insurance fraud scandal. Writing in the summer of 1973, BCA remarked that while a speculative, "Watergate-inspired," attack on the dollar further contributed to some short-term capital outflow, but that the macro-fundamentals of the economy would ultimately persevere. Would today play out more like Teapot and Clinton, or Nixon? It will depend on the fundamentals. In the 1920s and the 1990s, fundamentals were solid and thus politics could not dent the ongoing bull market. In the early 1970s, macro fundamentals were terrible and thus politics accentuated the decline in the bear market. One thing that impeachment would not change, however, is policy. The U.S. is not Brazil. Impeachment will not lead to a 180 degree change in policy outcomes. Vice President Mike Pence is a Republican and is as pro-business as Trump. Given that the aggressive trade policy towards China has both public and establishment support, we would not expect any relief on the protectionism front. However, there would be a lot less tweeting, insults, and erratic foreign policy rhetoric aimed at both allies and rivals. The "maximum pressure" doctrine would likely be replaced by a more traditional policy of carrots and sticks. Most notably, we think this would minimize the risk of a proxy war with Iran in the Middle East. How likely is impeachment once Democrats take over the House? It depends. If President Trump fires Department of Justice Special Counsel Robert Mueller, the Democrats in the House of Representatives may get enough votes to impeach President Trump even without a House takeover! The question is whether impeachment would matter. As we outlined in our special report, impeachment is a political, not a legal, process. As such, the House of Representatives has a low bar for impeachment. It can essentially impeach the U.S. president for anything, including a debatable claim that he obstructed justice. The real question is whether the Senate would convict. To do so, the Senate must hold a trial and vote on whether to remove the president from office by a two-thirds majority (67 votes). Even if Democrats win the Senate, they would need over 15 Republican Senators to join them in removing a sitting U.S. president from office, which has never been done in American history. This could happen, but it would require the American public, particularly Republicans, to lose faith in President Trump. In particular, we have been advising clients to focus on Republican voters' support for Trump. If it dips well below 70%, we suspect that Senators could start switching sides. We are currently nowhere near these levels (Chart 19). What could change these levels of support? The Mueller special investigation is a big risk to President Trump even if one thinks that the charge of collusion with Russia is unfounded. President Bill Clinton was similarly investigated by an independent special investigator, Kenneth Starr. Starr initially focused on the suicide of deputy White House counsel Vince Foster and the Whitewater real estate investments by Bill Clinton. But the trail led elsewhere. Ultimately, the "Starr Report" alleged that Clinton lied under oath regarding his extramarital affair with Monica Lewinsky, an issue completely unrelated to the original investigation. In other words, once independent investigators start digging, there is no telling what skeletons they will exhume. We do not intend to "prosecute" claims against President Trump in this or any future report. But we can also envision a scenario where the Mueller investigation reveals enough evidence of malfeasance to shake GOP voter confidence in President Trump, leading to a potential scenario where he is removed from power. Would the market care at this point? We think the answer is yes. While removal of a U.S. president has no impact on earnings, it could have an impact on social stability. Political polarization is at its highest levels in the U.S. (Chart 20), and roughly 40% of both Democrats and Republicans believe that their political competitors pose a "threat to the nation's well-being" (Chart 21). Chart 19Impeachment: Not A Risk (Yet) Chart 20Polarization, As Inequality, Remains At Record Highs Chart 21"A Threat To The Nation's Well-Being?" Really?! We would fade any risk of a widespread, Red State rebellion. Since a change in Republican opinion is required for Senators to convict Trump, most of Trump's supporters will have already lost faith in him by the time he is removed from office. As we outlined in our Strategic Outlook, we doubt that many Trump voters would risk social unrest to defend their champion.15 Many conservative voters simply wanted change and were willing to give an outsider a chance (much as their liberal counterparts did in 2008!). But convincing the markets may take time, and any sign of even minimal right-wing terrorism could create volatility and drawdowns. Bottom Line: Impeachment remains a headline risk to the markets. We continue to believe that impeachment will merely accentuate the impact of fundamentals on risk assets. However, fundamentals themselves are starting to look vulnerable, at least on a tactical horizon. As such, we are entering a six-month period where geopolitical, trade, and domestic political risks could pose headwinds to U.S. risk assets. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Assistant ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com David Boucher, Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist davidb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017; "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China," dated February 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 President Clinton launched the largest NATO military operation at the time against Yugoslavia amidst impeachment proceedings against him while President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. troops into Somalia a month after losing the 1992 election. Ironically, President George H. W. Bush intervened in Somalia in order to lock in the supposedly isolationist Bill Clinton, who had defeated him three weeks earlier, into an internationalist foreign policy. Less dramatic, but still notable examples, are President George W. Bush ordering the "surge" of troops into Iraq in 2007 after losing both houses of Congress in 2006, and President Barack Obama negotiating the Iranian nuclear deal after losing the Senate (and hence the entire Congress) to the Republicans in 2014. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here... So Much For Populism!" dated November 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 We use The Cook Political Report methodology for reporting the characteristic of House seats. Seats are split into "toss-up or worse," "likely/lean," and "solid" based on their Partisan Voter Index (PVI) score. The Cook PVI measures how each district performs at the presidential level compared to the nation as a whole. A district with a D+2 PVI voted an average of two points more Democratic than the nation did as a whole in the last two presidential elections (2012 and 2016 for current PVI rating). The Cook Political Report defines a "swing seat" as one that falls between D+5 and R+5. A "solid Republican" seat would therefore be any seat with a PVI of R+5 or higher. A "solid Democrat" seat would therefore be any seat with a PVI of D+5 or greater. 8 This is not to say that Democrats have not redistricted for partisan reasons. California was famously redistricted in the 1980s. Most recently, former Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley admitted, during a court deposition, that he redrew the state's district borders specifically to increase the Democratic congressional majority in the state. Please see Amber Phillips, "Maryland's redistricting case reminds us: Both parties gerrymander. A lot." The Washington Post, dated March 28, 2018, available at washingtonpost.com. 9 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "As Good As It Gets?" dated January 29, 2018, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 10 The state variables include the annual percent change in personal income, the annual change in the Philadelphia Fed Coincidence index, and incumbency. The national variables include presidential approval ratings, a variable indicating whether the last presidential election was close, and the annual percent change in real GDP, CPI, industrial production, and the DXY. We add to this mix of national and state data the latest opinion polling by state race and the generic congressional ballot. 11 The U.S. Vice President, Republican Mike Pence, would cast the deciding vote in case of a 50-50 tie and therefore the Democrats require a pickup of two seats. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America," dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 "Teapot Dome" was for decades the largest corruption scandal in U.S. history. It involved President Warren G. Harding, his Secretary of the Interior, other officials, and a number of oil companies that were given extremely favorable leases to drill oil in federal land in Wyoming. Investigations and prosecutions lasted through 1927. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2017 Report Card," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights U.S. Treasury Curve: The U.S. Treasury curve has flattened to new cyclical lows as the market has moved to fully price in the Fed's interest rate forecasts. Inflation expectations must rise further for those forecasts to be fully realized, however. Expect renewed U.S. curve steepening through higher inflation expectations and longer-term Treasury yields in the next 3-6 months. UST-Bund Spread Update: Stay in our recommended 10yr UST-Bund spread widening trade. as Treasury yield increases will not be matched in Bunds given slowing euro area economic momentum and a more balanced tone from the ECB. Global IG Corporate Sector Allocation: Our investment grade (IG) sector allocations, taken from our relative value models, have added positive performance since our last update in August. Feature The unpredictable, and at times unruly, behavior of financial markets over the first few months of 2018 has been exhausting for investors. A calm January was followed by the early February volatility spike and, more recently, huge intraday swings based on the ebb and flow of news on U.S. trade and foreign policy. Yet when looking at the year-to-date returns for various asset classes, the numbers do not seem unusually alarming given the amount of surrounding noise. Chart of the WeekA Long Road Back From The VIX Spike The S&P 500 index is only down -0.7%, while both equities in both the euro area and emerging markets (EM) equities are up +1.8% and +1.1%, respectively (using MSCI data in U.S. dollar terms). Credit markets are also delivering rather boring performance so far in 2018, from U.S. high-yield (+1.2% excess return over government debt) to euro area investment grade and EM hard currency corporates (both with an -0.1% excess return in U.S. dollar terms). Admittedly, these numbers look far less flattering considering the robust rally in risk assets in January. Yet the year-to-date returns simply do not line up with our impression of how investors' feel about how this year has gone so far. The perception is much gloomier than the actual outcome. Right now, markets are looking for guidance and direction and finding little of both. A big problem is that global bond yields, most notably in the U.S., have not fallen much from the highs for the year - even with global growth clearly losing some steam in the first quarter of 2018. The reason? Global inflation is in a mild cyclical upswing, a product of persistently tight labor markets and rising oil prices (Chart of the Week). The "leadership" in government bond markets has shifted away from accelerating global growth and an upward repricing of future central bank tightening, to rising inflation and unchanged monetary policy expectations. The notion of central bankers not being friendly to the markets remains our key theme for this year. We continue to expect that policymakers will not respond to the latest softer patch of economic data and will focus more on the reacceleration of inflation. This is especially true with risk assets stabilizing and volatility measures like the U.S. VIX index continuing to drift lower and, more importantly, the "volatility of volatility" (as measured by the VVIX index) now back to the levels that prevailed before the early February volatility spike (bottom panel). Although as BCA's strategists discussed at our View Meeting yesterday, volatility can quickly return with a vengeance given softer global growth momentum, and with the geopolitical calendar heating up next month (the U.S. government must make its final decision on the China trade tariffs and investment restrictions).1 This led the group to downgrade our recommended global equity exposure and upgrade our global bond exposure on a tactical (0-3 months) basis, although our more medium-term cyclical allocations (6-12 months) were unchanged (overweight stocks versus bonds). From the point of view of global bond markets, we may now be in period of mild "stagflation" with softening growth and rising inflation. We remain of the view that the former is temporary and the latter is not. This backdrop will keep global bond yields under upward pressure for at least the next few months, with better expected performance of corporate debt over governments - albeit with the potential for higher volatility given more elevated geopolitical risks. What Next For The U.S. Treasury Curve? The Treasury curve flattened to a new cyclical low last week, with the spread between 2-year and 10-year bonds now sitting at 45bps. On the surface, this flattening seems consistent with a Fed that is maintaining a "cautiously hawkish" message and that its rate hike plans for 2018 are unchanged despite more volatile financial markets. Chart 2This UST Curve Flattening Is Different What makes this current episode different from other bouts of Treasury curve flattening over the past five years, however, is the starting point for the absolute of bond yields. According to our two-factor valuation model for the 10-year Treasury yield, yields are now just a touch above fair value, which is currently 2.78%. That yield valuation was at least +25bps before the previous flattening episodes between 2014 and 2017 (Chart 2). That distinction is critical in differentiating a bull flattener from a bear flattener. Simply put, longer-dated Treasuries are not yet cheap enough to suggest that investors should extend duration risk to benefit from any additional curve flattening from here. In fact, we see a greater risk that Treasury curve re-steepens a bit from here, as there is more room for longer-term inflation expectations to move higher than there is for the front-end of the curve to reprice an even more hawkish Fed. The recent softening of cyclical global economic data has been occurring while realized inflation rates have been slowly rising from depressed levels (Chart 3). Yet in the U.S., the slowing of growth seen in the first quarter of the year remains very modest compared to that seen in Europe or Japan, while core inflation rates (for both the CPI index and the PCE deflator) have accelerated back to 2%. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow forecasting model is calling for Q1/2018 growth of 1.9%, while the New York Fed's Nowcast model is predicting Q1 growth of 2.8%. While both forecasts are a deceleration from the 3% rates seen in the previous three quarters in 2017, neither is below U.S. potential GDP growth, which the U.S. Congressional Budget Office now estimates to be 1.9%. Even in China, where the economy had been slowing as policymakers have aimed to tighten monetary policy and slow credit growth, cyclical indicators such as the Li Keqiang index (the preferred indicator of our China strategists) have shown a bit of a rebound of late. Right now, underlying U.S. growth and inflation momentum are still pointing towards the Fed delivering on its current projection of an additional 50bps of rate hikes in 2018, taking the funds rate to 2.25%, with even a chance of an additional hike if inflation continues to accelerate. This is essentially fully priced with a 2-year Treasury yield just under 2.4%, however, and the real funds rate is now at neutral according to measures like the Fed's r-star. Therefore, additional flattening pressures from the front end of the curve are unlikely unless the Fed is willing to signal a faster pace of rate hikes than currently laid out in its economic projections (the "dots"). At the same time, the 10-year TIPS inflation breakeven remains 25-35bps below the 2.4-2.5% range that would be consistent with the market expecting U.S. inflation to sustainably return to the Fed's 2% inflation target on the headline PCE deflator. Hence, a steeper Treasury curve is far more likely than a flatter Treasury curve from current levels. Where could this view go wrong? Perhaps the Trump administration's trade skirmishes with China could broaden into a full-on trade war that could cause deeper damage to U.S. equities, dampen growth expectations and drive longer-term yields lower. Coming at a time when there is a significant short position in the U.S. Treasury market, this could look similar to the prolonged bull-flattening seen in 2015-16. During that episode, duration exposure flipped from a big net short to very net long according to measures like the J.P. Morgan Duration Survey (Chart 4, top panel), while the market priced out all expected Fed rate hikes (2nd panel). However, that also occurred alongside a 50bp decline in inflation expectations (3rd panel) and a big deceleration of U.S. growth (bottom panel), both related to a weakening global economy and collapsing oil prices. It is uncertain if the current U.S.-China trade skirmish would have an equivalent impact on both the U.S. economy and the Treasury curve, especially given a starting point of stronger global growth a far more positive demand/supply balance in world oil markets. Chart 3A Whiff Of Stagflation? Chart 42018 Is Not 2015/16 In sum, we are sticking to our view that the Treasury curve is more likely to bear-steepen through higher longer-term yields than flatten bearishly through more discounted Fed hikes or flatten bullishly through much weaker growth and inflation. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance in the U.S., within an underweight allocation in a currency-hedged global government bond portfolio. We are also are sticking with our tactical trade of staying short the 10-year U.S. Treasury versus the 10-year German Bund, even with the spread now looking a bit too wide on our fundamentals-based valuation model (Chart 5). The unrelenting string of disappointing economic data in the euro area has already resulted in a far more cautious tone from European Central Bank (ECB) officials regarding the potential for quick rate hikes after the expected end of the asset purchase program at the end of this year. The gap between the U.S. and euro area data surprise indices has proven to be a good directional indicator for the Treasury-Bund spread (Chart 6, bottom panel). Given our views on the potential for renewed bear-steepening in the Treasury curve, which is unlikely to be matched in the German curve in the next 3-6 months, we see no reason to take profits yet on our spread trade. Chart 5UST-Bund Spread Now A Bit Too Wide... Chart 6...But Too Soon For Spread Tightening Bottom Line: The U.S. Treasury curve has flattened to new cyclical lows as the market has moved to fully price in the Fed's interest rate forecasts. Inflation expectations must rise further for those forecasts to be fully realized, however. Expect renewed U.S. curve steepening through higher inflation and longer-term Treasury yields in the next 3-6 months. Stay in our recommended 10-year Treasury-Bund spread widening trade, as Treasury yield increases will not be matched in Bunds given slowing euro area economic momentum and a more balanced tone from the ECB. A Brief (And Belated) Performance Update For Our Corporate Bond Sector Allocations It has been some time (August 2017) since we last published a performance update for our investment grade (IG) corporate sector allocations for the U.S., euro area and U.K. As a reminder, those allocations come from our relative value model, which is designed to measure the valuation of each individual sector compared to the overall Barclays Bloomberg corporate bond index for each region. The methodology takes each sector's individual option-adjusted spread (OAS) and regresses it in a panel regression with all the other sectors in each region, as a function of the sector's duration, convexity (duration squared) and credit rating - the primary risk factors for any corporate bond. Using the common coefficients from that regression, a risk-adjusted "fair value" spread is calculated. The difference between the actual OAS and the fair value OAS is our valuation metric from the model for each region. The latest output from the models can be found in the tables and charts in the Appendix starting on Page 14. We also show the duration-times-spread (DTS) for each sector in those tables, using that as our primary way to measure the volatility of each sector. The scatterplot charts in the Appendix show the tradeoff between the valuation residual from our model and each sector's DTS. Chart 7Performance Of Our IG Sector Allocations We then apply individual sector weights based on the model output and our desired level of overall spread risk that we wish to take in our recommended credit portfolio. At our last update in August 2017, we made a decision to keep the overall (weighted) DTS of our sector tilts roughly equal to the overall IG corporate DTS for each region. With credit spreads looking tight at the time, credit spread curves flat relative to history, and with the Fed in the midst of a tightening cycle, we did not see a case for taking aggressive spread risk (i.e. having a high aggregate DTS) in the portfolio. The performance of our latest sector recommendations since our last update in August 2017, and in the first quarter of 2018, are shown in Chart 7. We show both the total return and excess return of each sector versus duration-matched government bonds. Since that last review, our U.K. sector allocations have performed the best, delivering an additional 12bps of total return and 10bps of excess return versus the U.K. IG corporate index. Our euro area corporate allocations have added 2bps of total return and 3bps of excess return, while our U.S. allocations have modestly underperformed both on total return (-1bp) and excess return. We also show the performance numbers for just the first quarter of 2018 in Chart 7, and we will present the return numbers on this quarterly basis in the future as part of our regular model bond portfolio performance reviews. The sector allocations offered a modest underperformance in Q1 2018, with -5bps of total return and -8bps of excess return coming mostly from euro area and U.K. allocations. The U.S. allocations actually outperformed by +3bps on a total return basis in Q1. The return numbers for our U.S. sector allocations can be found in Table 1. Since our last update in August, the best performing sectors (in excess return terms) for our U.S. portfolio allocation were the overweights to all Energy sub-sectors (+35bps combined), Cable & Satellite (+4bps) and Banks (+4bps). Of those names, only the Independent Energy sub-sector delivered a positive excess return (+3bps) in Q1 2018. Table 1U.S. Investment Grade Performance The return numbers for our euro area sector allocations can be found in Table 2. Since our last update in August, the best performing sectors (in excess return terms) for our euro area portfolio allocation were the overweights to Financials (+35bps, coming mainly from Banks, Senior Debt and Insurance) and Integrated Energy (+13bps). Those overweights also delivered small positive excess returns (+3bps and +1bps, respectively) in Q1 2018. The return numbers for our U.K. sector allocations can be found in Table 3. Since our last update, the best performing sector (in excess return terms) was the overweight to Financials (+6bps, coming mostly from Banks). Looking ahead, credit spread curves remain very flat by historical standards (Chart 8), which suggests there is not enough spread compensation for extending credit risk to lower quality tiers. Thus, we are sticking with keeping our target DTS for our combined sector allocations equal to that of the overall IG index for each region. We will update our sector allocations in an upcoming Weekly Report. Table 2Euro Area Investment Grade Performance Table 3U.K. Investment Grade Performance Chart 8Credit Quality Curves Remain Very Flat Bottom Line: Our investment grade (IG) sector allocations, taken from our relative value models, have added positive performance since our last update in August. We continue to recommend a cautious approach to sector allocation, targeting index levels of spread risk (in aggregate) in the U.S. euro area and U.K. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Expect Volatility ... Of Volatility", dated April 11, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Appendix Chart 1U.S. Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Appendix Chart 1U.S. Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Appendix Table 2Euro Area Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Appendix Chart 2Euro Area Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Appendix Table 3U.K. Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Appendix Chart 3U.K. Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Markets have been uneasy recently; last month saw the Fed raise rates, combined with language indicating a steeper path for interest rate moves in the coming two years. However, amidst the Fed's tightening, the government has been embarking on fiscal largess. The recent tax cuts, budget announcements and potential infrastructure bill mean that we have entered a fairly rare period of loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy; similar periods have historically yielded exceptionally strong equity returns. We have analyzed the GICS1 industry groups and their average annualized performance in each of the most recent five periods for which we have data of loose fiscal and tight monetary policy with the results presented in the table below. The adjusted results are telling as cyclicals and positive interest rate sensitive sectors are the top performers. Conversely, defensives and negative interest rate sensitive sectors are the worst performers. Such a result is intuitive; loosening fiscal policy during expansions tends to extend/prolong the business cycle and may also arrive in late/later stages of the cycle where equity returns go parabolic and deep cyclicals roar. In addition, when the Fed raises rates, financials tend to benefit and competing fixed income proxies suffer. Please see this week's Special Report for more details and a deeper dive on the top and bottom performing sectors during periods of loose fiscal and tight monetary policy.
Highlights Duration & The Fed: With market rate expectations still not as elevated as the Fed's projections, the outlook for Treasury price return during the next 12 months is poor. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Duration & The CBO: The scope for further upward revisions to potential GDP growth forecasts is limited. This will cap the market's expected equilibrium fed funds rate and ultimately the pace of Fed rate hikes. The Bond Map: This week we introduce a framework for quickly comparing the risk/reward tradeoff on offer from each U.S. bond sector. Feature If we had to choose a fundamental first principle of bond investing, it would be that investors should determine what change in the short-term interest rate is currently priced into the market and then decide whether the central bank will move the interest rate by more or less than what is discounted. Using a 12-month investment horizon, Chart 1 shows that the difference between market expectations for the change in the federal funds rate and the actual change in the federal funds rate closely tracks the price return from the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index.1 It also shows that the market has underestimated the Fed's hawkishness since early 2016, leading to a negative price return for Treasuries. This stands in stark contrast to earlier in the recovery when the market consistently anticipated more rate hikes than were ultimately delivered (Chart 2). Chart 1The Fundamental Question Chart 2Investors Have Been Surprised By Fed With all that in mind, in this week's report we consider whether the Fed will continue to deliver hawkish surprises during the next 12 months. Or whether market expectations have finally caught up with reality. The Near-Term Rate Hike Outlook The first step in our "back to basics" bond analysis is to assess what rate hike outlook is currently priced into the yield curve. Using overnight index swap (OIS) forwards, we calculate that the market expects the federal funds rate to be 68 basis points higher in one year's time. Alternatively, we can calculate that the market expects a federal funds rate of 2.23% by the end of this year, 2.63% by the end of 2019, and 2.69% by the end of 2020 (Chart 3). The federal funds rate is currently 1.69%. Adopting the 12-month time horizon used in Chart 1, we can say that the market expects 2-3 rate hikes between now and next April. This is slightly below the Fed's current projections. As of the March FOMC meeting, 12 out of 15 FOMC participants anticipated delivering either 2 or 3 more rate hikes before the end of the year. With another 2-3 hikes anticipated in 2019, it is clear that the FOMC is somewhat more hawkish than the market. But even with a more hawkish outlook than the market, the FOMC still expects core inflation to modestly overshoot its 2% target during the next two years (Chart 4). We view this as a reasonable expectation. While core PCE inflation increased at a year-over-year pace of only 1.6% through February, we showed last week that base effects will cause it to jump sharply in March.2 A month-over-month increase of 0.1% in March translates to a year-over-year growth rate of 1.85%. A month-over-month increase of 0.2% translates to a year-over-year growth rate of 1.95%. As long as the economic recovery is sustained it is not far-fetched to expect that inflation will reach the Fed's target before the end of the year. Chart 3Market Versus Fed Dots Chart 4Fed Projects An Inflation Overshoot Once inflation reaches (or exceeds) the Fed's 2% target, it will necessitate a change in communication from the central bank. Specifically, with the Fed's inflation goal having been achieved, it would be inappropriate for it to maintain an "accommodative" monetary policy. The Fed discussed this eventuality for the first time at the March FOMC meeting, as evidenced by this passage from the minutes: Some participants suggested that, at some point, it might become necessary to revise statement language to acknowledge that, in pursuit of the Committee's statutory mandate and consistent with the median of participants' policy rate projections in the SEP, monetary policy eventually would likely gradually move from an accommodative stance to being a neutral or restraining factor for economic activity.3 The bottom line is that with inflation quickly approaching the 2% target, the Fed is unlikely to deviate from its gradual pace of rate hikes. With market rate expectations still not as elevated as the Fed's projections, the outlook for Treasury price return during the next 12 months is poor. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. The Importance Of The Equilibrium Fed Funds Rate Chart 5Potential GDP Growth ##br##Revisions Are Cyclical Another factor that will govern the cyclical outlook for Fed rate hikes is the equilibrium level of the federal funds rate. That is, the level of interest rates that is consistent with neither an accommodative nor a restrictive policy stance. The level that is expected to keep inflation more or less stable. From the most recent Summary of Economic Projections we know that most FOMC members think that the equilibrium fed funds rate is in the vicinity of 3%, while the bottom panel of Chart 3 shows that market prices embed a somewhat lower forecast. The importance of the equilibrium rate is that if it turns out to be higher than the market expects, then the central bank will be forced to deliver more rate hikes than are anticipated, leading to negative bond price returns, as shown in Chart 1. But how do we judge the appropriate level of the equilibrium fed funds rate? One way is to recognize that the equilibrium fed funds rate is theoretically linked to the rate of potential GDP growth. In fact, we observe that market expectations for the equilibrium fed funds rate - as measured by the 5-year/5-year forward OIS rate - closely track the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) forecast for potential GDP growth during the next 5 years (Chart 5). Notice that the increase in the 5-year/5-year OIS rate since mid-2016 coincides with upward revisions to the CBO's potential GDP growth projections. Chart 6Determinants Of The Growth##br## Of Real Potential GDP This brings up another important point. Because potential GDP growth is not easily measurable, it is often revised higher during periods when GDP growth strengthens and lower during periods of weaker growth (Chart 5, bottom 2 panels). This raises the possibility of further upward revisions if GDP growth remains strong. We certainly wouldn't rule out that possibility, but we also view the scope for further upward revisions to potential GDP growth as fairly limited. Chart 6 shows the breakdown of the CBO's potential GDP growth forecast between its two components: The size of the labor force Labor force productivity The CBO currently projects potential GDP growth of 2% (annualized) for the next 5 years, split between 0.6% annual growth in the size of the labor force and 1.4% annual growth in labor force productivity. Since projections for the size of the labor force are largely driven by slow-moving demographic factors, they are less subject to revision than are projections for the more nebulous productivity component. But with the CBO already embedding a forecast of 1.4% for annual productivity growth, how much higher can we reasonably expect it to be revised? The current forecast is already consistent with the productivity growth that was realized during the 2002-07 period. Any further upward revisions would cause productivity growth to approach the 2% level that was realized during the I.T. revolution of the 1990s. That seems overly optimistic. Bottom Line: The scope for further upward revisions to potential GDP growth forecasts is limited. This will cap the market's expected equilibrium fed funds rate and ultimately the pace of Fed rate hikes. A Quick Note On The Tactical House View Yesterday morning, BCA strategists decided to downgrade our tactical (0-3 month) view on global equities from overweight to neutral, while simultaneously upgrading the tactical view on global bonds from underweight to neutral.4 All cyclical (6-12 month) views remain unchanged. The two main reasons for the tactical shift are the moderation in global growth, which was flagged in this publication last week, and the long list of potential geopolitical risks that could roil markets in May and June.5 Of course any flare-up of geopolitical risk would lead to a near-term spread widening and a flight-to-quality into Treasury bonds. But while investors should certainly be aware of the near-term risks, we are not altering our cyclical portfolio recommendations. Unanticipated inflation remains the number one risk for bond markets. A re-anchoring of the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will apply 17 bps to 27 bps of upward pressure to the nominal 10-year Treasury yield, and we are likewise inclined to wait for inflation expectations to re-normalize before positioning for any sustained widening in corporate spreads. Navigating The Bond Map This week we introduce a new framework for judging the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. bond market. We dub this framework the Bond Map, as it gives us a quick glimpse of how different sectors stack up against one another. In this section we describe how the Bond Map is created, and we will introduce further applications of the Bond Map in the coming weeks. The Total Return Bond Map Chart 7 presents our Total Return Bond Map. The vertical axis of the Map represents the potential reward available in each sector. Specifically, the numbers on the vertical axis correspond to the number of days of average yield decline that are required for each sector to earn a total return of 5% over a 12-month period. For example, it would take 10 days of average yield decline for the Treasury index to deliver a 5% return, it would only take 4 days for the investment grade Corporate index to deliver the same return. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the potential for reward is greater in the investment grade corporate bond index than in the Treasury index. To calculate the number of days to earn 5%, we start with the following formula that relates the total returns for the index to its average yield, duration and convexity. Total Return = Yield - Duration * (Change in yield) + 0.5*Convexity*(Change in yield)2 We set the total return threshold to 5% and use 1-year trailing yield volatility as an estimate for the squared change in yields. This allows us to calculate the change in yields required for the index to return 5%. Lastly, we adjust the change in yields by the yield volatility of each index. Starting in 2000, we look at a sample consisting only of days when the average yield of the index declined, and we calculate the average magnitude of the yield decline on those days. We then divide the yield change required to gain 5% by the average magnitude of the daily yield decline. The result is a measure of the probability of earning a 5% return that should be roughly comparable between different bond sectors. The horizontal axis is the mirror image of the vertical axis. It is the number of days of average yield increase required for the index to lose 5%. This is calculated using the same process described above, except we use a total return target of -5% and calculate average daily yield changes using only days when yields increase. Once again, the result is a measure of the probability of losing 5% that is roughly comparable between different sectors. One way to interpret the Total Return Bond Map is to split it into quadrants centered on the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Aggregate Index. Sectors that plot in the upper-right quadrant are exciting sectors that provide a high probability of earning 5% but also a high probability of losing 5%. Conversely, sectors in the bottom-left quadrant are the boring sectors that provide a low probability of losses, but also a low probability of gains. More interesting are those sectors that plot in the upper-left and bottom-right quadrants. Those sectors in the upper-left (High-Yield bonds and Municipal bonds adjusted for the top marginal tax rate) provide both a higher probability of gains and a lower probability of losses than the Aggregate. Conversely, those sectors in the bottom-right quadrant (Treasuries) provide both a lower probability of gains and a higher probability of losses. One counterintuitive result that springs from the Total Return Bond Map is that the High-Yield index appears less risky than the Treasury index. But upon closer inspection the reason for this appears obvious. The average yield on the junk index needs to rise by approximately 250 bps for the index to lose 5%. Because of its lower carry buffer, the average Treasury index yield needs to rise by only about half as much. At the same time, while the volatility of junk yields is higher than the volatility of Treasury yields, it is not twice as high and therefore does not fully offset the yield advantage in high-yield bonds. The main reason for this is the negative correlation between Treasury yields and high-yield spreads. Usually when Treasury yields are rising, high yield spreads are tightening, and vice-versa. This moderates the volatility in junk yields. To see how the sectors in the Total Return Bond Map move around over time, Chart 8 presents what the Total Return Bond Map looked like on January 1, 2010. We see that high-yield bonds looked even more attractive in early 2010, as did 30-year conventional MBS and Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS. Chart 7Total Return Bond Map (As Of April 12, 2018) Chart 8Total Return Bond Map (As Of January 1, 2010) The Excess Return Bond Map Chart 9 presents the same Bond Map as above, except now we consider excess returns relative to duration-matched Treasuries rather than total returns for each index. We also set our excess return threshold for gains and losses at +/- 100 bps, rather than the 5% we used for total returns. All other calculations remain the same, except that we use spreads and spread volatilities as our inputs rather than yields. Chart 9 shows that the investment grade corporate, local authority and foreign agency sectors look most attractive in excess return space. While no sectors plot in the bottom-right "avoid" quadrant relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate. Chart 10 once again shows the same Bond Map as of January 1, 2010, and once again the attractiveness of Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS is apparent. Meanwhile, conventional 30-year MBS looked unattractive in excess return space in early 2010. In the Excess Return Bond Map, you will notice that some sectors actually have a negative number of days of spread tightening required to earn +100 bps. This simply means that spreads could actually widen somewhat and, because of the large carry buffer, the sector would still produce excess returns of +100 bps. Bottom Line: This week we introduced a framework for quickly comparing the risk/reward tradeoff on offer from each U.S. bond sector. While this framework does not impose a macro view, it does seem to provide a good starting point for assessing relative risk-adjusted value in U.S. bonds. We will continue to refine the approach and search for applications in the coming weeks. Chart 9Excess Return Bond Map (As Of April 12, 2018) Chart 10Excess Return Bond Map (As Of January 1, 2010) Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Market expectations are calculated from the overnight index swap curve. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Review", dated April 10, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 SEP = Summary of Economic Projections 4 A summary of all BCA house views can be accessed here: www.bcaresearch.com/trades/ 5 For details on the trend in global growth please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Review", dated April 10, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. For details on potential geopolitical risks during the next few months please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Expect Volatility ... Of Volatility", dated April 11, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification