Equities

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Stick with a neutral weighting in the tech sector as rising interest rates, higher inflation and a firming greenback offset improving industry operating metrics on the back of the virtuous capex upcycle. Chip and chip equipment stocks will remain under pressure as global semi sales are under attack and leading indicators of semi demand suggest that more pain lies ahead at a time when chip selling prices are steeply decelerating. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities regained their footing last week and remain perched near all-time highs. Investors are largely ignoring the trade-related uncertainty and are instead focusing on the upbeat economic backdrop. Both soft and hard data continue to send an unambiguously healthy signal for the U.S. economy, a potent tonic for corporate profitability. Chart 1EPS Will Do All The Heavy Lifting While a lot of parallels have been drawn between today and the late-1990s, our sense is that the current financial market and economic outlooks resemble more the mid-2000s. Chart 1 shows that, between 2004 and the stock market peak in late-October 2007, forward profit growth estimates peaked at over 20%/annum and the forward multiple drifted steadily lower. Nevertheless, stocks remained well bid and rose alongside forward EPS (top and third panels, Chart 1). In other words, despite decelerating forward profit growth estimates and a contracting forward multiple, expanding forward EPS did the heavy lifting, explaining all of the advance in the SPX. The similarities to today are eerie: while profit growth peaked in Q1/2018, 10% EPS growth is elevated for the tenth year of an expansion, and the forward multiple is coming in (Chart 1). On the policy front, the Bush tax cuts hit in the mid-2000s with the elimination of the double taxation of dividends and a drop in personal income tax rates, along with a one-time cash repatriation of corporate profits stashed abroad. With regard to the economic backdrop, capex was roaring and nominal GDP was firing on all cylinders as a housing bubble was getting inflated. The GDP deflator also hit a high mark. The ISM manufacturing survey eclipsed 61 in 2004 and non-farm payrolls were expanding smartly (Chart 2). But despite all that apparent overheating especially in the housing market, the real fed funds rate was near zero in 2004 (top panel, Chart 3). Finally, a number of financial market metrics were also similar to today. Oil prices were on their way to triple digits, high yield spreads were below 400bps and the VIX probed, at the time, all-time lows (Chart 3). However, one key difference between the mid-2000s and today is the strengthening U.S. dollar. The firming greenback remains a key risk to our positive equity market view (bottom panel, Chart 3), as it will eventually infiltrate EPS. Netting it all out, if history at least rhymes, an earnings-led advance in the SPX is the most likely outcome. Our sanguine cyclical (9-12 month) equity market view remains predicated on a 10%/annum increase in EPS and a sideways-to-lower move in the forward multiple. Meanwhile, wage inflation is slowly starting to rear its ugly head. In fact, we are surprised by the fits and starts in average hourly earnings growth. At this stage of the cycle, wage growth should start galloping higher as executives aggressively bid up the price of labor in order to fill job openings and bring expansion plans to fruition. A simple wage growth indicator comprising resource utilization and the unemployment gap suggests that wage inflation will really kick into higher gear in the coming 12 months (shown as a Z-score, Chart 4). Chart 2Eerie... Chart 3...Parallels With 2004 Chart 4Mind The Return Of Inflation Two weeks ago we highlighted that the S&P 500's profit margins are benefiting from lower corporate taxes and muted wage growth, a goldilocks backdrop. Despite evidence of a pending inflationary impulse, as long as businesses are successful in passing rising input costs down the supply chain and onto the consumer, then margins and EPS will continue to expand. Nevertheless, deconstructing the SPX's all-time high profit margins is in order. Chart 5 & Chart 6 show the 11 GICS1 sector profit margin time series using Standard & Poor's data, and Chart 7 is a snapshot of Q2/2018 profit margins for the 11 sectors and the broad market. Chart 5Sectorial Profit ... Chart 6...Margin Breakdown Chart 7Tech Is A Clear Outlier Five sectors (tech, industrials, materials, consumer discretionary and utilities) are enjoying record-high profit margins, and four (financials, consumer staples, telecom services and real estate) are on the verge of joining that club. This leaves two sectors with declining margin profiles: health care and energy. While most sectors are +/- five percentage points away from the S&P 500, the tech sector sports profit margins at twice the level of the SPX or eleven percentage points higher and is the clear outlier (Chart 7). The implication is that the broad market's EPS fortunes are closely tied to the high-flying tech sector that commands a 26% market cap weight. Thus, this week we are compelled to highlight the deep cyclical tech sector, and two of its hyper-sensitive and foreign exposed subcomponents. Tech On Steroids In late-August we published a chart on tech margins (which we are reprinting today) showing the upward force they have exerted on the broad equity market for the better part of the past decade (top panel, Chart 8). Naturally, stratospheric profits must underpin these parabolic margins. The middle panel of Chart 8 highlights that since 2006 tech EPS have almost quadrupled, pulling SPX profits higher. As a reminder, the S&P tech sector commands a 24% profit weight in the S&P 500, the highest since the history of this data series and almost double the weight during the previous cycle's peak (bottom panel, Chart 8). The implication is that in order for the broad market to suffer a severe blow, tech has to take a hit, and vice versa. Chart 8Secular Tech EPS Growth Has Boosted Margins Chart 9EPS Growth Model Flashing Green On the EPS front, our profit growth model has recently ticked higher from an already extended level, signaling that the profit outlook remains bright (Chart 9). The virtuous capex upcycle - BCA's key theme for the year - remains the key driver behind our EPS model. Chart 10 shows that the tech sector continues to make inroads in the overall capex pie, according to financial statement-reported data, and has now doubled its share since the GFC trough to roughly 12%. National accounts corroborate this data and underscore that pent up demand is getting unleashed, following a near 15-year hibernation period (bottom panel, Chart 10). The news on the operating front is equally encouraging. The San Francisco Fed's tech pulse index - an index of coincident indicators of technology sector activity1 - is reaccelerating. Tech new orders-to-inventories are also picking up steam and suggest that sell side analysts have set the relative EPS bar too low (Chart 11). Finally, the latest PCE report revealed that consumer outlays on tech goods are also gaining momentum, even relative to overall consumer spending. While this upbeat backdrop would point to an above benchmark tech allocation, three risks keep us at bay. First, the tech sector garners 60% of its revenues from abroad and thus the appreciating U.S. dollar is a significant profit headwind, especially for 2019 when the delayed negative FX translation effects will most likely emerge (third panel, Chart 12). Chart 10Capex On The Upswing... Chart 11...Underpinning Tech Operating Metrics... Chart 12...But Three Risks Keep Us At Bay Second, a rising U.S. inflation backdrop along with the related looming selloff in the bond market should knock the wind out of the tech sector's sails. Tech business models are built to withstand deflation and thrive in a disinflationary environment. Thus, when inflation re-emerges, tech stocks suffer (CPI and 10-year UST yield shown inverted, top two panels, Chart 12). Third, leading indicators of emerging Asian demand are souring rapidly and were the trade war to re-escalate, EM in general and tech-laden Korean and Taiwanese economic data in particular would retrench further (bottom panel, Chart 12). Bottom Line: We prefer to remain on the sidelines in the S&P information technology sector and sustain a barbell portfolio within the sector. As a reminder we continue to express our bullishness via two high-conviction overweight defensive tech sub-sectors, S&P software and S&P tech hardware, storage & peripherals (THSP), and our bearishness via avoiding their early cyclical peers, S&P semis and S&P semi equipment. Avoid Chip Stocks At All Costs While we are neutral the broad tech sector and prefer secular growth defensive tech sub-sectors, we continue to recommend shying away from chip and chip equipment stocks. Chart 13 shows the extreme sensitivity to changes in final demand of chip related stocks versus their defensive tech peers. In more detail, software and THSP indexes are in a secular advance with regard to EPS outperformance, whereas semis and semi equipment profits are hyper-cyclical with mean-reverting relative profit profiles. Granted, the commoditization of semiconductors explains this close correlation with the business cycle. But, as we highlighted last November when we put the semi equipment index on the high-conviction underweight list, extrapolating EPS growth euphoria far into the future was fraught with danger.2 In fact, late-November 2017 marked the peak in semi equipment performance versus the overall IT sector, confirming the early cyclical nature of chip stocks (Chart 14). Chart 13Bifurcated EPS Chart 14Good Times... Three factors have weighed heavily on this industry's growth prospects and there is no light at the end of the tunnel yet. Bitcoin's (and other cryptocurrencies) collapse is dealing a blow, at the margin, to demand for semi equipment (top panel, Chart 15). Taiwan's financials statement-reported data on IT capex and national data on overall Taiwanese capital outlays corroborates this downbeat demand backdrop (Chart 16). Finally, the drubbing in EM currencies is sapping purchasing power from the consumer and also warns that things will get worse for U.S. semi equipment stocks before they get better (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 15...Do Not Last Forever Chart 16Semi-Heavy Taiwan Emits A Grim Signal The outlook for their brethren, semi producers, is equally downtrodden. Global semi sales have crested and leading indicators of future semi revenue growth are sending a warning signal. Chinese imports of electronics have come to an abrupt halt, and the U.S. dollar's appreciation is also waving a red flag (second & bottom panels, Chart 17). BCA's calculated global leading economic indicator excluding the U.S. and BCA's calculated global ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment excluding the U.S. both herald a steep deceleration in global semi sales (Chart 17). On the pricing power front, using Asian DRAM prices as an industry pricing power gauge, DRAM momentum is on a trajectory to contract some time in Q1/2019. The implication is that semi earnings will surprise to the downside. Still expanding global chip inventories are not providing an offset and also confirm that semi EPS optimism is unwarranted (middle & bottom panels, Chart 18). Finally, another source of demand for chip stocks has reversed, as industry M&A activity has plummeted toward decade lows. Not only is this negative for pricing power, but inflated premia are also now working in reverse especially given this year's QCOM/NXPI and AVGO/QCOM flops (top panel, Chart 18). Our Chip Stock Timing Model (CSTM) does an excellent job encapsulating all these moving parts and is currently in the sell zone (bottom panel, Chart 19). Chart 17Global Semi Sales Trouble... Chart 18...Abound Chart 19Chip Stock Timing Model Says Sell Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P semis and S&P semi equipment indexes. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: BLBG: S5SECO - INTC, NVDA, QCOM, TXN, AVGO, MU, ADI, AMD, MCHP, XLNX, SWKS, QRVO, and BLBG: S5SEEQ - AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, respectively. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/indicators-data/tech-pulse/ 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Underweight Small cap stocks appear to have hit resistance, following the flight to safety (or at least shedding international risk exposure) that has seen them outperforming this year. Recent news that an offer from the Treasury Department to recommence trade talks has been warmly received by the Chinese Commerce Ministry underscores the early stages of a wind down in the escalating trade conflict; further relief will be a boon to large cap stocks, at the expense of their small cap peers. While easing trade tensions are a welcome reprieve to the elevated risk premiums borne by the internationally-geared S&P 500, our core thesis is unaffected. Namely, we believe the binging on debt by small caps, both in absolute and relative terms, should usher in a period of underperformance. In the second panel, we show the ratio of debt to profits; it is worth noting that profits (the denominator) are at record levels and the small cap ratio still is at a decade-high. The implication is that small caps are far less prepared for a profit shock and the divergence noted in the bottom panel will normalize via a decline in small cap relative performance. Bottom Line: We reiterate our large cap preference over small caps.

Highlights Oil markets and U.S. monetary policy are tightening coincidentally. This confluence of events in the past typically presages an equity correction and recession in the U.S. in the following 6 to 18 months (Chart of the Week). EM economies also could weaken as Fed policy collides with the oil-price spike we expect in the wake of a supply shock. In spite of continuing pressure from the Fed's policy-rate normalization policy, we continue to favor gold as a portfolio hedge (see below). Energy: Overweight. Russia's energy minister Alexander Novak expressed his determination to cooperate with OPEC to evolve the current production cut and emphasized his willingness to maintain a stable market, as reported by Platts on Tuesday.1 Base Metals: Neutral. Alcoa workers at Western Australian alumina and bauxite facilities voted to extend a strike initiated on August 8. Precious Metals: Neutral. The odds of sharply higher oil prices colliding with rising U.S. interest rates are increasing as the year winds down. Gold will outperform equities in this environment. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Brazilian farmers are lobbying Chinese consumers and Argentine suppliers to establish a futures contract tailored for delivery of soybeans from Latin America to China.2 Feature Oil markets continue to tighten, as the now fully discounted loss of ~ 2mm b/d of Iranian and Venezuelan exports is compounded by additional supply-side concerns in Iraq and Libya, and razor-thin OPEC spare capacity. Global demand remains robust. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising the energy ministers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia are huddling with the U.S. Energy Secretary this week to discuss oil markets in separate meetings on opposite sides of the globe.3 The risk an oil-supply shock collides with tightening monetary conditions in the U.S. is rising, as the Fed continues its rates-normalization policy. This potent confluence of risks, which could push Brent prices above $120/bbl, raises the odds of a sharp correction in U.S. equities (Chart of the Week). It also could pull the recession we expect in 2020 into 2019. This is a risk assessment, not our baseline scenario. While the odds of an oil-price spike accompanied by higher interest rates are increasing, we are not changing our view of oil or gold markets: We expect Brent crude to average $70/bbl in 2H18 and $80/bbl in 2019. We also remain long gold as a portfolio hedge against higher inflation this year and next, and expect the Fed to stay the course on its rates-normalization policy.4 Chart of the WeekOil Price Spikes + Rising U.S. Interest Rates Typically Presage S&P 500 Sell-Off That said, gold will remain one of the best indicators of how markets assess the Fed's willingness to lean into its rates policy: If prices weaken further, it will signal markets are pricing in continued tightness in U.S. monetary policy. Any weakness resulting from this expectation will be an opportunity to get long (or longer) gold as a portfolio hedge, particularly if oil markets tighten as we expect. Energy Ministers Meet As Oil Markets Tighten KSA's minister, Khalid al-Falih, and U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry met in Washington this past Monday, and Perry is due to travel to Moscow for a scheduled visit today. The increasing likelihood of 2mm b/d of exports being lost to U.S. sanctions against Iran later this year, and the imminent collapse of Venezuela, provides the context for these meetings. Platts Analytics estimates as much as 1.4mm b/d of Iranian exports could be lost to the market by the time U.S. sanctions against that country kick in in November. In our base case, we expect a loss of 1mm b/d, which keeps the global market in a physical deficit next year (Chart 2). Total OPEC production in August is estimated by Platts at 32.9mm b/d, a 10-month high, with output in Iraq surging to 4.7mm b/d and to 940k b/d in Libya.5 That Iraqi and Libyan production surge is increasingly at risk, however. In addition to the fully discounted Iranian and Venezuelan risk, we expect American, Saudi and Russian ministers also will discuss the growing risk to Iraq's and Libya's production, and its implications for global supply.6 Civil unrest in these states raises the risk of additional unplanned outages over the near term just as output is recovering.7 Concerns over razor-thin OPEC spare capacity - equal to ~ 1.5% to 2.0% of global demand - and continued strong global consumption likely number among their concerns, as well. In our view, these factors strongly suggest the oil market is setting up for a supply shock that could lift prices above $120/bbl (Chart 3). Chart 2Physical Deficits Could Widen Chart 3High-Price Scenarios Becoming More Likely Fed Policy Could Collide With Oil Price Spike With the U.S. economy at or very near full capacity, unemployment below 4%, and inflation and inflation expectations ticking higher, we believe the Fed will remain focused on its rates-normalization policy. This increases the risk an oil-supply shock collides with tightening monetary conditions in the U.S. is rising. If the Fed looks through the oil-price spike we expect in the next 6 to 12 months - treating it as a transitory event - its rates-normalization policy will become problematic for the U.S. and global economies. Such a reading by the Fed would be a policy error, in our estimation. As shown in the Chart of the Week, an oil-supply shock accompanied by continued Fed tightening raises the risk of a sharp correction in U.S. equity markets, and perhaps could trigger a bear market. In addition, the recession we expect later in 2020 could be pulled into 2019. As shown in Table 1, 10 out of the 11 recessions in the U.S. since 1945 were preceded by spikes in oil prices. Not every rise in oil prices was accompanied by a recession. In other words, recessions in the U.S. are usually preceded by spikes in oil prices, but not all spikes in oil prices are followed by recessions. This is important, as it implies that forecasting a recession based solely on rises in oil prices can sometimes misfire. Table 1History Of Oil Supply Shocks On the other hand, an oil-price shock combined with a rate-tightening cycle presents a more reliable recession signal. In fact, since 1970, every time the Fed-funds rate rose by more than ~200bps and oil prices rose by more than 50%, the U.S. business cycle peaked in the following 6-18 months.8 EM Growth Threatened, As Well As the Fed proceeds with its policy-rate normalization, the broad trade-weighted USD (USD TWIB) will strengthen. A sharp increase in oil prices accompanied by continued strength in the USD TWIB will redound to the detriment of EM economies, reducing demand for commodities generally, as the local currency costs of all USD-denominated goods increases. The confluence of these factors - should they materialize - would reduce EM income growth - perhaps even cause a contraction - and would produce a medium-term deflationary impulse, along with a rush to U.S. treasuries and other safe-haven assets. This would lower U.S. interest rates, all else equal, forcing the Fed to put its rates-normalization policy on hold, and possibly reverse it.9 Favor Gold, If Oil Spikes And Rates Rise In sum, the U.S. economy is at or very near full capacity, which will keep the Fed focused on its rates-normalization process. This will likely cause the Fed to treat the oil-price spike we expect on the back of a supply-side shock over the next 6 - 12 months as transitory. The Fed won't view it as a true inflationary threat, and will continue with its rates policy, as its core inflation gauge - the U.S. PCEPI ex food and energy - continues to move higher. Over the short run, this would look like U.S. real rates are falling, boosting the appeal of gold. However, the oil-price spike plus a maintained bias by the Fed to continue raising policy rates will lift the USD TWIB, even as oil prices remain high. This will be a double-whammy to EM economies - the absolute price of oil in USD will rise significantly, even as a stronger USD raises the cost of all other dollar-denominated goods and services. This will reduce disposable income and lower aggregate demand in EM economies. Should the Fed misread the oil-price spike in a rising interest-rate environment, we believe holding gold in a diversified portfolio continues to make sense. Gold outperforms in rising inflation environments, and when demand for safe-havens increases. In addition, gold outperforms equities in periods of declining stock markets (Chart 4). This convexity on the upside and downside is one of gold's strongest attributes. Bottom Line: Given the continued pressure on gold from the Fed's rates-normalization policy, the yellow metal will remain an inexpensive portfolio hedge. Gold prices are currently below or close to their long-term average when expressed in terms of the S&P 500 or oil units (Chart 5). Hence, diverting limited amount from equity to gold is recommended on a risk-adjusted basis. Chart 4Gold V. S&P 500 Chart 5Gold Is Relatively Cheap Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Russian energy minister Novak sees broader OPEC, Russia, allies cooperation charter 'expedient' from Jan 1, 2019" published by SP Platts Global on September 11, 2018. 2 Please see "Brazil Farmers Vie For Soy Contract During U.S. - China Trade War," published by reuters.com on September 10, 2018. 3 Please see "U.S. and Saudi energy ministers to meet in Washington: DOE," and "Russia's Novak to meet with U.S. counterpart Perry, discuss oil markets," both published by reuters.com on September 10, 2018. 4 Our view is aligned with BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy, which can be found in "The Powell Doctrine Emerges" published September 4, 2018. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "OPEC crude oil production rises to 32.89 mil b/d in Aug as cuts unwind: Platts survey" published by SP Platts Global September 6, 2018. Noteworthy in the Platts analysis is the KSA increase to 10.5mm b/d. NB: We will be updating our balances next week. See also "U.S. warns Iran it will respond to attacks by Tehran allies in Iraq" published by reuters.com on September 11, 2018. 6 Rising secular tensions in Iraq - particularly vis-à-vis Iran's role in that state - could threaten production and exports there, as we discussed in the Special Report we published last week, in concert with BCA's Geopolitical Strategy. Please see "Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply" published September 5, 2018, and "Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict" published June 7, 2018. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Civil order in Libya is collapsing. The Islamic State is increasing the tempo of its operations in and around Libya; forces loyal to the late dictator late Muammar Qaddafi staged a mass escape from a Tripoli prison earlier this month; and local militia are threatening to extend the Libyan unrest into neighboring states. Please see "Libya's Haftar threatens to 'spread war' to Algeria" reported by Arab News September 11, 2018; "Masked gunmen attack Libyan oil corporation HQ in Tripoli," published by The Guardian September 10, 2018; and "Hundreds escape in jailbreak near Libyan capital" published by The National in the UAE September 3, 2018. 8 These effects are not constant or fixed. Each period has its own specificities implying a range around the rate hike and oil-prices spike necessary to disrupt the economy. 9 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk" published August 23, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017

Special Report

Highlights A sovereign debt default in Argentina is unlikely in the next 12 months, the primary reason being IMF financing. The peso and the stock market appear close to two standard deviations cheap. Consequently, it makes sense to argue that financial market adjustments in Argentina are probably advanced, and investors should avoid temptation to become more bearish. However, we are not yet comfortable taking unhedged bets. For fixed income and currency investors, we recommend the following relative positions: short Brazilian / long Argentine sovereign credit, and long Argentine peso / short Brazilian real. Feature Chart I-1The Argentine Peso Is Cheap Argentine financial markets have plunged dramatically, and the question is whether the country is heading into another sovereign default. Argentina has defaulted eight times and devalued its currency many times in the past 60 years. Hence, odds of a government debt default cannot be dismissed lightly. This is also a valid question, given that Argentina's foreign currency public debt stands at $220 billion, and that after the latest currency devaluation, it is equal to 71 % of GDP. Total public (foreign and local currency) debt stands at 87% of GDP. Yet, our assessment is that a sovereign debt default is not likely in the next 12 months because of IMF financing. The latter will be ready to increase the size of its funding to Argentina's current government, if needed, for both political and economic reasons. The IMF has a good working relationship with Argentine President Mauricio Macri's government, which is packed with orthodox economists who share the IMF's philosophies. Besides, the U.S. administration will welcome IMF financial support for Argentina, as it will not want the latter country to request credit lines from China, like it did under its previous government. Given that a sovereign debt default is likely to be avoided in the next 12 months before Macri's current term expires, should investors buy Argentine financial assets? On one hand, the currency seems to have become quite cheap - Chart I-1 illustrates that the peso's real effective exchange rate has plunged close to 40% below its fair value. On the other hand, both the near-term domestic outlook and broader EM dynamics remain risky. What Went Wrong? Argentina's woes this year have been due to excessive reliance on foreign financing as well as tardy fiscal tightening. The government had been delaying crucial fiscal tightening due to political considerations. Further, it used its access to global capital markets last year to raise an immense amount of foreign funds to finance its ballooning fiscal deficit. In particular, portfolio net inflows amounted to $35 billion in 2017 amid the buying frenzy in emerging markets (Chart I-2). Meantime, net FDI inflows were meager. The outstanding amount of portfolio debt securities and portfolio equity investment owned by foreigners has risen sharply since Macri's government came to power in December 2015 (Chart I-3). The most recent data points on this chart are as of the end of March 2018. Hence, they do not incorporate security liquidations that have occurred by foreigners since that time. Chart I-2Argentina: Heavy Reliance On##br## Foreign Portfolio Flows Chart I-3Securities Holdings By Foreigners Have ##br##Surged Since Macri's Election In brief, Macri's government relied on plentiful global portfolio flows into EM to finance the country's large fiscal deficit in 2016 and 2017. As soon as foreign portfolio inflows into EM reversed, Argentina immediately began to feel the punch. Some commentators blame the central bank for excessive money printing, and have recommended Argentina dollarizing its economy: i.e., adopting the U.S dollar.1 These accusations and recommendations are misplaced and misguided. In the short term, commercial banks have expanded their loans aggressively in the past 18 months (Chart I-4). This is what has contributed to the peso's plunge. The central bank was late to hike interest rates accommodating this credit binge and the collapse in the exchange rate value was the price to be paid for this mistake. From a structural perspective, however, local currency broad money (M3) supply in Argentina is not excessive at all. It is equal to mere 24% of GDP, which is a very low ratio compared to Turkey's 52%, Brazil's 90% and China's 240% (Chart I-5). Therefore, there has structurally been no excessive money creation. Chart I-4Private Credit Boom This Year Chart I-5Money Supply Is Not Excessive In Argentina The currency meltdown can be attributed to persistent hyperinflation that makes residents reluctant to hold and save in pesos. Inflation is a structural problem in Argentina, and it is not due to excessive demand, but rather due to lack of supply. Structural supply deficiency - the inability of the economy to produce goods and services efficiently - is the primary reason for structurally high inflation and large current account deficits. Each time demand recovers in Argentina, it can only be satisfied by ballooning imports and a widening current account deficit since domestic production/supply is weak. Chronic supply deficiency can be cured by structural reforms, though it will take years to show progress. It cannot be solved by fiscal and monetary policies within a year or two. Painful Adjustments Are In The Making In near term, the currency will remain volatile but over the next six months, it will likely find a floor because of the following. First, the nation's foreign debt obligations (FDO) will drop from $68 billion this year to $40 billion in 2019 (Chart I-6, top panel). This will alleviate pressure on the balance of payments that has been severe this year. Therefore, the outlook for foreign funding should improve over the next year. The negotiated new tranche from the IMF of about $30-35 billion will cover a considerable portion of Argentina's foreign funding needs over the next 16 months. If more funding is required, the IMF will likely provide it as well. Second, in the past year the government has already been reducing its primary fiscal spending - i.e. excluding interest payments on public debt (Chart I-7). The crisis has forced Macri's government to slash public expenditures more aggressively. In recent weeks alone the government announced cuts in several government ministries and raised taxes on exports of agricultural goods. Overall, the primary deficit target for 2019 has been revised in from -1.3% of GDP to a balanced budget (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Argentina: Lower Foreign Debt ##br##Obligations Due Next Year Chart I-7Argentina: Government Spending Has##br## Been Substantially Curtailed Chart I-8Argentina: No Primary ##br##Fiscal Deficit In 2019 The key risk to this target is government revenues that may underwhelm because the economy is in a major recession. If this occurs, additional spending cuts are likely. This is bad for the economy, but if the government implements these expenditure cuts it will be positive for the currency and government creditors. Third, the current account and trade balances will improve in the next 12 months as the peso's plunge and higher interest rates are already crashing domestic demand and imports (Chart I-9). Imports of both consumer and capital goods are already plunging, and total imports will likely drop by at least 30-35% in the next 12 months (Chart I-10). Finally, given the peso's 50% plunge this year, inflation is set to surge. Based on the regression of inflation on the exchange rate, consumer price inflation could reach 55% by year end (Chart I-11). This will impair household purchasing power - erode their income in real terms - as the government will likely maintain the growth ceiling of 13% for minimum wages in 2018. The minimum wage serves as a benchmark for wage negotiations nationwide. In real terms, wage diminution will reinforce a contraction in consumer spending. Chart I-9Argentina: Current Account Balance ##br##Was Unsustainably Wide Chart I-10Argentina: Imports Are##br## Set To Plummet Chart I-11Argentina: Inflation Will Surge##br## To About 50% In a nutshell, the unfolding crash in domestic demand will cap inflation next year. Bottom Line: A dramatic domestic demand retrenchment (a major recession) along with lower foreign debt obligations in 2019 will reduce the country's foreign funding requirements next year. Besides, the IMF will likely disburse the remaining $35 billion in the next 16 months. It will, in our opinion, also be disposed to providing additional funding to avoid a public debt default in Argentina in the next 12 months at least. In this vein, investors should be asking whether the peso and asset prices have become sufficiently cheap to warrant bottom-fishing. What Is Priced In? There is little doubt that economic growth and corporate profits in Argentina will be disastrous in the months ahead. Nevertheless, financial markets have already crashed and investors should be looking to make a judgment on whether the peso, equities and sovereign credit are cheap enough to warrant bottom-fishing. We have the following observations: Currency: The peso is about 40% below its fair value, according to our valuation model (Chart 1 on page 1). This model is built using the real effective exchange rate (REER) based on consumer and producer prices. Previous episodes of devaluation drove the peso's REER 40-55% below its fair value. Hence, there still could be up to 15% of downside in the REER or in the peso's total return adjusted for carry. However, from a big-picture perspective, the peso may not be too far from bottoming in real inflation-adjusted terms. This does not mean that the nominal exchange rate will appreciate. It entails that the peso will bottom in real terms or adjusted for the carry (on a total return basis). Stocks: The aggregate Argentine equity index has plunged by 60% in dollar terms, and bank stocks have dropped by 75% in dollar terms. As a result, our cyclically adjusted P/E ratio has fallen to 5 for the overall bourse and to 3 for bank stocks (Chart I-12A & Chart I-12B). Chart I-12AOverall Equities Are Cheap... Chart I-12B... As Are Bank Stocks Yet there might be a tad more downside before these cyclically-adjusted P/E ratios reach two standard deviations below their fair value. Furthermore, if we were to compare the magnitude of the crash in Argentine share prices relative to the Asian crisis (specifically, Thailand and Korea), there seems to be further downside in Argentine equities (Chart I-13). Sovereign credit: Argentine sovereign credit spreads have reached 850 basis points (Chart I-14, top panel), which is 450 basis points wider than the spread for the aggregate EM benchmark (Chart I-14, bottom panel), but they are still well below their 2013 highs. Clearly valuations are not yet sufficiently attractive in the credit space to warrant bottom-fishing. However, assuming our call that the IMF will do everything to preclude a public debt default, at least in the next 12 months, sovereign credit spreads may not widen excessively from current levels. Chart I-13There Is More Downside When Compared With Asian Crisis Chart I-14Sovereign Credit Spreads: Absolute And Relative To EM Investment Conclusions The peso and stock market appear close to two standard deviations cheap. Consequently, it makes sense to argue that financial market adjustments in Argentina are probably advanced, and that investors should avoid the temptation to become more bearish. For investors who own the currency, stocks, or sovereign credit, and can withstand further volatility, it likely makes sense to stay the course. Even though the economy has entered yet another major recession, investors should keep in mind that financial markets are forward looking and may have already priced in a major economic contraction. In the equity space, we will wait before recommending a long position in the overall market or in bank stocks, as disastrous corporate profits could produce a final down leg in share prices. Our negative view on EM risk assets also argues for being patient. In the sovereign credit space, we are not yet comfortable taking a unhedged absolute bet, and continue to recommend maintaining the following relative position: short Brazilian / long Argentine sovereign credit (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Argentina Versus Brazil: Sovereign Credit Spreads Relative to Argentina, Brazil's financial markets are expensive at a time when Brazil's macro fundamentals and politics are problematic. We discussed our view on Brazil in detail in our July 27, 2018 Special Report,2 and will not repeat it here. Our recommendation - from January 16th 2017 - of buying Argentine long-dated local currency bonds has incurred large losses. We are closing this position and opening a new trade going long the peso to earn the high carry at the front end of the curve. The high carry could provide enough downside protection. Yet we do not have strong conviction as to whether the peso has reached an ultimate bottom. Therefore, we recommend a relative currency trade: long Argentine peso / short Brazilian real. This trade has a 35% positive carry, and certainly the selloff in the Argentine peso is far more advanced than that of the real. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to Wall Street Journal article entitled: Argentina Needs to Dollarize, dated September 10th 2018. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Brazil: Faceoff Time," dated July 27, 2018, available on page 18. South African Rand: Engulfed In A Downward Spiral? 13 September 2018 Chart II-1Risks Are To The Downside For The Rand From the beginning of 2016 to early 2018, the South African rand enjoyed various tailwinds: rising metal prices, an improving trade balance, strong foreign portfolio inflows and lastly, hopes that the new president Ramaphosa would implement structural reforms, in turn enhancing the country's structural backdrop. These tailwinds have turned into headwinds since early this year and seem likely to persist. Hence, we believe the rand will remain in a downward spiral for now. First and foremost, metal prices have been under serious downward pressure. Typically, they correlate with the South African rand. Chart II-1 illustrates our new indicator for the rand, which is calculated as the annual growth rate in metal prices minus South Africa's broad money (M3) impulse. When the indicator drops below zero, like it has done recently, the rand tends to sell-off. In short, the bear market in the rand is not yet over. The broad money impulse in this indicator serves as a proxy for underlying domestic demand, and hence, import growth. Also, we use the average of the Goldman Sachs industrial and precious metal price indexes for metal prices. The latter is used as a proxy for export growth. Worryingly, not only export prices are plummeting but export volumes are also weak and mining production is contracting (Chart II-2). As a result, the trade and current account deficits will widen again. Chart II-3 illustrates that the rand depreciates when the annual change in trade balance turns down. It will be difficult for South Africa to finance its widening trade and current account deficits given the poor global backdrop and the slowing fund flows to EM. Since 2013, foreign capital inflows have by and large been comprised of volatile portfolio inflows rather than stable foreign direct investments (Chart II-4). Presently, the gap between the two stands at its widest in history. Additionally, foreign ownership of domestic bonds remains extremely elevated. Our big picture view is that the liquidation in EM financial markets will persist and foreign investors in South African domestic bonds will be under pressure to reduce their holdings or hedge their currency risk exposure. Chart II-2Mining Output ##br##Is Shrinking Chart II-3Trade Balance Momentum Points ##br## To Currency Depreciation Chart II-4Excessive Reliance On ##br##Foreign Portfolio Inflows Politics served as a justification for investors to buy South African risk assets at the start of the year. We downplayed that optimism back then and still remain negative on politics today. Ramaphosa has recently endorsed a constitutional change that would allow the confiscation of land without compensation. Whether this policy will actually materialize and get implemented is impossible to know. That said, as outlined in our June 28 2017 Special Report entitled South Africa: Crisis of Expectations,3 our fundamental political analysis suggests that the median voter in South Africa will continue favoring populism. As such, populist policies are likely to continue being proposed to appease the ANC base, and some of them might be implemented. Constant pressure on the ANC from South Africa's far-left political party Economic Freedom Fighters, before next year's election, entails a very low likelihood that painful structural reforms will be enacted. As such, the productivity outlook will remain poor for now. On the fiscal front, there has been little to no improvement since Ramaphosa assumed office in February of this year (Chart II-5). In terms of valuation, South African risk assets are not particularly attractive at the moment. The rand is not very cheap (Chart II-6) and neither are equities (Chart II-7). Odds are that the rand will become as cheap as in 2015 based on its real effective exchange rate - before a bottom is reached. Chart II-5There Has Been No Improvement##br## In Fiscal Accounts Chart II-6The Rand Will Likely Get ##br##Cheaper Before It Bottoms Chart II-7South African Equities##br## Are Not Cheap Yet Putting all these factors together, the path of least resistance for South African risk assets is down. We recommend EM dedicated equity and fixed-income (both local currency and sovereign credit) investors to maintain an underweight allocation on South Africa. We also continue recommending shorting general retailer stocks. For currency traders, we suggest maintaining the following trades: short ZAR vs. USD and short ZAR vs. MXN. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy & Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Africa: Crisis Of Expectations," dated June 28, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights An inflation scare would initially take bond yields higher. But the higher bond yields would undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets worth several times the size of the global economy. Thereby, an inflation scare could unleash a potentially much larger disinflationary scare. And the subsequent decline in yields would exceed the original rise. Using the 10-year T-bond yield for our roadmap (because it is least impacted by the lower bound to yields) a short trip to the uplands of 3.5% would precede a longer journey down to 2%. Feature The global long bond yield has been trapped within a tight sideways channel for almost two years (Chart of the Week); the global equity market has also lacked any clear direction in recent quarters (Chart I-2). The result is that this year's defining feature for asset-class returns is that there is no defining feature! Global equities, bonds and cash have delivered near-identical returns.1 Chart Of The WeekThe Global Long Bond Yield ##br##Has Been Trapped Chart I-2World Equities Have Drifted ##br##Sideways This Year This is not to say that 2018 has been a dull year for investors. Far from it. But all the action has been underneath the main asset allocation decision, across sectors, regions and countries. For example, European healthcare has outperformed European banks by 35 percent; and developed market equities have outperformed emerging market equities by 15 percent (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Main Action Has Been Across Sectors... Chart I-4...And Across Regions Unshackling Bond Yields Might Be Difficult In the major developed economies, unemployment rates keep hitting new generational lows, implying that the main labour markets are tight. Yet policy interest rates range from a crisis-level negative 0.4 percent in the euro area to just 0.75 percent in the U.K. to a modest 2 percent in the U.S. This raises the potential for an inflation scare. At any moment, the bond market might panic that central banks are well behind the (Phillips) curve.2 The spike in bond yields would of course unleash a countervailing disinflationary feedback, by cooling credit growth and credit-sensitive sectors in the economy. But this feedback would take weeks or months to take effect and to show up in the economic data. Until then, it would liberate bond yields to reach higher ground. However, there would be a more powerful and immediate feedback which would keep the shackles on bond yields. That feedback would come not from the economy, but from the financial markets themselves. In Finance 101, all investment students learn that the valuations of risk-assets depend (inversely) on bond yields. But what is less well understood is that at very low bond yields this relationship becomes exponential. Approaching the lower bound of bond yields, bonds become doubly ugly. Not only do they offer feeble returns, but the bond returns take on an unattractive asymmetry. Specifically, you can no longer make a sudden large gain, but you can still suffer a sudden deep loss. In effect, bonds become much riskier investments.3 Confronted with this increased riskiness of bonds, 'risk-assets' becomes a misnomer because risk-assets are no longer riskier than bonds! This requires risk-asset returns to collapse to the feeble return offered by bonds with no additional 'risk-premium', giving their valuations an exponential uplift (Chart I-5). The big problem is that if bond yields normalise, the process goes into sharp reverse - the lofty valuations of risk-assets must decline as exponentially as they rose. Chart I-5At Low Bond Yields ##br##The Valuation Of Equities Changes Exponentially The global bond yield appears close to this crossover point at which risk-asset valuations become vulnerable to an exponential derating. In the past year, whenever the global bond yield has reached the upper limits of its recent range - defined by the sum of 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund, and JGB reaching 3.5 percent - the correlation between bond yields and equities has turned sharply negative (Chart I-6). And the subsequent sell-off in equities has eventually pegged back the rise in bond yields, effectively trapping them. Chart I-6At Higher Bond Yields The Correlation With Equity Prices Has Flipped From Positive To Negative But what would happen if there were an inflation scare? The answer depends on the relative sizes of the inflationary impulse compared with the disinflationary impulse that resulted from sharply lower risk-asset prices. If central banks were more concerned about the inflationary impulse, they would have to keep tightening - in which case, bond yields would be liberated to reach elevated territory. Conversely, if the bigger worry was the disinflationary impulse, central banks would quickly reverse course, and bond yields would return to the lowlands. We now explain why the disinflationary impulse from lower risk-asset prices would end up as the bigger worry. An Inflation Scare Would Be Disinflationary The current episode of elevated risk-asset valuations is not unprecedented, but there is a crucial difference. Previous episodes of elevated risk-asset valuations tended to be localised, either by geography or sector: 1990 was focussed in Japan; 2000 was focussed in the dot com related sectors; 2008 was focussed in the U.S. mortgage and credit markets and preceded the emerging market credit boom (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Emerging Market Boom Happened After 2008 By comparison, the post-2008 global experiment with quantitative easing, and zero and negative interest rate policy has boosted the valuations of all risk-assets across all geographies and all asset-classes - global equities (Chart I-8), global credit (Chart I-9), and global real estate. This makes it considerably more dangerous, because we estimate that the total value of global risk-assets is $400 trillion, equal to about five times the size of the global economy. Chart I-8Elevated Valuations On Global Equities Chart I-9Elevated Valuations On Global Credit Let's say you had an investment that was priced to generate 5 percent a year over the next decade. Now imagine that the valuation boost from ultra-accommodative monetary policy capitalises all of those future returns to today. For those future returns to drop to zero, today's price must surge by 63 percent.4 If you were prudent, you might amortise today's windfall to generate the original 5 percent a year over the next decade. But if you were imprudent, you might spend a large amount of the windfall today. Now let's imagine a valuation derating moves the investment's returns back to the future. For those that had prudently amortised the original windfall, nothing has really changed and future spending patterns would not be impacted. But not everybody is prudent. For those that had imprudently spent the original windfall, future spending would inevitably suffer a nasty recession. The key takeaway is that any inflationary impulse would - through higher bond yields - undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets worth several times the size of the global economy. Thereby, it could unleash a potentially much larger disinflationary impulse. A Roadmap For An Inflation Scare The high sensitivity of risk-asset valuations to bond yields is the genesis of our 'rule of 4' strategy for equity allocation, which is based on the sum of the 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB: Above 3.5 is the level to go to a neutral exposure to equities; above 4 is the level to go underweight. Today, our metric stands at exactly 3.5 (Chart I-10). Chart I-10The 'Rule Of 4' Is At 3.5 For bonds, this means that 4 on this metric is also a good level to buy a mixed portfolio of high-quality 10-year government bonds. The equivalent level for high-quality 30-year government bonds is 5.5 (using the sum of the three 30-year yields). To sum up, an inflation scare would initially take bond yields higher. But this would threaten to unleash a much larger disinflation scare, causing the subsequent decline in yields to exceed the original rise. Using the 10-year T-bond yield as an illustration - as it is least impacted by the lower bound to yields - this would suggest the following roadmap: a short trip to the uplands of 3.5% would precede a longer journey down to 2%. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The global long bond yield is captured by the simple average of the 30-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund and Japanese government bond (JGB). The global equity market is captured by the MSCI All Country World Index in local currency terms. 2 The -0.4 percent refers to the ECB deposit rate. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Rule Of 4 For Equities And Bonds," August 2, 2018, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 4 5 percent compounded over ten years. Fractal Trading Model* This week’s recommended trade is an intra-commodity pair trade: short palladium/long copper. The profit target is 6% with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short euro area energy versus financials was closed at the end of its 65 trading day holding period, albeit in loss. This leaves five open trades. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Last month we penned a Special Report highlighting that the S&P 500 is relatively immune to U.S. trade policy uncertainty.1 In fact, not only is the SPX having an outstanding 2018 in absolute terms, but also relative to the rest of the world (ROW) U.S., large caps are soaring, as the ROW bourses bear the brunt of the Administration's hawkish trade rhetoric. Beyond trade policy uncertainty, relative profit outperformance also explains the U.S. stock market's global dominance. As a reminder, the SPX garners 60% of sales domestically. Moreover, the diverging relative economic backdrop appears to further underlie the outperformance. In the chart below, we present the difference between the U.S. ISM manufacturing survey compared with the global manufacturing PMI excluding the U.S. Relative animal spirits are clearly enough to explain the U.S. outperformance, with some obvious interplay from the impact of trade uncertainty. Bottom Line: Relative economic and profit outperformance as well as apparent low sensitivity to trade policy uncertainty suggest that U.S. equity outperformance has staying power.   1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, " Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care?" dated August 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Last week's View Meeting underlined the point that BCA's take on the macro backdrop hasn't changed. Decelerating global growth and the potential for a nasty EM debt episode still argue for slightly cautious asset allocation. Global desynchronization is in full swing, with the U.S. leading the other major DM economies by a wide margin. The growth disparity will be dollar-positive while it lasts, but the deteriorating U.S. budget position will weigh on the dollar in the long run. S&P 500 performance across the earnings cycle reveals that decelerating earnings growth is not a problem for stocks as long as earnings are still growing year-on-year. Acceleration beats deceleration, but peaking earnings growth is not a signal to trim equity exposures. The U.S. is not impervious to a meaningful EM credit event, but its direct exposures are very limited. Post-crisis banking regulations have meaningfully reduced the banking system's vulnerabilities and make it very unlikely that another LTCM-like event might occur. Feature BCA researchers convened last week for our monthly View Meeting with the explicit goal of taking stock of our strategy teams' macro views. The nine-year-plus U.S. expansion is well advanced, and we are carefully monitoring the business cycle, the credit cycle, and the policy cycle for early warning of inflections in the rates, credit, and equity markets. In addition to the regular cyclical movements, we also have to gauge the impact of the ongoing reversal of extraordinary monetary accommodation and a raft of geopolitical issues. The investment outcome of the many crosscurrents continues to be subject to spirited debate, but the warily constructive house view, in place since mid-June, was not challenged. Decelerating global growth was a key driver of our June downgrade to neutral on equities. The U.S. economy may be surging as two years of fiscal stimulus makes its presence felt, but the other major developed-world economies are softening, and the emerging-market bloc faces considerable pressure. Although the S&P 500 has since made new highs (Chart 1, top panel), the MSCI All-Country World Index ("ACWI") has gone nowhere (Chart 1, second panel). Within the ACWI, DM equities (Chart 1, third panel), have handily outperformed struggling EM equities (Chart 1, bottom panel). We continue to expect more of the same. Tax cuts will keep corporate profits growing at better than 20% for the rest of the year, and federal spending will boost the U.S. economy through the end of 2019. The pickup in aggregate demand will strain dwindling spare capacity, feeding inflation pressures, and keeping the Fed from easing up on its rate-hiking campaign. A resolute Fed will ratchet up the pressure on EM borrowers, while increasing trade barriers pose a headwind for the many DM and EM economies that are more open than the U.S. Chinese policymakers could provide some respite to the global economy, but our China and EM strategists aren't counting on it. Easing monetary and/or fiscal policy would run counter to the Party's ongoing deleveraging and anti-corruption campaigns (Chart 2). Though China's rulers have demonstrated a tendency to overreact when acting to offset adverse economic events, our in-house experts think conditions will have to get a good bit worse to provoke meaningful stimulus of any sort. The strike price on a Chinese policy put may be considerably out of the money. Chart 1So Far, So Good Chart 2Will They Swim Against The Tide? Bottom Line: Overindebtedness, rising trade barriers, and a U.S. economy with the potential to overheat will keep the pressure on the EM bloc and cast a shadow over global growth. The Chinese policy cavalry may not feel any particular urgency to ride to the rescue. Leading The Pack There was no dispute about the U.S. growth outlook, absolute or relative. The U.S. economy is flying high, and will continue to outdistance its DM peers for the rest of this year and next. S&P 500 EPS growth will maintain its better than 20% pace in the third and fourth quarters. Next year's 10% consensus may be ambitious, given that this year's dollar appreciation probably hasn't shown up in earnings data, but corporate management teams have not yet expressed much in the way of dollar concerns. Decoupling cannot go on forever in the 21st-century global economy, but the comparatively closed U.S. economy has room to run in the near term. Last week's August ISM Manufacturing survey reached a 14-year high while the global PMI continued to hook lower (Chart 3). The gap between the U.S. LEI index and the global ex-U.S. LEI index has been widening for over a year (Chart 4), and would seem to herald additional dollar strength (Chart 4, bottom panel). Our corporate earnings models see U.S. EPS growth widening its lead on Europe and Japan over the rest of the year (Chart 5). Chart 3You Go Your Way And I'll Go Mine Chart 4Dollar Strength... Chart 5...Hasn't Gotten In Earnings' Way Yet Bottom Line: The U.S. is outgrowing its developed market peers, and there is nothing on the immediate horizon that suggests a reversal is in store. Superior corporate earnings growth and dollar strength should allow U.S. equities to outperform their major DM peers on a common-currency basis well into 2019. The Change, Or The Change Of The Change? Deceleration has been at the heart of BCA's managing editors' concerns, and there is an intuitive appeal to the idea that equity markets prize the change of the change (the second derivative) over the first-order move itself. It has the potential to clash, however, with the empirical fact that stocks typically rise unless earnings are contracting. To determine the degree to which decelerating earnings growth has historically presented a challenge to the S&P 500, we posit a four-phase earnings cycle based on the interaction between earnings-estimate growth and acceleration (Diagram 1), as follows: Diagram 1The Earnings Cycle Phase I begins when the worst part of the cycle has ended. Earnings estimates are contracting on a year-over-year basis, but at a slowing rate. Because earnings typically grow, and the bounce off the bottom is typically swift, this phase has occurred just 8% of the time. In Phase II, year-over-year earnings are growing at an accelerating rate. In Phase III, year-over-year earnings are still growing, but at a slowing rate. Phase II and Phase III are the de facto default phases, each accounting for 39% of all observations. In Phase IV, year-over-year earnings are contracting at an accelerating rate. Phase IV is more common than Phase I because the decline to the bottom tends to unfold more slowly than the bounce off of it, but it still occurs just 14% of the time. Table 1 shows annualized S&P 500 price returns for each phase of the cycle and then groups the phases by acceleration/deceleration and expansion/contraction. Stocks perform better when the rate of earnings growth is accelerating than they do when it's decelerating, but they also perform better when earnings are growing on a year-over-year basis than they do when they're declining. Stocks perform terribly when earnings are falling year-on-year at an increasing rate (Phase IV), and do great when the pace at which they're falling slows (Phase I), but those occurrences are few and far between. Earnings grow four-fifths of the time, and when they do, the differences between accelerating and decelerating growth aren't all that big a deal (Chart 6). Table 1Acceleration Is Better, But Deceleration Isn't All Bad... Chart 6...As It's Not A Problem As Long As Earnings Still Grow Bottom Line: Deceleration in the rate of earnings growth is not a signal to abandon stocks as long as earnings are still growing year-on-year. Investors have fared well for 40 years when earnings estimates expand, regardless of whether the rate of expansion is accelerating. 2018 Is Not 1997-98 In the wake of August's wobbles, several clients have been eager to explore various EM economies' vulnerabilities1 in more detail. We have fielded several questions relating to U.S. banks' EM exposures and how they compare to their exposures to the Asian Tigers on the cusp of the Asian Crisis. Per data from the Bank for International Settlements and the FDIC, U.S. claims on Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan amounted to about 14% of all U.S. bank credit at the end of 1996. That exposure is very similar to the U.S. banking system's current exposure to Argentina, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia. Direct exposure to fragile EM economies did not drive the S&P 500's 19% decline across July and August of 1998, however, nor did it inspire a consortium of fourteen major global financial institutions to come together to attempt to ring-fence the U.S. banking system. Those outcomes can be laid to the brokers' and investment banks' indirect exposure to the massively leveraged investment portfolio of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund (LTCM). To gauge the system's fragility back then, we perform a simple comparison of LTCM's debt to the publicly traded U.S. investment banks' total equity. In our back-of-the-envelope analysis (Table 2), we assume that the four investment banks, which contributed a quarter of the funds to rescue LTCM, had provided at least a quarter of LTCM's financing.2 Per our assumptions, LTCM claims accounted for 82% of the four banks' total equity. Losses given default would not have been anywhere near 100%, but a disorderly exit from LTCM's positions would surely have forced several of LTCM's creditors to conduct urgent capital raisings of their own. Fortunately for investors, today's banking system is nowhere near as vulnerable. Investment bank leverage ratios of 30 or more, commonplace in the late '90s, are a practical impossibility today. While lenders are no less likely to chase business late in the cycle today, post-crisis regulation makes it far more difficult to indulge their folly. Today's investment banks operate with a third of the leverage of 20 years ago (Table 3). The odds that another overextended investor, or group of investors, could imperil the U.S. banking system are much longer today than they were then. It's considerably harder to come by leverage via the regulated banking system, and leverage is the essential contagion ingredient. Table 2Enormous Leverage Made The Banking System Unstable In The Summer Of 1998 ... Table 3... But It's Not A Problem Anymore Bottom Line: Basel III, Dodd-Frank and the Volcker Rule save lenders from their own worst impulses. The odds of another LTCM crisis are far slimmer than they were in the late '90s. Investment Implications We continue to have a constructive view of the business, market and policy cycles in the U.S., but there's more to the global investing backdrop than just the U.S. Global investors should overweight U.S. equities versus equities in the rest of the world and U.S. investors should be sure to be at least equal weight equities, but the environment is sufficiently risky to inspire caution. We join our colleagues in continuing to recommend a benchmark equity allocation, while underweighting bonds and overweighting cash. August's employment report supports our economic and investment takes. The labor market remains tight, with the broader U-6 definition of unemployment (including involuntary part-time and discouraged workers) making a second straight 17-year low (Chart 7, top panel), and average hourly earnings extending their slow march higher (Chart 7, bottom panel). With the three-month moving average of payrolls (185,000) expanding at a rate well above the 110,000-per-month pace required to absorb new entrants to the labor market, qualified candidates are going to become even more difficult to find. The upshot is that the Fed remains firmly on a path to hike rates more than the market consensus currently expects. Despite the potential for a near-term flight-to-safety bid for Treasury bonds, we are sticking with our below-benchmark duration call. Chart 7As Slack Is Absorbed, Wages Will Rise Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the August 20, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Rude Health," available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Lehman did not contribute to the bailout, but it is highly improbable that it had not lent to LTCM.

Special Report

Following up from our inaugural U.S. Equity Market Indicators Report in early-August 2017, this week we introduce the second part in our Indicators series. In this Special Report we have drilled down to the ten GICS1 S&P 500 sectors (excluding the real estate sector) and have compiled the most important Indicators in four broad categories: earnings, financial statement reported, valuations and technicals. Once again this is by no means exhaustive, but contains a plethora of Indicators - roughly thirty Indicators per sector condensed in seven charts per sector - we deem significant in aiding us in our decision making process of setting/changing a view on a certain sector. The way we have structured this Special Report is by sector and we start with the early cyclicals continue with the deep cyclicals and finish with the defensives. Within each sector we then show the four broad categories. In more detail, the first three charts depict earnings Indicators including our EPS growth model, EPS breadth, profit margins, relative forward EPS and EBITDA growth forecasts and ROE and its deconstruction into its components. The following two charts relate to financial statement Indicators including indebtedness, cash flow growth and capital expenditures. And conclude with one valuation and one technical chart. As a reminder, the charts in this Special Report are also made available through BCA's Analytics platform for seamless continual updates. Due to length constraints, Part III of our Indicators series, expected in mid-October, will introduce a style and size flavor along with cyclicals versus defensives and end with the S&P 500, again highlighting Indicators in these four broad categories. Finally, likely before the end of 2018, we aim to conclude our Indicators series with Part IV that would feature our most sought after Macro Indicators per the ten GICS1 S&P 500 sectors, along with value/growth, small/large and cyclicals/defensives. We trust you will find this comprehensive Indicator chartbook useful and insightful. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Dulce Cruz, Senior Analyst dulce@bcaresearch.com Consumer Discretionary Chart 1Consumer Discretionary: Earnings Indicators Chart 2Consumer Discretionary: Earnings Indicators Chart 3Consumer Discretionary: ROE And Its Components Chart 4Consumer Discretionary: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 5Consumer Discretionary: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 6Consumer Discretionary: Valuation Indicators Chart 7Consumer Discretionary: Technical Indicators Financials Chart 8Financials: Earnings Indicators Chart 9Financials: Earnings Indicators Chart 10Financials: ROE And Its Components Chart 11Financials: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 12Financials: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 13Financials: Valuation Indicators Chart 14Financials: Technical Indicators Energy Chart 15Energy: Earnings Indicators Chart 16Energy: Earnings Indicators Chart 17Energy: ROE And Its Components Chart 18Energy: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 19Energy: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 20Energy: Valuation Indicators Chart 21Energy: Technical Indicators Industrials Chart 22Industrials: Earnings Indicators Chart 23Industrials: Earnings Indicators Chart 24Industrials: ROE And Its Components Chart 25Industrials: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 26Industrials: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 27S&P Industrials: Valuation Indicators Chart 28S&P Industrials: Technical Indicators Materials Chart 29Materials: Earnings Indicators Chart 30Materials: Earnings Indicators Chart 31Materials: ROE And Its Components Chart 32Materials: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 33Materials: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 34Materials: Valuation Indicators Chart 35Materials: Technical Indicators Tech Chart 36Technology: Earnings Indicators Chart 37Technology: Earnings Indicators Chart 38ROE And Its Components Chart 39Technology: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 40Technology: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 41Technology: Valuation Indicators Chart 42Technology: Technical Indicators Health Care Chart 43Health Care: Earnings Indicators Chart 44Health Care: Earnings Indicators Chart 45Health Care: ROE And Its Components Chart 46Health Care: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 47Health Care: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 48Health Care: Valuation Indicators Chart 49Health Care: Technical Indicators Consumer Staples Chart 50Consumer Staples: Earnings Indicators Chart 51Consumer Staples: Earnings Indicators Chart 52Consumer Staples: ROE And Its Components Chart 53Consumer Staples: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 54Consumer Staples: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 55Consumer Staples: Valuation Indicators Chart 56Consumer Staples: Technical Indicators Telecom Services Chart 57Telecom Services: Earnings Indicators Chart 58Telecom Services: Earnings Indicators Chart 59Telecom Services: ROE And Its Components Chart 60Telecom Services: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 61Telecom Services: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 62Telecom Services: Valuation Indicators Chart 63Telecom Services: Technical Indicators Utilities Chart 64Utilities: Earnings Indicators Chart 65Utilities: Earnings Indicators Chart 66Utilities: ROE And Its Components Chart 67Utilities: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 68Utilities: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 69Utilities: Valuation Indicator Chart 70Utilities: Technical Indicator

Highlights The U.S. has outperformed most major stock markets over the past few years largely because U.S. earnings have increased more rapidly than earnings abroad. U.S. companies will continue to deliver superior earnings growth during the remainder of this year. However, profit growth is likely to slow in 2019 owing to a larger wage bill, a stronger dollar, and a sluggish global economy. The efficacy of buybacks in boosting earnings-per-share is waning due to soaring valuations and rising interest rates. For the time being, asset allocators should maintain a neutral weighting to global equities, while favoring developed market stocks over emerging markets and overweighting defensive sectors relative to cyclical ones. Within the developed market equity space, the U.S. will outperform over the coming months in dollar terms, but will trade broadly in line with Europe and Japan in local-currency terms. Longer term, odds are high that earnings growth in the rest of the world will catch up with that of the U.S. Feature There Is No Mystery As To Why U.S. Stocks Have Outperformed The stock market is influenced by many variables, but in the end, the one that matters most is earnings. The U.S. has outperformed most major stock markets during the past few years largely because U.S. earnings have increased more rapidly than earnings abroad. Stronger earnings growth, in turn, has caused investors to assign a higher earnings multiple to the U.S. in comparison to other regions. This has given U.S. stocks a further lift (Chart 1). Differences in sector weights have helped flatter overall U.S. earnings to some extent. Globally, earnings in the tech and health care sectors have grown much more quickly than earnings in the financials and materials sectors (Chart 2). The former sectors have large weights in U.S. indices, while the latter are overrepresented in overseas indices (Table 1). Still, our analysis suggests that most of the outperformance of U.S. firms can be explained by their superior earnings growth within sectors (Chart 3). Chart 1U.S. Stocks Have Outperformed ##br##Thanks To Faster Earnings Growth Chart 2Global Earnings Sector Breakdown Table 1Tech And Health Care Stocks Are Heavily Weighted In The U.S., While Financials ##br##And Materials Are Overrepresented In Markets Outside The U.S. Chart 3AU.S. Earnings Have Risen Faster ##br##Within Each Equity Sector (I) Chart 3BU.S. Earnings Have Risen Faster ##br##Within Each Equity Sector (II) We do not expect U.S. corporate earnings growth to slow sharply this year. In fact, our margin proxy points to a slight increase in profit margins in the second half of the year (Chart 4). Nevertheless, there are four reasons why U.S. earnings growth will decelerate in 2019 and beyond: Wage growth is likely to pick up. Chart 5 shows that there is an almost perfect correlation between profit margins and the ratio of selling prices-to-unit labor costs. A variety of surveys suggest that U.S. firms are struggling to find qualified workers (Chart 6). This is confirmed both by the most recent Fed Beige Book and by firms' Q2 earnings conference calls. A stronger dollar will eat into earnings. A reasonable rule of thumb is that every 5% appreciation in the broad trade-weighted dollar reduces S&P 500 earnings by 1% over the course of the ensuing 12-to-18 months. The broad trade-weighted dollar has risen 6.2% so far this year and we expect further strength in the months ahead. Global growth will weaken further. The U.S. is increasingly running out of spare capacity, which is limiting domestic growth prospects. Emerging markets are struggling, with the crises in Turkey and Argentina likely to spread to bigger players such as Brazil and South Africa. A major Chinese stimulus package would help reboot global growth, but concerns about high debt levels, overcapacity, and an overheated housing market will limit the response. The policy environment will become more challenging. Corporate tax cuts helped boost earnings earlier this year. However, the regulatory landscape is likely to turn less benign over the next few years. The tech sector is facing increased scrutiny.1 New EU privacy rules came into effect in May, which will limit the ability of internet companies to harvest personal data. The Trump Administration is also increasingly targeting social media companies for allegedly suppressing conservative voices. In addition, our geopolitical strategists expect U.S.-China trade tensions to remain elevated, with the U.S. likely to impose tariffs on an additional $200 billion worth of Chinese imports. Meanwhile, a trade deal with Canada is no slam dunk. President Trump has even reiterated that he would be willing to exit the World Trade Organization. Chart 4Margins Could Rise A Bit More ##br##In The Near Term Chart 5Higher Wage Growth Will Undermine Profit Margins Chart 6U.S. Firms Are Having Difficulty ##br##Finding Qualified Workers Diminishing Returns From Buybacks U.S. companies are on track to spend a record amount of money buying back shares in 2018, with tech companies accounting for about 40% of all shares repurchased. While this may seem very bullish for stocks, one should keep in mind that the prior peak in share buybacks occurred in 2007. Companies are not particularly adept at timing the stock market, even when it is their own shares they are purchasing. Moreover, U.S. stock market capitalization has doubled since 2007. As a share of market cap, today's pace of buybacks is high, but not exceptionally so (Chart 7). To state the obvious, the more expensive stocks get, the more money it takes to purchase the same number of shares. U.S. equity valuations are quite stretched by historic standards (Chart 8). On a price-to-sales basis, U.S. stocks are now as expensive as they were in 2000. Our estimate of the U.S. equity risk premium - calculated as the difference between the cyclically-adjusted earnings yield and the average expected short-term real interest rate over the next decade - is well below its historic average (Chart 9). Chart 7Buybacks As A Share Of Market Cap: Fairly Muted Chart 8U.S. Equities Are Trading At Lofty Valuations Chart 9The U.S. Equity Risk Premium Is Well Below Its Historic Average It is also important to remember that share repurchases will only boost EPS if the interest rate that companies receive on their cash balances is below their earnings yield. To see this, consider a simple example where the earnings yield and the interest rate are the same. Specifically, suppose that a company has a market cap of $1 billion, $20 million in earnings, and earns 2% on its cash holdings. If the company buys back $100 million in shares, its share count will decline by 10%, but the interest payments that it receives will fall by $2 million, pushing profits down by 10% from $20 million to $18 million. The net result is no change in EPS. As U.S. interest rates continue to increase, companies will see ever-smaller benefits to their bottom lines from share buybacks. Where's The Earnings Growth Going To Come From? The foregoing discussion raises another point, which is that buybacks, by their very nature, leave companies with less cash to invest in future growth. This issue is quite relevant for the current environment. Analysts today expect the average S&P 500 company to grow earnings at an annual rate of 16.6% over the next 3-to-5 years (Chart 10). This is wildly optimistic. It is six points higher than the long-term earnings growth rate they expected just three years ago. Indeed, it is only topped by the euphoric projection of 18.7% reached in 2000 - just before the stock market came crashing down. Apparently, on Wall Street, companies can have their cake and eat it too. Chart 10Analyst Expectations Are Too Optimistic Creative Accounting? Earnings are earnings, correct? Actually, no. What constitutes earnings has changed over the years. Up until the 1990s, companies generally reported GAAP earnings - earnings based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Over the past two decades, however, companies have moved towards reporting so-called "pro forma" or "operating" earnings. Unlike GAAP earnings, there is no codified set of rules governing the definition of operating earnings. Conceptually, companies are supposed to exclude both one-off losses and gains when calculating operating earnings in order to give shareholders a better sense of the underlying trend in profits. In practice, they tend to exclude the former much more often than the latter. This problem has gotten worse over time, so much so that an apples-to-apples comparison now requires that we reduce earnings today by about 15% in order to compare them with earnings in the early 1980s (Chart 11). More ominously, it is possible that even GAAP earnings are currently overstated. Chart 12 shows that EBITDA profit margins, which are generally more difficult to fudge, have fallen over the past decade, while operating margins have risen. Economy-wide profit margins, as measured in the national accounts, have also increased much more slowly than S&P 500 operating margins (Chart 13). Chart 11A Bull Market In Creative Accounting? Chart 12S&P 500 Operating Margins Have Risen Much More Than EBITDA Margins Chart 13Profit Margins, As Measured In The National Accounts, Have Fallen Relative To S&P 500 Margins This raises the risk that we will see more earning restatements - or at the very least, earnings disappointments - in the years ahead as companies run out of magic asterisks to pull out of their bag of accounting tricks. Investment Conclusions Corporate earnings are highly correlated with the state of the business cycle (Chart 14). We do not expect the U.S. to enter a recession at least until 2020. Thus, it is doubtful that U.S. earnings will suffer a sharp decline before then. Nevertheless, as this report argues, earnings growth is likely to decelerate early next year. Investors have a lot riding on the assumption that earnings growth will hold up. U.S. households owned nearly $30 trillion of equities in Q1 of 2018, or 25% of total household assets, the highest level since 2000 (Chart 15). The monthly asset allocation survey published by the Association of Individual Investors (AAII) shows that stocks comprised 68.5% of investors' portfolios in August (Chart 16). While this is below the peak of 77% reached in March 2000, it is still more than seven points above the post-1987 average of 61%, putting it in the 84th percentile of the historic distribution. Chart 14Earnings Are Highly Correlated ##br##With The Business Cycle Chart 15Households Are Loaded Up On Stocks Which... Chart 16...Comprise A Big Chunk Of Their Portfolios If earnings growth slows significantly, investors could end up deciding to cut their exposure to the stock market. Since for every buyer there must be a seller, the only way for investors to collectively reduce the value of their equity holdings is if share prices decline. U.S. equities account for 55% of global stock market capitalization (Chart 17). Thus, if U.S. earnings begin to stagnate, this will limit the upside for global equity indices. Chart 17U.S. Equities Account For More Than Half Of Global Stock Market Capitalization Chart 18Earnings In Other Regions Will Eventually Catch Up With The U.S. Does this mean that investors should look for greener pastures abroad? Not yet. We expect the dollar to strengthen and global growth to slow further over the coming months. This will put downward pressure on cyclical stocks, which are overrepresented in foreign indices. For the time being, asset allocators should maintain a neutral weighting to global equities, favoring developed market stocks over emerging markets. Within the DM space, the U.S. will outperform in dollar terms, but will trade broadly in line with Europe and Japan in local-currency terms. Longer term, we are more sanguine about the prospects for non-U.S. stocks. The outperformance of U.S. equities over the past decade follows a decade of underperformance. In fact, EPS in Europe and emerging markets actually grew more rapidly between 1990 and 2007 than in the United States (Chart 18). Historically, the relative growth of earnings across different regions follows multi-year cycles, and there is no reason to think that this will change. As such, it is likely that earnings growth in the rest of the world will begin to outstrip the U.S. once the problems plaguing emerging markets have been flushed out. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy, "Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG?" dated August 1, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades