Emerging Markets
Feature An analysis on Singapore is available below. The plunge in global risk assets is occurring at such a breathtaking pace that any economic analysis is pointless at this time. Economic growth forecasts have been reduced to moving targets. In our latest report published two days ago, we argued that we are witnessing the unravelling of the policy put. For now, monetary stimulus – both rate cuts and QE programs – are unlikely to halt the market riot. Fiscal stimulus is forthcoming but its actual impact on the real economy will not materialize until another several months. The only thing that investors can use to gauge market downside as of now are valuations and market technicals. This report presents the most important technical and valuations indicators that we are currently monitoring. All market prices are updated as of the close of Thursday, March 12, 2020. We are in a liquidation phase where fundamentals do not matter and markets often undershoot. Such indiscriminate liquidation also leads to major buying opportunities. We will book profits on the short EM stocks position when the MSCI EM equity index in USD hits 800. On Thursday March 12, the MSCI EM equity index closed at 880. Possibly, we will recommend accumulating EM stocks and will reverse our bearish bias on EM currencies and fixed-income markets if the EM MSCI Index reaches this level. Remarkably, the top chart on page 2 shows that major EM bear markets – in 1998, 2002, 2008 and 2015-16 – all bottomed when EM share prices hit their 24-year exponential moving average. This technical support for the MSCI EM stock index is currently 780, about 10% below yesterday’s close. Stay tuned. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com EM Stocks Are Approaching A Major Defense Line Global Material Stocks Are At A Long-Term Technical Support Line A Long-Term Perspective On Brazilian Stocks The Brazilian Real Is Not Yet Very Cheap Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio For EM Equities Cyclically-Adjusted P/E (CAPE) Ratio For US Stocks Three Technical Support Levels For S&P 500 An Equal-Weighted Aggregate Stock Price Of Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google And Microsoft Is FAANGM A Bubble That Has Reached A Top? US Market Cap As % Of GDP Was Record High Last Month Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio, Commodities And EM Currencies Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio, Commodities And EM Currencies Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio, Commodities And EM Currencies Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio, Commodities And EM Currencies Singapore: Zero Interest Rates Ahead Risk Of Debt Deflation… Singaporean businesses and consumers have been deleveraging in the past six years. That, along with the ongoing export slump1 and collapse in tourism revenues – 50% and 5% of GDP, respectively – have likely pushed real and nominal GDP into contraction in Q1 2020. Negative income growth risks turning this gradual deleveraging into debt deflation. Debt deflation occurs when prices fall and the real value of debt rises. Given the private sector is still heavily leveraged, deflation will trigger defaults. This scenario would be disastrous for Singapore’s credit sensitive property and banking sectors – the two key pillars of this economy. Singapore is not far from this tipping point as core and trimmed-mean consumer prices inflation measures as well as GDP deflator are flirting with deflation (Chart II-1). In order to ensure that this ongoing deleveraging does not enter a debt deflation spiral, both monetary and fiscal authorities need to stimulate more aggressively than they already have. Specifically, they should reduce interest rates to zero and provide substantial fiscal stimulus. … Warrants Zero Interest Rates Even though Singapore households and companies have been deleveraging, they remain highly indebted - total non-financial private sector credit stands at 173% of GDP (Chart II-2, top panel). Chart II-1Singapore: Deflation Is At The Door Chart II-2Singapore: Companies & Households Are Deleveraging The middle and bottom panels on Chart II-2 illustrate company and household leverage, defined as the ratio of Singaporean banks domestic loans to non-financial businesses and households relative to corporate profits and employee compensation, respectively. Corporate profits and employee compensation are better measures because they are incomes available to corporates and households, while nominal GDP is not. In brief, these measures gauge companies and households liabilities relative to their proper income. Critically, nominal GDP growth has dropped well below prime lending rates which stand at 5.25%. Besides, the prime lending rate in real (in inflation-adjusted) terms has risen as inflation dropped (Chart II-3). This is dangerous and nominal income growth is falling below the nominal interest rate, worsening borrowers’ ability to service their debt. Chart II-4 shows that the private sector’s interest rate payments on debt are elevated relative to GDP. This risks pushing the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) at commercial banks much higher. Chart II-3Singapore: Real Lending Rates Are High Chart II-4Singapore: Interest Payments Are Elevated The non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at Singaporean commercials banks is bound to rise from the low NPL ratio of 2%. Moreover, the ratio of special-mention loans - loans that are stressed but are not yet officially recognized as non-preforming - are also set to climb meaningfully from 2%. Chart II-5Singapore: NPL Provisions And Bank Stocks Furthermore, Singaporean banks have extended a non-negligible amount of loans to Chinese and ASEAN businesses. With the indebted mainland economy struggling following the COVID-19 epidemics and ASEAN companies strained by weakness in their domestic demand, Singaporean banks will have to deal with rising NPLs emanating from China and ASEAN. Singapore’s commercial banks will be forced to raise their provisioning levels significantly, which will hurt their profits. Provisions of the three large MSCI-listed commercial banks have been already rising. This has been historically negative for bank share prices2 (Chart II-5). As banks boost their provisioning, shareholders will push them to curtail credit origination to control risks. This will dampen economic and income growth. Without bold actions by the authorities, the banking sector and the real economy are facing a dire outlook. Interest Rates Are Heading To Zero Although the monetary and fiscal authorities have provided stimulus, it remains inadequate to fend off rising risks of debt deflation. The MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore) conducts monetary policy by guiding the trade-weighted exchange rate. The MAS depreciates the trade-weighted SGD when it wants to ease and vice versa. Given the economy has become much more leveraged and, thereby, more sensitive to credit and interest rates, depreciating currency is not always sufficient to create a swift turnaround in domestic demand. This is especially true when global trade is shrinking, as it is today. The Singaporean economy needs much lower lending rates and a significant fiscal boost to avoid entering painful debt deflation. The odds are high that Singaporean bond yields and swap rates are heading to zero. In brief, currency depreciation will only augment the market share of exporters in world trade even though their exports will continue shrinking in absolute terms. Hence, currency depreciation will not promptly boost income and employment in the export industries amid the ongoing global trade contraction. At the current juncture, currency depreciation without a substantial decline in borrowing costs will have little spillover to domestic demand. Chart II-6 illustrates that Singapore’s central bank has already been injecting liquidity in the banking system in order to bring interbank/money market rates lower. However, interest rates remain relatively elevated compared with the US, the euro area and Japan (Chart II-7), as well as relative to what this indebted economy needs. Chart II-6Singapore: Rates Are Heading To New Lows Chart II-7Singapore Interest Rates Are Above G3 On the fiscal side, the government budget will barely turn expansionary this year: expenditures will rise from 3% currently to just 7%, which translates to a 1% rise relative to GDP. This will not do much to boost overall growth. If the pace of domestic loan growth drops from 2.4% to 1.4% (by 100 basis points), that would generate a negative 1.8% credit impulse of GDP, more than offsetting the rise in the fiscal spending impulse. Chart II-8Singapore: Cyclical Sectors Are Contracting Confirming the lingering growth downtrend, economic conditions were dire even before the COVID-19 outbreak. Manufacturing production volume is shrinking and sea cargo handled has been dropping (Chart II-8). Electronic exports are contracting from a year ago (Chart II-8, bottom panel). Finally, corporate profits are not growing. Consumer spending is extremely weak. Retail volume sales excluding vehicle sales are contracting 2% from last year (Chart II-9). The excess-mired property sector is slowing down anew. Housing loans are contracting which will trigger a material drop in residential property sales (Chart II-10, top panel). As the latter transpires, construction activity will also shrink (Chart II-10, bottom panel). Chart II-9Singapore: Consumer Are Not Spending Chart II-10Singapore Property Sector Is Struggling Bottom Line: The Singaporean economy needs much lower lending rates and a significant fiscal boost to avoid entering painful debt deflation. The odds are high that Singaporean bond yields and swap rates are heading to zero. Investment Recommendations The MAS will continue injecting more liquidity into the banking system to bring down interest rates further and devalue the currency. Exactly for these reasons, since June 8, 2018 we have been recommending shorting the SGD versus the JPY. This trade has so far produced a 7.3% gain with very low volatility (Chart II-11). Our target for this SGDJPY position is 70. Today we are booking profits on the short Hong Kong property developers / long Singapore property developers position because the Fed is about to cut rates to zero, which will reduce downside potential in Hong Kong real estate stocks. This recommendation has produced 21.5% profit since March 22, 2017 (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Stay With Short SGD / Long JPY Trade Chart II-12Book Profits On Our Long Singapore / Short Hong Kong Property Stocks Position As to the overall stock market, we continue recommending a neutral allocation to Singapore within an EM dedicated equity portfolio. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Domestic exports, excluding re-exports. 2 DBS Bank, Overseas-Chinese Banking, United Overseas Bank.
Highlights China is moving from virus containment to normalization and economic stimulus. The full weight of the virus panic is only now hitting the US public and has not yet peaked. The US – and western democracies in general – have the raw capabilities to manage the virus outbreak. The profile of global political risk is shifting as a result of the economic shock stemming from the virus. This implies that while equity markets are close to their bottom, they face more volatility. Feature Chart 1No Peak In New Cases Outside China China’s President Xi Jinping visited Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus breakout that has triggered a global bear market, on March 10. While he did not declare outright victory over the virus, his symbolic visit reinforced the fact that China has drastically reduced the number of new daily cases both within and without Hubei province. Meanwhile the virus is spreading rapidly across the rest of the world (Chart 1). It is not clear if the outbreak and emergency response in the United States will follow the Italian or South Korean trajectory. The initial US response is not encouraging, but the US has latent institutional strengths. Either way the US is facing a tsunami of new cases in the very near term. Hence the panic among the American population can still escalate from here (Chart 2). Panic among households translates to a drop in economic activity that will ensure financial markets remain volatile, even if US equities are close to their bottom. Chart 2US Public Panic Has Not Peaked Yet Can Democracies Manage The Crisis? Chart 3Developed Economies Have Better Health The question has become salient because of the poorly managed cordon sanitaire in Italy and the slow and halting initial reaction of the United States. Moreover, to distract from China’s domestic crisis, the Communist Party has turned up the volume of its propaganda organs, advertising the success of China’s draconian containment measures and warning that the virus cannot be contained if the rest of the world does not follow suit. However, it is not the case that the pandemic can only be managed through absolutist policies. To date, developed economies and democracies – including westernized countries like Japan – have the best record in the world of improving public health and reducing mortality from infectious diseases. This is apparent simply by looking at life expectancy for those aged 60. Europe and Japan have the longest lives beyond 60, including extension of life when dealing with late-life health problems, while other regions lag, including Asia. The United States is on the low end of the developed countries but still considerably better than emerging market economies at prolonging life, even for unhealthy elderly folks (Chart 3). Chart 4US Has Reduced Flu/Pneumonia Deaths Dramatically The United States, like other countries, has done battle with a range of infectious diseases over the course of its history – in which it was the leader in economic, scientific, and technological advancement. These include cholera and viral epidemics like smallpox, Yellow Fever, the Spanish Flu, and SARS. The death rate for influenza and pneumonia has generally declined since the 1950s, although a counter-trend increase is conceivable given what occurred in the 1980s-90s (Chart 4). The strategy that the US and developed economies have used, embodied in documents like the World Health Organization’s interim protocol for rapid operations to contain pandemics, is one of creating a containment zone with movement restrictions and a closely watched buffer zone in which a combination of anti-viral treatment and non-pharmaceutical treatment (e.g. social distancing) is employed. “Containment and isolation” strategies are generally successful even though they often fail to establish an impenetrable geographic cordon sanitaire, must rely on voluntary behavior, and will never receive total compliance. The survival instinct and social pressure are powerful enough to convince most individuals and households to keep their distance from others once they are informed of the risks. Targeted government measures by credible regimes with a monopoly on the use of force – in cases where strong restrictions are necessary – are effective. And in democracies they are kept in place only as long as necessary (the incubation period of the virus plus a few more weeks). Developed economies and democracies have the best record of improving public health and reducing mortality from infectious diseases. The overall effect is to “flatten the curve,” e.g. to slow the spread of the virus, and delay and reduce the peak intensity of the number of cases and burden on hospitals and doctors.1 Of course, nations need institutional capacity and leadership to deal with a pandemic and the indirect impacts on their economies, trade, and supply chains. When businesses grind to a halt, will households be able to get what they need? If not, civic order could break down. Supply security is a fundamental national interest and governments that cannot provide it risk a loss of legitimacy and control. Major nations devote extensive resources to building and maintaining internal lines of communication so that neither natural nor man-made disasters can stop them from ensuring security and essential goods and services. Europe and North America will ultimately deal with the crisis successfully. A look at some basic indicators and indexes of national capabilities shows which nations are best and worst positioned to meet the logistical and supply challenges of the virus’s economic shock: The US ranks close to Japan in logistical capabilities, while Italy ranks between these two and Iran, which is woefully lacking (Chart 5). Chart 5Italy Suffers From Logistic Weaknesses Italy resembles China in having significant supply chain vulnerabilities (Chart 6), including quality of infrastructure (Chart 7). Obviously China has made leaps and bounds, but interior regions are still underserviced. Clearly China has benefited from greater government authority and capacity relative to Italy. Chart 6US Supply Chains Are Resilient Chart 7US Infrastructure Is High-Quality Even when it comes to basic food security, Italy and China are more vulnerable than others (Chart 8). Yet China has kept food shortages to a minimum throughout the crisis. The US is large enough that different regions will have greater vulnerabilities when it comes to the health crisis. The National Health Security Preparedness Index shows California, Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Michigan are below the national average in the ability to execute countermeasures to health crises (Chart 9). Chart 8Food Security Risks Under Control In China Chart 9US: Regional Differences In Health Preparedness These institutional factors suggest that Europe and North America will ultimately deal with the crisis successfully, although in the near term the consequences are unpredictable. Italy’s experience has made it apparent to all nations that if the reproduction rate is not suppressed through containment and isolation, then the health system will be overwhelmed and the death rate will go up. But clearly this has nothing to do with Italy’s being a democracy, as neither Japan nor South Korea have had the same experience. Investment Conclusions The United States is moving more aggressively to mitigate the problem, beginning with President Trump’s ban on travel with continental Europe and declaration of a national emergency. With a bear market having occurred, and a recession likely, President Trump is losing the primary pillar of his reelection campaign. He will continue to make reflationary efforts to salvage the economy. He has announced $50 billion in emergency spending and a waiver on student debt loan payments worth as much as $85 billion. But he has also become a “crisis president.” This means that he may take dramatic, surprise actions that are market-negative in the short term in order to delay the spread of the virus. Emergency powers are extensive and he will utilize them not only to combat the pandemic but also to double down on the narrative that got him elected: closing off America’s borders and reducing its exposure to the risks of globalization. This can include the movement of people, from places other than China and continental Europe (already halted), and even capital flows. This is another reason to expect greater volatility in the near term despite the huge discounts on offer. We are not bottom-feeding yet. The profile of global political risk is shifting as a result of the virus and its economic shock. If Trump is seen as having mishandled the health and wellbeing of the nation, then he loses the election regardless of whether stimulus measures help the economy rebound by November. Whereas if he takes drastic, economically painful measures now to control the virus, and ultimately the virus subsides, there is still a slim chance he can win election. His approval rating, at an average of 45%, has lost its upward momentum but has not yet collapsed. Regardless of the election, the financial bloodbath should not obfuscate for investors the fact that the US is the world’s most advanced economy and longest continuously running constitutional republic. It has survived a total Civil War, two World Wars, a Great Depression, and countless outbreaks of disease. It has the ability to take emergency action and mitigate pandemics. This means that a great buying opportunity is just around the corner. The profile of global political risk is shifting as a result of the virus and its economic shock. The above should make it clear that the US and Italy face the most immediate ramifications – both are much more likely to see changes in ruling party over the next year than they were. Policy, however, will remain counter-cyclical (reflationary) regardless. Rogue regimes like Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea face renewed risks of regime failure and/or military confrontation with the US and its allies beginning in the immediate term, especially if President Trump becomes a clear “lame duck” in the coming months. Down the line, the Japanese, German, and French elections will be affected by the economic fallout of the virus scare. China and Russia face medium-term risks due to new difficulties in improving their populations’ quality of life. Their leaders and ruling parties have an authoritarian grip, but political risk will increase as a result of slower growth. China retains the ability to stimulate aggressively – which it is doing – but that will slow the reform and rebalancing process. Russia, meanwhile, faces another wave of internal devaluation if it does not call off its emerging market-share war with Saudi Arabia. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are likely to re-consolidate power by 2022, but they face much greater risks of domestic instability than they did before this year’s turmoil. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Martin S. Cetron, “Quarantine, Isolation and Community Mitigation: Battling 21st Century Pandemics with a 14th Century Toolbox,” September 20, 2006, available at nationalacademies.org.
Dear Client, In addition to this week’s report, BCA Research will hold webcasts over the coming days to discuss the economic and financial outlook amid the myriad of uncertainties gripping global markets. I will take part in a roundtable discussion alongside my fellow BCA Strategists Arthur Budaghyan, Mathieu Savary, and Caroline Miller for a live webcast on Friday, March 13 at 8:00 AM EDT (12:00 PM GMT, 1:00 PM CET, 8:00 PM HKT). In addition, I will hold a webcast on Monday, March 16 at 12:00 PM EDT (4:00 PM GMT). Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights A global recession is now a fait accompli. The only question is whether there will be a technical recession lasting a couple of quarters, or a more prolonged downturn that produces a sizeable increase in unemployment rates. We lean towards the former outcome. Unlike during most recessions, the decrease in labor demand will be mitigated by a decline in labor supply, as potentially millions of workers are confined to their homes. This will limit the rise in unemployment, at least initially. The pandemic is likely to prompt firms to increase inventory levels for fear of further disruptions to their supply chains. This should provide a short-term boost to output. While it is possible that spending will remain broadly depressed even after the panic subsides, this seems unlikely. Private-sector finances were reasonably strong going into the crisis, while ultra-low government bond yields will incentivize increased fiscal outlays. Spending on leisure travel and public entertainment will remain subdued well into 2021, but much of this demand will be redirected to other categories of discretionary consumer purchases, particularly in the online realm. Health care expenditures will also increase. The collapse in oil prices following the breakdown of OPEC 2.0 represents a positive supply shock for the global economy, albeit one that will have negative consequences for oil-extraction sectors. We tactically upgraded stocks on the morning of Friday, February 28. That was obviously a major mistake: While global equities did rally 7% higher after our upgrade, they have since given up all their gains (and then some). For now, we are maintaining a modest overweight recommendation to equities. However, this is a low-conviction view, and we would not dissuade more conservative investors from reducing risk exposure. We would only consider upgrading stocks to a high-conviction overweight if the S&P 500 dropped to 2250, or the number of new infections outside of China peaked. In the meantime, we are downgrading high-yield credit tactically, as the odds of earnings weakness prompting a near-term rise in default expectations warrant caution. What A Way To Start The Decade So far, the 2020s may not be roaring, but they are certainly not boring. At the outset of the crisis, there were three scenarios for the COVID-19 outbreak: 1) A regional epidemic largely confined to China; 2) a series of global outbreaks, successfully short-circuited by a combination of government intervention and voluntary “personal distancing” measures; 3) A full-blown pandemic that exposes a significant proportion of the planet to the virus. Unfortunately, the first scenario has been ruled out. Policymakers are now trying to achieve the second scenario. Successful containment would “flatten the curve” of new infections, while allowing the sick to receive better treatment than they would otherwise. It would also buy precious time to develop a vaccine and increase the output of face masks, hand sanitizers, and other products that could slow the spread of the disease. Health Versus Growth Ironically, while the second scenario is clearly preferable to a full-blown pandemic from a health perspective, it may be more damaging from the very narrow, technical perspective of GDP accounting. It all depends on how severe the measures to quash each outbreak need to be. If simple hygiene measures and social distancing turn out to be enough, the economic fallout will be minimal. If ongoing mass quarantines and business closures are necessary, the damage will be severe. History suggests that containment efforts can work. During the Spanish flu, US cities such as St. Louis, which took early action to slow the spread of the disease, ended up with far fewer deaths than cities such as Philadelphia which did not (Chart 1). Western Samoa did not impose any travel restrictions and lost a quarter of its population. American Samoa closed its border and suffered no deaths. Chart 1Containment Efforts Can Be Effective: The Case Of The Spanish Flu Recent experience suggests that COVID-19 can be stopped, even after community contagion has set in. The number of new Chinese cases has fallen from 3,892 on February 5 to 31 on March 11. South Korea seems to be getting the virus under control. The number of new cases there has declined from 813 on February 29 to 242 (Chart 2). Japan and Singapore also appear to be succeeding in preventing the virus from spreading rapidly. Chart 2Coronavirus: The Authorities In East Asia Seem To Be In Control Of The Situation What remains unclear is whether other countries can replicate East Asia’s experience. A recent Chinese study estimated that R-naught – the average number of people someone with the virus ends up infecting – fell from 3.86 at the outset of the outbreak to 0.32 following interventions (Chart 3).1 In other words, China was able to lower R-naught to one-third of what was necessary to stabilize the number of new infections. If one wanted to be optimistic, one could argue that other countries could get away with less heavy-handed measures, even if it is at the expense of a somewhat slower decline in the infection rate. Chart 3Severe Containment Measures Have Changed The Course Of The Wuhan Outbreak Unfortunately, given how contagious the virus appears to be, it is unlikely that simple measures such as regularly washing one’s hands, avoiding large gatherings, and wearing a face mask in public when sick will suffice. Trade-offs will have to be made between growth and health. Moreover, if the virus becomes endemic in a few countries that do not have the institutional capacity to contain it, this could create a viral reservoir that produces repeated outbreaks in the wider world. The result could feel like a ghastly game of whack-a-mole. The Fatality Rate The degree to which countries pursue costly containment measures depends on how deadly the virus turns out to be. On the one hand, there is some evidence that the fatality rate from COVID-19 is lower than the 2%-to-3% that has been widely reported once mild or asymptomatic cases, which often go undetected, are taken into account. This may explain why South Korea, which has arguably done a better job of testing suspected patients than any other country, has reported a fatality rate of only 0.7%. Like the seasonal flu, the death rate from COVID-19 appears to be heavily tilted towards the elderly. In Italy, 89% of COVID-19 deaths have occurred among those who are 70 and older. On the ill-fated Diamond Princess cruise liner, not a single person under the age of 70 has died. The fatality rate for passengers on the ship older than 70 is 2.4%. The seasonal flu kills about 1% of those it infects over the age of 70. Based on this simple calculation, COVID-19 is more lethal, but not light-years more lethal, than the typical flu (and possibly less lethal than the flu is for young children). Unfortunately, these optimistic estimates assume that patients with COVID-19 can continue to receive appropriate care. As we saw in Wuhan, where the official death rate stands at 4.5% compared to 0.9% in the rest of China, and as we are now seeing in Italy, once the health care system becomes overwhelmed, death rates can rise sharply. Bottom Line: Containing the virus will be economically costly, but given the potentially large death toll from a full-blown pandemic, most countries will be willing to pay the price. A Global Recession Even before the virus became endemic outside China, we estimated that global growth would fall to zero on a quarter-over-quarter basis in Q1. As we cautioned back then, the risk to our forecast was tilted to the downside, and that has proven to be the case. We now expect the global economy to shrink not just in the first quarter but in the second quarter as well, as country after country experiences a surge in new infections. Two consecutive quarters of negative growth constitute a technical recession. Despite the drop in new cases in China over the past two weeks, most high-frequency measures of economic activity such as property sales, railway-loaded coal volumes, and traffic congestion have yet to return anywhere close to normal levels (Chart 4). In the US, hotel occupancy rates, movie ticket sales, and attendance at sporting events were all close to normal levels as of last week. However, that is changing quickly. Already, automobile traffic in Seattle, one of the cities most hard-hit by the virus, has fallen sharply (Chart 5). Chart 4China: It Will Take Time For Life To Return To Normal Chart 5US: Staying Home More In Seattle Due To The Virus? Qualitatively Different While a recession in the first half of 2020 is now unavoidable, the nature of this recession is likely to be quite different than in the past. To understand why, it is useful to review what causes most recessions. A typical recession involves a prolonged loss of aggregate demand. Such a loss of demand can result from either financial market overheating or economic overheating. Financial market overheating can occur if a credit-fueled asset bubble bursts, leaving people with less wealth struggling to pay off debt. For example, US residential investment fell from 6.6% of GDP in 2005 to 2.5% of 2010. Thus, even after the credit markets thawed, there was still a large hole in aggregate demand that needed to be filled. A similar, though less severe, loss of demand occurred when the bursting of the dotcom bubble led to severe cutbacks in IT spending. Economic overheating occurs when a lack of spare capacity puts upward pressure on inflation. Wary of accelerating prices, central banks slam on the brakes, raising interest rates into restrictive territory. This often results in a recession. In both types of recessions, there are usually second-round effects that can swamp the initial shock to aggregate demand. As spending falls, firms start to lay off workers. The resulting loss in household income leads to less spending. Even those who retain their jobs are apt to feel less confident, leading to an increase in precautionary savings. For their part, businesses tend to cut production as inventory levels swell. Things only return to normal once enough pent-up demand has accumulated and/or policy has become sufficiently stimulative to revive spending. Framed in this way, one can see that the current downturn differs from past downturns in at least three important respects. First, unlike during most recessions, the decrease in labor demand this time around will be partly mitigated by a decline in labor supply, as potentially millions of workers are confined to their homes. While this will not prevent many workers from temporarily losing income, it will limit the increase in unemployment, at least initially. We have already seen this in China, where GDP growth collapsed but companies are complaining about a shortage of migrant labor. Second, rather than falling, inventory levels may actually rise. Since companies will have to deal with pervasive supply shocks of unknown frequency, duration, and magnitude, their natural inclination will be to increase inventory levels for fear that they will not be able to access their supply chains when they need them. If recent reports of hoarding of toilet paper and bottled water are any guide, the same sort of behavior will show up among consumers. Again, in the short term, this additional demand will help to keep unemployment from rising as much as it would otherwise. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the ongoing crisis is the result of an exogenous shock rather than an endogenous slowdown. In fact, a variety of economic indicators such as US payrolls, the Chinese PMI, and German factory orders were all pointing to an acceleration in global growth before the crisis began. This suggests that growth could recover quickly once the panic subsides. While it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty how long it will take for the panic to end, it may not last as long as many fear. Investors should particularly pay attention to the situation in Italy. If the number of new cases peaks there, it could create a sense that other western countries will be able to get the virus under control. Second-Round Effects? Although it is possible that economies will remain depressed even after the panic subsides, this seems unlikely. Private-sector finances were reasonably strong going into the crisis. The private-sector financial balance – the difference between what companies and households earn and spend – is in surplus in most countries, including China (Chart 6). Chart 6The Private Sector Spends Less Than It Earns In Most Economies Chart 7Lower Oil Prices Eventually Lead To Higher Growth Granted, not all sectors are likely to prove equally resilient. Spending on leisure travel and public entertainment will remain subdued well into 2021. The collapse in oil prices following the breakdown of OPEC 2.0 will also wreak havoc on oil producers. In both cases, however, there will be offsetting benefits. Much of the demand for travel and entertainment will be redirected to other categories of discretionary consumer purchases, particularly in the online realm. And while lower oil prices will hurt producers, they represent a boon for consumers and companies that use petroleum as an input. In general, as Chart 7 illustrates, global growth usually accelerates following declines in oil prices. Fiscal Policy Will Turn More Stimulative Even before the crisis began, we argued that most governments should permanently increase fiscal deficits in order to raise the neutral rate of interest. At the current juncture, with a recession upon us and government bond yields at ultra-low levels, the failure to enact meaningful fiscal stimulus would be economic malpractice of the highest order. In addition to easing measures being rolled out by central bankers, our sense is that we will get a lot of fiscal stimulus, sooner rather than later. During most recessions, there is always a chorus of voices from people whose own jobs are secure about how a downturn is necessary to cleanse the system. This time around, it is obvious that the victims are not to blame. Politicians will not endear themselves to voters by denying the need for fiscal support to households struggling with medical bills and lost time from work and businesses facing bankruptcy. President Trump’s pledge this week to cut payroll taxes and increase transfers to those affected by the virus is just a taste of what’s to come. Investment Conclusions Chart 8Stock-To-Bond Ratio: A Lot Of The Bad News Has Already Been Priced In We tactically upgraded stocks on the morning of Friday, February 28. That was obviously a major mistake: While global equities did rally 7% higher after our upgrade, they have since given up all their gains (and then some). In retrospect, we should have paid more attention to our own analysis in our report “Markets Too Complacent About The Coronavirus.” For now, we are maintaining a modest overweight recommendation to equities. The total return ratio between stocks and bonds has fallen by a similar magnitude as in the run-up to prior recessions, suggesting that much of the bad news has already been priced in (Chart 8). Nevertheless, significant downside risks remain, which is why we would characterize our equity overweight as a fairly low-conviction view. We would not dissuade more conservative investors from reducing risk exposure. As discussed above, containing the virus could lead to significant economic disruptions. We would only consider upgrading stocks to a high-conviction overweight if the S&P 500 dropped to 2250, or the number of new infections outside of China peaked. In the meantime, we are downgrading high-yield credit tactically, as the odds of earnings weakness prompting a near-term rise in default expectations warrant caution. Safe-haven government bond yields will probably not rise much from current levels, at least in the near term. The Fed cut rates by 50 basis points last week and will cut rates by another 50 basis points next week. Looking further out, however, bonds are massively overvalued and will suffer mightily as life returns to normal. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Chaolong Wang, Li Liu, Xingjie Hao, Huan Guo, Qi Wang, Jiao Huang, Na He, Hongjie Yu, Xihong Lin, Sheng Wei, and Tangchun Wu, “Evolving Epidemiology and Impact of Non-pharmaceutical Interventions on the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 in Wuhan, China,”medrxiv.org, March 6, 2020. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Yesterday, BCA Research's Emerging Markets Strategy service took a look at EM sovereign and corporate spreads. Inflows to EM fixed-income funds were enormous in 2019. Meanwhile, EM corporate and sovereign spreads have broken out. Provided this selloff…
Since February 2018, Chilean stocks in USD terms have fallen more than 50% to their 2008 lows. They now trade at their cheapest cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio since 2003. This cheapness is particularly significant as Chilean and global yields are much lower…
Highlights China should fare a global recession better than most G20 economies, given its large domestic market and powerful policy response. China is likely to frontload a large portion of its multi-year infrastructure investment projects to this year. We project a near 10% increase in infrastructure investments in 2020. While at the moment we do not have high conviction in the absolute trend in Chinese stock prices, we think Chinese equities will still passively outperform global benchmarks in a global recession. Feature Chart 1A Black Monday Triggered By A "Perfect Storm" Investors are now pricing in a global recession, triggered by a worsening COVID-19 epidemic outside of China and a full-blown price war in the oil market. Global stocks tumbled by 7% on Monday March 9 while the US 10-year Treasury yield dropped to a record low (Chart 1). This extreme volatility reflects investors’ inability to predict how the epidemic will evolve or how long the oil price war will persist. If growth in the US and other major economies turns negative, then China’s disrupted supply side in Q1 will be met with weaker global demand in Q2 and even Q3. While our visibility is limited on the predominantly medically- or politically-oriented crisis, what we have conviction in forecasting at this point is that the Chinese economy will weather the storm better than most G20 economies. China’s policy response and the recovery in domestic demand will more than offset weaknesses from external demand. Thus Chinese stocks will likely outperform global benchmarks in the next 3 months and over a 6-12 month span, even though the absolute trend in both Chinese and global stock prices remains unclear over both these time horizons. A One-Two Punch In a recessionary scenario affecting the entire global economy, China would receive a one-two punch through shocks to both supply and demand tied to the COVID-19 outbreak and shrinking global demand. However, while a global recession would impact China’s export growth, it would not have the kind of bearing on China’s aggregate economy as it did in either 2008/2009 or 2015/2016. The reason is that the Chinese economy is less reliant on exports than it was in 2015 and considerably less than in 2008 (Chart 2). Domestic demand is now dominant, accounting for more than 80% of China’s economy, meaning that the country is less vulnerable to reductions in global demand. Chart 2The Chinese Economy Is Much Less Reliant On Exports Chart 3Global Economy Showing Reflation Signs Before COVID-19 Our current assessment is that the shocks from the virus epidemic and oil price rout on global demand will be brief.Global manufacturing and trade were on a path to recovery prior to the crisis (Chart 3). China’s external and domestic demand rebounded sharply in December and likely have improved even further until late January when the COVID-19 outbreak took hold in China (Chart 4). Even though China’s trade figures in the first two months of 2020 were distorted by COVID-19 (Chart 5),1 a budding recovery in both China’s domestic and global demand before the outbreak suggests the epidemic should disrupt rather than completely derail the global economy. Moreover, a rebound in trade following the crisis will likely be powerful, as the short-term disruption in business activities will lead to a sizable buildup in manufacturing orders. A rebound in trade following the crisis will likely be powerful. Chart 4Chinese Exports Likely To Have Improved Further Until COVID-19 Hit Chart 5Chinese Demand Likely To Pick Up Sharply In Q2 Bottom Line: China’s export growth will moderate if the virus outbreak prolongs and substantively weakens the global economy. However, the demand shock should have a relatively minor impact on China’s aggregate economy and the subsequent recovery should be robust. Infrastructure Investment Comes To Rescue, Again Chart 6Substantial Acceleration In Infrastructure Investment Likely In 2020 Infrastructure investment in China will likely ramp up significantly in 2020, which will mitigate the influence on the domestic economy from both COVID-19 and slowing global growth. The message from the March 4th Politburo Standing Committee2 chaired by President Xi Jinping further supports our view, that Chinese policymakers are committed to a major increase in infrastructure investment in 2020. Our baseline projection suggests a near 10% increase in infrastructure investment growth in 2020 (Chart 6). Local governments’ infrastructure investment plans for the next several years amount to about 34 trillion yuan.3 While local government budget and bond issuance will be approved at the annual National People’s Congress, which is delayed due to the epidemic, we have high conviction that a significant portion of the planned spending will be frontloaded this year. A significant portion of the multi-year infrastructure projects will likely be moved up to this year. In the first two months, local governments have frontloaded 1.2 trillion yuan worth of bonds, including nearly 1 trillion yuan of special-purpose bonds (SPBs). The consensus forecasts a total of 3-3.5 trillion yuan of SPBs to be issued in 2020, a 30% jump from 2019. Given tightened restrictions on the use of SPBs, we expect that 50% of the bonds will be invested in infrastructure projects, up from about 25% from 2019. This should contribute to about 10-15% of infrastructure spending in 2020. We are likely to also see significant additional funding channels to support infrastructure spending this year: Debt-swap program: With the aggressive easing by the PBoC in recent weeks, there is a high probability that another round of debt-swap program will materialize this year – a form of fiscal stimulus similar to the debt-to-bond swap program that the Chinese government initiated during the 2015-2016 cycle (Chart 7). As we pointed out in our report dated July 24, 2019, the Chinese authorities were formulating another round of local government off-balance-sheet debt swaps, which we estimated would be about 3-4 trillion.4 What was absent back then was a concerted effort from the PBoC to equip commercial banks with the required liquidity and further lower policy rate (Chart 8). Both monetary and policy conditions are now ripe for such a program to be rolled out. Chart 7Money Supply Likely To Pick Up Strongly At The Onset Of Substantial Stimulus Chart 8Monetary Conditions Are Ripe For Major Money Base Expansion Construction bond issuance: Borrowing through local government financing vehicles (LGFV) has climbed since the second half of last year. This follows two years of tightened regulations on local government borrowing. Net issuance of urban construction investment bonds (UCIB) reached 1.2 trillion in 2019, nearly doubling the amount from a year earlier. A total of 457 billion yuan in UCB has already been issued in the first two months of 2020, which indicates that the authorities are further relaxing LGFV borrowing. We think that net UCIB issuance could reach 1.5 trillion this year, a 25% increase compared with last year. Chart 9More Room To Widen Government Budget Deficit Government budget: Funding from the central and local governments budgets accounts for about 15% of overall infrastructure financing. We think that the government budget deficit will likely expand by about 2% of GDP in 2020. As Chart 9 shows, this figure is a conservative estimate compared with the 3%+ widening in the budget deficit during the 2008 and 2015 easing cycles. Bottom Line: Fiscal efforts to support the economy will significantly escalate this year. Monetary conditions and policy directions have already paved the way for a 2015-2016 style credit expansion. We expect infrastructure investment to rise to about 10% in 2020 compared with 2019. Will The RMB Join The Devaluation Club? The RMB appreciated by more than 1% against the USD in the past week, fanned by the expectation that China will have a faster recovery than other countries. The latest round of interest rate cuts by central banks around the world also pushed yield-seeking investors to RMB assets (Chart 10). Still, it is highly unlikely that the PBoC will allow the RMB to continue to appreciate at this rate. When other economies are in a competitive currency devaluation cycle, a strong RMB will generate deflationary headwinds for China’s economy and will partially offset the PBoC’s easing efforts (Chart 11). Chart 10Too Much Too Fast? Chart 11A Strong RMB Will Choke Off PBoC's Easing Efforts If the upward pressure in the RMB persists, then Chinese policymakers will be more inclined to expand the money base. Chart 12PBoC Likely To Rapidly Expand Its Balance Sheet Again We do not expect the PBoC to follow the US Federal Reserve and chase its policy rate even lower. However, if the upward pressure in the RMB persists, then Chinese policymakers will be more inclined to expand the money base. This further raises the probability that local government debt-swap programs will develop this year (Chart 12). The government may allow financial institutions to extend or swap maturing local government off-balance sheet debt with bank loans that carry lower interest rates and longer maturities. Or, it will simply move the debt to the PBoC’s balance sheet. Bottom Line: If upward pressure in the RMB endures, the PBoC will likely expand its balance sheet and make more room to buy local government debt, but it is unlikely to aggressively cut interest rates. Investment Conclusions Chart 13Chinese Stocks Will Likely Continue To Outperform, Even In A Global Recession Our recent change in view5 concerning the willingness of Chinese authorities to “stimulate the economy at all costs” meant that Chinese stocks were likely to outperform the global benchmarks in a rising equity market. In a global recessionary, which is now a fait accompli, Chinese leadership’s willingness to stimulate the economy will only intensify. China’s large domestic economy also makes the country less vulnerable to a global demand shock. At this point in time we do not have high conviction in the absolute trend in either Chinese or global stock prices, as their near-term performance is predominantly driven by a medically- and politically-oriented crisis. However, as we expect the Chinese economy to outperform in a global recession, our overweight call on Chinese equities remains intact on both a 3-month and 12-month horizon, in relative terms (Chart 13). Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 China had postponed January’s data release and instead, has combined the first two months of the year. 2 “We should select investment projects; strengthen policy support for land use, energy use, and capital; and accelerate the construction of major projects and infrastructure that have been clearly identified in the national plan.” http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0305/c64094-31617516.html?mc_cid=2a979… 3 https://m.21jingji.com/article/20200306/504edc15217322ab37337da2ca35a49e.html?[id]=20200306/nw.D44010021sjjjbd_20200306_9-01.json 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report " Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 2): Will Proactive Fiscal Policy Lose Steam?," dated July 24, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China: Back To Its Old Economic Playbook?," dated February 26, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Bear markets occur in phases, and their narrative can mutate. What began as a selloff caused by the coronavirus outbreak could well mutate into an oil crash-led selloff, and then mutate again into a selloff due to policy omnipotence, or something else. We are reiterating our short positions in the EM equity index and a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar as well as our defensive positioning in EM domestic bonds and credit markets. We are taking profits on our long gold/short oil and copper trade. Oil prices may stabilize, but risks are still skewed to the downside. We are also booking gains on our long Russian domestic bonds/short oil position. Feature Chart I-1A Record Low Currency VOL Is Followed By Major Market Disturbances Global financial markets are witnessing the unwinding of the policy put. For the past several years, the consensus in the global investment community was that risk assets could not go down because of policy puts from the Federal Reserve, the US Treasury and President Trump, the European Central Bank and the Chinese authorities. Similarly, crude oil prices had been supported by OPEC 2.0’s put from December 2016 until recently. The latest panic and broad-based liquidation of risk assets has been due not only to fear and uncertainty related to the rapid escalation in COVID-19 cases around the world, but also to investor realization that these policy puts are ineffectual. The Fed’s 50-basis-point intra-meeting rate cut proved incapable of stabilizing global risk assets. Investors have begun to doubt the efficacy of policy puts and have thrown in the proverbial towel. Crucially, the high-speed and intensity of the selloff was due to widespread complacency and overbought conditions in risk assets. In our January 23 report, we quoted Bob Prince, co-CIO of Bridgewater, who stated in Davos that “…we have probably seen the end of the boom-bust cycle.” This comment was consistent with prevalent complacency in global financial markets, reflected in very tight credit spreads worldwide, high US equity multiples and record-low implied volatility in various asset classes. In the same January 23 report, we wrote: “Any time an influential person has made a similar declaration in the past, it marked a major turning point in financial markets. Remarkably, implied volatility for the US dollar has plummeted to a record low, as it has for EM currencies and a wide range of equity markets. Chart I-1 illustrates the implied volatility for EM currencies and the US dollar. Such low levels of implied currency market volatility historically preceded major moves in currency markets and often led to a material selloff in broad EM financial markets.” In that same report , we recommended going long implied EM currency volatility. Since then JP Morgan’s EM currency volatility has risen from 6% to 10%. What began as a selloff caused by the coronavirus outbreak could well mutate into an oil crash-led selloff, and then mutate again into a selloff due to policy omnipotence, or something else. Consistent with this thesis, we reinstated our short EM equity index recommendation in the following week’s report – on January 30. The MSCI EM stock index is down 11% since then. Our target is 800, which is 18% below current levels (Chart I-2, top panel). Chart I-2EM Stocks: A Breakdown In The Making Market Narratives Mutate Chart I-3VIX Surge In Early 2018 Was A Trigger Not Cause Of Selloff Narratives of all large market moves are always expounded in retrospect. Only after a selloff is well-advanced do investors and commentators come up with reasons for it and build a plausible narrative describing it. Critically, bear markets occur in phases, and their narrative can evolve. What began as a selloff caused by the coronavirus outbreak could well mutate into an oil crash-led selloff, and then mutate again into a selloff due to policy omnipotence, or something else. For example, the early 2018 selloff in global equities and industrial commodities was at the time attributed to the spike in US equity volatility (Chart I-3, top and middle panels). In retrospect, January 2018 marked a major top in the global business cycle (Chart I-3, bottom line). Hence, the true reason for the late-January 2018 top in global stocks and industrial commodities was a downturn in global manufacturing and trade and not the surge in the VIX. The key question investors are currently wrestling with is the following: How deep will this selloff be, and how long will it last? Our view is that the selloff in EM and global risk assets is not yet over. As such, we are reiterating our short positions in the EM equity index and a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar, as well as our defensive positioning in EM domestic bonds and credit markets. Gauging The Downside There is no doubt that global growth will be affected by the spread of COVID-19 and the precautionary measures taken by the authorities, companies and households around the world to contain the outbreak. Further, growth visibility is extremely low, and that uncertainty is raising the risk premiums that investors demand. The latter is weighing on risk assets in general and global share prices in particular. Presently, precise forecasts for GDP growth and a potential trajectory of COVID-19 cases are not credible, and hence cannot be relied upon to formulate a sound investment strategy. If the current bloodbath in risk assets persists, a market bottom could be reached well before bad economic data are released or COVID-19 infection cases peak. Given the uncertainty related to both the global growth trajectory and the Covid-19 epidemic, the only way for investors to gauge a market bottom is to continuously examine valuations, technicals and market internals. With respect to valuations and technicals, we have the following observations: The EM equity index seems to breaking below its major support lines. If this breakdowns transpires, there is an air pocket until the index reaches its next technical support, which is 18% below its current level (please refer to the top panel of Chart I-2 on page 3). If the EM MSCI equity index drops to this support range, it would be trading at 11 times its trailing earnings (please refer to the bottom panel of Chart I-2 on page 3). At those levels, the EM equity index would be discounting a lot of bad news, making it immune to dismal economic data and general uncertainty. For the S&P 500, if the current defense line – which held been during 2011, 2015 and 2018 selloffs – is violated, the next long-term technical support is around 2400-2500 (Chart I-4). Inflows to EM fixed-income funds were enormous in 2019. Meanwhile, EM corporate and sovereign spreads have broken out (Chart I-5). Provided this selloff commenced from very overbought and expensive levels, the odds are that liquidation forces will not abate right now and that the selloff in EM fixed income has further to go. Chart I-4S&P 500: Where Technical Support Lies? Chart I-5EM Sovereign And Corporate Spreads Have Broken Out In a nutshell, we suspect that EM local currency bonds and credit markets received a lot of inflows from European investors in recent years because yields were negative across European fixed-income markets. A weak euro was a boon for European investors investing in EM. That, however, is reversing. Since the recent sharp appreciation in the euro and the nosedive in EM currencies, EM financial market returns in euros have collapsed. This will likely prompt an exodus of European investors from EM financial markets. Chart I-6A Major Breakdown In This Cyclical Indicator Even though the EM equity index is not expensive or overbought, rising EM USD and local currency bond yields herald lower share prices, as we discussed at length in last week’s report. Our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio1 has plummeted below its major technical support and the next level is significantly lower. In other words, this indicator is also in an air pocket (Chart I-6). Given it is extremely well-correlated with EM share prices, the latter will not bottom until this indicator stabilizes. Technical configurations of high-beta and cyclical segments of the global equity universe are consistent with failed breakouts. Such a profile is typically not followed by a correction, but by a major drawdown. These include the European aggregate equity index, the Nikkei, global industrials and US high-beta stocks (Chart I-7). Chart I-7AFailed Breakouts Are Often Followed By Large Drawdowns Chart I-7BFailed Breakouts Are Often Followed By Large Drawdowns Chart I-8The Global Stocks-To-Bonds Ratio Is Back To 2011 Levels Finally, the global stock-to-bond ratio has decisively broken below the upward sloping channel that has been in place since 2009 (Chart I-8). Typically, when a market or ratio experiences such a major breakdown, the recovery does not occur quickly and is unlikely to be V-shaped. In short, the structural breakdown in the global stocks-to-bond ratio suggests that global share prices will likely stay under downward pressure for some time. Bottom Line: Odds are that risk assets remain in a liquidation phase and investors should avoid catching a falling knife. The odds are also high that EM share prices in US dollar terms have another 18% downside. We reckon at those levels – where the MSCI EM equity index is around 800 – it would be safe to start accumulating EM equities, even if the global growth outlook remains mired in uncertainty. For now, we recommend playing EM on the short side. What To Do With Oil Plays Despite periodic spikes in crude prices over the past few years, we have held our conviction that oil is in a structural bear market. We doubted the sustainability of the OPEC 2.0 arrangement, arguing that Russia would not cooperate with Saudi Arabia in the long term. Russia did cooperate much longer than we had expected, temporarily supporting oil prices. Ultimately, Russian President Vladimir Putin abandoned the cartel late last week, and the Saudis have hit back with massive price discounts amid large output increases. Consequently, oil prices have crashed and are presently oversold (Chart I-9). Given the uncertainty related to both the global growth trajectory and the Covid-19 epidemic, the only way for investors to gauge a market bottom is to continuously examine valuations, technicals and market internals. However, there will be no rapprochement between the Saudis and the Russians for some time. Given the drop in demand amid sharp increases in supply, crude oil prices may well slide further. Since July 11, 2019, we have been recommending a long gold/short oil and copper trade (Chart I-10). This position has generated a large 40% gain. Today, we are taking profits on this trade. Instead, we are replacing it with a new position: long gold/short copper. Chart I-9A Long-Term Profile Of Oil Prices Chart I-10Book Profits On Long Gold / Short Oil And Copper Trade Among oil plays, we have been overweight Mexico and Russia within EM, both in fixed income and equity universes. That said, for absolute return investors, we have not been recommending unhedged long positions in either Mexico or Russia because of our expectation of a drop in oil prices and the ensuing broad-based EM selloff. Regarding Russia, for investors who were looking to gain exposure to local currency bonds, we have been recommending that they hedge this position by shorting oil since November 14, 2019. This recommendation has paid off well, and we are closing this position with a 26% gain. We will be looking to buy Russian local bonds unhedged in the weeks ahead. Chart I-11Relative Performance Of Russian And Mexican Domestic Bonds Is Facing Near-Term Headwinds In Mexico, we have also been reluctant to recommend naked exposure to local currency or US dollar bonds because of our bearish view on oil and the risk of large outflows from EM that would hurt the peso. Indeed, the oil crash and outflows from EM have led to a plunge in the Mexican currency. Instead, in Mexico we have been recommending betting on yield curve steepening. The proposition has been that short rates are anchored by a disinflationary backdrop and tight fiscal policy in Mexico while the long end of the curve could sell off in a scenario of capital outflows from EM. As with Russia, we are monitoring Mexican markets and are looking to recommend buying domestic bonds without hedging the currency risk in the weeks or months ahead. Bottom Line: We are taking profits on our long gold/short oil and copper trade. Oil prices may stabilize, but risks are still skewed to the downside. In the near term, the relative performance of Mexican and Russian stocks and local currency bonds versus their respective EM benchmarks could be undermined by capital outflows from EM in general and these countries in particular (Chart I-11). Nevertheless, both nations’ macro fundamentals remain benign, and their fixed-income and equity markets will outperform their EM peers in the medium term. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Calculated as ratio of equal-weighted average of total return indices of cad, aud, nzd, brl, idr, mxn, rub, clp & zar relative to average of jpy & chf total returns (including carry); rebased to 100 at January 2000. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Even before COVID-19 became a market relevant issue, Chinese excess liquidity growth (defined as money growth relative to nominal GDP) was picking up. Now that Chinese policymakers are ramping up both their rhetoric and their efforts to boost domestic growth,…
Highlights Uncertainty & Yields: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation. Bond Portfolio Strategy: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Governments: Upgrade countries that are more responsive to changes in the level of overall global bond yields and with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading sovereign debt with a lower “global yield beta” and less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Credit: Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight. Feature Chart of the WeekOn The Verge Of Global ZIRP The title of this report is a quote from a worried BCA client this morning, discussing his daily commute into Manhattan from the New York suburbs. We can think of no better analogy for the mood of investors in the current market panic. After having enjoyed a decade of riding the gravy train of recession-free growth and robust returns on risk assets, all underwritten by accommodative monetary policies, worries about a deflationary bust following the boom have intensified. The global spread of COVID-19, the ebbs and flows of the US presidential election and, now, a stunning collapse in oil prices – markets have simply been unable to process the investment implications of these unpredictable events all at once. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. It is clear that global government bonds have been a preferred hedge, with yields collapsing to record lows worldwide. While most of the market attention has been on the breathtaking fall in US yields that has pushed the entire Treasury curve below 1% as the market has moved to discount a swift move to a 0% fed funds rate. New lows were also hit yesterday in countries that had been lagging the Treasury rally: the 10-year German bund reached -0.85% yesterday, while the 10-year UK Gilt fell to an intraday all-time low of 0.08% with some shorter-maturity Gilt yields actually dipping into negative territory (Chart of the Week). The common driver of yesterday’s yield declines was the 25% plunge in global oil prices after the weekend collapse of the OPEC 2.0 alliance between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The inflation expectations component of global bond yields fell accordingly, continuing the correlation with energy prices seen over the past decade. Yet the real component of global bond yields has also been falling, with markets increasingly pricing in an extended period of weak growth and negative real interest rates – especially in the US. Collapsing US Treasury Yields Discount A Recession, Not A Financial Crisis Chart 2Re-opening Old Wounds While this latest plunge in US equity markets has been both rapid and powerful, the damage only takes us back to levels on the S&P 500 last seen as recently as January 2019 (Chart 2). The turmoil, however, has reopened old wounds in markets that had suffered their own crises over the past decade, with European bank stocks hitting new all-time lows and credit spreads on US high-yield Energy bonds and Italian sovereign debt (versus Germany) sharply blowing out. The backdrop remains treacherous and global equity markets will likely remain under pressure until the number of new COVID-19 cases peaks outside of China (especially in the US). If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. Bank funding indicators like Libor-OIS spreads and bank debt spreads have widened a bit over the past week but remain at very subdued levels (Chart 3). This is in sharp contrast to classic risk aversion indicators like the price of gold and the value of the Japanese yen versus the Australian dollar, which are closing in on the highs seen during the 2008 global financial crisis and 2012 European debt crisis. Chart 3A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis We interpret this as investors being far more worried about a deep global recession than another major financial crisis. That is also confirmed in the pricing of US Treasury yields, especially when looking at the real yield. Chart 4Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Chart 5Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally The entire TIPS yield curve is now negative for the first time, even with the real fed funds rate below the Fed’s estimate of the “r*” neutral real rate (Chart 4). The combination of low and falling inflation expectations, and plunging real yields, indicates that the Treasury market now believes that the neutral real funds rate is not 0.8%, as suggested by the Fed’s estimate of r*, but is somewhere well below 0%. With the fed funds rate now down to 0.75% after last week’s intermeeting 50bps cut, the Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. The Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. Yet that may be too literal an interpretation of the incredible collapse of US Treasury yields. The power of negative convexity is also at work, driving intense demand for long-duration bonds that puts additional downward pressure on yields. Large owners of US mortgage backed securities (MBS) like the big commercial banks have seen the duration of their MBS holdings collapse as yields have fallen. The result is that banks are forced to buy huge amounts of Treasuries (or receive US dollar interest rate swaps) to hedge their duration exposure of negative convexity MBS, hyper-charging the fall in Treasury yields – perhaps over $1 trillion worth of buying, by some estimates.1 This is a similar dynamic to what occurred last summer in Europe, when sharply falling bond yields triggered convexity-related demand for duration from large asset-liability managers like pension funds, further fueling the decline in bond yields (Chart 5). Yet even allowing that some of the Treasury yield decline has been driven by a mechanical demand for duration, a 10-year US Treasury yield of 0.56% clearly discounts expectations of a US recession, as well – which appears justified by the recent performance of some critical US economic data. In Charts 6 & 7, we show a “cycle-on-cycle” analysis of some key US financial and indicators and how they behave before and after the start of the past five US recessions. The charts are set up so the vertical line represents the start of the recession, and we line up the data for the current business cycle as if the latest data point represents the start of a recession. Done this way, we can see if the current data is evolving in a similar fashion to past US economic downturns. Chart 6The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy Chart 7COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession The charts show that the current flat 10-year/3-month US Treasury curve and steady decline in corporate profit growth are both accurately following the path entering past US recessions. Other indicators like the NFIB Small Business confidence survey, the Conference Board’s leading economic indicator and consumer confidence series typically peak between 12-18 months prior to the start of a recession, but appear to be only be peaking now. The same argument goes for initial jobless claims, which are usually rising for several months heading into a recession but remain surprisingly steady of late – a condition that seems unlikely to continue as more companies suffer virus-related hits to their sales and profits and begin to shed labor. Net-net, these reliable cyclical US data suggest that the Treasury market is right to be pricing in elevated recession risk – especially with US cases of COVID-19 starting to increase more rapidly and US financial conditions having tightened sharply in the latest market rout. Bottom Line: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation – most notably in the US. Allocation Changes To Our Model Bond Portfolio The stunning fall in global bond yields has already gone a long way. Yet it is very difficult to forecast a bottom in yields, even with central banks easing monetary policy to try and boost confidence, before there is evidence that the global COVID-19 outbreak is being contained (i.e. a decreasing total number of confirmed cases). By the same token, corporate bonds (and equities) will continue to be under selling pressure until the worst of the viral outbreak has passed. We raised our recommended overall global duration stance to neutral last week – a move that was more tactical in nature as a near-term hedge to our strategic overweight corporate bond allocations in our Model Bond Portfolio amid growing market volatility. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. This week, we are making the following additional changes to our model bond portfolio to reflect the growing odds of a global recession: Downgrade global corporates to underweight versus global governments Maintain a neutral overall portfolio duration, but favor countries within the government bond allocation that are more highly correlated to changes in to the overall level of global bond yields. Chart 8Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Given how far yields have declined already, we think raising allocations to “high yield beta” countries that can still cut interest rates, at the expense of reduced weightings toward low beta countries that have limited scope to ease policy, offers a better risk/reward profile than simply raising duration exposure across the board. Such a nuanced argument is less applicable to global corporates, where elevated market volatility, poor investor risk appetite and deteriorating global growth momentum all argue for continued near-term underperformance of corporates versus government bonds. Specifically, we are making the following changes to our recommended allocations, presented with a brief rationale for each move: Upgrade US Treasuries and Canadian government bonds to overweight: Both Treasuries and Canadian bonds are higher beta markets, as we define by a regression of monthly yield changes to changes in the yield of the overall Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index (Chart 8). The Fed cut 50bps last week as an emergency measure and has 75bps to go before reaching the zero bound, which the market now expects by mid-year. Additional bond bullish moves after reaching the zero bound, like aggressive forward guidance, restarting quantitative easing and even anchoring Treasury yields in a BoJ-like form of yield curve control, are all possible if the US enters a recession. Meanwhile, the Bank of Canada (BoC) followed the Fed’s cut with a 50bp easing the next day and signaled that additional rate cuts are likely to prevent a plunge in Canadian consumer confidence. The collapsing oil price likely seals the deal for additional rate cuts by the BoC in the next few months. Downgrade Japanese government bonds to maximum underweight: Japanese government bonds (JGBs) are the most defensive low-beta market in model bond portfolio universe, thanks to the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control policy that anchors the 10yr JGB yield around 0%. This makes JGBs the best candidate for a maximum underweight stance when global bond yields are not expected to rise in the near term, as we expect. Downgrade Germany and France to Underweight: The ECB meets this week and will be under pressure to ease policy given recent moves by other major central banks. A -10bps rate cut is expected, which may happen to counteract the recent increase in the euro versus the US dollar, but there is also possibility that ECB will increase and/or extend the size and scope of its current Asset Purchase Program. Given the ECB’s lack of overall monetary policy flexibility, and low level of inflation expectations, we see limited scope for the lower-beta German and French government bonds to outperform their global peers. Remain overweight UK and Australia: While both Australian government bonds and UK Gilts have a “median” yield beta in our model bond portfolio universe, both deserve moderate overweights as there is still the potential for rate cuts in both countries. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) cut the Cash Rate by -25bps last week and they are still open to cut further to boost a sluggish economy hurt by wildfires and weak export demand from China. The RBA will stay more dovish for longer until we will see clear signs of a rebound of the Chinese economy from the COVID-19 outbreak. The Bank of England (BoE) will likely cut its policy rate later this month, or even before the next scheduled policy meeting, as COVID-19 is starting to spread through the UK. Downgrade US High-Yield To Underweight: US junk bonds had already taken a hit during the global market selloff in recent weeks, but the collapse in oil prices pummeled the market given the high weighting of US shale producers in the index (Chart 9). With additional weakness in oil prices likely as Russia and Saudi Arabia are now in a full-fledged price war, US high-yield will come under additional spread widening pressure focused on the weaker Caa-rated segment that contains most of the energy names. We recommend a zero weight in the Caa-rated US junk bonds, within an overall underweight allocation to the entire asset class. Downgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporates to underweight: COVID-19 is now spreading faster in Germany and France, after leaving Italy in a full-blown national crisis. The export-oriented economies of the euro area were already vulnerable to a global growth slowdown, but now domestic growth weakness raises the odds of a full-blown recession – not a good environment to own corporate bonds, especially with the euro now appreciating. Downgrade emerging market (EM) USD-denominated sovereigns and corporates to underweight: EM debt remains a levered play on global growth, so the increased odds of a global recession are a problem for the asset class – even with sharply lower interest rates and early signs of a softening in the US dollar (Chart 10). Chart 9Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Chart 10Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD We will present the new specific model bond portfolio weightings, along with a discussion of the risk management implications of these changes, in next week’s report. Bottom Line: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Upgrade high-beta countries with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading lower-beta countries with less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.wsj.com/articles/fear-isnt-the-only-driver-of-the-treasury-rally-banks-need-to-hedge-their-mortgages-1158347080 Recommendations Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns