Developed Countries

Highlights The supply of U.S. dollar outside America has been curtailed, yet there is large pent-up demand for dollars. This warrants another upleg in the greenback. The Trump administration's desire to shrink America's current account deficit will be very deflationary for the rest of the world, and mildly inflationary for the U.S. Such policies, if adopted, will exaggerate the paucity of U.S. dollars beyond America's borders and lead to notable dollar appreciation. The RMB is at risk because Chinese banks have created too many yuan, and deposit rates in real terms have turned negative as inflation has risen. Our negative view on EM has been and continues to be driven by our outlook on EM/China domestic demand, commodities prices and the U.S. dollar - not growth in advanced economies. Feature In recent weeks we met with clients in Asia and Australia. This week's report addresses some of the more common questions that we were asked to address. Question: You have written about "global U.S. dollar liquidity shortages." Why have these "global dollar shortages" occurred given the Fed expanded its balance sheet enormously from 2008 until 2014? How does one measure "global dollar shortages," and what does it mean for financial markets? By "global U.S. dollar shortages," we refer to deficiency in U.S. dollars outside the U.S., where U.S. dollar supply growth has fallen short of growth in demand for the greenback. We have the following pertinent observations on this issue: U.S. dollar shortages in the global banking system (eurodollar market) can be represented by U.S. banks' and other financial firms' claims on foreigners. This measure has been shrinking since early 2015 (Chart I-1). This corroborates the fact that U.S. banks, prime money market funds and other financial institutions have been unable/unwilling to supply dollars to the eurodollar market. This is consistent with rising LIBOR rates, which still continue to climb. U.S. non-financial entities' foreign assets have also fallen in the past year and a half but they are much smaller than banks and other financial institutions claims. As to U.S. banks' and other financial firms' claims on EM, they have also been shrinking since early 2015 (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Weak Supply Of U.S. Dollars To Rest ##br##Of World By U.S. Financial Institutions Chart I-2Shrinking Supply Of U.S. Dollars ##br##To EM By U.S. Financial Institutions Another way that the U.S. emits dollars to the rest of the world is by running a current account deficit. The U.S. current account deficit as a share of global GDP is now much smaller now than it was before the Great Recession (Chart I-3). This also means a smaller U.S. dollar supply relative to the size of the world economy. On the demand side, the widening in cross currency basis swaps indicates structural demand for U.S. dollar funding among euro area and Japanese investors (Chart I-4). Chart I-3The U.S. Emits Less ##br##Dollars To World Via Trade Chart I-4Pent-Up Demand For Dollars From Japanese ##br##And European Fixed-Income Investors These investors have been opting for exposure to dollar assets due to the higher yield on U.S. dollar fixed-income instruments - but they have been reluctant to take on exchange rate risk. In brief, they have avoided getting long exposure to the U.S. dollar. The reluctance to accept the exchange rate risk by European and Japanese investors means they are not bullish on the dollar. This goes against the widespread opinion among investors that the overwhelming majority of global investors are bullish on the U.S. currency. By hedging the exchange rate risk - in this case the risk of potential greenback depreciation - these investors are giving up a considerable portion of higher yield that they obtain in U.S. fixed-income market. In fact, if these basis swaps continue to widen or remain wide it might make sense for European and Japanese fixed-income investors to buy U.S. fixed-income securities and not hedge the currency risk. If and when these investors stop hedging their exchange rate risk, the U.S. dollar will appreciate versus the euro and the yen. Provided European and Japanese fixed-income investors are sizable players in global fixed income and hence currency markets, they have the potential to make a difference in exchange rate markets. In short, there is potential pent-up demand for U.S. dollars from these European and Japanese institutions. Such a widening in basis swaps is also consistent with the above observations that U.S. banks have been reluctant to take the other side of this trade - i.e., offer U.S. dollars to European and Japanese investors - even though it is a very profitable opportunity. Finally, the drop in EM central banks' foreign exchange reserves reflects demand for U.S. dollars in their economies, primarily in China (Chart I-5). The Chinese central bank has sold U.S. securities to meet mushrooming demand for U.S. dollars from Chinese households and companies. This entails there has been and remains considerable pent-up demand for dollars by mainland companies and households. With respect to the supply of currency, it is important to note that it is up to commercial banks - not the central bank - to create money. Central banks provide liquidity for commercial banks, but it is the latter that creates money.1 In a nutshell, by undertaking QE, the Fed provided reserves for U.S. commercial banks (Chart I-6), yet the latter have been reluctant to create too much money. Banks create money by originating loans and other types of claims. Chart I-5China: Selling U.S. Securities To ##br##Meet Domestic Demand For Dollars Chart I-6The Fed's Balance ##br##Sheet In Perspective U.S. banks have been very conservative in money creation especially outside America. In the U.S., banks shrunk their balance sheets and loans in the 2009-2011 period. That is why the Fed's QE programs have not led to inflation. Notably, U.S. banks' total assets - including bank loans - and broad money (M2) growth have lately rolled over (Chart I-7). This worsens the lingering dollar scarcity outside the U.S., which should in turn prop up the value of the dollar. The reasons why U.S. banks and financial institutions have been conservative is due to their own deleveraging objectives and because of regulatory changes in the financial industry. In regard to interest rates, U.S. nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates are very low yet they are high relative to European and Japanese real rates (Chart I-8). Given a relatively tight labor market, odds are that U.S. interest rate expectations will rise further in both absolute and relative terms. This will cause the dollar to appreciate. Chart I-7U.S. Banks Control ##br##The Supply Of U.S. Dollars Chart I-8U.S. And German ##br##Inflation-Adjusted Interest Rates Bottom Line: The pace of supply of dollars beyond the U.S. is falling short of growth in demand for this currency. Typically, this warrants greenback appreciation. Question: What about the U.S. administration's preference for a weaker dollar to improve America's trade position? Won't the greenback depreciate as the Trump administration expresses its desire for a weaker currency? Certainly U.S. officials can verbally influence the exchange rate and drive markets for a (short) period of time. Yet fundamentals and flows will re-assert themselves and the greenback will ultimately appreciate even if its rally is delayed by policymakers. The new U.S. administration intends to run mercantilist policies to create jobs in America and doing so will shrink the current account deficit. Nevertheless, a narrowing U.S. current account deficit ultimately entails diminishing flows of U.S. dollars to the rest of the world, which is bullish for the greenback. In brief, the U.S. administration can delay the dollar rally, but it will not be able to prevent it if and when it shrinks the U.S. current account deficit. This will be enormously deflationary for the rest of the world and ultimately for the global economy. The supply of dollars outside U.S. borders will become even more dearth. As their exports tumble, manufacturing-heavy Asian and European economies will have to run even more stimulative policies - reduce their real interest rates further - to offset such a deflationary shock to their economies. In the case where the Trump administration successfully manages to weaken the U.S. dollar, the ensuing boost to U.S. manufacturing and employment will be mildly inflationary given the already relatively tight labor market. Thereby, trade protectionism or policy-driven currency depreciation, if these occur, will lift U.S. inflation and U.S. interest rates will go up. Rising U.S. interest rates and lower interest rates throughout the rest of the world will propel the dollar's value higher. On the whole, in the case of U.S. trade restrictions, the exchange rates have to adjust to mitigate deflation in the rest of world and cap inflation in America. This ultimately entails a stronger U.S. dollar and weaker currencies abroad. A final note on exchange rates valuation. Based on unit labor costs, the U.S. dollar is not yet expensive (Chart I-9A). The same measure for other currencies is also shown in Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B. Chart I-9AReal Effective Exchange ##br##Rates Based On Unit Labor Costs Chart I-9BReal Effective Exchange ##br##Rates Based On Unit Labor Costs Financial markets tend to overshoot and undershoot before a major trend reversal. We believe the U.S. dollar is in a genuine bull market and will likely become more expensive before topping out. Bottom Line: The U.S.'s desire to shrink its current account deficit is very deflationary for the rest of the world. Such policies, if adopted in the U.S., will exaggerate the scarcity of U.S. dollars beyond America's borders and lead to notable dollar appreciation. Question: The RMB/USD exchange rate has been stable lately. Does this mean the authorities have reasserted their control over the exchange rate and will not allow it to depreciate? The authorities in China have partial and temporary control over the exchange rate. Ultimately, it will be Chinese households and companies that drive the exchange rate, barring full-out government controls over all export/import transactions, money transfers as well as financial and capital account flows. If mainland households and companies opt to convert a small portion of their liquid savings (deposits at banks) into foreign currency, there is little the authorities can do to defend the RMB, barring a complete closing of balance-of-payments transactions to companies and households. The primary risk to the yuan exchange rate is not currency valuation but an overflow of yuan in the system - i.e., excess supply of RMBs is the main factor that will cause currency depreciation. Unlike U.S. banks, Chinese banks have created too many yuan. Broad money (M2) in China has risen from RMB 48 trillion as of December 2008 to RMB 158 trillion currently - i.e., it has surged by 3-fold. M2 has risen from 150% to 210% of GDP in the past eight years (Chart I-10). In the meantime, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to M2 has dropped to 14% (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Chinese Banks Have ##br##Created Too Many Yuan Chart I-11China: Foreign Reserves Are ##br##Small Relative To Money Supply The latter ratio implies that if Chinese companies and households decide to convert 14% of their deposits at banks into foreign currencies and the People's Bank of China (PBoC) sells its international reserves to offset it, the latter will simply evaporate. We are not suggesting this will actually happen. The point to emphasize is that mainland banks have created so much money that even the country's US$ 3 trillion foreign exchange reserves are not sufficient to back those deposits up. Chinese households and companies may already be sensing there is too much in the way of RMBs floating around, and intuitively may not trust the currency. They have paid astronomical multiples for real assets like property in China, and have recently been willing to shift assets into foreign currencies/assets. Importantly, the one-year deposit rate at banks is 1.5% in nominal terms but in real terms it has now become negative as inflation has picked up. Chart I-12 (top panel) demonstrates that the deposit rate deflated by core inflation is negative for the first time in the past 10 years. The bottom panel of Chart I-12 shows that the deposit rate deflated by headline CPI inflation is also negative. Interestingly, any time the real deposit rate turned negative in the past, the central bank hiked interest rates. It is impossible to know whether the latest pick up in China's inflation represents a temporary spike or is the beginning of a major and lasting uptrend (Chart I-13). We are surprised by how fast and sharply inflation has risen lately, given the growth improvement has so far been modest. Chart I-12China: Real Deposit ##br##Rates Have Turned Negative Chart I-13China: Inflation ##br##Is Rising, For Now The trillion- dollar question is what is the true output gap in China and, correspondingly, whether the latest rise in inflation is genuine and lasting or simply a statistical aberration. No one including Chinese policymakers knows the answers to these very essential questions. What type of adjustment China embarks on depends on monetary policy and banks in China. As and if Chinese banks slow down money creation, economic growth will tumble and deflationary tendencies will resurface. This scenario is good for creditors - households and companies with large amounts of deposits - because deposit rates in real terms will rise again. Yet this is a bad outcome for indebted companies, capital spending and employment. If mainland banks continue to create money at a double-digit pace as they have been doing, inflation will likely become persistent and durable. These dynamics are positive for debtors as real borrowing costs will drop further/stay negative, and growth will hold up. However, in such a case, negative real rates will buttress capital outflows and pressure the value of the RMB. By and large, the Chinese authorities are facing a profound choice: Policymakers can choose to help debtors (indebted companies) by accommodating continuous money supply expansion by banks, i.e., opt for negative real interest rates. The outcome will be much stronger downward pressure on the RMB. The latter will depreciate at a double-digit pace annually in the next several years. They can opt to force the banking system to slow down the pace of money/credit creation. This will lead to some sort of debt deflation. Money growth and inflation will drop and the currency will not be at a risk of major depreciation. Yet, economic growth/profits/employment will tumble. A third choice for the authorities is to resort to full-out government controls over all trade, transfers as well as financial and capital account transactions - i.e., take the country back to socialism. Only in such a case can the authorities control the exchange rate and interest rates simultaneously - i.e., they can inflate the credit bubble away while preventing households from converting their liquid savings into foreign currency. In brief, this entails financial repression, and it will erode the real value of Chinese deposits. It is not clear to us whether this is a politically more viable option than allowing some bankruptcies/layoffs and debt deflation. Besides, this will devastate China's vibrant private sector as businessmen and high-income employees become reluctant to invest and expand as they observe the real value of their savings/wealth decline. Chart I-14U.S. Dollar And Commodities ##br##Prices Unusual Decoupling As if there were not enough domestic challenges, Chinese policymakers are also facing a hawkish Trump administration on the issue of trade and the exchange rate. Putting it all together, we conclude it will be extremely difficult for the Chinese authorities to navigate through these challenges. One area where we disagree with many investors is that the Chinese authorities have a viable plan and strategy. Given the above constraints, there are no easy choices and it is hard to know which route the Chinese government will take. The latest bout of stability in the RMB has been due to a notable shutdown in outflows. Yet this is a temporary solution. The inability to convert liquid savings into foreign currency will only make households and companies more set on converting their yuan. Odds are that capital outflows will skyrocket on any relaxation of recent harsh restrictions. Bottom Line: In any country, the monetary authorities cannot simultaneously control the price of money (interest rates), the quantity of money, and thereby the exchange rate. This will prove to be true in China too. We continue betting on further RMB depreciation. Question: Why do you not think this commodities rally has further to go, given supply has been curtailed and demand is picking up as global growth improves? The strength in commodities prices in recent months when the U.S. dollar has been firm is a major departure from historical correlations (Chart I-14). Remarkably, oil forward prices have recently dropped and global energy share prices have relapsed in absolute terms, even though the spot price has held up (Chart I-15). This foretells that the marketplace does not believe in the sustainability of the current spot price level of crude. As to industrial metals, our hunch is that Chinese demand will weaken again as the nation's credit and fiscal impulse relapses (Chart I-16). Besides, the recent resilience in copper has been due to supply disruptions that may be temporary. Chart I-15Has Sell Off In Oil Market Begun? Chart I-16China's Growth To Peak Later This Year Notably, hopes that U.S. infrastructure spending - even if such spending turns out to be considerable - will boost demand for industrial metals are misplaced, because the U.S. is a small consumer of metals. China consumes six to seven times more copper, nickel, zinc, aluminum, tin and lead than the U.S. Hence, we view industrial metals as a pure play on China's capital spending. Bottom Line: We expect a combination of a stronger dollar, weaker Chinese growth and elevated oil inventories to produce a major reversal in industrial metals and oil prices. Chart I-17EM Stocks And U.S. ##br##TIPS Yields: Negative Correlation Question: Is your negative stance on EM contingent on weakness in DM growth? No, our negative stance on EM is not contingent on a relapse in DM growth. Some combination of the following key factors will trigger and drive weakness in EM risk assets: Higher U.S. real rates or a stronger U.S. dollar. Chart I-17 demonstrates the strong negative correlation between higher U.S. TIPS yields and EM share prices in the recent years. Lower commodities prices. Renewed weakness in China's economy. Our negative view on EM has and continues to be driven by our views on EM/China domestic demand/credit cycles, commodities and the U.S. dollar. Investment Conclusions Chart I-18EM/China Plays Are At Critical Juncture Exchange rates have been critical to financial market dynamics in recent years. This is unlikely to change. Odds favor another upleg in the U.S. dollar and a weaker RMB. As such, the outlook for EM risk assets is poor. EM currencies will be driven by a stronger dollar, a weaker RMB and lower commodities prices. EM share prices as well as global mining, and machinery stocks are at a critical juncture (Chart I-18). China-plays may soon start reacting to the PBoC's recent modest tightening as well as regulatory credit curtailment and begin to sell off in anticipation of weaker growth later this year. Global equity portfolios should continue underweighting EM stocks. Similarly, global credit (corporate bonds) portfolios should underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit. Finally, the outlook for weaker currencies does not bode well for EM local currency bonds. However, for fixed income investors we have several swap rate trades, relative value recommendations and yield curve positions that are published regularly in our Open Position Table on page 16. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to Trilogy of Special Reports on money/loan creation, savings and investment, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, and "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, links available on page 17. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

After an M&A driven outperformance phase, semiconductor stocks appear to be putting in a major top. M&A activity has plunged, warning that deal premiums are likely to be removed from valuations. The recovery in global chip sales growth also looks to be at risk. Our global chip sales model has rolled over, reflecting softening new order growth in a number of chip-intensive industries. If top-line growth begins to recede, then the tentative trough in chip inventories is likely to turn into a full blown rebound. History shows that the highly anticipatory chip index fares poorly when chip supply accelerates. The latter signals that future chip output will decelerate, revealing the downside of a cyclical business with high operating leverage. Our Chip Stock Timing Model, a combination of technical and fundamental forces, has dropped sharply in recent weeks, reinforcing that relative performance is at serious risk. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SECO - INTC, QCOM, TXN, AVGO, NVDA, ADI, MU, SWKS, LLTC, MCHP, XLNX, QRVO, FSLR.

The large gap between the BCA Defense and BCA Aerospace indexes is likely to grow much larger. The U.S. is aiming to boost defense spending as part of its stimulus efforts, and is pressuring other NATO members to boost defense spending after a long contraction. While U.S. defense spending has been through a soft patch for the past several years, new orders for defense goods have been one of the strongest components of overall durable goods orders (second panel). Even global demand has boomed, even in the face of the strong U.S. dollar, as evidenced by surge in exports of military goods (bottom panel). On the flipside, aerospace new orders are on a downward trajectory, reflecting a downturn in the commercial aerospace cycle. While long lead times and lengthy delivery schedules offer some earnings protection, dwindling order backlogs will ultimately undermine confidence in the long-term outlook. Our global airline consumer price index, a composite of airline pricing power in a number of major countries, is in negative territory. A negative CPI reflects excess capacity, and warns of grim prospects for a recovery in new airplane orders. The bottom line is that earnings support remains intact for the defense index, but is rapidly dwindling for aerospace equities. Stay overweight the former and underweight the latter. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the BCA defense index are: LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL and the BCA aerospace index are: BA, UTX, HON, TXT.

Highlights Tensions are still high between the U.S. and China; China's neighbors are in the line of fire; Korea and Taiwan stand to suffer; We are bullish Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines; We are bearish Indonesia and Malaysia. Feature Over the past two weeks we have taken clients on a tour through Europe, where we think political and geopolitical risks are generally overstated in the short term. This provides ample room for European financial assets to outperform this year.1 This week we turn to Asia Pacific, where the situation is quite different. We see this region as the chief source of geopolitical "Black Swans," mainly due to rising U.S.-China tensions, which we have highlighted since 2012.2 While U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping have recently reassured the world that relations will be cooperative and stable, it is far too soon to declare that the two have resolved anything substantial. While we have addressed U.S.-China relations before, it is essential to watch the rest of EM Asia, where proxy battles between the U.S. and China continue to play out.3 If the Philippines shocked the world in 2016 by pivoting away from the U.S. and toward China, South Korea is the country that will do the same in 2017. In this report, we review the opportunities and risks afforded by this regional dynamic. I. Will Trump And Xi Cool Their Heels? Fundamentally, geopolitical risk in Asia Pacific is driven by the "Thucydides Trap," a struggle between the established regional and global power (the United States), and an emerging power that seeks to rewrite the region's geopolitical order (China).4 This dynamic emerged well before President Donald Trump's election.5 Trump is an unpredictable agent thrown into a structural dynamic. His election on an avowed platform of protectionism, his comments singling out China as a U.S. threat, and his break with the U.S. foreign policy establishment all suggest that the secular rise in Sino-U.S. tensions is about to get worse.6 Yet, since taking office, Trump has sent mixed signals. On the one hand, he threatens a policy of isolationism that would see the U.S. withdraw from its global security commitments. On the other hand, he has threatened to escalate geopolitical conflicts in order to get what he wants on business and trade. Table 1Market Implications Of ##br##Trump's Options Toward China As Table 1 illustrates, it is extremely important for investors which of these foreign policies Trump ultimately pursues - nationalist or isolationist - and whether he combines it with the trade protectionism (or mercantilism) that he has threatened. In the short term, the most bullish combination would be the economic status quo with a scaled-down U.S. presence. The most bearish would be mercantilism combined with nationalist foreign policy. Trump's recent interchanges with Xi were notable because for once he adhered to diplomatic protocol. He and Xi gave some initial - and we would add tentative - assurances to the world that Sino-U.S. relations will not explode in a ball of flames this year: Taiwan - Trump reaffirmed the One China Policy, i.e., that Taiwan has no claim to independence from the mainland. Trump's phone call with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in December, and subsequent comments, had put this principle in doubt, raising the prospect of a new Cold War or actual war. North Korea - China has offered to enforce a stringent new set of economic sanctions on North Korea, namely barring coal imports for 2017. This is significant, given the short duration of China's previous punitive measures against the North and the hit that North Korean exports have already suffered from China's slowing economic growth (Chart 1). The Obama administration had begun sanctioning China as a result of its unwillingness to enforce, so with enforcement may come the Trump administration's deactivation of such threats for a time. The RMB - Trump did not accuse China of currency manipulation on "day one" of his administration as he had promised during his campaign, though he has informally called the Chinese the "grand champions" of manipulation.7 This strongly suggests that he will allow the Treasury Department's semi-annual foreign exchange review process to run its course (Diagram 1). On that time frame, the U.S. would issue a warning in the April report and then begin negotiations that legally should take a year. Of course, China does not qualify by the usual measures. Since 2015 it has been propping up its currency rather than suppressing it (Chart 2), and its current account surplus has dropped sharply from 10% to 2% of GDP over the past ten years (though still massive in absolute terms). Diagram 1Calling China A Currency Manipulator: The Process The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - Trump yanked the U.S. out of the major multilateral trade initiative of the Obama administration, which was an advanced trade deal that excluded China and primarily benefited smaller Chinese competitors like Vietnam and Malaysia. Though Trump acted unilaterally - and therefore cannot have gotten any real concessions from China in exchange for killing an "anti-China" trade deal - he avoided the frictions with China that would have resulted over the coming years from implementing the deal. Chart 1Will China Cut Imports From Here? Chart 2The 'Grand Champions' Of Currency Manipulation In addition, the Trump administration is already embroiled in domestic politics with a number of its early actions. Thus it would not surprise us if Trump - exactly like Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush - needed to pacify relations with China despite his early tough talk. Meanwhile President Xi wants stability even more than usual this year as the Communist Party holds its "midterm" five-year National Party Congress. We will return to the party congress in an upcoming report, but for now we will simply reiterate that stability means neither excessive stimulus nor excessive reform (Chart 3). Chinese policymakers could trigger unintended consequences with their financial tightening, but that's why we think they will be exceedingly cautious.8 If Trump does not try to sabotage this politically sensitive year, China should be relatively stable. Chart 3China Wants Stability, Not Speed, Ahead Of Five-Year Party Congress So have U.S.-China ties become bullish all of a sudden? No. At least, not yet. Consider the following: South China Sea still a powder keg - On both sides, the idea of excluding "access" to the sea is being openly discussed, if disavowed.9 While there is conceivably a path for both sides to de-escalate, it will take very tough negotiations, and we are not there yet. Trade fight hasn't even begun - Though previous presidents got sidetracked, Trump was the first to campaign aggressively on a protectionist, anti-China platform, and to put a team in place to pursue that platform.10 We think he will get tough. We also think he will endorse the House Republicans' plan of a Border Adjustment Tax - a tax on imports - which would hurt China most of all as the country with the biggest trade surplus with the U.S.11 Japan is proactive - Japan has virtually no domestic political constraints and has an incentive to play up security threats. Why? Because Prime Minister Abe wants a nationwide popular referendum on revising the constitution to legitimize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.12 And this is not even to mention that Taiwan and the Koreas are still major risks. Structurally, we still see Sino-U.S. tensions as the chief source of geopolitical risk and "Black Swan" events this year that could rattle markets in a very big way. Bottom Line: A modus vivendi between Trump and Xi is conceivable, but the U.S. and China are not out of the woods yet. II. What About The Neighbors? Short of the formidable "left-tail" risk of direct U.S.-China conflict, China's periphery is the chief battlefield and source of risk for investors. Asian EM economies have the most to risk from the reversal of the past decade's trade globalization (Chart 4). Investors also tend to underrate the fact that they are in the thick of the geopolitical risk arising from Sino-U.S. tensions and global "multipolarity" more broadly.13 A look across the region suggests that most Asian EM economies are shifting their policy to become more accommodative with China. This should reduce their geopolitical risk in the short term, though it is too soon to sound the "all clear." We remain strategically short EM stocks relative to DM. Within the EM space, we are bullish on Thailand, less so on the Philippines and Vietnam, and neutral-to-bearish on Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Chart 4De-Globalization Hurts Asia Pacific Most Of All Koreas - Here Comes The Sunshine Policy South Korea is at the center of the U.S.-China struggle as it faces a domestic political crisis, economic pressure from China, rising North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, and a likely clash with the new U.S. administration. First, the Constitutional Court must decide the fate of impeached President Park Geun-hye. The market has rallied since the ruling Saenuri Party turned against her in early December, paving the way for her December 9 impeachment in the assembly. However, the politics of the court makes her removal from office less likely than the market expects, especially if the court does not rule by March 13, when a second judge this year retires from the bench.14 If the impeachment falters, it will lock South Korea into greater political instability throughout the year, at least until the scheduled election on December 20. Chart 5Leftward Policy Shift In South Korea ... However, it is virtually impossible for the Saenuri Party candidate, Acting President Hwang Kyo-Anh, to win the election, despite his fairly strong polling (Chart 5). His party has been discredited and split, and there are now calls for his impeachment as he defends Park from further investigation. The leading contenders are all left-of-center. They are contending in a primary election over how to redistribute wealth, crack down on the Chaebol (corporate conglomerates), engage North Korea, and improve relations with China. These policies are receiving a tailwind because Korean society has seen the economic system shocked by the end of the debt supercycle in the United States and the slowdown in China. Moreover, inequality has been rising in Korea (Chart 6). As in neighboring Taiwanese elections last year, the election is shaping up to be a backlash against the pro-trade and globalization policies of the preceding decade. Korea's share of global exports has increased, and its tech companies are profitable, but the government has engaged in conservative fiscal policies, its workers are overworked and underpaid, and its social safety net is non-existent (Chart 7). Redistribution and reforming the Chaebol could bring serious benefits over the long run, but both will negatively affect corporate profits on the margin. Internationally, improving relations with North Korea and China will mean that the new South Korean government, in H2 of this year or H1 of next, could be on a collision course with the United States and especially Japan. We expect Korea to go its own way for a time, giving the impression globally that another American ally is "pivoting to China" (after the Philippines in 2016).15 While this may seem bullish for Korea, as it did for the Philippines due to the fact that China is a growing economy, Korean exports to the U.S. and Japan are still a significant portion of its total exports (Chart 8). Korea is also constrained by the fact that China is increasingly a trade competitor, and Korea's exports to China mainly consist of goods that China wants to make itself: high-end electronic manufacturing, cars, and car parts. Thus, China will welcome greater ties as it looks for substitutes for the increasingly protectionist West in acquiring technology and expertise, but Korea's new government will see rising fears of economic "absorption" as it attempts to improve access to Chinese markets. Chart 6... As Inequality Has Risen Sharply Chart 7Workers Want More Largesse Chart 8Korea's Balancing Act What are the market implications? South Korea is in a decent place in the short run. Global growth, exports, and corporate earnings are improving, and stock valuations have come down, especially relative to EM. Over the long run, however, we are turning bearish. Korean labor productivity is in a downtrend (Chart 9), its population is not growing, and there is no reservoir of young people left to tap. There are three basic options for securing future growth. First, Korea could become a net investor nation like Japan (Chart 10). However, it is not yet wealthy enough to do so, and needs to build the aforementioned social safety net. Second, South Korea could reunify with the North, which would alleviate its labor force problems, though the costs of reunification would be extreme (Chart 11). Chart 9Reforms On Hold Until New Government Sits Chart 10Korea's Japanese Dream Chart 11Reunification Would Increase Labor Force Third, it could continue on its current path of trying to secure large markets like the U.S. and China, while conducting a balancing act between them as geopolitical tensions rise. The problem right now is that the first two options are not ready and the balancing act is getting too hard, too soon. The South stands to suffer from both protectionism and multipolarity, i.e., being sandwiched between resurgent Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese tensions. Furthermore, the Trump administration has not yet decided whether its North Korea policy will be one of engagement, aggression, or continued neglect. Yet the U.S. defense and intelligence establishment's threat assessment is reaching a level that will cause greater public concern and more demand for action. Until Trump's policy is clear, South Korea's attempts to launch a new "Sunshine Policy" toward eventual reunification will be extremely vulnerable. Over time, North Korea is likely to become more of a black swan than the red herring it has been in the past (Chart 12). Chart 12North Korean Incidents: Mostly Red Herrings Bottom Line: Now is ostensibly a good entry point for Korean stocks relative to EM stocks, but we remain reluctant due to the political and geopolitical factors. Also, the path of least resistance for the Korean won is down, so we recommend going long THB/KRW, discussed further below. Taiwan - "One China" Or More? Our prediction that China-Taiwan relations would deteriorate dramatically, and that Taiwan could be one of five "Black Swans" of 2016, has essentially played out.16 The two sides cut off formal contact, Trump accepted a phone call from the Taiwanese president in a sharp break with U.S.-China convention, and the Taiwanese navy accidentally fired a missile toward the mainland during a drill on the Chinese Communist Party's 95th birthday on July 1. Despite the tensions, hard data coming out of Taiwan have been strong. Its export-oriented economy is buoyed by strong global growth. Both its equities and currency are the few bright spots in the EM universe and investors have been responding positively to the strong data (Chart 13). Yet Taiwan remains highly vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, as its economy is "too open," especially to China. China has imposed discrete economic sanctions, as we expected. The number of mainland tourists to Taiwan have dropped by 50% (Chart 14). This trend will continue, hurting consumer sentiment. While Trump has backed away from his threat to break the One China Policy, a move markets view as very reassuring, he cannot unsay his words and China will not forget them. Moreover, his administration will attempt to shore up the U.S.-Taiwan alliance in traditional ways, including with new arms sales that will provoke angrier responses than in the past from Beijing (Chart 15). Chart 13Investors Do Not Fear Independence Talk Yet Chart 14China's Silent Sanctions Chart 15Plenty More To Come Crucially, Taiwan's domestic politics are not a major constraint on its actions, which heightens the risks of a cross-strait "incident." The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in control at almost every level of government on the island. President Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP swept to power on a popular mandate to stall and roll back trade liberalization with China, which the public felt had gone too far under the previous Kuomintang government. Perhaps if Trump had never entered the picture, Taiwan and China would have found a new equilibrium in which Taiwan distanced itself while assuring the mainland it did not seek independence. Now, however, the odds of that solution are declining. Taipei may become overly aggressive if it believes Trump has its back, and this dynamic will ensure continuous Chinese pressures and sanctions, all negative for Taiwanese assets. Bottom Line: Despite the fact that Taiwan's economy has some bright spots (exports, capital formation), we are sticking with our "One China Policy" trade of going long Chinese equities / short Taiwanese and Hong Kong equities. BCA's China Investment Strategy agrees with this call and is shorting Taiwanese stocks relative to its mainland counterparts.17 We expect China to penalize these territories for expressing the desire for greater autonomy. We also suggest going short the Taiwanese dollar versus the Philippine peso, to be discussed further below. Thailand - The Junta's Persistence Is Bullish For most of the past fifteen years, the death of Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej, which occurred on October 13 of last year, was feared as a catalyst for a total breakdown of law and order due to the deep socio-political and regional division in Thai politics that has pitted an urban royalist faction against a rural populist faction. But the 2014 coup was intended to preempt the king's death and ensure that the royalist, pro-military faction held firm control over the country during the risky succession period. The market responded positively during the coup in 2014 and upon the king's death last year (Chart 16). We recommended going long Thai stocks and THB last October, in a joint report with BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy, and both trades are in the black.18 Chart 16Thailand: Investors Cheered The Succession Crisis The junta's strategy has been to root out the leaders of the populist movement and rewrite the constitution to legitimize its ability to intervene in the future. The new monarch has cooperated with the military so far, upholding the status quo, but if at any point he favors the populists to the detriment of the military, political uncertainty will spike from its current historically low levels (Chart 17). The junta is fully in charge for the time being. It has pushed back elections to February 2018 or later, delaying the re-introduction of political instability into the Thai market. It is also surging public spending and transfers to the rural poor to ensure social stability. Historically, strong public capital investment and global exports coincide with strong Thai manufacturing output (Chart 18). Favorable domestic and external macro environments should be bullish for Thai equities, creating a near-term buying opportunity in the Thai market. Chart 17Junta Keeps A Lid On Politics... Chart 18... And Buys Friends With Public Money Thailand is distant from China's quarrels with its neighbors over the South China Sea. It was the first of the U.S. allies to hedge against President Obama's pivot and seek better relations with China instead, a strategy that has paid off. Thailand, like many regional actors, may be forced to choose between China and U.S. at some point, but for now it enjoys the best of both worlds. With a fundamentally strong macro-backdrop, including a large current account surplus of 12% of GDP, we are bullish on Thai assets relative to EM. Bottom Line: Thailand is the most attractive Asian EM economy right now from an investment-oriented geopolitical point of view. It is not too late to go long THB/KRW or long Thai stocks relative to EM. Philippines - The War On Drugs Is A Headwind The Philippines continues to display strong macro-fundamentals and market momentum in the EM universe. However, domestic political risks are significant and prevent us from returning to an overweight stance relative to EM.19 The inauguration of populist southerner Rodrigo Duterte as president of the Philippines in July of last year led the country into a bloodbath that has since claimed over 7,000 lives in a "war on drugs." Only recently has it shown any sign of abating, and it is not clear that it will. The political backlash is gradually building. Duterte's policy preferences are left-leaning and mark a partial reversal of the pro-market, reform orientation of the preceding Aquino government.20 As a result, foreign investment has dropped off from its sharp rise, though it remains elevated (Chart 19). The Philippines may also fall victim to its own success. Due to the booming economy under the Aquino presidency, bank loans and deposits have enjoyed strong growth in recent years. However, the loan-to-deposit ratio is getting overextended and the economy is showing signs of heating up with inflation creeping above 2% in 2016 (Chart 20). Populist policies and the advanced cyclical expansion may add more heat. Thus, it is becoming more likely that monetary policy will tighten as the economy moves into the advanced stage of its cyclical expansion. Duterte could create a problem if at any point he decides to interfere with the central bank or technocratic management of the economy more broadly. In terms of geopolitical risk, Duterte is engineering a pivot away from the United States toward Russia and China, aggravating relations with the former, its chief ally (Chart 21). As relations with China improve, they will bring some investment in infrastructure and a calming of the near seas. Chart 19Duterte Marked The Top Chart 20Credit Is Strong, Inflation Creeping Back Chart 21Duterte's 'Pivot' To Asia Ultimately, however, we view this calming as temporary, since China's assertiveness is a long-term phenomenon. We also think that the fundamental U.S.-Philippine alliance will survive any major disagreements of the Duterte era. Duterte is constrained by his weakness in the Philippine Senate and the popularity of the United States among Filipinos, which is among the highest in the world. In essence, the public is not anti-American but "anti-colonialist" - many feared that the U.S. "Pivot to Asia" of the Obama and Aquino administrations would put the Philippines into a subordinate "colonial" role highly vulnerable to Chinese aggression. Like other U.S. allies in the region, the Philippines wants to be a partner of the U.S. and not just a naval base. Thus, for now, we see the Philippines in a gray area of frictions with the U.S. yet disappointing hopes with regard to China. Until Duterte removes the headline risk to internal stability from his belligerent law and order policies - and compromises on his more anti-market economic stances - we are at best open to tactical possibilities. Bottom Line: Considering its strong macro-fundamentals, advanced cyclical expansion, and politically driven uncertainty, we are only willing to entertain short-term, tactical opportunities in the Philippines. Now is a decent entry point for equities relative to EM. Also, our colleagues at BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy point out that the peso is currently trading at a 10% discount.21 We recommend going long the peso versus the Taiwanese dollar to capitalize on the dynamics outlined for both countries above. Indonesia - A Dream Deferred Indonesia outperformed our expectations throughout 2016.22 President Joko Widodo ("Jokowi") managed to corral his party behind him despite an internal leadership struggle. And the large bureaucratic party, Golkar, joined his coalition in parliament, creating a strong legislative majority. These were our two preconditions for a more effective government; Jokowi has also found allies within the military, as we surmised. As a result, he managed to make some progress on his tax-raising, union-restraining, and infrastructure-building initiatives. Nevertheless, the market has sniffed out the difference between a pro-reform government and the enormous difficulties of pulling off reform in Indonesia. Long-term investment has fallen even as short-term portfolio investment has rallied on the back of the EM reflation trade (Chart 22). While Jokowi reduced the size of costly domestic fuel subsidies in his first year, it was easy to do so amid the oil-price collapse in 2014. Since then, Indonesian retail gasoline prices have remained subdued, indicating that subsidies are still significant. As the global oil prices continue increasing, so will the subsidy (Chart 23), adding to the country's budget deficit. Jokowi also put forth minimum-wage reforms in 2015, introducing a formula which requires the minimum wage to be adjusted every year based on inflation and economic growth (rather than ad hoc negotiations with local unions and governments). Predictably, wages have skyrocketed since the indexing policy was implemented, which is negative for profit margins (Chart 24). Chart 22Investors Skeptical Of Jokowi's Reforms Chart 23Fuel Subsidies Still In Effect Chart 24No Wage Rationalization Yet Indonesia is on the outskirts of China's claims in the South China Sea and has a domestically driven economy that should suffer less than that of its neighbors in a context of de-globalization. In that sense, we are inclined to view it favorably. However, its currency is at risk from twin deficits - current account and budgetary reforms have stalled, and the credit impulse is weakening. If Jokowi's favored candidate wins the heavily contested gubernatorial run-off in Jakarta in April, it will not be very bullish, but a loss would be bearish for Jokowi's reform agenda ahead of the 2019 elections. Bottom Line: We are still short Indonesia within the EM space - its underperformance since the second half of last year can persist. Vietnam - No American Guarantee Vietnam is highly vulnerable to a geopolitical conflict with China which would impact markets. Unlike the Philippines and Thailand, it cannot count on an underlying bedrock of American defense to anchor its pivot toward China - and yet, it has the greatest historical and territorial conflicts with China of all the Southeast Asian states. Chart 25Fighting In The Teeth Of The Dragon Nevertheless, in the short term, geopolitical risks are abating. Relations have improved since a recent low point in 2014.23 And Vietnamese leaders, having invested heavily in the TPP as the trade pact's biggest potential beneficiaries, are trying to make amends with China now that it is canceled. Thus, we remain long Vietnamese equities relative to EM. This is mostly due to the country's strong domestic demand and export competitiveness (Chart 25), attractive environment for foreign investment, and ability to capitalize on diversification away from China. The country's reforms are not perfect, but it has at least recognized NPLs and begun privatizing some SOEs. Bottom Line: We are sticking with long Vietnamese equities versus EM, though downgrading it to a tactical trade due to our wariness of a turn for the worse in China relations or the broader trade environment. Malaysia - Going To The Pawnshop Malaysia, with Vietnam, was to be the top beneficiary of the TPP. It, too, has lost greater access to the U.S. market that the deal would have provided and must now make amends with China. The latter process has already begun, as Malaysia's government has turned to China for a $33 billion deal in exchange for energy assets and valuable land in the state of Johor. The general election of 2013 and the economic slowdown have catalyzed domestic political divisions, especially ethnic and religious ones, igniting a drastic push over the past two years to have Prime Minister Najib Razak ousted for his alleged embezzlement of funds from the state-owned 1MDB corporation. Najib chose to crack down on the opposition and ride out the storm, which he has managed so far, causing unprecedented political instability. Najib's decision to sell land to the Chinese will not sit well with much of the Malay population. Many will see it as undignified; and historically, there is much animosity toward the local Chinese. Najib already faces an intense political struggle due to the exodus of high-ranking politicians from his ruling United Malay National Organization (UMNO). Former strongman leader Mahathir Mohammad and ex-Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin are leading the defectors to form a new Malay party that will pose a serious challenge in the 2018 elections. Recent flirtation between the ruling UMNO and the Islamist Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS) also injected new uncertainty into the already turbulent domestic political environment. In essence, the one-party state that investors once knew (and loved) is forming new factions that will contest the upcoming elections with abandon. Chart 26Growth Slowing, Credit Drying Up This struggle over the 2018 election promises to be emphatically unfriendly to investors. And until Najib gets a new mandate, he can do very little to arrest the economic breakdown. As long as the support and continuity of Najib's policies are in question, it is difficult to take a directional view of Malaysian assets. A victorious UMNO does not mean that investors should be bullish, but it will resolve the question of "Who is in charge?" At that point, we can reassess the market attractiveness based on the higher "certainty" of the policy preferences of the country. Meanwhile the constraints to Malaysia's economy are clear from a host of weak data, from domestic trade to the property market to the current account and the currency, along with a rise in NPLs that will undermine the inadequately provisioned banks' willingness to lend (Chart 26). While palm oil and petroleum prices have recovered, which is positive for Malaysian markets, this is not enough to outweigh the negative factors. Bottom Line: We are bearish on Malaysian assets and currency. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Climbing The Wall Of Worry In Europe," dated February 15, 2017, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "A Fat-Tails World," dated February 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Looming Conflict In The South China Sea," dated May 29, 2012, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Graham Allison, "The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?" The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, available at www.theatlantic.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Underestimating Sino-American Tensions," dated November 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening," dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 9 In the short time since Trump's and Xi's phone call, the U.S. has announced that it intends to intensify the Freedom of Navigation Operations around the rocks in the South China Sea to assert its rights of navigation and overflight. Meanwhile Chinese lawmakers have revealed that they want to pass a new maritime law by 2020 that would encourage maritime security forces to bar foreign ships from passing through Chinese "sovereign" waters if they are ill-intentioned. 10 Trump's Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin was only just confirmed by the Senate and could not have taken any significant action yet. His appointees, notably Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, National Trade Council chief Peter Navarro, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, are China hawks. If not currency, Trump's team will rotate the negotiations to focus on China's capital controls and failure to liberalize the capital account, its lackadaisical cuts to industrial overcapacity, and the negative business environment for U.S. firms. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax?" dated February 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com, and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 12 The first nationwide evacuation drill in the event of a North Korean missile attack will take place sometime in March of this year. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Bringing the total number of judges from nine to seven, and thus reducing the threshold for a vote in favor of retaining Park in office from four to two, for constitutional reasons. All but one of the judges were appointed by Park or her party's predecessor. 15 For instance, if the new administration reverses the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, it will provoke a crisis with the U.S., but if it does not, China will continue its underhanded economic sanctions on the South, and the new South Korean president's North Korean policy will be stillborn. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, and "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Taiwan's 'Trump' Risk," dated February 2, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see "Thailand: Upgrade Stocks To Overweight And Go Long THB Versus KRW," in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 20 For instance, he is imposing controls on the mining sector that will scare away investors, in an echo of Indonesia's mining fiasco implemented since 2013, and he is working on eliminating a "contract worker" system that enables employers to avoid the costs of full-time hiring. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models," dated February 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Stick To Long Modi / Short Jokowi," dated November 23, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Vietnam has moved toward better crisis management with China since the HYSY-981 incident in 2014, when a clash broke out over a mobile Chinese oil rig in the South China Sea. Significantly, the Vietnamese Communist Party's leaders removed former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, the highest-ranked China hawk and pro-market reformer on the Politburo, in the January 2016 leadership reshuffle.

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of February 28, 2017. The model has maintained its large overweight in the U.S. Within the non-U.S. level 2 model, Spain and Italy weights have been increased at the expense of Japan and Switzerland. Japan and U.K. remain the two largest underweight countries. (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, both the level 1 and level 2 models outperformed their respective benchmarks in February, resulting in a 39 bps outperformance of the aggregate model vs. the MSCI World. Since inception, the GAA model has outperformed its benchmark by 30 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of February 28, 2017. The momentum component has shifted Consumer Discretionary from overweight to underweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

How Long Is The Sweet Spot? Table 1Recommended Allocation The sweet spot on a baseball bat, scientists find,1 is the small area about two inches (5 cm) long, some six inches from the tip. The sweet spot for global risk assets may not be much bigger. The 22% rise in global equities since February last year has been driven by a "goldilocks" combination of recovering economic activity, quiescent inflation, and still-accommodative monetary policy. But, after such a strong rally, markets must walk a fine line - no slowdown in growth and no surprising tightening of monetary conditions - for prices to rise further. Our analysis suggests that they can, but the risk of a correction is rising. A lot of the better news of the past year has already been priced in. The price-to-sales ratio for U.S. stocks is close to an all-time high, and even the plain-vanilla 12-month forward PE ratio has reached 17.5x, the highest since 2002 (Chart 1). Volatility has fallen to a low level, with the VIX not rising above 12 over the past month, and the S&P500 index going 98 days without a one-day decline of 1% or more, the longest such period since 1995 (Chart 2). To a degree, this is justified by the recent strong pick-up in global growth. Sentiment indicators have accelerated since the election of President Trump, and even hard data is now showing the first signs of recovery (Chart 3) with, for example, U.S. retail sales rising 5.6% year-on-year in January, and core durable goods orders starting to follow the rise in companies' capex intentions (Chart 4). Similar positive economic surprises are visible in Europe, Japan, China and elsewhere. The problem is that further upside surprises are likely to be limited. Regional Fed NowCast surveys for Q1 real GDP growth are already at 2.5-3.1%. Consensus forecasts for S&P500 earnings growth in 2017 look about right at 10.5% but, with a stronger dollar and rising wages, are unlikely to be beaten. Chart 1Historically High Valuations Chart 2Time For A Pull-Back? Chart 3Hard Data Starting To Recover Too Chart 4Orders To Follow Capex Intentions Headline inflation has picked up (to 2.5% in the U.S. and 1.9% in the Eurozone), mainly because of higher oil prices, but core inflation remains sufficiently under control that central banks don't need to slam on the brakes. The rise in unit labor costs in the U.S. suggests that core PCE inflation will gradually move up to 2% during the year (Chart 5). The latest FOMC minutes revealed that members want a further rate hike "fairly soon", and BCA expects the Fed to raise three times this year (to which the futures market ascribes only a 36% probability). But Fed policy remains very accommodative (Chart 6), the European Central Bank is unlikely to end its asset purchases soon on account of political and banking system concerns, and the Bank of Japan remains committed to its 0% yield target for 10-year government bonds until inflation is well above 2%. Absent a powerful fiscal stimulus in the U.S. or a move by the "hard money" advocates in the Trump administration to change the Fed's modus operandi, we think its unlikely that a tightening of monetary policy will drag down asset prices. Chart 5Labor Costs Putting Pressure On Prices Chart 6Fed Policy Still Accomodative Risks certainly abound. The Trump administration could start a trade war with China. Its proposals for corporate and personal tax cuts could disappoint both in terms of their details and the timing of Congress's passing them. European politics remain a concern, with the probability of Marine Le Pen becoming French President increasing recently (though it remains small). But risk markets tend to rise on a wall of worry. Investor sentiment is not particularly bullish at the moment, with the bull/bear ratio among individual investors barely above 1 (Chart 7) and flows into equity funds in recent months not reversing the outflows of last year (Chart 8). Chart 7Retail Investors Not So Bullish Chart 8Equity Flows Are Still Tepid After a year of a strong cyclical risk-on rally, progress from now on will get tougher. A short-term change of direction is quite possible (and has already happened in some assets, with the yen moving back to 112 and the 10-year Treasury yield to 2.3%). But we expect economic growth to remain robust this year - with U.S. real GDP growth likely to come in close to 3% on the back of surprises in capex - which will push the 10-year Treasury yield above 3% by year-end. In this environment, we continue to favor equities over bonds, and maintain our pro-risk tilt in equity sectors, credit and alternative assets. Equities: U.S. equities have outperformed Eurozone ones by 5% year-to-date, mainly because of worries about Europe's political risk and the fragility of its banking sector. Though we think the political risks are overstated (except perhaps in Italy), we continue to prefer the U.S. in common currency terms because of our expectations of further dollar appreciation and because the lower volatility of the U.S. helps reduce the beta of our recommended portfolio. Emerging markets have outperformed global equities by 3% YTD, mainly on the back of stronger commodities prices. But we remain underweight EM because of the risks from a stronger dollar and rising global rates, concerns about protectionism and debt refinancing, and because of the likelihood that China's rebound will run out of steam over the next 12 months (Chart 9). Fixed Income: Rates have pulled back recently: long-term institutional investors have begun to find attraction in the long end of the U.S. Treasury yield curve at 2-3%, though speculative investors remain short (Chart 10). With the Fed likely to raise rates three times this year, inflation expectations to pick up further, and nominal GDP growth in the U.S. to reach 4.5-5%, we expect the U.S. 10-year yield to rise above 3%. We therefore remain underweight duration and prefer inflation-linked over nominal bonds. In the improving economic environment, we continue to like credit, but find valuations more attractive for investment-grade bonds than for high-yield. Currencies: Dollar appreciation has been on hold since January but we think the long-term trend remains in place because of the probable direction of relative interest rates. Neither Japan nor the Eurozone is likely to move towards monetary tightening over the next 12 months. Even if the Trump administration were to want a weaker dollar, a few tweets would not be enough to offset monetary fundamentals. And, while it is true that sentiment towards the dollar is already bullish, this has historically not precluded further appreciation, for example in the late 1990s (Chart 11). Chart 9EM Equities Correlated With China PMIs Chart 10Divergent Views On U.S. Bonds Chart 11Optimism Need Not Stop USD's Rise Commodities: The oil price remains close to its equilibrium level at around $55 a barrel, with the OPEC agreement largely holding but being offset by a production increase from the U.S. shale drillers, whose rig count has doubled since last May. We are neutral on industrial commodities: Chinese demand resulting from last year's reflationary policy is likely to be offset by the stronger dollar. Gold remains a useful portfolio hedge in a world of elevated geopolitical worries and inflation tail-risk, but is also negatively correlated with the U.S. dollar. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see, for example, "The Sweetspot of a Hollow Baseball or Softball Bat", by Daniel A. Russell, Pennsylvania State University, available at www.acs.psu.edu/drussell/bats/sweetspot.html Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Data processing stocks have been in a consolidation phase, but this increasingly appears to be a trend change rather than a continuation pattern. The economic backdrop is no longer conducive to capital inflows. Data processing companies enjoy hefty recurring revenue but have lower economic leverage than much of the corporate sector. As such, when growth and inflation expectations climb, capital inflows tend to wane (inflation expectations shown inverted, middle panel). Meanwhile, top-line growth has been in a funk of late, even though companies have made a significant investment to boost marketing, as evidenced by the surge in SG&A, but so far, this has sapped margins more than stoked revenue. Importantly, Visa has recently provided a fee break to retailers, who are increasingly banding together to put pressure on the industry to lower fees. Amidst increased competition on the payments processing side, this trend is likely to be structural and put downward pressure on profit margins. We shifted from overweight to underweight in yesterday's Weekly Report. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: V, MA, PYPL, ADP, FIS, FISV, PAYX, ADS, GPN, WU, TSS.

Since late last year, the market has adopted a more defensive than cyclically-oriented tenor. Defensive sectors have troughed at extremely attractive relative valuation levels, based on our models. Conversely, cyclical sectors have rolled over, meeting resistance at very demanding valuation levels of more than two standard deviations above normal. These nascent trend changes have developed even though economic data have generally surprised on the upside. Indeed, the global PMI has been strong, but any hint of a reversal would provide a catalyst for a full-fledged recovery in defensive vs. cyclical stocks. The contraction in U.S. bank lending growth may be heralding slippage in hard economic data (bottom panel), to the benefit of defensive vs. cyclical sectors. Keep in mind that the market is priced for non-inflationary growth nirvana, such that even modest economic disappointment could short circuit the buying binge. The yield curve has stopped widening and financial conditions are no longer easing, providing additional confirmation that the defensive vs. cyclical equity sector trough is more likely a budding trend change than a pause in a downtrend. The bottom line is that the character of the market advance is quietly changing, underscoring that investors should maintain a largely defensive portfolio structure. Please see yesterday's Weekly Report for more details.

Highlights U.S. Treasuries - Fair Value: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield now appears 7 bps expensive on our model. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration and continue to monitor bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar for signals about the breadth of the global economic recovery. U.S. Treasuries - Technicals: Large net short bond positions are in the process of being unwound. A more balanced technical picture removes one of the key impediments to the bond bear market and possibly sets the stage for another leg higher in yields. China: Chinese monetary policy that is sufficiently accommodative to spur economic growth, but not so accommodative that it causes undue strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, is the most bearish outcome for U.S. bonds. Feature Bonds rallied strongly late last week without any obvious economic catalyst. Now that the dust has settled we find the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield trading at 2.34%, 7 bps below our estimate of fair value (Chart 1). Chart 12-Factor U.S. Treasury Model Updating Our U.S. Treasury Model That fair value estimate comes from our 2-factor U.S. Treasury model, based on the Global Manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. In our view, these two factors capture the most important macro drivers of U.S. bond yields. Stronger global growth, as proxied by the Global Manufacturing PMI, tends to push yields higher. However, to the extent that stronger global growth coincides with an appreciating U.S. dollar, the amount of monetary tightening that needs to be achieved through higher interest rates is limited. This caps the upside in long-dated U.S. bond yields. Put differently, it is not just the magnitude of the global growth impulse that matters for U.S. bond yields, but also the breadth of the recovery. The more broad-based the recovery, the less upward pressure on the U.S. dollar and the higher U.S. Treasury yields can rise. Last week we received Flash PMI estimates for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan that we can use to estimate the Global PMI for February. According to the Flash estimates, the U.S. PMI declined slightly in February, but this was more than offset by accelerations in both the Eurozone and Japan. Altogether, these three regions account for 48% of the Global PMI and, assuming PMIs in all other countries remain flat, we can calculate that the global PMI will nudge higher from 52.7 in January to 52.9 in February. Of course one month of data is much less important than the longer run trend. Taking a step back, we see that manufacturing PMIs are trending higher in every major economic bloc (Chart 2). Our diffusion index also shows that the global manufacturing recovery is more broadly based than at any time during the past three years (Chart 2, top panel). The synchronized nature of the recovery is also reflected in the behavior of the U.S. dollar, which has not appreciated during the past month even though Fed rate hike expectations have shifted up (Chart 3). The message from the survey of bullish dollar sentiment - the series that is included in our Treasury model - is more mixed. Bullish dollar sentiment plunged from elevated levels in January but has recovered somewhat during the past few weeks (Chart 3, panel 2). Meantime, U.S. Treasury spreads over German bunds and JGBs are also sending mixed signals. Short-maturity spreads have widened alongside increased U.S. rate hike expectations, while long-maturity spreads have been well contained (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). Chart 2Synchronized Global Recovery Chart 3Keep Watching The Dollar Global bond investors should closely monitor trends in the U.S. dollar, bullish sentiment toward the dollar, and U.S. Treasury spreads over bunds and JGBs. Each of these indicators provides information about the breadth of the economic recovery. If Fed rate hike expectations remain firm, or even move higher, and that trend is not matched by a stronger dollar or wider Treasury spreads, then that would signal that the global recovery is becoming more synchronized, suggesting additional upside for bond yields. Bottom Line: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield now appears 7 bps expensive on our model. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration and continue to monitor bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar for signals about the breadth of the global economic recovery. Chart 4Positioning Becoming More Balanced Treasury Technicals Less Stretched This brings us back to last Friday's bond rally. Puzzlingly, the 2-year U.S. Treasury yield declined 6 bps and the 10-year yield fell 7 bps on a day without any significant economic or political news. In fact, Treasury yields managed to decline even though rate hike expectations embedded in the overnight index swap curve were unchanged and the probability of a March rate hike priced into fed funds futures actually increased from 31% to 33%! The unusual disconnect between Treasury yields and rate hike expectations is probably related to the expiry of the March bond futures contracts. Last week, traders had to decide whether to let their March contracts expire or roll them over into June. Positioning data show that speculators carried large net short positions into last week (Chart 4), so it is possible that it was the capitulation of these large short positions that drove yields lower on Friday. More timely data from the skew between payer and receiver swaptions show that swaption investors are no longer betting on rising rates (Chart 4, panel 4). Net speculative positions in Treasury futures could follow suit when the data are released later this week. In addition, our composite sentiment indicator has just recently ticked back above the zero line (Chart 4, panel 2). Bottom Line: Large net short bond positions are in the process of being unwound. A more balanced technical picture removes one of the key impediments to the bond bear market, and possibly sets the stage for another leg higher in yields. China's Bond Market Balancing Act Chart 5Easy Money Spurs Chinese Growth In the context of the 2-factor U.S. Treasury model presented above, there are two reasons why developments in China matter for U.S. bond markets. The first is that China accounts for the single largest weighting in the Global Manufacturing PMI, so stronger growth in the Chinese manufacturing sector will pressure bond yields higher, all else equal. But the Chinese economy can also influence U.S. bond yields if changes in the RMB exert meaningful influence on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. For example, faster Chinese growth pressures U.S. bond yields higher, but some of that upward pressure could be mitigated if that strong growth is engineered through a rapid depreciation of the RMB relative to the U.S. dollar. On the first point, China's manufacturing PMI is in a clear uptrend although the recent contraction in the government's fiscal expenditures is a potential warning sign (Chart 5). Our China Investment Strategy service views the fiscal contraction as a risk but still expects the Chinese economy to remain buoyant this year.1 This is because Chinese monetary conditions remain supportive of further gains in the manufacturing sector, and the rebound in China's PMI that began early last year is more tied to easing monetary conditions - a weaker exchange rate and falling real interest rates - than to increased fiscal spending. On the second point, while a weaker trade-weighted RMB has helped spur the recovery in Chinese manufacturing, the impulse from a weaker RMB has so far not been potent enough to move the needle on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar (Chart 6). From the perspective of U.S. fixed income markets a continuation of this trend would be the most bond-bearish outcome. Chinese monetary policy remains easy enough to spur economic growth but not so easy that it causes the U.S. dollar to spike. For the time being at least, China has been actively selling Treasuries in order to mitigate the extent of its currency depreciation (Chart 7). If China were to suddenly stop selling Treasuries, then the RMB would likely depreciate sharply. This would actually have an ambiguous impact on U.S. Treasury yields since it would probably lead to both a stronger U.S. dollar and faster global growth. Chart 6USD So Far Not Impacted By RMB Chart 7China Is A Treasury Seller More likely, however, is that China will continue to manage the gradual depreciation of its currency unless it is forced to take more dramatic action in the face of a negative growth shock. Our China Investment Strategy team notes that the annual People's Congress in early March should offer some important clues about the Chinese government's growth priorities and policy direction going forward. Bottom Line: Chinese monetary policy that is sufficiently accommodative to spur economic growth, but not so accommodative that it causes undue strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, is the most bearish outcome for U.S. bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening", dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Special Report

Feature Recently we have received a number of client questions about the Fed's balance sheet. When will the Fed start to shrink its balance sheet (if at all)? If the Fed does decide to shrink its balance sheet, how long will that process take? How will the Fed control interest rates in the years ahead? And most importantly, how will these decisions impact financial markets? To answer these questions, this week we are sending you a Special Report titled "Cleaning Up After The 100-Year Flood" that was first published on June 10, 2014. This report explains how monetary policy is conducted at an operational level, and also how the dramatic expansion of the Fed's balance sheet forced the Fed to modify its approach. But first, we have some additional thoughts on how the Fed's balance sheet is likely to evolve during the next few years. The Fed's Stated Plan The most up-to-date guidance we have received about the Fed's balance sheet plans comes from Janet Yellen's recent Congressional testimony: The FOMC has annunciated that its longer run goal is to shrink our balance sheet to levels consistent with the efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy. And while our system evolves and I can't put a number on that, I would anticipate a balance sheet that's substantially smaller than at the current time. In addition, we would like our balance sheet to again be primarily Treasury securities, whereas as you pointed out, we have substantial holdings of mortgage-backed securities. From this, and similar statements from other Fed officials, we conclude that the Fed will allow its balance sheet to shrink once the fed funds rate is somewhere in the range of 1% to 1.5%.1 Surveys also show that the median primary dealer expects the Fed will change its balance sheet policy when the target fed funds rate is 1.38%. As such, and under reasonable assumptions for the pace of rate hikes, we think it is very likely that the Fed will start to let its balance sheet shrink sometime in 2018. MBS First, Treasuries Maybe Later Yellen's statement to Congress also makes clear that the Fed would be more comfortable with a balance sheet that consists entirely of Treasury securities. For this reason, the central bank will start by simply ceasing the reinvestment of its Agency bond and MBS portfolios. At least initially, the Fed will continue to reinvest the proceeds from its maturing Treasury portfolio. Yellen also left open the possibility that reinvestment could be "tapered" rather than just halted altogether. While this is possible, and in fact 70% of primary dealers think that reinvestments will be phased out over time while only 14% think they will be ceased all at once, it seems to us like a needless complication. We expect that reinvestments of Agency bonds and MBS will end all at once sometime in 2018. As for the Fed's holdings of Treasury securities, it is much less clear whether the Fed will allow these balances to run down. The accompanying Special Report describes in detail the differences between the Fed's pre-crisis mode of operation, when bank reserves were scarce, and the Fed's current mode of operation with large bank reserve balances. As of now, the Fed has stated that it intends to eventually drain bank reserves from the system and return to its pre-crisis mode of operation, but there are several possible advantages to running a system with an outsized Fed balance sheet and large bank reserve balances. Chart 1Reserves Can Be Drained Fairly Quickly None other than Ben Bernanke pointed out a few of those reasons in a blog post last fall.2 In our view, the most compelling is that regulatory changes have increased private sector demand for safe, short-maturity, liquid assets in recent years. If the Treasury department is unwilling to supply T-bills in sufficient numbers, then the Fed can supply safe, short-maturity, liquid assets to the market by purchasing long-maturity Treasury securities and replacing them with bank reserves. Of course, we take the Fed at its word when it says that it would like to eventually drain excess bank reserves from the system. But even in that case, the steady growth of currency in circulation means that bank reserves will decline over time even if the Fed keeps the asset side of its balance sheet flat. For example, Chart 1 shows what would happen to bank reserves if the amount of currency in circulation grows at a conservative 5% per year pace, and if the Fed decides to allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off at the beginning of next year while keeping its Treasury portfolio flat. We assume that MBS runs off the Fed's balance sheet at a pace of $15 billion per month, slightly below the recent pace of MBS reinvestment. During the past three years, the Fed has reinvested between $20bn and $40bn MBS each month with an average monthly reinvestment of $32bn. In this scenario, outstanding bank reserves would decline to zero by the end of 2025. At that point the Fed would have to start adding to its Treasury holdings just to keep pace with the amount of currency in circulation. Bottom Line: While it is very likely that the Fed will allow its Agency bond and MBS portfolios to run off starting in 2018, it is much more uncertain whether it will ever cease the reinvestment of its Treasury holdings. If the Fed does allow its Treasury holdings to run down as well, it will have to start buying Treasuries again before 2025. Investment Implications Treasuries As our U.S. Bond Strategy service has written several times,3 considered in isolation it is unlikely that any decision by the Fed to allow its Treasury holdings to run off will have much of on an impact on the Treasury curve. To see why, we need to consider the process by which the Fed currently rolls over maturing Treasury securities at auction. At the moment, balances of matured Treasury securities are added to upcoming note/bond auctions as non-competitive bids. In other words, as Treasury securities mature the Fed buys an equal amount at upcoming Treasury auctions. If the Fed were to cease this reinvestment, that amount would need to be added to the competitive portion of the auctions and would greatly increase the gross issuance of Treasury debt to the public. For a sense of scale, we calculate that Treasury issuance to the public would need to increase by $426bn in 2018 and $378bn in 2019 if the Fed were to cease the reinvestment of its portfolio at the end of this year (Chart 2). However, the fact that this process is intermediated by the Treasury department means we also have to consider potential changes to fiscal policy and the U.S. government's financing mix. For instance, since running down the Fed's Treasury portfolio would also reduce the amount of bank reserves in the system, it is very likely that the Treasury department would seek to increase issuance of T-bills to compensate for the banking sector's loss of safe, short-maturity liquid assets. At present, bill supply as a percent of total Treasury debt is near a multi-decade low (Chart 3) and any increase in T-bill issuance would limit the impact of Fed balance sheet run-off on long-dated Treasury yields. Chart 2Fed Runoff Will Increase Issuance To Public... Chart 3... But Mostly Through T-Bills Bottom Line: When forecasting Treasury issuance and any potential impact on yields we must consider both the Fed's balance sheet and fiscal policy together. In our view, whatever the government's financing requirement in the years ahead, a considerable portion will be met through increased T-bill issuance, limiting the impact on long-dated Treasury yields. Mortgage-Backed Securities As our U.S. Bond Strategy service has recently written,4 the unwinding of the Fed's MBS portfolio poses a considerable threat to MBS spreads for two reasons. First, the transfer of MBS from the Fed to the private sector will put upward pressure on implied volatility. While private investors often hedge their MBS positions by purchasing volatility, the Fed has no incentive to do so. It follows that by removing a large stock of MBS from private hands the Fed has also removed a large source of demand for volatility. When this supply is re-introduced into the market, demand for volatility will increase pressuring MBS spreads wider (Chart 4). The second reason relates more directly to the supply and demand balance for MBS. In years when net MBS issuance (adjusted for Fed purchases) has been negative, excess MBS returns have tended to be positive (Chart 5). Further, while negative net MBS issuance (adjusted for Fed purchases) has been the norm since Fed asset purchases began in 2009 (Chart 6), this state of affairs will change once the Fed starts to unwind its MBS portfolio. Chart 4MBS Spreads Are##br## Linked To Vol Chart 5Annual MBS Excess Returns##br## Vs. Net Supply Since 1989 Chart 6Adjusted Net Issuance Will ##br##Turn Positive In 2018 Bottom Line: The unwinding of the Fed's MBS portfolio will pressure MBS spreads wider through increased supply and increased demand for volatility. Note: Please see the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, titled "Cleaning Up After The 100-Year Flood", dated June 10, 2014 available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 In a Q&A from June 2015 New York Fed President William Dudley floated 1% to 1.5% as a potentially reasonable range for the fed funds rate before the Fed considers changing its balance sheet policy. https://mninews.marketnews.com/content/feds-dudley-qa-markets-should-not-be-surprised-liftoff 2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/09/02/should-the-fed-keep-its-balance-sheet-large/ 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Time To Cut Duration?", dated January 17, 2017. And also U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Currencies: The Tail Wagging The Dog", dated August 18, 2015. Both available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Road To Higher Vol Is Paved With Uncertainty", dated February 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Cleaning Up After The 100-Year Flood In this Special Report we consider how the dramatic expansion of the Fed's balance sheet has influenced the conduct of monetary policy from an operational perspective. Massive reserve balances have made the federal funds market largely irrelevant, but the Fed's new overnight reverse repo facility will allow it to tighten policy when the time comes. The Fed will likely provide new guidelines for its exit strategy before the end of 2014. We anticipate how these guidelines will be modified to reflect the challenges of implementing monetary policy with a large balance sheet. Large reserve balances do not pose an inflation threat, but they do have implications for the state of banking sector regulation and the policy tools at the Fed's disposal. Chart 1What Are Implications Of Fed's Epic Intervention? Feature The Federal Reserve resorted to a number of very aggressive and extraordinary monetary policy measures to deal with the failure of Lehman Brothers, the subsequent financial crisis and Great Recession. The result has been a flood of liquidity that has supported asset prices and spurred the recovery, yet has left the central bank balance sheet exponentially larger than at any time in its 100-year history (Chart 1). In formulating its exit strategy the Fed will finally be forced to grapple publicly with the aftereffects of its dramatic intervention in financial markets, which has complicated how monetary policy is implemented at an operational level. This Special Report is divided into three sections. In the first section, Before The Storm, we provide some background on the process of money creation and explain how the Fed implemented monetary policy prior to the Great Recession. In the second section, The Flood Waters Rise, we consider how monetary policy is implemented today in light of the dramatic expansion of the Fed's balance sheet. In the third section, Building On Higher Ground, we examine the way forward for the Fed, describe how the exit is likely to be managed and discuss the potential problems with this approach. 1. Before The Storm Prior to the financial crisis, the Fed expressed the stance of monetary policy via a target for the federal funds rate. The federal funds rate is the rate at which banks borrow and lend reserves to each other in the overnight market. The Fed conducted its day-to-day operations with the goal of supplying all the reserves demanded by the banking sector, while steering the fed funds rate toward its target. To understand how this was accomplished, we first require some background on the money creation process. Money Creation: More Than Just A Printing Press Contrary to what many believe, the process of money creation does not begin at the Federal Reserve. Rather, it begins in the banking system at the point of loan origination and ends at the Fed (Figure 1). The process is set in motion when a bank makes a new loan. This loan creates a new asset on the aggregate balance sheet for the banking system. The newly created money typically ends up as a deposit, either at the same bank or elsewhere in the banking system.1 The increase to the asset side of the banking sector's balance sheet is offset by an equal increase on the liability side. Only then does the Fed enter the picture. In a fractional reserve system, banks must hold reserves equal to a proportion of their deposits. Therefore, in the pre-QE world illustrated in Figure 1, any increase in deposits also creates demand for more reserves. Crucially, only the Fed is able to supply the banking sector with the needed reserves. The Fed will increase the supply of reserves either by purchasing Treasury securities or lending money in the repo market. This increase on the asset side of the Fed's balance sheet is balanced by an increase in reserves on the liability side. The creation of new bank reserves is the final step in the money creation process. Figure 1The Money Creation Process Chart 2QE Has Not Encouraged Lending This is not to suggest the Fed is powerless to control the rate of money creation. On the contrary, Fed policy is the most influential determinant of the rate of money growth. One important distinction, however, is that the Fed exerts control over the pace of money creation because it controls the overnight interest rate. The interest rate, in turn, is the most important driver of bank lending. Changes in the level of bank reserves not associated with changes in interest rates, QE for example, have no effect on credit growth (Chart 2). The Pre-Crisis Fed Funds Market How then, prior to the Great Recession, was the Fed able to maintain the fed funds rate at its target, while still satisfying the banking system's demand for reserves? It accomplished this task by maintaining what it calls a "structural deficiency" in the supply of bank reserves. In practice this means the Fed was careful to supply no more than the quantity of reserves demanded, so that each day it would typically add to the reserve supply to accommodate the newly created demand. As a practical matter, the Fed increases the supply of reserves by either buying securities or lending money in the repo market. Both of these transactions enter the Fed's balance sheet as an asset, which must be offset by a liability, in this case an increase in bank reserves. The Fed can also reduce the supply of reserves by either selling securities or borrowing in the repo market (using the securities it owns as collateral, deemed a reverse repo from the point of view of the borrower). Although due to the "structural deficiency" in the reserve market, the Fed would typically transact to increase reserve balances. Chart 3The Pre-Crisis 'Channel System' If, for example, the Fed wanted to increase the fed funds rate. It would be slow to accommodate the increase in demanded reserves throughout the day. Banks in need of reserves to meet intra-day payment processing needs would bid up the fed funds rate towards the new target. Effective communication of the target fed funds rate also aided this process. Since the target for the fed funds rate was known in advance, and the banking sector believed the Fed would supply all necessary reserves at that target rate, most federal funds transactions tended to occur at rates very close to the target. By the end of the day, however, the Fed must always supply the exact amount of reserves demanded by the banking sector if it wants to maintain control of the fed funds rate. If the Fed were to supply more reserves than the banking system required, banks would try to lend the unwanted excess reserves in the fed funds market, driving the federal funds rate lower to the interest rate paid on excess reserves (IOER), which was zero prior to 2008. Or, consider the opposite case where the Fed supplies too few reserves. In this instance banks would clamor to borrow reserves to meet their regulatory requirement. This incremental demand would drive the federal funds rate higher to the Fed's discount window lending rate, which is always available for banks to access in times of severe stress. The IOER and discount window rate thus created a channel for the fed funds rate (Chart 3), within which the Fed could nudge the rate toward target by being either too quick, or too slow to accommodate increases in demanded reserves throughout the day. Bottom Line: A "structural deficiency" in reserve balances prior to 2008 allowed the Fed to conduct monetary policy by setting a target for the fed funds rate. Also, it is the level of interest rates, and not the level of reserves, that determines the rate of money creation in the economy. 2. The Flood Waters Rise The Federal Reserve began large scale asset purchases (quantitative easing) in late 2008, dramatically increasing the asset side of its balance sheet and consequently the supply of bank reserves (Figure 2). Suddenly, the banking system found itself with far more reserves than it demanded. Predictably, trading in the fed funds market dried up and the fed funds rate was driven toward its lower bound, the IOER.2 The Fed's target for the federal funds rate quickly became irrelevant. Figure 2Illustrative Post-Crisis Balance Sheets For The Fed And The Aggregatve Banking System*: ##br##An Explosion In Excess Reserves In the presence of excess bank reserves, the Fed needs a mechanism to control the lower bound of overnight lending rates. In theory, the IOER could serve as a floor beneath the fed funds rate because banks should not be willing to lend reserves at a rate lower than what can be earned at the Fed. Yet the fed funds rate has consistently traded below the IOER since 2008 (Chart 4). The reason for this violation is that the IOER is only available to depository institutions with reserve accounts at the Fed. Other suppliers of short maturity funds, mostly the GSEs, are still willing to transact at lower rates (Chart 5). Chart 4In Need ##br##Of A Floor Chart 5Fed Funds Market Smaller, ##br## And Dominated By GSEs Chart 6Reverse Repo Facility Is New Floor On ##br##Rates Money Markets Under The Microscope A new facility is required, that is capable of absorbing all of the supply of overnight funds including that emanating from outside the traditional banking system. The Fed answered this requirement by creating a fixed rate overnight reverse repo (RRP) facility. Once fully implemented, the Fed will stand ready to borrow overnight in unlimited amounts, at a rate that it chooses (i.e. is set independently of market forces). By making this facility available to a larger set of counterparties than the IOER, including money market funds and the GSEs, the Fed now has a "hard floor" on rates that it will be able to use to raise interest rates when the time comes. Even though it is still in a testing phase, the RRP already appears to be acting as a floor for overnight rates (Chart 6). Bottom Line: The stockpile of excess reserves created by the Fed's large scale asset purchase program has made the federal funds market largely irrelevant. The Fed is now only able to implement monetary policy by placing a floor under short-term interest rates, the RRP. 3. Building On Higher Ground From an operational perspective, there are two possible ways forward for the Fed as it prepares to lift rates. One option would be to return to the pre-crisis method of operation described in the first section. To do this, the Fed would first have to drain all excess reserves from the banking system by either selling securities, or deploying some of the tools on the liability side of its balance sheet, such as term deposits.3 This would re-launch the federal funds market and the Fed could return to setting policy in its traditional manner, by targeting the fed funds rate. Unfortunately, there are simply too many excess reserves in the system to make this a viable strategy, at least for the next several years. Moreover, the pace of asset sales required to drain excess reserves in a timely manner would lead to large spikes in the Treasury term premium. Instead, the Fed will almost certainly choose to maintain large reserve balances and operate monetary policy by lifting the floor RRP rate. Specifically, the Fed will set the RRP rate equal to (or slightly below) the IOER. It will then hike rates by increasing both in tandem. The Fed may still choose to set a target for the fed funds rate at a level somewhat above the RRP to maintain consistency in its communications, but this rate will be meaningless. We outline the likely sequence of the Fed's exit strategy in the following Box. Box The Exit Strategy Revisited The Fed first articulated the likely sequence of the exit strategy in the minutes to the June 2011 FOMC meeting.4 That sequence was as follows: Cease reinvestment of principal on securities holdings. Modify forward guidance on the path of the federal funds rate, and initiate reserve draining operations (e.g. term deposits). Begin raising the target federal funds rate. Begin sales of securities holdings, with a goal of returning the balance sheet to a more traditional size within two to three years. The above sequence suggests the Fed was planning to first drain excess reserves and then conduct monetary policy operations in the fed funds market, as it did prior to QE. This strategy has now been abandoned, and we expect to receive a modified exit sequence before the end of the year. The revised sequence will be consistent with the implementation of policy using a floor system, with large excess reserves, and could look something like: Modify forward guidance on the path of interest rates (including IOER, RRP and fed funds). Begin raising interest rates. First by raising the RRP rate to slightly below the IOER, and then by raising both rates in tandem. A few months after rate hikes begin; cease reinvestment of principal on Agency and Agency MBS holdings. Much later; cease reinvestment of principal on Treasury securities. The Fed will probably cease reinvestment of its MBS holdings prior to its Treasury holdings, and will then let its MBS holdings run-off passively to zero. The Fed will also probably let some of its Treasury holdings run-off passively, but could decide to maintain a permanently larger balance sheet, depending on the success of the RRP and floor system. In the next few years, as its balance sheet begins to shrink through passive run-off, the Fed may decide to drain the remaining excess reserves and return to its traditional operating method as outlined in Section1 above. Either way, U.S. monetary policy will operate under a "floor system", using the RRP rate, for at least the next few years. This new method of operation comes with several potential drawbacks, which we address below. Excess Reserves Are "Dry Powder" For The Banking System Chart 7Drivers Of Bank Lending Many have speculated that banks have been choosing to sit on large excess reserve balances. The thinking is that eventually the economy will reach a turning point and banks will decide to convert their excess reserves to loans en masse, leading to a surge in bank lending, and eventually, inflation. This implies that the presence of large excess reserve balances would force the Fed to hike rates more quickly than in their absence. This concern stems from a misunderstanding of the money creation process described above. The Fed could fall "behind the curve" and normalize policy too slowly, which could ultimately lead to higher inflation. However, this would simply be a consequence of keeping interest rates too low for too long. The presence of excess reserves does not in itself create a desire to lend and thus poses no additional inflation risk. For one thing, the banking system in aggregate is powerless to reduce the amount of excess reserves without the Fed also taking action to reduce the supply. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the supply of excess reserves is determined solely on the Fed's balance sheet. There is no danger of excess reserves "leaking out" into the economy. More importantly, however, is that the process of money creation begins with the origination of a loan and ends when the Fed increases the supply of reserves. The catalyst for the process, the amount of bank lending, is determined by (Chart 7): loan demand banks' perceived profitability from additional lending banks' concerns about taking too much risk on the balance sheet, putting their viability at risk regulatory requirements concerning capital and liquidity The Fed exerts control over these four factors through its interest rate policy, but not through changes in the balance of excess reserves. Prior to 2008, the lack of excess reserves did not act to constrain bank lending, rather the Fed chose to encourage or discourage lending by decreasing or increasing the interest rate. Similarly, the large excess reserve balances since 2008 have not provided an incentive to lend. Excess Reserves and Bank Regulation One implication of the Fed having sole control over the supply of bank reserves is that, through QE, it has effectively forced reserves onto bank balance sheets. These reserves obviously factor into banks' calculations concerning required regulatory ratios for liquidity and capital. Liquidity Coverage Ratio Chart 8Fed Purchases Pushed ##br##Term Premium Lower Under the proposed liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), banks must maintain a balance of high-quality liquid assets (such as bank reserves and Treasury securities) equal to their expected net cash requirement during a 30-day period. In theory, should the Fed ever decide to reduce the supply of excess reserves, banks could have trouble meeting the LCR requirement. In removing reserves, however, the Fed would also be selling securities. Banks falling short of their LCR requirement would be natural buyers for the securities offloaded by the Fed. Thus, the Fed's operating decisions will probably not exert any influence over banks' ability to meet their liquidity requirements. The LCR, however, does have implications for the equilibrium level of the Treasury term premium. Much as the Fed's Treasury purchases pressured the term premium lower (Chart 8), any future Treasury sales could be expected to unwind this effect. Even so, bank demand for those same Treasury securities would mitigate some of the upside for the term premium. Supplementary Leverage Ratio Large U.S. banks face a supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) which requires them to hold capital equal to at least 5% of total assets, not risk-weighted. In other words, large excess reserves force banks to hold more capital, which could have an adverse economic impact. Banks falling short of the SLR can either raise capital, or reduce assets. If they are either unable or unwilling to raise capital, then the large balance of excess reserves thrust upon them by the Fed could in theory crowd out bank lending. In other words, if the banking sector refuses to increase capital, then the onus falls on the asset side of the balance sheet to adjust to SLR standards. Since the banking sector in aggregate is unable to reduce reserve balances, any desired contraction in total assets could conceivably translate into an incentive to reduce the pace of bank lending. As currently proposed the SLR does not appear to be too big a hurdle for the largest U.S. banks. It is very likely they will be able to meet the requirement through retained earnings and new equity issuance. Nevertheless, it still provides a potential drag on bank lending that would not exist under the traditional model of monetary policy operations. Collateral Shortage Chart 9RRP Alleviates Collateral Shortage One side effect of the Fed's large scale asset purchases is that they have removed a lot of high-quality collateral from the financial system. Chart 9 shows that during periods when the Fed is adding to its balance sheet, the amount of collateral in the tri-party repo market declines. As the supply of collateral dwindles, repo rates are also pressured lower. The problem is that once repo rates approach the zero lower bound, counterparties have an increasing incentive to fail on delivery of repo contracts. Given the widespread use of repo financing, persistent repo fails have the potential to undermine liquidity in financial markets. Thankfully, the Fed's new tool for controlling the overnight interest rate, the RRP facility, solves this problem. In a reverse repo transaction, a counterparty purchases securities from the Fed with the understanding that it will sell them back the next day, earning the RRP rate in the process. This means the private sector once again gains access to collateral that had been cordoned off on the Fed's balance sheet. This should have the effect of keeping the repo rate above the floor set by the RRP, and well above zero. Repo fails have already levelled off and should begin to decline once the RRP facility is fully implemented. Financial Stability Concerns We have seen that monetary policy operates under a floor system when there are large reserve balances. One complication is that the U.S. is operating with two different floors, the IOER and the RRP. Due to its availability to a wider selection of counterparties, the RRP is the true floor on rates. From a monetary policy perspective, the easiest way forward is to set both rates at the same level and hike them in tandem. However, in a recent speech5 New York Fed President Dudley pointed out that from a financial stability perspective an RRP rate equal to the IOER could result in money flowing out of institutions eligible to receive IOER and into the less regulated shadow banking sector. It is therefore probable the Fed will choose to maintain the RRP at a level slightly below the IOER as rate hikes commence. We maintain focus on the RRP as the true floor on rates. President Dudley also made the case that the Fed's RRP facility could have positive implications for financial stability. He observed that with a Fed-backed short-term safe asset now more widely available, it could crowd out the creation of money-like liquid assets by the private sector. Those privately created liquid assets, such as commercial paper, are more prone to fire sales during times of stress. In a recent paper,6 John Cochrane agreed forcefully with this sentiment. Due to its potential for eliminating privately created money-like liquid assets, Cochrane referred to a monetary policy regime operating with large reserve balances as "a very desirable configuration of monetary affairs." The downside of the Fed providing a short-term safe asset is that it could encourage runs into the RRP during times of crisis. President Dudley rightly concludes that this is more of a technical hurdle that could be managed using caps on usage of the RRP facility. Bottom Line: The Fed will be able to operate monetary policy with large reserve balances, using the RRP as a floor on interest rates for several years while it decides by how much to run down its balance sheet and whether it should revert to its traditional fed funds rate target. Investors should remember that large reserve balances, by themselves, do not pose an inflation risk. Whether or not inflation becomes a problem will depend on the Fed's foresight to raise interest rates in a timely manner. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Alternatively it could be held in cash. This would be reflected on the banking sector's balance sheet as an increase in loans and a decrease in reserves, and on the Fed's balance sheet as an increase in currency in circulation and a decrease in reserves. 2 The Fed began paying interest on excess reserve balances on October 6, 2008. 3 The Fed's current Term Deposit Facility (TDF) temporarily drains reserves from the banking system by receiving funds from the banking sector for a period of 7 days, paying 26 basis points of interest. The early stages of the Fed exit strategy will rely more heavily on the overnight RRP facility rather than the TDF. But term deposits could be deployed once the Fed's balance sheet has returned closer to its traditional size, and the Fed decides it wants to drain the remaining excess reserves and return to its pre-crisis method of operation. 4 http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20110622… 5 "The Economic Outlook and Implications for Monetary Policy" available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud140520.html 6 Cochrane, John H. Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves. Available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/2014CochraneMonet…