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Highlights Investors are becoming less concerned about China's growth outlook, but there is no sign of euphoria. Monitor three risk factors that could disrupt the positive growth outlook and the bull market in Chinese stocks. For now, the risks appear reasonably contained, and the lack of a complacency in the marketplace means it is too early to bet against the herd. Remain positive and stay invested. Feature The latest purchasing managers surveys released early this week confirm that the Chinese economy remains buoyant. The manufacturing and service PMIs from both official and private sources remain comfortably in expansionary territory, and there are no signs of a material deterioration from the readings of the sub-indices. Improving growth also appears to be reflected in the stock market. Chinese investable equities have rallied by over 30% so far this year, beating the major global and EM benchmarks (Chart 1). Despite the improvement in the growth numbers and the rally in stock prices, there is no sign of euphoria among investors with respect to China. On the contrary, Chinese stocks' multiples are still among the lowest of the major global bourses (Chart 2). Importantly, ETFs investing in Chinese assets are still witnessing net redemptions: China-focused ETFs listed in the U.S. and Hong Kong have been witnessing constant net capital outflows since 2013 (Chart 3). Even in the first half of this year, these ETFs have continued to lose capital despite rising stock prices - which means retail investors have not participated in the rally. Attractive valuations and lack of "irrational exuberance" suggest the rally in Chinese investable stocks should have further to run. Chart 1Chinese Equities Have Outperformed... Chart 2...But Still With Much Lower Multiples Chart 3... And Net ETF Redemptions Overall, we remain positive on both Chinese equities and the economy's cyclical outlook, and see limited downside risks in the near term, as discussed in detail in recent weeks.1 However, as growth and stock market performance have been largely in line with our expectations, it is always useful to reflect on risk factors. We see three potential risks that could upset the economy and the ongoing rally in Chinese stocks that need to be closely monitored. Will The Trump Wildcard Strike Again? There are increasing signs that tensions between the U.S. and China are on the rise again after a period of relative tranquility. The first round of U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (CED) resulted in no material progress or concrete plans to improve bilateral trade imbalances. U.S. President Donald Trump has continued to pull "China hawks" into his trade policy team, naming Dennis Shea, well known for being highly critical of China's trade practices, as deputy U.S. Trade Representative. Furthermore, the U.S. State Department recently approved a major weapon package to Taiwan, the first arms sales to the Island since 2015. More recently, President Trump has openly accused China of not helping deal with the North Korea nuclear issue after the country tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that it claims can reach continental America. In addition, the Trump administration is reportedly planning trade measures to force Beijing to crack down on intellectual-property theft and ease requirements that American companies share advanced technologies to gain entry to the Chinese market. Overall, it is widely viewed that the brief "honeymoon" in U.S.-China relations following the April Summit between the leaders of the two countries has decisively ended, and the odds for protectionism tactics against Chinese products have increased. The "Trump wildcard" has always been a key risk with respect to our outlook for China2 - the latest developments suggest this risk remains firmly in place. President Trump and his inner circle appear genuinely convinced that punitive tactics could solve the country's chronic trade deficit. Moreover, President Trump has been increasingly bogged down by domestic policy, and he may lash out on the international front in an effort to boost his popularity. Furthermore, the U.S. President has few legal constitutional constraints to using tariffs against trade partners, giving him maneuvering room. From a big-picture perspective, the conflict between the U.S. and China has deep ideological and geopolitical roots, which are even harder to deal with than trade issues. Chart 4Steel Is No Longer Relevant For ##br##U.S.-China Trade Nonetheless, we maintain our guarded optimism that unilateral protectionism measures will not materially undermine Chinese exports, at least in the near term. On the U.S. side, even though President Trump has toughened his rhetoric on China and trade issues of late, it is still far less extreme compared to the promises he made on the campaign trail, in which he pledged to slap a 45% tariff on all imports from China and to label the country a currency manipulator on "day one." So far, the U.S. administration has mainly been focusing on specific industries, particularly steel, rather than broad-based tariffs, the impact of which should be marginal. For example, China accounts for only 3% of American steel imports. Sales to the U.S. account for less than 1% of China's massive steel output (Chart 4). In other words, steel appears to be a highly symbolic sector in Trump's trade policy, but the real impact on China-U.S. trade is negligible. On the Chinese side, the authorities have hard-drawn redlines on political and sovereign issues, but have much greater flexibility on trade-related issues. Chinese officials understand that the country's large surplus with the U.S. puts it at a near-term disadvantage in a trade war, and therefore will likely cave to pressure from the U.S. Moreover, the sectors that President Trump has been complaining about, namely steel and some other base metals, are the same sectors the Chinese government wants to restrict. Therefore, China will not fight for its own "out of favor" industries to disrupt the broader picture in exports. Taken together, President Trump's trade policy has once again become unpredictable, and some punitive measures on specific products appear likely in the near term. However, we still assign low odds of a drastic escalation in trade frictions, and we expect the Chinese authorities to refrain from tit-for-tat retaliation that could lead to a trade war. Protectionism risks, however, will remain a long-term structural issue that complicates the global trade and growth outlook. Deflationary Pressures And The Risk Of Policy Overkill? Chart 5Headline CPI Is Set To Drop Further A key feature of the Chinese economy is strong disinflationary/deflationary pressures, despite robust growth and job creation. Headline inflation to be released next week will likely once again surprise to the downside, mainly due to food prices (Chart 5). Wholesale prices of agricultural products have weakened substantially in recent months, pointing to sharply lower food CPI. Core CPI remains around 1%, underscoring incredibly low inflationary pressures. The key challenge for the Chinese authorities is figuring out how to manage economic policies to achieve the delicate balance between growth and disinflation/deflation. We have long viewed that one of the critical reasons behind China's sharp growth deterioration between 2012 and 2015 was a policy mistake, in which the authorities allowed monetary conditions to tighten dramatically. We are hopeful that the authorities have realized the cost of policy overkill, and will avoid similar mistakes down the road, but the risk certainly cannot be dismissed entirely. For now, we see low odds of policy overkill that could lead to price deflation and negative growth surprises. First, as growth has improved, some policy tightening is warranted. The authorities recently reported that the economy added 7.35 million new jobs in the first half of the year, far exceeding the government's target, pushing the registered urban unemployment rate to 3.95%, the lowest in recent years. In fact, the People's Bank of China may still be behind the curve, meaning that further tightening is simply a "catch-up" and is not immediately restrictive. Chart 6Another Sharp Rally ##br##In The Trade Weighted RMB is Unlikely Second, a major factor behind China's drastic tightening in monetary conditions in previous years was the sharp rally in the trade-weighted RMB, which appreciated by almost 30% between mid-2011 and early/late 2015 - a massive deflationary shock to Chinese exporters (Chart 6). Looking forward, it is extremely unlikely that the PBoC will allow the RMB to rise by a similar magnitude anytime soon. Finally, from investors' perspective, producer output prices are more important to watch for pricing power and profitability. On this front, PPI inflation has also rolled over and will likely continue to downshift, but will not turn to outright deflation in our view. It is important to note that the sharp decline in producer prices in previous years was due to a multi-year deterioration in Chinese growth, which has historically been an anomaly. The only other period in China's post-reform history with falling PPI happened in the late 1990s in the aftermath of the Asian crisis (Chart 7). In other words, falling PPI only occurs under rather extreme growth difficulties. Our model suggests that PPI inflation may decelerate to 3% by year end. Our PPI diffusion index, which measures the percentage of industrial sectors experiencing rising prices, suggests the majority of sectors are still witnessing higher prices both compared with previous months and a year ago (Chart 8). We are monitoring the PPI diffusion index closely to heed a leading signal on corporate pricing power and overall deflationary pressures in the corporate sector. Chart 7Producer Prices: A Historical Perspective Chart 8PPI Watch Bottom Line: A policy mistake of overtightening by the Chinese authorities remains a key threat to the near-term growth outlook, but is not our base case scenario. The Resumption Of The Dollar Bull Market? The U.S. dollar has rapidly dropped out of favor among global investors. The dollar index has fallen by 10% so far this year, the weakest among the major currencies. The weak U.S. dollar has provided a Goldilocks scenario for both the Chinese economy and financial markets: a weaker dollar depreciates the RMB in trade-weighted terms, which is reflationary for the Chinese economy. For investors, the broad dollar weakness also alleviates downward pressure on the CNY/USD, and a stable CNY/USD in turn reduces investors' anxiety on China's macro conditions, pushing up stock prices. This Goldilocks scenario could once again be disrupted if the dollar bull market resumes, and the positive feedback loop goes into reverse. A stronger dollar tends to strengthen the trade-weighted RMB, which is bad news for exporters. Meanwhile, it could rekindle downward pressure on the CNY/USD, re-intensifying domestic capital outflows, which could be viewed as a sign of China's macro troubles. Fears of an economic hard landing would quickly resurface. In our view, Chinese stocks are more vulnerable if the dollar's strength resumes, but the real damage on the broader economy should not be material. It is highly unlikely that Chinese policymakers would allow the trade-weighted RMB to rise alongside the dollar, and will tighten capital account controls to stop domestic capital flight. Chinese equities will suffer in this scenario, as investors' risk aversion increases. However, so long as the Chinese economy and corporate profits do not suffer a major relapse, the rally in stocks should eventually resume. All in all, the three risk factors should be closely monitored in the coming months, especially if investors become increasingly comfortable with the Chinese growth outlook. For now, the risks appear reasonably contained, and the lack of a complacency in the marketplace means it is too early to bet against the herd. We remain positive on Chinese growth, and favor Chinese equites both in absolute terms and against global/EM benchmarks. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China Outlook: A Mid-Year Revisit", dated July 13, 2017, "Rising Odds Of PBoC Rate Hikes", dated July 20, 2017, and Special Report, "Focusing On Chinese Money Supply", dated July 27, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard", dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Special Report Feature This is the first of two Special Reports on Electric Vehicles. In this report, we will look at the current costs of ownership of a typical mass-market EV, including and excluding subsidies, versus a similar Internal Combustion Engine Vehicle (ICEV). Based on current manufacturing costs and battery capabilities, EVs carry a significantly higher total cost per mile, even including current subsidies. Electric Vehicles have galvanized the interest of consumers, investors, and governments for several years now. We touched on the subject in our Special Report "Electric Vehicle Batteries", published September 20, 2016, where we noted that there were many misconceptions regarding batteries in general and EV batteries in particular. Despite the current cost and utility disadvantages of EVs, we expect governments (especially Europe and China) will continue to provide subsidies (carrots) and mandates (sticks) to further the adoption of EVs for the purposes of reducing CO2 emissions and tailpipe particulate pollution. The longer-term hope is that by forcing the EV market to expand, meaningful technological breakthroughs on batteries will eventually enable EVs to exceed ICEVs on a cost and utility basis. In our second report, we will look at the potential issues associated with adoption of EVs and the investment implications for the auto industry and energy markets. Cost Comparison: EV Vs. ICEV We estimated the difference in cost of ownership of a Chevy Bolt EV (known as the Opel Ampera-e in Europe) and two equivalent Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles (ICEVs), the Chevy Sonic and the Opel Astra, over 160,000 km or 100,000 miles (Table 1). Depreciation is an important consideration in cost of ownership, and we expect EVs to depreciate much more rapidly than ICEVs, a cost that many consumers either ignore or simply fail to incorporate into their purchase decisions. Table 1Comparison Of Costs Of Ownership Between EV And ICEV Automobiles There are many unknowns, such as actual selling price, actual manufacturing cost, etc., in this exercise which may add or subtract a thousand dollars or more to the net results. Under realistic assumptions, those probably cancel out. In summary, EVs are more expensive than ICEVs: Excluding subsidies, the net difference is about $16,100 in the U.S., $18,500 in Germany, and $13,200 in France. After subsidies, the difference is about $6,600 in New York State, $13,900 in Germany, and $6,000 in France. Even if electricity were free, after subsidies, the difference in cost of ownership in the U.S. (NY) would be $3,400, $3,200 in Germany, and $600 in France. The U.S. Federal subsidy of $7,500 is designed to be phased out once a manufacturer sells 200,000 vehicles, which would happen quickly if EVs are to become main stream. Therefore, the total premium cost of ownership of an EV over a comparable ICEV in the U.S. should be assumed to be $16,100 less state subsidy, if any. European subsidies are probably more politically acceptable, even though they will become quite costly if EV sales accelerate as many predict. GM is believed to be losing $9,000 with every Bolt it sells. If so, and if GM changed its pricing to deliver the company's average Gross Margin of around 13%, assuming it currently allows a 10% markup by dealers and discounts the vehicle by 10%, the price of the car would need to be raised to around $48,300 from its current MSRP of $37,500. This would increase the cost of ownership by nearly $11,000 (Table 2), or $0.11 per mile. To make the Bolt's ownership costs - after subsidies - competitive with GM's Opel Astra in France, the Bolt's manufacturing costs would need to be cut by about $14,750 or 34%. Table 2Comparison Of Costs Of Ownership Between EV And ICEV Automobiles, ##br##If GM Sold Bolt At Average Corporate Profitability Note that although we have focused on the Bolt, the common denominator for all EVs is the cost of batteries, which are a commodity. As such, our estimates probably hold for similarly sized vehicles and the differential costs of ownership are likely larger for larger EVs. As we will show in Part 2, integrated auto manufacturers probably have a significant cost advantage over "pure play" EV vendors such as Tesla, because outside of the drive train, they are able to use many of the same components they manufacture for ICEVs. Batteries: A Review All assumptions regarding EV technology are predicated on continued improvements in the cost, durability, and performance of batteries. The leading battery technology for EVs is a Lithium Ion technology (Illustration 1), and there really are no proven near-term alternatives worth discussing. Illustration 1Lithium Ion Technology In our Special Report "Electric Vehicle Batteries", we concluded that: Although the consensus view is that EV battery prices have experienced rapid (8 - 14% per annum) price declines over the past few years, we found no evidence to support that position; Battery durability is at least as important as price, and batteries will not likely last much more than 100,000 miles (160,000 km); Planned expansion of EV battery manufacturing capacity may significantly exceed demand by 2020, resulting in the collapse of EV battery prices and heavy losses for battery manufacturers. We continue to stand by those conclusions, and would like to stress that recent stories such as "China Is About to Bury Elon Musk in Batteries"1 and "10 Battery Gigafactories Are Now in the Works and Elon Musk May Add 4 More"2 are more or less consistent with our comment that "even though there is no reason to expect significant price improvements due to technological shifts, battery prices might drop due to oversupply - at least as long as manufacturers are willing to sell batteries at a loss."3 It seems likely now that China may follow the path it took to the solar industry and mass produce batteries, likely at a loss. The exact motivation for them to do so is uncertain, but this would be moot from the perspective of a western auto manufacturer or consumer. Finally A Reliable Battery Price Data Point! As we will demonstrate in Part 2 of our EV report, excluding the cost of the battery, it should be slightly cheaper to manufacture an EV than a similar ICEV. The EV drive train is much simpler and should be less expensive than that of an ICEV (Illustration 2), offset slightly by the need for a somewhat more robust chassis and suspension due to the weight of the battery, the requirement for electric powered air conditioning, and regenerative braking. Illustration 2Key Components Of A Bolt EV Drive Unit The battery is the most expensive part of an EV and responsible for the higher vehicle prices, and that is likely to remain the case even as manufacturing efficiencies allow EV prices to decline. Unfortunately, the cost of EV batteries is subject to much more speculation than should be the case: many articles cite speculative forecasts, projections, anecdotes, and so on, but without hard data backing them up. Fortunately, we finally have a data point: GM lists the cost of the Bolt EV battery pack as $15,734 for a 60 kWh unit, or $262/kWh.4 Some reports claim the battery cells cost $145/kWh,5 however, battery cells are not the same thing as a battery pack, which is a fully assembled unit complete with wiring, electronics, and a cooling system. Peer reviewed research suggests the cost of the battery pack is about 50% greater than the cost of the battery cells,6 however, we note the same article suggests that ratio will remain the same as battery prices drop. This is unlikely as there is no reason to believe the largely mechanical battery pack will decline proportionately any more than the cost of an engine or transmission will decline. Most likely, the battery pack assembly, excluding the cells, will decline only slightly. EV vendors likely oversize their battery pack in order to limit stress on the batteries (Illustration 3). In other words, the actual capacity of the battery is likely somewhat larger than the rated or useable capacity. If GM is indeed paying $145/kWh for its cells and its pack costs are 50% more than its cell costs and it is oversizing its pack by 20%, the cost of the pack works out to $261/kWh. Illustration 3Oversizing Battery To Account For Capacity Fade The reports which cite a $145/kWh cell price further suggest GM believes cells will cost $100/kWh in 2022, which implies a potential battery cost reduction of $2,700 (assuming the packs are not oversized) over the next 5 years (Table 3). The aforementioned research paper states: "The pure material costs for the VDA-type batteries are estimated to be currently about 50 EUR/kWh ($67.50), which seems to be the lower possible limit at long term." Even if the difference between materials cost and selling price is only 20%, that implies a lower limit of $81/kWh for the cells, meaning savings of $64/kWh are possible. This has not prevented some commentators from suggesting batteries will decline in price by 77% (or $112, implying $33/kWh pricing) by 2030.7 Regardless, savings of $64/kWh work out to $3,840 assuming a 60 kWh pack, or $4,680 assuming the pack is 20% oversized. Even if the pack cost were to decline a similar amount, the cost savings (assuming 50% for the pack, 20% oversized) would only be $7,000. Table 3GM Aims To Cut The Battery Cost By $2,700 By 2022 According to press reports, at the onset GM will lose $9,000 for every Bolt it sells.8 Since the major difference in costs between an EV and an ICEV is the battery pack, the $262 price cited above is probably not representative of the true cost. It may be that part of GM's commercial strategy is to show EV buyers that a replacement battery pack is not overwhelmingly expensive, and it is therefore willing to offer them at a loss. After all, the vehicle comes with a 100,000-mile, 8-year warranty on the battery, and we doubt many consumers would spend $15,734 (plus labor) to replace the battery on an 8-year-old EV. Therefore, GM is probably not going to sell that many replacements, so they won't suffer many losses by offering a replacement battery below its cost. The price differential between a Bolt and a Chevy Sonic, which is a similar vehicle manufactured in the same factory, is about $22,300. If we include the reported $9,000 expected loss, the "true" difference in price is $31,300. We believe that most likely the actual cost of the battery pack of the Bolt is much higher than $15,734. GM Confirms That Batteries Get Used Up Although the Bolt battery pack is covered by an 8-year 100,000-mile warranty, that warranty considers the potential for degradation of up to 40%: "Like all batteries, the amount of energy that the high voltage 'propulsion' battery can store will decrease with time and miles driven. Depending on use, the battery may degrade as little as 10% to as much as 40% of capacity over the warranty period."9 We highlight "all batteries" because this is the fate of all existing battery technologies. We further note that the amount of degradation will depend on the driving habits of the user: if the car is "lightly used" (i.e. traveled much less than 12,000 miles/year), chances are the battery degradation will be at the low end of the scale, whereas if the car is used a lot, chances are it will be at the high end of the scale. The average U.S. driver travels ~13,500 miles (22,000 km) per year,10 meaning the average driver with a single car would exceed the warranty on the Bolt in less than 8 years and, most likely, battery degradation would be closer to 40% than to 10%. Assuming a normal distribution, half of drivers would likely exceed the average annual miles driven, and as a result, their battery degradation would be even greater and happen even sooner, since they would be stressing the battery system through deeper and more frequent charging. Of course, if you were to travel 100,000 miles in 5 years, your battery warranty would expire. A major motivation for buying an EV is the expectation that it will save money on gasoline, which is true as shown in Table 1. However, the more you drive, the faster you use up the battery, and the sooner you would be faced with buying an expensive replacement battery. As such, drivers who drive a lot would be best to be cautious about purchasing an EV, as their costs of ownership due to battery degradation/replacement would be even higher. The Bolt has a purported range of 238 miles, but that range is achieved only when the battery is new and likely measured under ideal circumstances. Use of air conditioning, extreme temperatures (i.e. winter), etc., would probably trim the range significantly, likely to well below 200 miles. Assuming a reasonable usage for the vehicle, an 8-year-old Bolt would probably have a range closer to 100 miles than to 200 miles. This would significantly affect resale value as a vehicle with a range of 100 miles has much less utility than one with 200 miles. Difference In Cost Of Ownership: Chevy Bolt Vs. ICEV Calculating costs of ownership is subject to numerous assumptions, and this is especially the case with respect to an emerging technology such as EVs. Because we have a significant amount of information from GM on the cost and operating characteristics of the Bolt, and because GM makes "mass market" ICEVs which are roughly comparable to the Bolt, we thought it would be a uniquely useful benchmark for a cost of ownership analysis. We are neither making a claim that the Bolt or any EV will be commercially successful, nor are we endorsing it in any way; we are simply identifying the Bolt as representative of a typical mass-market EV. In our analysis we assume: The Chevy Bolt is a typical mass market EV; The sales price of the Bolt is roughly the same in the U.S.11 and Europe12 at $37,495; The Bolt is comparable to the Sonic in North America and the Opel Astra in Europe (Table 4); There are no direct financial subsidies associated with EVs; and After 100,000 miles, both the EV and the comparable ICEV have a similar residual value. Table 4The Bolt Is Much More Expensive Than Similarly-Sized GM ICEVs As we noted above, GM is believed to be taking a $9,000 loss associated with each Bolt sold. This is not sustainable if the firm expects to sell a lot of them. Most likely, either the company sees a path to significant cost reduction over the life of the product, or the company will artificially limit supply and use profits from its other products to subsidize the sales of Bolts. For the purpose of this analysis, we will assume the company and its rivals believe they can sell such vehicles at a reasonable profit in the future. The difference in the cost of ownership for similar vehicles is mainly associated with purchase cost, fuel costs, repair costs, and resale value. Insurance, parking, and so on would be a wash and annual repair and maintenance bills on most new cars are quite modest, so it would not significantly tilt the balance. Although EV enthusiasts tend to highlight the fact EVs do not require oil changes, the significantly increased weight of the battery means EVs require more frequent tire replacement than an equivalent ICEV.13 For example, modern ICEVs require an oil change every 10,000 miles. At $70/oil change this works out to $700, similar in price to a set of tires. Furthermore, the repair experience with EVs is extremely limited, and if we are to take Tesla as an example, they do not fare as well as many had hoped.14 We address the likely higher depreciation rates of EVs below. Estimating Electric Power Costs For An EV Charging a battery is not 100% efficient as losses occur in the charger and at the battery. Batteries get warm as they are charged, and that is a sign of inefficiencies in the charging process. As smartphone and notebook owners are aware, aged batteries produce a lot more heat when they are charged because the charging becomes less efficient as the batteries age. A new EV with a "slow" charger (see below) is about 85% efficient,15,16 while the figure is almost certainly lower for an aged battery. Assuming the system were 100% efficient, the Bolt vehicle goes 238 miles on 60 kWh, averaging about 0.25 kWh/mile, or approximately 25,000 kWh for 100,000 miles. Assuming lifetime average efficiency of 80% (85% when new, 75% when old), lifetime power consumption would be about 31,250 kWh. EV advocates note there are numerous "free" public charging stations. This is true, but there are far fewer public charging stations than there are EVs, which means the average EV owner pays for her electricity (Chart 1). Regardless, somebody has to pay for the electricity, and it is unreasonable to assume that "free charging" will persist if EVs gain significant market share, which apparently they have been doing in the past few years, especially in the U.S. and the EU (Chart 2). Chart 1Globally, EVs Outnumber Charging Stations By 6 To 1 Chart 2EV Market Share Is Increasing, Especially In Europe Furthermore, although many utilities have "time of use" utility rates which are lower in the evening when an EV is being charged, there is reason to question whether those can coexist with significant EV market penetration, a subject we will address in Part 2. Regardless, average power rates incorporate discounted time of use power to some extent, so that is the figure we use. Net Operating Costs: U.S. The Bolt17 is roughly comparable to a Chevy Sonic18 in terms of size, and the vehicles are made in the same factory. The difference in price is about $22,300. At 25/33 mpg, fuel use of the Sonic over 100,000 miles would be about 3,600 gallons (13,627 liters), costing about $9,000, assuming a gasoline price of $2.50 per gallon ($0.66/liter), which is slightly higher than the current nationwide average of ~$2.30/gallon. Assuming lifetime power consumption of 31,250 kWh and an average electricity price in the U.S. of $0.104/kWh,19 electric power costs for the Bolt would be around $3,250, for a net "fuel costs savings" of $5,700 in favor of the Bolt. However, the substantially higher initial purchase price and faster depreciation still results in the Sonic costing about $16,100 less over the duration of the vehicles' 100,000 miles (160,000 km). Put another way, the Bolt's total operating costs would average about $0.38 per mile, 73% higher than the $0.22/mile cost of the Sonic. Net Operating Costs: Europe In Europe, both fuel and electricity costs are typically much higher than in the U.S., but ICEVs also tend to be more fuel efficient. The Bolt is roughly equivalent to an Opel Astra, which costs €16,700 ($19,160) in France and consumes 4.4 litres/100 km20 (53 MPG). The difference in price between the Bolt and the Astra is about $18,300, a smaller premium than in the U.S. comparison. However, even though gasoline prices are more than twice as expensive in Europe than in the U.S., fuel costs for the Astra are moderated by the car's higher fuel efficiency, approximating $10,500 for the first 100,000 miles. Energy costs and EV subsidies vary widely across the EU. Because the economic impact of EVs would be roughly proportional to GDP, we decided to look at the largest EU economies excluding the UK. It happens that EV sales in Italy are negligible, with total market share less than 0.1%,21 and EV subsidies in the country are somewhat opaque. Therefore, we confined our analysis to Germany and France. Assuming lifetime power consumption of 31,250 kWh, the electric power costs of the Bolt would be around $5,350 in France, which has low power prices, for net energy savings of $5,100. In Germany, where power prices of $0.34/kWh are considerably higher, the Bolt and the Astra would have energy costs that are roughly equal. In France, EVs' ownership costs would be $13,200 (49%) higher than the ICEV; in Germany, EV ownership costs would be $18,500 (68%) higher. Bolt Vs Sonic Cost Of Ownership: Impact Of Subsidies In the U.S., there is a federal subsidy of $7,500 and some states also have an EV incentive. In New York State, the subsidy is $2,000, meaning the net increased cost of owning the Bolt instead of a Sonic drops to around $6,600. Note that the federal subsidy is designed to "phase out" once a manufacturer sells 200,000 vehicles. GM hopes to sell 30,000 EVs in 2017 despite only launching U.S.-wide in summer 2017. Combined with prior Volt sales of over 150,000 units, GM should exhaust its federal subsidies in early 2018. Subsidies vary considerably across the EU.22 In France, there is a subsidy of €6,300 ($7,200)23 associated with the purchase of an EV, while Germany24 has a €4,000 ($4,600) incentive. Besides subsidies, there are other benefits of owning an EV including reserved or even free parking spaces, often including free charging. These are offset to some extent by the limited range of EVs which may disqualify them from purchase by some. It remains to be seen how long EV subsidies will persist. They may be affordable to governments as long as the number of vehicles sold remains small, but they would become very costly if EV sales accelerate. For example, about 2 million new passenger cars are registered in France every year. If only half of those were EVs, subsides would total $7.2B. Money for roads, infrastructure maintenance, policing, and so on have to come from somewhere, and if ICEV sales decline substantially, European governments' huge gasoline tax revenues would also deteriorate; in such an environment, it is reasonable to assume that EV subsidies would eventually disappear and be replaced by taxes. It seems highly unlikely to us that a massive subsidy program would be a politically acceptable solution in the U.S. auto market; however, it may very well be that over the near term subsidies persist in the EU where concerns over climate change have greater political weight. Cost Of Ownership: Depreciation Depreciation of the EV is almost certainly going to be much higher than the ICEV, which accounts for some of the higher cost of ownership. We believe that most EV batteries will be substantially degraded after 160,000 km (100,000 miles), and we doubt there will be many EVs on the road past about 200,000 km or 15 years of operation. In contrast, the average age of a vehicle in the EU is over 10.5 years,25 while the average age of a vehicle in the U.S. is 11.6 years.26 The overwhelming majority of EVs on the road today are still under warranty and, in either event, relatively new, which means consumers lack the information to understand the inherent issues of battery degradation. As more consumers have experience with EVs, the problems of degradation and replacement cost (i.e. the high cost of depreciation) will likely temper demand. This would be the case even if battery costs drop significantly: few consumers would invest even $5,000 into repairing a 10-year-old vehicle, and an EV with a 100 mile (160 km) range is significantly less useful than one with a 200 mile (320 km) range. Rapid depreciation has been the experience of Nissan Leaf owners who are discovering their vehicles have lost 80% of their value after only 3 years.27 EV advocates suggest that degradation is not an issue and that, in any event, batteries are getting better and better. This flies in the face of what essentially every consumer has experienced with mobile phones, notebook computers, or any other cordless device. We believe GM has better insights into the issue than EV advocates do and, in any event, we see no evidence for significant improvements in battery life. If, indeed, significant improvements are made to batteries, prior-generation EVs (including today's Bolt) will plummet in value. That said, consumer understanding of battery degradation is not likely to be a factor for EV adoption over the near term. Conclusion: Costs Of Ownership Assuming similar depreciation and excluding subsidies, the net difference in cost of ownership over 160,000 km (100,000 miles) between a Bolt and an equivalent ICEV is about $16,100 in the U.S., $13,200 in France, and $18,500 in Germany, in favor of the ICEV. After subsidies, an optimistic analysis suggests the difference in cost of ownership to travel 100,000 miles (160,000 km) between a Bolt EV and a roughly similar ICEV is about $6,600 in the U.S. (New York), $6,000 in France, and $13,900 in Germany, in favor of the ICEV. Electric power costs for the Bolt are around $3,250 in the U.S., $10,600 in Germany, and around $5,350 in France. Even if electricity were free, after subsidies, the difference in cost of ownership would be $3,400 in the U.S. (NY), $3,200 in Germany, and $600 in France. GM is believed to be losing $9,000 with every Bolt it sells. If so, and it wanted to sell the vehicle at its average Gross Margin of around 13%, it would sell for closer to $48,300, which would increase cost of ownership by about $11,000. In other words it would take a cost reduction of around $14,750 (about 34%) of likely manufacturing cost before the cost of ownership would favor the Bolt in France after subsidies. As noted above in our discussion of battery costs, GM expects a $2,700 cost saving associated with battery cells by 2022. Given that it is losing money on the vehicle, it is hard to believe they will immediately pass these savings on to the consumer. Even if they did, cost of ownership would still favor the ICEVs. Brian Piccioni, Vice President Technology Sector Strategy brianp@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Johanna El-Hayek, Research Assistant johannah@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-28/china-is-about-to-bury-elon-musk-in-batteries 2 https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/10-battery-gigafactories-are-now-in-progress-and-musk-may-add-4-more 3 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "Electric Vehicle Batteries", dated September 20, 2016. 4 http://insideevs.com/heres-how-much-a-chevrolet-bolt-replacement-battery-costs/ 5 http://insideevs.com/gm-chevrolet-bolt-for-2016-145kwh-cell-cost-volt-margin-improves-3500/ 6 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260339436_An_Overview_of_Costs_for_Vehicle_Components_Fuels_and_Greenhouse_Gas_Emissions 7 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-26/electric-cars-seen-cheaper-than-gasoline-models-within-a-decade 8 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-30/gm-s-ready-to-lose-9-000-a-pop-and-chase-the-electric-car-boom 9 https://electrek.co/2016/12/07/gm-chevy-bolt-ev-battery-degradation-up-to-40-warranty/ 10 http://www.carinsurance.com/Articles/average-miles-driven-per-year-by-state.aspx 11 http://www.chevrolet.com/byo-vc/client/en/US/chevrolet/bolt-ev/2017/bolt-ev/features/trims/?section=Highlights§ion=Fuel%20Efficiency§ion=Dimensions&styleOne=388584 12 https://electrek.co/2016/12/15/chevy-bolt-ev-europe-june-2017-opel-ampera-e-gm/ 13 The Bolt weighs almost 800 pounds (360 kg) more than a similar sized Chevrolet Sonic. 14 http://www.consumerreports.org/cars-tesla-reliability-doesnt-match-its-high-performance/ 15 https://www.veic.org/docs/Transportation/20130320-EVT-NRA-Final-Report.pdf 16 http://teslaliving.net/2014/07/07/measuring-ev-charging-efficiency/ 17 http://www.chevrolet.com/bolt-ev-electric-vehicle 18 http://www.chevrolet.com/sonic-small-car 19 https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/ 20 http://www.opel.fr/vehicules/gamme-astra/astra-5-portes/points-forts.html#trim-edition 21 http://www.eafo.eu/content/italy 22 https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GlobalEVOutlook2017.pdf pages 53-55 23 http://insideevs.com/overview-incentives-buying-electric-vehicles-eu/ 24 https://electrek.co/2016/04/27/germany-electric-vehicle-incentive-4000/ 25 http://www.acea.be/statistics/tag/category/average-vehicle-age 26 http://www.autonews.com/article/20161122/RETAIL05/161129973/average-age-of-vehicles-on-road-hits-11.6-years 27 http://blog.caranddriver.com/tesla-aside-resale-values-for-electric-cars-are-still-tanking/ Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Overweight The cable & satellite index heavyweights Comcast and Charter Communications both reported their results last week, announcing that they had churned 34,000 and 90,000 of the traditional video customers, respectively. Still, neither company saw a decline in video revenue, reflecting still-strong sector pricing (second panel) and an unabated willingness of the consumer to purchase their content (third panel). The dominant theme from cable & satellite earnings was a transition to high-speed internet (unchanged from the past number of years), a lower revenue but higher margin business. This drove both of the aforementioned companies to each grow their customer relationships by mid-single digits in the quarter. Importantly, the customer additions were made without significantly increasing capital outlays (bottom panel) that, when combined with an overall higher margin business, implies more efficient returns on capital. This should ultimately drive more free cash flow, higher valuation multiples and ongoing share price increases. We reiterate our overweight recommendation for cable & satellite. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P cable & satellite index are: BLBG: S5CBST - CMCSA, CHTR, DISH.
Highlights The euro area's growth prospects, adjusted for population, are no different to any other major developed economy. If the euro area continues its recovery to just the mid-point of its long-term relative growth cycle... ...the yield spread between long-dated bonds in the euro area and the U.S. will compress to around -50 bps from today's -150 bps... ...and euro/dollar will eventually rally to over 1.30. Stay overweight euro area Financials and Retailers versus U.S. Financials and Retailers. Feature ChartThe Euro Area Has Surged Because Expectations ##br##For The Euro Area's 'Terminal' Interest Rate Have Surged Feature The latest GDP releases confirm that the euro area has comfortably outperformed other major developed economies this year. Yet among mainstream equity indexes the Eurostoxx50, which is up 6%, has comfortably underperformed both the MSCI World index1 and the S&P500, which are up 9% and 11%. Why? One clue comes from the technology-heavy NASDAQ 100, which is up 21%. Whereas euro area equities have a negligible exposure to technology, the S&P500 has more than a quarter of its market capitalization in the strongly performing tech and biotech sectors (Chart I-2). Then there is the effect of the surging euro. The largest euro area companies are multinationals earning dollars. In dollar terms, euro area profit growth2 has indeed outperformed U.S. profit growth by about 10%. But converted back into euros - the base currency of the Eurostoxx50 - the outperformance has become an underperformance (Chart I-3). Chart I-2When Technology Outperforms, The Eurostoxx50 Underperforms Chart I-3Euro Area Profits Have Outperformed In Dollars, ##br##But Not In Euros Play Relative Economic Performance Through Bonds And Currencies Chart I-4Euro Area Banks Have Outperformed U.S. Banks The salutary lesson is that sector and currency effects always swamp relative economic performance in predicting or explaining the relative performance of mainstream equity indexes. To play the euro area's economic outperformance, global equity investors must drill down to the more domestically driven euro area sectors, financials and retailers. An overweight position in these two domestic sectors versus their equivalents in, say, the U.S. has outperformed this year, and should continue to do so (Chart I-4). But the best way to play relative economic performance is through other asset classes. Focus not on equities, but on government bonds and currencies. In line with the euro area's superior economic performance this year, the spread between long-dated bond yields in the euro area and U.S. has compressed by 45bps, and euro/dollar is up 12%. The good news is that these trends can ultimately run much further. He That Is Without Structural Problem, Cast The First Stone... Chart I-5For American Men, Labour Force ##br##Participation Rate Is Collapsing The obvious pushback to the longer-term narrative is: what about the euro area's much discussed structural difficulties? To which our response is yes, the euro area does face undoubted long-term challenges. Integrating 19 disparate nations into the confines of an ever closer financial, economic, and ultimately political union is a task that comes with difficulties and risks, especially in the political dimension. Having said that, the euro area is not the only major economy contending with major financial, economic and political challenges in the coming years. To paraphrase the Bible, "he that is without structural problem among you, let him cast the first stone at the euro area." The United Kingdom will spend the next few years struggling to define and redefine the meaning of Brexit, then trying to negotiate it, and then grappling to implement it - whatever 'it' ends up being. The whole process is fraught with financial, economic and political challenges and dangers. Looking West, the United States is suffering a major structural downtrend in its labour participation rate; for American men especially, the participation rate is collapsing (Chart I-5), which creates its own political problems. Looking East, Japan is suffering a chronically low and declining birth rate. And China must wean itself off a decade long addiction to debt-fuelled growth. We could go on... Seen in this light, are the euro area's structural challenges really any harder (or easier) than those faced by the other major economies? The Euro Area Is An Economic Equal One important differentiator across the major developed economies is population growth. A population that is growing boosts headline output. On the other hand, it also adds to the number of people who must share the economy's income and resources. Conversely, a population that is shrinking weighs on headline output, but it reduces the number of people who must share the income and resources. Therefore, what matters for standards of living - and the consequent political implications - is the evolution of GDP per head. In a similar vein, a growing population means that a firm will see rising sales. But absent a rise in productivity, the firm will have to employ more staff and capital to deliver those increased sales - in other words, issue more shares. Therefore, what matters for earnings per share is the evolution of productivity, which once again means GDP per head. Some people consider a shrinking population as a particular problem. They argue that when a population is shrinking, the economy needs to shed workers and capital, which can be hard to do. But a growing population can also create disruptions and pains: specifically, resources such as housing and public services might struggle to keep pace with rapidly rising demand. Consider the United Kingdom. In the 1980s and 90s, the population grew at a very sedate 2% per decade. But since the millennium, population growth has almost quadrupled to 7.5% per decade. The resulting strain on housing and public services was a major factor behind the vote for Brexit - which of course, now carries its own disruptive consequences. Chart I-6The Euro Area Is An Economic Equal Therefore, population shrinkage or growth is a problem only if it is sudden or extreme. More modest changes in either direction are neither good nor bad per se. But to assess progress in living standards and indeed equity market profitability, it is crucial to measure economic growth adjusted for population change. On this population adjusted basis, the structural growth prospects of the euro area are not meaningfully different to other developed economies such as the U.K. and the U.S. The euro area is an equal, and recently it has been the first among equals. Over the longer term, the euro area and the U.S. have generated identical growth in real GDP per head (Chart I-6). Within the bigger picture, the euro area has underperformed through multi-year periods encompassing around half the time; and it has outperformed through the multi-year periods encompassing the other half. Seen in this light, the post-2008 phase of poor performance was the impact of back to back recessions separated by an unusually short gap, with the second of the two recessions the direct result of policy errors specific to the euro area. In other words, the euro area's 2008-14 economic underperformance was not structural; it was cyclical. Prospects For Bond Yield Spreads And The Euro If the euro area continues its recovery to just the mid-point of its long-term relative cycle, then recent investment trends ultimately have much further to run. Unsurprisingly, relative interest rate expectations closely follow relative real GDP per head. Relative interest rate expectations 2 years out between the euro area and United States have compressed from -230 bps last December to -185 bps today. Relative interest rates expectations 5 years out have compressed more, to -150 bps today (Feature Chart). This makes perfect sense. Clearly, the ECB will not hike interest rates any time soon, but expectations for the long-term 'terminal' rate have correctly gone up from overly-pessimistic levels. Nevertheless, to reach the mid-point of its long-term cycle, the gap between euro area and U.S. interest rate expectations must ultimately get to around -50 bps (Chart I-7). The implication is that the yield spread between long-dated bonds in the euro area3 and the U.S. will also compress to around -50 bps (Chart I-8). Therefore, on a 2-year horizon, stay underweight euro area bonds - especially German bunds - in a European and global bond portfolio. This also carries repercussions for euro/dollar, given that it closely tracks relative interest rate expectations. The mid-cycle gap of -50 bps equates to euro/dollar at over 1.30 (Chart I-9). And an overshoot to the top of the cycle implies over 1.50. Chart I-7Relative GDP Per Head Leads Relative Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-8...And Bond Yield Spreads Chart I-9Relative Interest Rate Expectations Drive Euro/Dollar But trends do not unfold in straight lines. They are punctuated by regular setbacks. The recent surge in euro/dollar has taken its 65-day fractal dimension towards its lower limit, which suggests excessive short-term herding. That said, we could now be at the mirror-image turning point in ECB policy to that of the summer of 2014. Then, Draghi pre-announced QE; now, he may pre-announce its demise. In which case, fundamentals will override the 65-day fractal signal just as they did three years ago (Chart I-10). Nonetheless, we would not be surprised if euro/dollar first revisited the 1.10-1.15 channel before resuming its long march upwards. Chart I-10Excessive Short-Term Herding In Euro/Dollar, But... Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In local currency terms. 2 Based on 12 month forward earnings per share. 3 Euro area average over 10-year sovereign yield, weighted by sovereign issue size. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to position for an underperformance of Chinese shares versus the emerging markets benchmark. Target a 2.5% profit target and stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Dear Client, Over the next three weeks, much of BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team will be traveling in Australia, New Zealand, and Asia. As such, we are taking this week off from publication and will return to our regular schedule next week. In lieu of our regular missive, we are sending you the following Special Report, penned by our colleagues in the BCA Technology Sector Strategy. The report, originally published on May 16, tackles “The Coming Robotics Revolution” in an innovative way that aligns with our own views. Clients often ask us what will be the political consequences of the revolution in artificial intelligence and robotics. Our answers are controversial because we strongly disagree with the conventional, Terminator-inspired, doom and gloom. Brian Piccioni and Paul Kantorovich agree with us, which is reassuring given that they understand the technology behind robotics far better than we do. I hope you enjoy the enclosed report and encourage you to seek out the insights of our Technology Sector Strategy. Kindest Regards, Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Feature "The amount of technology coming at us in the next five years is probably more than we've seen in the last 50" Mark Franks, Director Of Global Automation at General Motors, Bloomberg News, April 2017 There is good reason to believe we are at the cusp of a Robot Revolution which will have a dramatic impact on our economy. Robots have been around for decades or centuries, depending on the definition. Past robots were either fixed in place, as in the case of factory robots, or supervised by operators that are near the robot, or connected through telemetry. In contrast, the robots that are coming will not be fixed in place, and will be able to perform their functions without a human operator. This opens up massive markets for robots in industry (cutting lawns, cleaning windows, delivering parcels, etc.) and, most significantly, consumer applications. Part 1: Robots - Industrial Revolution To Early 21st Century The term "robot" can have different meanings. The most basic definition is "a device that automatically performs complicated and often repetitive tasks,"1 a definition which encompasses a broad range of machines: from the Jacquard Loom,2 which was invented over 200 years ago, on to Numerically Controlled (NC) mills and lathes, pick and place machines used in the manufacture of electronics, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), and even homicidal robots from the future such as the Terminator. For much of history, most of the labor force was involved with the production of food: over 50% of the U.S. labor force was involved in agriculture until the late 1800s (Chart 1). Agriculture has benefitted immensely from automation as inventions such as the McCormick Reaper (a wheat cutting machine pulled by horses), the cotton gin, and other mechanical systems displaced human effort. Steam and then internal combustion-powered tractors, which can be viewed as "robotic horses," accelerated the process, as engines delivered much more power more cost effectively than mechanical devices (Chart 2). This massively improved productivity: within 20 years from 1830 to 1850, the labor to produce 100 bushels of wheat dropped from 250-300 to 75-90 hours, and by 1955 it only took 6 ½ hours of labor for a net reduction of 97.5% in 125 years.3 Chart 1Farm Workers Were Disrupted In The Late 19th Century Chart 2...And So Were Horses In other words there is nothing new about automation displacing workers while improving productivity, nor is a rapid displacement unprecedented. The industrial revolution was about replacing human craft labor with capital (i.e. machines), which did high-volume work with better quality and productivity. This freed humans for work which had not yet been automated, along with designing, producing, and maintaining the machinery. Automation Frightens People Although automation is nothing new, it has always engendered anxiety among workers. The anxiety boils down to concern for continued employment as well as fear of the technology itself. We discuss below why Artificial Intelligence (AI) does not present the sort of threat to humanity or even employment that seems to be the consensus view at the moment. Will Robots Become Self-Aware? We have covered the topic of Artificial Intelligence/Deep Learning as it relates to sentient/self-aware machines in some detail in our October 18, 2016 Special Report on Artificial Intelligence. In summary, most of the discussion surrounding AI is misinformation. Although AI uses algorithms called "artificial neural networks," which are extremely useful for solving certain classes of problems, these are nothing like biological neural networks. There is no reason whatsoever to believe AI technology in its current form can become sentient, or even meaningfully intelligent, and that will not change with increased computing power. Furthermore, whether or not AI can arise to the level of a threat, there is no current or imagined power source which could keep a rampaging robot active for more than a few hours. The Terminator would have been much less threatening if he required frequent recharging. Will Robots Make Human Workers Irrelevant? Automation in agriculture occurred rapidly enough to be felt by workers at the time - and yet there were no marauding hordes of unemployed hay cutters or cowboys. Improved productivity meant markets were opened which did not previously exist, and unemployed agricultural workers moved to factory work. Media coverage of automation tends to focus on the potential job losses without mentioning the fact that the economy and its workers adapt, and overall living standards generally improve (Chart 3). Technology has displaced entire classes of jobs very rapidly in the recent past, and many products such as smartphones would be extremely difficult to assemble if the work was done by hand. Box 1 provides several other examples. Yet as is usual for many things that have happened multiple times in the past, we are told "this time is different." Chart 3The Industrial Revolution Led To A Vast Improvement In Living Standards Box 1 Automation Displaced Entire Classes Of Jobs In The Recent Past, But Brought Enormous Benefits Before calculators and word processors were available, writing and mathematical calculations were done manually. Machines such as calculators and type writers enhanced productivity, eliminating many such jobs. Software applications such as Microsoft Word and Excel further accelerated this process. Not that long ago, welding was entirely a manual job but now most welding in factories is done by robots: you can usually tell a human weld on a mass produced product by its poor quality. Robots in the modern factory have freed up workers for other roles in the economy just as the massive loss of agricultural jobs in the 20th century did. Many modern electronic products such as smartphones would be extremely difficult to assemble if the work was done by hand, as the components are so small they require microscopes to manipulate. Even if it were possible to hand assemble a smartphone, it would take hours of manual labor to produce, and the quality would be very poor. The use of automation means that smartphones cost a few hundred dollars instead of a few thousand dollars and are affordable enough to be a mass market item. Some of the anxiety around automation-related job losses centers on the possibility that this time, robots will displace workers from the service and white-collar sectors. BCA's European Investment Strategy service has written about the potential for AI to replace jobs involving tasks that require specialized education and training, such as calculating credit scores or insurance premiums, or managing stock portfolios.4 Recent developments in AI (specifically deep learning algorithms) have allowed computers to solve pattern recognition problems that they could not previously solve. However, we do not believe AI in its current form poses a widespread risk to white collar employment for the following reasons: Both service-sector and white collar employees have been subject to replacement through automation already, and the economy has adapted: ATMs are robot bank tellers, self-checkout lanes are robot checkout kiosks, and "smart" gas and electric meters that can be read remotely replace human meter readers. The legal profession has been transformed by Google searches and the accounting business by accounting software. These tools allow certain clients to avoid the use of a lawyer or accountant altogether (for example in setting up a corporation or doing bookkeeping), or allow a firm to employ less skilled workers for the task. We can offer numerous other examples of white collar jobs which have been fully or partially automated over the past couple decades. In addition, recall that AI produces high probability answers which turn out to be wrong, and it requires a lot of subject specific training. Both of these are intrinsic to the implementation of the algorithm. In contrast, humans generally are much better at assigning confidence to decisions and train very rapidly because they have cross-expertise AI lacks. An implementation of AI has to meet BOTH of the following conditions to be successful: There has to be a lot of subject-specific data available A high probability assigned to a wrong answer is either inconsequential or can be easily overruled by a human It is also important to note that although AI may reduce the demand for accountants, insurance agents, credit analysts and other skilled professionals, these are exactly the sort of people that can handle retraining. Part 2: What Makes Upcoming Robots Revolutionary Upcoming robots will be different because they will not be confined to the factory floor. We believe this is a key transition point, and that the next 20 years or so will see as dramatic a change from robotics as was caused by the Internet. Factory robots have improved immensely due to cheaper and more capable control and vision systems. Early robots performed very specific operations under carefully controlled conditions -an assembly robot which encountered a misaligned component would simply install it that way, resulting in a defective product. Eventually vision systems were developed which allowed robots to adjust to varying conditions. As camera and computing costs continue to decline, vision systems are becoming more elaborate and useful, as they gather and process more information to make increasingly complex decisions. As these systems evolve, the abilities of robots to move around their environment while avoiding obstacles will improve, as will their ability to perform increasingly complex tasks. Mobile robots will likely rely on AI to make many decisions. In order to be cost effective, for many years AI will likely be hosted in cloud data centers. This is especially the case for consumer robots, which will have to be highly capable and yet cost effective. We discuss the implications for cloud services providers in more detail in Part 3: Investment Implications. We May Be Entering A 'Virtuous Cycle' In Robotics Improvements to one domain of robotic applications can be generally applied to others. Robotics technology is concurrently moving forward on many fronts ranging from the aforementioned vacuum cleaners, lawnmowers, and logistics robots, to medical orderlies,5 farm tractors,6 mining equipment,7 transport trucks,8 and cargo ships.9 Despite enormous differences in cost and value added, all of these applications are solving essentially the same problem. As with any other technological revolution, advances between different fields in robotics will be adapted, borrowed, extended and enhanced. This, in turn, creates opportunities for ever more applications, creating a virtuous cycle (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Robotics Will Enter Into A Virtuous Cycle There are few tasks which cannot be automated, but there is a definite cost-benefit tradeoff for each one. For example, a golf course may consider spending $25,000 for a robotic lawnmower, however costs were closer to $70 - $90,000 in 2015,10 and installed cost is even higher.11 Because the incremental cost of the machines is comprised of electronics, which will drop in price rapidly, it is probably a matter of another 2 or 3 years before the price moves to the point where mass adoption by groundskeepers begins. The same improvements to industrial lawnmowers will lead to more useable, albeit still pricy, consumer models which will probably enter mass market adoption 5 to 10 years from now. The same argument can be made for almost any manual chore ranging from cleaning the carpet to delivering parcels. We predict the virtuous cycle for robots will span several decades. As the cost of automation drops, better solutions will be developed, resulting in 'early retirement' of dated but otherwise fully functional robotic systems. This is the opposite of the Feature Saturation phenomenon currently present in the smartphone and PC industries - though feature saturation will eventually hit robots as well. A Self-Driving Car Is A Robot The most important robotics technology, from a macroeconomic perspective, is the rapidly advancing field of Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). The automobile industry is a significant part of the global economy, so changes in this industry will have profound implications. We covered AVs in detail in our April 8, 2016 Special Report. Due to technical and legal obstacles that must be overcome, a vehicle which can safely travel from point to point on major roads and city streets without driver intervention is probably 20 years away, +/- 5 years. The macro impact, however, will occur much sooner than that, due to the technologies developed on the way to full AVs. Vehicles are already offering features such as forward collision warning, autobrake, lane departure warning, lane departure prevention, adaptive headlights, and blind spot detection.12 Although we have only touched the surface, robotics are being applied across many industries, making even seemingly modest advances significant when measured in aggregate, as small changes in one industry are quickly adapted by other industries. It is noteworthy that this transition will likely occur during a period where demographic shifts, in particular in the most developed economies, signal the potential for labor shortages, or at least increasing cost of labor (Chart 4).13, 14 Robots may be showing up in the nick of time to improve both the economy and quality of life in the developed world. Chart 4Advances In Robotics Will Counter Adverse##br## Demographic Trends Part 3: Investment Implications The semiconductor industry has stagnated as the PC and smartphone markets entered a largely replacement-driven era (Chart 5). Although it may not be evident until the virtuous cycle is fully engaged, robotics represents another up-leg in demand for semiconductors and therefore should result in a significant improvement to industry growth rates. There is little opportunity for startup semiconductor companies nowadays due to the high costs of developing a new chip. Well positioned, established, semiconductor companies will be the primary beneficiaries of the robotics revolution. Large firms that attempt to fit their existing product offering into the industry (e.g. by remaining PC or mobile-phone centric) will fall behind. Winners System on a Chip (SoC) Vendors: Robotics hardware will more likely be implemented as "System on a Chip" (SoC) as this provides the greatest functionality with lowest cost and power consumption. SoCs generally consist of a variety of Intellectual Property (IP) "cores" which may be licensed from third parties. Typically, IP cores consist of a microprocessor and various specialized subsystems, depending on the application. Robotics SoCs are likely to include Digital Signal Processing (DSP) or Image Processing cores to process sensor data. SoC vendors who target or encourage robot development, such as Overweight-rated Texas Instruments, are likely to be favored by early movers in the space.15 We believe it is a matter of time before Graphics Processors (GPUs) currently used in AI/Deep Learning are replaced by processors specifically designed for AI, which will be cheaper and more power efficient.16 This is one of the reasons for our Underweight rating on Nvidia. Semiconductor Foundries, Mixed Signal and Automotive Semiconductor Vendors: This environment will favor the merchant semiconductor foundries which manufacture most SoCs. In addition, firms with "mixed signal" expertise will experience increased demand for motor controls, sensor interfaces, etc. As robotics features are added to automobiles, demand for automotive semiconductors should outpace that in other sectors. A significant degree of commonality in the parts and systems used in advanced automobiles will be used in other mobile robots, so "automotive" semiconductor demand should significantly outpace automobile sales. Sensor Vendors: Robots need a variety of sensors, depending on the application. Unlike factory floor robots which can make do with cameras, mobile robots will require advanced radar, ultrasound, laser scanning and other sensor types in order to provide redundancy and cope with weather and other related issues. Important sensors on prototype AVs are currently made in low volumes and are extremely expensive. Due to the number of sensors involved, we believe there is significant opportunity for companies offering aggressive cost reduction in sensor technology. Wireless Equipment and Service Providers: Most robotic systems will include some degree of wireless connectivity and participate in the "Internet of Things" (IoT). This will present challenges and opportunities for wireless equipment and service providers,17, 18 as networks will have to adapt to increased upload bandwidth (from robot to carrier) as well as novel billing schemes. Coverage will also have to be expanded to accommodate AVs as it is non-existent or spotty in large stretches of North American roadways. Not being able to check Facebook between two cities is one thing, losing your robot driver is much more serious. Our recent downgrade of Cisco to Underweight19 may appear inconsistent with the analysis above. However, the company's valuation is extremely elevated and revenues are declining (Chart 6). Any benefit Cisco will derive from investment into wireless infrastructure is several years out, and open-source hardware initiatives are gaining momentum.20 For that reason, we see the risks as outweighing the opportunities at the moment for the company. Chart 5Long Replacement Cycles Mean Slower ##br##Semiconductor Sales Chart 6Cisco's Stock Price Is Close To Tech Bubble##br## Levels Despite Declining Revenue Cloud Service Providers: Most robots will be on line and some will likely use cloud services to offload computational effort and minimize cost. A relatively "dumb" robotic lawnmower which offloads control to a shared computational resource in the cloud would probably be cheaper than a much more capable fully autonomous system. This will increase demand for cloud services, however the challenge of declining margins (due to increased competition in the space) will offset cloud services revenue growth somewhat in the long term. On balance, Overweight-rated Microsoft and Alphabet/Google, as well as Amazon, stand to benefit. Chart 7Eastman Kodak Tried To Ignore The Shift ##br##To Digital Cameras Losers We believe companies who ignore the robotics revolution will find themselves at a significant competitive disadvantage. This is not unprecedented in the technology sector: Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) and Kodak vanished because their business models could not accommodate an obvious shift in their core markets (Chart 7). Similarly Intel and Microsoft completely missed the smartphone revolution. As we noted in our April 8, 2016 Special Report on AVs, the frequency and severity of crashes will decrease dramatically which will lead to reduced insurance rates, fewer repairs, and less money spent on accident related healthcare and rehabilitation. The economic losses of automobile crashes were estimated $871 billion in the US in 201021 and even a modest reduction in the frequency and severity of collisions due to partial automation would have a significant economic impact. "Dumb" Auto Parts Manufacturers: Fewer collisions will result in fewer repairs to people or vehicles. Auto parts manufacturers will fall into two camps: those with significant expertise in robotics will prosper, while those without such expertise will fall behind as the demand for replacement components (fenders, bumpers, doors, windshields, etc.) will decline. AVs are also likely to include advanced diagnostic and service reminder systems which will result in more timely service, reducing wear and tear on internal components as well. The Auto Insurance Industry: While it is doubtful robotics will ever eliminate auto accidents, the rate might be reduced to such a level that the auto-insurance industry, worth $157 billion in the US alone,22 will be much smaller in 20 years than it is today. This will be offset to a degree by greater demands for product liability insurance for AVs and robots in general. Brian Piccioni, Vice President Technology Sector Strategy brianp@bcaresearch.com Paul Kantorovich, Research Analyst paulk@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/robot 2 http://www.computersciencelab.com/ComputerHistory/HistoryPt2.htm 3 https://www.agclassroom.org/gan/timeline/farm_tech.htm 4 Please see European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Female Participation: Another Mega-Trend," dated April 6, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5 http://www.tomsguide.com/us/Forth-Valley-Royal-Robots-Serco-Medicine,news-7124.html 6 http://modernfarmer.com/2013/04/this-tractor-drives-itself/ 7 http://www.asirobots.com/mining/ 8 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/powering-australia/rio-rolls-out-the-robot-trucks/story-fnnnpqpy-1227090421535 9 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-25/rolls-royce-drone-ships-challenge-375-billion-industry-freight 10 http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/english/NEWS_EN/20141210/393619/ 11 http://www.golfcourseindustry.com/article/do-robotic-mowers-dream-of-electric-turf/ 12 http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/crash-avoidance-technologies/topicoverview 13 http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/preparing-for-a-future-labor-shortage/ 14 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/06/das.htm 15 http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/engineeringChange/robotics.html 16 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Google - AI And Cloud Strategy," dated April 25, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com. 17 http://www.fiercemobileit.com/press-releases/gartner-says-internet-things-will-transform-data-center 18 http://www.computerworld.com/article/2886316/mobile-networks-prep-for-the-internet-of-things.html 19 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Networking Equipment Update ," dated March 28, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com. 20 http://www.businessinsider.com/att-white-box-test-should-scare-cisco-juniper-2017-4 21 http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2014/NHTSA-study-shows-vehicle-crashes-have-$871-billion-impact-on-U.S.-economy,-society 22 http://www.bloomberg.c/bw/articles/2014-09-10/why-self-driving-cars-could-doom-the-auto-insurance-industry
Negative relative sales growth at retail drug stores has caused the S&P retail drug store index to underperform (top and second panels). However, the second derivative of the decline has turned positive, troughing early this year, but the sector's share of the consumer's wallet has barely changed since the share price slide began in 2015. Analysts' top line estimates have largely captured the modest improvements in the sales outlook; these pulled out of deflation last month for the first time since late-2016 (bottom panel). However, valuations have not followed suit, which appears to be the market assigning a too-high risk premium to the operating recovery. If, as we expect, sales at drug retailers have turned a corner, margins and multiples should expand, particularly since the industry has consolidated substantially since 2015. This should allow investors to recoup some of their losses. Stay overweight The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5DRUG - CVS, WBA.
The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of July 31st, 2017. The model has continued to reduce its allocation to the U.S. and now the U.S. allocation is the largest underweight. The funds from the U.S. are largely used to reduce the large underweight in the U.K. such that now the U.K. is in slight overweight. Other changes in the non-U.S. universe are the downgrade of Spain in favor of Germany, Italy and Netherland. These adjustments are mainly due to changes in liquidity indicators, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed its benchmark by 88 bps in July, entirely due to the 213 bps outperformance of Level 2 model where the overweight in Italy, Spain , Australia and Netherland vs the underweight in Japan, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland worked very well. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its benchmark by 257 bps. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of July 31, 2017. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The model continue to be bullish on global growth and hence the cyclical tilt. However, consumer discretionary is the only cyclical sector to have an underweight. This recommendation is mainly driven by the unfavorable liquidity and technical backdrop. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com.
Feature Recommended Allocation When Central Banks Turn Hawkish It seems almost as though, when central bank governors gathered in Portugal for the ECB's annual confab in late June, they agreed to start sounding more hawkish. ECB President Mario Draghi's speech included the line: "The threat of deflation is gone and reflationary forces are at play." Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz went ahead and on July 12 announced Canada's first rate hike in seven years. Indeed, BCA's Central Bank Monitors (Chart 1) suggest that, with the exceptions of Japan and possibly the euro area, all major developed central banks need to tighten monetary policy. Does this matter for risk assets, such as equities? Historical evidence suggests not, as long as the central bank is tightening because it is confident about the outlook for growth and unconcerned about financial risks (rather than, for example, reacting to a sharp rise in inflation). Equity markets typically move up in the early stages of a tightening cycle (Chart 2); it is only when the central bank tightens excessively (usually later in the cycle) that risk assets start to anticipate that this will trigger a recession. Even in the U.S. which, after four rate hikes since December 2015, is the furthest advanced in tightening, the real effective Fed Funds Rate is still -0.3%, below the 0.3% that the Fed believes to be the neutral real rate at the moment (Chart 3). The Fed expects the neutral rate to rise to 1% in the longer run. Chart 1Most Central Banks Need To Tighten Chart 2Equities Usually Rise During Rate Hike Cycle Chart 3Fed Policy Is Still Accommodative But the order in which central banks tighten will be a major driver of currencies (as has been clear with the sharp appreciation of the CAD and AUD in recent weeks). Our current asset recommendations are based on the belief that the market has become too complacent about the speed at which the Fed will tighten (with futures pricing only 26 bp of hikes over the next 12 months), and too nervous about the ECB (Chart 4). As the market starts to understand that the Fed has fallen a little behind the curve, and that the ECB will remain cautious (given continuing weakness in peripheral economies, and a lack of underlying inflationary pressures), we expect to see the dollar begin to appreciate again. A key to all this is whether the recent softness in U.S. inflation data (core PCE inflation has fallen from 1.8% YoY to 1.4% since January) proves to be temporary. A rebound in inflation would allow the Fed to continue to hike without bringing the real rate close to the neutral level yet. It is worth remembering that inflation is a lagging indicator: the recent weakness is largely a reflection of last year's soggy GDP growth (Chart 5), as well as some transitory technical factors (particularly drug and wireless data prices). The recent dollar depreciation should also boost inflation via the import price channel over the coming months (Chart 6). Chart 4Markets Views On Fed And ECB Have Diverged Chart 5Inflation Lags GDP Growth Chart 6Dollar Deprecation Will Raise Prices However, with global equities having produced a total return of 35% since their recent bottom in February last year, and 17% year to date, valuations are unattractive and, on some measures, sentiment is quite optimistic (Chart 7). What catalysts are there left to give risk assets further upside? We see two. First, earnings. The Q2 U.S. results season has seen 77% of S&P 500 companies surprising on the upside at the sales line, with EPS rising 7% compared to the same quarter in 2016. Most of our indicators suggest that earnings have further to rise this year (Chart 8), yet the consensus EPS forecast for 2017 as a whole remains at just over 10%, where it has been since January. Strong earnings momentum is likely to remain a positive at least through the end of the year. Second, tax cuts. Our Geopolitical Strategy service1 remains optimistic that the U.S. Congress will pass tax legislation to come into effect in early 2018. The failure to repeal Obamacare means that the Republican Party will need a big legislative win going into the mid-term elections in November 2017. Tax cuts (which the market is no longer pricing in - Chart 9) is one policy on which there is little disagreement within the GOP. Chart 7Are Investors Getting Too Optimistic? Chart 8Earnings Can Still Surprise On Upside Chart 9No One Expects Tax Cuts Any More None of the recession indicators we highlighted in our most recent Quarterly 2 (global PMIs, the shape of the yield curve, or credit spreads) are pointing to a downturn in the next 12 months. So, given the environment described above, we are happy to remain overweight equities versus bonds, and to maintain our pro-risk and pro-cyclical tilts. But we continue to warn of the risk of a recession in 2019 - probably triggered by the Fed needing to tighten more aggressively - and might look to lower our risk profile in the first half of next year. Equities: We favor DM equities over EM. An appreciating dollar, rising interest rates, weak industrial metals prices this year and uncertain growth prospects for China all represent headwinds for EM equities. Our strong dollar view points to an overweight in U.S. equities in USD terms but, in local currencies, our preference is for euro area and Japanese equities. Both are relatively high-beta, have strongly cyclical earnings momentum, and central banks that are likely to stay dovish. In Japan, the falling popularity rating of the Abe administration might compel it to ramp up fiscal spending to boost the economy, which would help the Bank of Japan in its efforts to rekindle inflation. Chart 10Everyone Has Turned Bullish On The Euro Fixed Income: Our macro outlook, with faster rate hikes and rebounding inflation in the U.S., is very negative for rates. We are underweight government bonds, short duration and prefer inflation-linked bonds to nominal ones. Valuations in credit are no longer particularly attractive but, with a 100 bp spread for U.S. investment grade bonds and a 230 bp default-adjusted spread for high-yield, returns are likely to be satisfactory as long as the economic cycle continues to improve. Currencies: Our fundamental view of the dollar is that relative monetary policy and interest rates point to further appreciation, especially against the yen and euro. The timing of the dollar's rebound, though, is harder to pinpoint. The euro could rise further over the next couple of months. However, given speculators' large net long positions in the euro - a big turnaround from the start of the year (Chart 10) - the likely announcement by the ECB in September or October of a reduction in its asset purchases might be the catalyst for a reversal (as a classic "buy the news, sell the rumor" event), particularly if Mario Draghi dresses it up as a "dovish tapering." Commodities: Oil inventories have begun to draw down in line with our expectations (Chart 11). Continued discipline by OPEC producers until next March, combined with a slowdown in the growth of U.S. shale production (reflecting the weaker crude price this year) should bring inventories down further (despite production increases in such countries as Libya and Iran), and push the price of WTI above $55 a barrel by year end. Industrial commodity prices have rebounded somewhat in the past six weeks, mainly on the back of moderately brighter economic data out of China (Chart 12). But, given uncertain prospects about the sustainability of this growth, especially beyond the Communist Party Congress in the fall, and amid some signs of weakness in Chinese monetary and credit aggregates,3 we remain cautious about the outlook for metals prices over the next 12 months. Chart 11Oil Inventories Will Draw Down Further in Chart 12Tick-Up In Chinese Data? Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bca.research.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Asset Allocation, "Quarterly Portfolio Review," dated July 3, 2107, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd," dated July 26, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Recommended Asset Allocation
Special Report This week we are sending you two Special Reports (both included in this document) that were previously published in the May and June editions of The Bank Credit Analyst. Both reports discuss the long-term outlook for global bond yields. The first report emphasizes the importance of demographics and the second focuses on the outlook for productivity growth. We are also sending a Weekly Report published jointly by our Global Fixed Income Strategy and U.S. Bond Strategy services. Highlights The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Feature In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart I-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart I-1Global Disequilibria The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Chart I-2Global Shifts In The Saving ##br##And Investment Curves Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart I-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart I-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart I-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart I-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart I-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart I-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart I-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. Chart I-6Hollowing Out The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart I-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart I-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart I-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart I-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart I-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart I-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart I-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Chart I-9Working-Age Population To Shrink In G7 And China Chart I-10Globalization Peaking? Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Chart I-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart I-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart I-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart I-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart I-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart I-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart I-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart I-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: Chart I-13Demographics And Capex Requirements Chart I-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart I-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart I-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table I-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table I-1Key Secular Drivers No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart I-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart I-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Chart I-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst MarkM@bcaresearch.com 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. Chart II-1Productivity Growth Has Slowed In Most Major Economies If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software Has ##br##Dampened IT Productivity Gains Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-4The Contribution To Growth ##br##From Rising Human Capital Is Falling Chart II-5Math Skills Around The World Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-6The Best Educated EMs Have The Worst Demographic Outlooks Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Emerging Markets: Interest Rates Tend To ##br##Be Higher Where Productivity Growth Is Weak Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In ##br##The 1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated ##br##The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-14Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-17Examples Of Capital-Biased ##br##Technological Change It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-20A Winner-Take-All Economy Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks ##br##To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.
Investors have shunned telecom services stocks vehemently year-to-date (YTD) on the back of an abysmal profit showing. Telecom services stocks are down 9%, while the S&P is up 10% YTD. In fact, in Q1 telecom services stocks were the sole sector to register negative year-over-year EPS growth on trough Q1/2016 earnings comparisons. Nevertheless, we do not want to overstay our welcome and are booking profits of 12% and lifting the S&P telecom services sector to the neutral column. Our Cyclical Macro Indicator (CMI) has arrested its fall giving us comfort that at least a lateral move in relative share prices is likely in coming months (top panel). The steep recalibration of cost structures to the new pricing reality is buttressing our CMI, offsetting the sector's plummeting share of the consumer's wallet (second panel). Encouragingly, selling prices cannot contract at 10% per annum indefinitely, and on a three month-rate of change basis, pricing power has staged a V-shaped recovery (third panel). Impressive labor cost discipline along with even a modest pricing power rebound signal that a grinding higher margin backdrop is likely in the coming months, in line with our margin proxy reading (bottom panel) Bottom Line: Lock in gains of 12% in the S&P telecom services sector and lift exposure to neutral. For additional details, please see yesterday's Weekly Report. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: T, VZ, LVLT, CTL.