Developed Countries

Highlights Neither the weakness in emerging market economies nor political turmoil in Europe are likely to significantly affect the U.S. economy. Although the U.S. economy is increasingly service-oriented, financial markets have become more bound to the manufacturing economy in the past 30 years. The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. Our energy strategists believe that the risks for oil prices remain biased to the upside, although we are less bullish in view of OPEC 2.0's possible production increases in the near future. Feature U.S. risk assets are rebounding amid solid economic news and rising hopes that another Eurozone financial crisis has been averted. Still, investors remain concerned about rising rates, protectionist trade policies, and the health of emerging market economies. In addition, market participants continue to scan the U.S. economic data in both the manufacturing and service sectors looking for signs that the late-cycle phase of the expansion is ending and that a recession is nigh. The NASDAQ and small cap U.S. stocks rallied past their February peaks last week, but the S&P 500 remains 3.7% below its early 2018 heights. Moreover, BCA's stock-to-bond ratio continues in an uptrend and we expect stocks to beat bonds in the next year. However, neither U.S. high-yield spreads nor the VIX have returned to their January lows. 10-year Treasury yields are 53 bps higher and the dollar is up by 5%. West Texas Intermediate oil prices peaked at $72.26/bbl on May 21. We discuss BCA's latest view on oil later in this report. U.S. economic growth remains solid. May's reading (58.6) on the ISM non-manufacturing index released last week is consistent with 3.5% real GDP growth. Moreover, the May sounding (58.7) on manufacturing indicates that the U.S. economy is growing near 5%. We discuss the signal from both the ISM's manufacturing and non-manufacturing indicators in the next section. In any case, U.S. economic activity in 1H 2018 will easily surpass the FOMC's view of both potential GDP growth (1.8%) and its estimate for actual growth in 2018 (2.7%) (Chart 1). The Fed will provide a new set of dot plots and economic forecasts this week. BCA expects the Fed to bump up rates this week and then gradually during the next year. The Fed and the market's view of the path of rates in the next 12 months is aligned (Chart 2). However, BCA's stance is that inflation will accelerate in 2019, which would elicit a more aggressive response from the central bank starting in the second half of 2019. Our view is that the Fed will stick to its gradual path unless economic growth is much weaker than expected or inflation spikes higher. Moreover, because inflation is at the Fed's 2% target and the economy is at full employment, the price at which the Fed's "policy put" gets exercised is much lower than earlier in the cycle. The implication is that neither the weakness in emerging market economies nor political turmoil in Europe are likely to significantly affect the U.S. economy. Still, a wider trade war is a risk to U.S. and global growth, and we address this issue in the service sector below. Chart 11H GDP Tracking Well Above##BR##Potential & Fed's Forecast Chart 2Fed And Market Aligned##BR##On Rate Path In Next 12 Months On The Same Page The ISM surveys - manufacturing and non-manufacturing - are aligned. The top panel of Chart 3 shows that both metrics have climbed since their troughs in late 2015 (manufacturing) and early 2016 (non-manufacturing). These lows occurred amid EM-related economic and market turbulence. The 2015 nadir in the manufacturing series was more pronounced, thus the rise outpaced the non-manufacturing indicator (panel 2). U.S. financial markets, and the stock market more specifically, are sensitive to the performance of the manufacturing sector. The service sector accounts for 62% of U.S. economic activity and 86% of private-sector employment (Chart 4). Charts 5 and 6 show the relationship between the year-over-year change in BCA's stock-to-bond ratio and the level of manufacturing (Chart 5) versus non-manufacturing (Chart 6) composites. The relationship (r-squared 0.56) between our stock-to-bond ratio and the manufacturing sector is more robust that the r-squared (0.43) between the stock-to-bond ratio and the non-manufacturing sector. Chart 3Manufacturing And Non-Manufacturing ISM Are Aligned, But That's Not Always The Case Chart 4U.S. Economy Is 60% Services... Although the U.S. economy is increasingly service-oriented, Charts 7 and 8 show that the financial markets have become more bound to the manufacturing economy in the past 30 years. Between 1958 and 1988, the r-squared between our stock-to-bond ratio and manufacturing data was 0.19 (Chart 7). That increased to 0.34 from 1988 to 2018 (Chart 8). Chart 5Tighter Relationship Between##BR##Stock-To-Bond Ratio And Manufacturing ISM... Chart 6... Than With##BR##Non Manufacturing ISM Chart 7ISM Manufacturing Vs.##BR##Stock-To-Bond Ratio 1958-1988... Chart 8... And##BR##1988-2018 Chart 9 shows that there have been six other periods when the manufacturing index recovered more quickly than non-manufacturing. Five of the intervals were associated with EM stress.1 Moreover, as is currently the case, the economy was at or below full employment in four of the six occasions when manufacturing outpaced the service sector. Furthermore, the Fed initiated rate hikes in four of the seven episodes, including the current one (Appendix Chart 1). EM stocks tend to outpace U.S. equities as the non-manufacturing index rises faster than the manufacturing index. In addition, when the U.S. manufacturing sector is accelerating relative to the service sector, China's growth prospects (as measured by the LI Keqiang Index) improve. Chart 9Performance Of EM Assets When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM The peak in our Relative ISM composite index is consistent with BCA's view that the economic expansion that began in 2009 is nearing an end. Our Relative ISM Composite dipped prior to the 2001 recession, but began to rise as the 2007-2009 downturn commenced. Both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing indices collapsed at the same pace prior to the 2007-2009 recession, because the breakdown of the banking system related to the housing crisis weighed on the non-manufacturing data. Unfortunately, the ISM non-manufacturing data only begins in 1997. However, using the goods and service-sector GDP as proxies for the ISM metrics, we find that the manufacturing sector tends to underperform the service sector in the late stages of an expansion (Chart 10). Our earlier work2 details the performance of U.S. financial assets in a late-cycle environment. Chart 10Manufacturing Sector Tends To Underperform The Service Sector In Late Cycle Environments Bottom Line: Last year's "global synchronized growth" story is showing signs of wear. While the U.S. economy will enjoy a strong rebound in the second quarter, leading economic indicators in most of the other major countries have rolled over. The advanced stage of the U.S. business cycle, heightened geopolitical risks and our bias for capital preservation keep us tactically cautious on risk assets again this month. Service Sector: An Update Even with the increasingly dominant role of the service sector (Chart 4 again), the majority of high frequency economic data measures activity in the manufacturing sector. However, the Quarterly Services Survey (QSS) initiated in 2003-2004 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), measures the service sector which includes small- and medium-sized companies3 and produces timely revenue figures on a quarterly basis. The dataset is used primarily by the BEA to paint a more accurate picture of national accounts, notably personal consumption and the intellectual property segment of private-fixed investment. The survey is also essential for FOMC policymakers because it is very useful to track economic performance. Moreover, the QSS is an important source of revisions to real GDP because over 40% of the quarterly estimates of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) for services is based on the QSS. The "key services statistics" include information services, health care services, professional, scientific and technical services, administrative and support, and waste management and remediation services. The QSS for Q1 2018 found that total revenues for selected services fell by 1.2% over the previous quarter but rose 5.2% over the last four quarters (in nominal terms and only non-seasonally adjusted data available). Nominal GDP climbed 4.7% year-over-year in Q1 (Chart 11). Several areas of the service economy saw sales growth in Q1 outpace nominal GDP. Sales were strongest in finance and insurance (+7.8%) followed by information (+7%). Real estate and rental leasing sales increased by 4.7% in the past year while revenue in health care & social assistance rose +3.4%. Together, sales in finance & insurance and health care & social assistance make up about 50% of total revenues. Chart 11Many Areas Of Service Sector##BR##Advancing Faster Than Nominal GDP Chart 12Sales Growth In The Service Sector##BR##Is Broad Based However, revenue growth in several categories decelerated in Q1 and grew more slowly than nominal GDP. Arts, entertainment and recreation, administration support and waste management, and other services are in this category. Bottom Line: Given that the majority of service industries from the QSS sample survey continue to show upward momentum, perhaps we will see a similar revision to real consumer spending for services for the third estimate of Q1 real GDP in late June (Chart 12). We continue to expect U.S. GDP growth to match or exceed the Fed's modest target for 2018. This above-trend growth will continue to put downward pressure on the unemployment rate and push inflation higher, setting the stage for a more aggressive Fed next year and a recession in 2020. The Wrong Trade War? The large trade surplus in the U.S. service sector is a hidden source of strength for the economy and labor market (Chart 13). President Trump campaigned on his ability to create high-paying manufacturing jobs and he has focused his attention on the goods side of the U.S. trade deficit. Nonetheless, his America First rhetoric threatens jobs in the high-paying service sector. Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has imported more than it has exported, acting as a drag on GDP growth. The trade gap reflects a large and persistent goods deficit, which more than offsets a growing trade surplus on the service side (Chart 14). U.S. imported goods exceeded exports by $807 billion in 2017. Service exports reached an all-time high of $798 billion in 2017 - $255 billion more than imports - up from $249 billion in 2016. It is too soon to tell if the smaller surplus in services is related to Trump's protectionist trade rhetoric. Exports of services have increased by 6% a year on average since 2000, which is nearly twice as fast as nominal GDP. Service exports expanded by just 4% in 2017 versus 2016, which is below the pace of nominal GDP (4.7%) The trade surplus in services subtracted 0.08% from real GDP in Q1 2018, but added 0.05% in 2017. Moreover, the trade surplus in services has consistently added to GDP growth over the past few decades, although the trade surplus in services is swamped by the large drag on GDP due to the trade deficit on goods. Industries where the U.S. enjoys a trade surplus have experienced job growth that is faster than in industries where the U.S. runs a deficit. In addition, median wages ($30.07 as of April 2018) among surplus-producing industries are more than 20% higher than in industries in the goods sector ($24.94) where there is a trade deficit. Moreover, wages in the trade-oriented service sector have escalated quicker than in the goods-producing sector in the past year (Chart 15). Chart 13The U.S. Runs Trade##BR##Surplus In Services... Chart 14...But It's Not Large Enough To Offset##BR##The Big Trade Deficit In Goods Chart 15Wages In Export-Led Service Industries##BR##21% Higher Than In Goods Sector Furthermore, exports in the U.S. service sector tend to compete on quality (not on price) and, therefore, will not be as affected as U.S. goods exports if the dollar meets BCA's forecast for a modest increase this year (Chart 16). That said, the Trump administration's trade policies threaten to reduce the U.S.'s global dominance in services. Chart 16Services Exports Compete On Quality, Not Price Table 1 shows that the U.S. has the largest trade surplus in travel ($82 billion surplus in 2016), intellectual property ($80 billion), financial services ($73 billion) and other business services ($43 billion), which includes legal, accounting, consulting and architectural services. The U.S. also runs a surplus in maintenance and repair services. Table 1Key Components Of U.S. Trade Surplus In Services Trump's trade and immigration policies put this trade surplus at risk. In 2016, foreigners spent $82 billion more to vacation in, travel to, and be educated in the U.S. than what U.S. citizens spent on those services overseas. Moreover, a recent U.N. report4 noted that "Global flows of foreign direct investment fell by 23 per cent in 2017. Cross-border investment in developed and transition economies dropped sharply, while growth was near zero in developing economies." If foreign governments continue to react to Trump's directives on trade and immigration, then the U.S. trade advantage in financial services ($73 billion), software services ($29 billion), TV and film rights ($12 billion), architectural services ($5 billion) and advertising ($10 billion) will also be at risk. Bottom Line: The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. The Trump administration's rhetoric and actions on trade and globalism potentially risks America's dominance in the service sector. In theory, U.S. trade restrictions could add to U.S. GDP growth via increased manufacturing output and a smaller goods trade deficit. However, many U.S. trading partners have already announced tariffs on U.S. goods which will put the brakes on growth. Even so, any gains on the manufacturing trade front could be largely offset by damage to the U.S. surplus in services trade. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service expects that trade-related uncertainty will persist at least until the midterm elections in November.5 On a related note, an increase in onshore oil production in the past 10 years reduced the U.S's large trade deficit in petroleum and petroleum products. BCA's energy strategists recently updated their oil price and production forecasts for this year and next. Still Bullish On Oil BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service remains bullish on oil, although two key elements of the outlook makes forecasting particularly difficult.6 Our base case forecast has been bullish for some time, based on our assumption that OPEC 2.0 would retain its previous output cuts, at least through the end of 2018. Venezuela's production has contracted sharply and we penciled in a further modest decline. Iranian exports will also shrink due to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions. The only substantial growth on the production side is expected to come from U.S. shale producers. The supply/demand backdrop pointed toward higher prices with world demand projected to remain robust. We estimated that Brent could reach $90/bbl early next year. Chart 17Ensemble Forecast Accounts For##BR##Collapse In Venezuela's Exports However, some major oil consumers, including the U.S., are starting to complain. The U.S. has asked the OPEC 2.0 countries to increase output, which may remove further upward pressure on prices. OPEC 2.0's leadership has signaled that it will consider reversing the production cuts during the second half of this year. This could add an extra 870 b/d of production. The other major unknown is how much further Venezuelan production will slide. Our oil strategists have run alternative scenarios to gauge the risks to the base case. The optimistic case sees OPEC 2.0 retaining production cuts and Venezuelan production dipping by another 1m b/d. The pessimistic case sees OPEC 2.0 reversing the production cuts, while Venezuelan production erodes modestly compared with the base and optimistic cases. Chart 17 shows that Brent hits $100/bbl in 2019 in the optimistic case, but drops to $60 in the pessimistic scenario. The ensemble forecast, shown in red in Chart 17, is a weighted average of the three scenarios. It shows that the price of oil will be roughly flat over the next 18 months. Bottom Line: Our energy strategists believe that the risks for oil prices remain biased to the upside, although we are less bullish in view of OPEC 2.0's possible production increases in the near future. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix Chart 1Fed Policy And Labor Market Slack When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Cleanup On Aisle Two", published June 4, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View," published October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.census.gov/services/qss/about_the_survey.html 4 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_overview_en.pdf 5 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China," April 4, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again", published May 31,2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Highlights Since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 there have been five major episodes where U.S. dollar moves were not uniform across all currencies. These episodes share common features: a rallying broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar, desynchronized global growth and falling commodity prices. The above conditions will likely be met in the coming months, producing a period of global currency divergence. Commodity and EM currencies will weaken the most against the U.S. dollar, then against the yen, and finally depreciating the least against the euro. Feature It is often assumed that the dollar behaves like a monolith. However, this is not always the case: some currencies do manage to occasionally buck the dollar's general trend (Chart 1). Interestingly, the yen is most often the currency that manages to avoid the broad dollar's general directionality. Chart 1Episodes Of Currency Divergence ##br##Versus the Dollar Our view has been and remains that the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar still has meaningful upside this year, and that the EM currency complex will be under heavy selling pressure in the coming months. That said, it is worth asking whether all other currencies will share the same fate against a rising broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar, or whether some could diverge from the general dollar trend. This is essentially akin to trying to understand the pecking order of currencies outside the USD. To address these challenges, we believe it is important to understand how global growth will evolve, how relative growth dynamics among regions will shift, and how commodity prices will perform over the coming six to 12 months. When The Dollar Wears Many Masks There have been five major periods of currency divergence versus the U.S. dollar. These have lasted anywhere from one to three years (Table 1). Table 1Summary Of Currency Divergence Episodes Interestingly, they share some common features, heeding important insights for global investors. These features are as follows: 1) Common feature #1: A Rising Broad Trade-Weighted Dollar With the exception of the 2005-2007 episode, all other episodes where some currencies diverged from the general trend in the USD occurred when the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar was in a bull market. 2) Common feature #2: Desynchronized Global Growth All episodes of divergence in the FX market occurred when global growth was desynchronized. This underscores the importance of growth as a key driver of FX movements. During the 1991-1993 period, the yen was able to buck the dollar's strength (Chart 2) even though Japanese growth was falling quite fast relative to the U.S. Explaining this seeming inconsistency was the policy conducted by the Bank of Japan at the time. The BoJ was cutting rates, from 6% in 1991 to below 2% in 1993, but it was not doing so fast enough to alleviate budding deflationary pressures. As a result, Japanese real interest rates did not fall. This caused real rate differentials to move firmly in favor of the yen. In the final months of 1991, Japanese 2-year and 10-year real rate spreads versus the U.S. were 50 basis points and -75 basis points respectively, but by June 1993, these spreads became 145 basis points and 115 basis points. In the 1995-1996 episode, all the economic blocks experienced a slowdown in growth relative to the U.S. While this time the yen plunged versus the dollar, commodity currencies managed to appreciate against the dollar. This was because commodity prices rose during this timeframe, creating a positive terms-of-trade tailwind that lifted these currencies (Chart 3). Chart 2Episode 1: The Yen Diverges Chart 3Commodity Currencies Diverge In 1997 and 1998, the euro was the currency that managed to remain stable versus the U.S dollar, while the yen and commodity currencies sagged meaningfully (Chart 4).The euro was able to defy the gravity of a strong dollar because the euro area's relative growth differential versus the U.S. remained stable. Essentially, in the late '90s, as the euro area periphery was enjoying the full dividend of convergence toward the living standards of core Europe, European domestic demand was left unaffected by the Asian crisis. Meanwhile, commodity producers and Japan - two groups with much deeper links with EM economies - were experiencing deeper repercussions from the EM economic contraction. The 2005-2007 period of de-synchronized currency action against the dollar is somewhat of an outlier (Chart 5). First, this particular episode of currency divergence materialized in an environment where the dollar was weak. Chart 4Episode 3: The Euro Diverges Chart 5Episode 4: The Yen Diverges Again Second, the outlier was the yen, which managed to depreciate against the dollar while all other currencies were strengthening against the greenback. Chart 6Episode 5: The Euro Diverges again Third, while Japanese growth was below that of the U.S. it was not falling versus the U.S. However, this still caused Japan to be the odd man out in terms of growth performance, as other economic blocs delivered better growth than the U.S. Moreover, Japan was not experiencing the same growth dividend from China's miraculous boom as emerging Asian or commodity producers were. Adding fuel to the fire was the endemic implementation of carry trades. The low FX and rate volatility of that era was an invitation to engage in this kind of strategy.1 But Japan's deflation, along with its sub-par economic performance when compared to non-U.S. economies, re-assured investors that the BoJ would keep rates at rock-bottom levels for the foreseeable future. This was an invitation to investors to sell the yen to fund these carry trades in EM and commodity currencies as well as the euro. Finally, during the 2012-2013 episode the euro area was the global growth laggard. However, the euro was the currency that was able to strengthen against the dollar, defying the greenback's broad appreciation (Chart 6). It is true that euro area domestic demand growth was slightly improving versus the U.S. More importantly though, this was the time period that followed European Central Bank President Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" speech. These soothing words caused the break-up risk premia across euro area member states to collapse, lifting the euro in the process. 3) Common feature #3: Commodity Prices Were Falling In three out of five episodes, commodity prices were falling, which is consistent with the fact that four out of the five episodes were periods of broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar strength. The only exceptions were the 1995-1996 and 2005-2007 episodes, where commodities rallied. The latter period was further marked by a weak broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar. Bottom Line: Looking back at history, there have been five episodes where some major currencies diverged from the U.S. dollar's broad trend. In the majority of these episodes, the broad trade-weighted U.S dollar was rising, global growth was desynchronized, and commodity prices were falling. When Is The Next Episode On The Air? The aforementioned three common features can be thought of as pre-conditions for some currency divergence to transpire. So, when can investors expect the next episode to hit the proverbial airwaves? In our view, this scenario is most likely to materialize over the coming six to 12 months. Our main macro themes have been and remain2 that the global macro landscape over the coming months will be shaped by two tectonic shifts: on the one hand, America's fiscal stimulus will sustain robust U.S. growth, and on the other hand, the continued slowdown in money and credit in China will culminate in a relapse in capital spending. The Chinese leg of the scenario will depress commodity prices and consequently emerging market economies; meanwhile, thanks to considerable fiscal stimulus, easy financial conditions and relative economic insularity, U.S. growth will remain steady, leaving it as the global growth outperformer. These dynamics are bullish for the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar: The U.S. economy is growing robustly despite rising interest rates. In fact, interest rate-sensitive sectors are showing no signs of slowing down, confirming the resilience of the economy at this stage of the cycle. Both the housing market and commercial lending standards are not flagging growth risks (Chart 7). Chart 8 demonstrates that BCA's broad money measure (M3) for China leads import volumes and industrial metals prices by about six months. Based on the indicator's track record, odds are that industrial commodity prices will fall meaningfully over the coming months. Chart 7U.S. Economy Is Weathering##br## Rising Interest Rates Chart 8China's Money/Credit Is Bearish ##br##For Industrial Metals While oil prices could hold out for longer due to supply dynamics and geopolitics, positioning remains extremely elevated. As such, we are not ruling out a meaningful pullback in crude as traders head for the exits - all in the context of slowing global demand. Bottom Line: Pieces are falling in place to create the conditions necessary for some currency decoupling: global growth is set to become desynchronized, and commodity prices are likely to weaken - all in the context of a rising broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar. A Reverse Currency Pecking Order Slowing global trade as well as a growth deceleration in China's capital spending and demand for commodities will have the biggest repercussions for commodity and EM Asian currencies (Chart 9). This leaves the euro and the yen as the two most likely candidates to potentially diverge from the broad U.S. dollar in this coming episode. In our view, we think the yen could win this title. First, while the euro area economy is less leveraged to a slowdown in China/EM than Japan, it is still extremely vulnerable. Investors are still very long the euro, and therefore are vulnerable to negative surprises. Euro area industrial production could be the impulse to continue generating underwhelming economic numbers, as it is very much leveraged to China (Chart 10), mainly due to Germany's own deep trade links with EM and China. Notably, the German IFO index for business expectations in German manufacturing - a good leading indicator for global trade - is pointing to a further slowdown in global exports (Chart 11, top panel). Furthermore, German manufacturing new orders from non-euro area countries are starting to roll over, suggesting German exports will weaken imminently (Chart 11, middle panel). Lastly, the Swiss KOF leading indicator has come in below 100 (Chart 11, bottom pane Chart 9EM Asia & Commodity Currencies To Remain Weak Chart 10When China Decelerates, So Does Europe Chart 11Global Trade Is Slowing Down Second, it seems that historically the yen has a greater ability to rally than the euro when commodity prices are falling or when the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is in a bull market, highlighting the counter-cyclical nature of the Japanese currency. This happened in the early to mid-'90s and in 2008 (Chart 12). The only exception was in 1998, when the euro was able to rally amid a selloff in commodity prices and a strengthening dollar because domestic growth was so resilient. Today, euro area domestic growth is healthier than it was in 2012-2013, but it is still much weaker than is the case in the U.S., especially as the latter is receiving a shot in the arm thanks to a large dose of late-cycle stimulus. Chart 12The Yen Has Counter Cyclical Attributes Chart 13Euro Long Positioning Is Higher Than For The Yen As such, we believe the euro has more downside than the yen against the U.S. dollar in this coming episode. Furthermore, speculators remain too long the euro versus the yen (Chart 13). Third, the yen is a crucial funding currency in global carry trades, while the euro has not been used by traders for this purpose over the past 18 months.3 As such, a selloff in EM and commodity currencies, which is our base case, could spur a rush to the exits for short yen positions, while the euro is not likely to benefit from a similar short squeeze. Additionally, Japan sports a large positive net international investment position of US$3.1 trillion, while Europe's stands at -US$0.6 trillion. Consequently, Japanese investors have proportionally more funds held abroad than European investors to repatriate home in the event of an upsurge in global/EM market volatility, adding a further impetus for the yen to buck the dollar trend. One of the best currency valuation metrics is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs, because it takes into account both wages and productivity. Unfortunately, this data set does not exist for all countries. On this metric, the U.S. dollar is not expensive (Chart 14, top panel). Adding credence to our view that the yen will be more resilient than the euro this year, according to the unit labor costs-based measures, the JPY appears to be cheap in trade-weighted terms and relative to the EUR (Chart 14, bottom panel). Chart 14The Yen Is Cheaper Than the Euro,##br## Dollar Is Fairly Valued Chart 15The Korean Won##br## Is Expensive Chart 16Commodity Currencies ##br##Are Not Cheap The Korean won - the only emerging Asian currency for which this measure is available - seems to be expensive (Chart 15). Chart 16 demonstrates that commodity currencies including those of Australia, New Zealand and Chile are on the expensive side, while the Canadian dollar and the Colombian peso are fairly valued. Bottom Line: Putting all the pieces together, our reverse pecking order for global investors from the weakest to strongest currency against the U.S. dollar is as follows: commodity currencies, non-commodities EM currencies (primarily Asian), the euro, and the yen. Investment Conclusions We recommend the following strategy to best navigate the coming global currency divergence episode over the coming six to 12 months: Global asset allocators should underweight the following currencies, from most to least, in the following order: First, the extremely vulnerable commodity currencies (BRL, IDR, ZAR, CLP, COP, AUD, NZD, NOK, and CAD); second, the EM Asian currencies (KRW, MYR, SGD, TWD, and PHP); third, the euro; and lastly, the yen. Currency traders stand to benefit the most in this coming episode by going short commodity and EM Asian currencies versus the U.S. dollar. That said, Japanese and European investors also stand to benefit by selling or underweighting commodity and EM currencies. The yen and the euro will depreciate significantly less than commodity and EM currencies, with the yen potentially ending flat versus the U.S. dollar. To capture these dynamics we suggest a new currency trade: long JPY / short SGD. The rationale behind this trade is that the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) manages the Singapore dollar against a basket of currencies of its major trading partners. Consequently, if as we anticipate the Japanese yen strengthens versus all other currencies with the exception of the greenback, the MAS will likely have to depreciate the Singapore dollar versus the yen. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Two Tectonic Macro Shifts", dated January 31, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Euro: Risk On Or Risk Off?", dated November 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Overweight (High Conviction) The S&P air freight index has been on a tear in recent months, after putting in a bottom earlier this year. It appears the market is valuing rising global trade driving a surge in revenues over a run up in fuel costs that will be a headwind for margins. We would concur. Domestic business conditions are nearly as good as they get, which has historically coincided with rising global air freight volumes (second panel). This rising demand, combined with relatively flat capacity growth, puts pricing power squarely in the hands of the logistics providers (third panel). We think the necessary conditions are in place to improve profit despite rising input costs. While the performance of the S&P air freight index has been solid recently, the growth in forward EPS estimates has been stronger, meaning valuations have barely budged from their steep discount to both normal and the market (bottom panel). We expect this situation is unlikely to persist with the most likely scenario being strong stock price performance, particularly if input costs begin to recede. Accordingly, we reiterate our high conviction overweight recommendation on the air freight index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRF - UPS, FDX, CHRW, EXPD.

Special Report

Highlights North Korea is a geopolitical opportunity more than a risk to markets - the key regional risk comes from U.S.-China tensions; China's geopolitical rise, and the fear of a U.S. attack on North Korea, is driving the two Koreas together; The U.S. can accept something less than complete denuclearization - such as inspections and a missile freeze; The path of peace and eventual unification removes the risk of disruption to the global economy and is positive for South Korea's currency and certain assets. Feature We at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy have been optimists about the diplomatic tack in North Korea since September 2017.1 Our optimism stands in stark contrast to our pessimism about U.S.-China relations. U.S.-China trade tensions will create an ongoing headwind for assets linked to the status quo of Sino-American engagement (Chart 1). U.S. President Donald Trump's threat to move forward with tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese goods - and his decision to impose steel and aluminum tariffs on China and others - lends credence to our long-held view that globalization has peaked.2 The seal on protectionism has been broken by the country known as the guarantor of free trade (Chart 2). Chart 1Trade Tensions Far From Resolved Chart 2The U.S. Has Broken The Seal On Protectionism Trade tensions are also spilling out into strategic areas of disagreement, as we expected.3 This week, Defense Secretary James Mattis warned China that the U.S. will maintain a "steady drumbeat" of freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea (Diagram 1). The goal is to reject China's claims of sovereignty over the sea and the rocks and reefs within it.4 The potential for a geopolitical incident or "Black Swan" event to occur in the South China Sea - or even the Taiwan Strait - is high. Diagram 1The U.S. Is Pushing Back Against China's Maritime-Territorial Claims For investors, the secular decline in U.S.-China ties and the "apex of globalization" are much more relevant than what happens on the Korean peninsula - as long as the peninsula does not become the central battleground between the two great powers in a replay of the devastating 1950-53 war. In this report we argue that it will not. The current round of diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea is likely to bear fruit in a diplomatic settlement of some kind, even a peace treaty, by 2020.5 Investors should see North Korea as a geopolitical opportunity rather than a geopolitical risk. While North Korea can still contribute to volatility, we recommend investors monitor U.S.-China trade tensions, the East and South China Seas, and Taiwan as the chief sources of market-relevant geopolitical risk in this region going forward. Elsewhere, U.S.-Iran tensions are the key understated geopolitical risk to markets. China: Hiding In Plain Sight The current diplomatic effort in the Koreas has a powerful tailwind behind it: the rise of China. China's re-emergence simply cannot be overstated. It is on track to reclaim its historic role as the world's largest economy (Chart 3A) and is developing naval, air, space and cyber-space capabilities that are rapidly eroding the U.S.'s military supremacy (Chart 3B). The rise of China vis-à-vis the U.S. is the single biggest difference between today's attempts to resolve the Korean issue and previous attempts in the 1990s and 2000s. China is reaching a critical mass that is changing the behavior of the states around it (Chart 4). Chart 3AChina's Economic Revival: ##br##The Long View Chart 3BChina's Comprehensive ##br##Geopolitical Power Rising Chart 4EM Economic ##br##Reliance On China As a result, a number of anomalies are occurring throughout the region: The United States is trying to revive its Pacific presence, yet cannot decide how: From 2010-16, the U.S. sought a historic deal with Iran that would enable it to wash its hands of the Middle East and "pivot to Asia." The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was envisioned as an advanced trade deal - excluding China - that would integrate the Pacific Rim economies under a new trade framework; China would have to reform its economy in order to join. Under President Trump, however, the U.S. canceled the TPP and revoked the Iranian deal,6 while maintaining the pivot to Asia through "hard power" tactics. The Washington establishment is unified in its desire to toughen policy on China, but it is divided about how to do so - a sign of the enormity of the challenge. Japan is taking drastic, 1930s-style measures to reflate its economy, which is necessary to revive its overall strategic capability. Military spending is on the rise (Chart 5). Symbolically, the pacifist Article Nine in the post-WWII constitution may be revised next year.7 Taiwan is distancing itself from China, with Beijing-skeptic candidates dominating every level of government since the 2014 and 2016 elections. The Taiwanese increasingly see themselves as exclusively Taiwanese, not also Chinese (Chart 6) - making Taiwan a potential source of "Black Swan" events.8 Chart 5Japan's 'Re-Militarization' Chart 6Majority Of Taiwanese Are Exclusively Taiwanese Southeast Asian states are vacillating. Filipinos and South Koreans recently voted against confrontation with China while Malaysians have voted against excessive Chinese influence; Thailand's junta has warmed up to Beijing while Myanmar's junta has sought some distance. The common thread is the desire to do something about China.9 India, long known for its independent foreign policy and "non-aligned" status in the Cold War, has begun courting deeper relationships with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, for fear of China. Even Russia, one of Beijing's closest partners, is engaged in talks with Japan that could result in a peace treaty, allowing these two to bury the hatchet and create economic and strategic options outside of China's control.10 Australia - the country with the most favorable view of China in the West (Chart 7) - is in the midst of an internal crisis over China that has recently broken out into a direct diplomatic spat resulting in Beijing imposing discrete economic sanctions. It goes without saying that China's rise is being felt with extreme sensitivity on the Korean peninsula. Korean kingdoms have historically struggled either to maintain their independence from China or to avoid becoming the battleground in China's conflicts with outside powers. North Korea has taken this dependency to the extreme. Trade data shows that its links to China have grown substantially since the Global Financial Crisis. China's stimulus-fueled economic boom increased commodity imports, while international sanctions cut off Pyongyang's access to most other foreign capital. The strategic vulnerability is revealed both before and after China's enforcement of sanctions in 2017 (Chart 8).11 Chart 7Australia And Russia Are China's Best Friends Chart 8North Korea's Over-Reliance On China Chinese President Xi Jinping's ascendancy - marked by his strict personal control of the ruling party and scrapping of term limits - has reinforced the North's vulnerability. Like his predecessor Jiang Zemin (1992-2004), Xi represents a faction in the Communist Party of China that sees Pyongyang as more of a liability than an asset. North Korea's anxiety can be marked by Kim Jong Un's attempts to reduce the "pro-China" faction within the North Korean state. For instance, he has ordered the execution of his uncle, Jang Song Taek, who was close to Beijing, and his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, who lived in Macao and was China's "alternative" to Kim.12 In effect, the next few years offer what is probably North Korea's last chance to create some new strategic options with South Korea and the rest of the world if it is to avoid being a mere vassal state for the coming centuries. Pyongyang's chief security threat is the United States and it has pursued a nuclear deterrent for decades in order to be able to negotiate with the U.S. for regime survival. The deterrent gives the North some independence, but normalizing ties with South Korea and the U.S. would enable the North to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on China. South Korea is also fearful that the coming decades will bring a Chinese empire that effectively swallows North Korea and surrounds Seoul. Eventually the North must liberalize and industrialize its economy: will South Korea have a part in this process, or will China take it all? South Korean President Moon Jae-in wishes to reduce the risk of war prompted by North Korea's conflict with the United States, but he also wishes to gain leverage over the North so that China does not absorb its economy. In short, the historic re-emergence of China is encouraging Korean integration, as the two Korean states begin to reconsider their relationship and national needs in the face of global "multipolarity" and great power competition.13 The strategic logic is thus pushing toward Korean unification, even if unification is in practice a long way away. A unified Korean peninsula would rise toward the level of Japan in comprehensive geopolitical power (see Chart 3B above). With a population of 75 million, South Korean technological prowess, and at least nuclear potential (if not outright capability), the Koreas would be better prepared to defend their interests against China and other neighbors than they are separately. In a multipolar world, strength in numbers has an appealing strategic logic. Unification, however, will be extremely costly for the ruling elites of both North and South Korea, possibly prohibitive. It is not within our five-year forecast horizon. Instead, economic engagement will be the main focus, a necessary but not sufficient step toward unification. Bottom Line: China's rise, as it pertains to Korea, is underestimated by investors. It is putting pressure on the two Koreas to cooperate, create some solidarity, and expand their economic and strategic options over the long run. It is also putting pressure on the U.S. to encourage this process and try to remove or reduce the nuclear threat through economic engagement rather than war. How Is "Moonshine" Different From "Sunshine"? South Korean President Moon Jae-in won a sweeping victory in the election of May 2017 on a promise to renew South Korea's engagement with the North. His agenda has been nicknamed "Moonshine policy."14 Will Moonshine actually work? In addition to China's rise, several of today's political trends are supportive of a diplomatic settlement: North Korean leadership change: Power succession and consolidation: Kim is not the rash and inexperienced youth that many feared upon his coming to power in 2011. Instead he has consolidated power within the regime and waged high-stakes international negotiations with the U.S. and China. He is also overseeing a generational change in the upper ranks of the party and state. Such a change is necessary if North Korea is ever to revamp its relations with the world.15 Economic reform: In March 2013, not long after coming to power, Kim signaled a shift in national policy. The North Korean governing philosophy under his father was called juche, or "self-reliance," and had a heavy emphasis on putting the military first. But Kim has promised to develop the economy alongside nuclear weapons, creating a governing philosophy known as byungjin, or "parallel development."16 There is substantial evidence of marketization in North Korea, which was formally allowed in 2003 but has been growing faster since the Global Financial Crisis and the country's failed currency reforms at that time. Official statistics, such as they are, do not capture this organic and informal market process (Chart 9). Farmers have been allowed to keep some of their profits; official and unofficial marketplaces have cropped up; informal banking is developing; mobile phones and televisions are more prevalent.17 Foreign policy and strategic deterrence: Kim has demonstrated to the world that his country's nuclear and missile capabilities are more advanced than previously thought (Diagram 2). The American defense and intelligence establishment have been forced, during Kim's rapid phase of tests in 2016-17, to revise upward their expectations of the North's ability to strike the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon. This creates a new environment in which the U.S. can no longer ignore North Korea. Yet Kim has also proven himself to be a rational actor by discontinuing missile tests when tensions approached a boil in late 2017 and offering an olive branch to the South Koreans and Americans in early 2018.18 Chart 9North Korea: Rising From A Very Low Level Diagram 2North Korea's Proven Missile Reach American leadership change: Pivot to Asia: The United States has attempted to "rebalance" its strategic posture by reducing its commitment to the Middle East and "pivoting" to East Asia. This is to confront the China challenge. President Trump's North Korea and China policies are aggressive, despite the fact that Trump is also ramping up pressure on Iran.19 International sanctions tightened: The U.S. has responded to North Korea's nuclear and missile advances by redoubling the international sanctions regime (Chart 10). A credible military threat: The Trump administration has also established a "credible threat" through its use of military drills, aircraft carrier deployments in the region, and Trump's hawkish speeches to the United Nations General Assembly and South Korean National Assembly. The demonstration that the military option is "on the table" is reminiscent of the Iranian nuclear negotiations from 2011-15 (and those to come) (Chart 11).20 Trump's maneuvering room: Few people doubt the current U.S. president's willingness to do something unpredictable, "out of the box," or even "crazy," such as preemptively attacking North Korea, or, on the other hand, withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea (Trump has often expressed dissatisfaction with the cost of U.S. troop commitments). For better or worse, the U.S. has much greater room for maneuver than it used to in making a deal with North Korea. Chart 10U.S.-Led Sanctions Tightened The Noose Chart 11U.S. Demonstration Of Credible Military Threat Causes Market Jitters Chinese leadership change: Xi's irritation with Kim: President Xi Jinping wants to create a Chinese sphere of influence in the region, which includes depriving the U.S. of a reason to bulk up its Asia Pacific presence. However, North Korea's threats and provocations give the U.S. good reason to build up its military assets, including missile defense.21 Pyongyang as an obstacle to Chinese power projection: Xi also wants to focus China's military and strategic development toward new dimensions of defense (sea, air, space, cyber) and improve China's ability to project power globally. But the potential for a crisis in North Korea - whether regime collapse or American invasion - ties China down to a 1950s-style military posture with a heavy focus on its army in the northeast. China enforces sanctions on the North: The above factors, combined with President Trump's sanctions on Chinese companies for dealing with the North, have prompted China to change its policy toward North Korea. China has been enforcing stringent sanctions since mid-2017 (Chart 12). China benefits from North Korean economic opening: China also has an interest in North Korea's economic opening - it has pioneered this process and has also clearly benefited from the recent opening of formerly closed neighboring states like Myanmar and Cambodia (Chart 13). China wants to remain the biggest player in the North's economy as it opens further. China seeks leverage over South Korea: Direct trade and infrastructure links to South Korea will also increase China's leverage over the South. Already President Moon has given China assurances of stopping U.S. missile defense deployments in exchange for the removal of economic sanctions against South Korean companies.22 Xi Jinping is not going anywhere: Xi has consolidated power and removed limits on his term in office, so China's policy shift toward the Koreas cannot be assumed to be easily reversible. Chart 12Even China Enforces Sanctions This Time Chart 13China Gains When Neighbors Open Up South Korean leadership change: The fall of the right-wing: The right-of-center parties and politicians in South Korea have suffered a cyclical drop in support. First, their hawkish policies since 2008 failed to prevent North Korea's belligerence. Second, former President Park Geun-hye was impeached and removed from office in early 2017 due to scandals that marred the right wing's popular standing. The legislative elections of 2016 and the post-impeachment presidential election of 2017 show that the major center-left party (the Minjoo Party) has made a big comeback. Local elections to be held on June 13, 2018 - the day after the planned Trump-Kim summit in Singapore - are likely to reinforce this trend (Chart 14 A&B). Thus the Moon administration is benefiting from a popular tailwind that will support its dovish approach to the North and could last for several years (Chart 15). The next election, for the legislature, is not until April 15, 2020, giving Moon time to implement his policies. Fear of abandonment: President Trump's policies threaten South Korea with the risk of preemptive war or American abandonment, making engagement with the North all the more necessary. Chart 14ASouth Korea's Right-Wing Faltered In 2016... Chart 14B... And Left-Wing Will Likely Win In 2018 Chart 15Ruling Minjoo Party Has Plenty Of Momentum The only other significant players are Russia and Japan, neither of which is willing or able to derail a diplomatic process pursued by both Koreas and the U.S. and China.23 Critically, this peace process is being driven by constraints, not preferences. True, Xi Jinping may be irritated by Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump may yearn for a Nobel peace prize. But the underlying factors are the following constraints on these policymakers: North Korea's regime cannot allow foreign domination, whether through war or economics; The U.S. regime cannot allow its homeland to be attacked by North Korea or its regional presence to be eliminated; China's regime cannot allow a Syria-style influx of North Korean refugees into China's Rust-Belt northeast or an American occupation of North Korea; South Korea's regime cannot allow anyone to trigger a war in which Seoul will be the first to be decimated. In each case, these states are bumping up against their constraints, such that the "Moonshine" diplomatic initiative is supported from all angles. Not only are the current U.S. and North Korean leaders planning to meet for the first time in the history, to build on the Moon-Kim summits, but they have already overcome a moment of cold feet that nearly quashed the June 12 summit.24 If the summit falls through, another summit will be scheduled; such is the underlying pressure of the above constraints. South Korean opinion polls demonstrate the pent-up demand for diplomacy that brought Moon and the Minjoo Party to power. The number of South Koreans who "trust" North Korea to denuclearize and pursue peace has shot up from 15% to 65% in recent polls (Chart 16A). Chart 16ASouth Koreans More Trusting Toward North... Chart 16B... Yet Doubt Full Denuclearization Will Occur Chart 17South Koreans Want Unification... Eventually Of course, "denuclearization" is a slippery term - about 64% of South Koreans doubt that the North will really give up its nuclear program. And yet even that number has fallen from 90% at the beginning of this year (Chart 16B). These numbers are volatile but reveal a deeply held public preference for some kind of deal that removes the threat of armed conflict. Indeed, 78% of South Koreans say they ultimately want not only peace but unification with the North (Chart 17). Subjectively, we think the probability of some kind of diplomatic settlement is 95% and the probability of war 5%. The next question is what kind of a settlement will it be? Bottom Line: The current diplomatic track on the Korean peninsula has greater potential than the previous two diplomatic pushes in 2000 and 2007. The different powers remain constrained by the lack of palatable or tolerable options other than diplomacy, yet China's rise and North Korea's missile capabilities have made the status quo unacceptable. Therefore we expect some kind of settlement that reduces tensions and allows for economic engagement. The U.S. Can Accept Less Than Full Denuclearization What about the critical issue of North Korea's strategic standoff with the United States? Will North Korea give up its nuclear program? Can the U.S. accept a deal that does not include complete and verifiable denuclearization? Subjectively, we would put full denuclearization at a 15% probability. It is three times more likely than a war (5% chance), but five times less likely than a lesser settlement (80% chance). The question boils down to whether the United States is capable of a preemptive military strike on North Korea that denies it the ability to inflict devastating casualties on South Korea. Such a strike would require the U.S. to use numerous tactical nuclear weapons on North Korean nuclear and chemical sites as well as artillery units deeply embedded in the hills overlooking Seoul.25 If the U.S. is believed capable of such an attack, then the North will need to retain some of its nuclear deterrent so that it can deter the U.S. from such an attack directly, by threatening U.S. cities. If the U.S. is not believed capable, then the North can afford to trade away its nuclear program and rely on its conventional deterrent of decimating Seoul as its chief security guarantee. Our assessment is that the U.S. is broadly capable of executing such an attack, however little it intends to do so. The U.S. would need to be politically willing to accept the devastation of Seoul, nuclear fallout over Japan, and potentially a second war with China (which might intervene more readily this time than in 1950). This is extremely unlikely to say the least. But given President Trump's hawkishness and the drastic vacillations of today's polarized U.S. public opinion and foreign policy, North Korea cannot gamble that the U.S. would under no circumstances, ever, adopt such a course of action. In other words, North Korea has developed a nuclear deterrent not to trade it away for concessions but to maintain it at some level. National Security Adviser John Bolton said it all in one word: Libya. Libyan President Mohammar Qaddafi unilaterally abandoned his country's nuclear program in 2003, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, to improve relations with the West. This worked until the Arab Spring, when Qaddafi was brutalized and executed after his regime collapsed under pressure of popular rebellion and a NATO bombing campaign. NATO struck his personal convoy, leaving him exposed to rebel militias. In other words, North Korea could be fully compliant and yet the U.S. could betray it. Regime change would be more likely for the U.S. to pursue if the North did not have a nuclear deterrent. In the negotiations, even an offer of total U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea for denuclearization - which is extremely unlikely - probably cannot convince Kim Jong Un of his personal safety and his regime's security in an era of Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Syria 2011, Ukraine 2014, and "Zero Dark Thirty."26 Finally, if it is true that North Korea also fears Chinese domination over the long run, then maintaining a nuclear deterrent is all the more important to secure the regime's independence, as it also constrains China. Thus we highly doubt that Pyongyang will fully, verifiably, and irreversibly denuclearize. We reserve a 15% chance simply because its ability to strike Seoul with artillery does give it greater leverage than Libya or other states that faced U.S.-imposed regime change. This fact combined with the possibility of an irresistible package of economic and political benefits from the Americans could conceivably cause the North to change course dramatically. But this is not our baseline case. More likely, Pyongyang can offer, and Washington can accept, mothballing reactors, holding nuclear inspections, freezing the ballistic missile program, and committing to a non-belligerent foreign policy, along with gradual normalization of diplomatic and economic relations. Washington can accept a sub-optimal deal because such a deal preserves the raison d'être for U.S. forces in Korea, yet reduces the threat to the homeland and helps dilute China's influence on the peninsula. As for the 5% chance of war, even if Pyongyang eschews any and all denuclearization, the U.S. may still opt for containment rather than war.27 Bottom Line: The U.S. can settle for "containment" against North Korea, whereas North Korea probably cannot give up its rudimentary nuclear deterrent given its twin fears of American invasion or Chinese domination. The U.S. gains from normalizing relations with the North, given that it enables North Korea to diversify its foreign policy away from China and yet Washington retains its overwhelming nuclear preemptive strike capability in the event that an attack is deemed imminent. North Korea Is The Most Promising Pariah State It is useful to remember how badly communism has served North Koreans relative to their capitalist neighbors. Chart 18 explains the unsustainability of the North's system and the impetus to change. At the same time, South Korea's development path suggests that North Korea has economic potential. There is considerable room to increase basic capital stock - roads, buildings, and basic equipment, etc. - even assuming that North Korea's pace of liberalization prevents the same kind of economic boom that fully capitalist South Korea witnessed in the second half of the twentieth century (Chart 19). Won't liberalizing the economy fatally undermine Kim's totalitarian regime? History teaches otherwise. The reform of communist East Asian regimes like China (1978) and Vietnam (1986) shows that partial liberalization can be pursued without fatally undermining the regime, as long as the regime is willing to do whatever it takes to stay in power, i.e. use domestic security and intelligence forces to suppress opposition and dissent. Communist states in other parts of the world - such as Cuba - also attest to this fact. This is not to say that liberalization poses no threat to Pyongyang. First, liberalization itself can lead to economic consequences, like inflation, that trigger instability, as China experienced in the 1980s. Second, successful liberalization increases household wealth, which can result in growing demand for civil rights and political participation, as occurred under South Korea's right-wing military dictatorship in the 1970s-80s, and as will eventually occur even in China.28 Still, North Korea today is faced with the same predicament that Iran, Myanmar, Cambodia, Cuba, and Zimbabwe face. All of them are trying gingerly to open up their economies, as their sclerotic regimes face a greater threat of social instability from economic opportunity costs than from popular political opposition. They are changing not a moment too soon. Global labor force, trade, and productivity have all slowed in recent decades, marking a contrast to the exuberant external environment that the emerging and frontier markets faced when opening their economies in the late twentieth century (Chart 20). They may still have a cheap labor advantage but they will struggle to develop as rapidly with global potential growth falling. Chart 18A Reason To Reform And Open Up Chart 19North Korea Could Follow This Path Chart 20North Korea Joins Global Market As Potential Growth Slows North Korea is better situated than any of these late-bloomers. Its immediate neighbors, South Korea, China, and Japan, each sport current account surpluses and positive international investment positions (Chart 21), giving the North a ready pool of capital to tap as it opens its doors. The global search for yield persists more or less (Chart 22), motivating investors to explore the riskiest and worst-governed countries, and yet North Korea sits in a prosperous corner of the world. South Korean investors can envision high returns from basic productivity-enhancing investments in the North, while accepting that unification and its immense fiscal costs are still a long way away. Chart 21Ample Sources Of Investment For North Korea Chart 22North Korea: Don't Miss The Search For Yield This means that North Korea - if it calms its quarrels with the West - will have alternatives to China's outward investment push (Chart 23), albeit with China remaining the biggest player. North Korea is not a large enough economy to have a major global impact when it opens up, but it is big enough to affect South Korea. It will make available a pool of cheap labor for a country that is otherwise suffering from the worst of low fertility and a shrinking workforce (Chart 24). The North's reserves of thermal coal, which are comparable to Indonesia's (Chart 25), and other commodities, are also likely to be exploited given that South Korea and its neighbors are already scouring the globe for resource plays. Chart 23China's Belt And Road Initiative Chart 24Reunification Would Increase Labor Force Chart 25North Korea Has Sizable Coal Reserves In reality, of course, it is the North's overexposure to commodities that is putting pressure on the regime to reform (in addition to international sanctions). China's economy is transitioning to a less resource-intensive model, putting the North's coal and metals exports in long-term jeopardy. The North lacks capital to industrialize and develop a manufacturing sector, and it risks missing out on the new wave of industrialization that is rewarding neighbors like Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The slowdown in global trade and globalization threatens to close the window of opportunity for the North. Bottom Line: Oppressive communist regimes have proved capable of selectively opening up to outside trade and investment while maintaining the regime. North Korea is attempting to create a favorable foreign policy environment to take its nascent economic reforms further. The global search for yield, especially by Northeast Asian states, may still offer an opportunity to attract capital. China's economic transition adds a sense of urgency, given North Korea's need to diversify. Investment Conclusions North Korea is small, but independent, and it is pivoting to South Korea and the United States to increase its strategic and economic options. China has an interest in letting this happen, but will try to remain the dominant power. Almost every peace treaty or major diplomatic settlement in human history has involved a series of dramatic ups and downs in the lead-up to the agreement. Diplomatic volatility should increase the closer the different parties get to an agreement, due to the fears and hesitations of losing out in the final compromise. Investors should stay focused on the structural factors. North Korea is more of a geopolitical opportunity than a geopolitical risk for markets today. War is especially unlikely over 2018-19. Hence the North Korean issue is unlikely to disrupt the global economy or threaten a bullish global equity view over this time period. That would be up to other factors. Only if the new round of diplomacy completely and utterly collapses will the tail-risk of war reemerge. U.S.-China tensions, North Korea's nuclear program, and Trump's re-election bid could conceivably lead to a breakdown of diplomacy by 2020. The Trump administration would then return to its "maximum pressure" campaign and the probability of military strikes would rise. However, we put a low probability on such a breakdown occurring and would argue that the grave implications should be seen as a strong constraint driving the different parties to cut a deal. Assuming diplomacy succeeds, it should provide a small tailwind for South Korea's currency and risk assets, which at the moment face a negative environment due to slowing global growth, Chinese reforms, and a strengthening U.S. dollar. First, the end-game itself - Korean unification - is implicitly a positive for removing the risk and uncertainty of conflict and increasing Korea's potential GDP. Germany's unification remains the best analogy, for better or worse. German unification led to a brief decline in total factor productivity, but also a multi-year rally in equities, the deutschmark, and a bullish curve-steepening relative to world markets (Chart 26A). Chart 26AGermany Benefited From Reunification... Chart 26B...South Korea Is Not There Yet South Korea is not yet at the cusp of unification, so the analogy with German assets is premature, but it is not a foregone conclusion that South Korea will suffer as it embarks on the path toward unification. Of course, this year's diplomatic progress has coincided with renewed EM financial turmoil that has clouded any benefits from improved North-South relations (Chart 26 B). Moreover, the burden of unification will be immense given that North Korea is much larger and poorer relative to the South than East Germany was to West Germany, and markets will have to price in this burden by expecting larger South Korean budget deficits in future. Still, we would expect KRW/USD to benefit on the margin, especially given Korea's simultaneous promise to the Trump administration not to engage in competitive devaluation. Second, certain Korean sectors are poised to benefit from integration with the North. Looking at how the different sectors have performed before and after the April 27 inter-Korean summit, relative to their EM counterparts, reveals that industrials, energy, consumer staples, and telecoms are the relative winners (Chart 27).29 Chart 27Winners And Losers Of Inter-Korean Engagement Chart 28AReal Estate Near The DMZ... Chart 28B...Is Optimistic Once Again Third, the signal from real estate along the DMZ is loud and clear. Paju is known as the best proxy for improved Korean relations and transaction volumes have spiked since Moon and Kim met on April 27 and declared an end to the Korean War. The move is particularly notable when contrasted with the rest of Gyeonggi province, which is not inherently a "unification" play (Chart 28A & 28B). Similar moves happened in Paju real estate around the time of the first and second inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, but as this report has shown, there is more reason to be optimistic today. This example speaks to the many opportunities for specialized funds to generate returns as development projects get underway. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Equities And Bonds Continue To Rally?" dated September 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Special Report, "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?" dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Mattis criticized China's militarization of the South China Sea rocks at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, accusing Chinese President Xi Jinping of violating his word on this matter. He also criticized China's Belt and Road Initiative. The same week, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie told a reporter that "the United States military has had a lot of experience in the Western Pacific, taking down small islands," in a thinly veiled hint to China's South China Sea activity. Finally, a report surfaced suggesting that the U.S. is considering sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait. Please see Ben Westcott, "US plans 'steady drumbeat' of exercises in South China Sea: Mattis," CNN, May 31, 2018, available at www.cnn.com; Laignee Barron, "Pentagon Official Says U.S. Can 'Take Down' Man-Made Islands Like Those in the South China Sea," Time, June 1, 2018, available at time.com; "Exclusive: At delicate moment, U.S. weighs warship passage through Taiwan Strait," Reuters, June 4, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize," dated May 30, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taiwan Is A Potential Black Swan," dated March 30, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Vladimir Putin, Act IV," dated March 7, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Satellite imagery reveals that international sanctions have hindered manufacturing development and increased reliance on trade with China. Please see Yong Suk Lee, "International Isolation and Regional Inequality: Evidence from Sanctions on North Korea," Stanford University, Center on Global Poverty and Development, Working Paper 575 (October 2016), available at globalpoverty.stanford.edu. 12 North Korea's disagreements with China have given rise to a host of academic articles and studies in recent years. For an overview please see Philip Wen and Christian Shepherd, " 'Lips and teeth' no more as China's ties with North Korea fray," Reuters, September 8, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. See also Sebastian Harnisch, "The life and near-death of an alliance: China, North Korea and autocratic military cooperation," Heidelberg University, WISC Conference, Taipei, April 2017; and Weiqi Zhang, "Neither friend nor big brother: China's role in North Korean foreign policy strategy," Palgrave Communications 4:16 (2018), available at www.nature.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 The term is a pun on the original "Sunshine" engagement policy of Moon's predecessors Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. President Kim's engagement attempt culminated in the first Inter-Korean summit in 2000, but was ultimately derailed by a hawkish turn in U.S. and North Korean policies and the inclusion of North Korea among the "Axis of Evil" following the 9/11 attacks. "Sunshine policy" revived again under President Roh Moo-hyun, leading to the second Inter-Korean summit in 2007. Roh's protégé, Moon, is now reviving the policy. Unfortunately, "moonshine" is saddled with the connotation of fraud and/or poison! 15 The major challenge to his rule came in late 2013 but he nipped it in the bud by executing his uncle Jang Song Taek and purging Jang's faction. He had his half-brother Kim Jong Nam assassinated in Malaysia in 2017. He promoted his sister, Kim Yeo-jong, to deputy chief of the Propaganda Department in the Korean Worker's Party. Kim has taken steps to empower the State Affairs Commission (cabinet), the Korean Worker's Party, and the legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly, vis-à-vis the long-dominant military. He has also reshuffled the military extensively, prior to a significant reshuffle this week that signaled a willingness to compromise with the Americans. See Thomas Fingar et al, "Analyzing The Structure And Performance Of Kim Jong-un's Regime," Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, June 2017, available at fsi.stanford.edu; and Hyonhee Shin, "North Korea's Three New Military Leaders Are Loyal To Kim, Not Policies," Reuters, June 4, 2018, available at reuters.com. 16 William Brown, "Is 'Byungjin' Working? A Look at North Korea's Money," The Peninsula, Korea Economic Institute of America, September 7, 2016, available at keia.org. 17 Please see Andrei Lankov, "The Resurgence of a Market Economy in North Korea," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2016, available at carnegieendowment.org; Sunchul Choi and Mark A. Myers, "Marketization in North Korea," United States Department of Agriculture, Global Agricultural Information Network Report KS1545, December 9, 2015, available at www.fas.usda.gov. 18 This diplomacy also reinforces Kim's reformist bent. In April 2017 he appointed Ri Su-yong, a close ally, to oversee foreign relations, and resurrected the Foreign Relations Committee within the country's legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly. See Fingar in footnote 15. 19 Please see footnote 6 above. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threat'," dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Does It Pay To Pivot To China?" dated July 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Presidents Moon and Xi agreed to improve bilateral relations, with China removing economic sanctions, on the basis of South Korea promising the "Three No's" - no additional THAAD deployments, no expansion of U.S. missile defense, and no trilateral military alliance with Japan and the U.S. Please see Park Byong-su, "South Korea's "three no's" announcement key to restoring relations with China," Hankyoreh, dated November 2, 2017, available at english.hani.co.kr. 23 Indeed, Russia shares China's desire to prevent North Korea from provoking the U.S. into a greater Pacific military presence, while Japan shares the American desire to reduce the North Korean nuclear and military threat to its homeland. 24 North Korea publicly aired misgivings about the upcoming Trump-Kim summit after the new National Security Adviser, John Bolton, implied that the administration would seek "the Libya model" (unilateral and total nuclear disarmament and dismantlement by North Korea) in its negotiations. North Korea criticized Bolton, a war-hawk who has a negative history with North Korea going back to the George W. Bush administration, putting the summit in jeopardy. The North was also angry about the U.S. and South Korean decision to proceed with annual military exercises ahead of the summit. Further, Chinese President Xi Jinping may have urged Kim Jong Un to tread more carefully, or cancel the summit, during a second meeting between these two presidents in early May. The White House rebuked Bolton's comments, saying the negotiations would follow "the Trump model." 25 Please see Christopher Woolf, "The only effective arms against North Korea's missile bunkers are nuclear weapons, says a top war planner," Public Radio International, August 10, 2017, available at www.pri.org; and Uri Friedman, "North Korea: The Military Options," The Atlantic, dated May 17, 2017, available at www.theatlantic.om. 26 Iraq set a precedent for U.S. preemptive invasion; Syria was a fellow nuclear aspirant and member of the Axis of Evil that suffered both Israeli strikes against its nuclear facilities and economic and political collapse due to mismanagement and international isolation; Ukraine gave up its Soviet nuclear weapons in 1994 with the Budapest Memorandum as a guarantee of its security only to suffer Russian invasion in 2014; and "Zero Dark Thirty" refers to the U.S. Seal Team Six covert raid into the heart of Pakistan to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden. 27 Our own analysis of the "bloody nose" military strike option, which is more likely than a full-blown war but very difficult to prevent from escalating, can be found in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 28 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Long View Of China," dated December 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 29 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Korea: A Comeback For Consumer Stocks?" June 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

As stocks have been stuck in a mini 'risk-off' phase, investors have begun to question whether the current global growth soft patch will prove transitory or morph into a severe global growth deceleration. We side with the former. The latest ISM manufacturing survey print is clearly signaling that SPX momentum will resume its ascent in the coming months (second panel). Further, the IHS Markit U.S. manufacturing PMI has been steeply diverging from the J.P. Morgan-calculated global manufacturing PMI (third panel) but, given America's heavy weighting in global output, recent strength in the U.S. should pull global growth higher. What could push our still constructive cyclical 9-12 month equity view offside is a surge in the U.S. dollar. The greenback's trough coincided with last year's peak in global growth (bottom panel), and further dollar appreciation would represent a meaningful headwind to earnings growth, particularly in the U.S. tech sector with its hefty foreign sales exposure. Netting it all out, there are high odds that the U.S. will lead global growth higher in the coming quarters and result in a recoupling higher of global growth, assuming the greenback stops appreciating. This would support low double digit calendar 2019 SPX profit growth. Under such a macro backdrop, it still pays to maintain a cyclicals over defensives portfolio bent; please see Monday's Weekly Report for more details.

Special Report

Highlights Investors are underestimating the risks of U.S.-Iran tensions; The Obama administration's 2015 deal resulted in Iran curbing aggressive regional behavior that threatened global oil supply; The U.S. negotiating position vis-à-vis Iran has not improved; Unlike North Korea, Iran can retaliate against the Trump administration's "Maximum Pressure" doctrine - particularly in Iraq; U.S.-Iran conflicts will negatively affect global oil supply, critical geographies, and sectarian tensions - hence a geopolitical risk premium is warranted. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy (CES) desk is using a new ensemble forecast, which takes its 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl, and WTI to $70/bbl from $72/bbl. For next year, CES's Brent forecast goes to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and WTI goes to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. CES expects higher volatility, as well. Feature Following the roll-out of our oil-price ensemble model last week, we are publishing a Special Report written by our colleague Marko Papic, who runs BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. This report explores the more nuanced aspects of the U.S. - Iran sanctions conflict, and why the contest for Iraq is important for investors. We also summarize our latest forecast. We trust you will find this analysis informative, Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy Tensions between the U.S. and Iran snuck up on the markets (Chart 1), even though President Trump's policy agenda was well telegraphed via rhetoric, action, and White House personnel moves.1 Still, investors doubt the market relevance of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international agreement between Iran and the P5+1.2 Chart 1Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Several reasons to fade the risks - and hence to fade any implications for global oil supply - have become conventional wisdom. These include the alleged ability of OPEC and Russia to boost production and Washington's supposed ineffectiveness without an internationally binding sanction regime. Chart 2BCA's Updated Ensemble Forecast:##BR##Brent Averages /bbl in 2H18 Our view is that investors and markets are underestimating the geopolitical, economic, and financial relevance of the U.S.-Iran tensions. First, the ideological rhetoric surrounding the original U.S.-Iran détente tends to be devoid of strategic analysis. Second, Iran's hard power capabilities are underestimated. Third, OPEC 2.0's ability to tap into its spare capacity is overestimated.3 CES's updated ensemble forecast takes its 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl previously, and its WTI forecast to $70/bbl from $72/bbl (Chart 2). For next year, CES's Brent forecast goes to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and its WTI expectation goes to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. CES expects higher volatility, as well, as markets continue to process sometimes-conflicting news flows. This means spike to and through $80/bbl for Brent are more likely than markets currently anticipate. Why Did The U.S.-Iran Détente Emerge In 2015? Both detractors and defenders of the 2015 nuclear deal often misunderstand the logic of the deal. First, the defenders are wrong when they claim that the deal creates a robust mechanism that ensures that Iran will never produce a nuclear device. Given that the most critical components of the deal expire in 10 or 15 years, it is simply false to assert that the deal is a permanent solution. More importantly, Iran already reached "breakout capacity" in mid-2013, which means that it had already achieved the necessary know-how to become a nuclear power.4 We know because we wrote about it at the time, using the data of Iran's cumulative production of enriched uranium provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).5 In August 2013, Iran's stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, produced at the impregnable Fordow facility, reached 200kg (Chart 3). Chart 3Iran's Negotiating Leverage At that point, Israeli threats of attacking Iran became vacuous, as the Israeli air force lacked the necessary bunker-busting technology to penetrate Fordow.6 As we wrote in 2013, this critical moment gave Tehran the confidence to give up "some material/physical components of its nuclear program as it has developed the human capital necessary to achieve nuclear status."7 The JCPOA forced Iran to stop enriching uranium at the Fordow facility altogether and to give up its stockpile of uranium enriched at 20%. However, Iran only agreed to the deal because it had reached a level of technological know-how that has not been eliminated by mothballing centrifuges and "converting" facilities to civilian nuclear research. Iran is a nuclear power in all but name. Second, the detractors of the JCPOA are incorrect when they claim that Iran did not give up any regional hegemony when it signed the deal. This criticism focuses on Iran's expanded role in the Syrian Civil War since 2011, as well as its traditional patronage networks with the Lebanese Shia militants Hezbollah and with Yemen's Houthis. However, critics ignore several other, far more critical, fronts of Iranian influence: Strait of Hormuz: In 2012, Iran's nearly daily threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were very much a clear and present danger for global investors (Map 1). Although we argued in 2012 that Iran's capability was limited to a 10-day closure, followed by another month during which they could threaten the safe passage of vessels through the Strait, even such a short crisis would add a considerable risk premium to oil markets given that it would remove about 17-18 million bbl/day from global oil supply (Chart 4).8 Since 2012, Iran's capabilities to threaten the Strait have grown, while the West's anti-mine capabilities have largely stayed the same.9 Map 1Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province Is A Crucial Piece Of Real Estate Chart 4Geopolitical Crises And Global Peak Supply Losses Iraq: The key geographic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran is Iraq (Map 2). Iran filled the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion almost immediately after Saddam Hussein's overthrow. It deployed members of the infamous Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into Iraq to support the initial anti-American insurgency. Iran's support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was critical following the American withdrawal in 2011, particularly as his government became increasingly focused on anti-Sunni insurgency. Map 2Iraq: A Buffer Between Saudi Arabia And Iran Bahrain: Home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Bahrain experienced social unrest in 2011. The majority of Bahrain's population are Shia, while the country is ruled by the Saudi-aligned, Sunni, Al Khalifa monarchy. The majority of Shia protests were at least rhetorically, and some reports suggest materially, supported by Iran. To quell the protests, and preempt any potential Iranian interference, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force. Eastern Province: Similar to the unrest in Bahrain, Shia protests engulfed Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 2011. The province is highly strategic, as it is where nearly all of Saudi oil production, processing, and transportation facilities are located (Map 1). Like Bahrain, it has a large Shia population. Saudi security forces cracked down on the uprising and have continued to do so, with paramilitary operations lasting into 2017. While Iranian involvement in the protests is unproven, it has been suspected. Anti-Israel Rhetoric: Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran threatened Israel with destruction on a regular basis. While these were mostly rhetorical attacks, the implication of the threat was that any attack against Iran and its nuclear facilities would result in retaliation against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq and direct military action against Israel. Both defenders and detractors of the JCPOA are therefore mistaken. The JCPOA does not impact Iran's ability to achieve "breakout capacity" given that it already reached it in mid-2013. And Iran's regional influence has not expanded since the deal was signed in 2015. In fact, since the détente in 2015, and in some cases since negotiations between the Obama administration and Tehran began in 2013, Iran has been a factor of stability in the Middle East. Specifically, Iran has willingly: Stopped threatening the Strait of Hormuz (the last overt threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were made in 2012); Acquiesced to Nouri al-Maliki's ousting as Prime Minister of Iraq in 2014 and his replacement by the far more moderate and less sectarian Haider al-Abadi; Stopped meddling in Bahraini and Saudi internal affairs; Stopped threatening Israel's existence (although its material support for Hezbollah clearly continues and presents a threat to Israel's security); Participated in joint military operations with the U.S. military against the Islamic State, cooperation without which Baghdad would have most likely fallen to the Sunni radicals in late 2014. The final point is worth expanding on. After the fall of Mosul - Iraq's second largest city - to the Islamic State in May 2014, Iranian troops and military advisors on the ground in Iraq cooperated with the U.S. air force to arrest and ultimately reverse the gains by the radical Sunni terrorist group. Without direct Iranian military cooperation - and without Tehran's material and logistical support for the Iraqi Shia militias - the Islamic State could not have been eradicated from Iraq (Map 3). Map 3The Collapse Of A Would-Be Caliphate How did such a dramatic change in Tehran's foreign policy emerge between 2012 and 2015? Iranian leadership realized in 2012 that the U.S. military and economic threats against it were real. Internationally coordinated sanctions had a damaging effect on the economy, threatening to destabilize a regime that had experienced social upheaval in the 2009 Green Revolution (Chart 5). It therefore began negotiations almost immediately after the imposition of stringent economic sanctions in early and mid-2012.10 Chart 5Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite To facilitate the negotiations, the Guardian Council of Iran disqualified President Ahmadinejad's preferred candidate for the 2013 Iranian presidential elections, while allowing Hassan Rouhani's candidacy.11 Rouhani, a moderate, won the June 2013 election in a landslide win, giving him a strong political mandate to continue the negotiations and, relatedly, to pursue economic development. Many commentators forget, however, that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei allowed Rouhani to run in the first place, knowing full well that he would likely win. In other words, Rouhani's victory revealed the preferences of the Iranian regime to negotiate and adjust its foreign policy. Bottom Line: The 2015 U.S.-Iran détente traded American acquiescence in Iranian nuclear development - frozen at the point of "breakout capacity" - in exchange for Iran's cooperation on a number of strategically vital regional issues. As such, focusing on just the JCPOA, without considering the totality of Iranian behavior before and since the deal, is a mistake. Iran curbed its influence in several regional hot spots - almost all of which are critical to global oil supply. The Obama administration essentially agreed to Iran becoming a de facto nuclear power in exchange for Iran backing away from aggressive regional behavior. This included Iran's jeopardizing the safe passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz either by directly threatening to close the channel or through covert actions in Bahrain and the Eastern Province. The U.S. also drove Iran to accept a far less sectarian Iraq, by forcing out the ardently pro-Tehran al-Maliki and replacing him with a prime minister far more acceptable to Saudi Arabia and Iraqi Sunnis. Why Did The U.S. Chose Diplomacy In 2011? The alternative to the above deal was some sort of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The U.S. contemplated such action in late 2011. Two options existed, either striking Iran's facilities with its own military or allowing Israel to do it themselves. One reason to choose diplomacy and economic sanctions over war was the limited capability of Israel to attack Iran alone.13 Israel does not possess strategic bombing capability. As such, it would have required a massive air flotilla of bomber-fighters to get to the Iranian nuclear facilities. While the Israeli air force has the capability to reach Iranian facilities and bomb them, their effectiveness is dubious and the ability to counter Iranian retaliatory capacity with follow-up strikes is non-existent. Chart 6Great Power Competition The second was the fact that a U.S. strike against Iran would be exceedingly complex. Compared to previous Israeli strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq (Operation Opera 1981) and Syria (Operation Outside The Box 2007), Iran presented a much more challenging target. Its superior surface-to-air missile capability would necessitate a prolonged, and dangerous, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission. In parallel, the U.S. would have to preemptively strike Iran's ballistic missile launching pads as well as its entire navy, so as to obviate Iran's ability to retaliate against international shipping or the U.S. and its allies in the region. The U.S. also had a strategic reason to avoid entangling itself in yet another military campaign in the Middle East. The public was war-weary and the Obama administration gauged that in a world where global adversaries like China and Russia were growing in geopolitical power, avoiding another major military confrontation in a region of decreasing value to U.S. interests (thanks partly to growing U.S. shale oil production) was of paramount importance (Chart 6). Notable in 2011 was growing Chinese assertiveness throughout East Asia (please see the Appendix on page 24). Particularly alarming was the willingness of Beijing to assert dubious claims to atolls and isles in the South China Sea, a globally vital piece of real estate (Diagram 1). There was a belief - which has at best only partially materialized - that if the United States divested itself of the Middle East, then it could focus more intently on countering China's challenge to traditional U.S. dominance in East Asia and the Pacific. Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout Bottom Line: The Obama administration therefore chose a policy of military posturing toward Iran to establish a credible threat. The military option was signaled in order to get the international community - both allies and adversaries - on board with tough economic sanctions. The ultimate deal, the JCPOA, did not give the U.S. and its allies everything they wanted precisely because they did not enter the negotiations from a position of preponderance of power. Critics of the JCPOA ignore this reality and assume that going back to the status quo ante bellum will somehow improve the U.S. negotiating position. It won't. What Happens If The U.S.-Iran Détente Ends? The Trump administration is serious about applying its Maximum Pressure tactics on Iran. Buoyed by the successful application of this strategy in North Korea, the White House believes that it can get a better deal with Tehran. We do not necessarily disagree. It is indeed true that the U.S. is a far more powerful country than Iran, with a far more powerful military. On a long enough timeline, with enough pressure, it ought to be able to force Tehran to concede, assuming that credible threats are used.14 Unlike the Obama administration, the Trump administration will presumably rely on Israel far less, and on its own military capability a lot more, to deliver those threats, which should be more effective. The problem is that the timeline on which such a strategy would work is likely to be a lot longer with Iran than with North Korea. This is because Iran's retaliatory capabilities are far greater than the one-trick-pony Pyongyang, which could effectively only launch ballistic missiles and threaten all-out war with U.S. and its regional allies.15 While those threats are indeed worrisome, they are also vacuous as they would lead to a total war in which the North Korean regime would meet its demise. Iran has a far more effective array of potential retaliation that can serve a strategic purpose without leading to total war. As we listed above, it could rhetorically threaten the Strait of Hormuz or attempt to incite further unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The key retaliation could be to take the war to Iraq. The just-concluded election in Iraq appears to have favored Shia political forces not allied to Iran, including the Alliance Towards Reform (Saairun) led by the infamous cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr (Chart 7). Surrounding this election, various Iranian policymakers and military leaders have said that they would not allow Iraq to drift outside of Iran's sphere of influence, a warning to the nationalist Sadr who has fought against both the American and Iranian military presence in his country. Iraq is not only a strategic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional rivals, but also a critical source of global oil supply, having brought online about half as much new supply as U.S. shale since 2011 (Chart 8). If Iranian-allied Shia factions engage in an armed confrontation with nationalist Shias allied with Muqtada al-Sadr, such a conflict will not play out in irrelevant desert governorates, as the fight against the Islamic State did. Chart 7Iraqi Elections Favored Shiites But Not Iran Chart 8Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Instead, a Shia-on-Shia conflict would play out precisely in regions with oil production and transportation facilities. In 2008, for example, Iranian-allied Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fought a brief civil war against Sadr's Mahdi Army in what came to be known as the "Battle of Basra." While Iran had originally supported Sadr in his insurgency against the U.S., it came to Maliki's support in that brief but deadly six-day conflict. Basra is Iraq's chief port through which much of the country's oil exports flow. Iraq may therefore become a critical battleground as Iran retaliates against U.S. Maximum Pressure. From Iran's perspective, holding onto influence in Iraq is critical. It is the transit route through which Iran has established an over-land connection with its allies in Syria and Lebanon (Map 4). Threatening Iraqi oil exports, or even causing some of the supply to come off-line, would also be a convenient way to reduce the financial costs of the sanctions. A 500,000 b/d loss of exports - at an average price of $70 per barrel (as Brent has averaged in 2018) - could roughly be compensated by an increase in oil prices by $10 per barrel, given Iran's total exports. As such, Iran, faced with lost supply due to sanctions, will have an incentive to make sure that prices go up (i.e., that rivals do not simply replace Iranian supply, keeping prices more or less level). The easiest way to accomplish this, to add a geopolitical risk premium to oil prices, is through the meddling in Iraqi affairs. Map 4Iran Needs Iraq To Project Power Through The Levant It is too early to forecast with a high degree of confidence precisely how the U.S.-Iran confrontation will develop. However, Diagram 2 offers our take on the path towards retaliation. Diagram 2Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree The critical U.S. sanctions against Iran will become effective on November 4 (Box 1). We believe that the Trump administration is serious and that it will force European allies, as well as South Korea and Japan, to cease imports of oil from Iran. China will be much harder to cajole. Box 1: Iranian Sanction Timeline President Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum to re-impose all U.S. sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA. The Office of Foreign Assets Control expects all sanctions lifted under the JCPOA to be re-imposed and in full effect after November 4, 2018. However, there are two schedules by which sanctions will be re-imposed, a 90-day and 180-day wind-down periods.1 Sanctions Re-Imposed After August 6, 2018 The first batch of sanctions that will be re-imposed will come into effect 90 days after the announced withdrawal from the JCPOA. These include: Sanctions on direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of several commodities (including gold), semi-finished metals, and industrial process software; Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the government of Iran; Sanctions on trade in Iranian currency and facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; Sanctions on Iran's automotive sector; Sanctions on export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts. Sanctions Re-Imposed After November 4, 2018 The second batch of sanctions will come into effect 180 days after the announced Trump administration JCPOA withdrawal decision. These include: Sanctions on Iranian port operators, shipping, and shipbuilding activities; Sanctions against petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC); Sanctions against the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran; Sanctions on transactions and provision of financial messaging services by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran; Sanctions on Iran's energy sector; Sanctions on the provision of insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting services. 1a Please see the U.S. Treasury Department, "Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018, National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," dated May 8, 2018, available at www.treasury.gov. By Q1 2019, the impact on Iranian oil exports will be clear. We suspect that Iran will, at that point, have the choice of either relenting to Trump's Maximum Pressure, or escalating tensions through retaliation. We give the latter a much higher degree of confidence and suspect that a cycle of retaliation and Maximum Pressure would lead to a conditional probability of war between Iran and the U.S. of around 20%. This is a significant number, and it is critical if President Trump wants to apply credible threats of war to Iran. Bottom Line: Unlike North Korea, Iran has several levers it can use to retaliate against U.S. Maximum Pressure. Iran agreed to set these levers aside as negotiations with the Obama administration progressed, and it has kept them aside since the conclusion of the JCPOA. It is therefore easy for Tehran to resurrect them against the Trump administration. Critical among these levers is meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. Not only is Iraq critical to Iran's regional influence; it is also key to global oil supply. We suspect that a cycle of Iranian retaliation and American Maximum Pressure raises the probability of U.S.-Iran military confrontation to 20%. We will be looking at several key factors in assessing whether the U.S. and Iran are heading towards a confrontation. To that end, we have compiled a U.S.-Iran confrontation checklist (Table 1). Table 1Will The U.S. Attack Iran? Investment Implications Over the past several years, there have been many geopolitical crises in the Middle East. We have tended to fade most of them, from a perspective of a geopolitical risk premium applied to oil prices. This is because we always seek the second derivative of any geopolitical event. In the context of the Middle East, by "second derivative" we mean that we are interested in whether the market impact of a new piece of information - of a new geopolitical event - will amount to more than just a random perturbation with ephemeral, decaying, market implications. To determine the potential of new information to catalyze a persistent market risk premium or discount, we investigate whether it changes the way things change in a given region or context. In 2015, we identified three factors that we believe are critical for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to have such second derivative implications, and thus global market implications.16 These are: Oil supply: The event should impact current global oil supply either directly or through a clear channel of contagion. Renewed sanctions against Iran do so directly. So would Iranian retaliation in Iraq or the Persian Gulf. Geography: The event should occur in a geography that is of existential significance to one of the regional or global players. Re-imposed sanctions obviously directly impact Iran as they could increase domestic political crisis. A potential Iranian proxy-war in Iraq would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Sectarian contagion: The event should exacerbate sectarian conflict - Sunni vs. Shia - which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. A renewed U.S.-Iran tensions check all of our factors. The risk is therefore real and should be priced by the market through a geopolitical risk premium. In addition, Iranian sanctions could tighten up the outlook for oil markets in 2019 by 400,000-600,000 b/d, reversing most of the production gains that Iran has made since 2016 (Chart 9). This is a problem given that the enormous oversupply of crude oil and oil products held in inventories has already been significantly cut. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Energy Sector Strategy teams believe that global petroleum inventories will be further reduced in 2019 (Chart 10). Chart 9Current And Future Iran##BR##Production Is At Risk Chart 10Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories,##BR##Keep Forward Curves Backwardated What about the hints from the OPEC 2.0 alliance that they would surge production in light of supply loss from Iran? Oil prices fell on the belief OPEC 2.0 could easily restore 1.8 MMb/d of production that they agreed to hold off the market since early 2017. Our commodity strategists have always considered the full number to be an illusion that consists of 1.2 MMb/d of voluntary cuts and around 500,000 b/d of natural production declines that were counted as "cuts" so that the cartel could project an image of greater collaboration than it actually achieved (Chart 11). In fact, some of the lesser "contributors" to the OPEC cut pledged to lower 2017 production by ~400,000 b/d, but are facing 2018 production levels that are projected to be ~700,000 b/d below their 2016 reference levels, and 2019 production levels are estimated to decline by another 200,000 b/d (Chart 12). Furthermore, renewed Iran-U.S. tensions may only be the second-most investment-relevant geopolitical risk for oil markets. Our commodity team expects Venezuelan production to fall to 1.2 MMb/d by the end of 2018 and to 1 MMb/d by the end of 2019, but these production levels could turn out to be optimistic (Chart 13). Chart 11Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing##BR##1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Chart 12Secondary##BR##OPEC 2.0 Chart 13Venezuela Is##BR##A Bigger Risk 2H18, 2019 Oil Forecasts BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy updated its forecast last week, after the leaders of OPEC 2.0 indicated member states would be considering putting as much as 1mm b/d back on the market, following the price run-up accurately called from the beginning of this year. KSA and Russian are not being explicit about what they intend to do. In the background are the U.S.'s renewed Iran sanctions discussed above, which could remove ~ 500k b/d from the export markets by the end of 1H19, and the increasingly likely collapse of Venezuela's exports, which could remove ~ 1mm b/d. Against this, we have production in the U.S. shales increasing this year and next by ~ 1.3 - 1.4mm b/d to offset these potential losses, but even there we're seeing problems getting the shale oil out of the U.S.17 That's why CES went to an ensemble forecast, and will keep it in place as the market continues to process these conflicting signals (Chart 14). While some production will be restored to the market this year, it will be a drawn-out process, given CES's view OPEC 2.0 does not want to undo the hard work it took to drain OECD oil inventories (Chart 15). CES's Brent forecast was lowered $2/bbl in 2H18 and $7/bbl in 2019 to $76/bbl and to $73/bbl, respectively. CES's WTI forecast for 2H18 also was lowered $2/bbl to $70/bbl, while our 2019 forecast is now at $67/bbl, down $5/bbl vs. our previous forecast. Chart 14Factors In BCA's Ensemble Forecast Chart 15Balances Will Loosen If Supply Increases CES continues to expect continued strength on the demand side, with global oil consumption growing 1.7mm b/d. This will be driven by steady income growth in EM economies. One of the principal gauges CES uses to assess EM demand - import volumes - continues to move higher on a year-on-year basis, signaling incomes continue to expand (Chart 16). EM growth accounts for 1.3 of the 1.7mm b/d of growth we're expecting in 2018 and 2019. In forthcoming research, CES will be looking more deeply into the evolution of demand and the threat - if any - higher prices pose for EM growth. As was noted in last week's CES publication,17 consumers in many states no longer are shielded from high oil prices, as they were in the past: Governments around the world used the collapse in prices beginning in 2014 to remove/reduce fuel subsidies. This changes the dynamics of EM oil demand considerably, even if governments feel compelled to step into markets and order suppliers to not pass through the entire price increase. OPEC 2.0's leaders - KSA and Russia - appear united in their view of what is required to keep oil markets balanced over the long haul, so as not to disincentivize consumers from purchasing cars and trucks and the motor fuel required to run them. But over the short term, their goals differ. KSA is looking to IPO Saudi Aramco - next year, according to the latest reports - and this sale would most definitely benefit from higher prices. Indeed, KSA's oil minister Khalid al-Falih appeared to be comfortable with prices pushing toward $80/bbl recently. Russia's energy minister, Alexander Novak, has said in the past he favors an oil price somewhere between $50 and $60/bbl. CES continues to believe the dominant price risks remain on the upside - at 28.31% and 12.12%, markets continue to underestimate the probability Brent prices will trade above $80 and $90/bbl this year and next (Chart 17). Chart 16Strong EM Commodity Demand Expected,##BR##As Incomes And Imports Continue To Grow Chart 17Oil Markets Continue To Underestimate##BR##Upside Price Risks In 2H18 And 2019 Bottom Line: A renewal of U.S. - Iran tensions throws up real risks that are not being fully priced by the oil markets at present. They raise the probability global oil supplies out of the Middle East will be directly threatened, and that tensions in Iran and Iraq will flare into proxy wars. Such an outcome would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Lastly, rising tensions could exacerbate sectarian conflict in the Middle East as a whole, particularly along the Sunni - Shia divide, which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 The JCPOA was concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus Germany (the "+1" of the P5+1). 3 BCA's Senior Commodity & Energy Strategist Robert P. Ryan has given the name "OPEC 2.0" to the Saudi-Russian alliance that is focused on regaining a modicum of control over the rate at which U.S. shale-oil resources are developed. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," dated March 30, 2017; and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" dated April 6, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 "Breakout" nuclear capacity is defined here as having enough uranium enriched at lower levels, such as at 20%, to produce sufficient quantities of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) required for a nuclear device. The often-reported amount of 20% enriched uranium required for breakout capacity is 200kg. However, the actual amount of uranium required depends on the number of centrifuges being employed and their efficiency. In our 2013 report, we gauged that Iran could produce enough HEU within 4-5 weeks at the Fordow facility to develop a weapon, which means that it had effectively reached "breakout capacity." 5 Please see International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation Of The NPT Safeguards Agreement And Relevant Provisions Of Security Council Resolutions In The Islamic Republic Of Iran," IAEA Board Report, dated August 28, 2013, available at www.iaea.org. 6 Although, in a move designed to increase pressure on Iran and its main trade partners, the Obama administration sold Israel the GBU-28 bunker-busting ordinance. That specific ordinance is very powerful, but still not capable enough to penetrate Fordow. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: Paradigm Shift," dated November 13, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Special Report, "Crisis In The Persian Gulf: Investment Implications," dated March 1, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 There are four U.S. Navy Avenger-class minesweepers based in Bahrain as part of the joint U.S.-U.K. TF-52. This number has been the same since 2012, when they were deployed to the region. 10 Particularly crippling for Iran's economy was the EU oil embargo imposed in January 2012, effective from July of that year, and the banning of Iranian financial institutions from participating in the SWIFT system in March 2012. 11 The Guardian Council of the Constitution is a 12-member, unelected body wielding considerable power in Iran. It has consistently disqualified reformist candidates from running in elections, which makes its approval of Rouhani's candidacy all the more significant. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reality Check: Israel Will Not Bomb Iran (Ever)," dated August 14, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 The NATO war with Yugoslavia in 1999 reveals how challenging SEAD missions can be if the adversary refuses to engage its air defense systems. The U.S. and its NATO allies bombed Serbia and its forces for nearly three months with limited effectiveness against the country's surface-to-air capabilities. The Serbian military simply refused to turn on its radar installations, making U.S. AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, designed to home in on electronic transmissions coming from radar systems, ineffective. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threats,'" dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: A Tale Of Red Herrings And Black Swans," dated October 14, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again," published May 31, 2018.It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017

Highlights One of Europe's major success stories is the structural and broad-based increase in female labour participation rates. The trend is set to continue for the next decade. Stay overweight the Personal Products sector as a long-term position. Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. It is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Buy exposure to Italian real estate as a new long-term position either directly or through Italy's small real estate equity sector. Feature Some analysts persist on comparing economic performances on the basis of real GDP per head of total population. But the total population includes children and the elderly who cannot contribute to economic output. Therefore, a correct assessment of economic performance should look at real GDP per head of working-age population. Chart I-1AWomen Are Powering The European Economy... Chart I-1B ...Less So In The U.S. Admittedly, as the retirement age rises, the definition of 'working-age' will gradually change, but the general principle still holds: only count in the denominator those who can contribute to economic output. GDP per head of working-age population can grow in several ways. One way is to get more output or better output from each hour worked through improvements in efficiency and/or quality. As this improvement is theoretically limitless, it is the main source of productivity gains in the long run. A second way is for each worker to work more hours. But given the physical and legal constraints on productive working time, there is only limited scope to increase output in this way. How Women Are Powering The European Economy There is one other way to increase GDP per head of working-age population: increase the percentage of the working age population that is in the labour force.1 In other words, structurally increase the labour participation rate. If this participation rate is already high - as it is for men - then there is little scope to increase it much further. But if the participation rate is low - as it is for European women - then there is considerable scope to increase it. This brings us to one of Europe's major, and largely untold, success stories - the structural and broad-based increase in female participation rates (Chart I-1-Chart I-5). Over the past twenty years, the EU28 female participation rate has risen from 57% to 68%, with an especially large contribution from the socially conservative southern countries. In Spain, female participation has surged from 47% to 70%. In Italy, it has shot up from 42% to 56% and has clear scope to rise much further. Chart I-2Italy: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-3Spain: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-4Germany: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-5France: Labour Force Participation Rate What is driving this structural trend? Two things. First, the employment sectors that are growing structurally - healthcare, social care, and education - tend to employ more women than men. Second, European countries have legislated a raft of policies encouraging women to join and remain in the labour force: generous paid maternity leave and subsidised childcare. The trend is for further improvements, with the focus now on improving paternity leave. Sharing parental and family responsibilities between mothers and fathers allows more women to enter and stay in the labour force.2 For the ultimate end-point in the trend, look to the Scandinavian countries which started such policies in the early 1970s. In Sweden, labour force participation for women and men is almost identical: 81% versus 84%. If the EU eventually adopts the Scandinavian model, it would mean another 20 million European women in employment and contributing to economic output (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Another 20 Million European Women ##br##Could Join The Labour Force Dispelling Two Myths: The Euro Area And Italy Having established that economic performances should be compared on the basis of GDP per head of working age population, we can now dispel two common myths. The first myth is that the U.S. generates superior productivity growth than the euro area. It is true that the U.S. has been better at getting more output from each hour worked, so on this measure, the U.S. does win. Against this, the euro area has been much better at getting more of its working-age population - albeit mostly women - into employment. So on this measure, the euro area wins (Chart of the Week). The net result is that, over the past twenty years, the U.S and the euro area have generated exactly the same growth in real GDP per working-age population (Chart I-7). Of course, the euro area's structural improvement in female participation rates cannot continue forever, but it can certainly continue for another decade or so, and this is generally the longest time horizon that most investors care about. Chart I-7The Euro Area And The U.S.: Identical Growth In Real GDP Per Head Of Working-Age Population The second myth concerns the subject du jour: Italy. Many people claim that Italy's economic stagnation is due to deep-seated structural problems which differentiate it from other major economies. The problem with this narrative is that from the mid-1990s until 2008 the growth in Italy's real GDP per head of working age population was little different to that in Germany, France or the U.S. (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Italy Performed In Line With Other Major Economies Until 2008 Italy's economic stagnation only started after the 2008 global financial crisis. After a financial crisis which cripples the banking system, there are two golden rules: unleash fiscal stimulus; and repair the banking system as quickly as possible. The U.S. and U.K. followed the golden rules perfectly and immediately; Ireland followed a couple of years later; Spain waited until 2013. But in each case, the economies rebounded very strongly as the fiscal stimulus kicked in and the banks recuperated. Italy neither unleashed fiscal stimulus, nor repaired its banks - so its economy has stagnated for a decade. Moreover, if output stagnates for a decade, it follows arithmetically that productivity growth will also look poor. In a back-to-front argument, critics have pounced on this as evidence of excessive 'red tape' and 'structural problems'. But this is a misdiagnosis of the malaise. To reiterate, Italy's real GDP per working-age population was growing very respectably before 2008. Italy's misfortune is that its indebtedness has an unusual profile: more public debt than private debt. France and Spain (and other major euro area economies) have the usual profile: less public debt than private debt. So the EU's fiscal rules - which can see only public debt and are blind to private debt - have severely and unfairly constrained Italy's ability to respond to financial crises. While every other major economy followed the golden rules to recover from the 2008 crisis, Italy could neither unleash fiscal stimulus to kick start the economy nor recapitalise its dysfunctional banking system. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Two Structural Investment Conclusions This week's two investment conclusions are both long term, and require a buy and hold mentality. The first conclusion reiterates a structural position: overweight the Personal Products sector. This is based on our expectation that, in Europe, female participation rates will continue their structural uptrend; while in the U.S. we expect female participation rates to continue outperforming male participation rates. Therefore the sales and profits of the Personal Products sector, in which female spending dominates, will benefit from a multi-year tailwind, at least relative to other sectors. And the extent of this tailwind is not fully discounted in valuations. The second conclusion is a new long-term recommendation: buy exposure to Italian real estate. This is based on our assessment that Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. Instead, it is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. Removing these shackles will allow a long-term recovery, just as it did for Spain in 2013. If we are right, the best multi-year buy and hold play is Italian real estate which has been in a decade-long bear market (Chart I-9). For those that cannot directly invest in property, Italy has a small real estate equity sector which faithfully tracks the long term profile of real estate prices (Chart I-10), and whose main component is Beni Stabili. The caveat is that the stock has a market cap of just €2 billion; the appeal is that it offers a juicy dividend yield of 4.5%. Chart I-9Italian Real Estate Has Suffered ##br##A Decade-Long Bear Market Chart I-10Italian Real Estate Equities##br## Track Real Estate Prices Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 And in employment. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Female Participation: Another Mega-Trend" published on April 6, 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* This week, we note that the 130-day fractal dimension for platinum versus nickel is close to its lower bound, a level which has consistently predicted a tradeable countertrend move over the following 130 days. Hence, this week's trade is long platinum/short nickel on a 130 horizon before expiry. The profit target is 14% with a symmetric stop-loss. Our two other open trades, long SEK/GBP and long PLN/USD, are both in profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Highlights Private debt raised a record $115 billion through 158 funds in 2017. Aggregate AUM has grown from $244 billion in 2007 to $664 billion in 2017. Private debt enjoys a higher yield and return, along with lower defaults, than traditional corporate bonds. This is driven by stronger covenants and collateral structures. Unlike traditional corporate debt with fixed coupons, most private debt has floating-rate coupons making it an attractive interest-rate hedge. Direct lending and mezzanine debt are low risk-low return capital-preserving strategies. Distressed and venture debt are more aggressive plays on operationally troubled firms and start-ups. Investors should allocate to private-debt funds with global exposure, to diversify away from U.S. corporate cash flow risk and increase exposure to different credit cycles. Business Development Companies (BDCs) are a liquid alternative to direct lending that provide impressive yield, but at the cost of higher volatility. Feature Introduction Private debt involves lending by institutional investors to middle-market companies in the form of investment-grade senior-secured debt, or subordinated debt. This space has experienced explosive growth: assets under management (AUM) have increased to $664 Bn in 2017 from $244 Bn in 2007. The key supply and demand factors driving this growth are: Chart 1Banking Sector Consolidation Bank Consolidation: For a couple of decades the U.S. banking industry has been consolidating, creating fewer but larger (Chart 1) commercial banks. These larger banks prefer to lend to larger rather than mid-market companies. Regulation: Following the financial crisis, increased regulation (for example, Dodd Frank and the Basel capital adequacy rules) forced commercial banks to reduce lending to the mid-market segment. This led to the rise of non-bank institutional lending. Search For Yield: With global bond yields depressed, institutional investors with target returns turned to alternate sources of income. This has created a new source of demand for private debt. Liquidity: The Volcker Rule, which banned proprietary trading in bond markets, reduced liquidity. ICG, a specialist asset manager, estimated that it took seven times as long for investors to liquidate bond portfolios in 2015 as it did in 2008. This made private debt's illiquidity relative to public markets less clear than previously.1 In this report, we run through the basics of private debt, and analyze past performance and fundraising cycles. In the following sections, we analyze different private-debt strategies and explain how investors can benefit from allocating to these. We close with a brief word on Business Development Companies (BDCs). Our conclusions are that: Private debt has returned an average net IRR of 13.0% from 1989-2015. This compares to an annualized total return of 7.0% and 7.2% for equities and corporate bonds respectively. Direct lending and mezzanine debt are intended to be capital preservation strategies that offer more stable returns while minimizing downside. Investors should allocate to these strategies from their alternative credit bucket. Distressed debt and venture debt are intended to be return-maximizing strategies that offer larger gains, but with a higher probability of losses. Investors should allocate to these strategies from their private equity bucket. In the late stages of an economic cycle, investors should deploy capital defensively through first-lien and other senior debt positions. In contrast, a recession would create opportunities for distressed strategies and within deeper parts of the capital structure. Unlike private equity and other private investments, private debt investors start receiving positive cash flow immediately and are charged management fees only on invested capital. This reduces the "J curve" effect. A note on the data we use in this report. All the returns and fund data are based on the private debt online platform from Preqin Ltd. Given the uncertainty around the investment horizon and cash flows of a private debt fund, it is hard to create a traditional total return index. Instead, we use the concept of internal rate of return (IRR) to understand past realized returns. (See Appendix for more detail on how the data is collected). The Private Debt Market Private debt funds raised a record $115 billion through 158 funds in 2017, surpassing the previous high of $100 billion in 2015. Total assets under management (AUM) have reached $664 Bn (Chart 2). There has been a trend towards the creation of larger funds, just as in private equity. Additionally, it took managers only 14 months to close fund-raising in 2017 versus 19 months in 2016, another testament to investors' strong appetite for this asset class. Finally, 58% of funds exceeded their target size. Below we describe key characteristics of this asset class. (In the Appendix, we explain in detail the key terms, and methodologies used to measure performance.) Chart 2Strong Investor Demand Chart 3Private Debt Market Return And Risk: Table 1 shows the past realized return for each private debt strategy and the range of outcomes that investors can expect from allocating to them. Distressed and venture debt produce a higher average IRR, but with greater dispersion in returns. Compared to traditional corporate credit, private debt enjoys a higher yield and return, along with lower default rates and credit loss.2 This is because public bonds are mostly unsecured obligations with standard indentures, whereas private debt investors have more control over terms and conditions such as covenants and collateral structures. Additionally, private debt can improve performance (Chart 3) by diversifying the sources of risk and return,3 and gives access to more esoteric exposures such as illiquidity and manager skill. Illiquidity premia are generated from both asymmetric information flow about target companies and also the low frequency of transactions. Another attractive feature is the ability to customize deals with favorable security packages and cash flow patterns to meet unique liability and payment schedules. Finally, many of the more aggressive private debt strategies provide investors with the option to convert to equity ownership, thereby further improving risk-return dynamics with an equity upside. Table 1Capital Preservation Vs. Return Maximizing Unlike most traditional corporate bonds with fixed coupon payments, most private debt investments have floating-rate coupons making them attractive hedges in rising-rate environments. Additionally, cash distributions to investors include both interest and principal repayments, and are mostly quarterly. Unlike traditional bullet repayment structures, periodic principal repayments reduce the average effective duration of the investment, and reduce refinancing risk. Finally, risk levels in the private debt space are highly dependent on the investment strategy; we address this issue in the next section. Diversification: Another important aspect of private debt is its ability to provide uncorrelated returns. Cross-asset class correlations have been rising since the start of easy monetary policy early this decade. The core risk exposure in a private-debt investment comes from idiosyncratic firm-specific sources, which is not the case with publicly traded corporate credit. Investors can gain exposure to different industries and customized duration horizons in the private space. Since deal origination is highly dependent on manager skills and relationships, private debt gives access to firms or projects that are not available via any index. Finally, private debt was the only group in the private space that did not experience a contraction in AUM during the financial crisis. Fund managers also had no challenges deploying capital - as seen by falling dry powder during the period. Chart 4Europe Will Be The Growth Engine Global Allocation: Investors looking to build a durable private-debt mandate will benefit tremendously from global allocation. This helps diversify away from the key risk factor of U.S. corporate cash flow, and also exposes returns to multiple credit cycles. Currently, North America is the largest and most developed private-debt market with issuance almost 4-5 times that of Europe. But looking forward, given the low level of non-bank penetration (Chart 4) in the lending market, Europe is likely to be the next growth engine. Investing in Europe versus the U.S. will have a few different characteristics: 1) lower leverage at the fund level; 2) a larger PIK4 (pay in kind) and smaller cash-pay5 component; 3) origination fees making up a greater portion of overall return. There has also been growth in the emerging markets/Asian private-debt space. Investors can expect an additional return of 4-6% relative to the U.S. and Europe for similar risk. A high level of idiosyncratic risk make these credits very attractive from a diversification perspective. For example, Australian and Korean authorities have very strict regulations on banks, thereby opening the door for alternative lenders. Moreover, the onshore and offshore markets created by capital controls in China increase the need for mezzanine and bridge financing. Deal Origination: For middle-market lending, there are three channels for sourcing deals: 1) sponsored, 2) direct (non-sponsored), and 3) capital markets. In the sponsored channel, private-debt funds can benefit by investing alongside control-focused private equity investors which also provide equity capital injections. In the non-sponsored or direct channel, private-debt funds have to maintain continuous communication and relationships with management teams, and this requires more involvement in terms of due diligence and portfolio monitoring. The capital markets channel involves participation in a third-party investment and comes with terms that have already been negotiated. Chart 5Compressing Fee Structures Chart 6Manager Selection Is Key Fee Structure: Fees (Chart 5) and administrative costs are important for an asset class where up to 25% of gross returns can be swallowed by costs. Compared to private equity, direct lending helps mitigate the effect of the "J-curve", as these funds typically charge management fees on invested capital, and carry over a hurdle rate. Increasing competition and rising dry powder have pushed management fees to the lowest level in 10 years. Finally, fees for direct-lending funds are much lower than other strategies because of the lack of equity components and a lower risk-return profile. Manager Selection: The heterogeneity in private debt means that picking the right general partner (GP) can have a big impact on returns (Chart 6). Like the entire private capital space, there is great dispersion between top-quartile managers and the rest. Additionally, there has also been a performance differential between first-time and returning managers. It is critical to conduct extensive due diligence. The private debt space consists of multiple strategies with different risk-return implications for a portfolio. Looking back at Table 1, these strategies can be split into the following two groups: Capital Preservation Strategies: These strategies offer more stable returns while minimizing downside. A more conservative risk-return profile means investors should allocate to these strategies from their alternative credit bucket. Direct lending and mezzanine debt fall under this group. Return Maximizing Strategies: These strategies offer larger gains but with a higher probability of deals going bust. A more aggressive risk-return profile means investors should allocate to these strategies from their private equity bucket. Distressed debt and venture debt fall under this group. Private Debt Strategies Direct Lending Chart 7Direct Lending Loans are made to middle-market companies without an intermediary bank or broker (Chart 7). This is done by going directly to private-equity sponsors or owner-operators of middle-market firms. Institutional lenders are more actively involved than commercial banks, offering customized financing solutions. The loans are mostly structured as term loans with 5-7 years maturity, and an emphasis on smaller loan sizes.6 These investors are sold with the intention of generating high current income with low volatility and losses. Most are senior secured loans underwritten as a multiple of EBITDA.7 Prospective investors compare direct lending to its public-market equivalent: syndicated leveraged loans. Direct lending offers a yield premium along with lower leverage levels, higher coverage ratios, and more conservative deal terms. Banking regulations such as Basel III and the new Federal Reserve loan guidelines will reduce banks' willingness to refinance the $180 Bn - $240 Bn of existing mid-market loans, which will give direct lenders a larger market to service. Additionally, with North American private equity dry powder at $530 Bn,8 there will be increased demand for direct lending to fund leveraged buyouts (LBOs). However, the direct lending space has grown 10-fold, from being an $18 Bn market in 2007 to $180 bn at the end of 2017. Investors looking to deploy capital in current market conditions may be skeptical. A recent development in the direct lending space, following the financial crisis, has been the creation of unitranche loans. This structure combines a senior and junior credit position into one blended loan and interest rate. The risk profile is a single lien that is often a senior first-lien position. Investors can benefit from advantageous pricing: the interest rate received falls between the rate of senior debt and subordinated debt. Deals originated through the private-equity sponsored channel have become very competitive. Investors should look at non-sponsored channel deals which are less crowded and make up a smaller fraction of the mid-market space. These are normally smaller and require more active due diligence, but potentially offer higher risk-adjusted returns compared to sponsored deals. Mezzanine Debt Chart 8Mezzanine Debt Directly originated loans that are subordinate to senior secured notes but senior to equity (Chart 8). These loans are secured by assets and are used to finance leveraged buyouts, recapitalize the balance-sheet, and for corporate acquisitions. They generally fill a funding gap due to insufficient capital from other sources. Most mezzanine loans are evaluated and structured based on the ongoing cash flow and enterprise value of the company, as opposed to asset-based lending which focuses on the liquidation value of assets. An added advantage is the ability to customize debt terms to match the cash flow profile of each company by changing the timing and amounts of current and deferred payments. This includes incurrence9 and maintenance10 covenants, unlike covenant-lite large-cap corporate issues. Given their subordinate position in the capital structure, investors can expect higher returns compared to direct lending (but at a higher risk, since these are highly leveraged situations). Coupon income is generally fixed-rate and paid in cash, and investors also enjoy call protection. Investors in this group mostly focus on total return versus income return in direct lending. This is because there exists an additional upside with the equity kicker,11 which means mezzanine holders enjoy features of both debt and equity. Additionally, not only do investors benefit from current payments in the form of cash interest and principal repayments, but also deferred payments through payment in kind (PIK) and bonus exit payments.12 The key risk with this investment is its junior position in the capital structure, putting the lender in first-loss position after the value of company drops by more than equity value. These investments tend to underperform when distressed managers outperform: environments of rising defaults, higher corporate leverage, and economic slowdown. Such events are bad for junior bondholders and reduce possible equity upside. Distressed Debt Chart 9Distressed Debt Investing in this group (Chart 9) can take a number of different forms depending on the manager's return and risk target and investment horizon. Investors are usually less familiar with the process and require fund managers with legal expertise to handle possible bankruptcy proceedings. In 2016, global non-performing loans reached 4%13 of total gross loans. The distressed market has changed substantially. In the early 2000s, funds could make attractive returns by effectively trading in and out of debt. Recently, fund managers have had to focus on restructuring and operational turnarounds which require private-equity like exposure. Since attractive opportunities in this space come less frequently, investors need to look for managers that are good at sourcing deals. What differentiates performance between different distressed managers is what they do with the securities after purchase. Most large returns will be generated through negotiation and restructuring, and only a smaller portion from "pull-to-par"14 investing. A key driver of returns is the accurate assessment of a borrower's enterprise value. Investors will have access to both a contractual coupon yield and also substantial capital appreciation driven by pull-to-par from a refinancing or settlement. Loan-to-own strategy. Taking an activist role with a target company will involve the possibility of converting to equity during bankruptcy proceedings. This also gives investors access to restricted information about the target and considerable leverage at the negotiating table. At the other end of the spectrum, managers target non-control15 transactions and acquire their debt at a discount to par with the hope of par refinancing driven by positive improvements at the firm. Investors should commit capital to distressed assets when fundamentals are solid and defaults are relatively low before the onset of the upturn in the economic cycle. Additionally, investors should analyze current political and economic trends to pinpoint where the next distressed opportunity will arise. Fund managers that keep ample dry powder waiting to be deployed will benefit from picking assets at beaten-down valuations. A classic example was following the 2014 oil bear market, when distressed managers with sufficient dry powder were able to source attractive deals. Additionally, investors looking to further customize risk-return dynamics can look to deploy capital to the growing distressed market in Asia. Along with years of rapid growth in China, there is a growing problem of bad corporate debt. However, investing in these new markets with different legislative mechanisms may require partnering with a local asset manager. Venture Debt CHart 10Venture Debt These are loans (Chart 10) to early-stage firms backed by venture capital. Family businesses seeking capital, but not willing to surrender control and ownership, will opt for venture debt. The loan is usually secured by intellectual property, receivables, and other intangible assets such as trademarks and copyrights. Venture debt is typically raised immediately after an equity round in order to minimize borrowing costs. For every four-to-seven venture equity dollars, one dollar will be financed by venture debt. The core function of venture debt is to extend the "cash runway",16 thereby achieving the next milestone/valuation driver. There are two structures of venture debt financing: 1) receivables financing - a firm will borrow against its receivables (at a 15-20% discount) to meet cash flow needs; and 2) equipment financing - structured as a lease for the purchase of equipment. In the first case, investors can expect a higher risk-return profile compared to the second given the more unpredictable nature of cash flows. Return stream consists of cash interest, PIK income, and equity warrants. The equity kicker is generally 10-25% of the loan value which gives investors an option to participate in subsequent equity rounds. Another interesting feature is that capital distributions are reinvested and recycled, maximizing IRR over the fund's life. In short, investors can expect some private equity-like upside with a baseline return from a debt component. With private-equity upside comes similar downside. The business of venture lending is very cyclical since it involves young businesses. During tough times, additional rounds of equity injection might be required to reduce cash burn. Additionally, there exists tremendous variability across vintage years, therefore it is important for investors to pick the right time to enter this space. Special Situations Chart 11Special Situations Managers in this space do not have a specific mandate and can cover a wide range of complex strategies targeting specific industry or geographic opportunities (Chart 11). Deal sourcing is harder since most opportunities are event-driven. The more popular types include rescue financing, balance-sheet restructuring, and non-performing loans (NPLs). Generally, most attractive opportunities for special situations arise at the beginning of a distressed cycle. Special-situation funds can be thought of as liquidity providers in situations of both micro and macro dislocations. In the case of the recent energy crisis in 2015, managers provided bespoke restructuring solutions for oil producers' capital structures as their debt matured. On the other hand, managers could also acquire a diversified portfolio of NPLs across sectors. Given that deal flow is highly dependent on firm specific or aggregate industry dislocations, investors need to pick managers with strong performance across multiple economic cycles and across the entire capital structure. Key risks depends on the type of mandate. For a manager with a niche focus, investors need to be wary about the strategy attracting increased attention, eventually decreasing the range of opportunities. For managers with a broad mandate, the risk lies with miscalculating a new and unfamiliar opportunity. Business Development Companies (BDCs) - A Liquid Alternative To Direct Lending Chart 12BDCs: Higher Yield, Higher Volatility BDCs are U.S. closed-end exchange-traded investment vehicles with an aggregate market cap of $33 billion17 specialising in private non-syndicated secured and unsecured middle-market corporate debt with daily liquidity (Chart 12). These structures were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980 to stimulate private investment in middle-market firms which had suffered during the stagflation that followed the 1973-1974 recession. These entities have legal and tax similarities with real-estate investment trusts (REITs) and master limited partnerships (MLPs): 1) annual distribution of 90% of income to shareholders, and 2) preferential tax treatment. Underlying assets are mostly directly originated middle-market loans with an increased use of covenants. They tend to have an average maturity of five years with a floating-rate coupon and origination fees which give 0.25% in additional income. Additionally, the maximum debt-to-equity leverage allowed is 1:1. Finally, investors can expect a fee structure of 1.5%/20%, with an 8% hurdle rate. One of the biggest attractiveness of BDCs is the high dividend yield relative even to other high-yielding assets such as REITs and MLPs. Additionally, BDCs have a positive yield spread versus high-yield bonds despite holding higher quality assets. This in turn leads to lower loss rates for BDCs compared to high-yield credit. However the annualized volatility of BDCs is far greater than equities, corporate and junk bonds. Conclusion Creating a well-balanced private-debt program requires deploying capital across the credit/economic cycle. Investors should strategically deploy capital to generate a meaningful yield over cash, while retaining agility to be able to move into higher risk/return assets when market sentiment recovers and opportunities arise. In a late-cycle phase, investors should deploy capital to senior debt direct lending with attractive asset coverage and strong current income. In a recessionary phase, investors should move into distressed assets and into deeper parts of the capital structure which will benefit from future expansion as the cycle improves. In an early cycle phase, investors should move into mezzanine debt and other equity-linked strategies with the potential to deliver strong performance through capital appreciation. Aditya Kurian Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1 http://www.icgam.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Rise of Private Debt as an institutional asset class Amin Rajan GENERIC.pdf 2 American Society of Actuaries. 3 From 2012 to 2017, the middle market exhibited stronger revenue and employment growth than the S&P 500. In 2017, the average revenue growth rate for middle-market companies was 8% compared to 5.3% for the S&P 500. Source: National Center for the Middle Market. 4 Under PIK, interest is paid by increasing the principal amount through capitalization of interest when it is due. 5 "Cash pay component" is the part of the quarterly payments received by private debt investors that are in the form of cash. 6 Average loan size for middle-market direct lending is $20M - $30M. 7 Direct lending funding is provided in terms of either Debt/EBITDA or Net Debt/EBITDA so that investors can better analyze a borrower's repayment capacity. 8 With dry powder of $530 Bn, and assuming a 60% debt, 40% equity capital structure, this implies over $750 Bn of future financing opportunities in sponsored buyouts. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. 9 If a borrower takes an action (dividend payment, acquisition), the resulting position would need to remain in compliance with the loan agreement. 10 The borrower needs to meet certain financial tests every reporting period in order to remain qualified for the loan. 11 Mezzanine debt providers often have the option to convert to equity at a future date, thereby participating in any upside. 12 A variable payment calculated as a percent of the change in the value of the company over the duration of the mezzanine facility. 13 Source: The World Bank. 14 Investors buying distressed debt trading at a discount in the hope of selling it at par when the company recovers and its bonds return to face value. 15 When the total position in the firm is too small to gain board or management representation. 16 When funding each round, venture capitalists look at how much cash the company is expected to burn to reach the next milestone, with each round typically designed to fund 12 to 14 months. If this expected cash burn phase extends beyond that period and the firm runs out of cash, venture debt could be used as a cash runway until the next round of venture capital funding. 17 Source: http://cefdata.com/bdc/

Underweight (Upgrade Alert) It is a well-established rule that where jet fuel prices go, airline stock prices will go the opposite direction. Thus, it is no surprise that the most recent peak in the S&P airlines index coincided with the most recent trough in jet fuel prices in early 2017; the former has since fallen steeply as the latter has soared (fuel prices shown inverted in top panel). Easing oil prices are a likely catalyst for a significant rerating in depressed relative valuations. Fuel hedges no longer play a significant role in earnings and lower fuel costs would translate directly to the bottom line. As a reminder, nearly all major players reiterated their pledge to avoid kerosene hedging earlier this year. Adding it up, we think downside risks to airlines have abated considerably and are well reflected in beaten down valuations (bottom panel). We are therefore compelled to add this transportation sub-index to our upgrade watch list. If there is any letup in jet fuel prices, we would not hesitate to crystallize relative profits north of 21% since our underweight inception. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P airlines index for now, but put in on upgrade alert; please see Monday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, AAL, UAL, ALK.

Overweight (High Conviction) The S&P software index is on the cusp of breaching the 2000 relative performance all-time peak, and we reiterate the high-conviction overweight status of this key tech sub-index, that is up over 11% versus the SPX since the late-November inception.1 BCA's synchronized global capex upcycle theme is the fundamental driver of our sanguine software industry view. Currently, software investment is outpacing overall capital outlays (second panel). These software capex market share gains on the back of a growing overall capex pie bode well for relative profit growth. Our S&P software EPS growth model corroborates this encouraging news (third panel), pointing to ongoing exceptionally strong earnings growth. Meanwhile, the S&P software index has a pristine balance sheet with virtually no net debt (bottom panel); if our virtuous capex upcycle thesis further bolsters software sales/profits in the coming months, then more gains are in store for the S&P software index that will likely grow into its pricey valuations. Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight status in the S&P software index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT - MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, ATVI, INTU, EA, RHT, ADSK, CTXS, ANSS, SNPS, SYMC, TTWO, CDNS, CA. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.