Developed Countries
Highlights A no-deal Brexit which did not cause pain pour encourager les autres would be the much graver existential threat for the EU. A U.K. parliamentary vote to extend Article 50 by a few months would not be a game changer in itself, because it just delays the day of judgement. The real denouement will only happen when a workable route to a benign Brexit option commands a majority in the U.K. parliament. This is the point at which U.K. exposed risk-assets would outperform sustainably. Investors should then buy: the pound, the FTSE250, FTSE Small Cap, and U.K. homebuilders. Feature Chart of the WeekU.K. Homebuilders Is The Best Equity Sector To Play Brexit The Article 50 process that governs Brexit is fast approaching its two-year time limit, and the question naturally arises as to what will happen when the clock strikes midnight on March 29.1 To answer this question, it is worth stepping back to ask something even more fundamental: what was the purpose of the two-year time limit in the first place? The EU Must Protect The Integrity Of The Union The two-year time limit in Article 50 was designed to disadvantage the exiting country relative to the EU, and this disadvantage has now become abundantly clear. After the two years have run down, a no-deal or ‘cliff edge’ exit would be bad for the EU27, but it would be far worse for the U.K. This balance of power has put the EU27 very much in the driving seat of the Brexit process, and there is no reason to presume that the EU27 will do anything other than prioritise and protect its own interests. For the EU27, the priority right now is to protect the unity and integrity of the Union in the face of a growing existential threat from populists and nationalists. Unfortunately, much of this has been overlooked in the Brexiteer rhetoric, with arguments like "they need to sell us their BMWs and Prosecco". Clearly, frictionless and barrier-less trade is in the economic interests of both parties, but the economic reality is that less than a tenth of EU27 exports go to the U.K. while something approaching half of U.K. exports go to the EU27 (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Less Than A Tenth Of EU27 Exports Go To The U.K. ... Chart I-3...While Almost Half Of U.K. Exports Go To the EU27 Brexit is essentially a huge economic gamble in the name of an overarching political aim to ‘take back control’ (Chart I-4). Remember that the case for Brexit largely hinged on the desire to regain political sovereignty: specifically, controlling migration and ending the supremacy of the European Court of Justice. That’s fine, we have no qualms about that. But if the case for Brexit was largely political, it’s a bit rich to presume that the EU27 will not also prioritise its own overarching political aims – even if these political aims come at the cost of a short-term setback to the European economy. Chart I-4U.K. House Prices Have Stagnated Since The Brexit Negotiations Started Brexit Is The Litmus Test For Optimality Of The EU A catastrophic no-deal Brexit would undoubtedly hurt the EU27, and be particularly painful for the member states most exposed to U.K. trade, notably Ireland and the Netherlands. But here’s the paradox: a no-deal Brexit which did not cause pain pour encourager les autres would be the much graver existential threat for the EU. If membership of the EU and its institutions is supposedly an optimal economic and political structure for European states, then Brexit is the litmus test for the sub-optimality of exiting, and especially the heavy cost of exiting abruptly. If, after the two-year notice of Article 50, the U.K. abruptly left the EU with negligible disruption and then quickly thrived outside the EU, it would galvanize the European nationalists and populists to emulate a newly confident and resurgent U.K.’s quick and painless divorce. As this could be the death knell of the European project, the paradox is highlighted in our mischievous title: why a catastrophic no-deal might be good… for the EU. Brexit can take three ultimate shapes: The U.K. revokes its intention to withdraw the EU and remains a full member of the Union. A long transition to a new and negotiated trading relationship between the U.K. and the EU27. A sharp cliff-edge in which the U.K. abruptly becomes a third country to the EU27. The U.K. population now clearly favours option 1 – remain – over the two alternatives (Chart I-5). Meanwhile, the U.K. parliament has expressed its opposition, albeit not yet legally binding opposition, to option 3 – the no-deal Brexit. As for the EU27, the best outcome is for the U.K. to revoke its intention to withdraw and thrive within the club; the next best outcome is a long transition to Brexit, during which and after which the U.K. economy underperforms its European peers to illustrate the sub-optimality of exiting. But if Brexit is a cliff-edge, it has to be demonstrably painful. Hence, the EU27 will want to put off the day it has to confront this paradox if there is any chance of avoiding it. Article 50 does allow for this delay. The specific wording of paragraph 3 states: The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. But a close reading suggests that if there is still a real possibility of finalising a withdrawal agreement, or if withdrawal is an outcome that the State no longer desires, then this would not represent ‘failing’. Meaning that the period of negotiation of a withdrawal agreement could be extended beyond March 29, or indeed Article 50 could be entirely revoked. A Short Delay Is Not A Game Changer, But A Second Referendum Would Be Looking at the desired outcomes of the U.K. population, the U.K. parliament, and the EU27, Brexit should rationally end up as benign options 1 or 2. The trouble is that rational outcomes can be thwarted if there is no mechanism to implement them. Although the U.K. parliament has expressed its desire to avoid a no-deal, it has not yet coalesced a majority around how exactly to avoid the cliff-edge outcome. A parliamentary vote to extend Article 50 by a few months would not be a game changer in itself because it just delays the day of judgement, though a longer extension would be more significant. But if the extension facilitated a second referendum or a general election, then that would be a game changer – as there would be the potential for the U.K. population to overturn the decision to leave. It follows that the real denouement will only happen when a workable route to either of the benign Brexit options 1 or 2 above commands a majority in the U.K. parliament. From the perspective of investors, what this way forward turns out to be – permanent customs union, Common Market 2.0, second referendum, or general election – does not really matter. What matters is that a parliamentary majority exists for a positive course of action that eliminates no-deal rather than just delays it. This would be the point at which the BoE is finally liberated from its emergency policy (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7), pushing up U.K. gilt yields relative to other government bond yields (Chart I-8), and allowing a sustained rally in the pound (Chart I-9). Chart I-6Brexit Has Subdued The BoE... Chart I-7...Despite A Tight U.K. Labour Market Chart I-8Were It Not For Brexit, U.K. Interest Rates Would Be 1 Percent Higher... Chart I-9…And The Pound Would Be At $1.50 In this event, U.K. exposed risk-assets would also outperform. Note that the FTSE100 is not one of these investments. Whenever the pound strengthens, the weaker translation of the FTSE100 companies’ dollar-denominated earnings tends to weigh down this large-cap index (Chart I-10). Instead, investors should focus on: the FTSE250 (Chart I-11) and the FTSE Small Cap, but the best play is the U.K. homebuilders (Chart of the Week). Chart I-10When The Pound Rallies, The FTSE100 Underperforms... Chart I-11...So Prefer The FTSE250 Fractal Trading System* We are pleased to report that long Italy’s MIB versus Eurostoxx600 reached the end of its 3-month holding period very comfortably in profit which is now crystallised. This week, we note that the sharp underperformance of aluminium versus tin is at the limit of tight liquidity which has previously signalled a trend-reversal. Hence, the recommended trade is long aluminium versus tin. Set a profit target of 6.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 Midnight British Summer Time Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Underweight (High-Conviction) Home Depot, the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index heavyweight, reported earnings yesterday that missed expectations as same store sales fell well short of estimates. The company also added guidance that this key figure would moderate in the coming year from 2018 levels. While a slower rate of top line growth this quarter was fairly predictable, given the Q4 collapse in lumber prices (recall that HIR earns a markup on lumber), the outlook does not bode well. This tough operating environment is captured by our model that, even with a modest recovery in lumber prices, still points to a significant decline in the S&P HIR index (third panel). Still, the HIR index trades at a premium to the broad index despite the headwinds facing the sector (bottom panel). A premium valuation seems misplaced and we accordingly reiterate our high-conviction underweight recommendation on the sector. We further point investors to our market neutral trade going long homebuilders/short HIR.1 The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index is BLBG: S5HOMI – HD and LOW. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings,” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
If those expectations continue to rise, likely in the context of stickier realized U.S. inflation alongside solid U.S. growth, then the Fed will return to a hawkish bias. That ultimately means higher U.S. real yields and, most likely, some pullback in U.S.…
Investors have priced out any possibility of a Fed rate hike over the next year, and now even discount a modest rate cut, according to the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. Yet, while most of the attention of bond investors has been focused on the U.S.,…
It will come as no surprise that the trend in GDP growth is vital to our interest rate call. In fact, we showed in a recent report that when year-over-year nominal GDP growth falls below the 10-year Treasury yield it is often a good signal that monetary…
in the current environment is by initiating a duration-neutral yield curve trade where you buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve, while selling the 5-year or 7-year maturity. The 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields are most…
FOMC participants need more confidence that inflation will return to target before re-starting rate hikes, but the bar seems higher for some than for others. Year-over-year core and trimmed mean CPI are currently running at 2.15% and 2.19%, respectively. This…
Highlights Fed: With financial conditions easing and core inflation more likely to rise than fall, the majority of Fed officials will feel justified lifting rates again in the second half of this year. The best way to position for the resumption of rate hikes is to sell the 5-year or 7-year part of the Treasury curve and buy a duration-matched barbell consisting of the short and long ends of the curve. These sorts of positions currently offer positive carry, meaning you get paid as you wait for the market to price rate hikes back in. Corporate Spreads: Maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) with the exception of the Aaa credit tier. But be prepared to reduce exposure when spreads reach our target levels. Economy: Tracking estimates for 2018 Q4 and 2019 Q1 real GDP have fallen significantly during the past two weeks. The decline in tracking estimates is heavily influenced by an abnormal December retail sales report. That impact will reverse in 2019. Feature The Federal Reserve’s “on hold” strategy is now well known and has been completely discounted in the market. In fact, the overnight index swap curve is priced for 9 bps of rate cuts during the next 12 months and 21 bps of cuts during the next 24 months (Chart 1). Chart 1Primary Dealers Still Looking For Hikes At this point, the only thing that’s unclear is how the Fed will respond to the economic data going forward. Will it be eager to re-start rate hikes at the first sign of calm? Or perhaps the Fed is leaning toward a strategy where the next move will be a rate cut in the face of flagging economic growth? Survey Says Unfortunately, last month’s FOMC meeting was not accompanied by an updated Summary of Economic Projections. We therefore don’t know how policymakers have revised their rate hike expectations since December. However, the New York Fed’s Survey of Primary Dealers was updated in January, and it shows that the median primary dealer still expects two rate hikes this year. The only change between the December and January surveys is that the median primary dealer now expects one of the 2019 rate hikes in June and the other in December. In the December survey, both 2019 rate hikes were anticipated before the end of June (Chart 1). Typically, the median primary dealer and the median FOMC participant have very similar views on the future interest rate trajectory. Counting The Minutes The next stop on our search for clarity is the minutes from the January FOMC meeting, which were released last week. The January minutes provide a lot of insight into the thought processes of different FOMC participants. Unfortunately, they also reveal a serious lack of cohesion amongst the group. All in all, the document might confuse more than it clarifies. A few key excerpts from the document drive this point home. Referring to “global economic and financial developments”: Many participants observed that if uncertainty abated, the Committee would need to reassess the characterization of monetary policy as “patient” and might then use different language. This suggests that many Fed participants view the pause in rate hikes as a result of slower non-U.S. growth and tighter financial conditions. They also suggest that if global growth improves and financial conditions ease it would be appropriate to abandon a “patient” stance. … several […] participants argued that rate increases might prove necessary only if inflation outcomes were higher than in their baseline outlook. This second statement is much more dovish than the first. It suggests that several participants think that even improving global growth and an easing of financial conditions would not be sufficient to re-start rate hikes. They would also need to see inflation come in stronger than expected. Several other participants indicated that, if the economy evolved as they expected, they would view it as appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate later this year. Finally, this last statement reveals that several other participants disagree with the view that an unexpected rise in inflation is a pre-condition for further rate hikes. What can we make of all this mess? The first thing that seems clear is that all Fed members view easier financial conditions as a pre-condition for further rate hikes. In this regard, we are already well on our way. Financial conditions have eased considerably since the start of the year, with the stock-to-bond total return ratio up sharply and credit spreads, the VIX and the dollar all off their highs (Chart 2). Chart 2Financial Conditions Are Easing Second, all FOMC participants need more confidence that inflation will return to target before re-starting rate hikes, but this bar seems higher for some than for others. Year-over-year core and trimmed mean CPI are currently running at 2.15% and 2.19%, respectively. This is slightly below the 2.4% level that is consistent with the Fed’s inflation target (Chart 3).1 The minutes suggest that some FOMC participants would be comfortable re-starting rate hikes as long as core inflation moves higher in the next few months and approaches the Fed’s target from below. Some others, however, may need to see an overshoot of the Fed’s inflation target before recommending rate hikes. Chart 3Core Inflation Needs To Move Higher Depressed inflation expectations, as seen in the TIPS market or the Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey, are a related issue (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). The Fed will probably want to see upward movement in both of these measures before resuming rate hikes. In fact, New York Fed President John Williams warned last week that the “persistent undershoot of the Fed’s [inflation] target risks undermining the 2 percent inflation anchor.” He added that “the risk of the inflation expectations anchor slipping toward shore calls for a reassessment of the dominant inflation targeting framework.”2 Williams has long been an advocate for a monetary policy framework where the Fed targets an overshoot of its inflation target in the future to “make up” for undershooting its target in the past, i.e. some form of price level targeting. The Fed is currently conducting a year-long investigation into whether it should switch to this sort of regime and we learned last week that the Fed will announce the results of its investigation in the first half of 2020. Our own sense is that the Fed will eventually adopt some sort of “history dependent” inflation target as a way to avoid continuously bumping up against the zero-lower bound on interest rates. But this change will not occur this year and maybe not even next year. Of course, the more immediate concern for bond investors is whether inflation pressures will be meaningful enough in the next few months for the Fed to resume rate hikes in 2019. We expect they will be. We have previously shown that base effects alone will pressure year-over-year core CPI higher as we head toward mid-year.3 Meanwhile, other signs also point toward rising core inflation (Chart 4): Chart 4Inflation Pressures Building The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge is running close to 3% (Chart 4, top panel). The ISM Manufacturing PMI is off its highs, but is still consistent with rising year-over-year core CPI (Chart 4, panel 2). Our CPI Diffusion Index is deep in positive territory, pointing to further near-term upside in the core measure (Chart 4, bottom panel). Bottom Line: With financial conditions easing and core inflation more likely to rise than fall, the majority of Fed officials will feel justified lifting rates again this year. January’s FOMC minutes imply that several Fed members want to see an overshoot of the inflation target before advocating for the resumption of rate hikes, but until the Fed changes its inflation targeting regime they will likely be out-voted. The Best Way To Trade The Fed We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration bias in U.S. bond portfolios, on the view that rate hikes will exceed depressed market expectations on a 12-month horizon. However, this is not the most attractive way to position for the resumption of Fed rate hikes. The best way to trade the Fed in the current environment is by initiating a duration-neutral yield curve trade where you buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve, and sell the 5-year or 7-year maturity. In a prior report we demonstrated that the 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields are most sensitive to changes in our 12-month fed funds discounter.4 That is, when the market starts to price-in more Fed rate hikes, the 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields increase more than other maturities. Similarly, the 5-year and 7-year yields fall the most when our discounter declines. Clearly, this means that if you are short the 5-year/7-year part of the curve versus the wings, you will make money as rate hikes are priced back into the market. Usually the problem with implementing such a trade is that it has negative carry. That is, the 5-year or 7-year bullet typically offers a greater yield than what you would earn on a duration-matched 2/10 or 2/30 barbell. If you don’t time the trade properly, you end up losing money waiting for Fed rate hike expectations to move. However, this is not a problem at the moment. In fact, duration-matched barbells are now positive carry propositions relative to 5-year and 7-year bullets (Chart 5). Chart 5 Barbell Yields Greater Than Bullet Yields In other words, if you think rate hikes will resume at some point, you are currently getting paid to wait for the market to catch on. The only way to lose money in this sort of trade is if our 12-month fed funds discounter falls further from its current -9 bps level. We view that as an unlikely scenario. Bottom Line: The best way to position for the resumption of Fed rate hikes is to sell the 5-year or 7-year part of the Treasury curve, and buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve. We currently recommend being short the 7-year and long the 2/30 barbell. This trade has positive carry, meaning that you will earn money as you wait for rate hikes to get priced back in. Corporate Spread Targets As we have discussed in prior reports, we think the Fed’s pause opens up a window where corporate bond spreads have room to tighten during the next few months.5 However, we also acknowledge that the window for outperformance is limited. Once financial conditions ease and the Fed resumes rate hikes, the environment will quickly become more difficult for corporate bonds. For this reason, in last week’s report we presented Chart 6. The diamonds in Chart 6 show where corporate 12-month breakeven spreads are today relative to past “Phase 2” periods, which are environments similar to today when the yield curve is quite flat but still positively sloped.6 We argued that we would be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure when the breakeven spreads reach the historical median for Phase 2 periods, i.e. when the diamonds fall to the 50% line in Chart 6. However, we acknowledge that this is not a helpful guide for investors who don’t have timely access to our valuation metrics. So this week we present Charts 7A and 7B. These charts estimate the option-adjusted spread (OAS) levels for each credit tier of the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond indexes that would be consistent with the 50% line in Chart 6. To make these estimates we need to assume that the average duration of each index remains constant. The results show the following spread targets: For Aa we target 55 bps. The current OAS is 61 bps. For A we target 84 bps. The current OAS is 94 bps. For Baa we target 128 bps. The current OAS is 161 bps. For Ba we target 186 bps. The current OAS is 236 bps. For B we target 298 bps. The current OAS is 391 bps. For Caa we target 571 bps. The current OAS is 813 bps. We do not recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated corporate bonds, where spreads are already expensive relative to past Phase 2 periods (Chart 7A, top panel). Chart 7aInvestment Grade Spread Targets Chart 7BHigh-Yield Spread Targets Bottom Line: Maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) with the exception of the Aaa credit tier. But be prepared to reduce exposure when spreads reach our target levels. Economic Update We will finally receive GDP data for the fourth quarter of 2018 on Thursday, and investors should ready themselves for a weak number. In fact, the most recent tracking estimates from the New York Fed have real GDP coming in at 2.35% in Q4 and a mere 1.20% in 2019 Q1 (Chart 8). Chart 8Poor GDP Tracking Estimates ... It will come as no surprise that the trend in GDP growth is vital to our interest rate call. In fact, we showed in a recent report that when year-over-year nominal GDP growth falls below the 10-year Treasury yield it is often a good signal that monetary policy has turned restrictive and that interest rates have peaked for the cycle.7 With that in mind, if we add 1.2% expected real growth in Q1 to the 1.7% average growth rate of the GDP deflator (Chart 8, bottom panel), we can roughly estimate nominal GDP growth of 2.9% in Q1. This remains above the current 10-year Treasury yield, suggesting that monetary conditions would still be accommodative, but just barely. However, we expect the Q1 tracking forecast to improve as new data come in. According to the New York Fed’s model, the weak December retail sales report trimmed 0.41% from its Q1 growth forecast and this report increasingly looks like an aberration. In contrast to the retail sales number, the Johnson Redbook index of same-store sales is growing at a rate close to 5%, and indexes of consumer confidence remain elevated (Chart 9). Chart 9...Driven By Abnormal Retail Sales Even the Fed staff’s economic report, as presented in the January FOMC minutes, suggests that December should have been a good month for consumer spending: The release of the retail sales report for December was delayed, but available indicators – such as credit card and debit card transaction data and light motor vehicle sales – suggested that household spending growth remained strong in December. Bottom Line: However, we expect the Q1 tracking forecast to improve as new data come in. According to the New York it seems likely that the partial government shutdown influenced the collection of the December retail sales data and led to an abnormal print. Since the retail sales data feed directly into GDP, the impact will be felt in the next GDP report. But the impact will prove fleeting. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Fed’s target is for 2% PCE inflation. CPI tends to run about 0.4% above PCE. 12-month core PCE is currently 1.88%, but data only go to November. This is why we refer to CPI in this report, which has data through January. 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/wil190222 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caught Offside”, dated February 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit”, dated January 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For more detail on the different phases of the economic cycle please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Running Room”, dated January 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Low Bond Volatility: Weakening non-U.S. growth and a more dovish Fed have crushed global government bond volatility, especially in Europe and Japan where yields are struggling to stay above 0%. Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads, which now largely reflect long-run real growth differentials between the U.S and Europe/Japan, are likely to stay range bound. USTs vs Bunds/JGBs: Stay overweight Bunds & JGBs versus Treasuries, on a hedged basis in U.S. dollars, given the boost to returns from hedging into higher-yielding dollars. Feature Bond Yields Are In Winter Hibernation Developed market (DM) government bonds, never the most exciting of asset classes to begin with, have become boring of late. While benchmark 10-year yields since the end of January have moved in line with our recommended country allocations - lower in Germany (-7bps), Japan (-3bps), the U.K. (-5bps) and Australia (-11bps) where we are overweight, higher in the U.S. (+5bps), Canada (+2bps) and Italy (+19bps) where we are underweight – government bonds have settled into trading ranges and lack direction. The proximate trigger for the muted yield volatility was the Federal Reserve shifting to a neutral stance on U.S. monetary policy in January. Investors have priced out any possibility of a Fed rate hike over the next year, and now even discount a modest rate cut, according to the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. Yet while most of the attention for bond investors have been focused on the U.S., there are developments in other major economies that are also depressing yields – namely, weakening economic momentum and sluggish inflation. In particular, the downturn has shown no signs of stabilizing in the eurozone and Japan, with the latest readings on manufacturing PMIs now below the 50 line, signaling a contraction (Chart of the Week). The latest data in both regions still shows that core inflation is nowhere near the inflation targets of the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ). The story is much different in the U.S, with the manufacturing PMI still well above 50 and core inflation hovering close to the Fed’s 2% inflation target. Yet Treasury yield volatility has collapsed, with the MOVE index of Treasury options prices now back to the lows of this cycle. Chart Of The WeekAre Treasuries Leading Or Following? For the time being, non-U.S. factors are driving the direction of global bond yields. We think that will change later this year, as steady U.S. growth and surprisingly firm U.S. inflation readings will prompt the Fed to begin hiking rates again. Yet until there are signs that non-U.S. growth is stabilizing, the low yields in Europe and Japan will act as an anchor on U.S. Treasury yields, particularly given how wide U.S./non-U.S. yield differentials already reflect faster growth and inflation in the U.S. Decomposing Treasury-Bund & Treasury-JGB Spreads When looking at the pricing of the “Big 3” DM government bond markets – the U.S., Germany and Japan – there are some major differences but also some similarities as well. Even with the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury sitting at 2.68% compared to a mere 0.11% and -0.03% on the 10-year German Bund and 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB), respectively. Simply looking at the breakdown of those nominal 10-year yields into the real and inflation expectations components, there is not much of a comparison (Chart 2). The real 10-year Treasury yield is in positive territory at 0.6%, compared to -1.4% and +0.2% for JGBs and German bunds, respectively. Inflation expectations, measured by 10-year CPI swap rates, are 2.1% in the U.S., 1.5% in Germany and 0.2% in Japan. Thus, the current wide 10-year Treasury-Bund spread (just under +260ps) can be broken down into a real yield spread of +200bps and an inflation expectations gap of +60bps. In the case of the 10-year Treasury-JGB spread (just under +270bps), that breaks down into a real yield differential of +80bps and an inflation gap of +190bps. Chart 2Big Differentials Here... So while the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads are of similar magnitude, the valuation components driving the spread are much different. The former is more of a real yield gap, while the latter is more of an inflation expectations gap. That is no surprise given the BoJ’s Yield Curve Control policy that maintains a ceiling on the 10-year JGB yield of between 0.1% and 0.2%, limiting how much real yields can move (there are no BoJ restrictions on the level of CPI swap rates). Yet the U.S.-Japan inflation expectations gap is not too far off the spread between realized headline and core inflation measures in both countries - both are 1.4 percentage points higher in the U.S. as of January. Looking at other valuation metrics, the cross-county differentials are less pronounced (Chart 3). Chart 3...But Less So For Other Yield Measures Yield curves are quite flat, with the 2-year/10-year slope a mere +16bps in the U.S., +14bps in Japan and only +66bps in Germany. Our estimates of the term premia on 10-year government debt are negative for all three markets, most notably in the countries that have seen quantitative easing in recent years (-10bps in the U.S., -90bps in Germany and -60bps in Japan). Perhaps most importantly, our preferred measure of the market pricing of the real terminal policy rate – the 5-year OIS rate, 5-years forward minus the 5-year CPI swap rate, 5-years forward – is +0.2% in the U.S., -0.5% in Germany and 0.0% in Japan. That means the market is pricing in only a +70bp differential, in real terms, between the neutral policy rates of the Fed and ECB. That gap is only +20bps between market pricing of the neutral real rates for the Fed and BoJ. That narrower gap between the market-implied pricing of the real neutral rate is consistent with the theoretical macroeconomic drivers of real rate differentials, like growth rates of potential GDP and labor productivity. According to OECD estimates, potential GDP growth is 1.8% in the U.S., 1.5% in the overall euro area and 1.2% in Japan (Chart 4). This implies a long-run real yield gap between the U.S. and Germany of +60bps and the U.S. and Japan of +30bps – very close to the market pricing for the real terminal rate differentials.1 When looking at the 5-year annualized growth rates of labor productivity data from the OECD, there is no difference between the three regions with all growing at a mere 0.5% (suggesting that either a faster growth rate of the labor input, or greater productivity of capital, accounts for the higher potential growth rate in the U.S.). Chart 4No Major Differences In Long-Run Real Growth With the cross-country yield spreads now effectively priced for the long-run real growth differentials between the U.S. and Europe/Japan, this will limit the ability for nominal Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads to widen much further. Right now, U.S. inflation expectations are rising faster than those of Europe and Japan, in response to the Fed’s more dovish stance. Yet if those expectations continue to rise, likely in the context of stickier realized U.S. inflation alongside solid U.S. growth, then the Fed will return to a hawkish bias. That ultimately means higher U.S. real yields and, most likely, some pullback in U.S. inflation expectations since the markets would begin to price in the implications of the Fed moving to a restrictive policy stance (including a stronger U.S. dollar that will help dampen U.S. inflation, at the margin). So that means inflation differentials between the U.S. and Germany/Japan can move wider now but will narrow later; and vice versa for real yield differentials (narrower now and wider later). The main investment implication: nominal UST-Bund and UST-JGB spreads are unlikely to move much wider, likely for the remainder of this business cycle/Fed tightening cycle. The main takeaway is that bond yields in core Europe and Japan are effectively anchoring global yields, in general, and U.S. yields, in particular. Treasury yields will not be able to break out of the current narrow trading ranges until there are signs that growth has stabilized in Europe and Japan. Reduced global trade tensions and faster Chinese growth (and import demand) are necessary conditions to reflate the export-heavy economies of Europe and Japan. Yet even if that scenario does unfold in the months ahead (which is BCA’s base case scenario), there is still a case to prefer Bunds and JGBs over U.S. Treasuries on a currency-hedged basis in U.S. dollars. Given the wide short-term interest rate differentials between the U.S. and Europe/Japan, those near-zero 10-year Bund and JGB yields, after hedging into U.S. dollars, are actually higher than 10-year Treasury yields, which benefits the relative hedged performance of the low-yielders versus the U.S. (Chart 5) Chart 5Stay Overweight Bunds & JGBs Vs. USTs (Hedged Into USD) Thus, we continue to recommend an overweight stance on core Europe and Japan, versus an underweight tilt on the U.S., in global U.S. dollar-hedged government bond portfolios. Bottom Line: Weakening non-U.S. growth and a more dovish Fed have crushed global government bond volatility, especially in Europe and Japan where yields are struggling to stay above 0%. Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads, which now largely reflect long-run real growth differentials between the U.S and Europe/Japan are likely to stay range bound. Stay overweight Bunds & JGBs versus Treasuries, on a hedged basis in U.S. dollars, given the boost to returns from hedging into higher-yielding dollars. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We are using the full euro area data for these economic comparisons, even though we are discussing U.S.-German yield differentials in this report. We think this is reasonable given the status of German government bonds as the benchmark for the euro area, and with the ECB setting its monetary policy for the overall euro area. The differences between the data for Germany and the overall euro area are modest, with German potential GDP and 5-year productivity growth both only 0.3 percentage points higher. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns