Developed Countries

Highlights Central bankers appear to be in a rush to boost inflation expectations before the next economic downturn. This in practice should be stimulative for the global economy. Historically, currencies of small, open economies are typically the first to benefit from rebounding global growth. Ditto for those whose output gaps have fully closed. However, there appears to be a shift in the behavior of certain currency pairs in the current cycle. For example, the U.S. dollar has tended to perform better in a low-volatility environment in recent years, a shift from the past. Correspondingly, its safe-haven status may have been marginally eroded. The U.S. decision not to extend waivers on Iranian oil exports beyond the May 2 deadline is bullish for petrocurrencies such as the RUB and NOK. The Bank of Canada kept rates on hold but will be hard pressed to meet its inflation mandate before the next downturn. This suggests standing aside on USD/CAD. Rising net short positioning on the yen and Swiss franc is making them attractive from a contrarian standpoint. Place a limit-buy on CHF/NZD at 1.45. Feature Chart I-1Volatility Is Due For A Bounce The four most important financial variables that could give a near-complete snapshot of the world economy at any point in time are probably the level of the S&P 500, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield, the trade-weighted dollar and a commodity bellwether, say, crude oil prices. Any permutation of these variables can identify what quadrant the world economy is operating in, with the two most important states being either boom or bust. Taking three of those variables today – the S&P 500 breaking to all-time highs, crude oil prices up 40% from their lows and U.S. 10-year Treasury yields off by almost 100 basis points from their October highs – it is hard to justify why the dollar has hardly budged, this week’s rally aside. Obviously, this is a very simplified view of an intricately complex world economy. But it highlights a point we have been making in recent bulletins: that extended periods of low currency volatility have been very unusual in the post-Bretton Woods world (Chart I-1). The typical narrative has been that as we enter a reflationary window, pro-cyclical currencies should outperform. The reason is simple enough: These economies are export-oriented and tied to the global cycle. So, a rising current account surplus as demand for their goods and services picks up provides underlying support for the currency. Should there be little slack in their domestic economies, this also raises the probability that the central bank tightens monetary policy to fend off future inflationary pressures. It does not hurt if these countries are also commodity producers, since rising terms of trade also provides an additional exchange-rate boost. The reality is that the world is not static, and some of these dynamics have been shifting. The evidence is in the counterfactual: At current levels, China’s credit injection should have lit a fire under pro-cyclical trades because they tend to work in real-time rather than with a lag. The foreign exchange market is one of the deepest and most liquid where new information tends to get digested and discounted instantaneously. As such, the lack of more pronounced strength in pro-cyclical currencies like the Australian, New Zealand and Canadian dollar exchange rates is genuine reason for concern and worth investigation. Why Is The Dollar Breaking Higher? Our Special Report1 on March 29th highlighted the fact that the dollar should be 5-10% higher simply based on measures of relative trends, and recent data corroborate this view. The growth differential between the U.S. and the rest of the world remains wide. Meanwhile, exports and industrial production from Southeast Asia continue to decelerate. Interbank rates in China are spiking higher, suggesting most of the monetary stimulus may have already been frontloaded. And on the earnings front, U.S. profit leadership also continues. It is unclear which of these catalysts was the actual trigger for dollar strength, since these have been in place for a while now, but confirmation from any and all of them was sufficient to reinvigorate the dollar bulls. That said, it is important to pay heed to shifting market forces, but it will be imprudent to change investment strategy on this week’s moves alone. Given these moves, a few observations are in order: Almost all currencies are already falling versus the U.S. dollar – a trend that has been in place for several months now (Chart I-2). This means most of the factors putting upward pressure on the dollar are well understood by the market. For example, global growth has been slowing for well over a year, based on the global PMI. Putting on fresh U.S. long positions is at risk of a washout from stale investors, just as it was back in 2015, a year after growth had peaked. Dollar technicals are also very unfavorable (Chart I-3). Speculators are holding near-record long positions, sentiment is stretched and our intermediate-term indicator is also flagging yellow. Over the past five years, confirmation from all three indicators has been followed by some period of U.S. dollar indigestion. This time should be no different. Chart I-2Is It Time To Initiate Fresh Dollar Longs? Chart I-3Dollar Technicals Are Unfavourable A breakout in the dollar along with rising equity markets suggests that the correlation is once again shifting. The dollar has tended to trade as a counter-cyclical currency for most of the time, with a negative correlation even to global equities (Chart I-4). Importantly, given current low levels of volatility and elevated equity market valuations, the dollar would have been a great insurance policy for any stock market correction. But with U.S. interest rates having risen significantly versus almost all G10 countries in recent years, the dollar has itself become the object of carry trades. This has also come with a good number of unhedged trades, as the rising exchange rate has lifted hedging costs (Table I-1). Chart I-4The Dollar Remains A 'Risk-Off' Currency It will be difficult for the dollar to act as both a safe-haven and carry currency, because the forces that drive both move in opposite directions. For one, safe-haven assets tend to be lower-yielding but also during episodes of capital flight, investors choose to repatriate capital to pay down debt, with creditor nations having the upper hand. And given U.S. investors have already been repatriating close to $400 billion in assets over the past 12 months, it is unlikely this pace persists (Chart I-5). The bottom line is that investors who believe that the U.S. dollar has become a high-beta currency should be prepared to stampede out the door on any rise in volatility. Our bias remains that the U.S. dollar will ultimately weaken, given that the forces driving it higher are mostly behind us. Meanwhile, currencies such as the Japanese yen or even Swiss franc that have been used to fund carry trades are very ripe for short-covering flows. Putting everything together suggests at minimum building portfolio hedges. It will be difficult for the dollar to act as both a safe-haven and carry currency. One such hedge is going long CHF/NZD. This trade has a high negative carry, so we do not intend to hold it for longer than three months. But speculative positioning and relative economic trends also support this cross for the time being (Chart I-6). We are placing a limit-buy at 1.45. Chart I-5How Much More Will Repatriation Flows Help? Chart I-6CHF/NZD Is An Attractive ##br##Hedge A Shifting Landscape If the dollar eventually weakens, let’s consider the premise that the most export-dependent economies should benefit more from a rebound in global growth, and by extension, their currencies should appreciate the most. Within the G10 universe, this will be notably the European currencies led by the Swiss franc, the Swedish Krona, the euro and the pound (Chart I-7). However, from the trough in the global Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) in December 2008 until the peak in April 2010, it was the commodity currencies that outperformed. During that time frame, the Swiss franc actually fell. It is well known that Switzerland’s persistent trade surplus over the decades has been a key factor behind structural appreciation in the currency. However, at any point in time, other nuances such as whether the rebound is China or commodities driven, the starting point for valuations or even interest rate differentials take center stage in explaining currency moves. The lesson is that investors have to become nimble with currency investment strategy. The lesson is that investors have to become nimble with currency investment strategy. For pro-cyclical currencies, there have been dramatic shifts in the export share of GDP for various countries, according to World Bank data. Most euro area countries have massively expanded their export share of GDP as they have gained ground in value-added products and services. Meanwhile, the export share in Australian GDP has been stuck at 20% for many years, while that in Norway, New Zealand and Canada has seen a huge drop, even since 2009 (Chart I-8). At first blush, this suggests diminishing marginal returns to their currencies from global growth. Chart I-8A Shifting Export ##br##Landscape Take the example of New Zealand, where commodities are over 75% of exports. Since the 2000s, the government has been actively trying to redistribute growth from net exports to domestic demand. This has been mainly via the skilled workers program. The result has been a collapse in the export share of GDP from 36% to about 26%. This means that the New Zealand dollar, which has typically been a higher-beta play on global growth, is giving way to other currencies such as the euro and the Swedish krone (Chart I-4). In addition to this, while global growth might eventually recover, part of the widespread deterioration since the global financial crisis may be structural. If the overarching theme over slowing global trade is a global economy that is trying to lift its precautionary savings and spend less, then the world may not see the high rates of trade growth registered in the 1990s anytime soon. This is because at a lower rate of potential GDP growth, trade elasticities also tend to fall.2 There are many reasons for this, including less willingness among creditor nations to finance current account deficits, the paradox of thrift or just outright saturation in the turnover of trade. All of this dampens marginal returns toward all pro-cyclical currency trades. Chart I-9Trade Volatility Has Fallen The bottom line is that the overall magnitude and volatility of trade relative to GDP has fallen, at least until the recent China – U.S. trade spat (Chart I-9). This has had the effect of dampening the volatility of the corresponding mediums of trade exchanges. Part of this is clearly cyclical, but a part may be structural as well. If we embrace confirmation that the Chinese economy has bottomed, it will be important to monitor if this cycle plays out like those in the past. Notes On Petrocurrencies, And The BoC The U.S. has decided not to extend waivers on Iranian oil exports beyond the May 2 deadline. Supposedly, a coalition with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would ensure that oil markets remain adequately supplied, though Saudi Arabia has since signaled they are in no rush to raise production. Overall, this increases the bullish narrative for oil. First, the Iranian response to a shutoff in their exports could be unpredictable. The U.S. threat of driving Iranian oil exports to zero increases the geopolitical risk premium in prices, as full implementation pushes Iran to a wall, raising the odds of retaliation. Chart I-10Iran Is A Meaningful Oil Supplier Second, oil production is being curtailed at a time when Venezuelan output is rapidly falling, conflict in Libya is reviving and OPEC spare capacity remains tight. This could nudge the oil market dangerously close to a negative supply shock (Chart I-10). Meanwhile, there is the non-negligible risk of unplanned outages which have been rising in 2019, which is another source of risk for oil supply Oil futures have responded positively to the news, with both Brent and WTI making fresh 2019 highs. However, while initially reacting favorably, petrocurrencies such as the Canadian dollar, Russian ruble and Norwegian krone are selling off amid dollar strength. We think Brent will continue to trade at a premium to WCS crude. This bodes well for currencies tied to North Sea production. Hold short CAD/NOK and long NOK/SEK positions, despite the selloff this week. As for Canada, we are neutral on the loonie both short and medium term. The dovish shift by the BoC and looser fiscal policy are likely to be growth tailwinds. So is the rise in oil prices. However, there appears to be a genuine slowdown in the Canadian economy that is not yet fully reflected in economic forecasts.  The key drivers for the CAD/USD exchange rate are interest rate differentials with the U.S. (which we think will compress further) and energy prices (which we think Canada benefits less from due to the discount Canadian oil sells for, and persistent infrastructure problems). As such, we think domestic conditions will continue to knock down whatever benefit comes from rising oil prices (Chart I-11). Chart I-11CAD/USD Will Benefit From##br## Rising Terms Of Trade Chart I-12Can The BoC Hike Given ##br##This Backdrop? (1) On the consumer side, real retail sales are deflating at the worst pace since the financial crisis, and demand for housing loans is falling off (Chart I-12). This is unlikely to improve if house prices continue to roll over (Chart I-13). A study by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand shows that on average, the elasticity of consumption growth to house price changes is asymmetric with negative housing shocks, hurting consumption by more than the boost received from positive shocks. This asymmetry may be due to the fact that at very elevated debt levels, leveraged gains are used to pay down debt aggressively, whereas leveraged losses hit bottom lines directly. There appears to be a genuine slowdown in the Canadian economy that is not yet fully reflected in economic forecasts. On the corporate side of the equation, the latest Canadian Business Outlook Survey is very telling. Firms’ expectations for sales have softened significantly, as businesses in several sectors are less optimistic about demand. This is driven by uncertainty in the oil patch, weak housing and weak external conditions. This in turn, has led to a steep drop in plans to increase capex (Chart I-14). For external investors, the large stock of debt in the Canadian private sector and overvaluation in the housing market are likely to continue leading to equity outflows on a rate-of-change basis. Chart I-13Can The BoC Hike Given This Backdrop? (2) Chart I-14Can The BoC Hike Given This Backdrop? (3) Technically, USD/CAD failed to break below the upward sloping trendline drawn from its 2017 lows. The next resistance zone is the 1.36-1.38 level. Our bias is that this zone will prove to be formidable resistance. We continue to recommend investors short the CAD, mainly via the euro. Housekeeping Our limit-buy on AUD/USD was triggered at 0.70. Place tight stops at 0.68 until further evidence that global growth has bottomed. Our short USD/SEK position garnered losses this week. The RiksBank’s dovish shift surprised the market, and triggered panic selling as important technical levels were broken. With a manufacturing PMI at 52.8, inflation at 1.8% and wages growing near 3%, this is not exactly the symptoms of an economy that needs more stimulus. We recommend holding onto positions, but will respect our stop loss a few hundred pips away. Finally, the dovish shift by the Bank of Japan does not change our thinking on the yen. The resilience in the currency might indicate the pool of yen bears has been exhausted.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Tug Of War With Gold As Umpire,” dated March 29, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Cristina Constantinescu, Aaditya Mattoo, and Michele Ruta, “The Global Trade Slowdown: Cyclical Or Structural?” IMF working paper (2015). Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1 Chart II-2​​​​​ Recent data in the U.S. suggest a weaker housing market: In March, building permits contracted by 1.7% month-on-month, falling to 1.27 million; housing starts decreased by 0.3% month-on-month, coming in at 1.14 million. March new home sales grew by 4.5% month-on-month, coming in at 0.69 million. However, existing home sales contracted by 4.9% month-on-month, falling to 5.21 million. The house price index grew by 0.3% month-on-month in February, in line with expectations. MBA mortgage applications decreased by 7.3% in April. The Chicago Fed National Activity index fell to -0.15 in March, underperforming expectations. Durable goods orders increased by 2.7% in March, surprising to the upside. DXY index appreciated by 1% this week, hitting the highest level since June 2017. While a more accommodative monetary policy stance has been taken in China, global growth momentum remains weak, which is a cause for concern. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3 Chart II-4 Recent data in the euro area continue to soften: Italian business confidence and consumer confidence in March fell to 100.6 and 110.5, respectively. April preliminary consumer confidence in the euro area fell to -7.9, below expectations. German IFO business climate fell to 99.2 in April; expectations and current assessment fell to 95.2 and 103.3, respectively. French business confidence improved to 105, while business climate decreased to 101 in April. Italian trade balance came in at a larger surplus of 3.42 billion euro in April. EUR/USD depreciated by 1% this week. The incoming data from the euro area and globally have been weaker than expected. The recent ECB Economic Bulletin remains positive for the growth outlook going forward, stating that “the supportive financing conditions, favorable labor market dynamics and rising wage growth should continue to underpin the euro area expansion.” Report Links: Reading The Tea Leaves From China - April 12, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 A Contrarian Bet On The Euro - March 1, 2019 The Yen Chart II-5 Chart II-6 Recent data in Japan have been negative: Headline inflation and core inflation were unchanged at 0.5% and 0.4% year-on-year in March, respectively. Machine tool orders in March contracted by -28.5% year-on-year. All industry activity index fell by 0.2% month-on-month in February, in line with expectations. USD/JPY surged initially by 0.4% ahead of BoJ’s rate decision, then fell sharply, returning flat this week. The BoJ has decided to keep the interest rate on hold at -0.1%. The shift to a calendar-based form of forward guidance is unlikely to be a game-changer on its own. Moreover, the BoJ expects the Japanese economy to pick up through 2021 supported by highly accommodative financial conditions and government spending, despite the weakness of global growth and scheduled consumption tax hike. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7 Chart II-8 Recent data in the U.K. have been positive: Public sector net borrowing increased to 0.84 billion pounds in March. In April, the CBI retailing reported sales increased to 13. The CBI business optimism came in at -16 in April, an improvement compared to the last reading of -23. GBP/USD fell by 1% this week, mostly affected by the U.S. dollar’s broad strength. The pound is likely to rebound once we see more signs confirming the strength in global growth, given Brexit has been kicked down the road. Report Links: Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9 Chart II-10 Recent data in Australia have been negative: Headline inflation fell to 1.3% year-on-year in Q1, missing expectations. Trimmed mean inflation in Q1 fell to 1.6% year-on-year. AUD/USD fell by 2.3% this week, which triggered our limit buy order at 0.7 on Wednesday. Inflation is a lagging indicator. While the Q1 inflation number missed expectations, the Australian dollar is likely to bottom as Chinese stimulus plays out and global growth starts to pick up. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11 Chart II-12 Recent data in New Zealand has been negative: Credit card spending contracted by 5.1% year-on-year in March, underperforming expectations. NZD/USD fell by 1.36% this week. We remain bearish on the New Zealand dollar due to the Achilles’ heel of an overvalued housing market. Moreover, the Kiwi is still expensive compared to its fair value. Report Links: Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13 Chart II-14 Recent data in Canada have been positive: Wholesale sales grew by 0.3% month-in-month in February, surprising to the upside. CFIB business barometer increased to 56.7 in April. USD/CAD surged by 0.95% this week. The Canadian dollar seems to be less responsive to the energy prices this week due to lots of concerns regarding the pipeline issue in Alberta. The Bank of Canada maintained its overnight interest rate target at 1.75% on Wednesday. In the April Monetary Policy Report, the BoC projects real GDP growth of 1.2% in 2019, and around 2% in 2020 and 2021. Given the current developments in household spending, energy investment, and trade conditions, a dovish stance by BoC is warranted. Report Links: A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15 Chart II-16 Recent data in Switzerland have been mostly positive: Money supply M3 grew by 3.5% year-on-year in March, same as last month. ZEW survey expectations increased to -7.7 from the previous reading of -26.9. USD/CHF increased by 0.66% this week. While global growth is set to rebound, the uncertainties regarding geopolitical risks, trade conditions, and oil prices will weigh on the growth pace. We remain neutral on the Swiss franc against U.S. dollar, but acknowledge that the large short positioning is attractive from a contrarian standpoint. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17 Chart II-18 There is no significant data from Norway this week. USD/NOK appreciated by 2.2% this week. We remain overweight the NOK based on our bullish outlook for oil. The Trump administration said they would not renew the waivers for Iranian oil exports, a move that roiled the energy market. The spike in oil prices will eventually benefit the Norwegian krone once global growth stabilizes. Report Links: A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19 Chart II-20 Recent data in Sweden suggest a more positive sentiment: Consumer confidence increased to 95.8 in April, surprising to the upside. Economic tendency survey increased to 102.7 in April. Moreover, the manufacturing confidence also improved to 108.4 in April. USD/SEK appreciated by 2.64% this week. The Riksbank has kept its interest rate unchanged at -0.25% this week, as widely expected. The dovish shift of central banks worldwide is likely to help the global economy, which will benefit the Swedish krona. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights The U.S. dollar will ultimately reach fresh cycle highs, but not before going through a weak phase starting this summer that could last 12 months. We closed our long DXY trade for a carry-adjusted return of 16.4% last week. We will go tactically short the index if it breaches 101 (about 3% above current levels). As a countercyclical currency, the dollar is likely to stumble in the second half of this year as global growth accelerates. Positioning and sentiment are currently very dollar bullish, which is likely to exacerbate any sell-off in the greenback. The dollar should begin to rally again late next year, as global growth decelerates while the Fed is forced to turn more hawkish in the face of rising inflation. Go long European banks as a tactical trade. Feature Moving To The Sidelines On The Dollar We closed our long DXY trade recommendation for a carry-adjusted gain of 16.4% at last Thursday’s close – too early it turns out, as the DXY has gained another 0.7% since then. The dollar is a high-momentum currency (Chart 1). The trend is the dollar’s friend at the moment, which makes betting against the greenback risky. Nevertheless, we would not chase the dollar higher at these levels. Long dollar positioning is highly stretched and sentiment is overly bullish (Chart 2). This makes a price reversal increasingly probable. Perhaps more importantly, the macro fundamentals, which have worked in favor of the dollar since early 2018, will likely start working against it as the summer months approach. Chart 2There Are A Lot Of Dollar Bulls Out There   Stronger Global Growth Will Hurt The Greenback The dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 3). Global growth has been decelerating since early 2018, and that has helped boost the dollar’s value. The dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of global growth. Chart 3The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency If anything, the growth divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the developed world has increased over the past few months. Goldman’s Current Activity Indicator (CAI) for the U.S. has been rising since January, while the European and Japanese CAIs have continued to fall (Chart 4). Looking out, the rest of the world is likely to catch up to the United States. The Chinese CAI has already moved sharply higher thanks in part to an acceleration in Chinese credit growth. Chart 4Growth Is Recovering In The U.S. And China Chart 5China: Credit Is Growing At A Moderately Faster Pace Than GDP We would downplay recent market speculation that the Chinese authorities are preparing to restart their deleveraging campaign. Credit growth is now running only modestly above nominal GDP growth (Chart 5). With the ratio of debt-to-GDP broadly stable, there is no need to further clamp down on credit formation. The Chinese government also wants to keep the economy buoyant in order to gain negotiating leverage in trade talks with the Trump administration.   Better Chinese Data Will Benefit The Rest Of The World Fluctuations in Chinese growth usually affect Europe with a lag of around six months (Chart 6). This suggests that European exports should strengthen starting this summer. Meanwhile, European domestic demand should benefit from an easing of fiscal policy of around 0.5% of GDP. Chart 6Europe Will Benefit From Improving Chinese Growth Chart 7Swings In Interest Rate Differentials Explain Some Currency Moves   Faster growth in the U.S. in relation to the euro area has caused the spread in expected interest rates to widen between the two regions. The spread in one-month, five-year forward OIS rates now stands at 202 bps, similar to the highs seen in late-2016 (Chart 7). If euro area growth recovers this summer, the market will price in a bit of tightening from the ECB starting late next year. This will cause the spread to narrow, leading to a stronger euro. A revival in Chinese growth should also help EM and commodity currencies. The market is currently pricing in 44 basis points of rate cuts in Australia, 33 bps of cuts in New Zealand, and 21 bps of cuts in Canada over the next 12 months. While domestic concerns around high household debt levels and overvalued real estate markets will keep central banks on guard in all three economies, a more robust global growth backdrop should allow some of the expected easing to be priced out. Japan remains a bit of a wildcard due to the government’s stated intention to raise the sales tax this October. We see little justification for increasing the sales tax given that inflation expectations are still nowhere close to the BOJ’s target. Japan needs easier, not tighter, fiscal policy. There is still an outside chance that the tax hike will be postponed, but even if it is, rising bond yields in the rest of the world will still hurt the yen. The BOJ has no intention of abandoning its yield curve targeting system anytime soon. In fact, it introduced new forward guidance at this week’s monetary policy meeting promising not to raise rates at least until the spring of 2020. Investors looking to trade the yen should consider going long EUR/JPY or AUD/JPY. We recommend going long European banks outright for a tactical trade. Bottom Line: If global growth accelerates later this year, the dollar will probably weaken. Accordingly, investors should use this week’s rally in the dollar to scale back exposure to the currency. We are also putting in a limit order to go short the DXY index if it reaches 101 (about 3% above its current level). Looking Further Out… Chart 8Low Odds Of An Imminent Major Inflationary Upswing In The U.S. Mini-cycles within the broader global business cycle tend to last around 12-to-18 months. If this pattern continues to hold, global growth will probably falter again in the second half of next year. At that point, the dollar is likely to strengthen again. By how much can the dollar rise? That depends on what the Fed does. A stronger dollar would entail a tightening in financial conditions. Normally that would cause the Fed to turn more dovish, limiting the upside for the greenback. The risk is that rising inflation prevents the Fed from turning more accommodative. Inflation is not much of a concern now. Leading indicators of inflation such as core intermediate goods prices and the prices paid component of the ISM remain well contained (Chart 8). Wage growth has picked up, but productivity growth has risen even more. As a result, unit labor costs, which tend to lead core inflation, have been decelerating since the middle of last year. If the U.S. economy continues to grow above trend, however, inflation could begin to break out late next year. That would force the Fed to start raising rates more aggressively than it would like, even in the face of slower growth. Such a stagflationary outcome will be awful for equities and other risk assets. As U.S. financial conditions tighten, global growth will slow, giving the dollar a further boost. The upshot is that the dollar could see a meaningful rally starting late next year. Stay Bullish On Stocks For Now… Until that fateful day arrives, we are inclined to maintain our bullish equity bias. We upgraded global stocks to overweight in December after having moved to the sidelines in June. Despite the run-up in stock prices, the forward P/E ratio on the MSCI All-Country World Index is still 7% below where it was at the start of 2018 and 3% below its long-term (30-year) average (Chart 9). Earnings estimates are also finally starting to increase (Chart 10). Accelerating global economic growth will ensure that profits continue to rise into year-end. Chart 9Global Stocks Are Not That Expensive Chart 10Earnings Estimates Have Turned The Corner     … And Buy Some European Banks For A Tactical Trade European banks are trading at distressed valuations (Chart 11). One can debate the long-term prospects for the European banking sector, but in the near term, one thing is clear: If European growth begins to surprise on the upside, bond yields in core European markets will rise, which should help European bank stock prices (Chart 12). Stronger economic growth will also translate into more credit demand and lower non-performing loans. This will boost bank earnings (Chart 13). With all this in mind, we recommend going long European banks outright for a tactical trade. Chart 11European Banks: A Good Value Play Chart 12Euro Area: Higher Bond Yields Bode Well For Bank Stocks Chart 13More Credit, Fatter Bank Earnings   Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Overweight (High-conviction) S&P software index heavyweight Microsoft reported results this week that reflect the themes underpinning our high-conviction overweight recommendation on the sector. Companies are actively deploying capex on software at an increasing rate (second panel) while the secular trends of cloud computing and SaaS are lifting software companies in general and, with its ubiquitous suite of products, Microsoft in particular. We expect today’s GDP release to confirm the trend of the past several quarters that investment in software is on a secular uptrend. The outsized growth in software is revealed in forward growth estimates versus the S&P 500; while the earnings of the broad market have been under pressure, software is soaring (third panel). Further, it is not just earnings growth that is driving the relative share price outperformance as inter- and intra-industry M&A has taken off (bottom panel), another secular theme that we expect to power the S&P software index to new relative highs. Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight recommendation on the S&P software index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT – MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, INTU, ADSK, RHT, CDNS, SNPS, ANSS, SYMC, CTXS, FTNT.

Overweight Caterpillar, the global trade bellwether, reported results yesterday that beat expectations despite sell-side pessimism that global softness had not been priced in to the stock. Of particular note was the resilience in resource demand that was the source of both revenue and profit outperformance as volume and price gains outweighed tariff-driven input cost increases and FX headwinds. The stock’s reaction to the earnings beat was muted as investors focused on management commentary that aggressive competition would result in market share losses in China. Nevertheless, the credit easing-driven rebound in Chinese construction/infrastructure spending growth should more than offset this headwind. We remain focused on the sector’s core performance drivers. The CRB raw industrials index, which moves in lockstep with the S&P CMHT index, has been ticking up recently and continues to positively diverge from the CMHT’s relative performance (second panel). In particular, the recent spike in energy prices will likely provide a robust lever for relative share prices as energy development projects take off (third panel). Bottom Line: Solid end-demand should deliver outsized profit gains while the still-outstanding catalyst from a positive resolution of the China/U.S. trade tussle stands to lift S&P CMHT share prices. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CSTF - CAT, CMI, PCAR.  

Special Report

Highlights An aging population, a banking sector in poor health, and a private sector focused on building up savings are the key factors undermining euro area growth on a structural basis. A large manufacturing sector makes the euro area vulnerable to EM competition. Unlike the U.S., the region’s tech sector is held back by regulatory burdens, taxes and heavy dependence on bank funding. The euro area growth faces decades of low growth and inflation. Euro area rates will stay depressed, but paradoxically, the euro can still experience structural appreciation. Euro area equities are cheap for a good reason, and banks will continue to weigh on performance. Feature Over the past 10 years, the euro area has gone through a sovereign debt crisis, a double-dip recession, persistent below-target inflation, and most recently, yet another major growth slowdown. Moreover, this economic malaise materialized despite highly stimulative monetary policy, including negative interest rates. The ongoing economic weakness has raised the specter that the euro area is the new Japan. Nearly three decades after the bursting of the Nikkei bubble, the Land of the Rising Sun remains mired in low growth and mild but persistent deflation. Consequently, charts showing that European policy rates or bond yields are tracking Japanese developments with a 17-year lag (Chart II-1) have not only become commonplace, they elicit fears that European growth, interest rates and asset valuations will lag the rest of the world for decades to come. Chart II-1Europe Is Following The Japanese Example In this piece, we discuss the various forces that explain why the euro area economy has been so weak this decade, and why such low interest rates have had so little impact on growth. We also study what sets the U.S. and euro area apart, and whether or not Europe will follow the trail blazed by Japan nearly 30 years ago. The Three Headwinds Three ills have kept European growth particularly depressed this cycle and are likely to remain significant headwinds into the foreseeable future: demographics, the banking sector’s poor health, and nonfinancial private sector balance sheet cleansing. 1)   Demographics This is the most well understood and acknowledged problem impacting Europe today. Since 2008, the European population has grown by 2%, or only 0.2% a year, with the working age population having peaked around that year. Going forward, the picture will only deteriorate: The UN expects Europe’s population to contract by 12% over the next 27 years, and the working age population to fall by 15%. This also means that the dependency ratio – the number of individuals aged less than 15 and above 65 per 100 working-age people – will approximately double over the coming 40 years. This is a clear parallel with Japan. As Chart II-2 illustrates, Europe’s population, the number of working-age individuals and the dependency ratio are all tracking Japan with a 17-year lag. Like Japan, Europe’s trend growth will thus only deteriorate further. Not only will Europe not be able to add as many workers as the U.S. to its total, but it will need to build even fewer schools, malls, office buildings or units of housing. Consequently, both the supply and demand sides of the economy will lag due to this factor alone. 2)   Banking Sector Health The poor health of the euro area banking sector is well known. BCA’s Global Asset Allocation service published an in-depth analysis of the European banking sector last December.4 The piece demonstrated that European banks have been much slower to recognize non-performing loans, curtail credit and rebuild capital than their U.S. counterparts. U.S. bank loans to the private sector fell by 13% in the two years during the crisis, while in Europe, these same loans have only fallen by 2% since 2008. Euro area banks generally remain burdened with significant non-performing loans as a percentage of regulatory capital. Moreover, net interest margins are also dismal, implying that the income cushion against bad loans is thin. Consequently, outside of France, Finland and Germany, European banks have either not grown their loan books to the private sector or, as is the case with Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, these books are continuously shrinking (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Same Demography In Europe Now Than In Japan Then Chart II-3Peripheral Banks Continue To Curtail Credit   The poor health of the European banking system is now constraining the supply of new credit to the rest of the economy. This is a much bigger problem than is the case in the U.S. given that in Europe, 72% of corporate funding comes from the banking system while 88% of household liabilities are also funded this way. In the U.S., the share of bank funding for these sectors is 32% and 29%, respectively (Chart II-4). A weak euro area banking system prevents the nonfinancial private sector from growing as robustly as it could. 3)   Nonfinancial Private Sector Balance Sheet Cleanse Another major drag on European growth has been the continued efforts of the European private sector to rebuild its balance sheet. To use the terminology developed by our upcoming conference speaker Richard Koo, the euro area has been in the thralls of a powerful balance sheet recession. Households in the euro area, Japan and the U.S. are all accumulating more financial assets than liabilities. However, only in the U.S. is the nonfinancial corporate sector building more liabilities than it is accumulating assets (Chart II-5). In Japan and Europe, the nonfinancial corporate sector is also a source of savings for the economy. Moreover, in Europe, the government runs a much smaller financial deficit. The current account balance tells this story vividly. A country’s current account is equal to the private sector’s savings minus investment and minus government deficits. As Italy, Spain, and other peripheral economies increased their aggregate savings after 2008, their large current account deficits vanished. Meanwhile, the governments of countries like Germany or the Netherlands, which sported healthy public finances, did not increase their spending in a commensurate way. This adjustment transformed an overall euro area current account deficit of 1.5% in 2008 into a surplus of 3.0% of GDP today, sending some of Europe’s excess savings abroad. This mimics the post-1990 Japanese experience. In the U.S., where the private sector savings did not rise as durably as in Europe, the current account stopped improving meaningfully in 2010 (Chart II-6). Chart II-5European Businesses Are Savers, Like In Japan Chart II-6The Current Account Dynamics Epitomise The Savings Dynamics   A private sector squarely focused on rebuilding its balance sheet liquidity can lead to a liquidity trap. In this state, monetary policy can become ineffective as spending does not respond to lower interest rates. This is where Europe is currently stuck, explaining why the European Central Bank is finding that inflation and growth are not experiencing much lift, despite seemingly incredibly accommodative monetary conditions. Why Such An Urge To Save? The fact that the household sector is a net saver is not surprising, as this is a normal state of affairs across most economies. But why is the European nonfinancial corporate sector still trying to improve its balance sheet liquidity by accumulating more assets than liabilities? Like Japanese businesses 30 years ago, European firms have large debt loads. Another problem is the lack of capex opportunities in Europe. Why do we make this assertion? The return on assets in Europe has been at rock-bottom levels ever since the introduction of the euro (Chart II-7). In the decade from 1998 to 2008, this was a non-issue. Strong global growth flattered European sales, and easy access to credit meant that via rising leverage euro area-listed nonfinancial corporations were able to generate returns on equity comparable to U.S. firms (Chart II-8, top panel). Once European banks got cold feet and European nonfinancial businesses began focusing on deleveraging, the low level of return on assets became more apparent. Part of the problem is that European profit margins are much closer to Japanese than U.S. levels (Chart II-8, middle panel). Even more damning, asset turnover – how much sales are generated by a unit of assets – has been structurally lower in Europe than in both Japan and the U.S. for multiple decades (Chart II-8, bottom panel). Chart II-7Europe Suffers From A Lower RoA Chart II-8DuPont's Decomposition Shows Why The Euro Area RoA Is Poor   The first factor weighing on the level of asset utilization and returns in Europe is the elevated level of capital stock. As Chart II-9 illustrates, the capital stock as a share of output in Italy, Spain and France dwarfs that of Japan, China or the U.S. Even Germany’s capital stock, which stands well below that of other large euro area economies, is nearly 100 percentage points of GDP larger than the U.S’s. Europe has too large a pool of assets to make any additional investments profitable, especially in light of its poor demographic profile. The second factor weighing on European asset utilization and returns is the poorer level of labor productivity. From the 1950s to the early 1980s, European GDP per worker rose relative to the U.S., albeit peaking at 92% of the levels across the Atlantic. Due to falling working hours in Europe relative to the U.S. since the 1980s, relative output per hour continued to rise until the mid-1990s, peaking at 105% of the U.S. level. However, since their respective zeniths, both relative productivity measures have collapsed (Chart II-10, top panel). Chart II-10Another Symptom Of Europe's Misallocation Of Capital In The 2000s These collapses are in fact worse than Japan’s performance since its lost decades began. As the second panel of the chart shows, since the early 1990s, Japan’s relative output per hour and per worker have flattened – not declined – at around 65% and 72%, respectively, of U.S. levels. Instead, relative European productivity levels are currently converging toward Japanese levels (Chart II-10, third and fourth panels). The particularly poor level of European asset utilization and productivity principally reflects the duality between the peripheral as well as French economies on one side, and Germany as well as the Netherlands on the other side. The exceptionally large capital stock outside of Germany is a legacy of the years directly after the euro’s introduction. Back then, the ECB kept rates low to help Germany, the then-sick man of Europe. These rates were too low for the rest of Europe, encouraging large capital stock build-ups. Moreover, this capital was misallocated, as demonstrated by the tepid growth of output per hour and output per capita in Europe post 2000. Since funds were poorly allocated, the output-to-capital ratio in the periphery collapsed. In other words, the peripheral capital-stock-to-GDP ratios continued rising because the denominator, GDP, lagged. An additional problem for Europe’s asset utilization has been its large manufacturing sector. Even after declining, 20% of Europe’s GDP still comes from the secondary sector versus less than 12% in the U.S. (Chart II-11). This has two consequences for Europe’s asset utilization relative to the U.S. First, a large manufacturing sector requires a much larger asset base than a large service or tech sector. Second, the manufacturing sector is more exposed to competition from emerging markets than the tech sector, or than the domestically-focused service sector. Chart II-11Europe Is Left Exposed To EM Competition In other words, not only has the U.S. experienced less capital misallocation than a large swath of the European economy, it has also re-aligned its economy to make it more robust in the face of competition from emerging economies, while Europe mostly has not. Consequently, hurt by foreign competition and unable or unwilling to re-invent itself, Europe has been left with dwindling relative productivity levels and poor degrees of asset utilization and returns. Why Did The U.S. Economy Transition Better than Europe To A Globalized World? There are many reasons why the U.S. has maintained higher RoAs and has been more successful at transitioning away from a manufacturing-led economy than the euro area. First, the level of product and service market regulation in Europe is highly punitive. As Chart II-12 illustrates, like Japan, most euro area countries fare poorly in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey. In fact, Italy scores even lower than China! Meanwhile, the U.S. ranks near the top, not far from Singapore. This means that starting new businesses, competing, and so on is easier in the U.S. than in Europe, helping foster a greater level of entrepreneurialism. Consequently, established businesses have been able to maintain the status quo longer in Europe than in the U.S., preventing creative destruction from purging the system of bad assets. Second, most large euro area economies are burdened by heavy taxes. As Chart II-13 shows, while the U.S. public sector extracts taxes equal to 27.1% of GDP, German, Italian and French taxes equal 37.5%, 42.4% and 46.2% of GDP, respectively, well above the OECD average of 34.2%. Such high levels of taxation disincentivize risk-taking. Lower levels of risk taking by individuals further prevented the degree of creative destruction necessary for Europe to better use its capital stock. Third, and linked to the previous point, government spending equals 34.9% of GDP in the U.S., compared to 48.2% and 56.0% in Italy or France, respectively. A large government has historically stifled innovation and favored the status quo. By no means does this implies that the U.S. system is free of imbalances, but it highlights that compared to two of the three largest European economies, the U.S. public sector has had a less deleterious impact on growth conditions and entrepreneurialism. Moreover, Italy and France have been in deep need of structural reforms that have been lacking. On this front, while the outlook is improving in France under Macron’s presidency, Italy remains mired in immobilism. Europe has too large a pool of assets to make any additional investments profitable, especially in light of its poor demographic profile. Fourth, the financing structure in the U.S. favors investing in new businesses and industries, especially when compared to the euro area. Equities represent 78% of the capital structure of nonfinancial corporations in the U.S. while they represent only 61% in the euro area. Moreover, within debt-financing, capital markets account for 68% of sourced funds in the U.S. compared to 28% in the euro area. In fact, junk bond market capitalization only accounts for 2.2% of GDP in Europe compared to 6.0% in the U.S. This suggests that financing risky ventures – and entrepreneurialism is inherently risky – is tougher in Europe than in the U.S. In fact, as a share of GDP, the European venture capital business is less than a sixth the size of the U.S.’s (Chart II-14), a gap that has existed for more than 30 years. Chart II-14U.S. Financing Allows For Greater Risk Taking With all these hurdles, it is unsurprising that Europe has taken more time to make its economy more dynamic in the globalized economy of the 21st century. It also explains why Europe might be suffering more from EM competition than the U.S. Interestingly, this last point may be changing as U.S. voters seem to want to move back toward a larger manufacturing sector. This transition is unlikely to happen without more protectionism. This is a topic for another report. Is Europe Doomed To Japanification… Or Worse? It is easy to see why Europe cannot hope to grow as fast as the U.S., and therefore why the ECB will not be able to lift rates as high as the Fed and why bund yields are likely to lag Treasurys for years to come. Europe has a much more dire demographic profile than the U.S. It needs to purge its capital stock and invigorate its economy through reforms, a smaller public sector, and more diversified financing channels. But can the euro area fare better than Japan has over the past 30 years? On three fronts, the euro area looks better than Japan. First, as Chart II-15 shows, the overall European nonfinancial private sector entered its crisis in 2008 with lower leverage than Japan’s in the early 1990s. Additionally, European stocks were much cheaper in 2007 than the Nikkei was in 1989 (Chart II-16, top panel). Even Spanish real estate was more reasonably valued in 2007 than Japanese real estate in the early 1990s (Chart II-16, bottom panel). This combination means that now that the acute part of the crisis is over, the hole in the European private sector’s balance sheet is much smaller than the one Japan needed to plug 30 years ago. Thus, from a balance-sheet perspective, the need to rebuild savings is lower in Europe than Japan, and we could expect the current period of elevated savings to be shorter in the euro area than it has been in Japan. Chart II-16...And European Assets Were Not As Expensive As Japanese Ones At The Onset Of The Crisis   Second, despite former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet’s policy mistake of raising interest rates in 2011, the ECB was much quicker to implement extreme easing policy measures than the Bank of Japan was in its day. It took 10 years for the BoJ to cut rates to zero after the Nikkei peaked in December 1989. It took one year for the ECB to do so after stock prices peaked in 2007. It took nine years for the BoJ to expand its balance sheet aggressively, but it took less than two years for the ECB to do so. One of the key benefits of this greater European proactivity has been to keep European inflation expectations much higher than in Japan, curtailing real interest rates in the process. Third, Europe purged economic excesses much more quickly than Japan. The Japanese unemployment rate increased from 2% to 6% between 1990 and 2010. In peripheral Europe, where the worst pre-crisis excesses existed, unemployment rose from 7.5% in 2008 to 18% in 2013 (Chart II-17, top panel). Meanwhile, real wages never adjusted in Japan, but fell 27.0% at their worst in Spain and 32.5% in Greece (Chart II-17, bottom panel). Moreover, the Rajoy reforms in Spain and the Macron reforms in France show that outside of Italy, European governments have been reforming their economies faster than Japan did after the bubble burst in 1990. Chart II-17Bigger Labor Market Purge In Europe Than Japan However, on three fronts Europe is faring worse than Japan. First, up until the last 10 years, Japan benefited from a robust global economy where trade grew strongly. Europe is entering its second decade of low growth in an environment where global economic activity is much weaker, as potential U.S. GDP growth has slowed and China is not growing at a double-digit pace anymore. Moreover, budding protectionism in the U.S. is creating another hurdle for European economic output. Second, the excess capital stock in the European periphery is in fact greater than was the case in Japan in 1990. This suggests that the periphery needs to curtail investments by a greater margin than Japan did. Consequently, peripheral growth will continue to exert downward pressure on aggregate European activity for an extended period. Third, the European fiscal response will not match Japan’s. Investors often decry Japan’s large government debt of 238.2% of GDP as a sign of profligacy. It is not. It is mainly a mirror image of the private sector’s savings surplus. The Japanese government’s ability to run large deficits has prevented a larger fall in output – one that would have equaled the annual savings of the private sector. Without the government’s dissaving, the Japanese private sector would have found its debt load even more onerous to service, and the need to curtail spending would have been even greater as economy-wide cash flows would have been even smaller. Europe does not have a unified fiscal authority that can run such large-scale deficits. Instead, each nation’s government has a limited capacity to accumulate debt as investors worry that overly-indebted governments may very well redenominate what they have borrowed in much weaker currencies than the euro. This risk is made even greater by the fact that there is no euro-area wide deposit insurance scheme. Since Italian and Spanish banks hold large amounts of BTPs and Bonos, respectively, a so-called doom-loop exists that links the health of banks in those countries to the health of their governments, further limiting the public sector’s ability to act as a spender of last resort. This makes the efforts of the private sector in Italy, France, and Spain to increase its savings and bring down its excess capital stock more difficult, and thus, likely to last longer. Even if 10 years after the crisis first emerged, Europe has done more to purge its economy from its pre-crisis excesses than Japan had after its first lost decade, a lack of unified fiscal lever in Europe nullifies this positive. Thus, so long as the European integration efforts remain on the backburner, euro area growth, inflation, and interest rates will continue to look more like Japan’s have over the past 30 years than the U.S. This is likely to cause a big problem once the next recession emerges. Europe will enter that slowdown without any ammunition to reflate growth. Therefore, the next recession is likely to prove very deflationary and test the recent improvement in support for the euro seen across all euro area nations (Chart II-18). If the euro area survives this crisis, and we suspect it will, the probability of a fiscal union will only grow.2 After all, it has been through various crises that Europe has moved closer together, and the rise of a multipolar geopolitical environment dominated by large countries makes this imperative ever more vital. Chart II-18Support For The Euro Is Resilient Bottom Line: We expect European growth and inflation to continue to lag well behind the U.S. for years to come if not a full decade. Ultimately, bringing down the expensive capital stock in the European periphery will be a slow process, especially if governments remain tight fisted. Investment Implications First, core euro area interest rates are likely to remain well below U.S. levels. As long as the European private sector pares back investments in order to normalize its capital stock-to-GDP ratio - a phenomenon that will be most pronounced in the periphery and France - European growth and inflation will lag behind the U.S. This also means that as long as European governments remain shy spenders and do not compensate for the lack of spending from the private sector, in the euro area periphery, European banks will suffer from depressed net interest margins and be structural underperformers. Second, the euro is likely to experience a structural upward drift. The euro is trading at a 10.5% discount to its purchasing power parity. Moreover, high private sector savings not only weigh on inflation, they will also push Europe’s net international investment position higher via an accumulated current account surplus. Both these factors are long-term bullish for the euro. Moreover, the fact that the euro area will soon become a net creditor nation, along with a lack of room to stimulate growth via monetary easing in times of recessions, means that the euro could increasingly become a counter-cyclical currency like the yen. So long as the European integration efforts remain on the backburner, euro area growth, inflation, and interest rates will continue to look more like Japan’s have over the past 30 years than the U.S. Third, European equities are trading at a discount to U.S. equities, but we do not think this guarantees long-term outperformance. European equities are cheap because European growth prospects are poor. If Japan is any guide, European stocks may be set to continue underperforming. This is especially true as financials are over-represented in European equity benchmarks, and banks stand at the epicenter of the European economic malaise. Fourth, European stocks will remain slaves to the global business cycle. Since the crisis, European growth has become hypersensitive to global growth, making European equities very responsive to the global business cycle. The same phenomenon happened in post-1990 Japan. In other words, the beta of European stocks is likely to continue to rise. This phenomenon could be exacerbated if the euro indeed does become a counter-cyclical currency, in which case the euro and European equities would become negatively correlated, like the yen and the Nikkei. Finally, the period from 1999 to 2005 showed how ECB policy targeted at supporting Germany resulted in imbalances that boosted real estate and equity returns in the periphery – in Spain and Ireland in particular. Today, the periphery is the worst offender when it comes to poor bank health and private sector balance sheet rebuilding. This means that the ECB is likely to keep monetary conditions too accommodative for Germany, where balance sheets are more robust and where the capital stock is not as excessive. As a result, financial market plays linked to German real estate are likely to continue outperforming other European domestic plays. They therefore warrant an overweight within European portfolios. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Euro Area Banks: Value Play Or Value Trap?" dated December 14, 2018, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 2 The European Commission Eurobarometer Surveys show that Europeans overwhelmingly see Europe as a peace project and as a way to maintain a voice in a world dominated by huge players like the U.S., China, or Russia, a world where France, Germany, or Italy individually are marginal players. In 2016, the U.K. population did not share this opinion. Moreover, even after what amounts to a depression, the support for the euro continues to rise in Greece, showing the growing commitment of Europeans to the euro, and the resilience of this commitment to economic shocks.