Developed Countries

Dear client, In addition to this week’s abbreviated report, we are also sending you a Special Report on currency hedging, authored by my colleague Xiaoli Tang. Xiaoli’s previous work mapped out a dynamic hedging strategy for developed market equity investors in various home currencies. In this report, she extends the work to emerging market exposure. I hope you will find the report insightful. Next week, in lieu of our weekly report on Friday, we will be sending you a joint Special Report on the UK on Tuesday, together with our Global Fixed Income colleagues. Kind regards, Chester Highlights The DXY index is up for the year, but further gains will be capped at 2-3% from current levels. Long yen positions are offside amid the dollar rally. This should wash out stale longs, and underpin the bull case. Lower the limit-sell on the gold/silver ratio to 68. We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN position amidst a broad-based selloff in EM currencies. We are reinitiating the trade this week. Feature Chart I-1The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The DXY index has once again kissed off the 90 level and is gaining momentum in March. Year-to-date, the DXY index is up 1.1%. This performance has been particularly pronounced against other safe haven currencies, such as the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. GBP and AUD have fared rather well in this environment (Chart I-1). As the “anti-dollar,” the euro has also suffered.  Our technical indicators continue to warn that the dollar still has upside. Net speculative positions are at very depressed levels, consistent with many sentiment indicators that are bearish USD. However, this time around, any dollar rally could be capped at 2-3%, in sharp contrast to the bounce we witnessed in March 2020.  The Message From Dollar Technical Indicators Our dollar capitulation index has bounced from very oversold levels, and is now sitting above neutral territory (Chart I-2). The index comprises a standardized measure of sentiment, net speculative positioning and momentum. It is very rare that a drop in this index below the -1.5 level does not trigger a rebound in the dollar. This time around, the bounce has been rather muted. Chart I-2BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside Part of the reason has been concentration around dollar short positions. Investors throughout most of the pandemic executed their bearish dollar bets through the euro, yen and the Swiss franc (countries that already had negative interest rates). Positioning on risk on currencies such as the Australian dollar and the Mexican peso were neutral. This also explains the underperformance of the yen, as the dollar rises. From a sizing standpoint, ever since the dollar peaked in March 2020, counter-trend moves have been in the order of 2-3%. We expect this time to be no different. What To Do About The Yen The yen has been one of our core holdings on three fundamental pillars: it is cheap, it tends to rise during dollar bear markets and the economy in Japan is more hostage to deflation than the US. This bodes well for real rates in Japan, relative to the US. Over the last month, our long yen position has been put offside. First, demand for safe havens has ebbed as US interest rates have gapped higher (Chart I-3, panel 1). King dollar has once again become the safe haven of choice. As Chart I-1 illustrates, low beta currencies such as the Swiss franc and yen, that tend to do relatively well when the dollar is rallying, have underperformed.  Yield curve control (YCC) in Japan is also negative for the yen as interest rates rise (panel 2). Economic momentum in Japan is also rolling over (panel 3). Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s mulling to extend the state of emergency in the Tokyo region could further cripple any Japanese economic recovery. Chart I-3A Healthy Reset In The Yen Chart I-4USD/JPY Support Should Hold For short-term investors, USD/JPY is very overbought and is approaching strong resistance (Chart I-4). In our view, a washing out of stale shorts would provide a healthy reset for the bear market to resume. Meanwhile, USD/JPY and the DXY change correlations during risk-off periods, where the yen appreciates versus the dollar.  Therefore, a market reset is also positive for the yen.     Housekeeping Chart I-5Remain Short AUD/MXN We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN trade last week for a loss of 6.1%. We are reinitiating the trade this week. The case for the trade, made a month ago, remains intact. A short-term recovery in the US economy, relative to the rest of the world, argues for an AUD/MXN short. In fact, a divergence has occurred between the BRL/MXN and the AUD/MXN exchange rate (Chart I-5). Domestic factors have certainly tempered the Brazilian real, but the underperformance of metal prices relative to oil in recent months is also a factor. We expect some convergence to occur, with MXN appreciating much faster than the AUD.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have stepped up: Personal income rose by 10% in January, while personal spending rose by 2.4% month-on-month. The ISM report was stellar. The manufacturing PMI improved from 58.7 to 60.8 in February. Prices paid rose to 86. Factory orders were slightly above expectations at 2.6% month-on-month in January.   The DXY index rose by 165 bps this week.  The narrative of a counter-trend reversal in the DXY index isn playing out. As the story unfolds, it will be important to establish targets. Our bias is that the DXY stalls before 93-94 is reached.  Report Links: Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Sizing A Potential Dollar Bounce - January 15, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area remain weak: Core CPI in the Eurozone came in at 1.1%, in line with expectations. The unemployment rate declined from 8.3% to 8.1% in January. January retail sales were weak at -6.4% year-on-year. The euro fell by 1.7%% against the US dollar this week. It will be almost impossible for the euro to rise in an environment where the dollar is in a broad-based decline. Given elevated sentiment on the euro, a healthy reset is necessary for the bull market to resume. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan has been marginally positive: The employment report was positive, with the unemployment rate dipping to 2.9% and an improvement in the jobs-to-applicants ratio in January. Consumer confidence in February is rebounding from very low levels. The Japanese yen fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The recovery in the Japanese economy is fragile, and tentative signs of a renewed lockdown will knock down confidence. In this transition phase, yen long positions could be hostage to losses. Longer-term, the yen is cheap and will benefit from a broad-based dollar decline. Report Links: On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data out of the UK have been in line: Mortgage approvals rose 99K in January, in line with expectations. The construction PMI rose from 49.2 to 53.3 in February. Nationwide house prices are soaring, rising 6.9% in February on a year-on-year basis. The pound fell by 0.8% against the dollar this week. It is however the best performing currency this year. Our short EUR/GBP trade has benefited from faster vaccination in the UK (that could give way to a faster reopening of the economy) and a nice valuation starting point. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia was robust: Home lending remained in an uptrend. Owner-occupied loans increased by 11% in January, while investor loans increased by 9.4%. Terms of trade are soaring, rising 24% year-on-year in February. The current account surplus came in near a record A$14.5 billion in Q4. GDP grew by 3.1% QoQ in Q4. The Aussie fell by 1.8% his week. Terms of trade will continue being a tailwind for the AUD/USD. We also like the AUD/NZD cross, as a valuation and terms-of-trade bet. However, we expect that any positive surprises in the US will hurt AUD relative to the Americas. One way to play this is by shorting AUD/MXN. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of New Zealand this week: Terms of trade rose by 1.3% in Q4. CoreLogic home prices rose 14.5% in February. The New Zealand dollar fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. The kiwi ranks as the most unattractive currency in our FX framework. For one, it has catapulted itself to the most expensive currency in our PPP models. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada was positive: The Nanos confidence index rose from 58.2 to 59.4 in February. Annualized 4Q GDP came in at 9.6%, above expectations. Building permits rose 8.2% month-on-month in January. The Canadian dollar fell 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Oil prices remain very much in an uptrend, which is underpinning the loonie. Better US economic performance in the near term should also help the CAD. Report Links: Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data out of Switzerland have been improving: Swiss GDP rose by 0.3%  quarter-on-quarter in 4Q. The KOF leading indicator rose from 96.5 to 102.7 in February. The February manufacturing PMI rose from 59.4 to 61.3. Switzerland remains in deflation, with the core CPI that came in at -0.3% year-on-year in February. The Swiss franc fell by 2.6% against the US dollar this week. Safe -haven currencies continue to be laggards, as rates rise and gold falls to the wayside. This is bullish on  procyclical currencies, and negative the Swiss franc. We are long EUR/CHF on this basis, but short USD/JPY purely as portfolio insurance. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The data out of Norway has been robust: The unemployment rate fell from 4.4% to 4.3% The manufacturing PMI increased from 51.8 to 56.1 in February. The current account balance was robust in Q4. It should increase significantly in Q1 this year given the large trade balance in January. Being long the Norwegian krone is one of our high-conviction bets in the FX portfolio. The Norwegian krone fell by 1% against the US dollar this week, but outperformed the euro, amongst other currencies. The NOK ticks all the boxes of an attractive currency – cheap valuations, a liquidity discount, and primed to benefit from a global growth rebound. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Most Swedish data releases were in line with expectations: GDP came in at -0.2% quarter-on-quarter, below expectations. Retail sales rose 3.1% year-on-year, above expectations. The trade balance came in at a surplus of SEK 5.2 billion  in January. The manufacturing PMI remained elevated at 61.6 in February. The Swedish krona fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. Manufacturing data is improving in Sweden but the economy remains hostage to COVID-19, compared to Norway. That is weighing on the krona. That said, Sweden is a highly levered play on the global cycle. Therefore, once the pandemic is behind us, the SEK will outperform. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights We use a correlation-hedge approach to manage emerging market (EM) currency exposure for global investors with nine different home currencies. For USD-based investors, EM debt volatility is driven by the EM spot exchange rate vs. USD. Hedged EM debt has better absolute and risk-adjusted returns than US Treasurys. Investing in EM equities, on the other hand, makes sense only when the expected absolute return is positive on a sustained basis. During these episodes, hedging is not necessary. If USD-based investors choose to manage EM currency exposure directly, then a 12-month momentum-based dynamic hedging strategy could add value in terms of risk-adjusted returns for both EM stocks and bonds. USD-based investors could also diversify the source of funding by selling closely correlated DM currencies using an overlay of currency forwards. For non-USD-based investors, EM currency volatility is low and there is no need to fully hedge EM exposure. Domestic bonds have very low volatility, therefore these investors should avoid EM debt if their objective is to maximize risk-adjusted returns. To enhance returns, unhedged EM equities are a much better choice than EM debt. Currency overlay, in line with our long-held view on the total portfolio approach, should be managed at the total fund level. Feature How to manage EM currency exposure when investing in EM local currency debt and equities has been a frequently asked question since our reports on managing developed market (DM) currency exposure when investing in DM equities 1,2 and government bonds.3 According to the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, EM currency exchange markets have evolved rapidly since 2001. The daily turnover reached 1.65 trillion dollars in April 2019, which is about 25% of the global currency daily turnover.4 While it is becoming increasingly easy to trade EM currencies, compared with DM currencies it is still more costly and operationally more challenging to hedge EM currency exposure, especially the currencies with non-deliverable forwards (NDFs) that require collateral management. In this report, we identify the return and volatility drivers of EM local currency government bonds (represented by JP Morgan’s GBI-EM Global Diversified Local Currency Index) and EM equities (represented by MSCI’s EM Net Return Index). We briefly touch on a momentum-based dynamic hedging strategy to hedge EM exposure directly for USD-based investors. Our main focus is to test a correlation-hedge approach, both static and dynamic, for nine home currencies: the US dollar (USD), the euro (EUR), the Japanese yen (JPY), the British pound (GBP), the Canadian dollar (CAD), the Australian dollar (AUD), the New Zealand dollar (NZD), the Swedish krona (SEK), and the Norwegian krone (NOK). We want to determine if a USD-based investor’s return/risk profile would be improved when investing in EM assets by using unfunded overlays of DM currency forwards. Finally, we present solutions for non-USD investors, which vary based on the correlations between the home currencies and the EM currency aggregates. Part 1: The USD Perspective 1.1 EM Asset Return Drivers In general, unhedged USD returns for US investors from investing in foreign assets can be decomposed into three parts as shown in the following equation (1): (1+Rd) = (1+Rh) (1+Rc) (1+Rs) ..…..(1) Where, Rd is the unhedged return in USD. Rh is the hedged return in USD using currency forwards. Rc is the carry return resulting from the short-term rate differential between a foreign country and the US. Rs is the spot exchange rate return of a foreign currency vs. the USD (quoted as how many USD per 1 unit of foreign currency). Chart 1A and Chart 1B show the return decompositions of JP Morgan’s (JPM) EM local currency government bonds and MSCI’s EM equities based on equation (1). Chart 1AEM Local Debt USD Return Decomposition Chart 1BEM Equities USD Return Decomposition Hedging reduces both the volatility and returns for both EM local currency bonds and equities; however, the return and volatility reductions are more significant in bonds than in stocks (panel 1 in Chart 1A and Chart 1B). EM currency aggregate indexes implied from JPM and MSCI are different because of the different country compositions. The currency component has been very volatile for both indexes and has generated negative returns during the 18 years from January 2003 to January 2021 (panel 3 in Chart 1A and Chart 1B). The carry component from JPM is sharply higher than that from MSCI, which is also the result of different country compositions (panel 2, Chart 1A and Chart 1B). The carry components from both indexes have very low volatility with positive returns over the 18-year period. Many EM countries had much higher interest rates than the US, therefore a US investor had to be exposed to EM currencies to capture this carry gain. Thus, from a return-enhancing perspective, an investor should hedge only if he/she expects the EM currency spot exchange rate to depreciate more than the implied carry (panel 3, Chart 1A and Chart 1B). The answer may be different from a volatility-reducing perspective, especially for EM debt where currency volatility dominates bond volatility. We plot the return-risk profiles of EM local currency bonds and equities (hedged and unhedged) in Charts 2A, 2B and 2C to show how they behave in different environments compared to US equities, US Treasurys and hedged non-US global government bonds. Table 1 further lists the detailed statistics of all the above-mentioned assets, in addition to the spot currency and carry components implied from JPM’s EM local currency bond index and MSCI’s EM index, ranked by risk-adjusted return. The entire 18-year period (Chart 2A) is also separated into the period with steadily rising EM currencies (1/2003 – 7/2008, Chart 2B) and the period with declining EM currencies (8/2008-1/2021, Chart 2C). Chart 2AUSD Asset Return-Risk Profile For The Entire Period (1/2003-1/2021) Chart 2BUSD Asset Return-Risk Profile When EM Currencies Were Strong (1/2003-7/2008) Chart 2CUSD Asset Return-Risk Profile When EM Currencies Were Weak (8/2008-1/2021) Both EM debt and equities had impressive unhedged returns in the period from January 2003 to July 2008 when the EM currency index rose steadily against the USD. Even on a hedged basis, EM bonds still delivered better absolute returns (5.1%) than US Treasurys (4.3%) with lower volatility. In terms of EM equities, although hedged return of 22.8% significantly outpaced US equities (9.7%), the volatility of EM equities (16.8%) was much higher than US equities (9.8%). Interestingly, in the period with declining EM FX from August 2008 to January 2021, hedged EM equities (5.6%) significantly underperformed US equities (11.5%) with comparable volatility, but hedged EM bonds (4.2%) outperformed US Treasurys (3.6%) with comparable volatility, despite the negative carry. It is easy to make the case for EM equities: US investors should not touch EM equities unless they are convinced that EM is entering a sustainably strong absolute return period. There is no need to hedge the currency exposure because the risk reduction is relatively small. In the case of EM local currency debt, the three components of total returns in USD based on equation (1) have distinct characteristics as follows: First, the carry component generated an annualized return of 3.4% with only 0.7% volatility in the entire period, making it the best performer among all the assets in terms of risk-adjusted return, as shown in Table 1. Table 1USD Asset Return-Risk Profile In Different Time Periods Chart 3What Drives The Hedged Return Of EM Local Debt? Second, the hedged return or the EM duration return (i.e. the compensation for a US investor to take on EM interest rate and term premia risks), had a better return/risk profile than US Treasurys in terms of both absolute return and risk-adjusted return, regardless of whether the EM currency index rose or fell against the USD. From January 2003 to January 2021, hedged EM debt returned 4.5% with a volatility of 4.1%, giving a 1.1 return per unit of risk, while US Treasurys returned 3.8% with a volatility of 4.3%, resulting in a 0.9 return per unit of risk. This component is mainly driven by the direction of government bonds in the developed markets as shown in Chart 3. Third, from January 2003 to January 2021, the JPM-implied EM currency had the worst return/risk profile with an annualized loss of 1.7% and annualized volatility of 9.1% (Table 1). However, this component was also the most regime-dependent. Between January 2003 and July 2008 it registered an annualized gain of 7.0% and an annualized volatility of 6.2%, in contrast with the annualized loss of 5.2% and annualized volatility of 9.9% from August 2008 to January 2021. Historically, the EM currency as an aggregate, no matter how the aggregate is calculated, closely correlates to commodities as shown in Chart 4. This is because many EM countries are either commodity producers or have significant trading exposure to China, the dominant player influencing commodity prices as shown in Chart 5. Chart 4EM FX Largely Driven By Commodities Chart 5The Commodities-China Link It is a challenge to build a systematic EM currency model due to the complex nature of EM economies. BCA’s FX Strategy team is working on EM currency models by applying the same approach they used for their DM models. BCA’s EMS Strategy team takes a more discretionary approach to forecasting currencies. Below we will explore two options: one for investors who choose to manage an EM FX hedging program directly and another for investors who cannot manage a direct EM currency hedging program but want to improve their return-risk profile in EM assets. 1.2 Momentum-Based Dynamic Hedging Of EM Currencies Price momentum is a useful tool for dynamic hedging as shown in our previous work on DM currency exposure management. A simple rule of hedging back to the home currency when the 12-month price momentum of a foreign currency turns negative adds value for investors with several DM home currencies. Given that the USD is a strong momentum currency, it makes sense to test if a simple 12-month price momentum rule for the EM FX aggregate vs. USD adds any value. The results are encouraging as shown in Chart 6A and Chart 6B and Chart 7A and Chart 7B. Chart 6AMomentum-Based Dynamic Hedging For EM Bonds Chart 6BMomentum-Based Dynamic Hedging For EM Stocks In the case of EM local debt, dynamic hedging reduced volatility to 8.4% from an unhedged volatility of 11.7%, while only trimming return slightly compared with the unhedged index (Charts 6A, 7A). For EM equities, dynamic hedging cut volatility to 18.6% from the unhedged volatility of 21.1%, while increasing the return by 25 bps, compared to the unhedged index. (Charts 6B, 7B). Chart 7AEM Local Debt Return-Risk Profiles: Static Hedging* Vs. Dynamic Hedging** Chart 7BEM Equities Return-Risk Profiles: Static Hedging* Vs. Dynamic Hedging** These results are directionally encouraging, but this method still requires hedging all EM currencies. The approach may operationally challenge investors who are not equipped to manage EM currency overlays. Bottom Line: Using only price momentum to hedge EM currency aggregates could improve the return-risk profile of both EM debt and equities, even though the improvements would be limited. This is encouraging for our eventual systematic approach for direct EM currency hedging. 1.3 Correlation Hedge Using DM Currencies EM FX is closely correlated with DM commodity currencies, such as the NOK, CAD, AUD, and NZD. As shown in Charts 8A and 8B, even the euro has an average correlation greater than 60% with EM currency aggregates. Only the JPY has an unstable correlation with the EM currencies of less than 25%, while the GBP also has a relative lower correlation. Chart 8AJPM-Implied EM FX* Correlation** With DM FX Chart 8BMSCI-Implied EM FX* Correlation** With DM FX Therefore, a USD-based investor, instead of hedging out EM currency exposure directly, should be able to eliminate part of EM currency volatility by selling lower-yielding DM currencies. This move would diversify his/her source of funding from USD to other DM currencies with high correlations with EM currencies. To test the effect on the return-risk profile, we use an unfunded overlay of 1-month DM currency forwards and rebalance monthly. To begin, we test a static correlation hedge where each of the eight DM currencies is sold individually. Then we test a dynamic correlation hedge where each one is dynamically sold based on the BCA Forex Strategy Team’s Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM), which uses the same indicators described in our DM currency hedging report. To avoid subjective selection bias among the currencies, we also test an equally- weighted basket of eight currencies (AUD, NZD, JPY, GBP, EUR, CAD, NOK, and SEK) for dynamic hedging and an equally- weighted basket of five currencies (GBP, EUR, CAD, NOK, and SEK) for static hedging. The AUD, NZD, and JPY were excluded in the static hedging basket because in general, AUD and NZD had very high carries and JPY had an unstable correlation with EM currencies. The combined results are shown in Chart 9A and Chart 9B. Additionally, Table 2A and Table 2B list the return-risk profiles together with the fully hedged and unhedged EM indexes for equities and local debt. Chart 9AStatic Correlation Hedge For US Investors Chart 9BDynamic Correlation Hedge For US Investors Table 2AEM Debt Funding Source Diversification For USD-Based Investors (2/2003-1/2021) Table 2BEM Equity Funding Source Diversification For USD-Based Investors (2/2003-1/2021) For US investors investing in EM local currency bonds, the best risk-adjusted return of 1.08 would come from fully hedging all the EM currencies as shown in Table 2A. Fully-hedged EM debt has the lowest volatility (4.12%), but also the lowest return (4.45%). To achieve a comparable return of unhedged EM debt (6.18%) without incurring the same high volatility (11.71%), however, a USD-based investor could either statically sell the five DM currencies or dynamically sell the eight DM currencies. The resulting risk-adjusted return of 0.8 would still be comparable to US Treasurys as shown in Table 1. US investors investing in EM equities may improve their return-risk profile by funding their positions in DM currencies. If the aim is to maximize risk-adjusted returns, then the choice would be to fund the position by selling the basket of equally weighted five DM currencies using currency forwards (i.e. using a static correlation hedge). In this way, they would achieve a comparable volatility (16.25%) as if all the EM currencies were fully hedged to USD (16.29%), while also achieving a higher return (12.29%) than when all the EM currencies were not hedged (11.71%). The return per unit of risk of 0.76 would be the highest among all the cases as shown in Table 2B and be on par with US equities as shown in Table 1. If investors prefer even higher returns without significantly higher volatility, then dynamically selling an equally weighted basket of eight currencies would achieve an annualized return of 13.03% with a higher volatility of 18.71%, resulting in a risk-adjusted return of 0.7. Bottom Line: USD-based asset allocators should use the hedged EM debt index and the unhedged EM equities index as benchmarks to measure the performance of their asset-class managers. The EM currency exposure should be managed in a currency overlay at the total fund level by either statically or dynamically selling DM currencies using a correlation hedge, depending on the return-risk preferences. Part 2: Non-USD-Perspective Six out of the eight non-USD DM currencies have strong positive correlations with EM currencies as shown in Chart 8A and Chart 8B. Therefore, non-USD investors investing in EM assets should naturally experience less spot-currency volatility (Chart 10A and Chart 10B). Consequently, they do not need to hedge EM currency exposure from a volatility perspective. But what about return enhancement? Should they consider an allocation to EM assets in place of domestic assets? If they do, would the correlation-hedge approach used by USD-based investors benefit them too? Chart 10ADM Currency Per Unit Of EM Currency Chart 10BDM Currency Per Unit Of EM Currency To find answers to those questions, we compare the return-risk profiles of domestic assets, unhedged EM assets, and correlation-hedged EM assets in Table 3A and Table 3B. For the correlation-hedged results for non-USD investors, we simply use the results for the US investors converted into the non-USD home currencies at spot exchange rates. This way, the return enhancements from the correlation-hedged EM assets compared to the unhedged EM assets would be similar for all nine currencies. Chart 3AEM-Debt* For Non USD-Based Investors Table 3BEM-Stocks* For Non USD-Based Investors We find that non-USD investors would do better to avoid local-currency EM debt if their objective is to maximize risk-adjusted returns because domestic government bonds had unbeatably low volatility, resulting in the highest risk-adjusted returns, as shown in Table 3A. But domestic government bonds had lower returns than unhedged EM bonds for all but AUD- and NZD-based investors. To further enhance the return-risk profile, non-USD investors could follow their US counterparts by dynamically diversifying their funding sources, then converting their USD returns into their home currency at spot exchange rates (i.e. not hedging the USD exposure). GBP- and JPY-based investors would benefit the most from a dynamic correlation hedge with higher returns and lower volatility compared with the unhedged case. In the case of EM equities, other than SEK- and NZD-based investors, unhedged EM equities have higher returns on an absolute and risk-adjusted basis compared with domestic equities, with GBP-, JPY- and euro-based investors benefiting the most (Table 3B). Even though NOK-based investors increased their returns by only 1% by putting funds into unhedged EM equities, they enjoy lower volatility than in domestic equities. Unlike the case for EM debt where a static correlation hedge did not improve over an unhedged case, both static and dynamic correlation hedges improve the return/risk profiles relative to the unhedged case, and the dynamic hedge outperforms the static hedge in each country. While domestic equities underperform domestic government bonds in terms of risk-adjusted returns, EM equities outperform EM local currency debt when a dynamic correlation hedge is applied. Even in the unhedged case, EM equities are still a much better choice than EM debt (Chart 11). To evaluate how this could impact an asset allocation, we replace home equity with EM equities in a 60/40 home equity/Treasury portfolio. In this extreme exercise, six of the eight non-USD-based portfolios could generate better return/risk profiles, with only the NZD- and SEK-based portfolios worse off (Chart 12). Chart 11Risk-Adjusted Return: Stocks Minus Bonds Chart 12Asset Allocation Implications*     Bottom Line: Non-USD-based investors should avoid EM local debt if their objective is to maximize their risk-adjusted returns. For the purposes of return enhancement, EM equities are a much better choice than EM debt for all investors with the exception of those based in New Zealand and Sweden.   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1,2Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Reports, “Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors,” dated September 29, 2017; and "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors (Part II)," dated October 13, 2017. 3 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Reports, “Why Invest In Foreign Government Bonds?” dated March 12, 2018. 4 Please see "Triennial Central Bank Survey Foreign exchange turnover in April 2019," Bank for International Settlements, dated 16 September 2019.

Weekly Performance Update For the week ending Thu Mar 04, 2021 The Market Monitor displays the trailing 1-quarter performance of strategies based around the BCA Score. For each region, we construct an equal-weighted, monthly rebalanced portfolio consisting of the top 3 stocks per sector and compare it with the regional benchmark. For each portfolio, we show the weekly performance of individual holdings in the Top Contributors/Detractors table. In addition, the Top Prospects table shows the holdings that currently have the highest BCA Score within the portfolio. For more details, click the region headers below to be redirected to the full historical backtest for the strategy. BCA US Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA US Portfolio S&P500 TRI -1.63% -1.55% Top Contributors   WES:US MPLX:US AM:US UHAL:US NRG:US Weekly Return 49 bps 20 bps 15 bps 10 bps 10 bps Top Detractors   EXPI:US IEP:US AWK:US ICLR:US CCI:US Weekly Return -73 bps -33 bps -22 bps -20 bps -20 bps Top Prospects   TX:US QFIN:US SCCO:US MORN:US LPX:US BCA Score 99.49% 97.38% 95.03% 92.70% 91.21% BCA Canada Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Canada Portfolio S&P/TSX TRI -1.98% -0.47% Top Contributors   PXT:CA MG:CA CSH.UN:CA SPB:CA LNR:CA Weekly Return 33 bps 13 bps 9 bps 8 bps 7 bps Top Detractors   SCR:CA CS:CA NXE:CA SOY:CA APHA:CA Weekly Return -53 bps -48 bps -36 bps -30 bps -24 bps Top Prospects   LNF:CA IFP:CA CFP:CA FTT:CA MIC:CA BCA Score 99.69% 99.64% 99.03% 86.29% 85.06% BCA UK Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA UK Portfolio FTSE 100 TRI -0.33% 0.22% Top Contributors   MTO:GB SMS:GB OXIG:GB ROSN:GB PZC:GB Weekly Return 27 bps 24 bps 14 bps 13 bps 8 bps Top Detractors   TRMR:GB FDEV:GB MXCT:GB PLUS:GB GLO:GB Weekly Return -31 bps -26 bps -18 bps -15 bps -12 bps Top Prospects   NLMK:GB SVST:GB MNOD:GB GLTR:GB PLUS:GB BCA Score 98.66% 98.59% 97.82% 97.57% 95.74% BCA Eurozone Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA EMU Portfolio MSCI EMU TRI -1.95% 0.24% Top Contributors   FDJ:FR LOTB:BE SOLV:BE GCO:ES ZV:IT Weekly Return 11 bps 11 bps 11 bps 8 bps 6 bps Top Detractors   MELE:BE FTK:DE PHA:FR VBK:DE REG1V:FI Weekly Return -46 bps -25 bps -23 bps -19 bps -18 bps Top Prospects   SOL:IT LOG:ES EDNR:IT HAL:NL IPS:FR BCA Score 98.45% 96.79% 95.55% 95.37% 94.65% BCA Japan Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Japan Portfolio TOPIX TRI 0.06% -2.15% Top Contributors   4980:JP 9436:JP 3132:JP 7966:JP 8133:JP Weekly Return 19 bps 9 bps 8 bps 7 bps 6 bps Top Detractors   3765:JP 7943:JP 8198:JP 8739:JP 8595:JP Weekly Return -12 bps -11 bps -9 bps -6 bps -5 bps Top Prospects   8198:JP 4966:JP 8173:JP 3291:JP 8133:JP BCA Score 99.22% 98.98% 97.27% 96.43% 96.40% BCA Hong Kong Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Hong Kong Portfolio Hang Seng TRI -5.53% -2.78% Top Contributors   1378:HK 867:HK 86:HK 6198:HK 2798:HK Weekly Return 18 bps 10 bps 5 bps 4 bps 2 bps Top Detractors   2008:HK 579:HK 1798:HK 2138:HK 818:HK Weekly Return -78 bps -55 bps -49 bps -47 bps -42 bps Top Prospects   1830:HK 1866:HK 1571:HK 2138:HK 297:HK BCA Score 99.06% 98.75% 98.06% 97.38% 95.61% BCA Australia Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Australia Portfolio S&P/ASX All Ord. TRI -2.08% -0.85% Top Contributors   GRR:AU PDN:AU JLG:AU ARF:AU CWP:AU Weekly Return 55 bps 23 bps 15 bps 13 bps 11 bps Top Detractors   ADO:AU 360:AU OCL:AU PSQ:AU SDG:AU Weekly Return -80 bps -42 bps -39 bps -30 bps -20 bps Top Prospects   GRR:AU BSE:AU BLX:AU PSQ:AU BFG:AU BCA Score 99.69% 99.66% 99.28% 99.10% 99.02%

Underweight “COVID-19 Winners” hypermarket equities remain a solid underweight call. Worrisomely, relative share prices recently broke down and propelled relative returns for our portfolio into the double digits since the late-August inception. While there is a number of factors that weigh on this defensive industry, today we turn our attention to the US dollar. As the greenback depreciates, it reduces the purchasing power of US importers, including Big Box retailers that source most of their goods from abroad (bottom panel, import prices shown inverted). As a result, relative margins bear the brunt of the USD’s fall – especially given that these input cost increases are difficult to pass on to the consumer – profits slip and relative share prices find an equilibrium lower. True, the US dollar has retraced part of its losses recently, but given the lag between the currency debasing and its effects on import prices and margins, the FX related damage will likely have a lasting effect (see chart). Tack on the stealing of demand from the future that these defensive retail stores enjoyed all of last year, as WMT recently admitted on their earnings call, and the revenue and profit outlooks darken further for this safe haven industry. Bottom Line: Remain underweight the S&P hypermarkets index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HYPC – WMT, COST.   

Recently we reopened our long “Back-To-Work”/short “COVID-19 Winners” pair trade that we first instituted in the September 8th, 2020 Strategy Report, and subsequently closed earlier this year for a gain of 21.5%, since inception as our risk management rolling stop was hit. The selloff in the bond market last week served as a catalyst and turbocharged this pair trade that is highly levered to the economic reopening theme; already stellar gains have accrued for our portfolio to the tune of 20% since the early February second inception. Importantly, as the bottom panel of the chart on the right shows, the relative price ratio still has catch up potential to the parabolic move in yields. More recently, we took a deep dive into the economic reopening theme and created two baskets (laggards and overshooters) from the entire GICS4 universe we cover and recommended investors put an intra “Back-To-Work” trade on. Bottom Line: Stay with the long “Back-To-Work” / short “COVID-19 Winners” pair trade. The ticker symbols in the “Back-To-Work” and “COVID-19 Winners” baskets are: LUV, DAL, MAR, HLT, CVX, EOG, SBUX, MCD, CAT, HON, AXP, COF, NUE, GM; and TDOC, FCN, ZM, CTXS, JNJ, AMGN, REGN, CLX, RBGLY, WMT, COST, KR, NFLX, AMZN, respectively.  

Dear Client From March 18 I will be writing under a new product title, the BCA Research Counterpoint. The aim of the Counterpoint is to generate a high volume of investment opportunities that are unconnected to the business cycle and run counter to the conventional wisdom. For those of you that have followed the European Investment Strategy through the past ten years, Counterpoint will seamlessly continue the same intellectual framework of investment ‘mega-themes’, fundamental analysis, fractal analysis, and sector primacy. The difference is that the investment opportunities will encompass all geographies. To whet your appetite, early Counterpoint reports will introduce new investment mega-themes including: the compelling structural case for cryptocurrencies; why shocks such as the pandemic are inherently predictable; and the structural transformation coming to the global labour market. There will also be an upgrade of the proprietary Fractal Trading System to generate more ideas per week and to boost the win ratio towards 70 percent. As for the European Investment Strategy, it will continue in the very capable hands of my colleague and friend, Mathieu Savary. Mathieu has previously written the Foreign Exchange Service, the flagship Bank Credit Analyst, and most recently the Daily Insights. Moreover, Mathieu is French. So if anyone knows how Europe works (and doesn’t work), it is Mathieu! I do hope you read both products. Best regards Dhaval Highlights If bond yields continue their march higher, the most dangerous earthquake will happen in the global real estate market. If higher bond yields caused even a 10 percent decline in the $300 trillion global real estate market it would unleash a deflationary impulse equal to one third of world GDP This would make any preceding inflationary impulse feel like a waltz in the park. For long-term investors who can ride out near term pain, there are three important conclusions: The ultimate low in bond yields is still ahead of us. The structural bull market in stocks will continue until bond yields reach their ultimate low. Equity investors should structurally tilt towards ‘growth’ sectors that will benefit from the ultimate low in bond yields. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Real Estate Market Dwarfs The Stock Market And The Global Economy In the last couple of weeks, higher bond yields have caused tremors in the stock market. But if bond yields continue their march higher and stay there, the most dangerous earthquake will not happen in the stock market, it will happen in the real estate market. The $90 trillion worth of the global stock market is large, but it is chicken feed compared with the $300 trillion worth of global real estate (Chart of the Week). The big worry is that the valuation of global real estate is critically dependent on bond yields staying low. If higher bond yields caused even a 10 percent decline in global real estate values, it would amount to a $30 trillion plunge in global wealth. Such a deflationary impulse, equal to one third of world GDP, would make any preceding inflationary impulse feel like a waltz in the park. Hence, to anybody worried that we are on the road to inflation, we pose a simple question. How would the world economy cope with the massive deflationary impact on $300 trillion of global real estate?1   The Real Risk Is Real Estate Over the past decade, global real estate rents have broadly tracked nominal GDP, as they should. But real estate prices have massively outperformed rents (Chart I-2). The reason is that the valuation paid for those rents has surged by 35 percent. This ‘multiple expansion’ of real estate which has added $80 trillion to global wealth – broadly equivalent to global GDP – is entirely due to lower bond yields. Chart I-2Real Estate Prices Have Massively Outperformed Rents And GDP Within the global real estate market, the residential segment constitutes 80 percent by value. Commercial real estate accounts for a little over 10 percent, and agricultural and forestry real estate makes up the remainder. It follows that the most important component of the real estate boom has been a housing boom. Given that most homes are owner-occupied, the boom in house prices has boosted the wealth of the ordinary global citizen by much more than the boom in stock prices. Moreover, the 2010s housing boom was unprecedented in its penetration and regional breadth, simultaneously encompassing cities, suburbs, and rural areas across North America, Europe, Asia and Australasia. Even Germany and Japan joined in, making it the most widely participated-in housing boom in economic history. What was behind this synchronised and broad-based housing boom? The answer is the universal decline in bond yields. As the global real estate firm Savills puts it: “Real estate has increased significantly in value, spurred on by the intervention of central banks and their suppression of bond yields” In fact, as the US and China now dominate the global real estate market, the downtrend in the global rental yield has closely tracked the downtrend in the US and China long bond yields. The big danger would be if this downtrend turned into an uptrend, undermining the valuation of $300 trillion of global real estate. To repeat, even a 10 percent synchronised decline in global real estate prices would wipe out $30 trillion of global wealth equal to one third of annual GDP, and it would impact almost everybody. The ‘multiple expansion’ of real estate has added $80 trillion to global wealth, broadly equivalent to global GDP. But where is the pain point? Our answer is that if inflation fears lifted the average US and China 30-year bond yield to 3.75 percent (from 3 percent now), it would constitute the change in trend that would unleash a massive countervailing deflationary impulse from falling house prices (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Higher Bond Yields Would Unleash A Massive Deflationary Impulse From Falling House Prices Waiting For Rationality To Return To Stocks In the stock market, the August to mid-February period was a brief aberration in which stocks rallied in tandem with rising bond yields. But looking at the bigger picture, the bull market in stocks, just as for real estate, is due to lower bond yields (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The August To Mid-February Rally In Stocks Was An Aberration Since 2008, global stock market profits have gone nowhere. Therefore, the only reason that the stock market surged is that the valuation paid for those unchanged profits surged. Just as for real estate, the stock market’s valuation surged because bond yields collapsed (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Bull Market In Stocks Is Entirely Due To Higher Valuations Taking account of this downtrend in bond yields, the post-2008 boom in valuations is rational. However, as we warned two weeks ago, the continued expansion of valuations while bond yields are backing up means that The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational. The point of vulnerability is in high-flying tech stocks. Since 2009, the technology sector earnings yield has always maintained a minimum 2.5 percent premium over the 10-year T-bond yield, defining the envelope of the rational bubble. But in recent weeks, this envelope has been breached, indicating that valuation is entering a new and irrational phase (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational For long-term investors the pressing questions are: how much higher can bond yields go, and for how long? Our answers are, much less than 1 percent, and not for long – because the deflationary impact on $300 trillion of real estate would eventually force bond yields into a very sharp reversal. The Road To Inflation Ends At Deflation Many people believe that ‘real’ assets such as real estate and stocks perform well in an inflationary scare. But this is a misunderstanding. Granted, the income generated by real assets should keep pace with nominal GDP. But the valuation paid for that income collapses, taking the price of the asset down with it. From the state of price stability, in which most developed economies now find themselves, the creation of inflation is a non-linear phenomenon. Non-linear means that policymakers’ efforts result in either nothing (witness Japan or Switzerland), or in uncontrolled inflation (witness the US in the late 1960s). In fact, can you name any economy that has shifted from price stability to a controlled inflation? If you can, please tell me in an email! When an economy phase shifts from price stability to price instability, the valuations of real assets collapse. This is because the starting valuation needed to generate a given real return during uncontrolled inflation is much lower than during price stability. When an economy phase shifts from price stability to price instability, the valuations of real assets collapse. Chart I-7 should make this crystal clear. During the low-inflation 1990s and 2000s, a starting price to earnings multiple of 15 consistently generated a prospective 10-year real return of 10 percent. But during the uncontrolled inflation of the 1970s, the same starting multiple of 15 generated a real return of zero. To generate a real return of 10 percent, the starting multiple had to sink to 7. This explains why the prices of stocks and real estate collapsed in the 1970s and why they would collapse again in a new inflationary scare. Chart I-7In An Inflation Scare, Valuations Have To Collapse To Generate An Adequate Real Return As an aside, this also explains why so-called ‘financial repression’ – whereby the central bank holds down bond yields while the government generates inflation – will not work. While it is conceivable that a government could corner its government bond market and thereby repress it, it would be near-impossible to repress the much larger asset-classes of stocks and real estate. Once these large and privately priced markets sniffed out the government’s nefarious plan, the valuation of such assets would collapse to generate the previously required real return – the result being an almighty crash in stock and real estate prices. Given that the combined value of such markets dwarfs the $90 trillion global economy, the road to inflation would end at deflation. For long-term investors who can ride out near term pain, all of this leads to three important conclusions: The ultimate low in bond yields is still ahead of us. The structural bull market in stocks will continue until bond yields reach their ultimate low. Equity investors should structurally tilt towards ‘growth’ sectors that will benefit from the ultimate low in bond yields. Fractal Trading System* In a very successful week, short MSCI Korea versus MSCI AC World achieved its 10.6 percent profit target and short tin versus lead quickly achieved its 13 percent profit target. This takes the rolling 12-month win ratio to 60 percent. Given the transition to the new product title, there are no new trades this week. We look forward to introducing the upgraded Fractal Trading System and some new trades in the BCA Counterpoint on March 18. Chart I-8MSCI Korea Vs. MSCI All-Country World* For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Source: Savills Prime Index: World Cities, August 2020; and Savills: 8 things to know about global real estate value, July 2018. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights The Senate will pass the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan largely as it stands. Markets will now turn to Biden’s second major reconciliation bill for FY2022 – the one with tax hikes. Democrats will go forward with tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy. But they will spend more than they tax for fear of squandering their term in power. Tax hikes threaten sectors like tech that already face headwinds from rising bond yields. The health sector is also at risk. Stick with cyclicals and value plays.  Feature Markets have seesawed as volatility spikes in the face of rapidly rising bond yields. Value stocks such as financials stand to benefit relative to growth stocks as the market comes to grips with the first hint of normal inflation expectations since 2019 (Chart 1). Underlying the trend is a sea change in US fiscal policy. Chart 1Value Stocks To Reignite On Rising Bond Yields The House of Representatives passed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan so it will now go to the Senate for revision, back to the House for approval, and then to President Biden’s desk by around March 14. Investors will now turn to Biden’s second major legislative act prior to the 2022 midterm election cycle: the fiscal year 2022 budget reconciliation process. Before we outline the time frame and tax hikes that that process will entail, we should take a moment to review the current bill. Senate Will Pass American Rescue Plan Largely As Is The House version of the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan contains $1,400 household rebates, direct checks via the Internal Revenue Service, for people who make less than $75,000 per year (double those numbers for married couples). Unemployment benefits are supposed to rise from $300 to $400 per week for 73 weeks instead of 50 weeks, with an expiration on August 29 instead of March 14. Those with children or other dependents will receive additional payments. The bill also includes $75 billion for fighting COVID-19, $350 billion for state and local governments, $170 billion for schools and universities, $225 billion for small business, $38 billion for the airline industry and various other tax benefits for families and workers.1 Those who have been let go from their jobs can more easily retain their previous health insurance. Chart 2 provides a visual comparison of the American Rescue Plan with the $900 billion in fiscal relief passed at the end of 2020 prior to House passage and Senate revision. Already the Senate version excludes a hike to the minimum wage, from $7.25 to $15 per hour, as the Senate parliamentarian ruled that does not qualify under the “Byrd rule” because it does not directly impact spending or taxation.2 Vice President Kamala Harris, who is also president of the Senate, could reverse this decision but otherwise the minimum wage will have to be considered in a separate bill later. Chart 2American Rescue Plan The Senate could pare back other aspects of the bill – such as state and local aid, given that local government revenues are in much better shape than expected. Chart 2 highlights that the state and local aid component is much larger this time around. Still, the purpose of Senate negotiations is to secure the votes of moderate Democrats, as winning over 10 Republicans is no longer feasible, and moderate senators are not going to sink the first legislative proposal of a president of their own party. The Senate is virtually guaranteed to pass the bill, likely by March 14 when current unemployment benefits expire. The bill’s economic impact will be to speed the vaccination process and provide another infusion of cash into households and various public institutions. Families are just starting to receive the last round of benefits passed in December and they had not exhausted the 14% year-on-year increase in real income that they saw as a result of last year’s CARES Act when the Coronavirus Response and Relief Act sent incomes soaring yet again (Chart 3). Economic growth will be supercharged as economic activity normalizes, consumer confidence recovers, and the service sector revives. Chart 3Washington Lavishes Households With Dole Biden’s Second Bill Will Pass This Fall The second budget reconciliation procedure, for fiscal year 2022, will begin in mid-April. The formal deadline to adopt a budget resolution is April 15 but the average delay would put the resolution in June.3 The maximum delay would see the resolution passed in October but that is unlikely in today’s context (Diagram 1). After the resolution passes, the House and Senate must reconcile their budgets, pass the same bill, and send it to the president for his signature.  Diagram 1Timeline Of Biden Administration’s Second Budget Reconciliation, FY2022 The average time between Congress adopting a budget resolution and the president signing a reconciliation bill into law is 150 days, putting completion on September 15, 2021. This period could easily extend to November. In the worst-case, judging by history, Democrats could fail to conclude the process until October 2022 – but that is highly unlikely. A delay till December of this year would be a fumble, but a more realistic fumble, say if moderate Democrats must be won over due to controversial provisions. The second reconciliation bill is supposed to consist of investments over a ten-year period rather than emergency relief for the lingering pandemic and economic recovery. Biden’s proposed $2-$3 trillion green infrastructure program is the highlight but we also expect Democrats to prioritize their health care plan, which is estimated to cost $1.7-$1.9 trillion. Hence $4 trillion is a reasonable expectation for new spending but in this case the headline spending figure will be at least partially defrayed by tax hikes, unlike the first reconciliation bill (Charts 4A & 4B). If Biden raises taxes by half as much as he intends, the full price tag would be $2 trillion. Chart 4ABiden Will Spend, Then Tax Chart 4BBiden Will Spend, Then Tax The precise contours of this bill will remain unknown until Biden presents an outline in April and the House of Representatives drafts a resolution. We test six different scenarios involving different assumptions about Biden’s tax-and-spend proposals, highlighted in Table 1. Generally, we assume that Democrats will much more readily compromise tax hikes rather than spending, given that they want to err on the side of firing up the economic recovery. They are just as capable as Republicans were in 2017 of manipulating the numbers when it comes to the reconciliation requirement that the budget deficit not increase beyond a ten-year time period. Table 1Scenarios For Biden’s Second Reconciliation Bill The results are broken down in terms of revenue, expenditure, and net interest costs in Chart 5. The baseline is Biden’s campaign proposal. Scenario 1 assumes that Biden gets all of the spending he wants but is forced to compromise on tax hikes. Scenario 2 is more realistic as it assumes that Biden gets half of what he wants on both spending and taxes. Scenarios 3-6 examine what would happen if Biden were forced to strike out either his green infrastructure plan or his health and social security plan, depending on different revenue assumptions. In Scenarios 5 and 6 we grant Biden only half of his proposed taxes on corporations and wealthy folks, leaving other tax proposals to the side – otherwise the result would be a net tightening of fiscal conditions, which is neither intended nor politically possible. Chart 5Scenarios For Biden’s Second Reconciliation Bill The impact on the budget deficit in each scenario is shown in Chart 6. The greatest economic stimulus would occur under Scenario 1, which would soon become a problem for investors as it would hasten inflation and rising interest rates. Chart 6Deficit Scenarios For Biden’s Second Reconciliation Bill Scenario 2 is the most realistic policy scenario while being the least inflationary. By contrast, Scenario 4 is realistic but hardly less inflationary than the baseline case. In each of these scenarios it is important to bear in mind that the new government programs would be administered over a ten-year period and therefore the increase to the budget deficit would be more gradual than is the case of the American Rescue Plan, which clearly aims to be disbursed in the first few years. In the case of the Obama administration’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) the peak in spending occurred in 2013, four years after the bill was passed (analogous to 2025 today) (Chart 7). Infrastructure and green energy projects are also expected to increase productivity and hence potential growth. Chart 7Infrastructure Spending Could Peak Four Years After Bill’s Passage, As In 2009-13 The Byrd rule will become even more important with Biden’s second reconciliation bill because the bill will contain a mishmash of Biden’s campaign proposals. Democrats will try to pass as much of their agenda via fast track as possible so as to meet promises ahead of the 2022 midterm election. An advantage of health care spending is that it is unlikely to be struck down by the Senate parliamentarian given that the Obama administration relied on reconciliation to pass a critical second installment to the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). Biden’s health care plan is more popular than climate change policy, with both the general public and moderate Democrats, and it is guaranteed to pass reconciliation. Infrastructure spending faces greater challenges under reconciliation but they are not insurmountable. Infrastructure is normally handled via the traditional budget process or the Highway Trust Fund and some measures are likely to run afoul of the Byrd rule. Still, workarounds can be found.4  Hence the infrastructure plan is likely to be compromised but not prohibited due to technicalities. Even if infrastructure fails to make it into reconciliation, Biden can use the deadline to top up the exhausted Highway Trust Fund or to reauthorize the Surface Transportation Act as alternative pathways. It is not impossible to get Republican cooperation on infrastructure though the green agenda will meet resistance. The reconciliation process is nominally forbidden from increasing the budget deficit beyond ten years. Short-term spending is exempt, as is the case with the American Rescue Plan and its crisis-response measures, but the purpose of the second reconciliation bill is to invest in long-term, productivity-enhancing programs. A new government health insurance option and/or a green infrastructure buildout will take many years to implement and could increase deficits beyond the ten-year window. But Democrats, like Republicans, will be able to use accounting chicanery and gimmicks to make the budget outlook serve their purposes in passing the legislation. As long as they keep moderate members of the party on their side.   Yes, Taxes Will Go Up … But That May Not Be All Bad For Markets Why should Democrats raise taxes at all? Why not focus on stimulus without taking on the political risk of higher taxes? After all, Republicans passed tax cuts via reconciliation without offsetting them by spending cuts. Was it not the higher taxes in Obamacare that greatly fueled resistance from Republicans and their victory in the House of Representatives in 2010? First, on the level of intentions, the Democrats clearly seek to increase taxes on corporations, high-income earners, and capital gains: Both Biden and Harris said they would raise taxes on the campaign trail and in the presidential debates despite the risk to their election prospects. Biden committed only to prevent tax hikes on those making less than $400,000 per year. Harris’s weakest moment in her debate with Mike Pence was her insistence that she would raise taxes but she stuck to her guns. Both factions of the Democratic Party want to raise taxes. Traditional Democrats view tax hikes as a way of paying for a larger government role in addressing social and economic imbalances. Populists view tax hikes as a way of redistributing from the ultra-rich. While budget deficits are not a general concern, combating inequality is a theme shared across the party. Second, on the level of capability, Democrats can get at least some of the tax increases that they want: The US is not overtaxed on the whole. True, Biden’s full tax agenda would push the US back up to the top of the OECD countries in terms of the corporate tax if an “integrated” view of both firm-level taxes and taxes on dividends and capital gains (Chart 8). But this point suggests that Biden will moderate his tax plan rather than abandon it altogether. Popular opinion did not favor Trump for cutting corporate taxes. Chart 8Biden’s Corporate Tax Proposal Would Make US An Outlier Again The macroeconomic impact of raising taxes is manageable in the context of the extraordinary fiscal stimulus that the US is passing. There is no clear relationship between tax rates and economic growth but it is natural for the Democrats to fear that they could squander their term in power by excessive fiscal tightening. Yet the negative economic impact of raising the corporate rate is only 0.8% of GDP over the long run, and half of that if the corporate rate is raised only halfway to what Biden intends (25% instead of 28%) (Table 2), according to the conservative-leaning Tax Policy Foundation. Table 2Economic Impact Of Corporate Tax Not Dramatic President Biden has the political capital early in his term to revise the Trump tax cuts according to Democratic prerogatives. His popularity will not hold up for long (Chart 9). And he only just has enough legislative power. While household sentiment is weak and economic conditions are moderate, both are set to improve as the pandemic fades and fiscal stimulus takes effect (Table 3). While tax hikes will embolden Republican opposition and the Democrats will have lost their chance to affect the tax code if Republicans win in 2022. At the moment, Republicans are divided and unpopular, so Democrats have a window of opportunity (Chart 10). Chart 9Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis? Chart 10Independents Up, Republicans Down Table 3Political Capital Index While Democrats could chuck all the Senate rules out the window in order to pass their spending plans without any offsets, this would anger moderates who tend to uphold Senate rules and norms. The party cannot afford to lose a single vote from their caucus in the Senate. Yet moderate Democrats are not against tax increases in principle. What they would oppose is either excessive tax hikes or a fiscal spending bonanza without any revenue offsets at all.5  It is entirely feasible to back-load tax increases so that they take effect in the latter half of the ten-year budget window, especially after the 2024 election. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is advising precisely this course of action and has herself argued that corporate tax hikes will go through.6 There may be some risk that Democrats go full left-wing populist and abandon any semblance of fiscal responsibility so as to supercharge the economy. So far they have agreed to maintain the Senate filibuster and scrap the minimum wage hike but this acceptance of Senate norms may not last as pressure builds. The second reconciliation bill is the last chance to fast-track major initiatives before the midterm. Vice President Harris could overrule the Senate parliamentarian across the board. This scenario is unlikely. The White House and Congress will find a balance that raises some revenue but errs on the fiscally accommodative side, as our scenarios above highlight. Investment Takeaways The market’s concern is that the Democrats will “overdo” the fiscal response and we fully share this concern. The American Rescue Plan alone will plug the output gap by almost three times more than the amount required. The coming tax hikes will not offset the wave of new spending that is coming down the pike. Democrats will partially reverse Trump’s tax cuts in the context of additional pump-priming that constitutes a net increase to the budget deficit. The net effect is inflationary.   If Congress were to pass another $2 trillion bill without any substantial revenue offsets then the market would face an even bigger inflationary jolt and an even earlier return to rate hikes by the Fed. But this scenario is unlikely. So the inflationary risk is clear but investors need not panic in the short run.  Our infrastructure trade is back on track as the reflation trade rumbles onward (Chart 11). The Democrats will get at least one more major bill passed and it will likely include at least half of Biden’s agenda, including around $2 trillion on green infrastructure. We will discuss the renewable energy portion at length in a forthcoming report. The health care sector faces headwinds from both Biden’s health policies and corporate tax hikes. The sectors that stand to benefit the most from a higher corporate tax rate are those that benefited least from Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act – namely energy, industrials, materials, and financials, in that order (Chart 12A). These are also the cyclical plays that we favor in today’s accommodative policy environment. Chart 11Infrastructure Trade Back On Track   Chart 12ACyclicals Outperforming Health Care Chart 12BCyclicals To Outperform Tech? The same cyclical sectors are also trying to make headway against the tech sector, which stands to suffer from higher interest rates as well as higher taxes, including a minimum tax on book earnings, if that part of Biden’s agenda makes it through the negotiations this fall (Chart 12B).   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A1BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A1CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3Biden’s Cabinet Position Appointments Footnotes 1     See Jeff Drew, “House passes $1.9 trillion stimulus bill with a variety of small business relief,” and Alistair M. Nevius, “Tax provisions in the American Rescue Plan Act,” February 27, 2021, Journal of Accountancy, journalofaccountancy.com.     2     See “The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s ‘Byrd Rule,’” Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2020, fas.org.            3    The current delay centers on whether the Senate will confirm Biden’s appointee for director of the Office of Management and Budget, Neera Tanden, who lost support from key moderate Democrat Joe Manchin. If she does not receive a compensatory Republican vote then Biden will have to appoint someone else and the Senate will have to confirm. Thus the budget resolution could easily be delayed into May or June.       4    For the difficulties, see Peter Cohn, “Democrats plan a spending blowout, but hurdles remain,” Roll Call, January 11, 2021, rollcall.com. For workarounds, see Zach Moller and Gabe Horwitz, “Reconciliation: How It Works and How to Use It to Help American Workers Recover,” Third Way, February 1, 2021, thirdway.org. 5    See Alexander Bolton, “Democrats hesitant to raise taxes amid pandemic,” The Hill, February 25, 2021, thehill.com. 6    See Saleha Mohsin and Christopher Condon, “Yellen Favors Higher Company Tax, Signals Capital Gains Worth a Look”, Bloomberg, February 22, 2021, Bloomberg.com