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Commodities & Energy Sector

Feature In investment, there are times when your view and your strategy should not be the same. Our view remains that the global economy is likely to avoid recession over the next 18 months, that the Fed will cut rates once or twice more as an “insurance” but not enter a full easing cycle, that global bond yields will rise, and that risk assets will outperform over the next 12 months. But the risks to that view have increased, and so we want to bolster the hedge against our view being wrong. We don’t see Recommended Allocation Chart 1GAA Portfolio Volatility Relative To Benchmark government bonds as an attractive hedge at this level of yield, and so are moving to a “barbell” strategy, with overweights in equities and cash, and an underweight in fixed income. This lowers the volatility of our recommended portfolio to close to that of the benchmark (Chart 1). First, the good news. Although the manufacturing sector globally continues to deteriorate, with many PMIs falling to below 50, services and consumption remain robust almost everywhere (Chart 2). With central banks easing monetary policy, and in some countries (Italy, the U.S., the U.K., maybe even Germany) governments loosening fiscal policy, financial conditions are improving, which will eventually support growth (Chart 3). Intra-cyclical manufacturing downturns typically last around 18 months, and this one is close to its sell-by date (Chart 4). Chart 2Manufacturing Weak, Services Fine So what has changed? First, manufacturing has continued to decline for longer than we expected. In the early summer, there were signs of a bottoming in Europe, but these are no longer evident. The diffusion index of the global manufacturing PMI (i.e. the percentage of countries with a rising versus falling PMI), which typically leads the PMI by six months, suggests the PMI has further to fall (Chart 5). Chart 3Easing Financial Conditions Will Help Chart 4Close To The Bottom?   Chart 5Further Downside For PMIs? Chart 6China's Reluctant Monetary Stimulus   The most likely cause of this is that China has been more reluctant to ramp up monetary stimulus than we expected. It has eased fiscal policy, but monetary policy has been tentative: despite a moderate increase in credit creation this year, M3 money supply growth has barely accelerated (Chart 6). This has been enough to stabilize Chinese growth, but has been insufficient to give the sort of boost to global growth that China provided in 2016. There are two reasons for China’s reluctance to stimulate. The authorities seemingly continue to prioritize debt deleveraging and clamping down on shadow banking. And, also, maybe they do not want to give a boost to the global economy that would help the U.S. avoid recession and increase the probability of President Trump’s being reelected. China has been more reluctant to ramp up monetary stimulus than we expected. The Trade War is an increasing risk. BCA’s geopolitical strategists continue to assign a 40% probability to a resolution by year-end,1 but it is becoming harder to see how (or, indeed, why) President Xi would offer concessions to the U.S. that would lead to a deal. Ultimately, if Chinese growth slows significantly and U.S. stocks fall sharply, China will boost monetary stimulus and President Trump will push for even a superficial trade agreement. But things will need to get worse first. Meanwhile, the rise in global political uncertainty – and the mercurial nature of Trump’s foreign and trade policies – are a risk for markets (Chart 7). Chart 7Global Political Risks Rising Chart 8Consumers (Mostly) Remain Confident   We are also concerned about how long consumption can remain robust in this environment. So far, consumer confidence has remained resilient in the U.S., though it has dipped a little in Europe and Japan (Chart 8). But, if corporate profits remain weak, companies will start to delay hiring decisions and begin to lay off workers. This would be the transmission mechanism for the manufacturing slowdown to spread into the broader economy. So far, fortunately, there are few signs it is happening: German unemployment is at a record low, and U.S. initial claims continue to run at or below last year’s level (Chart 9). Chart 9No Signs Of Weakening Labor Market Table 1GAA Recession Checklist     In the recession checklist we have published for the past two or more years, we are starting to have to tick off more warning signs (Table 1 and Chart 10). Chart 10Some Worrying Signs Chart 11Risk Of Recession No Longer Negligible   For example, the yield curve has inverted both for the 3-month/10 year and 2-year/10-year. Although the yield curve has been an almost infallible predictor of recession in the past 70 years, there are some reasons to argue that it may not be as good this time: for example, central bank purchases have artificially pulled down long-term rates. But inversion is probably a self-fulfilling prophesy. For example, in a recent Fed Senior Bank Loan Officers Survey, 40% of banks said they would tighten credit standards simply because of a moderate inversion of the yield curve. Formal models of recession 12 months ahead that incorporate the yield curve slope, put recession risk now at about 25% (Chart 11).   Chart 1218 Months Of Ups And Downs Given all this, we think it is appropriate to take some risk off. As far back as February 2018, we argued that “investors primarily concerned with capital preservation might look to dial down risk or hedge exposure now”.2 Given the ups and down of markets in the past 18 months, we suspect that those risk-averse investors would not have been unhappy with that advice (Chart 12), although they would also have missed some nice equity rallies over that time, if they had been nimble enough to time entry and exit points. Since a majority of the subscribers to this service are rather conservative, we are now extending that advice to all clients. On a 12-month time horizon, we raise cash to overweight. We are also reducing somewhat both our equity overweight and bond underweight. In this period of increased uncertainty, a portfolio closer than usual to benchmark makes sense. (BCA’s House View is a little more bullish, remaining neutral on cash and overweight equities on the 12-month horizon). Fixed Income: Absent recession, we see little room for rates to fall further. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield (now 1.5%) should stay above its July 2016 historic low of 1.37%. The Fed is unlikely to cut rates by 100 basis points over the next 12 months, as futures imply. We would expect only two 25 bp rate cuts: in September and either October or December. Yields are likely eventually to move up over the next 12 months (particularly given that inflation continues to trend higher). But they may not move much for a while, and so we move from underweight to neutral on duration for now. Eventually, we see investors understanding that government bonds are no longer an attractive hedge at current yields. Even if German 10-year yields fell to -1.2% (probably around the lowest possible), one-year total return would only be 5% (Table 2). The U.S. looks a little better, though. One could imagine the yield falling to zero in the next recession, which would give a return of 16%. On credit, we remain neutral: it represents a low-beta play on equities. So far this year, both investment-grade and high-yield bonds have eked out a small positive excess return (Chart 13). Table 2Not Much Room For Positive Returns Chart 13Credit Returns Have Not Been Bad Chart 14Downside For Cyclicals?   Equities: To offset our overweight on equities, we continue with a low-beta country/regional tilt. We recommend an overweight on the U.S., and underweight on Emerging Markets. The key for upside to U.S. equities remains earnings. Analysts have a pessimistic forecast of only 2.5% EPS growth in 2019 for the S&P500. A rough proxy for earnings growth (nominal GDP growth of 4.5%, wage growth of 3.5% leading to some margin expansion, 2% buybacks) points to EPS growth of around 7-8%. Q3 earnings (where analysts forecast -2% year-on-year) are likely to surprise on the upside, as did Q1 and Q2, though the strong dollar and weak overseas growth are risks. In our next Quarterly, to be published on October 1, we may make some adjustments to further dial down risk, for example in our equity sector recommendations, which currently have a slight cyclical tilt. The relative performance of cyclicals has started to wobble, and the message from bond markets is that cyclicals have further to fall in relative terms (Chart 14). Investors will come to understand that government bonds are no longer an attractive hedge at current yields. Currencies: The trade-weighted dollar has broadly moved sideways in the past year (Chart 15), weakening against the yen, but strengthening against the euro and EM currencies. We remain neutral on the dollar. It will continue to be pulled by two opposing forces: weak global growth is a positive, but the Fed has more room to cut rates than the rest of the world and so interest rate differentials will shift against the dollar. The renminbi is likely to continue to weaken, as the Chinese use currency policy as the least painful offset against U.S. tariffs. The latest  set of tariffs suggests that the CNY needs to fall to around 7.5-7.6 to the USD to offset their impact but, if Trump implements all the tariffs he has threatened, it could fall as far as 8.0 (Chart 16). This would pull other EM currencies down further. GBP will continue to be buffeted by Brexit scenarios. A no-deal Brexit could bring it down to 1.00 against the USD, whereas Remain or a very soft Brexit would take it back to PPP, 1.43. The current level is a probability weighted average of the two. Chart 15Dollar Has Moved Broadly Sideways Chart 16CNY Could Fall Much Further     Commodities: The oil price has been hurt by a slowing of demand in developed economies (Chart 17). Supply, however, remains tight, and our energy strategists have cut their forecast for Brent this year only modestly to an average of $66 a barrel (from an earlier forecast of $70, and from a current spot price of $60).3 Industrial commodities continue to struggle because of China’s slowdown (Chart 18) and are unlikely to recover until China’s stimulus is beefed up. Gold remains a good insurance for investors worried about geopolitical risk, recession, and inflation.   Chart 17EM Oil Demand Has Been Weak   Chart 18Industrial Commodities Hurt By China       Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly, “Big Trouble In Greater China,” dated August 23, 2019, available at gps.bcareseach.com 2      Please see Global Asset Allocation, “GAA Monthly Portfolio Update,” dated February 1, 2018, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy, “USD Strength Slows Oil Demand Growth; 2020 Brent Forecast Remains At $75/bbl,” dated August 22, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation  
Highlights While a self-fulfilling crisis of confidence that plunges the global economy into recession cannot be excluded, it is far from our base case. Provided the trade war does not spiral out of control, it is highly likely that global equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. The auto sector has been the main driver of the global manufacturing slowdown. As automobile output begins to recover later this year, so too will global manufacturing. Go long auto stocks. As a countercyclical currency, the U.S. dollar will weaken once global growth picks up. We expect to upgrade EM and European equities later this year along with cyclical equity sectors such as industrials, energy, and materials. Financials should also benefit from steeper yield curves. We still like gold as a long-term investment. However, the combination of higher bond yields and diminished trade tensions could cause bullion to sell off in the near term. As such, we are closing our tactical long gold trade for a gain of 20.5%. Feature “The Democrats are trying to 'will' the Economy to be bad for purposes of the 2020 Election. Very Selfish!” – @realDonaldTrump, 19 August 2019 8:26 am “The Fake News Media is doing everything they can to crash the economy because they think that will be bad for me and my re-election” – @realDonaldTrump, 15 August 2019 9:52 am Bad Juju Chart 1Spike In Google Searches For The Word Recession President Trump’s remarks, made just a few days after the U.S. yield curve inverted, were no doubt meant to deflect attention away from the trade war, while providing cover for any economic weakness that might occur on his watch. But does the larger point still stand? Google searches for the word “recession” have spiked recently, even though underlying U.S. growth has remained robust (Chart 1). Could rising angst induce an actual recession? Theoretically, the answer is yes. A sudden drop in confidence can generate a self-fulfilling cycle where rising pessimism leads to less private-sector spending, higher unemployment, lower corporate profits, weaker stock prices, and ultimately, even deeper pessimism. Two things make such a vicious cycle more probable in the current environment. First, the value of risk assets is quite high in relation to GDP in many economies (Chart 2). This means that any pullback in equity prices or jump in credit spreads will have an outsized impact on financial conditions.   Chart 2The Total Market Value Of Risk Assets Is Elevated Chart 3Not Much Scope To Cut Rates Second, policymakers are currently more constrained in their ability to react to adverse shocks, such as an intensification of the trade war, than in the past. Interest rates in Europe and Japan are already at zero or in negative territory (Chart 3). Even in the U.S., the zero-lower bound constraint – though squishier than once believed – remains a formidable obstacle. Chart 4 shows that the Federal Reserve has cut rates by over five percentage points, on average, during past recessions. It would be impossible to cut rates by that much this time around if the U.S. economy were to experience a major downturn.   Chart 4The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound Fiscal stimulus could help buttress growth. However, both political and economic considerations are likely to limit the policy response. While China is stimulating its economy, concerns about excessively high debt levels have caused the authorities to adopt a reactive, tentative approach. Japan is set to raise the consumption tax on October 1st. Although a variety of offsetting measures will mitigate the impact on the Japanese economy, the net effect will still be a tightening of fiscal policy. Germany has mused over launching its own Green New Deal, but so far there has been a lot more talk than action. President Trump floated the idea of cutting payroll taxes, only to abandon it once it became clear that the Democrats were unwilling to go along. On The Positive Side Despite these clear risks, we are inclined to maintain our fairly sanguine 12-to-18 month global macro view. There are a number of reasons for this: First, the weakness in global manufacturing over the past 18 months has not infected the much larger service sector (Chart 5). Even in Germany, with its large manufacturing base, the service sector PMI remains above 50, and is actually higher than it was late last year. This suggests that the latest global slowdown is more akin to the 2015-16 episode than the 2007-08 or 2000-01 downturns. Chart 5AThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) Chart 5BThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) Second, manufacturing activity should benefit from a turn in the inventory cycle over the remainder of the year. A slower pace of inventory accumulation shaved 90 basis points off of U.S. growth in the second quarter and is set to knock another 40 basis points from growth in the third quarter, according to the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model. Excluding inventories, U.S. GDP growth would have been 3% in Q2 and is tracking at 2.7% in Q3 – a fairly healthy pace given the weak global backdrop (Chart 6). Chart 6The U.S. Economy Is Still Holding Up Well Outside the U.S., inventories are making a negative contribution to growth (Chart 7). In addition to the official data, this can be seen in the commentary accompanying the Markit manufacturing surveys, which suggest that many firms are liquidating inventories (Box 1). Falling inventory levels imply that sales are outstripping production, a state of affairs that cannot persist indefinitely. Third, and related to the point above, the automobile sector has been the key driver of the global manufacturing slowdown. This is in contrast to 2015-16, when the main culprit was declining energy capex. According to Wards, global vehicle production is down about 10% from year-ago levels, by far the biggest drop since the Great Recession (Chart 8). The drop in automobile production helps explain why the German economy has taken it on the chin recently. Chart 7Inventories Are Making A Negative Contribution To Growth Chart 8Auto Sector: The Culprit Behind The Manufacturing Slowdown Importantly, motor vehicle production growth has fallen more than sales growth, implying that inventory levels are coming down. Despite secular shifts in automobile ownership preferences, there is still plenty of upside to automobile usage. Per capita automobile ownership in China is only one-fifth of what it is in the United States, and one-fourth of what it is in Japan (Chart 9). This suggests that the recent drop in Chinese auto sales will be reversed. As automobile output begins to recover later this year, so too will global manufacturing. Investors should consider going long automobile makers. Chart 10 shows that the All-Country World MSCI automobiles index is trading near its lows on both a forward P/E and price-to-book basis, and sports a juicy dividend yield of nearly 4%.1 Chart 9The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China Chart 10Auto Stocks Are A Compelling Buy   Fourth, our research has shown that globally, the neutral rate of interest is generally higher than widely believed. This means that monetary policy is currently stimulative, and will become even more accommodative as the Fed and a number of other central banks continue to cut rates. Remember that unemployment rates have been trending lower since the Great Recession and have continued falling even during the latest slowdown, implying that GDP growth has remained above trend (Chart 11). As diminished labor market slack causes inflation to rebound from today’s depressed levels, real policy rates will decline, leading to more spending through the economy.  Chart 11Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower The Trade War Remains The Biggest Risk The points discussed above will not matter much if the trade war spirals out of control. It is impossible to know what will happen for sure, but we can deduce the likely course of action based on the incentives that both sides face. President Trump has shown a clear tendency in recent weeks to try to de-escalate trade tensions whenever the stock market drops. This is not surprising: Despite his efforts to deflect blame for any selloff on others, he knows full well that many voters will blame him for losses in their 401(k) accounts and for slower domestic growth and rising unemployment. What about the Chinese? An increasing number of pundits have warmed up to the idea that China is more than willing to let the global economy crash if this means that Trump won’t be re-elected. If this is China’s true intention, the Chinese will resist making any deal, and could even try to escalate tensions as the U.S. election approaches. It is an intriguing thesis. However, it is not particularly plausible. U.S. goods exports to China account for 0.5% of U.S. GDP, while Chinese exports to the U.S. account for 3.4% of Chinese GDP. Total manufacturing value-added represents 29% of Chinese GDP, compared to 11% for the United States. There is no way that China could torpedo the U.S. economy without greatly hurting itself first. Any effort by China to undermine Trump’s re-election prospects would invite extreme retaliatory actions, including the invocation of the War Powers Act, which would make it onerous for U.S. companies to continue operating in China. Even if Trump loses the election, he could still wreak a lot of havoc on China during the time he has left in office. Moreover, as Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, has stressed, if Trump were to feel that he could not run for re-election on a strong economy, he would try to position himself as a “War President,” hoping that Americans rally around the flag. That would be a dangerous outcome for China.  Chart 12Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? In any case, it is not clear whether China would be better off with a Democrat as president. The popular betting site PredictIt currently gives Elizabeth Warren a 34% chance of winning, followed by Joe Biden with 26%, and Bernie Sanders with 15% (Chart 12). This means that two far-left candidates with protectionist leanings, who would stress environmental protection and human rights in their negotiations with China, have nearly twice as much support as the former Vice President. All this suggests that China has an incentive to de-escalate the trade war. Given that Trump also has an incentive to put the trade war on hiatus, some sort of détente between the U.S. and China, as well as between the U.S. and other players such as the EU, is more likely than not. Investment Conclusions Provided the trade war does not spiral out of control, it is very likely that global equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. Since it might take a few more months for the data on global growth to improve, equities will remain in a choppy range in the near term, before moving higher later this year. As we discussed last week, the equity risk premium is quite high in the U.S., and even higher abroad, where valuations are generally cheaper and interest rates are lower (Chart 13).2 Chart 13AEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Chart 13BEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency (Chart 14). If global growth picks up later this year, the greenback should begin to weaken. European and emerging market stocks have typically outperformed the global benchmark in an environment of rising global growth and a weakening dollar (Chart 15). We expect to upgrade EM and European equities – along with more cyclical sectors of the stock market such as industrials, materials, and energy – later this year. Chart 14The U.S. Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 15EM And Euro Area Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves     Thanks to the dovish shift by central banks around the world, government bond yields are unlikely to return to their 2018 highs anytime soon. Nevertheless, stronger economic growth should lift long-term yields at the margin, causing yield curves to steepen (Chart 16). Steeper yield curves will benefit beleaguered bank stocks. Chart 16Stronger Economic Growth Should Lift Long-Term Bond Yields, Causing Yield Curves To Steepen Finally, a word on gold: We still like gold as a long-term investment. However, the combination of higher bond yields and diminished trade tensions could cause bullion to sell off in the near term. As such, we are closing our tactical long gold trade for a gain of 20.5%. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   Box 1 Evidence of Inventory Liquidation In The Manufacturing Sector Footnotes 1 The top ten constituents of the MSCI ACWI Automobiles Index are Toyota (22.6%), General Motors (7.8%), Daimler (7.3%), Honda Motor (6.2%), Ford Motor (5.7%), Tesla (4.8%), Volkswagen (4.8%), BMW (3.8%), Ferrari (3.0%), Hyundai Motor (2.4%). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “TINA To The Rescue?” dated August 23, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Away from the Sino-U.S. trade-war headlines – and the remarkable commodity price volatility they produce – apparent steel consumption in China is up 9.5% y/y in the first seven months of this year. This is being spurred by fiscal stimulus directed at infrastructure and construction spending, which remains strong relative to year-ago levels (Chart of the Week).1 Demand for copper normally drafts in the wake of China’s steel demand, and picks up when steel-intensive capital projects are being wired for use. In less uncertain times, getting long copper would make sense.2 Chart of the WeekFiscal Stimulus Boosts China Steel Consumption We are holding off getting long for now, given the policy uncertainty – particularly in re trade policy – that dominates commodity markets, none moreso than steel and base metals. While the odds of a resolution to the trade war might be edging up from our 40% expectation, moving them closer to those of a coin toss does not justify taking the risk.3 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Retaliatory tariffs on $75 billion of U.S. imports, including crude oil, into China, provoked an additional 5% duty by President Trump on ~ $550 billion of goods shipped to the U.S. by China. This will lift the total tariff on $250 billion of U.S. imports from China to 30%, and on another $300 billion to 15%, starting Oct. 1 and Sept. 1. Following the imposition of Chinese tariffs, China Petroleum & Chemical Corp, or Sinopec, petitioned Beijing for waivers on U.S. crude imports. Base Metals: Neutral. Included in the latest Chinese tit-for-tat tariff retaliations is a 5% tariff increase on copper scrap imports from the U.S., which takes the duty to 30%; the re-imposition of 25% tariffs on U.S. auto imports, and a 5% tariff on auto parts. The latter tariffs go into effect December 15, according to Fastmarkets MB. Precious Metals: Neutral. We are getting long platinum at tonight’s close, but with a tight stop of -10%, given highly volatile – and uncertain – trading markets. In addition to following the wake of safe-haven demand for gold, a physical deficit for platinum is possible.4 Markets have been well supported technically – bouncing off long-term support of ~ $785/oz dating to the depths of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 – 09. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA reported 57% of the U.S. corn crop is in good or excellent condition this week, vs. 68% a year ago. The Department also reported 55% of the soybean crop was in good or excellent shape vs. 66% last year at this time. Feature Iron ore price surged more than 38.1% y/y, while steel prices rallied in 1Q19 off their year-end 2018 lows, helped by the Central Committee fiscal stimulus directed at infrastructure and construction, which hit the market after the collapse of Vale’s Brumadinho dam in January (Chart 2). The combination of the fatal dam disaster and fiscal stimulus in China lifted prices for iron ore and steel sharply.5 Chart 2Iron Ore and Steel Rally Leaves Copper Behind Chart 3China's Construction, Real Estate Investment Spur Higher Steel Demand While policymakers guide domestic markets to expect reduced stimulus for the real-estate sector, we continue to expect copper demand to pick up in the short term. Our modeling indicates strong steel consumption presages higher copper consumption, especially when construction’s contribution is high (Chart 3). This is because the projects accounting for that consumption typically are fitted out with electrical wiring six months or so after the structures built with all that steel are made ready for residential or commercial use (Chart 4).6 This should support copper prices as we go through 2H19, although a slowdown in steel’s apparent consumption in 1Q19 followed by a rebound in April could make for a bumpy ride. CPC Central Committee guidance is stressing the need to get stimulus to the “real economy, such as privately-owned manufacturers and high-tech firms, which are the engines of long-term growth.”7 Still, while policymakers guide domestic markets to expect reduced stimulus for the real-estate sector, we continue to expect copper demand to pick up in the short term, as completed construction and infrastructure and projects in the pipeline from past stimulus are made ready for use.8 Chart 4Higher Steel Demand Normally Presages Higher Copper Demand   Copper Puzzle: Why Was It Left Behind? Part of the explanation for copper’s lackluster relative performance likely is USD-related: A strong dollar will reduce demand. Prices for iron ore and steel have come back to earth, following their impressive rallies this year. However, as Chart 2 illustrates, copper prices languished, and retreated to $2.50/lb on the COMEX. This, despite a contraction of physical copper concentrates supply, which kept copper treatment and refining charges (TC/RC) close to record lows, and inventories tight globally (Chart 5).9 Part of the explanation for copper’s lackluster relative performance likely is USD-related: A strong dollar will reduce demand (Chart 6).10 Our House view continues to expect the U.S. Fed to deliver a 25bp rate cut at its mid-September meeting. This could be followed by additional easing if Sino-U.S. trade tensions persist or get worse. Our House view expects Fed easing and a recovery in EM GDP growth will weaken the USD later this year. As iron ore shipments pick up from Brazil and Australia, we would expect pressure on those prices as the additional supply arrives at Chinese docks, and residential construction wanes (Chart 7). This should, in relative terms, mean copper outperforms iron ore, all else equal, since copper supplies and inventories are contracting. And, as construction spending moderates and winter restrictions on steel mills go into effect, we would expect copper to outperform steel. Chart 5Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight   Chart 6Strong USD Restrains Base Metal Demand Chart 7China's Iron Ore Imports Remain Strong Lastly, we would note from a technical perspective that copper has been – and remains – oversold (Chart 8). This could reflect the fact that, among base metals, it has the deepest liquidity, so that when hedgers or speculators are looking for a way to hedge trade-war risk vis-à-vis China – or to simply take a view on EM GDP prospects – copper is the preferred vehicle. It still is too early to wade into buying based on technicals, and, historically, copper has dipped further into oversold territory than where it now sits. But continued excursions into oversold territory will get our attention, and incline us to revisit our bullish bias. Chart 8Technically, Copper's Oversold   Trade War Deadweight The foregoing analysis suggests copper is due to rally. That is our expectation, at any rate. But uncertainty re the Sino-U.S. trade war and other exogenous policy issues – chiefly increasing recession risks arising from higher tariffs on Chinese imports to the U.S., a possible oil-price spike driven by military action in the Persian Gulf, and a disorderly Brexit – forces us to stand aside. Back in May, the N.Y. Fed conducted an analysis of U.S. President Donald Trump’s increase in tariff rates on $200 billion of Chinese imports from 10% to 25%.11 The N.Y. Fed estimated this increase in the tariff rates on that $200 billion would cost the average American household $831/yr, owing to a sharp increase in the deadweight loss arising from the increase. The deadweight loss estimated by the bank arising from tariff increase on the $200 billion of goods subject to the duty went from $132/household/year to $620/household/year. This means the total cost of the tariffs on the $200 billion of goods went from $414/household/year to $831/household/year. The N.Y. Fed notes: Economic theory tells us that deadweight losses tend to rise more than proportionally as tariffs rise because importers are induced to shift to ever more expensive sources of supply as the tariffs rise. Very high tariff rates can thereby cause tariff revenue to fall as buyers of imports stop purchasing imports from a targeted country and seek out imports from (less efficient) producers in other countries. The deadweight loss that comes from importers being forced to buy tariffed goods from higher-cost suppliers is, in other words, highly non-linear. This latest round of tariff increases is being levied on $550 billion of imports come September 1 and October 1. According to the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, a Washington-based research joint-venture between the Urban Institute and the Brookings Institute, U.S. middle-class households earning $50k to $85k, received an average income tax cut of about $800 last year following passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which was signed in to law by President Trump December 22, 2017.12 Further increasing tariffs, as proposed, means the after-tax income of average U.S. households will contract, as the total cost of tariffs overwhelms the value of TCJA tax cuts for middle-income households, if they are imposed as scheduled. China's economy is struggling under the strain of the trade war, as it overlaps with President Xi’s reform and deleveraging campaign of 2017-18.  While these campaigns have been postponed, the lingering effects are weighing on growth.  In addition, banks and corporations appear to be backing away from taking on new risks. The state’s reflationary measures, including a big boost to local government spending, have so far been merely sufficient for domestic stability.12 Bottom Line: Fundamentals and technicals align to support copper prices. However, given the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the Sino-U.S. trade war we are staying on the sidelines, and avoiding putting on a long position at present. Rising tariffs by the U.S. and China increases the risk of recession in both countries.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      In Copper Will Benefit Most From Chinese Stimulus, published April 25, 2019, we noted China would deploy $300 billion (~ 2 trillion RMB) to support policymakers’ GDP growth targets this year. See also the June 2019 issue of Resources and Energy Quarterly, published by the Australian Government’s Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, particularly Section 3 beginning on p. 22. 2      We are referring to Knightian uncertainty here, a distinction developed by economist Frank Knight in his 1921 book "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit". Uncertainty in Knight’s sense refers to a risk that is “not susceptible to measurement,” per the MIT.edu reference above. This differs from the “risk” we routinely consider in this publication, which can be measured via implied volatilities in options markets. A pdf of the book can be downloaded at the St. Louis Fed’s FRASER website. 3      These odds were calculated by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy group. For a discussion, please see our article entitled Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals, published May 9, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4      This is not a certainty. In its PGM Market Report for May 2019, Johnson Matthey, the platinum-group metals refiner, forecast a slight physical platinum deficit this year of ~ 4MT, while Metals Focus expects a 20MT surplus. 5      The Australian Government DIIS report footnoted above (fn 1) states, “Production growth in China was driven by stimulatory government spending, which focused on higher infrastructure investment and boosting construction activity.” This is consistent with our framework for analyzing Chinese bulks (iron ore and steel) and base metals markets: Steel production and consumption are directed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, which motivates us to treat China’s steel market as a unified vertically integrated industry. Chinese steel production, accounts for ~ 50% of the global total. Its strong showing this year pushed world steel production up ~ 5% y/y in the first five months of this year, according to the DIIS. 6      In our modeling of copper prices, we lag steel apparent consumption by six months. 7      Please see Property sector cooling to help real economy funding, published by China Daily on August 1, 2019. 8      BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy noted, “The July Politburo statement signaled a greater willingness to stimulate the economy; as a result, we are penciling in a slightly more optimistic scenario on forthcoming credit growth through the remainder of the year, by adding 300 billion yuan of debt-to-bond swaps and 800 billion yuan of extra infrastructure spending to our baseline estimate for the rest of 2019. However, this would only add a credit impulse equivalent of 1 percentage point of nominal GDP and would only marginally reduce the probability of an earnings recession to 40%.” Please see Don’t Bottom-Fish Chinese Assets (Yet), published August 14, 2019. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 9      The International Copper Study Group reported world mine production fell ~ 1% in the January – May 2019 period to ~ 8.3mm MT. Global refined copper production also was down ~ 1% to 9.8mm MT, while refined copper usage was down less than 1% over the same period. China’s refined usage – ~ 50% of world demand – was up 3.5%. 10   Our modeling indicates a 1% y/y increase in the broad trade-weighted USD translates into a 0.7% y/y decrease in the price of copper. Iron ore also is affected by USD levels, but price formation in this market is dominated by the overwhelming influence of Chinese demand on the seaborne iron-ore market, which accounts for close to 70% of global demand. For steel, China accounts for slightly more than half of global supply and demand, which somewhat insulates it from USD effects. 11   Please see New China Tariffs Increase Costs to U.S. Households, published by the N.Y. Fed May 23, 2019. 12   Please see Big Trouble In Greater China, a Special Report published by BCA Research's Geopolitical and China Investment strategies August 23, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
In our balances estimates, we show OPEC producing 29.8mm b/d of crude oil on average this year, and 29.7mm b/d next year. This is down sharply from the 32mm b/d we estimate the Cartel produced last year, which included a surge in 2H18 undertaken in response…
For 2019, a grouping of negative demand-side effects have proven to be strong – uncertainty spawned by the Sino-U.S. trade-war, tightening financial conditions globally, and the strong USD. As a result, we have been forced to lower our growth expectation for…
Hard-to-predict policy risks and trade-war uncertainty will continue to hinder oil-demand growth, as will USD strength. The cost of oil in local-currency terms remains close to highs not seen since Brent and WTI traded above $100/bbl in 2014 in key EM economies, which partly explains the fall-off in demand begun in 2H18 that carried into 1H19 (Chart of the Week). We continue to expect oil demand to revive on the back of global fiscal and monetary stimulus, which, along with continued production discipline by OPEC 2.0 and capital discipline by U.S. shale producers, keeps our 2020 Brent forecast at $75/bbl. For 2019, however, our Brent forecast falls to $66/bbl from $70/bbl, following a re-basing of estimated demand in 2017-18 to bring it in line with lower historical data, and the lingering impact of a stronger USD.1 We also are revising our WTI expectation, as markets price in the last bits of ~ 2mm b/d of new pipeline takeaway capacity coming online in the Permian Basin. For 2019, we expect WTI to trade $6.50/bbl under Brent, and $4/bbl under next year, vs. $7/bbl and $5/bbl we expected last month. Chart of the WeekUSD Strength Hinders Oil-Demand Rebound Highlights Energy: Overweight. Distillate fuel accounted for 29.6% of the product derived from refining crude oil in the U.S. during July, a record for the month, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Refiners are gearing up for the global change-over to low-sulfur marine fuels ahead of the January 1, 2020, implementation of IMO 2020. Base Metals: Neutral. Increased infrastructure spending will add ~ $2 billion (14 billion RMB) to China’s total infrastructure spending of 524 billion RMB, according to a Fastmarkets MB analyst survey. Copper usage is expected to increase as 2H19 grid spending picks up. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold and silver continue to mark time close to recent highs. USD strength could slow the metals’ rally. We remain long both metals as portfolio hedges. Ags/Softs: Underweight. This week’s USDA’s Crop Progress report showed 56% of the corn crop was in good or excellent condition, vs. 68% in 2018. For beans, 53% of the crop is in good or excellent condition, vs. 65% last year. Feature We expect global fiscal and monetary stimulus to lift demand in EM economies, which will be visible over the balance of this year and next. In this month’s assessment of supply-demand balances, we are lowering our 2019 Brent forecast to $66/bbl from $70/bbl, after re-basing our demand estimates so that they are more in line with EIA’s historical data (Chart 2). We lowered our historical demand estimates up to and including 2017, in line with the EIA data. This reduces the base level for 2018-20 demand. As a result, the level of our 2018 demand is down by 200k b/d to 100.1mm b/d, vs. last month’s estimate, and the level of our 2019 and 2020 demand estimates is down by 250k b/d to 101.3mm b/d and to 102.8mm b/d. The adjustments are mainly due to the revision of historical level of demand in 2017-2018. In addition, we lowered our growth estimate for 2019 slightly to 1.2mm b/d from 1.25mm b/d last month, but kept our 2020 growth rate expectation at 1.5mm b/d. Chart 2Lower 2019 Demand Estimate, Price; Keeping 2020 Unchanged As noted above, we expect global fiscal and monetary stimulus to lift demand in EM economies, which will be visible over the balance of this year and next. Continued production discipline by OPEC 2.0 and capital discipline by U.S. shale producers leaves our 2020 Brent forecast unchanged at $75/bbl. In addition, this combination of stronger demand and tighter supply will create a physical supply deficit (Chart 3). This deficit will force inventories lower, which remains OPEC 2.0’s paramount goal, and backwardate the Brent and WTI forward curves (Chart 4). Chart 3Stronger Demand, Tighter Supply Produces Physical Deficit Chart 4Inventory Draws Will Resume For WTI, we now expect it to trade $6.50/bbl under Brent in 2019 and $4/bbl under in 2020, vs. the $7/bbl and $5/bbl differentials we expected last month. This narrowing of the differential comes on the back of the build-out of takeaway pipeline capacity in the Permian Basin, which amounts to ~ 2mm b/d by the end of this year. The expansion of deep-water harbor capacity in the U.S. Gulf is being delayed by regulatory action, which means the Brent vs. WTI differential will not significantly contract further until later in 2020 or 2021 when we expect crude-oil export volumes to pick up sharply. Over the course of the coming year, we do expect exports to pick up before 2021, as they have done in 2018-2019. This trend likely continues. We calculated there is ~ 4.5 mm b/d of current export capacity in the Gulf, therefore exports still can increase before being fully constrained. In addition, small capacity expansion projects already are under construction, which will lift capacity next year. That said, any delays could pressure differentials (LLS-Brent, WTI-Brent). But, as long as shale-oil production keeps increasing and foreign demand remains strong, exports can increase – likely at a slower pace – while differentials hold around the $4/bbl level next year. Digging Into The Oil Demand Slow-Down This was a stealthy USD rally, overshadowed by the Sino-U.S. trade war, and exogenous foreign-policy shocks re U.S. Venezuela and Iran policy. For 2019, a grouping of negative demand-side effects have proven to be quite strong – uncertainty spawned by the Sino-U.S. trade-war, tightening financial conditions globally, and the strong USD. Over the past year, these effects have combined to lower actual demand, and forced us to lower our growth expectation for this year for a fourth time to 1.2mm b/d. In hindsight, it is apparent the strong USD has affected EM demand by raising the local-currency cost of oil in particular over the past year to levels not seen since crude was trading above $100/bbl in 2014 (Charts 5A and 5B). Chart 5AAs USD Strengthened Local-Currency Costs Skyrocketed Chart 5BAs USD Strengthened Local-Currency Costs Skyrocketed   This was a stealthy USD rally, overshadowed by the Sino-U.S. trade war, and exogenous foreign-policy shocks re U.S. Venezuela and Iran policy. In addition to raising the cost of commodities priced in USD, in local-currency terms, the stronger dollar lowered the cost of producing commodities for countries like Russia, whose currencies are not pegged to the USD. So, in one fell swoop, USD strength lowered demand via higher prices, and increased supply via lower costs of production. In addition, weaker local currencies catalyze capital outflow, which reduces the supply of savings available to EM economies for investment. At the margin, this also stunts income growth.2 The effects of USD strength could persist, and continue to have a deleterious influence on oil demand into next year, given the way in which monetary policy – and its effects on FX rates – can act with “long and variable lags.” Our BCA Commodity-Demand Nowcasting model continues to point toward a revival of demand as EM economic growth picks up (Chart 6).3 Given the dollar is a counter-cyclical currency vis-à-vis the rest of the world, we expect this will weaken the USD and be supportive of commodity prices. Chart 6BCA Commodity-Demand Nowcast Remains Upbeat Chart 7Expect Further Backwardation In Crude Oil Forward Curves Higher oil demand and lower supply likely will further backwardate Brent and WTI forward curves, which will diminish the impact of the USD’s strength (Chart 7), and lead to higher volatility, as fundamentals once again dominate price formation (Chart 8). Still, the effects of USD strength could persist, and continue to have a deleterious influence on oil demand into next year, given the way in which monetary policy – and its effects on FX rates – can act with “long and variable lags," to borrow Milton Friedman's well-turned phrase.4 We will monitor this risk closely, and will be offering further research into it.   Supply Concerns Persist E&P companies are using their accumulated inventory of excess Drilled-but-Uncompleted (DUC) wells to reach their production targets, while controlling capital expenditures (i.e. flat/lower rig count). We continue to expect OPEC 2.0 to manage production, and to keep a laser focus on reducing inventories. The producer coalition continues to get a huge assist in this effort from the U.S. sanctions against Iran, which, according to the American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have taken almost all of that country’s oil exports – some 2.7mm b/d – out of the market (Chart 9).5 In our balances estimates, we show OPEC producing 29.8mm b/d of crude oil on average this year, and 29.7mm b/d next year. This is down sharply from the 32mm b/d we estimate the Cartel produced last year, which included a surge in 2H18 undertaken in response to pressure from the U.S. to build inventories ahead of oil-export sanctions being re-imposed against Iran (Table 1). Given the lower demand estimate OPEC is forecasting for this year and next – 99.9mm b/d, and 101.1mm b/d this year and next – we expect OPEC’s leader, KSA, to keep production closer to 10mm b/d vs. its 10.33mm b/d quota. We expect the other putative leader of OPEC 2.0, Russia, to produce 11.43mm b/d and 11.41mm b/d this year and next, versus 11.4mm b/d last year. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Once again, U.S. shale-oil output provides the largest increase in supply globally. That said, shale-oil producers are being forced to temper production growth, as investors’ demand higher profits or greater return of capital. We revised down our U.S. shale production growth to 8.2mm b/d in 2019 and 9.1mm b/d in 2020 (Chart 10). In 2018, we estimated U.S. shale production at 7.2mm b/d. Chart 10Shale Output Reduced Slightly Lower-than-expected WTI prices and capital discipline will limit U.S. shale production growth this year, and temper it next year. E&P companies are using their accumulated inventory of excess Drilled-but-Uncompleted (DUC) wells to reach their production targets, while controlling capital expenditures (i.e. flat/lower rig count).6 Year to date, DUC completions increased in the Big Five tight-oil basins, overtaking new wells drilled (Chart 11).7 However, the Permian’s excess DUC inventory increased in July despite the ongoing pipeline capacity expansion and falling rig count. The Permian’s completion rate will be important to monitor. At current oil prices, producers need to tap into their excess DUC inventories to reach both their free-cash-flow and production goals. Bottom Line: We are reducing our Brent price forecast for 2019 to $66/bbl, on the back of weaker demand. Our forecast for 2020 remains unchanged at $75/bbl. Our expectations are driven by our expectation fiscal and monetary stimulus to lift commodity demand – oil in particular – and that production discipline by OPEC 2.0 and capital discipline from U.S. shale-oil producers will tighten markets and lift prices from here.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition formed in late 2016 by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. The producer coalition’s mission was – and remains – managing global supply so as to reduce inventories. We expect OPEC 2.0 production to be at or below quota levels agreed December 7, 2018, when KSA and Russia and their respective allies set about once again to drain global inventories of the 62-million-barrel overhang that resulted from the production ramp-up undertaken in response to demands from U.S. President Donald Trump. 2      The International Energy Agency (IEA) noted that, on the back of higher prices last year, oil once again was “the most heavily subsidized” energy source, expanding its share of the $400 billion provided consumers by their governments to 40%. Please see Commentary: Fossil fuel consumption subsidies bounced back strongly in 2018, published by the IEA June 13, 2019. 3      For a description of our nowcast model, please see Just In Time For Christmas! U.S. Tariff Delay Rocks Oil published last week by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. We noted last week that our expectation of stronger EM growth and a weaker USD is contrary to the view of BCA Research’s Emerging Markets Strategy, which expects continued weakness in EM GDP growth. Moreover, as mentioned in last week's report, our nowcast’s last data point was observed in July, which is before the latest escalation in trade tensions. We could see a move down in some of the indicators used as input in our nowcast model in the coming month. 4      Friedman, the 1976 Nobel Laureate in Economics, noted monetary policy operates with long and varying lags, which makes it difficult to be precise as to when its effects will be noticed in the macroeconomy. Please see Milton Friedman’s article, “The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 69, No. 5 (Oct., 1961), pp. 447-466. 5      To date, OPEC and non-OPEC producers have had no apparent trouble replacing lost Iranian and Venezuelan barrels taken off the market as a result of U.S. sanctions. This indicates spare capacity remains sufficient to meet short-term supply disruptions and unplanned outages. Please see U.S. removed almost 2.7 million barrels of Iranian oil from market - Pompeo, published by uk.reuters.com August 20, 2019. 6      The process of drilling and completing wells produces a normal inventory of uncompleted wells, because of the time lag between the moment wells are drilled and the time they are completed. The development of multi-well pad drilling in U.S. shales structurally increased the time lag between drilling and completion to ~ 5 months. This implies a normal level of DUC inventory that corresponds to ~ 5 - 6 months’ worth of drilling activity. We define any DUC above our estimate of normal as an excess DUC well. On average, completion accounts for ~ 65% of the total well costs. 7      The Big Five shale basins are the Permian; the Eagle Ford; Niobrara; the Bakken, and the Anadarko. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
While price levels have been hammered lower by trade policy uncertainty and global growth fears, the Brent and WTI forward curves remain backwardated. This normally indicates market tightness – i.e., refiners are willing to pay more for prompt-delivered crude…
Chart II-1Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Unlike 2015 when steel, iron ore and coal prices collapsed, in the current downturn they have so far held up reasonably well. They have begun falling only recently (Chart II-1). Even though we do not anticipate a 2015-type Armageddon in steel, iron ore and coal prices, they will deflate further due to supply outpacing demand in China. For both steel and coal, the pace of “de-capacity” reforms in China has diminished considerably, with declining shutdowns of inefficient capacity and rising advanced capacity, as we argued in a couple of reports last year.  This has led to a faster growth in supply, while demand has been dwindling with weak economic growth. Lower steel, iron ore and coal prices will harm Chinese and global producers along with their respective countries.1 Steel And Iron Ore First, both crude steel and steel products output will likely grow at a pace of 5-7% (Chart II-2). As the 2016-2020 steel de-capacity target (150 million tons capacity reduction) was already achieved by the end of 2018, the scale of further shutdowns will be limited. In addition, collapsing graphite electrode prices reflect an increased supply of this material. This along with more availability of scrap steel will facilitate the continuing expansion of cleaner technology (electric furnace (EF)) steel capacity and their output in China. The newly added EF steel capacity is planned at about 21 million tons in 2019 (representing 1.8% of official aggregate steel production capacity), slightly lower than the 25 million tons in 2018. Second, we expect steel products demand to grow at 3-5%, slightly weaker than output. Construction accounts for about 55% of Chinese final steel demand, with about 35% stemming from the property market and 20% from infrastructure. The automotive sector contributes about 10% of final Chinese steel demand. All of these end markets are weak and do not yet show signs of revival (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Steel Production In China Chart II-3No Recovery In Chinese Demand   Concerning iron ore price, we expect more downside than in steel. Supply disruptions among Brazilian and Australian producers were the main cause for the significant rally in iron ore prices this year. Evidence is that these producers have already resumed their output recovery. Current iron ore prices are still well above marginal production costs of major global iron ore producers. Besides, ongoing large currency depreciation in commodity producing countries will push down their marginal production costs in U.S. dollars terms. This will encourage further supply.  As China has increased its use of scrap steel in its crude steel production, the country’s iron ore demand has not grown much. In fact, imports of this raw material have contracted (Chart II-4) As scrap steel prices are currently very low relative to the price of imported iron ore (Chart II-5), steel producers in China will continue to use scrap steel instead of iron ore. Chart II-4China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking Chart II-5Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore   Coal Chart II-6Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Chinese coal prices will also be under downward pressure. First, coal output growth will likely slow but will still stand at 2-4% down from a current 6% level (Chart II-6, top panel). The government has set a production goal of 3900 million tons for 2020. Given last year’s output of 3680 million tons, this implies only a 2.9% annual growth rate this year and the next. Second, the demand for both thermal coal and coking coal will likely weaken. They account for 80% and 20% of total coal demand, respectively. About 60% of Chinese coal is used to generate thermal power. As the country continues to promote the use of clean energy, thermal power output growth will likely slow further. Increasing the nation’s reliance on clean energy is an imperative strategic objective for Beijing. Given that thermal coal still accounts for a whopping 70% of electricity production, China will maintain its effort on reducing coal in its energy mix (Chart II-6, bottom panel). In the same vein, the government will continue to replace coal with natural gas in home heating. Finally, Chinese coal import volumes are likely to decline as the nation is increasingly relying on its domestic sources. In particular, the strategic Menghua railway construction will be completed in October. It will be used to transport the commodity from large producers in the north to the coal-deficit provinces in the south. This will reduce the nation’s coal imports, as the transportation cost of shipping domestic coal to the southern power plants will become more competitive than imported coal. Macro And Investment Implications First, companies and economies producing these commodities will face deflationary pressures. These include - but are not limited to - Indonesia, Australia, Brazil and South Africa, as well as steel producers around the world. Second, the RMB depreciation will allow China to gain further market share in the global steel market. In fact, China’s share of global steel output has been rising (Chart II-7, top panel). The bottom panel of Chart II-7 shows that steel production in the world excluding China have actually come to a grinding halt at a time when mainland producers have enjoyed high output growth. Global steel stocks have broken down and global mining equities are heading into a breakdown (Chart II-8). Chart II-7China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market Chart II-8Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks   Finally, we remain bearish on commodities and other global growth sensitive currencies. In particular, we continue shorting the following basket of EM currencies against the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR and KRW. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      This is BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy view and is different from BCA’s house view.
Highlights The current global trade downtrend has primarily been due to a contraction in Chinese imports. The latter reflects weakness in China's domestic demand in general and capital spending in particular. The current global manufacturing and trade downturns will prove to be drawn out. Several important markets have already experienced technical breakdowns, and a few others are at risk of doing so. EM domestic bonds and EM credit markets could be the last shoe to drop in this EM selloff. Steel, iron ore and coal prices, will all deflate further due to supply outpacing demand in China. Feature In our report last week, we argued that the odds of a liquidation phase in EM are growing. This week’s report continues exploring this theme, offering additional rationale and evidence of a pending breakdown in EM. Trade Tariffs: The Wrong Focus? The media and many investors seem to be solely focused on the impact of U.S. tariffs against imports from China. Yet these tariffs have not been the primary cause of the ongoing global manufacturing and trade recessions. It appears that the headlines and many investors are looking at individual trees and ignoring the forest. Chart I-1Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Global trade contraction and China’s growth slump are not solely due to the trade tariffs imposed by the U.S. but rather stem from weakening domestic demand in China. Chart I-1 illustrates that Chinese aggregate exports are faring much better than imports. If the imposed tariffs were the main culprit behind both weakness in Chinese growth and global trade, mainland exports would have registered a far-greater hit by now than imports. However, they have not yet done so. This entails that U.S. tariffs have so far not had a substantial impact on Chinese and global manufacturing. The key point we would like to emphasize is that the current global trade downtrend has primarily been due to a contraction in Chinese imports. In turn, the accelerating decline in mainland imports is a reflection of relapsing domestic demand in China. The latter has been instigated by lethargic money/credit impulses owing to the government’s 2017-2018 deleveraging campaign and its reluctance to undertake an economy-wide irrigation type stimulus. What’s more, the recent RMB depreciation will likely intensify the Chinese import contraction already underway, as the same amount of yuan will buy less goods priced in U.S. dollars than before (Chart I-2). Given the majority of goods and commodities procured by mainland companies are priced in dollars, suppliers will receive fewer dollars, and their revenue derived from sales to and in China will continue to shrink (Chart I-3). Chart I-2RMB Depreciation Will Depress China's Purchases From Rest Of The World Chart I-3China Is In A Recession From Perspective Of Its Suppliers   We do not deny that the trade war has prompted a deterioration in sentiment among Chinese businesses and consumers as well as multinational companies, which in turn has dented both their spending and global trade. We do not see these issues reversing anytime soon. If the imposed tariffs were the main culprit behind both weakness in Chinese growth and global trade, mainland exports would have registered a far-greater hit by now than imports. Chart I-4EM EPS Are Contracting Even though U.S. President Donald Trump is flip-flopping on tariffs and their implementation, barring a major deal between the U.S. and China, business sentiment worldwide will not improve on a dime. In brief, delaying some import tariffs from September to December is unlikely to promote an imminent global trade recovery. The confrontation between the U.S. and China is profoundly not about trade: it is a geopolitical confrontation for global hegemony that will last years if not decades. Businesses in China and CEOs of multinational companies realize this, and they will not change their investment plans on Trump’s latest tweet delaying some tariffs. For now, we do not detect signs of an impending growth turnaround in China’s domestic demand and global trade. Therefore, China-related risk assets, commodities and global cyclicals are at risk of breaking down. Economic Rationale The global trade and manufacturing recession will linger for a while longer, and a recovery is not in the offing: The business cycle in EM/China continues to downshift. Consistently, corporate earnings are already or soon will be contracting in EM, China and the rest of emerging Asia (Chart I-4). EM corporate EPS contraction is broad-based (Chart I-5A and I-5B). The recent declines in oil and base metals prices entail earnings shrinkage for energy and materials companies (Chart I-5B, bottom two panels). Chart I-5AEM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based Chart I-5BEM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based   China’s monetary and fiscal stimulus has not yet been sufficient to revive capital spending in general and construction activity in particular (Chart I-6). Chinese household spending is also exhibiting little signs of recovery (Chart I-7). Chart I-6China: Building Construction Is Dwindling Chart I-7China: Consumer Spending Has Not Yet Recovered   Domestic demand continues to deteriorate, not only in China but also in other emerging economies, as we documented in our July 25 report. In EM ex-China, imports of capital goods and auto sales are contracting (Chart I-8). High-frequency freight data point to ongoing weakness in shipments in both the U.S. and China (Chart I-9). Chart I-8EM Ex-China: Domestic Demand Is Depressed Bottom Line: The current global manufacturing and trade downturns will prove to be drawn out, and investors should be wary of betting on an impending recovery. This is BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy view and is different from BCA’s house view which is anticipating an imminent global business cycle recovery. Chart I-9Global Freight Does Not Signal Recovery   Breakdown Watch Financial market segments sensitive to the global business cycle have been splintering at the edges. These cracks appear to be proliferating to the center and will render considerable damage to aggregate equity indexes. EM corporate EPS contraction is broad-based. We explained our rationale behind using long-term moving averages to identify significant breakouts and breakdowns in last week’s report. We also highlighted the numerous breakdowns that have already transpired. Today, we supplement the list: EM equity relative performance versus DM has fallen below its previous lows (Chart I-10, top panel). Crucially, emerging Asian stocks’ relative performance versus DM has clearly breached its 2015-2016 lows (Chart I-10, bottom panel). The KOSPI and Chinese H-share indexes have broken below their three-year moving averages (Chart I-11, top two panels). Chart I-10EM Equities Relative Performance Has Broken Down Chinese bank stocks in particular have been responsible for dragging China’s H-share index lower (Chart I-11, bottom panel). In addition, Chinese small-cap stocks dropped below their December low, as have copper prices and our Risk-On versus Safe-Haven currency ratio1 (Chart I-12). Finally, German chemical and industrial share prices such as BASF, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp have decisively broken down (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Breakdowns In Korea And China...   Chart I-12...In Commodities Space As Well Chart I-13German Manufacturing Stocks Are In Free Fall   This implies that Germany’s manufacturing slowdown is not limited to the auto sector but rather is pervasive. Besides, these companies are greatly exposed to China/EM demand, and their share prices simply reflect the ongoing slump in China/EM capital spending. There are several other market signals that are at a critical technical juncture, and their move lower will confirm our downbeat view on global growth and cyclical markets. In particular: The global stocks-to-U.S. Treasurys ratio has dropped to a critical technical line (Chart I-14, top panel). Failure to hold this defense line would signal considerable downside in global cyclical assets. Similarly, the Chinese stock-to-bond ratio – calculated using total returns of both the MSCI China All-Share index and domestic government bonds – has plunged. The path of least resistance for this ratio might be to the downside (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Given China is the epicenter of the global slowdown, this ratio is of vital importance. The lack of recovery in this ratio signifies lingering downside growth risks. Finally, global cyclical sectors’ relative performance versus defensive ones is sitting on its three-year moving average (Chart I-15). A move lower will qualify as a major breakdown and confirm the absence of a global manufacturing and trade recovery. Chart I-14Global Stocks-To-Bonds Ratio: Sitting On Edge Chart I-15Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives: At A Critical Juncture   Bottom Line: Several important markets have already experienced technical breakdowns, and a few others are at risk of doing so. All in all, these provide us with confidence in maintaining our downbeat stance on EM risk assets and currencies. EM Bonds: The Last Shoe To Drop? Although EM share prices are back to their December lows, EM local currency and U.S. dollar bonds have done well this year, benefiting from the indiscriminate global bond market rally. However, there are limits to how far and for how long the performance of EM domestic and U.S. dollar bonds can diverge from EM stocks, currencies and commodities prices (Chart I-16). EM domestic bond yields have plunged close to the 2013 lows they touched prior to the Federal Reserve’s ‘Taper Tantrum’ selloff (Chart I-17, top panel). That said, on a total return basis in common currency terms, the GBI EM domestic bond index has not outperformed U.S. Treasurys, as shown in the bottom panel of Chart I-17. Chart I-16Which Way These Gaps Will Close? Chart I-17EM Domestic Bonds: Poor Risk-Reward Profile   Looking forward, EM exchange rates remain critical to the returns of this asset class. With the GBI EM local currency bond index’s yield spread over five-year U.S. Treasurys at about 400 basis points, EM currencies have very little room to depreciate before foreign investors begin experiencing losses. We believe that further RMB depreciation, commodities prices deflation and EM exports contraction all bode ill for EM exchange rates. Consequently, we expect EM local bonds to underperform U.S. Treasurys of similar duration over the next several months. German chemical and industrial share prices such as BASF, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp have decisively broken down. Finally, the euro has begun rapid appreciation versus EM currencies. This will erode EM local bonds’ returns to European investors and trigger a period of outflows. Within this asset class, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, Central Europe, Chile, Korea and Thailand, while we continue to recommend underweight positions in the Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Peru within an EM local currency bond portfolio. As to EM credit space (hard currency bonds), these markets are overbought, and investors positioning is heavy. EM currency depreciation and lower commodities prices typically herald widening spreads. Argentina has a large weight in the EM credit indexes, and the crash in Argentine markets could be a trigger for outflows from this asset class. Technically speaking, there are already several negative signposts. The excess returns on EM sovereign and corporate bonds seem to have rolled over, having failed to surpass their early 2018 highs (Chart I-18). Besides, EM sovereign CDS spreads are breaking out (Chart I-19, top panel). Chart I-18EM Credit Markets Is Toppy Chart I-19EM Credit Space Is Entering Selloff   Finally, there are noticeable cracks in the emerging Asian corporate credit market. The price index of China’s high-yield property bonds – that account for a very large portion not only of the Chinese but also the emerging Asian corporate bond universes – has petered out at an important technical resistance level (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Further, the relative total return of emerging Asia’s investment-grade corporate bonds against their high-yield peers is correlated with Asia corporate spreads, and presently points to wider spreads (Chart I-20). The rationale is that periods when safer parts of the credit universe outperform the riskier ones are usually associated with widening credit spreads. China’s property market remains vulnerable as the central authorities in Beijing have not provided much housing-related stimulus in the current downtrend. Furthermore, companies in this space are overleveraged, generate poor cash flow and have limited access to credit. The euro has begun rapid appreciation versus EM currencies. This will erode EM local bonds’ returns to European investors and trigger a period of outflows. Overall, Chinese property developers will affect the EM credit space in two ways. First, their credit spreads will likely continue to shoot up, generating investor anxiety and outflows from this asset class. Second, reduced investment by debt-laden and cash-strapped property developers will inflict pain on industrial and materials companies in Asia and beyond. We discuss the outlook for steel, iron ore and coal, which are very exposed to Chinese construction, in the section below. Bottom Line: For asset allocators, we recommend underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit versus U.S. investment grade, a strategy we have been advocating since August 16, 2017 (Chart I-21). For dedicated portfolios, the list of our overweights and underweights, as always, is presented at the end of the report (page 21). Chart I-20Emerging Asian Corporate Spreads Will Widen Chart I-21Favor U.S. Investment Grade Versus EM Overall Credit   As for EM domestic bonds, we continue to recommend betting on yield declines in select countries without taking on currency risk. These include Korea, Chile, Mexico and Russia. We will warm up to this asset class in general when we alter our negative EM currency view. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Chinese Steel, Iron Ore And Coal Markets: Renewed Deflation Chart II-1Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Unlike 2015 when steel, iron ore and coal prices collapsed, in the current downturn they have so far held up reasonably well. They have begun falling only recently (Chart II-1). Even though we do not anticipate a 2015-type Armageddon in steel, iron ore and coal prices, they will deflate further due to supply outpacing demand in China. For both steel and coal, the pace of “de-capacity” reforms in China has diminished considerably, with declining shutdowns of inefficient capacity and rising advanced capacity, as we argued in a couple of reports last year.  This has led to a faster growth in supply, while demand has been dwindling with weak economic growth. Lower steel, iron ore and coal prices will harm Chinese and global producers along with their respective countries.2 Steel And Iron Ore First, both crude steel and steel products output will likely grow at a pace of 5-7% (Chart II-2). As the 2016-2020 steel de-capacity target (150 million tons capacity reduction) was already achieved by the end of 2018, the scale of further shutdowns will be limited. In addition, collapsing graphite electrode prices reflect an increased supply of this material. This along with more availability of scrap steel will facilitate the continuing expansion of cleaner technology (electric furnace (EF)) steel capacity and their output in China. The newly added EF steel capacity is planned at about 21 million tons in 2019 (representing 1.8% of official aggregate steel production capacity), slightly lower than the 25 million tons in 2018. Second, we expect steel products demand to grow at 3-5%, slightly weaker than output. Construction accounts for about 55% of Chinese final steel demand, with about 35% stemming from the property market and 20% from infrastructure. The automotive sector contributes about 10% of final Chinese steel demand. All of these end markets are weak and do not yet show signs of revival (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Steel Production In China Chart II-3No Recovery In Chinese Demand   Concerning iron ore price, we expect more downside than in steel. Supply disruptions among Brazilian and Australian producers were the main cause for the significant rally in iron ore prices this year. Evidence is that these producers have already resumed their output recovery. Current iron ore prices are still well above marginal production costs of major global iron ore producers. Besides, ongoing large currency depreciation in commodity producing countries will push down their marginal production costs in U.S. dollars terms. This will encourage further supply.  As China has increased its use of scrap steel in its crude steel production, the country’s iron ore demand has not grown much. In fact, imports of this raw material have contracted (Chart II-4) As scrap steel prices are currently very low relative to the price of imported iron ore (Chart II-5), steel producers in China will continue to use scrap steel instead of iron ore. Chart II-4China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking Chart II-5Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore   Coal Chart II-6Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Chinese coal prices will also be under downward pressure. First, coal output growth will likely slow but will still stand at 2-4% down from a current 6% level (Chart II-6, top panel). The government has set a production goal of 3900 million tons for 2020. Given last year’s output of 3680 million tons, this implies only a 2.9% annual growth rate this year and the next. Second, the demand for both thermal coal and coking coal will likely weaken. They account for 80% and 20% of total coal demand, respectively. About 60% of Chinese coal is used to generate thermal power. As the country continues to promote the use of clean energy, thermal power output growth will likely slow further. Increasing the nation’s reliance on clean energy is an imperative strategic objective for Beijing. Given that thermal coal still accounts for a whopping 70% of electricity production, China will maintain its effort on reducing coal in its energy mix (Chart II-6, bottom panel). In the same vein, the government will continue to replace coal with natural gas in home heating. Finally, Chinese coal import volumes are likely to decline as the nation is increasingly relying on its domestic sources. In particular, the strategic Menghua railway construction will be completed in October. It will be used to transport the commodity from large producers in the north to the coal-deficit provinces in the south. This will reduce the nation’s coal imports, as the transportation cost of shipping domestic coal to the southern power plants will become more competitive than imported coal. Macro And Investment Implications First, companies and economies producing these commodities will face deflationary pressures. These include - but are not limited to - Indonesia, Australia, Brazil and South Africa, as well as steel producers around the world. Second, the RMB depreciation will allow China to gain further market share in the global steel market. In fact, China’s share of global steel output has been rising (Chart II-7, top panel). The bottom panel of Chart II-7 shows that steel production in the world excluding China have actually come to a grinding halt at a time when mainland producers have enjoyed high output growth. Global steel stocks have broken down and global mining equities are heading into a breakdown (Chart II-8). Chart II-7China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market Chart II-8Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks   Finally, we remain bearish on commodities and other global growth sensitive currencies. In particular, we continue shorting the following basket of EM currencies against the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR and KRW. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1          Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP & ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to average of JPY & CHF total returns. 2      This is BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy view and is different from BCA’s house view. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Fixed-Income And Credit Recommendations
How important is the potential thawing of the Sino-U.S. trade war to oil markets?  On a scale of 1 – 10, this goes up to 11 (Chart of the Week). Brent’s and WTI’s one-day rally of ~ 5% on Tuesday, followed by a 4.5% sell-off on Wednesday, is a testimony to the importance these markets place on the evolution of the Sino-U.S. trade war, and anything that suggests a change in the status quo.1 The rally was an almost-immediate response to the announcement the U.S. would delay until December 15 the imposition of tariffs on ~ $160 billion of $300 billion of goods that become effective September 1. The tariffs were announced August 1 by President Trump. Wednesday's sell-off was triggered by weak global economic data and building U.S. crude stocks. It also was a wake-up that nothing substantive was advanced to resolve the Sino-U.S. trade war. The rally indicates pent-up demand awaits a resolution of trade uncertainties. In this report, we introduce our new proprietary Nowcast model of EM commodity demand.2 We also look at the overall macro backdrop for commodity markets, which is largely supportive, with most of the world’s central banks moving to a recession-fighting mode.3   In addition, we could get a deal between the U.S. and China following the resumption of tariff negotiations in Washington come September, which allows some resumption of trade. We have little doubt markets would welcome such an outcome. However, we remain skeptical of the deeper issues separating the two sides – e.g., IP protection, an end to forced technology transfers – will be resolved in the near future. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Saudi Aramco held its first-ever investor call this week, disclosing it earned close to $50 billion in 1H19. Earnings were down ~ 12% in the period, according to the company, partly as a result of a 4% decline in realized prices for crude oil vs. 1H18. This is a relatively small decline vs. the 7% and 12% 1H19 y/y declines in Brent and WTI, over the same period, reflecting the Kingdom’s premier position as the largest exporter of medium and heavy crudes in the world. These streams are in short supply relative to the light-sweet crude being produced in the U.S. shales. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper also got a lift from renewed trade-talk hopes, rising 2.3% on the back of the unexpected trade news from the Trump administration earlier in the week. Many of the products exempted by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative are electronics – cell phones, laptop computers, video game consoles, and computer monitors – which will marginally support copper prices, and Christmas retail sales. Copper held on to most of its gains Wednesday. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold and silver sold off following the U.S. trade representative’s announcement, but recovered later in the trading day, and Wednesday. Gold continues to trade above $1,500/oz, while silver trades over $17/oz. We remain long both metals as portfolio hedges against policy risk. Ags/Softs: Underweight. With the exception of corn, grains and beans mostly rallied on the trade news, with soybeans ending the day up 1.2% Tuesday. Corn traded down 6.1% Monday and a further 5.0% Tuesday, following the USDA’s WASDE report, which indicated acres planted would fall by less than analysts estimated going into the Monday morning release of the department’s supply-demand estimates, according to agriculture.com. Feature Commodity markets are noted for their ability to cover a year’s worth of price movement in a matter of days. The past two weeks in the oil markets have not disappointed, as the Chart of the Week attests. Despite the volatility introduced by exogenous policy shocks, we remain constructive on crude oil. The underlying resilience in the growth of EM economies, which drives commodity demand generally, is apparent in various gauges we’ve developed to track something close to current conditions in markets. In addition, as noted above, fiscal and monetary policy globally remains supportive of commodity demand. While growth may not match the halcyon pre-GFC days shown in the top panel of Chart 2, growth still is strong and, importantly for commodities, is coming off a higher base level.4 Broader indicators – e.g., global and country-specific LEIs – support our expectation for improved EM growth, which, ultimately is what drives commodity demand. We are compelled to note considerable uncertainty around the prospects for global growth – particularly for EM GDP growth – exists in markets and within BCA Research. Our Special Report on these divergent views elegantly presents these differences, and we highly recommend it to our readers. Fundamentally, we align with the bulls, who argue global growth can be expected to rebound this year, for reasons we cite above. The bears in BCA, which include our Emerging Market strategists, have a different view to ours, particularly on EM domestic demand. The bears expect a further deterioration in global economic activity or a delayed recovery. As a result, they expect additional downside in stocks and risk assets – including commodities – and outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar.5  EM GDP Resilience Our BCA EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast model points to an underlying recovery in oil demand, despite the continued policy-induced volatility in prices (Chart 2). This model is a weighted index of our Global Commodity Factor (GCF), Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models (Chart 3).6  Chart 2BCA EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Suggests Oil Demand Rebounding Chart 3BCA EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Components   Chart 4Global Growth Poised To Resume The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different commodity prices traded globally. The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data and Chinese industrial activity statistics, which can be updated monthly. Lastly, the EMIV model is driven by EM import volumes reported with a two-month lag by the CPB in the Netherlands, which can be updated to current time using FX rates of economies highly sensitive to EM trade. Our BCA EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast is strongly correlated with y/y growth in nominal EM GDP and non-OECD oil consumption, as Chart 2 shows. This highlights the strong connection between EM GDP growth and oil demand growth. This also is critical to price formation – indeed,  our Nowcast is highly correlated with crude oil prices, which explains why EM GDP is our principal demand variable in forecasting oil prices (Chart 2, bottom panel). Other, broader indicators – e.g., global and country-specific LEIs – support our expectation for improved EM growth, which, ultimately is what drives commodity demand (Chart 4). However, these can change as local economic activity changes.7 One important thing to note, however: While China’s nominal import volumes are weaker y/y, its volume of crude oil imports (Chart 4, top panel) are growing. Partly this is the result of strong refinery margins; but there is a risk too much product will be produced, which could saturate Asian refined-product markets.8 Bullish Crude Oil Term Structure While price levels have been hammered lower by trade policy uncertainty and weekly pivots in direction, the Brent and WTI forward curves remain backwardated (Chart 5). This normally indicates market tightness – i.e., refiners are willing to pay more for prompt-delivered crude than for deferred delivery. Crude oil markets continue to be buffeted by policy shocks – particularly in regard to the Sino-U.S. trade war. Chart 5Crude Oil Forwards Remain Backwardated This is consistent with our reading of the underlying supply-demand dynamics of the crude market. It is important to note the backwardation in these forward curves weakened almost every month since the beginning of the year. This suggests demand slowed – the market is tight, but closer to balanced, and not in as large a supply deficit as it was expected earlier in the year. We expect OPEC 2.0 to continue to maintain production discipline, and for demand to turn up in 2H19.9 In addition, we continue to expect strong demand in 2H19 and in 2020 as we’ve noted above, given the supportive fiscal and monetary backdrop globally. Bottom Line: Crude oil markets continue to be buffeted by policy shocks – particularly in regard to the Sino-U.S. trade war. Despite these shocks, demand for crude is holding up, although it still is lower than what we expected previously – along with the EIA and IEA, we’ve been revising demand lower in our last three monthly Global Oil Balance assessments. Demand is now supported by monetary and fiscal policy easing globally. However, escalation in trade tensions could bring demand down again. Indeed, an escalation in Sino-U.S. trade tensions could push this to a lower equilibrium. It is important to point out our Nowcast is a coincident indicator, and that most of our series' last data points were observed in July, which is before the latest escalation in trade tensions. We could see a move down in some of our indicators next month. To be clear, we are not sounding an all-clear on the trade front, although we are seeing signs of recovery from relatively high base levels of EM GDP activity.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see USTR Announces Next Steps on Proposed 10 Percent Tariff on Imports from China, issued by the Office of the United States Trade Representative August 13, 2019. The USTR’s press release appears to be something of an olive branch, noting, “On May 17, 2019, USTR published a list of products imported from China that would be potentially subject to an additional 10 percent tariff.  This new tariff will go into effect on September 1 as announced by President Trump on August 1.”  This suggests the opening of a possible compromise ahead of trade talks set to resume next month. 2      As discussed below, our BCA EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast combines three of our proprietary models gauging EM commodity demand.  Please see Getting Long Silver, To Hedge Exogenous Shocks, published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy August 8, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    Our prior remains it is highly unlikely the PBOC or the Fed will let their economies weaken substantially without deploying additional monetary stimulus.  In addition, we believe Chinese policymakers will hold off on major stimulus in the next couple of months to get thru National Day, which will allow them to deploy further fiscal stimulus after October and next year, in the event the trade war and currency war worsens.  We also draw attention to the fact that, globally, central banks all are acting as if they’re already fighting a recession – last week, three central banks announced further easing (India, New Zealand, Thailand), following similar action by the Fed and Asian central banks (South Korea and Indonesia).  A full-blown trade war between the U.S. and China would be tumultuous, but, after the dust settles, global supply chains would have to be rebuilt or augmented, as trading blocs centered on the respective antagonists regrouped and reorganized their trading relationships and supply lines. 4     Using World Bank quarterly GDP figures, we calculate Emerging and Developing markets’ GDP will be up close to 74% between 2007 and 2019, averaging $7.24 trillion in constant 2010 USD this year. 5      We urge our clients to read this Special Report, What Goes On Between Those Walls? BCA’s Diverging Views In The Open, published by BCA Research July 19, 2019. 6       The nowcasting index uses the weighted average of each component’s coefficient of determination that falls out of a regression against EM GDP growth. Our analysis indicates EM oil demand is driven by EM GDP growth.  For additional information on the separate gauges, please see Getting Long Silver, To Hedge Exogenous Shocks, Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy August 8 and May 9, 2019.  Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      We note Indian economic activity is slowing due to strains on the shadow-banking system in that country.  This bears watching, as India is the second largest EM economy we track in our oil-demand estimates.  Please see India's passenger vehicle sales drop at steepest pace in nearly two decades, published by in.reuters.com August 13, 2019. Auto industry representatives are pushing for government support to address the sales downturn.  S&P’s BSE index measuring the health of Indian banks is down 23% ytd.  8     Please see UPDATE 1-China's July crude oil imports rise as refiners ramp up output published by reuters.com August 8, 2019. 9      We are updating our supply-demand balances and prices forecasts for Brent and WTI next week. For our most recent forecast, please see Weak 1H19 Oil Demand Data Fuels Market Uncertainty published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy July 18, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades