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Highlights Treasury yields have slumped since early March, helping to push down the dollar. Slower U.S. growth in the first quarter of the year, weak inflation readings, uncertainty on tax reform, the prospect of a government shutdown, and rising political risks in Europe have all contributed to the Treasury rally. Looking out, U.S. growth should accelerate while growth abroad will stay reasonably firm. The market is pricing in only 34 basis points in rate hikes over the next 12 months. This seems too low to us. Go short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract. Feature What Explains The Treasury Rally? Global bond yields have swooned since early March. The 10-year Treasury yield fell to as low as 2.18% this week, down from a closing high of 2.62% on March 13th. A number of fundamental factors have contributed to the Treasury rally: Recent "hard data" on the U.S. growth picture has been somewhat disappointing. The Atlanta Fed's model suggests that real GDP expanded by only 0.5% in Q1 (Chart 1). So far this month, hard data on payrolls, housing starts, and auto sales have fallen short of consensus expectations. Credit growth has also decelerated sharply (Chart 2). The prospect of tax cuts this year have faded. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told the Financial Times on Monday that getting a tax bill through Congress by August was "highly aggressive to not realistic at this point."1 Meanwhile, worries about a government shutdown - possibly coming as early as next week - have escalated. Recent inflation readings have been on the soft side. Core CPI dropped by 0.12% month-over-month in March, the first outright decline since 2010. China's growth outlook remains cloudy. Government officials warned this week that recent measures undertaken to cool the housing sector will begin to bite later this month.2 Concerns that the French election will feature a runoff between the "Alt-Right" candidate, Marine Le Pen, and the "Ctrl-Left" candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, have intensified (Chart 3). Euroskeptic parties also continue to make gains in Italy (Chart 4). Chart 1A Disappointing First Quarter Chart 2Credit Growth Slowdown While none of the things listed above can be easily dismissed, the key question for fixed-income investors is whether bond yields are already adequately discounting these risks. Keep in mind that markets are pricing in only 34 basis points in Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months (Chart 5). This is substantially less than the median "dot" in the Summary of Economic Projections, which implies three more hikes between now and next April. Chart 3French Elections: A Many-Way Race? Chart 4Euroskepticism Is On The Rise In Italy Chart 5Markets Are Too Sanguine About The Fed's Rate Hike Intentions U.S. Economy Still In Reasonably Good Shape Our view on rates for the next year is closer to the Fed's than the market's. Yes, the "hard data" on U.S. growth has been lackluster. However, as we discussed last week, the hard data may be biased down by seasonal adjustment problems.3 Moreover, the hard data tend to lag the soft data, and the latter remain reasonably perky. Reflecting the strength of the soft data, our newly-released Beige Book Monitor points to an improving growth picture across the Fed's 12 districts (Chart 6). Worries about plunging credit growth are also overstated. While the increase in interest rates since last year has likely curbed credit demand, some of the recent deceleration in business lending appears to be due to the improving financial health of energy companies. Higher profits have permitted these firms to pay back old bank loans, while also enabling them to finance new capital expenditures using internally-generated funds. In addition, the rising appetite for corporate debt has also allowed more companies to access the bond market. According to Bloomberg, the U.S. leveraged-loan market saw $434 billion in issuance in Q1, the highest level on record (Chart 7). Chart 6Fed Districts See Things Improving Chart 7More And More Leveraged Loans Looking out, business lending should pick up. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey indicates that banks stopped tightening lending standards to businesses in Q1. This should help boost the supply of credit over the coming months (Chart 8). Meanwhile, the recovery in the manufacturing sector will bolster credit demand. Chart 9 shows that an increase in the ISM manufacturing index leads business lending by 6-to-12 months. Chart 8Bank Lending Standards: Stable For Businesses, Tighter For Consumers Chart 9Manufacturing ISM Points To A Pick Up In Business Lending As far as household credit is concerned, higher interest rates and tighter lending standards for consumer loans (especially auto loans) are both headwinds. Nevertheless, overall household leverage has fallen back to 2003 levels and the household debt-service ratio is at multi-decade lows (Chart 10). And while delinquencies have edged higher, they are still well below their historic average (Chart 11). Chart 10Lower Household Leverage Chart 11Despite Slight Uptick, Delinquency Rates Remain Well Contained A reasonably solid growth picture should help lift inflation over the coming months. Chart 12 shows that inflation tends to accelerate once unemployment falls below its full employment level. The U.S. headline unemployment rate currently stands at 4.5%, below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. Other measures of labor market slack also point to an economy that is quickly running out of surplus labor (Chart 13). As such, it is not surprising that the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker continues to trend higher, as has the NFIB's labor compensation gauge and most other measures of labor compensation (Chart 14). Chart 12The Phillips Curve Appears To Be Non-Linear Chart 13Disappearing Labor Market Slack Chart 14U.S.: Broad Measures Pointing To Rising Wage Pressures Wage Growth Trending Higher U.S. Political Risks Will Diminish... The political risks which have pushed down Treasury yields since early March should also subside over the coming weeks. Concerns that the Trump administration will be unable to pass tax cuts are overblown. Unlike in the case of health care, there is virtual unanimity among Republicans in favor of cutting taxes.4 Congressional hearings on tax reform are scheduled to begin next week. We expect Trump to move quickly to get a deal done. He needs a political victory and this is his best shot. We are also not especially worried about the prospect of a government shutdown. Congress needs to agree on a bill to extend government funding beyond April 28 when congressional appropriations are set to expire. So far, Republican leaders are pursuing a sensible strategy of keeping controversial items - including funding for a border wall and cuts to Obamacare subsidies - out of the bill in the hopes of attracting enough Democrat support to avoid a filibuster in the Senate. Without the inclusion of these contentious measures, it would be politically difficult for the Democrats to take any action that triggers a government shutdown, as they would be blamed for the outcome. ...As Will Risks In Europe... Chart 15The French Are Not Euroskeptic In the U.K., Prime Minister Theresa May's decision to hold a snap election reduces the risk of a "hard Brexit." The current slim 17-seat majority that the Conservatives hold in Parliament has made May highly dependent on a small band of hardline Tories. These uncompromising MPs would rather see negotiations break down than acquiesce to any of the EU's demands, including that the U.K. pay the remaining £60 billion portion of its contribution to the EU's 2014-20 budget. If the Conservative Party is able to increase its control over Parliament - as current opinion polls suggest is likely - May will have greater flexibility in reaching an agreement with Brussels and will face less of a risk that Parliament shoots down the final deal. Worries about the outcome of French elections should also diminish. Opinion polls continue to signal that Emmanuel Macron will make it to the second round of the presidential contest. If that happens, he would be a shoo-in to win against either Marine Le Pen or the far-left challenger Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Even in the unlikely event that Le Pen or Mélenchon ends up prevailing, their ability to push through their agendas would be severely constrained. Neither candidate is likely to secure a majority in the National Assembly when legislative elections are held in June. French presidents have a lot of leeway over foreign affairs, but need the support of parliament to change taxes, government spending, regulations, or most other aspects of domestic policy.5 Also, keep in mind that France's place in the EU is enshrined in the French constitution. Any modifications to the constitution would require that a referendum be called. Considering that French voters are highly pessimistic of their future outside of the EU, it would require a seismic shift in voter preferences for France to end up following the U.K.'s example (Chart 15). ...And In China Lastly, the risks of a trade war between the U.S. and China have eased following President Trump's summit with President Xi. This should help stem Chinese capital outflows. On the domestic front, the government's efforts to clamp down on property speculation will cool the economy. However, as our China team has pointed out, this may not be such a bad thing, given that recent activity has been strong and parts of the economy are showing signs of overheating. Investment Conclusions Chart 16Bet On The Fed The reflation trade will eventually fizzle out, but our sense is that this will be more of a story for late next year than for 2017. For now, underlying global growth is still strong and the sort of imbalances that usually precipitate recessions are not severe enough. If there is going to be one big surprise in the U.S. fixed-income market this year, it is that the Fed sticks to its guns and keeps raising rates at a pace of roughly once per quarter. With that in mind, we recommend that clients go short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract as a tactical trade (Chart 16). A rebound in U.S. rate expectations will lead to a widening in interest rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners. This will produce a stronger dollar. The yen is likely to suffer the most in a rising rate environment, given the Bank of Japan's policy of keeping the 10-year JGB yield pinned close to zero. On the equity side, we continue to recommend a modestly overweight position in global stocks. Investors should favor Japan and the euro area over the U.S. in local-currency terms. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Sam Fleming, Demetri Savastopulo, and Shawn Donnan, "Interview With Steven Mnuchin: Transcript," Financial Times, Monday April 17, 2017. 2 Li Xiang, "Real Estate Investment Likely To Slow Down," Chinadaily.com.cn, April 18, 2017. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Talk Is Cheap: EUR/USD Is Heading Towards Parity," dated April 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Questions On Europe," dated March 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Commercial oil inventories finished the first quarter with a minimal draw. This was largely due to a surge in production and sales by Gulf producers and Russia at the end of 2016 and earlier this year, as well as slightly lower demand. Despite reports floating storage and more opaque inventories - e.g., Caribbean storage - drew significantly, OPEC 2.0 remains well short of its goal to get visible oil stocks down to five-year-average levels by year-end. If drawing storage down to more normal levels remains OPEC 2.0's goal, then the production-cutting deal negotiated by Saudi Arabia and Russia will have to be extended when OPEC meets next month. We expect this to happen. Even so, risk-reversals in options markets indicate investors and hedgers are willing to pay more for downside put protection than upside call exposure. We recommend fading this bias, and buying out-of-the-money calls and selling out-of-the-money puts using Dec/17 options. Energy: Overweight. We closed our long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI position last Thursday with a 583.3% gain. We remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, which is up 242.1%. Our long GSCI position is down 1.3%. We are recommending a long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl call vs. a short Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl put, which we will put on at tonight's close. This is driven by our analysis of the need to extend OPEC 2.0's production-cutting deal into the end of the year to reduce OECD commercial oil inventories. We continue to expect Brent and WTI prices to trade on either side of $60/bbl by year-end. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper traded lower this week, on the back of news Freeport McMoRan is poised to resume exports from its Indonesian facilities. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold traded higher, but remains range-bound. Our long volatility gold options play is up 2.9%. We will leave this trade on as a hedge, going into the French elections. Ags/Softs: Underweight: Despite heavy rains, grains (excluding rice) and beans were well offered this past week. Feature The surge in oil production and sales by Gulf producers and Russia at the end of last year and earlier this year, along with a reported slowing of demand - down ~ 100k b/d from our March estimates - combined to leave estimated supply and demand roughly balanced for 2017Q1 (Chart of the Week). These dynamics left visible OECD inventories above year-end 2016 levels (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekVisible Inventories Barely Budge In 2017Q1, ##br##As Supply Surge And Lower Demand Collide Chart 2Visible Inventories Will Reach 5-year Average##br## If OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Are Extended Less-visible floating storage, along with oil stockpiles in China and Japan, drew more than 70mm barrels (bbls), according to Morgan Stanley, while Caribbean storage fell by some 10 - 20mm bbls during the last quarter.1 In addition, major trading companies are actively looking for buyers to take unwanted physical storage capacity off their hands. Nonetheless, OPEC 2.0 - the states banded together under the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to remove some 1.8mm b/d of oil production from the market in 2017H1 - remains well short of its goal to get visible inventories down to five-year-average levels. Failure to reduce inventories almost surely requires producers allied in the production-cutting deal to extend their pact into 2017H2. We think they will, given the oft-stated desire of the Saudi and Russian energy ministers, Khalid Al-Falih and Alexander Novak, to see inventories continue to draw. Their desire was re-stated recently at a hastily called news conference in Houston last month.2 This message has remained constant from other OPEC leaders as well. The Logic Of Extending OPEC 2.0's Deal To 2017H2 Reducing the global storage overhang is imperative for the OPEC 2.0 coalition. It is the driving force behind the unlikely alliance KSA and Russia forged at the end of last year. Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015 - 16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector.3 After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue. Entering the second quarter of this year, KSA and its allies continue to over-deliver on their pledges to cut ~ 1.2mm b/d of production. Markets are expecting Russian cuts to increase to ~ 300k b/d, in line with their pledges under the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting Agreement negotiated last year (Chart 3 and Chart 4). Chart 3KSA Continues To Over-Deliver; ##br##Russian Cuts Expected to Increase Chart 4KSA Allies Continue to Deliver;##br## Iran And Iraq Continue To Under-Deliver However, if the OPEC 2.0 production deal to remove ~ 1.8mm b/d of production is not extended beyond its end-June deadline, storage levels will remain uncomfortably high for the KSA - Russia alliance. By our reckoning, allowing the deal to expire without extending it would only reduce visible OECD inventories by a little over 170mm barrels by year-end. This can be inferred from our assessment of balances (Chart of the Week). Not extending OPEC 2.0's deal leaves OECD commercial oil inventories close to 130mm barrels above the targeted 300mm-barrel drawdown required to return OECD inventories to more normal (i.e., five-year average) levels. With U.S. shale production coming on strong, this could be precarious for OPEC 2.0 next year. Extending the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting deal to the end of 2017H2 will reduce visible commercial inventories in the OECD by slightly more than the 300mm barrels being targeted (Chart 5). This should put storage levels back at more normal, five-year average levels, and give OPEC 2.0 some breathing room to craft a strategy to contain U.S. shale production going forward.4 For this reason, extending the 1.8mm b/d production cuts to end-2017 is almost a foregone conclusion for us, particularly as KSA needs to clean up the market, so to speak, ahead of the IPO of Saudi Aramco next year. Among other potential investors with a keen interest in the potential $100 billion floatation is a state-led consortium of Chinese banks and oil companies.5 We Think Upside Risks Dominate Oil Markets The logic of extending the OPEC 2.0 deal is compelling. But the market does not share this view. Oil speculators have significantly reduced their net long position as a percent of total open interest in the dominant crude-oil futures markets, WTI and Brent (Chart 6). This, after the specs were chastened following their huge increase in upside exposure earlier this year. Chart 5Extending OPEC 2.0'S Production Deal Reduces ##br##OECD Oil Stocks By 300mm+ Barrels By End-2017 Chart 6Specs Are Retreating From Oil We can also see a lack of conviction in oil options markets. Option markets provide a useful gauge of fear and greed called "skew," which is nothing more than the difference between implied option volatilities (IOV) for puts and calls.6 When the skew favors puts - shown by a negative number in the risk-reversal shown in Chart 7 - markets are signaling they value downside protection more than upside exposure, and vice versa when call IOVs exceed put IOVs. Chart 7Option Skew Favors Downside Puts ##br##Over Upside Call Exposure Given the logic we laid out above, we are recommending investors fade the put skew in the options markets. Specifically, we are getting long out-of-the-money Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls and selling out-of-the-money Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts against them, to express our view. We will be doing so at the close of trading today, and will report our strikes and net premium in next week's publication.7 Bottom Line: We expect the OPEC 2.0 production deal to be extended when OPEC meets on May 25 in Vienna. This will significantly raise the odds OECD commercial oil stocks will be drawn down to more normal levels, giving the OPEC 2.0 petro-states more breathing room to develop a strategy to regain a modicum of control over prices. This is critical for KSA, which still is on track to IPO Saudi Aramco next year. Given our expectation, we are recommending investors buy out-of-the-money Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls and sell out-of-the-money Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts. This allows investors to fade what appears to be a consensus - given put skews and spec positioning - and capitalize on what we believe is an all-but-certain extension of the OPEC 2.0 production deal. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by December, and to average $55/bbl to 2020. As has been mentioned often, our level of conviction in that forecast is low beyond 2018, given the large capex cuts for projects that would have been funded between 2015 and 2020 absent the 2014 - 2016 oil-price collapse. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "OPEC's Barkindo Sees Progress in Oil Cuts as Stockpiles Drop," and "Oil Traders Drain Hidden Caribbean Hoards as OPEC Cuts Bite," published by Bloomberg.com on April 2 and 3, 2017, respectively. 2 Please see "Saudi Arabia, Russia Offer United Front on Oil Supply Cuts," published by Bloomberg.com on March 7, 2017, and "Saudi energy minister says oil market fundamentals improving," published by reuters.com on the same day. 3 BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy examined this in our feature article published on September 8, 2016, entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 We discuss this at length in "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report April 6 and March 30, 2017, Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," published by Reuters.com on April 19, 2017. We speculated on just such an event in "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and its Geopolitical Strategy January 14, 2016. We noted, "While inviting Western investors and energy firms to take a stake in Aramco would make obvious sense for Saudi Arabia, we would speculate that the real target for the IPO will be Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China has overtaken the U.S. as the main importer of crude from Saudi Arabia ... but it continues to free-ride on Washington's security guarantees and commitments in the region. By giving China a stake in Saudi Arabia's energy infrastructure, Riyadh would force Beijing to start caring about what happens in the region." 6 "Implied option volatility" is market jargon for the standard deviation of expected returns. It is used as an input for option-pricing models. The "implied," as it's known colloquially in markets, solves an option-pricing model like Fischer Black's, once the option's premium is discovered via trading. Market participants can determine whether puts (i.e., the right, but not the obligation, to sell) are more highly valued than calls (the right to buy) in relative terms by differencing the implied volatilities of puts and calls that are equidistant from at-the-money options. This is referred to as the options' "skew." We use the IOVs for puts and calls that both change by $0.25/bbl for every $1.00/bbl move in oil futures (i.e., 25-delta puts and calls) to calculate skew. Please see Fischer Black's seminal article, "The Pricing of Commodity Contracts," in the Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, (1976), pp. 167-79. 7 We employed a similar strategy in March 2016 - getting long Dec/16 Brent $50/bbl calls vs. selling $25/bbl puts, which registered a 103.5% gain between March 3 and April 14, following a rally in Brent prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights The July 2016 to January 2017 doubling of the global bond yield was possibly the sharpest ever 6-month spike in modern economic history. Its toll is a global growth pause - evidenced by the post February 2017 synchronized retracement of bond yields, commodity prices, steel production, and cyclical equity prices. Until bank credit flows stabilize, stay cyclically overweight bonds - especially T-bonds... ...and stay underweight bank equities, but overweight real estate equities. Fade any knee-jerk move in the CAC40 after the French Presidential Election first round result. Feature Since February, world bond yields have edged down in synchronized fashion; commodity prices - including the global bellwether Dr. Copper - have fallen together (Chart I-2); global steel production has suffered an abrupt reversal; and cyclical sectors in the stock market have rolled over (Chart I-3). Chart of the WeekSharpest Proportionate Change In Bond Yields... Ever? Chart I-2Compelling Evidence Of A Global Growth Pause: ##br##Bond Yields And Commodity Prices Have Rolled Over Chart I-3Steel Production And Cyclical Equity##br## Sectors Have Rolled Over Too For us, the synchronized decline in the four separate indicators - bond yields, commodity prices, steel production, and cyclical equity prices - can mean only one thing: a global growth pause. The Largest Proportionate Increase In Bond Yields Ever... To make sense of what is happening, let's ask a simple but crucial question. If interest rates go up, from say 1% to 2%, is it the absolute increase - of 1% - that matters more for the economy, or is it the proportionate increase - a doubling - that matters more? We ask this simple question because the 0.75% absolute increase in the global government bond yield through July 2016 to January 2017 amounted to one of the sharpest rises in the past decade (Chart I-4). But when it comes to the proportionate increase, the doubling of the global yield in 6 months was the sharpest spike in at least 70 years, and quite possibly the sharpest 6-month spike ever in economic history! (Chart I-5 and Chart of the Week). Chart I-4A Sharp Absolute Spike In ##br##Global Bond Yields... Chart I-5...But An Extremely Sharp ##br##Proportionate Spike Anybody with a mortgage knows that it is not the absolute change in the mortgage rate that matters for your budget; it is the proportionate change that matters. A 1% rise in rates hurts much less when rates start high than when they start low. One way to see this is that to note that a 1% spike in U.K. bond yields over six months was extremely common in the 1970s and 80s - when the level of yields was already high. But outside this era of high nominal numbers, a 1% yield spike over six months is almost unheard of (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6A 1% Rise In Bond Yields Over Six Months Was Very Common In The 70s And 80s Chart I-7But Today A 1% Rise Equates To An Extreme Proportionate Increase Some people might counter that interest payments are just a transfer from borrowers to savers. For every borrower who complains at a doubling of his interest outlays, there is a mirror-image saver who rejoices at a doubling of his interest income. But understand that higher interest rates do not just redistribute spending power from borrowers to savers. The much more important economic effect almost always comes from the impact on bank lending. Fractional reserve banking allows banks to create money out of thin air. When a bank issues a new loan, the borrower's spending power instantaneously goes up, but there is no equal and opposite saver whose spending power goes down. ...Takes Its Toll On Bank Lending Our thesis is that the change in bank lending depends on the proportionate change in long-term interest rates. If long-term rates rise by, say, 1% then a certain proportion of investment projects will suddenly become unprofitable. Firms (and households) would stop borrowing for such projects, and the drop in borrowing would equal the proportion of projects impacted. It should be clear that the distribution of investment project returns is much wider in an era of high nominal numbers when interest rates are, say, 10% than in an era of low nominal numbers when interest rates are, say, 1%. So the impact on borrowing of a 1% rise in rates is much less when rates are high - as they were in the 1970s and 80s - than when rates are low - as they are today. In other words, the impact depends on the proportionate increase in interest rates. And this explains why a 1% spike in U.K. bond yields over six months was extremely common in the 1970s and 80s, but is almost unheard of now. Some commentators point out that working in the other direction are so-called "animal spirits" - increased optimism about the future and the returns that all investment projects will generate. But as we explained in Credit Slumps While Animal Spirits Soar, Why? 1 the greatest proportionate 6-month increase in global bond yields for at least 70 years has understandably trumped these putative animal spirits. Bank credit flows have slumped. In practice, changes in borrowing can take 3-6 months to impact spending. For this reason, we tend to monitor the change in the credit flow in the last 6 months versus the preceding 6 months. Recently, this global 6-month credit impulse has headed sharply lower (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Headed Sharply Lower Putting this all together, the sharpest spike in global bond yields in living memory has taken an understandable toll on bank credit creation and the global 6-month credit impulse. In turn, the slump in the credit impulse is now weighing on the global growth mini-cycle - as signaled by the synchronized retracement in bond yields, commodity prices, steel production and cyclical equity performance. The evidence compellingly suggests that we are two months into a global growth pause. But mini down-cycles tend to last, on average, about six months. So for the time being, and at least until bank credit flows stabilize, own bonds - especially T-bonds - and avoid cyclical equity exposure. Furthermore, as we presciently argued in our February 16 report The Contrarian Case For Bonds, when bond yields decline, bank equities are losers and real estate equities are winners. These arguments still hold. A Brief Comment On Upcoming Elections: France And The U.K. Ahead of the French Presidential Election first round on April 23, we would like to remind readers of two facts. First, the CAC40, like most mainstream European equity indexes, is a collection of large multinational companies. As such, it is not a play on French economics or politics. Indeed, compared to other European indexes, the CAC40 underexposure to banks actually makes it one of the more defensive European equity indexes. Given the loose connection between the index and domestic economics and politics, fade any knee-jerk move that happens after the first round result: sell any relative rally; buy any relative dip. Second, euro area sovereign credit spreads must ultimately relate to the relative competitiveness of their national economies, as this is what would determine the size and direction of redenomination were the euro to break up. In this regard, there is now no difference in competitiveness between France and Spain (Chart I-9), yet Bonos still yield more than OATs. So for long-term investors, it is still right to be long Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-9France And Spain Have Converged On Competitiveness We will wait until the more important second round vote on May 7 to present a more detailed assessment of the impact of French politics on the European economic and investment landscape. Lastly, a quick comment on the likely snap U.K. General Election on June 8: the conventional wisdom states that U.K. politics will drive the type of Brexit; and the type of Brexit will drive the long-term destiny of the U.K. economy. But for us, the causality runs the other way round. The U.K. economy will drive the type of Brexit - the weaker the economy gets, the softer that Brexit will get (and vice-versa); and the type of Brexit will drive the long-term destiny of U.K. politics. Therefore, for us, the General Election does not appear to be a game changer - unless it delivers a shock result. I am on holiday right now, so I will cover this topic in more depth on my return next week. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Published on March 30, 207 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model There are no new trades this week, but all three open positions are now in profit, having produced classic liquidity-triggered trend reversals. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Highlights Expanded data availability and increasingly systemized investment processes have powered a surge of interest in factor attribution among academics, quants and ordinary investors. Momentum has long been recognized as a proven factor. Kenneth French's database shows that a zero-net-exposure strategy of shorting the stocks with the weakest momentum to fund the purchase of their strong-momentum counterparts yielded over 10% per year from 1939-1999. Since the crisis, however, momentum has lost its magic touch. As in the 1930s, Fama and French's long/short momentum strategy has stumbled following a crash. The long leg of the strategy's outperformance record remains intact, though, just as it has across the 90 years covered by the Fama-French database. In this Special Report, we examine some hypotheses for why momentum has lost some of its edge and consider the conditions under which it might fully regain it. We then consider the current crop of smart-beta momentum funds based on the features we would like to have in a momentum fund once the factor fully recovers its footing. Feature Regular readers will recognize this installment of our smart-beta ETF series as a departure. Unlike the Value and Dividend Special Reports, this one does not employ the relevant metrics from our Equity Trading Strategy's ("ETS") proprietary multi-factor model to evaluate single-factor ETFs. The momentum factor's post-crisis stumbles may indicate that the classic momentum yardsticks are in need of realignment, and the modest pool of smart-beta momentum ETFs can be winnowed without them. We instead use this Special Report to explore the momentum factor: its empirical history, potential explanations for its long success and current slump, and its interaction with the fed funds rate cycle. We will examine the links between the big picture and factor performance next month, with a particular focus on monetary policy settings. Careful study of the relationship between macro variables and equity factors may shed some light on the most opportune cycle phases for seeking particular factor exposures. It will also illustrate how individual factors could interact within a portfolio to boost risk-adjusted returns. The series' primary goal is still to provide our clients with a solid grounding in the basics of factor investing and the smart-beta process. It is our hope that the addition of macro-level guidance to help recognize the best cyclical backdrops for taking on factor exposures will enhance the micro-level guidance to help choose the optimal ETFs for gaining exposure to a particular factor. The Momentum Paradox Traders are a famously empirical breed with little use for fancy theories. Their common-sense mantras that survive long enough to pass into general use are based on steady observation and hard-won experience. Two of our favorites sum up the duality at the heart of momentum investing: The trend is your friend. Trees don't grow to the sky. Trader intuition is valid: academic research has repeatedly confirmed the existence and persistence of momentum. Alas, it doesn't last forever. The challenge at the heart of developing a working momentum strategy is determining how long the typical trend runs before it reverses. Investors have much longer timeframes than traders, but they would do well to heed traders' warning about overstaying one's welcome when they plot their course: Bulls make money; bears make money; pigs get slaughtered. A History Of Momentum In Five Chapters The Golden Age, 1939-1999 Momentum shot the lights out for 60 years. From late 1939, when it finally threw off the lingering effects of the Great Depression, until the peak of the tech bubble in early 2000, a simple zero-net-exposure strategy developed by Fama and French (please see Box 1 for the parameters of the strategies referenced herein) generated a whopping 10.4% compound annualized return (Chart 1, Phase 3). The strategy's consistency may have been even more remarkable. The 60-year golden age included just one bear event (a peak-to-trough decline of at least 20%),1 and a mild and brief one at that.2 Data from Jegadeesh and Titman, co-authors of the seminal momentum-focused paper,3 corroborate Fama and French's findings. Tracking the results of 32 separate strategies from 1965 to 1989 (Box 1), Jegadeesh and Titman definitively established that the momentum factor generates statistically significant excess returns. The 6-month, 6-month strategy on which they focused (shorting the last six months' biggest laggards to fund the purchase of its biggest outperformers, and holding the portfolio for six months) generated an average compound annual return of 12%.4 The Roaring Twenties, 1927-1932 The Fama-French momentum strategy blasted out of the gate with compound annual returns of 29% through June 1932 (Chart 1, Phase 1). Full year returns were at least 20% every year from 1927 through 1931, as momentum was impervious to the 1929 Crash. This chapter illustrates that stock-price momentum is hardly a new phenomenon, and that momentum strategies, which often zig when the broad market zags, can contribute welcome diversification to a portfolio. The First Failure, 1932-1939 The party came to an abrupt end in July and August 1932, when the strategy lost three-quarters of its value in two months (Chart 1, Phase 2). As the financial crisis would reiterate seven decades later, momentum crashes can be vicious and swift. This one was followed by several years of listless performance, capped by a brutal coda. The aftershocks can be much worse for momentum than the earthquake itself, and it only hit bottom after September 1939's 30% decline. The Wobbly Years, 2000-2008 The end of the tech bubble marked a watershed for momentum. Although the strategy generated hearty positive returns given its zero net exposure (4.7% CAGR from March 2000 through November 2008), its return profile became uncharacteristically volatile (Chart 1, Phase 4). Momentum bear markets became a regular feature, with three separate declines of 23% to 32% occurring between February 2000 and August 2004. Academic research into the momentum factor became a veritable cottage industry after its discovery in the early 1990s, making this the first chapter to unfold against a backdrop of wide investor awareness of its existence. The Crisis and Its Aftermath, 2008-2017... The spring of 2009 witnessed the second great momentum crash, with the strategy losing 58% from its November 2008 peak to its September 2009 trough, sustaining a 49% loss over just the three months of March (-11.5%), April (-34.6%) and May (-12.3%) (Chart 1, Phase 5). The strategy has crept back to post a 3% compound annualized return since the trough, but it has recovered just 18% of its peak-to-trough decline in the ensuing seven-and-a-half years,5 and it just entered a bear market for the first time since the '08-'09 crash. Highlighting its extended slump, the strategy now trades at a level it first reached in December 1999. What Makes Momentum Tick? As with all factors, the jury is out on just what drives momentum's performance. Some researchers have argued for a risk-based explanation, but we do not see momentum as especially risky, relative to other strategies6 (Table 1), and therefore have more sympathy for the behavioral hypotheses advanced by the academic consensus. These hypotheses coalesce around the sense that markets systematically underreact to information, perhaps because of the time required to fully digest it or because the disposition effect lures investors into parting with winning positions too quickly and holding onto losing positions too long. As the built-in lags between portfolio formation and activation described in Box 1 recognize, however, the medium-term underreaction reliably follows an immediate overreaction. Table 1Market-Neutral Momentum Versus The Broad Market BOX 1 Momentum Strategy Parameters We refer to two distinct approaches to building momentum portfolios in this Special Report: Fama and French's single long/short strategy and Jegadeesh and Titman's matrix of sixteen long/short strategies. Both approaches attempt to exploit the observed tendency for outperforming stocks to continue to outperform and underperforming stocks to continue to underperform. Each strategy starts by ordering stocks based on their trailing returns over a stated period (the lookback period) to determine their relative price momentum. Each strategy creates its portfolio after a short lag following the lookback period to evade relative performance's tendency to mean revert over the short term. Each strategy maintains its portfolio for a stated holding period before reshuffling the deck. Fama and French's lookback period is the first eleven months of the preceding twelve-month period, with the twelfth month serving as the lag between portfolio definition and formation. Fama and French form their market-neutral portfolio by buying the top three relative-performance deciles and shorting the bottom three. The portfolio is reconstituted monthly and its sample period extends from 1927 to today. By using four different lookback and holding periods (three, six, nine and twelve months), Jegadeesh and Titman formed sixteen different market-neutral portfolios with a one-week lag. Jegadeesh and Titman's portfolios buy the top, and short the bottom, deciles. They offer a more concentrated take on a long/short momentum strategy than Fama and French's. The near-term overreaction/medium-term underreaction response is additionally complicated by the tendency for relative performance to mean revert over long periods. Trees don't grow to the sky. Over time, investors may unduly extrapolate past surprises into the future, or mean-reversion may impede continued growth surprises via adaptive expectations and/or the law of large numbers. Whatever the cause, our Equity Trading Strategy model navigates the oscillating reaction gauntlet by betting on mean reversion over one- and 36-month timeframes and on momentum over a twelve-month timeframe. Why Isn't Momentum Working Like It Used To? Advances in communications and computing technology may have compressed the timeframes over which the overreaction/underreaction/overreaction pattern unfolds. Information travels faster in a wired world, and enhanced computing power allows it to be digested more rapidly after it's disseminated. Once digested, investors are able to act upon it in milliseconds. Reduced frictions in terms of commission costs and bid-ask spreads (as stocks have gone from being quoted in eighths, to sixteenths to pennies) have made it feasible to capture profits that couldn't be captured before. Specific to the post-crisis landscape, momentum portfolios are particularly susceptible to the whipsawing that can occur in the wake of once-in-a-generation bear markets. Momentum strategies tend to weather the initial storms quite well by steadily migrating to lower-beta stocks and shunning higher-beta ones. Eventually, however, their lopsided beta profiles turn momentum portfolios into sitting ducks for the violent snapback rallies that originate among the most down-and-out stocks. Those rallies inflicted heavy casualties after the Depression, when the bottom three deciles surged by 200% in July and August 1932, versus the top three deciles' 60%, and after the crisis, when the bottom three deciles nearly doubled in March, April and May 2009 while the top three deciles gained just 15%. The gory particulars behind momentum's biggest setbacks illustrate why investors shouldn't write the factor off just yet. Its crashes - and the reason it takes so long to recover from them - are a function of runaway shorts. Table 2 shows the Fama-French momentum portfolio separated into its long (Up Basket) and short (Down Basket) components. As one would expect in a market that's trended steadily higher ever since the Depression, the shorts are volatile and lag both the overall market and the long basket. Jegadeesh and Titman's more concentrated portfolios (confined to stocks in the top and bottom deciles) have struggled mightily in the out-of-sample period, losing money across the board (Chart 2). Table 2Full Speed Ahead For Long-Only Momentum Strategies Chart 2The Last Shall Be First (After A Crash, Anyway) But the real news is in the Up Basket's performance, which has pounded the overall market on both a nominal and a risk-adjusted basis for the entirety of the pre-crisis history and has fought it to a risk-adjusted draw since the crisis (while winning again on a nominal basis). Momentum still works, even now. We like to test factor performance on a market-neutral basis to gauge how well it stratifies a population from top to bottom, but we are sensitive to the fact that the majority of our clients are long-only investors. It is gratifying to see the factor's favored stocks consistently outperforming by a wide margin because it means alpha-generation is available to all investors. The potential excess returns to overweighting the winners and under- or zero-weighting the losers may be limited relative to overweighting the winners and shorting the losers, but they are excess returns nonetheless. We are unwilling to conclude that a factor as persistently robust as momentum is dead. It is simply hibernating, in our view, until the rising tide of extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy stops lifting all boats. ZIRP (and NIRP) have helped enable a bull market that has muffled the distinctions between individual stocks and other risk assets. That's unhelpful for relative value strategies, which feed on wide spreads, but the inflection in Fed policy may soon help mo-mo recover its missing mojo. Momentum And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle We have found that the fed funds rate cycle can provide an excellent guide to broad equity movements. As our U.S. Investment Strategy service has shown, the level of the fed funds rate has exerted a powerful pull on equities, with all of the S&P 500's price returns over 55 years having accumulated in periods when policy settings were accommodative.7 As Table 3 shows, Fama and French's momentum strategy turns that rule on its head, posting its strongest returns during periods when policy settings are restrictive. Table 3Fama French Momentum Portfolio Returns During Rate Cycle Phases From August 1961 The results are not as counterintuitive as they seem when one recalls that they are generated by long/short portfolios. As noted above, accommodative policy could act to narrow the gap between winners and losers. Restrictive policy may have the opposite effect, as reduced liquidity and higher yields make borrowing more fraught and debt service more onerous. It's only when the tide goes out that markets see who was swimming naked. Isolating Fama and French's Up- and Down-Basket returns supports this reading. Average return spreads between the long and short positions widen when policy is restrictive and narrow when it's accommodative (Tables 4A and 4B). Restrictive policy brings internal stresses to the fore, even to the point of inducing recessions (all of the recessions since the inception of our equilibrium fed funds rate model have begun in Phase II or Phase III of the policy cycle). Table 4AFama French Down-Basket Returns During Rate Cycle Phases From August 1961 Table 4BFama French Up-Basket Returns During Rate Cycle Phases From August 1961 The empirical evidence suggesting that restrictive policy settings are more conducive to momentum factor outperformance than accommodative ones carries tactical and strategic implications. The tactical implication suggests there's no rush to assume standalone momentum exposure even though it has distinguished itself over time. The strategic implication suggests that momentum exposure, in conjunction with other factor exposures, could help to reduce portfolio volatility for any given level of expected returns, or increase expected returns for any given level of volatility. The Smart-Beta Momentum Menu The same considerations involved in setting momentum model parameters bear on the choice of smart-beta momentum ETFs (Table 5). What is the optimal lookback period, the optimal rebalancing frequency and portfolio-formation lag? What tweaks might help avoid drawdowns and boost risk-adjusted performance over time? The sponsors of the ETFs tend to keep their lookback-period cards close to the vest, but six- and twelve-month lookback periods seem to be the standard. Lag periods are also treated like competitive secrets, except at the major index providers, where one- and two-month lags are the norm. Table 5The Current Universe Of U.S. Equity-Focused Smart-Beta Momentum ETFs The funds distinguish themselves more clearly in their rebalancing frequencies. Quarterly rebalancings are the standard, but MTUM, ONEO and SPMO, based on benchmarks from established index families, roost at the more patient semi-annual end of the continuum. EEH has the shortest attention span, pursuing its sector rotation strategy with daily rebalancing, and fund-of-funds DWTR rebalances monthly. We note that EEH is an ETN representing an obligation of a Swedish bank and that, all else equal, we prefer ETFs since they carry no credit risk. QMOM recently shifted its registration from Active to Passive, along with three other Alpha Architect funds. Alpha Architect is a quant shop run by a Finance PhD and we have noticed that its funds tend to cluster at the top of our ETS model rankings. It would appear that its portfolio construction models share several factors with the ETS model, and we will be keeping an eye on its funds' performance. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President Global ETF Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com Philippe Morissette, Associate Vice President Equity Trading Strategy philippem@bcaresearch.com 1 Based on a manual review of the data using month-end closing prices. 2 The strategy lost 20.4% from December 1980 through August 1981 at the beginning of the Volcker bear market. 3 Jegadeesh, Narasimhan and Titman, Sheridan, "Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, Volume 48, Issue 1 (March 1993), p.70. 4 Ibid, p. 89. 5 Through the end of February. 6 Asness, Clifford S. and Frazzini, Andrea and Israel, Ronen and Moskowitz, Tobias J., "Fact, Fiction and Momentum Investing," Journal of Portfolio Management, Fall 2014 (40th Anniversary Issue); Fama-Miller Working Paper. Asness et al demonstrate that momentum's risk-adjusted returns have outpaced those of more widely celebrated factors and the overall market. 7 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," published December 23, 2013, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Highlights GFIS Portfolio: Our GFIS model fixed income portfolio has essentially matched the benchmark in the six months since inception. Our strategic below-benchmark duration stance has given up much of the strong Q4/2016 excess return performance over the past couple of months as bond yields have drifted lower. Corporate bonds contributed positively to performance, particularly after our upgrade of U.S. Investment Grade and High-Yield in late January. Upsizing Positions: The weightings in our model portfolio appear to have been too small versus our benchmark index to generate any meaningful outperformance. This week, we increase our positions for our highest conviction views: staying below-benchmark portfolio duration, underweighting U.S. Treasuries, overweighting U.S. corporate debt and underweighting Italian government debt. Tactical Overlay: Our current Tactical Overlay trades have been very successful over the life of the model bond portfolio, with 9 of 12 positions currently in the money with an average return of 0.45%. We are maintaining these positions for now, even as we alter the model portfolio. Feature Last September, we introduced a new element into our global bond strategy framework - a model portfolio that allows us to track the combined performance of our individual recommendations. The first piece of this process was the introduction of our custom benchmark index that defined our investment universe, which is similar to the Barclays Global Aggregate but with a dedicated allocation to global high-yield corporate debt.1 The next component is presented in this Special Report, where we take an initial look at measuring the performance of our model portfolio. The final element (to be presented in another upcoming report) will be introducing a formal risk management system into our process to help guide the relative sizes of our suggested portfolio tilts. We intend to show the portfolio returns on a quarterly basis going forward, in line with the types of reporting mandates that a typical bond manager might face. However, our recommendations are meant to play out over a more strategic investment horizon of one full year, in line with our proven strength in analyzing medium-term macroeconomic and investment trends. Each individual quarterly report should be interpreted in that context as only a partial reflection of the full expected return from our portfolio if our market calls come to fruition. Overall Portfolio Performance Attribution: Winners & Losers Chart 1GFIS Model Portfolio Performance Our model portfolio has delivered a total return of -0.41% (hedged into U.S. dollars) since inception on September 20, 2016. This slightly underperformed our Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) custom benchmark index by -2bps, but did outperform the Barclays Global Aggregate index that returned -0.85%. In terms of the main drivers of our returns, the government bond portion of our portfolio added +3bps of excess return versus our GFIS benchmark, while the spread product component subtracted -5bps (Chart 1). These are admittedly small numbers, essentially delivering a benchmark return in six months. In terms of our major asset allocation decisions, our below-benchmark overall duration stance served us well in the final quarter of 2016, adding +20bps of excess return during the run-up in global bond yields following the election victory of President Trump in November. After shifting to a neutral posture in early December, however, our decision to cut duration again in late January has hurt the performance of our model portfolio, as global bond yields have since fallen and eliminated much of our gains from duration positioning from Q4/2016. On the other hand, that same choice to lower duration exposure in late January coincided with our decision to raise exposure to U.S. corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) and cut the allocations to U.S. Treasuries and Euro Area investment grade corporates. U.S. corporates have performed relatively well since then, helping pull the excess return from our overall spread product exposure, excluding U.S. Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), into positive territory (Chart 1, bottom panel). Unfortunately, our underweight tilt on U.S. MBS - a sector that represents a hefty 14% of our benchmark index - has acted as a drag on our overall returns from spread product. However, MBS performance has started to lag both U.S. Treasuries and corporates of late, justifying our underweight stance. A more detailed performance attribution is presented in Table 1, which shows the excess returns broken down by the same government bond duration buckets and credit sectors that we regularly present in the model portfolio table in our Weekly Reports. We also show the average deviation from our GFIS benchmark index weightings (our "active" positions) over the period in question to give a sense of the bias of our tilts. Table 1A Detailed Breakdown Of The GFIS Model Performance Within the government bond portion of our model portfolio, there were positive excess return contributions from the U.S. and Japan (Chart 2), largely coming from underweights at the very long end of the yield curves that reflect our bias for curve steepening in those markets. The 10+ year duration buckets in the U.S. and Japan added +8bps and +7bps of excess return, respectively. Also, our underweight position in Italy helped generate a small positive excess return of +3bps. Chart 2GFIS Model Portfolio Performance Attribution By Country Within Government At the same time, our exposures in Europe proved to be an almost equivalent drag on returns, as we maintained an underweight in U.K. Gilts, and overweights in German and French sovereign debt, for a bit too long before the trends in those markets turned late last year (more bullishly for the U.K. and bearishly for core Europe). Within the spread product segment of the portfolio (Chart 3), our steady overweight to U.S. Investment Grade Financials and our large underweight to U.S. Investment Grade industrials late last year (which we reduced substantially in December) helped those segments deliver excess returns of +5bps and +2bps, respectively. Our decision to upgrade High-Yield in late January also added positively to our performance within the Ba-rated and B-rated credit tiers. Emerging market debt, where we have maintained only a neutral weighting, was the largest contributor to absolute returns within our portfolio and our benchmark, adding +30bps to both. Chart 3GFIS Model Portfolio Performance Attribution By Sector Within Spread Product Detailed charts showing the total returns, yields, portfolio weights and excess returns for some of our best and worst performing sectors are presented in the Appendix on page 11. Bottom Line: Our GFIS model fixed income portfolio has essentially matched the benchmark in the six months since inception. Our strategic below-benchmark duration stance has given up much of the strong Q4/2016 excess return performance over the past couple of months as bond yields have drifted lower. Corporate bonds contributed positively to performance, particularly after our upgrade of U.S. Investment Grade and High-Yield in late January. Increasing The Sizes Of Our Highest Conviction Portfolio Recommendations Delivering only a benchmark-like return is hardly the goal we are aiming to achieve with our model portfolio. However, given how much our weightings have, in aggregate, mirrored those of our benchmark index so far, the results should not be a surprise. The average (mean) allocations to government debt and spread product over the six-month life our model portfolio are shown in Chart 4, alongside the average (mean) benchmark weightings. It is clear from that chart that our overall exposures have been far too similar to those of our GFIS benchmark index. In the parlance of portfolio management, we have been taking far too little tracking error versus our benchmark, so far, to generate any meaningful alpha. Or, more simply put, our recommended positions have been too small and, in many cases, have been offsetting each other. Chart 4Bigger Tilts Are Needed In The Model Portfolio The absence of a true risk management system, incorporating sector correlations and volatilities, has clearly been an issue so far. Our initial (and, admittedly, simple) attempt at sizing our recommendations was based on translating our "1 to 5" rankings from our traditional portfolio allocation tables into a factor that would scale up/down the individual country or sector weightings versus our benchmark.2 Clearly, this approach has not created portfolio weightings large enough to move the needle on performance. We will look to complete that final piece of our GFIS model portfolio framework - appropriate trade sizing and risk management - in the next couple of months. This will allow us to more properly size our relative positions going forward while maintaining enough overall deviation from the GFIS benchmark index (i.e. tracking error) to have a chance to generate meaningful outperformance. For now, however, we feel that we can comfortably increase the sizes of our current recommended tilts for our highest conviction views, which we discussed in our most recent Weekly Report.3 We are reducing our overall portfolio duration from the current 6.34 years (-0.64 years versus our GFIS benchmark index duration) to 5.75 years. After the recent decline in bond yields on the back of rising global geopolitical tensions and a modest soft patch of "hard" U.S. economic data, the entry point for reducing duration exposure even further is attractive. We are cutting our allocation to U.S. Treasuries from the current 14.6% (-3% versus the benchmark) to 10%, and placing the proceeds equally into U.S. Investment Grade and High-Yield corporate debt. This is to capitalize on the cyclical uptrend in U.S. growth and corporate profits, and additional Fed rate hikes, which we still see unfolding this year. We are cutting our allocation to Italian government debt from the current 3.5% (-0.8% versus the benchmark) to 1%, and placing the proceeds equally into Germany and Spain. This is to reduce exposure to the weakest link in the Euro Area, particularly as political risks will remain elevated in Italy leading up to the parliamentary elections that are due in 2018. We are maintaining the current sizes of the medium conviction views that we discussed last week - specifically, the overweight stance on Japanese government bonds (a low-beta market in a rising yield environment) and an underweight tilt on U.S. MBS (where valuations are stretched). The new weightings within our portfolio are shown in the model portfolio table on page 10. Bottom Line: The weightings in our model portfolio appear to have been too small versus our benchmark index to generate any meaningful outperformance. This week, we increase our positions for our highest conviction views: staying below-benchmark portfolio duration, underweight U.S. Treasuries, overweight U.S. corporate debt and underweight Italian government debt. Don't Forget About Our Tactical Overlays Our model portfolio is intended to be a reflection of the more medium-term, strategic fixed income investment views that stem from our regular analysis of trends in the global economy, inflation, monetary policy, etc. In other words, the positions in the portfolio are not intended to be changed too frequently. We also have chosen to stick with what we believe are more liquid markets in the portfolio, and without any use of derivatives of leverage to amplify returns beyond what the "fundamentals" suggest. Our recommendations that are shorter-term in nature (i.e. 0-3 months), or that may be in less liquid markets (i.e. New Zealand government bonds or U.S. TIPS), or that involve derivatives (i.e. Japanese CPI swaps or Sweden Overnight Index Swaps) are placed in our "Tactical Overlay Trades" list that appears in every Weekly Report. These recommendations have been performing extremely well since the inception of our model portfolio, as shown in Table 2.4 Table 2GFIS Tactical Overlay Trades Are Doing Well 9 of the current 12 trades are making money, with an average total return of 0.45%. The most successful are the long U.S. TIPS/short U.S. Treasuries trade (+3.4%) and the short 10-year Portugal government bond versus German Bunds trade (+1.0%). While we have not made any attempt to put any position sizes on those trade ideas, in contrast to our model portfolio, it is clear that even a modest allocation to each of these trades would have generated a meaningful positive return "overlay" on top of what was generated by our model portfolio. Bottom Line: Our current Tactical Overlay trades have been very successful over the life of the model bond portfolio, with 9 of 12 positions currently in the money with an average return of 0.45%. We are maintaining these positions for now, even as we alter the model portfolio. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Introducing Our Recommended Global Fixed Income Portfolio", dated September 20, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 For example, a "5 of 5" ranking would generate a portfolio allocation that was 1.75x the benchmark index weight, while a "1 of 5" ranking would apply a 0.5x factor to the index weight. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Song Remains The Same", dated April 11, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please note that in Table 2, the returns on the trades that were initiated before the inception of our model portfolio on September 20th, 2016 are shown from that date and not from the date that the trade was initiated. This is to allow an "apples-to-apples" comparison to our model portfolio performance. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Appendix - Selected Sectors From The GFIS Model Portfolio
Highlights Duration: The recent strength in bond markets appears to be a flight to quality driven by heightened political uncertainty. Underlying economic growth remains solid, and investors should fade the recent moves by adding to duration underweights. Quality Spreads: It might be wise to take advantage of current tight quality spreads to hedge the risk of the corporate interest expense tax deduction being repealed. Credit Curve: There is a substantial spread advantage to extending maturity within an allocation to investment grade corporate bonds. Further, this spread advantage should dissipate as Treasury yields move higher. Feature Political risks dominated the headlines last week, sparking what looks like a textbook flight-to-quality in financial markets. The 10-year Treasury yield broke below its long-standing 2.3% floor to end the week at 2.24%, and the S&P 500 declined by just over 1%. Another telltale sign of a flight-to-quality is that the term structure of implied equity volatility inverted (Chart 1). That is, implied volatility on 1-month S&P 500 index options rose above 3-month implied vol. We know the playbook here. Politically driven risk-off episodes that are unlikely to materially impact economic growth should be faded. This means staying at below-benchmark duration and overweight spread product, while favoring curve steepeners and TIPS breakeven wideners. We don't have to look that far back to identify another politically driven risk off episode. The Brexit vote from early last summer also caused the equity volatility term structure to invert, and drove the 10-year Treasury yield down to 1.37%, well below the fair value dictated by global economic fundamentals. Following the Brexit vote the 10-year Treasury yield was 58 bps expensive according to our 2-factor Treasury model.1 Presently, the 10-year yield appears 30 bps expensive (Chart 2), and much like in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, the deviation from fair value looks to be driven by spiking political uncertainty. Chart 1Inverted Vol Term Structure Chart 210-Year Treasury Yield Fair Value Now, the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index has been above normal levels since Donald Trump's election last November (Chart 2, bottom panel), and as long as the reading from that index is elevated the risk of another flight-to-quality episode in financial markets will remain high. However, spikes in policy uncertainty that do not coincide with economic deterioration have historically tended to mean-revert in relatively short order. We anticipate that Treasury yields will rise as policy uncertainty eases in the months ahead. Chart 3The Fed Is Being Priced Out Coincident with the drop in long-dated Treasury yields, the overnight index swap curve is now priced for only 39 bps of rate hikes between now and the end of the year (Chart 3). That's barely more than one 25 basis point hike! We previously recommended shorting January 2018 Fed Funds Futures on March 21,2 and would advise investors who have not yet entered this trade to do so now from even more attractive levels. We calculate that a short January 2018 Fed Funds Futures trade will return 20 bps (from current levels) in the event that the Fed hikes twice more this year, and 45 bps in the event of three more hikes. In our view, growth will be strong enough to support at least two more rate hikes this year. Bottom Line: The recent strength in bond markets appears to be a flight to quality driven by heightened political uncertainty. Underlying economic growth remains solid, and investors should fade the recent moves by adding to duration underweights. Are Markets Sniffing Out A Slowdown? Of course, bond markets could just be rallying in response to slowing U.S. economic growth. After all, the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow forecast is calling for a measly 0.5% annualized GDP growth in Q1. In stark contrast, the New York Fed's GDP Nowcast is calling for robust growth of 2.6% in Q1 and 2.1% in Q2 (Chart 4). How do we square the two? The answer relates to the ongoing debate between so-called "soft" and "hard" data. The New York Fed model incorporates a great deal more "soft data" than the Atlanta Fed model. In other words, it incorporates a wider swathe of survey data than the Atlanta Fed model, which relies more heavily on actual production and spending statistics. We think it would be unwise to dismiss the more positive economic message being sent by survey data. First, surveys tend to lead actual spending so we should expect some divergence whenever the economy reaches a turning point. Second, "hard data" are often revised after the fact and there are question marks about whether residual seasonality has biased Q1 growth lower during the past few years. The minutes from the March FOMC meeting showed that participants "noted that residual seasonality might have exaggerated the increase" in the PCE price deflator in January and February. The corollary of an unduly strong PCE price deflator is unusually weak real consumer spending. Real consumer spending was indeed weak in January and February, as was the headline retail sales figure for March. However, the weakness in March retail sales was concentrated in gasoline stations and auto sales. The more stable retail sales control group - a measure that excludes autos, gas stations and building materials - ticked higher in March (Chart 5). While the recent decline in auto sales should not be dismissed, it is too soon to call for a broad slowdown in consumer spending. Finally, as was recently noted by our colleagues at BCA's Global Investment Strategy service,3 even with bad weather having been a large drag on employment growth in March, aggregate hours worked still grew 1.5% in Q1 (Chart 6). This means that productivity growth would need to be negative in order to achieve the Atlanta Fed's 0.5% forecast. Given that aggregate hours worked were biased lower due to weather in the first quarter, and that quarterly productivity growth has averaged approximately +0.7% (annualized) since 2010, overall GDP growth forecasts closer to 2% seem more reasonable going forward. Chart 4Soft Data Versus Hard Data Chart 5Weak Auto Sales Are A Concern Chart 6Aggregate Hours Still Robust No Deflation Here GDP growth in the neighborhood of 2% is sufficient to keep measures of core inflation gradually trending higher. Higher inflation, in turn, will eventually translate into increased inflation expectations and higher long-dated Treasury yields. While last week's release showed that core CPI actually contracted in March, we note that this followed two months of extremely strong inflation (Chart 7). Taking a step back, it still appears as though measures of core inflation put in a cyclical bottom in early 2015 (Chart 8). While our CPI diffusion index is still below zero, signaling that inflation is likely to remain soft during the next couple of months, it would be premature to suggest that the gradual uptrend in core inflation has reversed. Chart 7March CPI Is An Anomaly Chart 8Inflation Still Trending Higher One final point relevant to the inflation outlook is that last week President Trump refused to rule out re-appointing Janet Yellen as Fed Chair when her current term expires early next year. If we can take the President at his word, then this potentially removes what was an important tail risk for the inflation outlook and the reflation trade more generally. If Trump were to appoint a staunch hawk as Fed Chair, then a much tighter Fed policy would likely halt the uptrend in core inflation. This would also cause the Treasury curve to bear-flatten and risk assets to sell off. However, an FOMC hewing closer to the status quo would allow inflation to trend higher, prolonging the reflation trade. Bottom Line: We don't see enough evidence to call for a slowdown in economic growth or inflation. Growth in the neighborhood of 2% going forward will be sufficient to send inflation expectations and long-dated nominal yields higher. Corporate Bond Positioning: Credit Rating & Maturity In last week's report we performed an assessment of the corporate credit cycle and concluded that corporate bonds should perform well relative to Treasuries this year, but are at risk next year once inflationary pressures start to bite and the Fed speeds up the pace of tightening.4 This week, we consider the implications of this outlook for positioning across the corporate bond quality and maturity spectrums. Quality Spreads Chart 9Quality Spreads Are Tight Obviously, lower rated corporate bonds offer a spread advantage relative to more highly rated bonds. This spread advantage is usually worth chasing unless the default outlook is worsening and overall corporate spreads are widening. At the moment, the option-adjusted spread (OAS) advantage in the Barclays High-Yield index relative to the Investment Grade index is 274 bps, about 100 bps below its long-run average. Further, Baa-rated investment grade corporate bonds currently offer a spread advantage of 77 bps over Aa-rated bonds, about 20 bps below the long-run average. Even though these quality spreads are somewhat tight by historical standards, the mere fact that the quality spread is positive means there is an advantage to moving down the quality spectrum as long as default risk is benign. For this reason, it is more relevant to consider the additional compensation for moving down in quality relative to our expectations for default losses during the next 12 months.5 In Chart 9 we see that quality spreads are in fact tighter than average, even after adjusting for default loss expectations, although there have also been extended periods when they were even tighter than current levels. Although the risk/reward trade-off for moving down in quality is not all that attractive by historical standards, given our view that corporate spreads will be well behaved this year, we are fairly agnostic about moving down in quality on a 6-12 month investment horizon. There is, however, one additional factor to consider with regards to positioning across the credit quality spectrum. Corporate tax reform, some form of which our Geopolitical strategists still see as having a high probability of being passed before the end of this year,6 will involve some combination of lower tax rates and the repeal of some deductions. One deduction that is very much at risk is that of corporate interest expense. If implemented, it seems likely that corporate interest deductibility would be phased out over time. That is, the interest on outstanding corporate bonds would remain tax deductible, and only the interest on newly issued debt would be excluded from the deduction. While the gradual phase-out would prevent a wave of defaults related to a sudden surge in tax expense, the provision very clearly favors large highly-rated firms relative to small lower-rated firms, whose interest expense makes up a larger proportion of total expenses. Investors with longer time horizons might be wise to take advantage of current tight quality spreads (i.e. move up in quality) to hedge the risk of the corporate interest expense tax deduction being repealed. Credit Curve Considerations Turning to the corporate bond term structure, we see that the OAS advantage in long-maturity investment grade corporate bonds is extremely high relative to history (Chart 10). As we discussed in a 2013 report,7 the two main drivers of the credit OAS curve are differences in duration and expected default losses. A greater difference in duration between the long-maturity and intermediate-maturity investment grade corporate bond indexes leads to a greater OAS advantage in the long-maturity index. Conversely, an increase in perceived default risk causes the OAS curve to flatten, as short-maturity credits are perceived to be at greater risk of default. We find that the majority of the spread advantage in long-dated corporate bonds represents compensation for duration risk. If we look at OAS per unit of duration rather than outright OAS, the credit curve no longer appears steep (Chart 10, panel 2). Digging a little deeper, we see that the difference in duration between the long-maturity and intermediate-maturity indexes has been steadily increasing since 1990. In the early 1990s the increase was at least partially attributable to actual changes in the maturity structure of the indexes themselves (Chart 10, panel 3). However, in recent years the increased duration spread is entirely the result of lower Treasury yields (Chart 10, bottom panel). It follows that if Treasury yields continue to trend lower, then the corporate OAS curve will remain very steep. Higher Treasury yields would reduce the difference in duration between the intermediate and long maturity indexes, causing the OAS curve to flatten. After adjusting for differences in duration, we also need to consider the default outlook. By performing a regression of the difference in OAS per unit of duration between the long-maturity and intermediate-maturity indexes on our measure of expected default losses, we find that the amount of spread per unit of duration at the long-end of the curve looks somewhat attractive given our outlook for default losses (Chart 11). Chart 10OAS Term Structure Is Steep Chart 11Higher Defaults = Flatter OAS Curve Adding it all up, there is a compelling case to be made for favoring long-maturity investment grade corporate bonds relative to short maturities. Not only is the spread advantage substantial on its face, but the OAS curve should flatten if Treasury yields move higher - as we expect they will. The OAS curve also appears too steep relative to our assessment of default risk. Bottom Line: There is a substantial spread advantage to extending maturity within an allocation to investment grade corporate bonds. Further, this spread advantage should dissipate as Treasury yields move higher. Investors should favor long-maturity issues over short-maturity issues within an overweight allocation to investment grade corporate bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Our 2-factor Treasury model is based on Global Manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Talk Is Cheap: EUR/USD Is Heading Toward Parity", dated April 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We calculate expected default losses using the Moody's baseline forecast for the default rate and our own forecast of the recovery rate. 6 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017", dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "On The Term Structure Of Credit Spreads", dated July 10, 2013, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
I am honored to join BCA Research as Senior Vice President of the U.S. Investment Strategy service. I have been researching and writing about the economy and financial markets for more than 30 years. I joined BCA Research from LPL Financial in Boston, MA where I served as the firm’s Chief Economic Strategist. At LPL I helped to manage more than $120 billion in client assets and provided more than 14,000 financial advisors and 700+ financial institutions with insights on asset allocation, global financial markets and economics. Prior to LPL, I served in similar functions at PNC Advisors, Stone & McCarthy Research, Prudential Securities, and the Congressional Budget Office in Washington, DC. I look forward to meeting you and providing quality research in the years to come. John Canally, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy Highlights We are not changing our view on Treasury markets or our stocks over bonds call despite the news that the Fed will begin shrinking its balance sheet later this year. The Fed's action is marginally dollar positive. For the major industrialized economies, the so-called "hard" data are moving in line with the "soft" survey data for the most part. Retail sales and industrial production have accelerated, although "hard" data on business capital spending remains weak. We introduce our Bond Duration checklist this week. These are the key economic and market indicators that we are watching to assess whether we should maintain our current below-benchmark portfolio stance. We continue to favor U.S. equites over bonds in 2017 and recommend keeping duration short of benchmark. Despite outsized performance from high-yield corporate bonds in 2016, investors should favor stocks over high-yield over the coming year. We introduce the BCA Beige Book Monitor this week. This metric provides a quantitative look at the qualitative, or "soft" data in the Fed's Beige Book. The Beige Book is due out Wednesday, April 19. Feature Chart 1Weak Data And More Weighed ##br##On Risk Assets U.S. stocks stumbled and Treasury yields slumped last week with the 10-year Treasury yield hitting a 2017 low. The drop in yields came despite news from the FOMC that the Fed is prepared to shrink its balance sheet later this year, a bit sooner than the market expected. Comments from Fed Chair Yellen - who expressed concern that the Fed's independence is "under threat"- should have jolted the bond market, but didn't. Not yet at least. Geopolitics played a role in the week's market action as well, the main culprits being upcoming French elections, the aftermath of President Trump's missile attack on Syria and ongoing tensions in North Korea. The looming Q1 earnings reporting season weighed on risk assets as well. The dollar ended lower last week. Trump told the Wall Street Journal he prefers a weak dollar. Those comments and the tepid data helped to offset the safe-haven bid generated by the geopolitical events of the week (Chart 1). The "hard" vs "soft" data debate will continue this week and likely for some time thereafter. "Hard" data on housing and manufacturing for March as well as the U.S. leading indicator are due out this week. Of course, the ultimate set of "hard" data is the corporate earnings data. Nearly 70 S&P 500 firms will report Q1 results and provide guidance for Q2 and beyond this week. "Soft" data on the PMI, Philly Fed and Empire State manufacturing sector for April will undoubtedly keep the debate going. Our view is that the hard data will catch up with the upbeat surveys in the U.S. This week we review the key economic indicators for the major advanced economies, which highlight that the global growth acceleration remains on track. We also introduce a Duration Checklist designed to help separate "signal from noise" in the bond market. Most of the items on the Checklist remain bond-bearish. Fed plans to shrink its balance sheet is not particularly negative for bond prices, but it certainly won't be supportive. The main risk to our bond-bearish view remains geopolitics, including the first round voting and results in the French election due on Sunday, April 23. Balance Sheet Bedlam? Maybe Not The release of Minutes from the FOMC's March meeting contained a robust discussion of the Fed's balance sheet. Until recently, most market participants had assumed that the Fed would maintain the size of its balance sheet via reinvesting through at least late 2017/early 2018. The latest FOMC minutes suggest that, assuming the economy continues to track the Fed's forecast, the FOMC will allow its balance sheet to shrink this year. The FOMC will achieve this by ceasing reinvestment of both its MBS and Treasury holdings at the same time. No decision has been made about whether the reinvestments will end all at once or will be phased out over time (tapered). Chart 2 shows that when QE1 ended in 2010 and QE2 ended in 2011, U.S. equities underperformed bonds. It's important to note, however, that underperformance didn't occur in a vacuum. The European debt crisis, the U.S. rating downgrade and debt ceiling debates all weighed on risk assets after QE1 and QE2 ended. Other factors played a role as well, such as weak economic growth and policy uncertainty. Amid QE3, U.S. equities surged in 2013, returning 32.4%, while bonds fell 8.5%. But in late 2013, the Fed announced that purchases would be tapered over the course of 2014. QE3 finally ended in late 2014. Stocks and bonds battled it out over 2014 and 2015, with stocks beating bonds by 3%. Chart 2Reminder What Happened When QE1, QE2 & QE3 Ended Bottom Line: Our view remains that Fed balance sheet run-off won't have a big impact on Treasury yields, although may lead to a widening of MBS spreads. What matters more for Treasury yields than the size of the balance sheet is the expected path of short rates. As for equities, while geopolitical risks are ever-present, the U.S. economy is in far better shape today than it was when QE1, QE2 and QE3 ended. U.S. corporate earnings are pointing higher as well. While we've clearly entered a new part in the Fed cycle, the news on the Fed's balance sheet does not change our view that U.S. stocks will outperform bonds this year. All else equal, the dollar should get a small boost from a shrinking Fed balance sheet, supporting our view that the dollar will rise 10% this year. Overplaying The Soft Data And Underplaying Geopolitics...In 2018 Chart 3Global Pick-Up On Track Traders and investors have been giving up on the global reflation story of late, sending the 10-year Treasury yield down to the bottom end of this year's trading range. Missile strikes, upcoming French elections and U.S. saber rattling regarding North Korea have lifted the allure of safe havens such as government bonds. At the same time, the Fed was unwilling to revise up the 'dot plot', doubts are growing over the ability of the Trump Administration to deliver any stimulus and a few recent U.S. data releases have disappointed. It is difficult to forecast the ebb and flow of safe-haven demand for bonds, especially related to North Korea and Syria. However, our geopolitical team holds a high-conviction view that angst over Eurozone elections this year are overblown. The Italian election in 2018 is more of a threat. While we cannot rule out an even stronger safe-haven bid from developing in the coming weeks, the global cyclical economic backdrop remains negative for government bond markets. For the major industrialized economies, the so-called "hard" data are moving in line with the "soft" survey data for the most part. For example, retail sales growth continues to accelerate, reaching 4.7% in February on a year-over-year basis (Chart 3). This follows the sharp improvement in consumer confidence. Manufacturing production growth is also accelerating to the upside, in line with the PMIs. The global manufacturing sector is rebounding smartly after last year's recession, which was driven by the collapse in oil prices and a global inventory correction. Readers may be excused for jumping to the conclusion that the rebound is largely in the energy space, but this is not true. Production growth in the energy sector is close to zero on a year-over-year basis, and is negative on a 3-month rate of change basis (Chart 4). The growth pickup has been in the other major sectors, including consumer-related goods, capital goods and technology. In the U.S., non-energy production has boomed over the three months, rising 5.2% at annual rates (Chart 5). The weak spot has been in capital goods orders (Chart 3). We only have data for the big three economies - the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone - but growth is near to zero or slightly negative for all three. These data are perplexing because they are at odds with an acceleration in the production of capital goods (noted above) and a pickup in capital goods imports for 20 economies (Chart 3, third panel). Nonetheless, improving CEO sentiment, strengthening profit growth and activity surveys all suggest that capital goods orders will "catch up" in the coming months. Chart 4Manufacturing Rebound Is Not About Energy Chart 5U.S.: Non-Energy Production Surging That said, one risk to our positive capex outlook in the U.S. is that the Republicans could fail to deliver on their promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. This is not our base case, but current capex plans could be cancelled or put on indefinite hold were there to be no corporate tax cuts or immediate expensing of capital expenditures. Duration Checklist: What We're Watching BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service recently introduced a "Duration Checklist" designed to keep us focused on the most relevant factors while trying to sift out the signal from the noise (Table 1).1 These are the key economic and market indicators that we are watching to assess whether we should maintain our current below-benchmark portfolio stance. Naturally, leading and coincident indicators for global growth feature prominently in the top section of the Checklist (Chart 6). All four of these indicators appear to have topped out except the Global Leading Economic Indicator (GLEI), suggesting that the period of maximum growth acceleration has past. Nonetheless, all four are still consistent with robust growth for at least the near term. Table 1Stay Bearish On Treasuries & Bunds Chart 6Some Warning From Leading Indicators The rapid decline in the diffusion index, based on the 22 countries that comprise our GLEI, is concerning. The LEIs for two major economies and two emerging economies dipped slightly in February, such that roughly half of the country LEIs rose and half fell in the month. While it is too early to hit the panic button, the diffusion index is worth watching closely; a decline below 50 for several months would indicate that a peak in the GLEI is approaching. The remainder of the items on the checklist are related to growth, inflation pressure, central bank stance, investor risk-taking behavior and bond market technicals. We are focusing on the U.S. and Eurozone at the moment because we believe these two economies will be the main driver of global yields over the next 12 months. In the U.S., the Fed is tightening and market expectations are overly benign on the pace of rate hikes in the coming years. Upside pressure on global yields should intensify later this year, when the ECB announces the next "tapering" of its asset purchase program. All of the economic growth, inflation pressure and risk-seeking indicators on the Checklist warrant a check mark for the U.S., although this is not the case for the Eurozone inflation indicators. From a technical perspective, the Treasury and bund markets no longer appear as oversold as they did after the rapid run-up in yields following last November's U.S. elections. Large short positions have largely unwound. This removes one of the largest impediments to a renewed decline in global bond prices. For the U.S., we expect that the 10-year yield to rise to the upper end of the recent 2.3%-2.6% trading range in the next couple of months, before eventually breaking out on the way to the 2.8%-3% area by year-end. Bottom Line: A number of political pressure points and some modest U.S. data disappointments have triggered an unwinding of short bond positions. Nonetheless, the global manufacturing revival and growth impulse remain in place, and the majority of items on our Checklist suggest that the recent bond rally represents a consolidation phase rather than a trend reversal. Keep duration short of benchmark within fixed-income portfolios. Favor Stocks Over Junk Bonds Table 2A New Trend In Junk Vs. Stocks? We continue to favor U.S. equities over bonds in 2017 and recommend keeping duration short of benchmark. But what about U.S. equities versus high-yield bonds? As a reminder, favoring corporate bonds over equities was a long-running BCA theme during the early stages of the economic recovery.We noted that corporate bonds were likely to outperform equities in a prescient Special Report published in late-2008,2 and we continued to favor corporate bonds until late-2012 when we shifted towards strong dividend-paying stocks. Table 2 highlights that our corporate bond vs equity recommendations have worked out well over the past several years. The table presents the annual total return for the S&P 500 and high-yield corporate bonds (as well as the difference between the two), and it shows that the former underperformed the latter from 2008 to 2011 (and again in 2012 in risk-adjusted terms). However, stocks materially outperformed high-yield bonds from 2013-2015, which followed our recommendation to favor the S&P Dividend Aristocrats index over corporate bonds in our November 2012 Special Report.3 But Table 2 also shows that the trend of stock outperformance reversed last year, with high-yield bonds having somewhat outpaced the S&P 500 in total return terms. Does this imply that investors are witnessing the beginning of a new uptrend in corporate bond outperformance versus equities? In our view, the answer is 'no'. Chart 7 presents our simple framework for the relative performance of stocks vs high-yield corporate bonds, which suggests that investors should favor the former over the latter. Panel 1 highlights that the trend in stocks vs high-yield is generally the same as that vs 10-year Treasuries, with a few notable exceptions of sustained difference. The first exception was from 2002 to 2004, when stocks significantly outperformed government bonds but were flat vs high-yield. The second exception occurred during the early part of this expansion, which again saw high-yield corporate bonds post equity-like returns. Chart 7Major Valuation Advantage Needed For High-Yield To Outperform Stocks Panel 2 suggests that both of these circumstances were fueled by a substantial high-yield valuation advantage over stocks. The panel illustrates the gap between the speculative-grade corporate bond yield-to-worst and the S&P 500 12-month forward earnings yield, which was elevated and fell materially in both of the cases of sustained divergence shown in panel 1. The key point for investors is that last year's outperformance of junk bonds is unlikely to continue. While the compression of the junk/stock yield gap did lead the former to outperform last year, the gap was not high to begin with and is currently not that far away from its historical lows. This suggests that there is no reason to expect the stock/junk relative performance trend to deviate from the overall stock/government bond trend, which we expect to rise further over the coming 6-12 months. Bottom Line: Despite outsized performance from high-yield corporate bonds in 2016, investors should continue to favor stocks over high-yield over the coming year (but favor both over Treasuries and cash). Introducing The BCA Beige Book Monitor Chart 8BCA Beige Book Monitor: ##br##A "Hard" Look At "Soft" Data The Fed's Beige Book is released eight times a year, two weeks ahead of each FOMC meeting. It was first released in 1983. The Beige Book's predecessor was the Red Book, first produced in 1970. The Beige Book itself got a makeover from the Fed in early 2017. The Fed changed the way the information was presented across the 12 Fed districts, but, according to the Fed, the Beige Book will continue to provide "an up-to-date depiction of regional economic conditions based on anecdotal information gathered from a diverse range of business and community contacts." In addition to the Beige Book, FOMC officials also review what is now known as the "Teal Book" at each meeting. The Teal Book combined the "Green Book" - a review of current economic and financial conditions - and the "Blue Book"- which provided context for FOMC members on monetary policy actions. As noted in the Fed's own description, the Beige Book is "soft data". In discussing the Beige Book, the financial press often notes the number of districts where growth is expanding and contracting or describes the pace of overall activity (modest, moderate etc). The BCA Beige Book Monitor takes a more quantitative approach to all the qualitative data in the Beige Book. We began by searching the document for all the words we could think of that signify strength: Strong, strength, rise, increase, accelerate, fast, expand, advance, positive, robust, optimistic, up, etc. We then counted up all the words that denote weakness: Weak, fell, slow, decelerate, decrease, decline, soft, negative, pessimistic, down, contract, etc. Next, we subtracted the number of weak words from the strong words to calculate the BCA Beige Book Monitor. The Monitor begins in 2005, so it covers the time period from the middle of the 2001-2007 expansion, through the Great Recession (2007-2009) and the recovery since 2009. A more streamlined approach, using the words "strong" and "strength" (and their derivatives like stronger, strengthened, etc) as proxy for all the strong words and the word "weak" as a proxy for all the weak words, showed the same results. We adopted this simpler approach. Chart 8, panels 1 and 2, shows the BCA Beige Book Monitor versus real GDP and CEO Confidence. The BCA Beige Book monitor does a good job explaining GDP, but it is more timely. The Monitor leads CEO confidence, especially around turning points. We intend to do more work with the Beige Book Monitor and present it to you in future editions of this publication. We also track mentions of other key words in the Beige Book. For example changes in mentions of "inflation" words in the Beige book track, and sometimes lead, core inflation (Panel 3). Mentions of the "strong dollar" track the dollar itself, although tends to be lagging (Panel 4). We'll be watching for those inflation words and mentions of the dollar in the Beige Book this week. The Beige Book will also help to shed some qualitative light on the recent weakness in capital spending and C&I loans. Has the uncertainty about the timing, scope and scale of Trump's legislative agenda (taxes, infrastructure and the repeal of Obamacare, etc) had an impact on corporate spending or borrowing? We'll find out this week. Bottom Line: Although technically it is "soft" data, the Beige Book is a major input on monetary policy decision making for the FOMC. As we showed last week, the rise in "inflation" words in the Beige Book has certainly captured the Fed's attention, and confirms the "hard" we've seen on inflation. The next FOMC meeting is on May 2-3, and neither we nor the consensus expects a hike at that meeting. Despite the apparent flare-up in geopolitics last week and the run of disappointing economic data, we continue to expect the Fed to raise rates 2 more times in 2017. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jonathan LaBerge Vice President, Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasurys And German Bunds," dated February 15, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Value And The Cycle Favor Corporate Debt Over Equities," dated November 14, 2008, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Search For Yield Continues: Aristocrats Or High Yield?" dated November 5, 2012, available at usis.bcaresearch.com
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Operating leverage could surprise on the strong side this year, based on the message from our pricing power and wage growth indicators. REITs are experiencing a playable recovery following the Fed-induced sell-off earlier this year, and overweight positions will continue to pay off. Energy services activity is set to steadily accelerate this year, powering an earnings-led share price outperformance phase. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Volatility has climbed to the highest level since the U.S. election, signaling that the broad market is not yet out of the woods. As stocks recalibrate to a cooling in economic growth momentum and an escalation in geopolitical threats, downside risks should be reasonably contained by mounting signs of a healthier corporate sector. Last week we posited that stronger top line revenue growth is necessary to sustain the profit upcycle, and provide justification for historically rich valuations. Chart 1 shows sales and EPS growth over the long-term. Chart 1Joined At The Hip Obviously, the two move closely together, with earnings enjoying more powerful growth phases when revenue accelerates. Since 1960, regression analysis shows that operating leverage for the S&P 500's is 1.4X. In other words, a 5% increase in sales growth typically leads to 7% EPS growth. When sales are initially recovering from a deep slump operating leverage can be even higher, with earnings often rising two to three times as fast as revenue. Clearly, that is not sustainable, but can give the illusion of powerful and sustained growth for brief periods of time. At the current juncture, there are reasons to expect investors to embrace the durability of the profit expansion. Our corporate pricing power proxy has vaulted higher. Importantly, the breadth of this surge has been impressive, which bodes well for its staying power (Chart 2, second panel). On the flip side, rising labor costs look set to take a breather. Compensation growth has crested, and according to our diffusion index, fewer than half of the 18 industries tracked have higher wages than last year. The wage growth diffusion index provides a reliable leading indication for the trend in labor expenses. In other words, pricing power is rising on a broad basis while wage inflation is decelerating on a broad basis. Consequently, there are decent odds that resilient forward operating margin expectations can be matched (Chart 2, bottom panel). Elsewhere, a revival in animal spirits, the potential for easier fiscal policy and prospects for a hiatus in the U.S. dollar bull market bode well for brisk business activity. While the budding recovery in global trade could sputter if protectionism proliferates, our working assumption is that the U.S. Administrations' bark will be worse than its bite. Thus, a self-reinforcing sales and profit upcycle could be materializing. The objective message from our S&P 500 EPS model concurs (Chart 3), underscoring that high single digit/low double digit profit growth could be broadly perceived as attainable this year. Chart 2Profit Margins Can Expand Chart 3Few Sectors Control The Fate Of S&P 500 EPS True, our model has recently shown tentative signs of cresting, but difficult comparisons will only arise later this year. Indeed, Q3 and Q4 2016 were all-time high EPS numbers, implying that 12% estimated growth rates are a tall order (Chart 3, middle panel). Importantly, dissecting the profit growth sectorial contribution is instructive. Calendar 2017 over 2016 S&P 500 earnings growth is concentrated in four sectors: tech, energy, health care and financials comprise over 87% of the incremental profit growth expected (Chart 3, bottom panel). The upshot is that there is a high degree of concentration risk to fulfilling overall profit growth expectations. Energy profits are wholly dependent on the oil price, and financial sector profit optimism appears to have embedded a healthy increase in both interest rates and capital markets activity. In addition, tech sector earnings are heavily influenced by the U.S. dollar. Consequently, it will be critical for monetary conditions to stay loose, otherwise estimates will be at risk of downward revisions. Adding it up, the corporate sector sales pendulum is finally swinging in a positive direction, which should support the cyclical overshoot in stocks for a while longer, notwithstanding our expectation that the current corrective phase has further to run. This week we are updating our high-conviction overweight views on both the lagging energy services index and REIT sector. Revisiting REITs REITs have staged a mini V-shaped rebound after being punished alongside rising bond yields and worries about aggressive Fed rate hikes earlier this year. As outlined in recent Weekly Reports, the reflation theme is likely to lose steam in the second half of the year as economic momentum cools, providing additional impetus for capital inflows into the more stable income profile of REITs. Even if the economy proves more resilient and Treasury yields move higher, there are few barriers to additional outperformance. Our Technical Indicator, a combination of rates of change and moving average divergences, is extremely oversold. Forward intermediate and cyclical relative returns from current readings have been solid, as occurred in 2004, 2008 and 2014 (Chart 4). REIT valuations are more than one standard deviation below normal, according to our gauge. This suggests that poor operating performance and/or higher discount rates are already expected. There may be a limit as to how high bond yields can climb, given that they are already deep in undervalued territory according to the BCA 10-year Treasury Bond Valuation Index (Chart 4). Regardless, history shows that REITs have typically had a more positive than negative correlation with bond yields. The inverse correlation has only been in place since the financial crisis, when zero interest rate policies pushed massive capital flows into all yield generating assets. Chart 5 shows that prior to 2008, REITs outperformed during periods of both rising and falling Treasury yields. Chart 4Unloved And Undervalued Chart 5No Concrete Correlation Pre GFC Similarly, REITs have a solid track record during periods of rising inflation pressures. Since 1975, there have been six periods of rising core PCE inflation: REITs have enjoyed meaningful rallies during five of these phases (Chart 6). Hard assets tend to hold their stock market value well when overall inflation moves higher, with REIT net asset values providing solid support to share price performance. Chart 6Buy REITs In Times Of Inflation Looking ahead, REITs should continue to enjoy success in boosting rental rates. Occupancy rates continue to rise (Chart 7). The unemployment rate is low, consumption is decent and businesses are growing increasingly confident. That is a recipe for higher rental demand. Our Rental Rate Composite has crested on a growth rate basis, but the advance in the CPI for homeowner's equivalent rent, a good proxy for REITs, suggests that the path of least resistance remains higher (Chart 7). REIT supply growth has also leveled off, which provides additional confidence that rental inflation will remain solid. Nevertheless, there are some areas of concern. Banks are tightening lending standards on commercial real estate loans. Some sub-categories are experiencing a mild deterioration in credit quality. For instance, Chart 8 shows that delinquency rates in the retail and office spaces have edged higher. Retail and mall REITs are likely under structural pressure owing to online competition from the likes of Amazon. Chart 7Rental Demand##br## Is Solid Chart 8Watch Delinquencies As ##br##Banks Tighten Credit Standards Overall vacancy rates are still very low (Chart 8), but if credit becomes too tight, then the relentless advance in commercial property prices may cool. For now, our REIT Demand Indicator is not signaling any imminent stress. In fact, the economy is strong enough to expect occupancy rates to keep climbing, to the benefit of underlying property valuations and rental income (Chart 7, bottom panel). In sum, the budding rebound in REIT relative performance should be embraced as the start of a sustained trend. Total return potential is very attractive on a relative basis. Bottom Line: REITs remain a very attractive high-conviction overweight. Energy Servicers Are Cleaning Up Their Act We put the S&P energy services index on our high-conviction overweight list at the start of the year, because three critical factors that typically lead to a playable rally existed, namely; the global rig count had hit an inflection point, oil supplies were easing and global oil production growth had begun to decelerate. While the pullback in oil prices has undermined relative performance for the time being, there is scope for a full recovery, and more. Oil prices have firmed, underpinned by a revival in the geopolitical risk premium following the U.S. bombing campaign in Syria. There is already a wide gap between share prices and oil prices (Chart 9, top panel), and a narrowing is probable, especially as earnings drivers reaccelerate. There are tentative signs that capital spending cuts are finally reversing. The global rig count has rebounded, and is a good leading indicator for investment (Chart 10). This message is corroborated by our Global Capex Indicator, which has recently surged anew (Chart 10). Chart 9Room For ##br##Margin Improvement... Chart 10...As Deflation Eases ##br##And Capex Rebounds The longer that oil prices can stay in their current trading range, or beyond, the more time E&P balance sheets have to heal and the greater the odds that the cost of capital will be reduced. Against this backdrop, there are high odds that previously mothballed exploration projects will be restored. The V-shaped recovery in the global oil rig count, albeit from a very low base, will eventually absorb excess capacity and allow the industry to escape deflation. A major improvement in day rates is unlikely given the scale of the previous capacity boom, but even a modest pricing power improvement should provide a nice boost given high operating leverage. EBITDA margins have considerable room to improve if pricing power grows anew (Chart 9, bottom panel). Importantly, the shifting composition of global production will allow service companies with domestic exposure to shine. Shale oil producers should recapture lost market share, given that the onus to rebalance markets has been taken on by OPEC. OPEC production is contracting, while non-OPEC output is starting to recover (Chart 11, bottom panel), culminating in a widening in the Brent-WTI oil price spread. Production restraint is helping to rebalance physical oil markets. Total OECD inventory growth is reversing, and anecdotal reports are surfacing that floating storage is rapidly being depleted. Oil supply at Cushing is on the cusp of contracting, which is notable given that this has had a high correlation with relative share price performance for the past decade (oil supply shown inverted, Chart 11). On a global basis, global inventory drawdowns have been correlated with a firming industry relative profitability, and vice versa. OECD oil supply growth is rapidly receding, which augurs well for an extension of budding earnings outperformance (Chart 12, middle panel). Chart 11Receding Inventories ##br##Should Boost Performance... Chart 12...EPS And##br## Valuations The rise in clean tanker rates reinforces that oil demand is rising quickly enough to expect additional inventory depletion (Chart 12, bottom panel). Typically, tanker rates and energy service relative valuations are positively correlated. Adding it up, a rising global rig count, decelerating inventories and restrained oil production continue to bode well for a playable rally in the high-beta S&P energy services group. Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight stance in the S&P energy services index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRE - SLB, HAL, BHI, NOV, FTI, HP, RIG. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Highlights The level of Fed interest rates, in absolute or relative terms, has been a poor determinant of dollar bull markets. A more useful marker has been the relative performance of U.S. assets as well as relative growth rates. The U.S. economy should continue to outperform the rest of the G10 on a cyclical basis, suggesting that the USD could rise further on a 12-18 months basis. April is seasonally the cruelest month for the USD. Once this hurdle is passed, the likelihood grows that the dollar correction will be over. The conditions are slowly falling into place for the SNB to abandon the floor under EUR/CHF. Bank of Canada: Bye-bye easing bias, hello neutrality. Feature One of the great paradox of modern finance is the relationship between the dollar and the Fed. Contrary to a priories, rising U.S. interest rates are not synonymous with a rising dollar (Chart I-1). In fact, since 1975, out of seven protracted Fed tightening campaigns, the greenback fell four times. Obviously, one could argue that domestic interest rates per say are irrelevant, what matters should be the trend of U.S. interest rates relative to the rest of the world. Here again, the evidence is rather inconclusive. As Chart I-2 illustrates, since 1975, out of the eight episodes where U.S. policy rates rose relative to the rest of the advanced economies, the dollar was down or flat five times. Chart I-1The Fed Is Not An All-Weather Friend Chart I-2Rate Differentials Are Also A Fickle Ally This modern Gordian knot is not as intractable as it seems. In fact, we would argue that focusing on the Fed misses some key drivers of flows inside the U.S. economy. What really matters for the U.S. dollar is not just what the Fed does, but in fact, how U.S. assets are performing relative to the rest of the world. It's Not Just The Fed, It's Everything Simple interest rate differentials have a poor long-term track record explaining the U.S. dollar. However, one factor does seem to work better: the relative performance of a portfolio of U.S. stocks, bonds, and money market securities relative to the rest of the world. This does make sense. Investors who want to buy the USD do so because they expect to receive higher returns on their U.S. assets, independently of whether these assets are cash, stocks or bonds. As Chart I-3 shows, the ups and down of the USD have been contemporaneous with the gyrations of a U.S. portfolio invested 40% in stocks, 30% in bonds, and 30% in cash relative to the same portfolio in the euro area (and its predecessor national markets), Japan, the U.K., and Canada. However, there is a problem with this observation. It is expected returns that should drive the inflows into a currency, not the ex-post returns like the one used in the previous chart. But this forgets a key factor influencing asset returns: the momentum effect. As Chart I-4 illustrates, playing momentum continuation strategies has historically been one of the best performing investment philosophies, a fact not lost on investors.1 As such, there is a very rational reason for previously outperforming markets to attract funds by virtue of their previous outperformance. This would also explain why peaks and troughs in the relative U.S. / global portfolios tend to lead the turning points in the dollar itself. Chart I-3It's All About Returns Chart I-4Don't Get Against The Crowd The same dynamics are prevalent when one looks at bilateral pairs. This is particularly true of the EUR/USD, which has a 58% weight in the dollar index vis-à-vis major currencies. As Chart I-5 illustrates, as was the case with the dollar against the majors, EUR/USD dynamics are a function of the relative performance of a European portfolio of various assets against a similar U.S. portfolio. As an aside, it is true that the secular trend in the dollar is not nearly as well explained by the dynamics in the asset markets. On longer time horizons, other factors dominate currency returns. While the most well know long-term exchange rate determinant has been relative inflation rates (the PPP effect), our research has corroborated well-known academic findings that relative productivity differentials and net international investment positions (NIIP) also play important roles.2 While U.S. productivity growth has been equal or superior to that of the other nations comprised in the dollar index against the majors, the other variables have forced the long-term fair value of the dollar downward. Relative to Europe and Japan (the crucial weights in the dollar index), the U.S. NIIP grows each year more deeply into negative territory, and the U.S. has also experienced structurally more elevated inflation than these currency blocs (Chart I-6). Going back to the cyclical moves in the dollar, another factor has had a very strong explanatory power for the USD: Relative trend growth (Chart I-7). The 5-year moving average of real growth rate differentials - when GDP is measured at PPP, thus eliminating some currency effects - has mimicked the moves in the greenback. In the context of portfolio flows, this also makes sense. Ultimately, a faster growing economy should be able to generate higher rates of returns than slower growing ones, and thus attract more funds. Chart I-5EUR/USD And Asset Returns Chart I-6Secular Drags On The USD Chart I-7Growth Is Paramount What do these observations mean for the future path of the dollar? Despite continued noise by President Trump, we think the outlook for the dollar remains bright. First, the dollar is still not nearly as expensive as it has been at the peak of previous cyclical bull markets, which raises the likelihood that the USD has yet to hit the historical pain thresholds of the U.S. economy (Chart I-8). Further reinforcing this probability, U.S. employment in the manufacturing sector represents 10% of the working population today, versus 15% in 2001 and more than 22% in 1985 (Chart I-9). Not only does this mean that the sector of the U.S. economy most exposed to the pain created by a strong dollar is much smaller than at previous dollar peaks - raising the resilience of the U.S. economy to the tightening created by a strong dollar - the share of employment in that sector today remains much lower in the U.S. than it is in Japan and Europe. Chart I-8Valuations Have Yet To Bite Chart I-9The U.S. Is More Resilient To XR Moves Second, on a multi-year basis, the U.S. economic outlook remains more exciting than what the majority of the rest of the G10 has to offer. Most obviously, even if Trump changes immigration laws, the U.S. demographic outlook still outshines that of other nations (Chart I-10). Also, the U.S. benefits from being much more advanced than the rest of the G10 in its deleveraging cycle. As Chart I-11 illustrates, U.S. non-financial private debt to GDP fell from 170% of GDP to a low of 146% of GDP, while outside of the U.S., the same ratio has plateaued at 175%. This means that debt is likely to represents a greater ceiling on growth outside than inside the United States. Chart I-10A Structural Help To The U.S. Chart I-11Lower Deleveraging Pressures In The U.S. Third, U.S. markets can continue to attract funds. For one, most of the net inflows in the U.S. since 2015 has been driven by a surge in U.S. funds repatriation. Foreign investors remain timid buyers of U.S. assets (Chart I-12). This phenomenon is most pronounced in the equity space, where investors have been net sellers of U.S. equities (Chart I-13). Additionally, if the U.S. continues to grow faster than most other large advanced economies, FDIs inflow into the U.S. are likely to improve further, something that could be reinforced by Trump's hard-nosed trade negotiations with the rest of the world (Chart I-14). Chart I-12Foreigners Still Have Room To Buy Chart I-13Big Deficit In U.S. Stock Purchases Chart I-14FDI Inflows In The U.S. Can Grow More Finally, when it comes to money markets, the U.S. continues to hold the advantage. As we have argued, U.S. rates are likely to remain in the top of the G10 distribution. While the level and direction of rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world has been a poor predictor of the USD's trend, how high U.S. rates rank globally has been a better explanatory variable of the greenback (Chart I-15). This means that money markets in the U.S. are likely to remain more attractive to investors needing to park liquidity than money markets outside the U.S. We are currently still positioned negatively on the U.S. dollar against European currencies and the yen on a tactical basis. We expect this phenomenon to be toward its tail end. First, when it comes to seasonality, April is historically the weakest month for the dollar (Chart I-16). Second, Trump's comments on Wednesday regarding the dollar's strength were enough to prompt a vicious sell-off in the dollar. Yet, this seems overdone. Unlike Reagan in 1985, Trump has little levers to force a strong re-evaluation of the euro and the yen. Moreover, his endorsement of Janet Yellen implies that the Fed is less likely to lose its independence in the near future, suggesting that U.S. rates will continue to be tightened if the economy improves. Thus, a plunge in U.S. real rates relative to the rest of the world prompted by a too easy Fed is less of a risk, reducing the probability of the re-emergence of the 1970s.3 Chart I-15Being The Leader Of The Pack Is What Matters Chart I-16April Is The Cruelest Month Bottom Line: On a cyclical basis, more than simple interest rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world, what matters for the dollar's trend is the return on U.S. assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world as well as the growth rate of the U.S. compared to other nations. On this front, relative growth rate differentials continue to be the best factor pointing toward further USD outperformance. Tactically, the USD is in the midst of its seasonally weakest month, suggesting another down leg in DXY is likely in the coming weeks. However, it may soon be time to start buying the USD once again. EUR/CHF: Getting Closer To The End Recent data in Switzerland have shown great improvement. The PMIs are at their highest levels in six years and CPI has moved back into positive territory. This raises the specter of the end of the Swiss National Bank floor under EUR/CHF (Chart I-17). Chart I-17The SNB Floor Lives On While we think this peg might be in its final innings, its end is not imminent. However, we think that if Swiss data continues to improve, late 2017 will be a more supportive environment for the SNB to bury this strategy. What key signals are we looking for? First, inflation may be in positive territory, but it remains very low by recent standards. Most specifically, core CPI stands at a low 0.1%, well below the 0.8% average experienced from 1999 to 2010, an era when the euro already existed, but when the euro area crisis was still outside of investors' lexicons. As well, wage dynamics continue to underwhelm. Swiss wages are growing at a 2.4% rate compared to 3.3% from 1999 to 2010. Growth conditions also remain weak. Swiss real GDP is growing at 1%, half of the average that existed before the euro area crisis. Nominal GDP growth is undershooting the mark by an even greater margin, standing at 0.7% versus an average of 3%. What does this mean for the SNB? We would expect these datasets to move closer to their historical average before the SNB adjusts its policy stance. The main reason for this is 2015. In late 2014, just before the SNB tentatively let the CHF float, nominal and real GDP growth were outperforming current readings, yet the Swiss economy was not strong enough to handle a stronger franc. While Europe and the global economy are in a better place than in these days, risk management and precaution are likely to dictate a more careful approach by the central bank, especially as the ECB has eased monetary policy since that period, potentially causing another slingshot move in the franc if the SNB lets it float once again. In terms of strategy, we would expect the SNB to manage any appreciation in the franc following a lifting of the floor. We expect a move more akin to that of the PBoC in 2005, when the yuan, after an original 2% move, was allowed to increase progressively to minimize disruptions. We think this type of strategy is also currently being employed by the Czech central bank, and that EUR/CZK will continue to depreciate over time. This means that we would use any rebound in EUR/CHF to 1.08 to begin shorting this cross, knowing that the timing of an SNB policy change will be uncertain, but that the conditions are falling into place. Bottom Line: Even if it is still too early to bet on an imminent fall in EUR/CHF, Swiss data is moving in the right direction to expect a lift of the EUR/CHF floor later this year. As such, with the large amount of uncertainty surrounding such a decision, we would use any rebound in EUR/CHF to 1.08 to implement some short positions on the cross to bet on the eventuality of a policy change in Switzerland. Bank Of Canada: Less Dovish But Far From Hawkish The Bank of Canada this week officially removed its dovish bias. Canadian data has been very strong, with recent housing starts coming in at 254 thousand, a 10-year high. Additionally, recent employment data has been strong and so have purchasing managers index and business surveys. As a result, the BoC used this meeting as an opportunity to increase its growth expectation for the year - albeit a move heavily based on a stronger Q1 - and also brought forward in time its expectation of the closing of the output gap to early 2018. Chart I-18Canadian Surprises: More Likely##br## To Roll-Over Than Not Despite this more upbeat picture, the Bank of Canada also highlighted heavy risks to the Canadian economy. Obviously, the risks from the potential for a U.S. border adjustment tax and renegotiations of NAFTA were seen as crucial. The housing market too continues to be a big worry for the Bank of Canada, with affordability being extremely poor. Moreover, the BoC also decreased its estimate of the neutral rate and observed that monetary conditions are not as accommodative as was believed in January. Going forward, we think that the upside for the CAD remains limited. Canadian economic surprises are stretched and are very likely to rollover in the coming months (Chart I-18). This suggests that further upgrades to the Canadian economic outlook may take some time to emerge. As such, we continue to expect rate differentials between the U.S. and Canada to continue to support a higher USD/CAD, especially as Canadian money markets are already pricing in a full rate hike by Q1 2018. Bottom Line: The Bank Of Canada abandoned it dovish bias, but it is still far away from moving toward a hawkish bias. While a rate hike in 2018 is now much more likely, the market already anticipates this. As such, since the Canadian surprise index is very elevated, the likelihood of a move downward in interest rate expectations grows as surprises are likely to roll over. Stay long USD/CAD. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 For a discussion on why momentum continuation strategies may have worked, see the April 24, 2015 Global Investment Strategy Special Report titled "Investing In Style" available at gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "A Guide To Currency Markets (Part I)", dated April 8, 2016, and the Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets", dated February 26, 2016, both available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 For a more detailed discussion of the 1970s stagflation, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "Trump: No Nixon Redux", dated December 2, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 President Trump, once again, delivered dollar-nuking remarks, after saying it was "getting too strong". The dollar dropped 0.7% on the news, while other currencies appreciated. The dollar has since regained most of its losses, but further upside remains questionable in the coming weeks. The market has already priced-in large amounts of monetary tightening, and recent producer price figures disappointed expectations: PPI increased at a 2.3% annual pace and contracted 0.1% monthly; core PPI increased at a 1.6% annual pace, and did not grow at a monthly pace. Additionally, in the past 5, 10 and 26 years, April has been the weakest month for the dollar. Upside is most likely limited until after the French elections. Report Links: U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain - March 24, 2017 USD, Oil Divergences Will Continue As Storage Draws - March 17, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent movements in the euro remain largely a function of the dollar. Even after the Trump-induced dollar gyrations, the euro appreciated this week. The ZEW Survey for Economic Sentiment and Current Situation both outperformed expectations, however weak industrial production figures were also evident, which contracted by 0.3% on a monthly basis, and grew at less than expectations at 1.2%. Peripheral economies are also showing strength, with inflation outperforming expectations in Italy and Greece. Nevertheless, the outlook for the euro this month remains decent, as April is notorious for dollar weakness. Moreover, Melanchon's rising popularity is a double-edge sword: while it increases the risk that yet another euro-sceptic becomes the French president, if it grows further it is likely to take away potential voters from Le Pen. In fact, with the chances of Macron winning remaining elevated, this election could ultimately could provide further support to the euro. Report Links: ECB: All About China? - April 7, 2017 Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain - March 24, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 USD/JPY continues to fall rapidly, and now stands at 109. However, we believe the yen could still have more upside. Indeed, EM assets continue to struggle with a technical resistance, and a down leg seems imminent, given the tightening in liquidity conditions that China is currently experiencing. As evidenced by the events of early 2016, such as sell off of EM assets could supercharge yen rallies. On the data side the Japanese economy continues to show mixed signs: Labor cash earning underperformed expectations, growing by a paltry 0.4% from a year ago. However domestic corporate goods prices outperformed expectations, growing by 1.4% year on year. Overall Japanese economic activity continues to be too tepid for the BoJ to have a shift from its ultra-dovish policy. This makes us yen bears on a 12 to 18 month basis. Report Links: U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive - February 24, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the U.K. has been mixed this week: Industrial production growth underperformed coming in at 2.8% The goods trade balance also underperformed coming in at -12.46 billion pounds. However, average hourly earnings including bonus outperformed coming in at 2.3%, while core inflation come in at 1.8%, below expectations. This last point bodes well for consumption as it would limit the downside to real income caused by the inflationary shock resulting from the depreciation of the pound. Moreover, long term inflation expectations remain relatively stable, which means that British households are looking past the temporary nature of the inflation caused by the pound sell-off. Both of these factors should help the British economy outperform expectations, and ultimately help the GBP rally against the EUR. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The ConqueringDollar - October 14, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 An unfortunate tropical storm, Cyclone Debbie, ravaged through the state of Queensland at the end of March. Queensland is known for its agriculture and mining industries, which suffered heavily during the hurricane. March and April export figures are likely to weaken as output was destroyed and reparations may delay production. Exacerbating this weakness is the risk of faltering import demand from China, which is the most likely the reason behind the current weakness in industrial metal prices. As this trend continues, the AUD is likely to suffer for the remainder of the year. On the bright side, the labor market has regained some vigor as full-time employment outperformed part-time employment in two consecutive months, with full-time job growing at a 30-year-high pace. However, a durable trend needs to be apparent for the labor market to fully strengthen. Report Links: U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 After positive import and export data out of China, the kiwi rallied strongly. The market interpreted this data as evidence that global growth is on a solid footing and that it will continue to surprise to the upside. Although we agree with the first point we disagree with the second one, as outperformance in global growth amid a sharp tightening in Chinese monetary conditions, a slowdown in Chinese shadow banking credit and a deceleration in Chinese house prices, is highly unlikely. Thus, carry currencies like the NZD are likely to underperform against the dollar. Against other commodity currency the picture is more nuanced, as strong PMI numbers of 57.8 as well as solid credit and employment numbers are evidence that the kiwi economy is better equipped to deal with a Chinese shock than Australia. Report Links: U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The BoC left its overnight rate unchanged at 0.5%, citing recent stronger than expected economic activity and a sooner-than-previously-anticipated closure of the output gap. The gains in the energy sector are unlikely to provide as much of a tailwind as earlier this year as the base effects from rising oil prices prove transitory on inflation and exports. The Bank highlighted labor market slack as a key factor which may contribute to the brevity of this growth impulse, as well as the business sector being hampered by low investment aimed at maintenance rather than expansion. Similarly strong data are needed to keep growth rate high enough for the Bank to become hawkish. For the time being, employment data still remains mixed. Although employment increased by 19,400, the unemployment rate ticked up to 6.7%. With only 38% of firms planning to add jobs over the next 12 months, job gains could be modest and slack could remain. Report Links: AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 After a short rally in early March, EUR/CHF cross is once again at 1.066, very close to the SNB's implied floor of 1.065. This sell-off is most likely the result of risk-off flows caused by the French presidential elections. However, we believe these fears are overstated, as Macron seems primed to win the election. Once these political fears dissipate, and economic fundamentals take over, EUR/CHF would likely be at a point where it would become an attractive short, given that there are some early signs that inflation is slowly coming back to the alpine country and that the franc has strong structural forces pushing up its value. While an abandonment of the SNB's floor in unlikely until the end of the year, investors could still begin positioning themselves for this eventuality given that a rally in EUR/CHF beyond the French election should be limited. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The relationship between the NOK and oil prices continues to be a strange one, as the NOK has depreciated this last month even in the face of a strong rally in oil prices. Plummeting inflation and inflation expectations in Norway are probably the main culprit, as it entrenches the Norges Bank dovish bias. All this being said, there are some faint signs that the economy is starting to recover as manufacturing PMI is at 5 year highs while consumer confidence keeps creeping up and is now at its highest point since early 2015. While we are still NOK bears, we will continue to monitor these developments, as the NOK could become an attractive buy against other commodity currencies. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent inflation numbers corroborate downside risk to the krona. Headline inflation dropped by 0.5% to 1.3% on an annual basis; Core inflation dropped by 0.3% to 1%. This is most likely a follow-through of February's producer prices contraction. This may justify the Riksbank's fear over deflationary risks, as inflation remains tamed despite increased economic activity. However, it is likely that this proves to be a temporary phenomenon, as manufacturing new orders expanded at 12% in February, while industrial production expanded at 4.1%. Given that the next monetary policy meeting is in July, it is too early to tell if the Riksbank will further pursue its dovish stance: inflation will need to be consistently underperform further for that to happen, which is still not our base case. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights This week, we provide one of our occasional updates on Commodities as an Asset class (CAAC), examining the strategic case for getting long commodity index exposure. Commodity index exposure is more highly correlated with inflation than equities or bond exposure, indicating commodities - and real assets generally - provide a better hedge against inflation than financial assets. A pure investment case for getting long broad commodity index exposure can be made if backwardation is expected in one or more of the components of a given index. Given our expectation for higher inflation, and our positioning for backwardation in the oil market, we recommend getting long the energy-heavy S&P GSCI index as a strategic portfolio position. Energy: Overweight. Deeper-than-expected production cuts from OPEC were reported by Reuters Tuesday, suggesting Cartel members are at 104% of pledged output reductions.1 Our $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl WTI calls spreads in Jul-Aug-Sep settled at an average of $3.06/bbl, and we are taking profits of 76.9%, per the upside $3.00/bbl stop we established for these positions on March 23/17. We also are taking profits on our Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 WTI backwardation trade basis tonight's close, after registering a gain of more than 700% when we marked to market earlier this week. We are keeping our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 Brent backwardation spread open; it is up 426.3% since we recommended it on March 23/17. We are recommending a strategic long position in the energy-heavy S&P GSCI basis today's close. Given this commodity index's overweight to oil and refined products, we believe price appreciation will offset negative roll returns until crude markets go into backwardation later this year. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by year end. Base Metals: Neutral. Workers at Southern Copper's Toquepala and Cuajone mines struck Monday seeking higher wages and improved working conditions, according to Metal Report. Front-line copper on the COMEX has been chopping between ~ $2.50/lb and $2.70/lb since the beginning of the year through multiple strike actions. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold rallied slightly, but our long volatility play still is down 14.7%. Markets do not appear to be overly concerned with Fed actions over the next couple of months. Feature There's a long-standing argument among equities investors as to whether they trade the stock market or a market of stocks. In the case of the former, getting long index exposure makes sense. In the case of the latter, stock pickers sensitive to the idiosyncratic risk of individual equities outperform the broad-exposure devotees. Sometimes, both are right at the same time. Commodities are no different. There are times when broad exposure to commodities is warranted - e.g., in the early stages of a global industrial rebound or when investors expect higher inflation. However, there are periods in which sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk reflecting different fundamental states for each market works best. And, as is the case with equities, there are times when both points of view can co-exist without contradiction. The relative performance of commodities vs. equities post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) leaves much to be desired (Chart 1A and Chart 1B). The re-balancing of commodities generally, led by crude oil, but apparent in key base metals like copper, suggests the overall commodity down-cycle - with the exception of ags - has leveled out. Fundamentals - supply, demand and inventories - will be far more important for commodities going forward, particularly as the Fed pursues its rates-normalization policy and markets are slowly weaned off the excessive monetary accommodation they've seen in the post-GFC period. Chart 1ACommodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, ##br##Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse Chart 1BCommodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, ##br##Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse There are two global-macro considerations driving our expectation commodities will outperform the other major asset classes going forward, which we consider below. First, consistent with our House view and recent analysis from our Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) service, we expect higher inflation, which already is being reflected in the forward CPI swaps markets. This could be exacerbated if oil supplies tighten on the back of massive capex cuts following the 2015 - 16 oil-price collapse, and if U.S. fiscal stimulus overheats an economy that already is at or near full capacity and full employment. Second, backwardation in crude oil markets will be a positive development for commodity index products generally, and the energy-heavy S&P GSCI in particular. Together, these fundamentals will provide investors portfolio diversification via non-correlated returns vis-à-vis the other asset classes. Higher Inflation Expectations Support Commodity Index Exposure We have been highlighting the inflationary "tail risks" in commodity markets for a number of months. These include the possibility of 1) higher oil prices after 2018, following the more-than-$1 trillion cuts in oil-and-gas capex in the wake of the 2015 - 16 oil price collapse; and 2) a large injection of fiscal stimulus to the U.S. economy from the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress working with President Trump's White House. The fiscal stimulus could become material next year, revving an economy that is at or near full employment and an output gap at or close to being closed.2 Our colleagues on BCA's GFIS desk note, "underlying U.S. inflation pressures remain strong, particularly given the evidence that conditions in the labor market are getting progressively tighter." While inflationary forces are a bit more subdued in Europe and Japan, our colleagues continue to favor being long CPI swaps in both markets (Chart 2).3 BCA's GFIS expects inflation expectations to rise to a level of ~ 2.5% p.a. on 10-year TIPS breakevens, which are priced off the CPI index. If markets do raise the odds of higher inflation over the medium term, it most likely will continue to show up in the 5-year 5-year (5y5y) CPI Swaps in the U.S. and Europe, which we have found to be cointegrated with 3-year forward WTI futures (Chart 3). The oil market will be especially sensitive to the supply-demand balances after 2018, and will move higher if it senses a supply squeeze from too-little investment in production following the massive cuts to supply-side capex. This will feed into the 5y5y CPI swaps markets, which, in turn, will drive TIPS yields higher. Chart 2Early Days Yet, But ##br##U.S. Inflation Pressures Are Building Chart 3Watch 3-Year Forward WTI Futures ##br##For Early Signs Of Higher Inflation Apart from active commodity positioning, commodity index exposure offers better inflation risk coverage than equities or bonds, as can be seen in Table 1.4 Chart 4 shows the out-performance of the commodity indices, the S&P GSCI in particular, in higher-inflation environments. Table 1Correlations Between Real And Financial Assets Our own modeling supports the academic findings. When we estimated the yoy S&P GSCI returns as a function of U.S. CPI yoy changes and the difference between 1st-nearby WTI futures (CL1) and 12th nearby WTI futures (CL12), we found this specification explained just over 84% of the commodity index's annual returns. Our model indicates the S&P GSCI can be expected to increase in value by close to 15bp for every 1% increase in U.S. CPI (Chart 5). This energy-heavy index - crude oil and refined products comprise more than half of the S&P GSCI - performs much better than the more evenly disbursed Bloomberg Commodity Index (BCI) as an inflation hedge. Chart 4Commodities Outperform In##br## Inflationary Markets Chart 5S&P GSCI Index Exposure ##br##Moves With Inflation Profiting From Backwardation Long-only commodity index products generate returns from three sources: Price appreciation; roll yield - the returns generated by selling and replacing futures contracts approaching their terminal trading date (the expiring contract in the index is sold and replaced by a contract with a deferred delivery); and on the collateral posted to carry positions. An investor with a strong view on prices can express it by getting long or short futures. When an investor wants to express a view on the structure of the market - chiefly the shape of the forward curve and whether it will be backwardated (prompt delivery costs more than deferred delivery), or in contango (prompt delivery costs less than deferred delivery) - they can do so either by trading spreads (buying prompt-delivered contracts vs. selling deferred-delivered contracts, and vice versa) or getting long commodity-index exposure such as the S&P GSCI or Bloomberg Commodity Index (BCI). Typically, long-only commodity-index products largest returns are generated via price appreciation and roll yield, which simply are returns generated by "rolling" the underlying futures contracts in the index as these contracts approach the termination of trading to a deferred month. In a backwardated market, prompt-delivered contracts are sold and replaced with lower-cost contracts. In contango markets the opposite occurs. Indexes with heavy concentrations in futures that are likely to be backwardated for a length of time are preferred to indexes with futures that, on a fundamental basis, are more likely to have a flat or contango term structure. We have been positioning for a backwardation in crude oil later this year for some time. We continue to expect backwardation in crude oil markets, and remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent to express this view. Given the very high concentration of energy exposure in the S&P GSCI index - more than half of the index is crude oil or refined products, according to S&P - this index is best-suited, in our estimation, to benefit from a backwardated oil market.5 Indeed, our modeling, shown in Chart 5, supports our view that backwardation would significantly boost performance in the S&P GSCI index: A 1% increase in the spread between 1st-nearby WTI vs. 12th-nearby WTI contracts likely would translate into gain in the index of slightly more than 1.14%. Bottom Line: We expect higher inflation and backwardation in the oil market later this year. For this reason, we are recommending a long exposure in the energy-heavy S&P GSCI index. Commodities outperform equities and bonds in inflationary markets. In addition, this index's overweight to crude oil and refined products suggests it will outperform when markets backwardate. Given we expect WTI and Brent prices to trade on either side of $60/bbl later this year, we believe price appreciation will offset minor roll-yield losses until markets backwardate. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Exclusive: OPEC futures show oil output cuts exceed pledge in March - sources" published by Reuters.com on April 11, 2017. 2 Please see issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Gold's 'Known Unknowns' And Fat Tails," dated February 23, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy weekly Report "The Song Remains The Same," dated April 11, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Bhardwaj, Geetesh, Gary Gorton and Geert Rouwenhorst (2015), "Facts and Fantasies about Commodity Futures Ten Years Later*" published by Yale University. This article updates earlier research and notes, "In the original study we found that commodities had historically offered a risk premium similar to equities, and at the same time would provide diversification to a traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds. What set commodities apart from these traditional assets was their positive correlation with inflation. (Emphasis added.) Here we provide 10 years of additional data. Although a decade is sometimes too short to draw firm conclusions, our-of-sample period is rich because it includes a global economic expansion led by the industrialization of China, a housing boom and bust in the United States, the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression, followed by a monetary policy stimulus response which has driven interest rates around the world towards zero. ... Many of the basic conclusions of the original study continue to hold." (p. 22) 5 Please see "WTI Crude Oil Remains On Top As S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces 2017 Weights For The S&P GSCI," at http://ca.spindices.com/indices/commodities/sp-gsci, website for the index. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Trades Closed In 2016