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Its 7% loss was good for 33rd-worst in the postwar record books, and just missed being a -2 standard-deviation event. At its lowest point, a half-hour before the October 29th close, the index was down a whopping 10.5% for the month. The price action…
Highlights Chart 12015 Repeat?   Credit spreads widened as Treasury yields rose in October, bringing to mind the experience of 2015 when tight monetary policy and flagging global growth combined to cause a large drawdown in spread product excess returns. Chart 1 shows the familiar pattern. The market's rate hike expectations held constant throughout most of 2015. Meanwhile, falling commodity prices signaled weakness in global demand. Eventually, the combination of tight money and slowing growth was too much for the market to bear. Junk sold off in late-2015 and didn't recover until after the Fed scaled back its rate hike plans. It's hard to ignore today's similar set-up. Commodity prices are once again falling and the Fed appears committed to lifting rates. Unless global demand rebounds, we could be in for a repeat of late-2015's ugly price performance. The best way to position U.S. bond portfolios for this risk is to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration, and to scale back exposure to credit risk. We advocate nothing more than a neutral allocation to spread product, with an up-in-quality bias. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 82 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -98 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 12 bps on the month, and currently sits at 117 bps. Recent spread widening has returned some value to the corporate bond space. The 12-month breakeven spread for Baa-rated corporate bonds is back up to its 36th percentile relative to history, while the same spread for A-rated securities is at its 18th percentile (Chart 2). Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Though spreads are somewhat more attractive, caution remains warranted in the corporate bond space. Corporate profit growth has only just managed to keep pace with debt growth during the past few quarters (bottom panel). In other words, even a mild deceleration in profits will be enough for leverage to resume its uptrend (panel 4). As we observed in last week's report, Q3's sharp decline in non-residential investment spending might signal that weak foreign growth is finally starting to weigh on profits.1 The possibility of rising leverage in the coming quarters leads us to recommend an up-in-quality bias within our neutral allocation to corporate bonds. To pick up extra spread we prefer a strategy of favoring long-maturity credits over short maturities. In last week's report we showed that the long-end of the credit curve outperforms (in excess return terms) when Treasury yields rise. High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 159 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +161 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 55 bps on the month, and currently sits at 363 bps. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for default losses is currently 259 bps, above the long-run mean of 247 bps (Chart 3). This tells us that if default losses are in line with our expectations during the next 12 months and junk spreads remain constant, we should expect high-yield returns of 259 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. If we assume that spreads tighten enough to bring our default-adjusted spread back to its long-run average, we would expect an excess return of 306 bps. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview The main reason for continued caution on junk bonds is that the default loss expectation embedded in our excess spread calculation is extremely low relative to history (panel 4). Our assumption, derived from the Moody's baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate, calls for default losses of 1.04% during the next 12 months. Default losses have rarely come in below that level. Further, the recent trend in job cut announcements makes it even more likely that default losses surprise to the upside during the next 12 months. Job cut announcements are highly correlated with the default rate, and while they remain low relative to history, they have clearly formed a trough this year (bottom panel). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation*   Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -44 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread increased 2 bps on the month. A 4 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS) was partially offset by a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The OAS has widened in recent months, though it remains tight compared to its average pre-crisis level (Chart 4). The overall nominal MBS spread remains very low, but for good reason (panel 4). Chart 4MBS Market Overview The two most important drivers of MBS excess returns are: (i) mortgage refinancing activity and (ii) bank lending standards. Refi activity is already depressed and will stay muted as interest rates rise. Bank lending standards eased in Q2 for the 17th consecutive quarter, but remain tight relative to history. In response to a special question from the Fed's July Senior Loan Officer Survey, respondents noted that mortgage lending standards are in the tighter end of the range since 2005. This suggests that further gradual easing is likely going forward. With lending standards easing and refi activity low, the macro environment is consistent with tight MBS spreads. We maintain only a neutral allocation to the sector for now, but will look to upgrade when it comes time to further pare exposure to corporate credit risk. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 55 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -16 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 184 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -118 bps. Foreign Agencies underperformed by 94 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -60 bps. Local Authorities underperformed by 28 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +63 bps. Supranationals underperformed Treasuries by 3 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +13 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 4 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +5 bps. Sovereign debt has underperformed this year, but spreads remain expensive compared to U.S. corporate credit. In a recent report we looked at USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt by country and found that only a few nations offer excess spread compared to equivalently-rated U.S. corporates.2 Those countries being Argentina, Turkey, Lebanon and Ukraine at the low-end of the credit spectrum and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE at the upper-end. We continue to view the Local Authority sector as very attractive. Not only does the sector offer elevated spreads (Chart 5), but it is dominated by taxable municipal securities which are insulated from weak foreign growth and U.S. dollar strength. Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +105 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 1% in October, and currently sits at 87% (Chart 6). This is about one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and only slightly above the average of 81% that was observed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview But despite the low yield ratio, we see tax-exempt municipal yields as quite attractive, especially at the long-end of the curve. For example, we observe that a 5-year Aa-rated municipal bond carries a yield of 2.55% versus a yield of 3.62% for a comparable corporate bond index. This implies that an investor with an effective tax rate of 30% should be indifferent between the two bonds. Moving further out the curve, the breakeven tax rate falls to 23% at the 10-year maturity point and is even lower at the 20-year maturity point. Further, unlike the corporate sector, state & local government balance sheets are relatively insulated from weakening foreign economic growth and a rising U.S. dollar. While our Municipal Health Monitor has bounced in recent quarters, it remains below zero, consistent with ratings upgrades outpacing downgrades (bottom panel). Treasury Curve: Favor The 7-Year Bullet Over The 1/20 Barbell The Treasury curve bear-steepened in October. The 2/10 slope steepened 4 bps and the 5/30 slope steepened 16 bps. As a result of the large curve steepening, our position long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell returned +67 bps on the month, and is now up +107 bps since inception. However, the curve steepening also means that steepener trades focused on the belly (5-7 year) of the curve are no longer attractive according to our models (see Tables 4 & 5). The 7-year bullet is now fairly valued relative to the 1/20 barbell, meaning that the butterfly spread is priced for an unchanged 1/20 slope during the next six months (Chart 7). Our baseline macro assessment is that the yield curve slope will remain near current levels during that timeframe. As such, we close our position long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Absent attractive value, the only reason to focus curve exposure on the 5-7 year maturity point is as a hedge against an unexpected pause in Fed rate hikes. In prior research we showed that the belly of the curve performs best when the 12-month discounter falls.3 But with our discounter priced for only 61 bps of rate hikes for the next 12 months, this risk may not be worth hedging. Instead, we prefer to go long the 2-year bullet and short a duration-matched 1/5 barbell. This trade is attractively priced on our model (bottom panel) and should outperform in a rising yield environment. The 1/5 slope tends to steepen when our 12-month discounter rises, and vice-versa. TIPS: Overweight TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 61 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +76 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 9 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.06%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate also fell 9 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.21%. Both the 10-year and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. We think it is only a matter of time before inflation expectations adjust higher into that range, and we therefore maintain an overweight position in TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. The catalyst for wider TIPS breakevens will be persistent inflation readings near the Fed's 2% target. Trimmed mean inflation has only just returned to the Fed's 2% target (Chart 8), but will probably remain close to that level for the next six months. While base effects will pose a higher hurdle for year-over-year inflation during this time, pipeline inflation pressures are also building, as evidenced by the prices paid component of the ISM Manufacturing survey (panel 4).4 Chart 8Inflation Compensation ABS: Neutral Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +23 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 5 bps on the month and now stands at 38 bps, 4 bps above its pre-crisis low. The excess return Bond Map on page 15 shows that consumer ABS offer attractive return potential compared to both Supranationals and Domestic Agencies, but carry a substantially higher risk of losses. Agency CMBS appear much more attractive than consumer ABS on a risk/reward basis, offering approximately the same expected return with less risk. From a credit quality perspective, the consumer credit delinquency rate remains low by historical standards but has clearly put in a bottom (Chart 9). The household interest coverage ratio has been rising for 10 consecutive quarters, suggesting that the delinquency rate will continue to increase. Chart 9ABS Market Overview We remain neutral on consumer ABS for now, but prefer Local Authorities, Municipal Bonds and Agency-backed CMBS when it comes to high-quality spread product. If consumer credit delinquencies continue to rise without a commensurate increase in ABS spreads, then our next move will likely be a reduction to underweight. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +120 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 10 bps on the month and currently sits at 94 bps (Chart 10). Chart 10CMBS Market Overview A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards on commercial real estate loans as well as falling demand. The Fed's Q2 Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that both lending standards and demand are close to unchanged. In other words, the macro picture for CMBS is decidedly mixed. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +23 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 51 bps. The Bond Maps on page 15 show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this sector continues to make sense. The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of November 2, 2018)   Chart 12Total Return Bond Map (As Of November 2, 2018)   Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of September 28, 2018)   Table 5Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?", dated October 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Oil Supply Shock Is A Risk For Junk", dated October 9, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners", dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For details on our base effects indicator for PCE inflation, please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Powell Doctrine Emerges", dated September 4, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Frenzied software M&A activity, the ongoing capex upcycle, firming industry operating metrics and pristine balance sheets suggest that software stocks are a must have for equity portfolios. Rising interest rates along with the Fed's quantitative tightening, the return of volatility, higher gasoline prices, stretched technicals and a lack of a valuation cushion all suggest that it pays to remain bearish consumer discretionary stocks. Recent Changes We lifted the S&P Industrial Conglomerates index to overweight in a Sector Insight on Wednesday last week.1 Table 1 Feature Chart 1Stocks Are... The S&P 500 found its footing last week, but the volatility comeback assures more violent oscillations before equities resume their upward trajectory. Crash-prone October lived up to its reputation but it is now over, and once the midterm election uncertainty passes this week, investors will refocus their attention on the U.S./China trade war and U.S. economic growth. Trump's moderating approach on the former was welcome news last week, and any further de-escalation signs in the trade tussle will breathe a huge sigh of relief for equities. On the investment front, the 10% SPX drawdown triggered our "buy the dip" strategy on Friday October 26 (please see the "Time To Bargain Hunt" Sector Insight), when we put to work longer-term oriented capital. Our "buy the dip" view remains intact, as we still do not foresee a recession in the coming 9-12 months. On the volatility front, the CBOE SKEW index, a measure of tail risk,2 is sending a positive message as investors are no longer buying tail risk protection as they did in August. Interestingly, as the nominal level of the SPX has been increasing over the decades so has the price of tail risk protection (Chart 1). We view the recent collapse in the CBOE SKEW index as a positive indication that the worst may be behind the equity market. With regard to global flows to U.S. shores, the Treasury International Capital (TIC) System data revealed that global portfolio managers were not chasing U.S. equities this summer as they had been at the beginning of the year. The likely current trough in net foreign portfolio flows into U.S. equities should, at the margin, underpin U.S. stocks (Chart 2). Chart 2... Likely Out Of The Woods... On the U.S. economic front, the latest GDP release revealed that housing is indeed softening. This is the first time since the GFC that residential investment's contribution to real GDP growth turned negative for three consecutive quarters. Tack on decelerating house prices and collapsing lumber prices (Chart 3) and residential real estate confirms the yellow flag from our recently introduced Economic Impulse Indicator.3 Chart 3...But Housing Poses A Risk While house prices are decelerating, corporate pricing power remains upbeat. True, investors focused on anecdotes about input cost inflation this earnings season and all but ignored evidence that companies across different sectors have been able, and will continue, to raise selling prices by more than the rise in wage and commodity costs. Thus, corporate profit margin squeeze fears are overblown; they are likely a risk for the back half of 2019, especially if volume growth suffers a setback. This week we are updating our corporate pricing power gauge. While our overall proxy has ticked down, it is still clocking higher than wage inflation. In fact, our pricing power diffusion index shows excellent breadth (second panel, Chart 4). This firming corporate inflation backdrop suggests that businesses have been successful in passing on rising input costs down the supply chain or to the consumer, and thus suggests that investors are mistakenly fretting about a looming profit margin squeeze. Chart 4No Margin Pressures Yet While labor cost inflation is trending higher, wage growth remains contained near 3% despite a multi-decade low in the unemployment rate. According to our wage growth diffusion index, just over half of the 44 industries we track have to contend with rising wages, a visible fall from earlier in the year (middle panel, Chart 4). In addition, the Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker remains tame and the switcher/stayer index recently nosedived to multi-year lows. The switcher/stayer index provides a reliable leading indication for the trend in overall labor expenses (fourth panel, Chart 4). Put differently, corporate pricing power is rising on a broadening basis while leading indicators of wage inflation suggest an easing in wage pressures in the coming months. As a result, there are rising odds that expanding forward operating margin expectations are likely, extending the two year margin expansion phase (bottom panel, Chart 4). Digging deeper into our corporate pricing power update is revealing. Table 2 summarizes the results. As a reminder, we calculate industry group pricing power from the relevant CPI, PPI, PCE and commodity growth rates for each of the 60 industry groups we track. Table 2 also highlights shorter term pricing power trends and each industry's spread to overall inflation. Table 2Industry Group Pricing Power 73% of the industries we cover are lifting selling prices, while another ten industries are experiencing only mild price deflation (less than a 0.6% decline). If we include those ten industries then 90% of sectors are maintaining or raising selling prices. One third of the industries are lifting prices at a faster clip than overall inflation. This is lower than our early-July report. Outright deflating sectors increased by four to sixteen since our last update but only six are deflating at 1% or more. On a slightly negative note, fourteen industries are experiencing a downtrend in selling price inflation, twice as many since our most recent report (Table 2). Deep cyclicals/commodity-related industries continue to dominate the top ranks, occupying the top 7 slots (top panel, Chart 5). Despite the ongoing global export softness, intensifying trade tussle with China and 5% year-to-date appreciation in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, the commodity complex's ability to increase prices is impressive especially given that the base effects from the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession have filtered out. On the flip side, tech industries dominate the bottom ranks of Table 2. Chart 5Cyclicals Have The Upper Hand In sum, accelerating business sector selling prices will continue to underpin top line growth into 2019. As long as wage inflation rises gradually and does not gallop higher and the corporate sector sustains its pricing power, then profit margins and earnings will remain upbeat. This week we update a high-conviction overweight tech subgroup and reiterate our below benchmark allocation to an early cyclical sector. Software Is In High Demand Despite recent tech stock ills, software stocks continue to defy gravity and remain in a multi-year uptrend, still above the dotcom bubble relative performance highs (top panel, Chart 6). We reiterate our high-conviction overweight status and within tech we continue to prefer the S&P software and S&P tech hardware, storage & peripherals indexes to the early-cyclical tech S&P semis and S&P semi equipment subgroups. Chart 6Software Fever It did not take long for the large CA acquisition to get surpassed by RHT. Inter-industry M&A activity is reaching fever pitch and this frenzy is bidding up premia to stratospheric levels (fourth panel, Chart 6). The push to the cloud, SaaS and even AI has boosted the appeal of software stocks and brought them to the forefront of potential takeout candidates. These are secular trends and will likely continue to gain steam irrespective of the different stages in the business cycle. As a result, software stocks should remain core tech holdings in equity portfolios. Chart 7Capex Gains... Beyond the positive M&A angle that we have been exploring for quite some time in our research, software stocks are particularly levered on capital spending. Chart 7 shows that relative capital outlays and the share price ratio are joined at the hip. Software upgrades offer the simplest, quickest and most effective capital deployment especially when productivity gains ground to a halt. Importantly, leading indicators of overall capex remain upbeat and should continue to underpin software profits (Chart 8). Chart 8...Say Stick With Software Moreover, industry operating metrics are on fire. Top line growth is accelerating and running at a higher clip than the broad market. The recovery in the software price deflator (middle panel, Chart 9), a proxy for industry pricing power, corroborates this bright demand backdrop. Impressively, labor additions have been muted, implying that margins can expand further and possibly challenge cyclical highs (bottom panel, Chart 9). Chart 9Operating Metrics Are Firing On All Cylinders With regard to financial statements, software stocks have pristine balance sheets with more cash on hand than debt, which sustains the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio in negative territory. Interest coverage is great at 10x and free cash flow generation is expanding smartly (Chart 10). Chart 10Pristine Balance Sheets Nevertheless, all of these positives have pushed several valuation metrics to a premium to the broad market and leave little space for any mishaps. On a forward P/E, trailing P/S, and even EV/EBITDA basis, software equities are pricey, but we think for good reason (bottom panel, Chart 10). This rerating phase will likely continue until there is evidence of an end either to the M&A frenzy, or capex upcycle or business cycle. In sum, feverish software M&A activity, the ongoing capex upcycle, firming industry operating metrics and pristine balance sheets, suggest that software stocks are a must have for equity portfolios. Bottom Line: The S&P software index remains a high-conviction overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT - MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, INTU, RHT, ADSK, CA, SNPS, CTXS, ANSS, CDNS, FTNT and SYMC. Consumer Discretionary Stocks Are Still A Sell While we remain constructive on financials that benefit from higher rates, we continue to recommend investors avoid the consumer discretionary sector - the other early cyclical - that suffers when interest rates rise. Chart 11 depicts this inverse correlation consumer discretionary equities have with interest rates, especially the fed funds rate. Most discretionary equites are levered off of floating rates and thus any increase in the fed funds rates gets reflected immediately in banks' prime lending rate. Also, most consumer debt is floating rate debt and thus tighter monetary conditions, at the margin, dampen consumer debt uptake and, as a knock-on effect, weigh on discretionary consumer outlays. Chart 11Rising Fed Funds Rates... Last week we highlighted that, now that the Fed has been raising rates and allowing bonds to roll off its balance sheet, volatility is making a comeback. Unsurprisingly, the consumer discretionary share price ratio is inversely correlated with the VIX index, signaling that more pain lies ahead for this early cyclical index (VIX shown inverted, Chart 12). Chart 12...The Volatility Comeback... Money aggregates also corroborate that the time to buy consumer discretionary equities is when the money supply is galloping higher and shed exposure when both M1 and M2 are decelerating as we have shown in previous research. Importantly, the velocity of M2 money stock is inversely correlated with relative share prices and the current message is negative for consumer discretionary stocks as GDP is finally growing faster than M2 money growth (velocity of M2 money stock shown inverted, Chart 13). Chart 13...And Money Velocity Point To More Losses In Consumer Discretionary Not only are higher interest rates anchoring consumer discretionary stocks but rising energy prices are also dealing a blow to this sector. Chart 14 shows our Consumer Drag Indicator (CDI, comprising mortgage rates and energy prices). Historically, our CDI has been an excellent leading indicator of relative share price momentum. Currently, the message is clear: the sinking CDI signals that a bear market in consumer discretionary stocks has likely commenced. Chart 14Heed The Message From The Consumer Drag Indicator Sentiment and technical indicators also point to more downside ahead for this interest-rate sensitive index. Our sector advance/decline line is waning and EPS breadth has plunged (Chart 15). Worrisomely, sell-side analysts are penciling in an extremely optimistic 5-year outlook with EPS growth north of 30%/annum or twice as high as the overall market. Clearly this is not realistic as it assumes a near quadrupling of EPS in the coming 5 years. Chart 15Bad Breadth... In the near-term, analysts are more cautious (bottom panel, Chart 15). Relative EPS estimates have already given way as AMZN commands very little EPS weight, despite its massive market cap weight (30% of the S&P consumer discretionary sector), and suggests that relative share prices will converge lower (top panel, Chart 16). As a result, the 12-month forward P/E ratio is trading at a 27% premium to the broad market and significantly above the historical mean. Technicals are almost as extended as relative valuations and cyclical momentum has likely peaked, warning that a downdraft in relative share prices looms (Chart 16). Chart 16...With Poor Technicals And No Valuation Cushion Adding it up, a rising interest rate backdrop along with the Fed's quantitative tightening, the return of volatility, higher gasoline prices, stretched technicals and a lack of a valuation cushion, all suggest that it pays to remain bearish consumer discretionary stocks. Bottom Line: The path of least resistance is lower for the S&P consumer discretionary index, stay underweight. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Sector Insight, "A Rout For Conglomerates Opens A Buying Opportunity," dated October 31, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 "The crash of October 1987 sensitized investors to the potential for stock market crashes and forever changed their view of S&P 500® returns. Investors now realize that S&P 500 tail risk - the risk of outlier returns two or more standard deviations below the mean - is significantly greater than under a lognormal distribution. The Cboe SKEW Index ("SKEW") is an index derived from the price of S&P 500 tail risk. Similar to VIX®, the price of S&P 500 tail risk is calculated from the prices of S&P 500 out-of-the-money options. SKEW typically ranges from 100 to 150. A SKEW value of 100 means that the perceived distribution of S&P 500 log-returns is normal, and the probability of outlier returns is therefore negligible. As SKEW rises above 100, the left tail of the S&P 500 distribution acquires more weight, and the probabilities of outlier returns become more significant. One can estimate these probabilities from the value of SKEW. Since an increase in perceived tail risk increases the relative demand for low strike puts, increases in SKEW also correspond to an overall steepening of the curve of implied volatilities, familiar to option traders as the "skew"." Source: CBOE, http://www.cboe.com/products/vix-index-volatility/volatility-indicators/skew 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Icarus Moment?" dated October 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights Did October's equity rout ... : Before bouncing back in its final two sessions, October was the S&P 500's 12th-worst month of the postwar era. ... represent a watershed for financial markets?: Shaken investors have begun asking if the equity bull market is finally over, and if Treasury yields are in the process of making their cyclical highs. Not according to the macro backdrop, which still supports risk assets, ... : There is no recession in sight. An earnings contraction sufficient to induce an equity bear market, or a meaningful pickup in defaults, isn't imminent. ... or our rates checklist, which still supports a bearish take: Inflation may be taking its time, but nothing on our rates checklist calls for increasing duration in a bond portfolio. Feature U.S. equity investors were relieved to close the books on October, which was a notably bad month for the S&P 500. Its 7% loss was good for 33rd-worst in the postwar record books, and just missed being a -2 standard-deviation event. Had the month ended before its robust bounce in the final two sessions, it would have been the 12th-worst, two-and-a-half standard deviations below the mean (Chart 1). At its lowest point, a half-hour before the October 29th close, the index was down a whopping 10.5% for the month. Chart 1Standing Out From The Crowd The price action understandably unnerved investors. Monthly declines of this magnitude are almost always associated with bear markets; just seven of the thirty-two larger declines occurred outside of bear markets, two of them by the skin of their teeth. Decomposing the equity returns into changes in earnings estimates and changes in forward multiples shows that sharp multiple contraction is a feature of nearly every bad month (Table 1). Table 1Worst Postwar Monthly Declines It is estimate growth - a robust 0.8% - that makes October something of an outlier among the S&P 500's worst months, and we expect growing forward earnings will keep the S&P out of a bear market for another year, especially now that its multiple is more than 15% off its peak. Earnings growth should also keep spread product out of trouble for the time being. Although we recommend no more than an equal weight in corporate bonds, modest spread widening has boosted their total return prospects. Too Legit To Quit We expect that earnings will keep growing because they rarely contract in a meaningful way outside of recessions. With monetary accommodation likely reinforcing certain fiscal stimulus over the coming year, it is hard to see how the next U.S. recession will occur before 2020. As our U.S. bond strategists pointed out last week, the ongoing market implications of last month's equity decline depend on what precipitated it.1 Was it a simple correction sparked by a valuation reset, or has the market begun to sniff out an economic slowdown? With forward four-quarter earnings growing by an annualized 9.5% in October, it appears that the selloff was nothing more than a valuation reset. As our bond strategists point out, the picture was much different when the S&P 500 corrected in the summer of 2015 and the winter of 2015-16. Those corrections unfolded against the backdrop of a global manufacturing recession (Chart 2). The U.S. economy is not bulletproof, and slowing global growth and tighter financial conditions will eventually bring it to heel, but we think the next recession is still too far down the line for markets to begin selling off in advance of it. Chart 2The Fundamentals Are Much Improved From 2015-16 Checking In With Our Rates Checklist If macro conditions really did change for the worse last month, our bearish rates view may no longer apply, and we would have to rethink our underweight Treasury and below-benchmark-duration calls. We introduced our rates checklist in September to identify and track the key series that could trigger a view change. We review it now to see if perceptions of the Fed, inflation measures, labor-market developments, or financial-market excesses suggest that rates may be at a turning point (Table 2). Table 2Rates View Checklist Market Perceptions Of The Fed We continue to scratch our head over markets' refusal to take the FOMC's terminal-rate projections seriously. The overnight index swap (OIS) curves are calling for a measly two hikes over the next 12 months ... and the next 18 months ... and the next 24 as well (Chart 3). That would leave the terminal fed funds rate for this tightening cycle at a mere 2.75%. The median projection among FOMC voters is 3 1/8%, and we're looking for anywhere from 3.5 to 4%. We will have to start backing off once the gap between our expectations and the market's expectations begins to close, but it's only widened since we established the checklist. Chart 3Stubbornly Staying Behind The Curve We get to our 3.5-4% estimate on the premise that measured inflation will pick up enough to force the Fed to keep hiking beyond its own expectations in a bid to keep inflation from getting out of hand. Client meetings suggest that investors find our inflation call hard to swallow. Some eye-rolling when we mention the Phillips Curve is understandable, but our view is ultimately based on capacity constraints. Tepid investment in the years following the crisis have left the economy's productive potential ill-suited to meet the surge in aggregate demand provoked by tax cuts and fiscal stimulus. An inverted curve would indicate that the bond market has begun to anticipate that rate hikes will soon stifle the economy's momentum. For all the hand-wringing in the media about flattening over the 2-year/10-year segment of the curve, our preferred 3-month/10-year measure remains nowhere near inverting (Chart 4). The yield curve tends to invert way ahead of a recession, so we would look for other indicators to corroborate its message before we changed our big-picture take. We also note that a bear flattening would support below-benchmark-duration positioning. Chart 4The Fed Hasn't Gone Too Far Yet Bottom Line: The bond market remains well behind the Fed, and the Fed may well wind up behind the economy. A broad repricing of the Treasury curve awaits. Inflation Measures Inflation's slow creep has gotten a little slower since we initially rolled out the checklist. Headline PCE and CPI have hooked downward, though their uptrends remain intact (Chart 5). Looking forward, continued tightening of the output gap should boost inflation (Chart 6), though long-term expectations have stalled for now (Chart 7). Inflation is the only section of the checklist that has backslid since September, but not by nearly enough to justify checking any of the boxes. Chart 5Two Steps Forward, One Step Back Chart 6An Economy Running Hot ... Chart 7... Will Eventually Produce Inflation Labor Market Indicators The first item on our list of labor-market indicators is the unemployment gap, the difference between the unemployment rate and NAIRU. NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating-Inflation Rate of Unemployment), is the estimate of the lowest sustainable unemployment rate. The actual rate fell below NAIRU in early 2017, and the gap has been getting steadily more negative ever since (Chart 8, top panel). A negative gap is associated with higher compensation, but the wage response has been muted so far (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 8Supply And Demand Friday's October employment report pointed to further downward pressure on the unemployment gap. The three-month moving average of net payroll additions came in at 218,000, keeping job growth for the last seven years at around 200,000/month (Chart 9). If the trend were to continue for another twelve months, and population growth and the labor force participation rate (Chart 10, middle panel) were to remain constant, the Atlanta Fed Jobs Calculator2 projects that the unemployment rate will fall to 3%. Chart 9A Steady, Job-Rich Recovery Chart 10As 'Hidden' Unemployment Shrinks ... We understand investors' impatience with the Phillips Curve. We admit to being surprised that compensation growth hasn't shown more life to this point (Chart 11). Just because wage gains have been sluggish out of the gate, however, doesn't mean they won't speed up in the future. Ancillary indicators like the broader definition of unemployment that includes discouraged and involuntary part-time workers (Chart 10, top panel), and the ratio of workers voluntarily leaving their jobs (Chart 10, bottom panel), reinforce the unemployment rate's signal that the labor market is on its way to becoming as tight as a drum. Chart 11... Wages Should Rise Broader Indications Of Instability The final three items on our checklist are meant to flag factors that could bump the Fed off its gradual rate-hiking pace. Overheating would encourage the Fed to move more quickly, but there is nothing in the main cyclical elements of the economy that stirs concern (Chart 12). The Fed might move faster if its third mandate - preserving financial stability - dictated it, but the Fed has been quiet about financial-sector imbalances since Governor Brainard expressed concern about corporate lending two months ago. Finally, the Fed is not oblivious to economic strain in the rest of the world, but conditions in even the most vulnerable emerging markets are far from triggering some sort of "EM put." Chart 12No Sign Of Overheating Yet Investment Implications We remain constructive on the economy and markets in the absence of a near-term catalyst to cut off the expansion, the credit cycle and/or the equity bull market. Like our bond strategists, we simply think the U.S. economy is too healthy to merit revising our bearish view on rates. The implication for investors with a balanced mandate is to continue to underweight Treasuries. Within fixed-income portfolios, investors should continue to maintain below-benchmark duration. No investment stance is forever, and we are counting on our checklist to help keep us alert to an approaching inflection point in rates, but the coast is clear for now. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?," published October 30, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/calculator.aspx?panel=1
Highlights Investors are worrying too much about the things that caused the global financial crisis, and not enough about those that could cause the next downturn. Despite the recent patch of soft data, the U.S. housing market is in good shape. Go long homebuilders relative to the S&P 500. Imbalances in the corporate debt market have increased, but are not severe enough to generate systemic economic distress. U.S. rates will need to rise quite a bit more than the market anticipates before the economy slows by enough to force the Fed to back off. The combination of a stronger dollar and inadequate Chinese stimulus will continue to pressure emerging markets. Even Brazil's pro-capitalist new president may not be able to reverse the country's bleak fiscal dynamics. Our MacroQuant model, which predicted the correction, points to further near-term downside risk for global equities. The cyclical (12-to-18 month) outlook looks much better, however. Feature The Market's Maginot Line One of the most reliable ways to make money as an investor is to figure out the market's collective biases and trade against them. Behavioral economists have long noted that people tend to assign too much weight to recent experience in taking decisions. As a result, in finance, as in military strategy, there is a constant temptation to fight the last war. The last war policymakers waged was against the scourge of deflation that followed the housing bust and financial crisis. For much of the past decade, investors have held a magnifying glass over anything that could possibly resemble the conditions that led up to the Global Financial Crisis. While such behavior is understandable, it is misplaced. History suggests that both lenders and borrowers tend to act prudently for years, if not decades, following major financial crises. Mistakes are still made, but they are different mistakes. People overcompensate. They obsess about the past rather than focusing on the future. U.S. Housing Is Okay There is no denying that the U.S. housing market has softened this year (Chart 1). Housing starts, building permits, and home sales have all fallen. Residential investment has subtracted from GDP growth over three consecutive quarters. Chart 1Housing Has Been A Drag On The U.S. Economy This Year There is little mystery as to why the housing market has been on the back foot. The Trump tax bill capped the deduction on state and local property taxes, while reducing the amount of mortgage debt on which homeowners can deduct interest payments from $1 million to $750,000. This had a negative effect on housing activity, especially in high-tax Democrat-leaning states with elevated real estate prices. More importantly, mortgage rates have risen by over 100 basis points since last August. Chart 2 shows that home sales and construction almost always decline after mortgage rates rise. In this respect, the weakness in housing activity is reminiscent of the period following the taper tantrum, when housing activity also slowed sharply. Chart 2No Mystery Why U.S. Housing Has Been Weak... We do not expect mortgage rates to fall from current levels. But they are not going to rise at the same pace as they have over the past year. Thus, while the headwinds from higher financing costs will not disappear, they will abate to some extent. Fundamentally, the housing market is on solid ground (Chart 3). Mortgage rates are still well below their historic average. Home prices have risen considerably, but do not appear excessively stretched compared to rents or incomes. Unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate is near its historic lows. Residential investment stands at only 3.9% of GDP, compared with a peak of 6.7% of GDP in the second half of 2005. The average age of the residential capital stock has risen by nearly five years since 2006, the largest increase since the Great Depression. With household formation rebounding briskly from its post-recession lows, homebuilders are still arguably not churning out enough new homes. Chart 3A...But Fundamentals Are Still In Good Shape (I) Chart 3B...But Fundamentals Are Still In Good Shape (II) Mortgage lenders have learned from past mistakes (Chart 4). While lending standards have eased modestly over the past 4 years, underwriting standards have remained high. The average FICO score for new borrowers is more than 40 points above pre-recession levels. The Urban Institute Housing Credit Availability index, which measures the percentage of home purchase loans that are likely to default over the next 90 days, is at reassuringly low levels. This is particularly the case for private-label mortgages, whose default risk has hovered at just over 2% during the past few years, down from a peak of 22% in 2006. Moreover, banks today hold much more high-quality capital than in the past, which gives them additional space to absorb losses (Chart 5). Chart 4Lending Standards Have Been Tight, But Are Starting To Loosen Chart 5U.S. Banks Are Well Capitalized With all this in mind, we are initiating a new strategic trade to go long U.S. homebuilders relative to the S&P 500.1 Corporate Debt: How Big Are The Risks? Unlike household debt, U.S. corporate debt has risen over the past decade and now stands at a record high level as a share of GDP. The quality of the lending has also been less than pristine, as evidenced by the proliferation of "covenant lite" loans. The interest coverage ratio for the economy as a whole - defined as the volume of profits corporations generate for every dollar of interest paid - is still above its historic average (Chart 6). However, this number is skewed by a few mega-cap tech companies that hold a lot of cash and have little debt. Chart 6Interest Coverage Looks Relatively High My colleague Mark McClellan, who writes our monthly Bank Credit Analyst publication, has shown that the interest coverage ratio for companies comprising the Bloomberg Barclays index would drop close to the lows of the Great Recession if interest rates were to rise by a mere 100 basis points across the corporate curve. The damage would be far worse if profits also fell by 25% in this scenario.2 While the corporate debt market has become increasingly frothy, it does not pose an imminent danger to the economy. There are several reasons for this. First, while U.S. corporate debt is high in relation to the past, it is still quite low in comparison with many other economies (Chart 7). The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP, for example, is 30 percentage points higher in the euro area. This suggests that U.S. businesses still have the "carrying capacity" to take on additional debt. Chart 7U.S. Corporate Debt Is Not That High By Global Standards Second, the average maturity of U.S. corporate debt has risen over the past decade, with an increasing share of companies opting for fixed over floating-rate borrowings. This implies that it will take a while for the effect of higher rates to make their way through the system. Third, and perhaps most importantly, corporate bonds are generally held by non-leveraged investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate-sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart 8). The share of leveraged loans held by banks has declined from about 25% a decade ago to less than 10% today. Chart 8Banks Have Reduced Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Tellingly, we already had a dress rehearsal for what a corporate debt scare might look like. Credit spreads spiked in 2015. Default rates rose, but the knock-on effects to the financial system were minimal (Chart 9). This suggests that corporate America could withstand quite a bit of monetary tightening without buckling under the pressure. Chart 9The 2015 Debt Scare Did Not Topple The Economy Government Debt: No Worries... Yet If the risks posed by both the housing market and corporate debt market are contained, what about the risks posed by soaring government debt? The long-term fiscal outlook is certainly bleak, but the near-term risks are low.3 President Trump's tweets aside, the U.S. has an independent central bank which has been able to keep inflation expectations well anchored. The U.S. private sector is also running a financial surplus at the moment, meaning that it earns more than it spends (Chart 10). Not only does this make the economy more resilient, it also provides the government with additional savings with which to finance its fiscal deficit. Chart 10The U.S. Private Sector Is A Net Saver The private sector's financial balance will deteriorate over the next two years as household savings decline and corporate investment rises. This will put upward pressure on Treasury yields. However, if rising yields are reflective of stronger aggregate demand, this is unlikely to derail the economy. When Things Break Recessions are usually caused when the Fed raises rates by enough to undermine spending on interest rate-sensitive purchases such as housing, or when higher rates prick an asset bubble just waiting to burst. Given the lack of clear imbalances either in the real economy or financial markets, the Fed may have to raise rates significantly more than the market is currently anticipating. In fact, far from having to press the pause button midway through next year, our baseline expectation is that the Fed will expedite the pace of rate hikes in late 2019 as inflation finally starts to accelerate. Aggressive Fed rate hikes combined with an incrementally less expansionary fiscal policy will sow the seeds of a recession in late 2020 or 2021. Before the next U.S. downturn arrives, the dollar will have strengthened further. A resurgent greenback will cast a long shadow over emerging markets and commodity producers. As we discussed last week, China is unlikely to save the day by launching a massive stimulus program of the sort that it orchestrated in both 2009 and 2015.4 True, not all emerging markets are equal. Emerging Asia is more resilient now than it was two decades ago. Thailand, for example, was patient zero for the Asian crisis in 1997. Today, it sports a current account surplus of over 10% of GDP and low levels of external debt. This resilience will not prevent Asian economies from experiencing slower growth on the back of weaker Chinese demand, but it will prevent a full-blown balance of payments crisis from spiraling out of control. In contrast to Emerging Asia, Latin America looks more vulnerable (Table 1). BCA's chief emerging market strategist, Arthur Budaghyan, wisely upgraded Brazilian assets on a tactical basis on October 9th ahead of the presidential elections. Nevertheless, Arthur still worries that Brazil's daunting fiscal challenges - the budget deficit currently stands at 7.8% of GDP and the IMF expects government debt to rise to nearly 100% of GDP over the next five years (Chart 11) - are so grave that even South America's answer to Donald Trump may not be able to save the Brazilian economy. Table 1Vulnerability Heat Map For Key EM Markets Chart 11Brazil Is Fiscally Challenged A Correction, Not A Bear Market The current market environment bears some similarities to the late 1990s. The Fed is tightening monetary policy in order to keep the domestic economy from overheating. The U.S. economy is responding to higher rates to some extent, but the main effects are being felt overseas. The Asian Crisis did not end the bull market in U.S. stocks, but it did generate a few nasty selloffs, the most notable being the 22% peak-to-trough decline in the S&P 500 between July 20 and October 8, 1998. We witnessed such a selloff this October. The bad news is that our MacroQuant model is pointing to additional equity weakness over the coming weeks (Chart 12). The model tends to downgrade stocks whenever growth is slipping, financial conditions are tightening, and sentiment is deteriorating from bullish levels. All three of these things are currently occurring. Chart 12MacroQuant* Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted The good news is that none of our recession indicators are flashing red. Since recessions and bear markets typically overlap (Chart 13), the odds are high that the current stock market correction will be just that, a correction. Chart 13Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 The corresponding ETFs are long ITB/short SPY. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "The Long Shadow Of The Financial Crisis," dated October 25, 2018. 3 It is actually not even clear that a loss of confidence in America's fiscal management would cause a recession. The Fed largely determines borrowing costs at the short-to-medium end of the yield curve, which is where the government finances most of its debt. If people lose confidence in the dollar, they will either need to run down their cash balances by purchasing more goods and services or try to move their wealth abroad. The former will directly increase aggregate demand, while the latter will indirectly increase it through a weaker currency. To be clear, we are not suggesting that such an outcome would be beneficial to the economy; it would, among other things, greatly slow potential GDP growth by discouraging investment. But the near-term effect would likely be economic overheating and rising inflation rather than a recession. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Stimulus: Not So Stimulating," dated October 26, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report Dear Client, Next week, I am on the road in the Middle East visiting clients and teaching the BCA Academy Principles of Global Macro course. There will be no regular Weekly Report on November 9th. Instead, we will be sending you a Special Report on November 6th written by my colleague Rob Robis, who runs BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service. In this piece, Rob will be discussing the outlook for Euro Area monetary policy and its implications for rate markets and the euro. This is an especially relevant topic as the end of the ECB's Asset Purchase Program is scheduled to soon materialize. I trust you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights Uncovered Interest Rate Parity still works for currencies. However, it needs to be based on a combination of short- and long-term real rates. Currencies are also affected by global risk appetite, as approximated by corporate spreads and commodity prices. Based on our timing models, the dollar is now fairly valued on short-term basis. However, slowing global growth and robust U.S. activity suggest that the dollar has room to rally further, with our models pointing to a move in the greenback's favor. These conflicting forces suggest the dollar's easy gains are behind us, and any further dollar rally will prove much more volatile. Feature In July 2016, in a Special Report titled, "In Search Of A Lost Timing Model," we introduced a set of intermediate-term models to complement our long-term fair value models for various currencies.1 These groups of models provide additional discipline - a sanity check if you will - to our regular analysis. Additionally, these models can help global equity investors manage their currency exposure, thanks to their ability to increase the Sharpe ratio of global equity portfolios vis-Ã -vis other hedging strategies, and also for a host of base-currencies.2 In this report, we review the logic underpinning these intermediate-term models and provide commentary on their most recent readings for the G10 currencies vis-Ã -vis the USD. UIP, Revisited The Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) relationship is at the core of this modeling exercise. This theory suggests that an equilibrium exchange rate is what will make an investor indifferent between holding the bonds of Country A or Country B. This means that as interest rates rise in Country A relative to Country B, the currency of Country B will fall today in order to appreciate in the future. These higher expected returns are what will drive investors to hold the lower-yielding bonds of Country B. There has long been debate as to whether investors should focus on short rates or long rates when looking at exchange rates through the prism of UIP. This debate has regained vigor in the past six months as the dollar has greatly lagged the levels implied by 2-year rate differentials (Chart 1). Research by the Federal Reserve and the IMF suggests that incorporating longer-term rates to UIP models increase their accuracy.3 This informational advantage works whether policy rates are or aren't close to their lower bound.4 Chart 1Interest Rate Parity: Generally Helpful, But... Incorporating long-term rates as an explanatory variable increases the performance of UIP models because exchange rate movements not only reflect current interest rate conditions, but currency market investors also try to anticipate the path of interest rates over many periods. By definition, long-term bonds do just that, as they are based on the expected path of short rates over their maturity - as well as a term premium, which compensates for the uncertain nature of future interest rates. There is another reason why long-term rate differential changes improve the power of UIP models. Since UIP models are based on the concept of indifference among investors between assets in two countries, changes in the spreads between 10-year bonds in these two countries will create more volatility in the currency pair than changes in the spreads between 3-month rates. This is because an equivalent delta in the 10-year spread will have a much greater impact on the relative prices of the bonds than on the short-term paper, courtesy of their much more elevated duration. To compensate for these greater changes in prices, the currency does have to overshoot its long-term PPP to a much greater extent to entice investors trading the long end of the curve. Bottom Line: The interest rate parity relationship still constitutes the bedrock of any shorter-term currency fair value model. However, to increase its accuracy, both long-term and short-term rates should be used. Real Rates Really Count Another perennial question regarding exchange rate determination is whether to use nominal or real rate differentials. At a theoretical level, real rates are what matter. Investors can look through the loss of purchasing power created by inflation. Therefore, exchange rates overshoot around real rate differentials, not nominal ones. On a practical level, there are additional reasons to believe that real rates should matter, especially when trying to explain currency moves beyond a few weeks. Indeed, various surveys and studies on models used by forecasters and traders show that FX professionals use purchasing power parity as well as productivity differential concepts when setting their forex forecasts.5 Indeed, as Chart 2 illustrates, real rate differentials have withstood the test of time as an explanatory variable for exchange rate dynamics, albeit with periods where rate differentials and the currency can deviate from one another. Chart 2Real Rates Work Better Over The Long Run It is true that very often, nominal rate differentials can be used as a shorthand for real rate differentials, as both interest rate gaps tend to move together. However, regularly enough, they do not. In countries with very depressed inflation expectations (Japan immediately comes to mind), nominal and real rate differentials can in fact look very different (Chart 3). With the informational cost of incorporating market-based inflation expectations being very low, we find the shorthand unnecessary when building UIP-based models. Chart 3Real And Nominal Rate Spreads Can Differ Finally, it is important to remark that in environments of high inflation, inflation differentials dominate any other factor when it comes to exchange rate determination. However, the currencies discussed in this report currently are not like Zimbabwe or Latin America in the early 1980s. Bottom Line: When considering an intermediate-term fair value model for exchange rates, investors should focus on real - not nominal - long-term rate differentials. Global Risk Aversion And Commodity Prices Global risk appetite is also a key factor in trying to model exchange rates. Risk-aversion shocks tend to lead to appreciation in the U.S. dollar, which benefits from its status as the global reserve currency.6 Much literature has focused on the use of the VIX as a gauge for global risk appetite. Our exercise shows stronger explanatory power with options-adjusted spreads on junk bonds (Chart 4). Chart 4The Dollar Benefits From Global Stresses Commodity prices, too, play a key role. Historically, commodity prices have displayed a very strong negative correlation with the dollar.7 This correlation is obviously at its strongest for commodity-producing nations, as rising natural resources prices constitute a terms-of-trade shock for them. However, this relationship holds up for the euro as well, something already documented by the European Central Bank.8 The Models The models for each cross rate are built to reflect the insight gleaned above. Each cross is modeled on three variables, with the model computed on a weekly timeframe. Real rates differentials: We use the average of 2-year and 10-year real rates. The rates are deflated using inflation expectations. Global risk appetite approximated by junk OAS. Commodity prices: We use the Bloomberg Continuous Commodity Index. For all countries, the variables are statistically highly significant and of the expected signs. These models help us understand in which direction the fundamentals are pushing the currency. We refer to these as Fundamental Intermediate-Term Models (FITM). We created a second set of models, based on the variables above, which also include a 52-week moving average for each cross. The real rates differentials, junk spreads and commodity prices remain statistically very significant and of the correct sign. They are therefore trend- and risk-appetite adjusted UIP-deviation models. These models are more useful as timing indicators on a three- to nine-month basis, as their error terms revert to zero much faster. We refer to these as Intermediate-Term Timing Models (ITTM). Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com The U.S. Dollar To model the dollar index (DXY), we used two approaches. In the first one, we took all the deviation from fair value for the pairs constituting the index, based on their weights in the DXY. In the second approach, we ran the model specifically for the DXY, using the three variables described above. U.S. real rates were compared to an average of euro area, Japanese, Canadian, British, Swiss and Swedish real rates, weighted by their contribution to the DXY. We then averaged both approaches, which gave us very similar results to begin with. Currently, there is no evident mispricing in the USD, as it trades near fair value when compared to both the FITM (Chart 5) and ITTM. While this means that the easy part of the dollar rally is behind us, it does not imply that the rally is over. As Chart 6 illustrates, periods of dollar strength tend to end when the dollar trades at a 5% premium to the ITTM. This would imply that a move to 102 on the DXY is likely over the coming months. Moreover, the widening interest rate differential between the U.S. and the rest of the world, as well the bout of rising volatility the world is experiencing, should continue to push the fair values of both the FITM and ITTM higher. Chart 5Fundamentals Continue To Help The Dollar Chart 6More Upside Is Possible The Euro As a mirror image to the DXY, there is no evident mispricing in EUR/USD. Currently, based on both the FITM and the ITTM, the euro trades at a small premium to fair value (Chart 7). However, the sell signal generated by the deviation from the ITTM in 2017 is still in place, as periods of overvaluation tend to be followed by periods of undervaluation (Chart 8). This indicator will only generate a buy signal for the euro once EUR/USD falls 5% below equilibrium, or to a level of 1.06. Moreover, this target is a moving one. European growth and inflation continue to disappoint, as the euro area feels the drag of a slowing China and decelerating global growth. This means that interest rate differentials are likely to continue to move in a euro-bearish fashion in the coming months. Hence, the flattening in the FITM that materialized in 2018 is at risk of becoming an outright deterioration. Chart 7Fundamentals For The Euro Are Deteriorating Chart 8EUR/USD Is Not Cheap The Yen In an environment of rising global bond yields, the FITM for the yen continues to trend south, as Japanese rates lag well behind U.S. interest rates (Chart 9). This means the yen is once again trading at a small premium to its FITM, implying that even if global risk assets sell off further, the upside for the yen against the dollar may prove limited. However, the picture for the yen against the ITTM is more benign. The yen is at equilibrium on this basis (Chart 10). However, due to the design of the ITTM, previous periods of overvaluations tend to be followed by periods of undervaluation. As a result, on the basis of this model, the yen could continue to experience downside against the dollar over the coming three to six months. This will be even truer if U.S. bond yields can continue to rise. Chart 9Rate Differentials Continue To Hurt The Yen Chart 10More Downside Ahead If U.S. Yields Keep Rising The British Pound The GBP/USD has deteriorated in recent weeks, a move that was mimicked by cable itself. As a result, the pound does not show any evident mispricing on this basis against the USD (Chart 11). The ITTM corroborates this message, as GBP/USD trades at a marginal 1% discount to this indicator (Chart 12). This upholds our analysis of September 7, which showed there was little risk premium embedded in the pound to compensate investors for the risks associated with the Brexit negotiations and the cloudy British political climate.9 Since British politics remain a minefield, this lack of valuation cushion suggests that the GBP is likely to continue to swing widely. As a result, a strategy to be long volatility in the pound, or to bet on the reversal of both large upside and downside weekly moves in the GBP, remains our preferred approach. Chart 11Cable Is At Equilibrium Chart 12Small Valuation Cushion Could Be Problem If Political Risk Increases The Canadian Dollar Despite the softening evident in the Loonie's FITM, the Canadian dollar continues to trade at a substantial discount to this fair value model (Chart 13). However, the FITM for the CAD is at risk of weakening further as oil prices have begun to be engulfed in the weakness that has gripped EM and risk assets globally. Mitigating this message, on the eve of the announcement of the USMCA trade deal, which essentially kept in place the trade relationships that existed between the U.S. and Canada under NAFTA, the Loonie was trading at a 1.5 sigma discount to the ITTM, a level normally constituting a buy signal (Chart 14). As a result, we expect the Canadian dollar to not be as sensitive to commodity price weakness as would have been the case had the CAD traded at a premium to its ITTM. This is one factor explaining why the Canadian dollar remains one of our favorite currencies outside the USD for the coming three to six months. The second favorable factor for the CAD is that the Bank of Canada is likely to hike interest rates at the same pace as the Fed. Hence, unlike with other currencies, interest rate differentials are unlikely to move against the CAD. Chart 13Loonie Trades At A Big Discount To Fundamentals... Chart 14...Which Will Help The CAD Mitigate A Fall In Oil Prices The Swiss Franc Like the euro, the Swiss franc trades in line with both its FITM and ITTM fair values (Chart 15). Moreover, the CHF has been hovering around its fair value for nearly a year now, which means there is less of a case for an undershoot of the ITTM fair value than for currencies that have experienced recent overshoot (Chart 16). Moreover, if volatility in financial markets remains elevated, and volatility within the bond market picks up, the fair value of the Swissie could experience some upside. However, this is where the positives for the Swiss franc end. The Swiss economy remains mired by underlying deflationary weaknesses, reflecting the lack of Swiss pricing power as well as the tepid growth of Swiss wages. As a result, the interest rate differential components of the models are likely to continue to represent a headwind for the CHF, especially as the Swiss National Bank remains firmly dovish and wants to keep real interest rates at low levels in order to weigh on the franc and also stimulate domestic demand. Based on these bifurcated influences, while we remain negative on the CHF against both the dollar and the euro on a cyclical basis, EUR/CHF may remain under downward pressure over the coming three to six months. Chart 15No Valuation Mismatch... Chart 16...Implies That The CHF Will Be At The Mercy Of Central Banks The Australian Dollar While the Australian dollar continues to trade at a significant premium against long-term models, it now trades at an important discount against both its FITM and ITTM equilibria (Chart 17). However, the problem for the AUD is that the FITM estimates continue to trend lower as Australian interest rates are lagging U.S. rates, especially in real terms. This is a direct consequence of the Reserve Bank of Australia maintaining the cash rate at multi-generational lows, while the Fed keeps hiking its own policy benchmark. With real estate prices sagging in both Melbourne and Sydney, as well as with a lack of wage growth and inflationary pressures, this down-under dichotomy is likely to remain in place and further weigh on the AUD. Meanwhile, while it is true that the AUD is also trading at a discount to its ITTM, historically, the Aussie has bottomed at slightly deeper levels of undervaluation (Chart 18). When all these factors are taken in aggregate, they suggest that for the AUD to fall meaningfully from current levels, we need to see more EM pain, more Chinese economic weaknesses, and commodity prices following these two variables lower. While this remains BCA's central scenario for the coming three to six months, if this scenario does not pan out the AUD could experience a sharp rebound over that timeframe. Chart 17Discount In AUD Emerging... Chart 18...But Not Yet Large Enough The New Zealand Dollar The NZD now trades at an even greater discount to both its FITM and ITTM equilibria than the AUD (Chart 19). In fact, so large is this discount that the ITTM is flashing a buy signal for the kiwi (Chart 20). This further confirms the view that we espoused 3 weeks ago that the NZD was set to rebound. As a result, we remain comfortable with our tactical recommendation of buying NZD/USD and selling GBP/NZD. The long NZD/USD position is definitely the riskier one of the two, as the NZD's upside may be limited if EM markets sell off further. In fact, NZD/USD traded at an even greater discount to its ITTM fair value when EM markets were extremely weak in late 2015 and early 2016. However, EM spreads are narrower and EM equities today trade well above the levels that prevail in those days, implying a margin of safety exists for the NZD. Meanwhile, short GBP/NZD is less likely to be challenged by weak EM asset prices, especially as in a post-Brexit environment the U.K. needs global risk aversion to stay low and global liquidity to remain ample in order to finance its large current account deficit of 3.3% of GDP. Chart 19NZD Is Now So Cheap... Chart 20...That It Is A Buy The Norwegian Krone The Norwegian krone continues to trade at a large discount to its FITM. However, this pair often experiences large and persistent deviations from this model (Chart 21). Nonetheless, it is important to note that as real interest rate differentials between the U.S. and Norway continue to widen, the fundamental drivers of the NOK are set to deteriorate further. By construction, the ITTM has proven to be a more reliable indicator for the Norwegian krone. While the NOK is currently at fair value on this metric, it is concerning that the upward trend in the ITTM has ended and that the equilibrium value for this currency has begun to deteriorate (Chart 22). As such, if oil prices are not able to find a floor at current levels, USD/NOK is likely to experience additional upside. This is because on a three- to six-month basis, there is not enough of a valuation cushion embedded in the NOK at current levels to prevent the Norwegian krone from experiencing deleterious effects in a weak energy price environment. Chart 21The NOK Fundmentals's Are Still Pointing South Chart 22...And The NOK Remains Vulnerable Versus The USD The Swedish Krona The very easy monetary policy conducted by the Riksbank is the key factor explaining why the Swedish krona remains so weak. Indeed, despite a robust economy, Swedish real interest rates are lagging well behind U.S. rates, which is putting strong downward pressure on the SEK's FITM (Chart 23). Meanwhile, despite the SEK's prodigious weakness, this currency only trades at a modest, statistically insignificant discount to its ITTM (Chart 24). This picture suggests that for the SEK to appreciate, the Riksbank needs to become much more aggressive. It is true that the Swedish central bank has flagged an imminent rise in interest rates, but the pace of increase will continue to lag far behind the Fed's own tightening. Moreover, the weakness in global trade is likely to hamper Swedish growth as Sweden is a small, open economy very influenced by gyrations in global industrial activity. As a result, the current slowdown in global trade may well give the Riksbank yet another excuse to only timidly remove monetary accommodation. This suggests that both the FITM and ITTM for the SEK have downward potential. Chart 23The Riskbank Still Hurts The SEK Chart 24...And The Krona Needs To Build A Greater Valuation Cushion 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Global Investment Strategy Special Report titled, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets", dated February 26, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Global Asset Allocation Special Reports titled, "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors", dated September 29, 2017, and "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors (Part II)", dated October 13, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gaa.bcaresearch.com 3 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori, "U.S. Dollar Dynamics: How Important Are Policy Divergence And FX Risk Premiums?" IMF Working Paper No.16/125 (July 2016); and Michael T. Kiley, "Exchange Rates, Monetary Policy Statements, And Uncovered Interest Parity: Before And After The Zero Lower Bound," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-17, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (January 2013). 4 Michael T. Kiley (January 2013). 5 Please see Yin-Wong Cheung and Menzie David Chinn, "Currency Traders and Exchange Rate Dynamics: A Survey of the U.S. Market," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 251 (February 2000); and David Hauner, Jaewoo Lee, and Hajime Takizawa, "In which exchange rate models do forecasters trust?" IMF Working Paper No.11/116 (May 2010) for revealed preference approach based on published forecasts from Consensus Economics. 6 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori (July 2016) 7 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori (July 2016) 8 Francisco Maeso-Fernandez, Chiara Osbat, and Bernd Schnatz, "Determinants Of The Euro Real Effective Exchange Rate: A BEER/PEER Approach," Working Paper No.85, European Central Bank (November 2001). 9 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Assesing The Geopolitical Risk Premium In the Pound", dated September 7, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Investors looking for equity upside, along with fixed-income-like downside protection, coupled with a hedge against rising rates, should consider convertible bonds. As we near the end of the business cycle, the attractions of convertibles are becoming clearer: investors will benefit from more upside capture in case of a last run-up in stocks, but at the same time suffer less downside in a recession. Moreover, in periods of rising rates, convertible bonds perform well compared to other traditional fixed-income securities. However, multi-asset portfolio managers should note that the risk-return profile of convertible bonds is more like equities than bonds, and so convertibles have no place in a conservative fixed-income portfolio. Investors have a number of options to choose from when customizing equity-versus-fixed-income exposure in their convertible allocations. Feature Introduction An ideal financial instrument would have large equity exposure in an equity bull market, and increased fixed-income exposure in a bear market. Financial engineering can create synthetic positions using derivatives to replicate just this sort of hybrid exposure - or an investor can just buy convertible bonds. In this current, late, phase of the business cycle - with increased volatility, rising interest rates, and a pickup in inflation - where can investors find shelter, but without sacrificing returns in the event of a last blow-out run-up in stocks? In this report, we discuss how convertible bonds - despite their somewhat complex structure1 - could be the answer. Issuers prefer convertibles to traditional corporate bonds because of: 1) a lower coupon rate and fewer covenants, 2) the opportunity to sell equity at a premium to the current price, 3) a faster process for raising capital, compared to a secondary equity issue, and 4) easier access to capital markets for non-investment grade firms. On the demand side, the composition of convertible investors has evolved over time. Prior to the 2007-9 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), proprietary trading desks and leveraged hedge funds were the most important players, since convertible arbitrage2 was very profitable. But the liquidity freeze in 2008 and 2009 forced these short-term investors out of the market and brought back long-term buy-and-hold investors. Currently 65% of U.S. convertible bonds are held by long-only investors. This change in market structure has had important implications for arbitrage opportunities (Chart 1). Chart 1Fewer Short-Term Investors In the first half of 2018, issuance of global convertible securities topped $57 billion, the largest amount for a six-month period since 2008. The U.S. led the way, with issuance of $34 billion (Chart 2), followed by Asia ex-Japan at $12 billion, and Europe, $10 billion. The U.S. total includes $13.4 billion in convertible bond issuance by tech companies, the highest amount in the post-GFC period (Chart 2, panel 2). Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that full-year global issuance could be the highest in 12 years. The macro-backdrop for convertibles remains favorable: Chart 2Issuance Similar To Pre-Crisis Levels The hybrid equity/fixed-income exposure offers protection against rising rates because of its shorter duration; The new U.S. tax code limits interest deductibility, which strengthens the relative appeal of issuing a convertible security instead of a traditional bond; The return of volatility means investors benefit from holding a security with an embedded option; The flexibility of the asset class gives investors room to customize their exposure in terms of coupon rate, premium, and maturity. In this report, we start with the market structure and mechanics of convertible bonds. Next, we look at the four types of convertible bonds, which provide different risk-return profiles. In the following section, we analyze historical returns and performance in different market environments. Finally, we discuss the key asset allocation decisions involved in investing in convertible bonds. Our main findings are: Investors can customize their risk-return profile by choosing between high-volatility equity exposure (equity-sensitive convertibles), or more stable fixed-income exposure (credit-sensitive convertibles); Convertible bonds historically have generated an annualized return of 9.5% compared to 9.8% from equities, but with 2% lower volatility; Convertible bonds have a risk-return profile more like that of equities and junk bonds than that of investment-grade credit; In periods of rising rates and inflation, convertible bonds have outperformed their traditional fixed-income counterparts; In comparison to equities, convertibles capture more upside in bull markets than downside in bear markets; Investing in convertible bonds requires active management because of their varying degree of equity- and fixed-income sensitivity that changes over time. The Convertibles Market Convertible securities can be broken into three key groups: 1) convertible bonds (cash-pay3 and zero-coupon), 2) convertible preferred shares, and 3) mandatory convertibles. Cash-pay convertible bonds make up almost 80% of the outstanding market (Chart 3), while zero-coupon convertible bonds are almost non-existent. Mandatories and convertible preferred equities make up 15% and 7% respectively. Chart 3Convertibles Bonds Are 80% Of Convertibles Market... Before we delve deeper into the convertible bond markets, here are few key characteristics (Chart 4) of the other two groups: Chart 4...And Have The Best Risk-Adjusted Returns Convertible Preferred Equities are issued with a specific dividend rate that is generally higher than the dividend on common shares. They include an embedded option to convert to a specified number of common shares. Additionally, preferred dividends usually accumulate in arrears should the firm be unable to make a payment. The conversion rate increases with any increase in the common-share dividend. After the call protection expires, the company has the option of redeeming the issue at the stated par value. Mandatory Convertibles. These bonds automatically convert to common shares at a specified time. However, they do not offer downside protection since conversion can be into shares worth less than the original issue price. Rating agencies view these securities more as equities than bonds, giving firms an incentive to issue them from a balance-sheet perspective. Table 1 shows us that cash-pay (coupon paying convertible bonds) generated the highest return with the lowest volatility, thereby providing investors with the best risk-adjusted returns. Mandatory convertibles have a large excess kurtosis - driven by the forced conversion into equities at inopportune times. In bull and bear markets, it is clear convertible bonds did not enjoy the full upside provided by preferred shares and mandatories, but had 50% less downside in bear markets. Also, in periods of rising rates convertible bonds produced positive returns, but lagged both preferred shares and mandatory convertibles. Table 1Convertible Bonds' Risk-Return Profile A niche market exists for contingent convertibles (CoCos) - or, as they are sometimes called, anti-convertibles. Banks in the euro area issue CoCos to meet capital requirements and provide a cushion should they find themselves in a serious predicament. These typically pay a higher coupon than the bank's straight bonds to compensate for the possibility of a complete wipeout. In short, if all goes well you receive your fixed coupons and principal back at maturity. But, if things turn sour, the bonds convert to equity and the investor potentially loses everything. Mechanics Of Convertible Bonds Convertible bonds are a hybrid security issued as a senior unsecured bond with a fixed maturity (normally five years) with optionality to convert to a fixed number of shares. In exchange for the equity kicker, these bonds typically yield less and carry a lower coupon rate (Chart 5) than the issuer's comparable non-convertible debt. We describe the basics of convertible bonds in the Appendix. Chart 5The Cost Of An Embedded Option An investor considering an allocation to convertibles has four groups to choose from depending on his or her risk-return tolerance. The trade-off is between high volatility equity exposure versus more stable credit exposure. If the underlying stock does well, the convertible increases in value even without the investor exercising the option to convert into shares. If the stock does not appreciate, the investor retains the bond and collects regular coupons and par value at maturity. The interaction of market price with investment value and conversion price creates convertible bonds with different risk-return profiles: Credit Sensitive: A large decrease in the stock price has pushed the convertibles to trade close to their investment value (bond floor). These are out-of-the money convertibles, with a delta ranging from 10% to 40%, and also with large premium over investment value. The main factors affecting the pricing of such instruments are the level of interest rates and credit spreads. An investor has a small probability of generating large unexpected gains from underlying stock appreciation. Balanced: The stock price is close to the conversion price, making these at-the-money convertibles. They have a moderate premium to conversion value, and deltas in the range of 40-80%. Rising stock prices make the embedded call option more valuable, pushing the convertible price closer to the stock price. Long-term buy-and-hold investors looking to maintain a core allocation to convertibles should invest in balanced convertibles. Equity Sensitive: Convertibles that are deep in-the-money, trading near parity, with high deltas of over 80%, and generating returns that closely track equities. They still retain some downside protection due to seniority and par value at maturity even if they have most of the common share's upside potential. Distressed: As a company threatens to default or goes bankrupt, the value of the straight bond component declines to trade significantly below par. These bonds tend to have high degree of price volatility and low probability of return of capital. Risk & Return Convertible bond returns are driven by: 1) the bond component that is a function of rates, credit spreads, and curve effects; 2) the equity component, supported by the delta to the underlying stock price; and 3) the option component, that is a function of the underlying stock price and time to maturity. Convertibles combine characteristics of stocks and bonds (Chart 6), so they represent either lower-volatility equity exposure or enhanced fixed-income exposure. Over the past 24 years (Table 2), U.S. convertible bonds generated returns similar to U.S. equities, but with a lower volatility. However, relative to traditional corporate bonds, convertibles outperformed massively, but with much higher volatility. Looking at risk-adjusted returns, we see that convertible bonds have more similarity to equities and high-yield credit than to investment-grade credit (Chart 7). However, defaults in the convertible bond space have been close to 1%, which is significantly lower than the 4% in the high-yield credit market (Chart 8). This is because convertible bonds include a smaller proportion of issuers with high operating leverage, such as energy producers, and have a high representation of mature healthcare and technology companies. Chart 6Convertibles Vs. Traditional Table 2Better Than Equities, But More Volatile Than Traditional Bonds Chart 7Close To Equities & Junk Chart 8Lower Defaults Than Junk Bonds Short-term performance of the convertible bond market is driven by the composition of issuers, but long-term performance is driven by the performance of the different variables described above. In 1Q 2018, convertible bonds outperformed equities, largely due to technology and consumer staples convertibles. Technology convertibles saw a 11% gain, while the S&P technology sector was up only 3.5%. This was because technology convertible issuers were concentrated in the mid-cap growth segment, whereas the large-cap equity names are more heavily weighted in semiconductors. BCA has for two or three years been warning about the return of inflation and rising interest rates. Convertible bonds outperform traditional fixed income in periods of rising interest rates because: 1) rising rates are often coupled with periods of positive equity momentum, which benefits convertibles; 2) convertibles have lower duration than straight bonds. Since 1994, there have been 10 instances when the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield rose by more than 100 bps: convertible bonds outperformed in every instance. Additionally, convertible bonds enjoy a yield advantage: the average income return (coupon rate) on a convertible is greater than the dividend yield on the underlying stock. When investors allocate to convertible bonds from either their equity or fixed-income portfolio, the key consideration is upside versus downside exposure. When the underlying stock price rises, convertibles will capture a portion of the capital appreciation but, on the downside, convertibles continue to provide a consistent income flow and principal repayment at maturity. History tells us that convertibles capture more upside in bull markets than downside in bear markets. If the share price falls sharply below the conversion price, the convertible will react less and less to fluctuations in the underlying stock price. In short, convertible bonds provide more downside protection than stocks as market value will not drop below the investment value (bond floor). Convertibles also have a mechanism to offset rising equity volatility and rising rates. The embedded equity option in a convertible bond rises in value when volatility rises, providing a meaningful offset in contrast to equities that may suffer a drawdown. Over the long-run, convexity enables this asset to make the most of favorable stock market conditions, whilst suffering less in difficult conditions. As mentioned earlier, the risk-return profile of convertible bonds tends to have a closer relation with equities than with fixed income. Within fixed income, high-yield credit, which tends to have a return profile closely aligned with equities, has a strong correlation with convertible bonds. The greatest diversification potential is when convertible bonds are added to a portfolio of government bonds. However, investors should realize the risk-return profiles for convertibles and government bonds are very different, and an allocation to the former is only a possibility for an investor with a higher risk tolerance. What To Choose From? Equity Sensitive Versus Credit Sensitive Investors need to choose the right type of convertible bond depending on their risk tolerance. Equity-sensitive convertibles made up over 60% of the market prior to the GFC, but this proportion fell to around 20% during the recession (Chart 9). As stock prices tumble, the market price of convertibles get closer to the investment value (bond floor), and convertibles start behaving more like pure credit-sensitive bonds. Looking at total returns (Chart 10 & Table 3), it is clear that aggressive investors with a higher risk tolerance should invest exclusively in equity-sensitive convertibles. But investors looking to maintain a core long-term allocation to convertibles should focus on the balanced group. Despite being a small piece of the market, distressed convertibles are attractive return enhancers immediately after a recession. Investors looking for income return should prefer credit-sensitive or distressed convertibles over equity-sensitive ones. Equity-sensitive convertibles have the highest delta, making them the most vulnerable to underperformance in a downturn. Balanced convertibles have the highest vega, which means they are most impacted by increasing volatility - driven by both equity and rate volatility. In times of rising interest rates, equity-sensitive convertibles provide their best protection given their short duration. Credit- and rate-sensitive convertibles have almost double the duration, making them more vulnerable to rising rates. Chart 9Equity Vs. Fixed Income Exposure Chart 10Massive Outperformance By Equity Sensitive Table 3Equity Sensitive For The Aggressive, Credit Sensitive For The Conservative, Balanced For Everyone Small Cap Versus Large Cap Issues Investors can choose between convertible issues from companies of different size. Since the middle of the financial crisis, large-cap issues have grown to over 50% of the market (Chart 11), up from below 30%. The increase in market share was taken from small-cap issues, with mid-cap issues stable at 20% of the market. In terms of total returns (Chart 12 & Table 4), small cap outperformed both mid and, particularly, large caps. Part of this outperformance was due to the higher yield offered by small-cap issuers compared to their larger counterparts. In terms of equity sensitivity, small-cap issues currently have significantly lower delta than large caps. However, in times of rising volatility, small-cap issues lose more, driven by their higher vega. In terms of interest-rate sensitivity, all three sizes are roughly equally exposed given similar durations. Chart 11Bigger Is Not Always Better Chart 12Small Cap Outperforms Table 4Small Cap Provides The Best Value Investment Grade Versus The Rest A credit investor has one particularly important call: investment-grade versus high-yield. The situation is trickier for convertibles as over 60% of the bonds are unrated (Chart 13), thereby giving managers amply opportunity for alpha generation. Historical performance (Chart 14 & Table 5) shows that non-rated convertible bonds have a close relationship with non-investment-grade issues. Moreover, the relative performance of non-investment-grade and non-rated issues with investment grade issues follows a similar path. From an income-return perspective, both non-rated and non-investment-grade issues have lost their yield advantage since 2016. Investors are not receiving adequate yield for the additional risk they are taking with riskier issues. The return of volatility will have a smaller impact on investment-grade issues compared to the rest of the market because the former have a lower effective duration. Additionally, implied volatility is lower for investment-grade issues. Chart 13Over 60% Has No Credit Rating Chart 14Similar Return, But Different Risk Table 5No Rating = Source Of Alpha The Asset Allocation Decision The key question here is: are investors looking at convertible bonds (Chart 15) as part of an equity or a fixed-income allocation? Investors considering convertibles as part of their equity allocation are looking for a more defensive exposure and yield pick-up, and so should focus on balanced convertibles and not equity-sensitive ones. On the other hand, considering convertibles as part of fixed-income allocation will deliver equity exposure, and so investors should focus on credit-sensitive or balanced convertibles. Chart 15Somewhere Between Equities & Junk Another major factor is the investment horizon of the convertible allocation. A core strategic allocation to convertibles will require a hybrid exposure, providing lower-volatility equity exposure over multiple full market cycles. Such investors are looking for long-term equity upside, but are concerned about shorter-term downside equity volatility and should consider balanced convertibles. On the other hand, investors using convertibles as part of a tactical allocation, to make a short-term bet in order to diversify away from traditional fixed-income or equity exposure, should consider either equity-sensitive or credit-sensitive convertibles. The bottom-line is that convertible investing requires active management because these securities have varying degrees of equity and fixed-income sensitivity that change over time. In periods of rising equity markets, an investor with passive exposure to convertibles would automatically have a large holding in equity-sensitive convertibles with a high delta, thereby increasing his or her exposure to equity downside risk. For example, in February 2009, when markets troughed after the GFC, more than two-thirds of convertibles were trading as credit-sensitive instruments. An investor following a passive index in this situation would have had minimal exposure to equity-sensitive convertibles, and would thereby have had limited participation in the equity upside. Finally, the convertible universe is constantly evolving. The typical convertible bond is issued with a five-year life by a company in the early to mid stage of its corporate life cycle, seeking capital to grow. As time passes, the issuer matures to a point where it no longer needs convertibles in its capital structure. Nearly two-thirds of the current issuers of convertible were not in the market 10 years ago, while two-thirds of the S&P 500 members remain unchanged over this time. Aditya Kurian, Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com 1 Despite the complexities, the first convertible bond was issued as long ago as 1874 by Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg Railroad to finance a project. The bond was never converted since the underlying shares failed to rise enough and the company refinanced the bond in 1904. 2 For an explanation of convertible arbitrage, please see A Note On Convertible Arbitrage at the end of this report. 3 Convertible bonds that make regular coupon payments. A Note On Convertible Arbitrage A market-neutral hedge fund strategy where the manager goes long the convertible bond and short the underlying stock. The short position in the underlying stock creates a delta-neutral position, but maintaining this position requires dynamic hedging which is expensive. There is a possibility of large mispricing because of the over-the-counter nature of the market and uncertainty regarding call or redemption features of convertibles. Often, the embedded equity option is a source of cheap volatility compared to the underlying stock's listed options. A quick measure for convertible valuations is comparing the volatility of options in the market to the volatility priced in the embedded option in the convertible. If market volatility rises, but the price of convertible stays the same, the security could be cheap and attractive. Looking at historical performance (Table 6), convertible arbitrage generated almost 3% less than equities, but with less than half the volatility. However, all of the outperformance was during recessions or equity bear markets. Additionally, convertible arbitrage funds have large negative skew and kurtosis relative to both equities and the hedge-fund composite. We recommend investors allocate to convertible arbitrage hedge funds in preparation for a downturn. Table 6Convertible Arbitrage Versus Traditionals Appendix: The Basics Of Convertible Bonds Investment Value (Bond Floor): The fixed-income component of the convertible bond, or in other words, the value of the bond without the conversion feature (equity kicker). This remains stable over a wide range of stock prices but, when creditworthiness deteriorates, consequent stock price movements will have an impact on the investment value (IV). Holding creditworthiness constant, the IV provides the bond floor, below which the convertible should not trade. The IV fluctuates in tandem with the price of a straight corporate bond of similar quality. A convertible that is trading close to its IV will be more affected by changes in rates than one that is well above it. Investment Premium: The market price minus IV expressed as a percentage of IV. Premium over IV indicates the level of downside risk. A higher premium means the bond price is more sensitive to the price of underlying stock, which means less downside protection because the bond market price would have to decline significantly before reaching the IV. Higher premium is a result of rising underlying stock value, whereas a smaller premium is when the convertible is more interest-rate sensitive and behaves like a pure bond. Conversion Value (CV): The equity portion of the convertible bond. Conversion ratio is set at the time of issuance and it is the number of shares a bondholder will receive upon conversion. Conversion price is the price at which the number of converted shares is equal to the par value of the bond. At issuance, the underlying stock price is usually below conversion price. Conversion Premium: The market price minus CV expressed as a percentage of CV. As market price rises above CV, fixed-income attributes are lost and equity features take over, consequently decreasing conversion premium. Declining stock prices mean convertible market price approaches fixed-income value (bond floor) and conversion premium increases. Appendix Chart 1Preferred Shares & Mandatory Convertibles Have Higher Income Returns Appendix Chart 2Convertible Bonds' Delta & Vega Reduces In A Recession Appendix Chart 3Conversion Premium Far From Recessionary Levels Appendix Chart 4Average Duration Less Than 2.5 Appendix Chart 5U.S. Is 60% Of Global Appendix Chart 6U.S. Is Clearly The Best Performer Appendix Chart 7U.S. Also Provides The Best Income Return Appendix Chart 8But, U.S. Is The Most Equity Sensitive Appendix Chart 9U.S. Has A Higher Implied Volatility Appendix Chart 10Distressed Is The Best Solution Immediately After A Recession Appendix Chart 11Balanced Has The Lowest Coupon Appendix Chart 12Balanced Has Moderate Delta, But Highest Vega Appendix Chart 13Equity Sensitive Are The Best Rate Hedge Appendix Chart 14Premiums Are Stable Appendix Chart 15Mid-Cap Provides Low Income Return Appendix Chart 16Massive Delta & Vega Divergence Appendix Chart 17Large Cap Premium Has Risen The Most Appendix Chart 18Implied Volatility Is Similar Across The Board Appendix Chart 19ALl Coupon Rates Have Fallen Appendix Chart 20Investment Grade Has The Highest Delta Appendix Chart 21Underweight Duration = Investment Grade Convertibles Appendix Chart 22Premiums Stable
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of October 31, 2018. The quant model downgraded U.S. and Italy to underweight from overweight while upgrading Canada to a slight overweight from underweight, largely due to changes in technical and valuation conditions. Now the model is overweight 5 countries (Netherland, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and Canada) and underweight 7 countries (Japan, U.S., U.K., France, Australia, Sweden and Italy), as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, both Level 1 and Level 2 of the model system outperformed in October by 6bps and 57 bps, respectively, resulting in an outperformance of 24 bps from the overall model. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its benchmarks by 44 bps, driven by Level 2 outperformance of 121 bps and Level 1 outperformance of 2bps. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model," dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model Dear Client, As advised last month, we have suspended the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model due to the significant changes in the GICS sector classifications, implemented at the end of September. We will rebuild the model using the newly constituted sectors once full back data is available from MSCI, which we understand will be in December. We thank you for your understanding.
Dear Client, You will see in this Monthly Portfolio Update that we have expanded our table of Recommendations to include a wider range of the views that Global Asset Allocation (GAA) regularly discusses in its publications. Please see our most recent Quarterly Portfolio Outlook1 for a detailed explanation of those recommendations that we do not specifically touch on in this Monthly. A note on our publication schedule. We will not publish a Monthly for December, or a Q1 2019 Quarterly in mid-December. Instead, we will send you in late November the BCA 2019 Outlook (BCA's annual discussion with Mr. and Ms. X). This will be accompanied by a short GAA note, updating our recommendation tables with a brief commentary. Best Regards, Garry Evans A Correction, Not A Bear Market Investors have a tendency to forget that corrections are common in bull markets. The current equity run-up, which began in March 2009, has seen five corrections (defined as a 10-20% decline in the S&P500). We may now be experiencing the sixth, with the index already down 9.9% from its peak on September 20. Recommendations But we think the evidence is fairly strong that this is just a correction and not the beginning of a new bear market (using the common definition of a 20% or greater fall). It is highly unusual for bear markets to occur - and for bonds to outperform equities - except in the run-up to, and during, recessions (Chart 1). We see little to suggest that a recession in on the horizon over the next 12 months. Chart 1Corrections Are Not At All Rare What caused the correction? The immediate trigger was a seemingly concerted series of statements in early October from FOMC officials, including even doves such as Lael Brainard, that economic circumstances are "remarkably positive" and that rates remain "a long way from neutral" (to quote Fed Chair Jay Powell). In particular, New York Fed President John Williams argued that the neutral rate of interest (the r*) is very uncertain - even though he was joint creator of the main model that estimates it. The implication is that the Fed will keep on raising rates until the economy clearly slows. This pushed the 10-year Treasury yield above 3.2%. Markets are starting to worry that the Fed will make a policy mistake and that certain segments of the economy (housing, emerging markets?) may be too weak to withstand tighter monetary policy. Moreover, this is in a context in which global growth has been weakening (Chart 2), China appears to be slowing quite sharply (Chart 3), the trade war is escalating (with the U.S. now threatening to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports), and valuations for most assets are stretched. Chart 2Outside The U.S., Growth Is Slowing Chart 3Sharp Slowdown Ahead For China? So how worried should investors be? Most of the usual indicators of generalized risk aversion have not flashed strong warning signals during the equity market sell-off (Chart 4). The move up in bond yields came mostly from a rise in real yields, not inflation expectations, and the yield curve steepened, suggesting that markets are pricing in stronger growth not excessive Fed action. Safe haven assets, such as gold and the Swiss franc, did not perform particularly strongly. Credit spreads rose a little, by around 70 basis points, but do not yet signal stress. Chart 4No Signals Of Strong Risk Aversion Moreover U.S. growth, in particular, remains robust. Though the r* may be tricky to estimate, monetary policy is still clearly accommodative and is likely to remain so until at least mid-2019, even if the Fed hikes by 25bp a quarter (Chart 5). Fiscal policy will be stimulative until the end of 2019, adding 1.1 percentage points to growth this year and 0.5 next, according to IMF estimates. Earnings growth will slow from its current lick - Q3 U.S. earnings look like coming in at 23% year-on-year, compared to a forecast of 19% before the results season - but our models suggest that 2019 bottom-up estimates are about right, with growth slowing to around 10% in the U.S. and to somewhat less in the euro area and Japan (Chart 6).2 Chart 5Fed Policy Still Accomodative Chart 6Earnings Growth To Continue, Albeit More Slowly If we have a concern, it is that a few interest-rate sensitive elements of the U.S. economy are showing signs of softness. Housing starts have been weak for a while, but higher mortgage rates may now be having an effect, with residential investment subtracting from GDP growth in all three quarters so far this year (Chart 7). However, mortgage rates are unlikely to continue to rise at the same pace and so the effect should weaken in further quarters. Capex intentions and durable orders have also slipped, perhaps suggesting that corporations have reined back investment plans due to global uncertainties (Chart 8). But these signs point to slower growth next year, not recession, with the U.S. likely to continue to grow above trend. Historically, higher long-term rates have proved a drag on the economy only when they have risen above trend nominal GDP growth, currently around 3.8% (Chart 9). We have some way to go before we reach that tipping-point. Chart 7Housing Is Hurting Chart 8...And Capex Is Getting Cautious Chart 9Rates Matter When They Exceed Nominal Growth We moved to neutral on risk assets, including equities, at the beginning of July. Many of the worries we flagged then have come about. This is late in the cycle, and so volatility will probably remain elevated. However, we do not expect the next recession to come until 2020 at the earliest. Moreover, none of the warning signals on our bear market checklist (which includes the shape of the yield curve, profit margins, a peak in cyclical spending as a percentage of GDP, Fed policy becoming restrictive etc.) are yet flashing, though several may do by mid next year. Equity market valuations are no longer expensive after the recent sell-off (Chart 10). If the current correction were to continue and the drop in the S&P 500 extend to 15% and in global equities to 20% from their most recent peaks, we might be inclined tactically to move back overweight on risk assets. Chart 10Stocks Are No Longer Expensive Currencies: We expect further U.S. dollar appreciation. Divergences in growth and monetary policy between the U.S. and other developed markets will continue. While we expect the Fed to continue to hike once a quarter until end-2019, we could imagine the ECB turning more dovish if euro zone growth continues to slow and Italian BTP 10-year bond yields rise above 4%. The Bank of Japan will stick to its Yield Curve Control policy, which will prevent the yen rising. Emerging market currencies look vulnerable as their economies slow as a result of central bank rate hikes earlier in the year. Asian currencies might undertake competitive devaluations if the renminbi falls below 7, as a result of a worsening trade war. Fixed Income: Long-term rates are unlikely to have peaked for this cycle. Core inflation will stay at around 2% for a few more months because of a favorable base effect, but underlying inflation pressures (the result of rising wages and increases in import tariffs) will push up U.S. inflation by mid next year (Chart 11). A combination of higher inflation, steady Fed hikes, and deteriorating supply/demand conditions (which will raise the term premium) will move 10-year rates above 3.5% by mid-2019 (Chart 12). We accordingly recommend being short duration and overweight TIPs. U.S. high-yield bonds look somewhat attractive, with a default-adjusted spread of 270 bps, after their recent modest sell-off (Chart 13). But this is dependent on our assumption (based on Moody's model) of credit defaults of only 1.04% over the next 12 months.3 Given where we are in the cycle, and considering the elevated corporate leverage in the U.S., we do not consider this a risk worth taking, and so maintain our moderate underweight in credit. Chart 11Underlying Inflation Pressures Are Strong Chart 12Indicators Point To Treasury Yields Above 3.5% Chart 13Are Junk Bonds Attractive Again? Equities: We prefer DM equities over EM, and favor the U.S. and, to a degree, Japan. Emerging markets continue their deleveraging process and will be hurt by rising U.S. rates, a stronger dollar, and slowdown in China. Valuations for EM equities, though one standard deviation cheap relative to global equities, are not yet sufficiently attractively valued to permit investors to buy EM stocks irrespective of their poor fundamentals. Moreover, analysts are still far too optimistic on the outlook for EM earnings, flattering the valuation metric (Chart 14). Stronger growth and an appreciating currency point to an overweight in U.S. equities which, moreover, would be likely to outperform in the event of a deeper correction, given their low beta. Chart 14EM Equities Aren't As Cheap As They Seem Commodities: The crude oil price has fallen back a little in recent weeks, as a result of increases in OPEC production, a modest slowing of demand, and releases of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Our energy strategists have slightly lowered their 2019 Brent forecast to $92 a barrel, from $95 (Chart 15). However, they warn that geopolitical risks, such as widespread application of sanctions on Iran and a collapse in Venezuela, and limits to capacity in Saudi Arabia and U.S. shale production could easily cause spikes above $100.4 A 100% year-on-year rise in oil prices has historically been a clear warning of recession. That would equal Brent at $120 in 1H 2019. Metal prices will continue to be driven by China. At the moment we see no sign of China implementing a major stimulus, which would boost infrastructure spending and therefore demand for commodities (Chart 16), and so we expect further falls in industrial commodities prices. Chart 15Oil Prices Can Rise Further Chart 16No Sings Of Big China Stimilus Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see GAA Quarterly Portfolio Outlook - October 2018, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 2 For details of these models and the assumptions behind them, please see The Bank Credit Analyst November 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 For details please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?", dated October 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For details please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy & Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity", dated October 25, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights After tumbling more than 20% between June and August, copper prices have remained largely static. This reflects the tug-of-war between the near-term bullish physical market fundamentals, and the cloudier macro headwinds ahead, arising from a stronger U.S. dollar. Furthermore, Chinese policymakers are unlikely to abandon their reform agenda and stimulate massively, which will put downside pressure on copper prices further down the road. Despite our negative 12-month outlook, we do not rule out the potential for some upside going into year-end, on the back of falling inventories. Energy: Overweight. News leaked earlier this week indicates the Trump administration is divided over whether to grant waivers on Iranian crude oil imports to big importers like China, India and Turkey, following the re-imposition of sanctions on November 4.1 The U.S. State Department, in particular, appears worried the sanctions will produce a price spike that could derail growth in the U.S. and its allies. This suggests the Administration will be less determined to enforce its Iranian export sanctions, until it has been assured Saudi Arabia and Russia will be able to bring enough production on line in 1H19 to cover the lost Iranian exports, and possible deeper Venezuelan losses. Markets will remain focused on actual export losses from Iran - if they come in at the high end of expectations (i.e., greater than 1.5mm b/d), we expect higher prices; if it becomes apparent the U.S. will go soft on enforcing sanctions, prices would fall. Expect higher volatility. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices could rally over the short term, on the back of lower inventories. However, longer term, we see no catalysts to push prices toward recent highs of ~ $3.30/lb on the COMEX. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold's break above $1,200/oz is holding, but it continues to grind in a $1,210 to $1,240/oz range. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA will report on export sales of grains and oil seeds today. Soybean exports were down 21% y/y for the current crop year, based on the Department's October 18 report. Feature Tight Market Conditions Suggest A Brief Upswing ... After remaining in the $2.90-$3.30/lb trading range for the better part of 1H18, copper prices plunged ~20% since their June peak. The trigger? The escalation of the U.S.-China trade war. The increasingly acrimonious trade relationship acted as a reality check. Investors betting on strike-induced mine supply shortfalls earlier this year were forced to adjust expectations regarding the resilience of the global, and, more specifically, the Chinese business cycles.2 The negative impact of the trade war is clear: copper prices moved to the downside with each escalation in the dispute (Chart of the Week). While current market fundamentals do not necessarily warrant such drastic declines, we see these developments as a wake-up call to market participants. Copper sentiment - previously buoyed by expectations of mine strikes (which failed to materialize) - has come crashing down (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekCopper Down On Trade War Chart 2Sentiment Has Come Crashing Down However, the outlook in the very near term is not so bleak. The evidence below suggests tight physical conditions, indicating copper's next move could be to the upside: Chinese copper imports came in strong in September (Chart 3). While unwrought copper imports reached a 2.5-year high, ores and concentrates forged new record highs. Chart 3Chinese Imports Came In Strong The resilience of Chinese purchases comes on the back of restrictions on scrap imports, which account for a significant share global copper supply (Chart 4). As we have been highlighting, Chinese restrictions on the purity of scrap imports require other forms of the metal to fill the supply gap.3 At the same time, the 25% tariff imposed on Chinese imports of U.S. scrap since August also manifests itself in greater demand for other forms of the metal. This is evident in weak scrap copper imports (Chart 5). Chart 4A Dependable Secondary Market Is Essential For Global Supply Chart 5Scrap Import Restrictions Raise Need For Other Forms Of Copper Copper inventories at the three major global exchange warehouses have been declining steadily and together now stand at half their late April peak (Chart 6). This is their lowest level since late 2016. Chart 6Exchange Inventories At Two Year Low The above evidence of a tight market is in line with copper's futures curve, which is recently pricing a premium for physical delivery (Chart 7). Chart 7Markets Pricing A Premium For Physical Delivery Going into the winter, smelter disruptions may lend further upside support amid these tight conditions: The Vedanta copper smelter in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu was forced to shut down in May due to violent protests. The smelter has an annual production of over 400k MT. In Chile, Codelco gave notice to the market that two of its four smelters will undergo weeks-long outages, in order to comply with tightening of emissions rules - requiring smelters to capture 95% of emissions - due to take effect in December. This will halt production from smelters at the Chuquicamata and Salvador mines for 75 days and 45 days, respectively. Furthermore, in mid-October BHP Billiton reduced its 2018 copper production forecast by 3% to between 1.62mm MT and 1.7mm MT, due to shutdowns at its Olympic Dam facility in Australia and Spence in Chile. Bottom Line: Dynamics at the scrap level in China and disruptions at major smelters in India, Chile and Australia justify tight copper market conditions. This offers potential for a minor rebound in copper prices in the very near term. ... Ahead Of Macro Headwinds In the medium term, macro headwinds will dominate the physical market, capping gains in copper prices. Most notably, fall-out from the U.S.-China trade war in absence of aggressive traditional forms of stimulus, will weigh on demand there. Furthermore, U.S. dollar strength on the back of economic and monetary policy divergences, will make the red metal more expensive for global consumers. Ex-U.S. Growth Unpromising Given the stimulative fiscal policies in the U.S., our House View still does not expect a recession before late-2020. However in the meantime, the global economy will be characterized by divergence in favor of the U.S. (Chart 8). Chart 8Global Economic Divergence Favors U.S. Of utmost importance is, of course, China - where roughly half of global refined copper is consumed. The trade dispute with the U.S. has raised concerns over the resilience of the Chinese economy. Recent data releases have done little to ease fears of a manufacturing slowdown. The Li Keqiang Index and our China construction proxy - both of which are strongly correlated with copper prices - are on a slight downtrend (Chart 9). Chart 9Ominous Signs From China China's 3Q18 GDP data indicate the Chinese economy grew by the slowest pace in nearly a decade (Chart 10). At the same time, PMI's have fallen to or near the 50 level - the boom-bust line - reflecting pessimism in the manufacturing sector. The real estate market - where 45% of China's copper is consumed - also looks gloomy. Home sales rolled over, boding ill for future housing starts. Chart 10Weak Q3 GDP Mirrors Manufacturing And Property Sectors What's more, we are not betting on a flood of stimulus to rescue China's ailing economy. As our colleagues at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service have been highlighting, the drive to combat vulnerabilities in financial markets raised the pain threshold of Chinese policymakers.4 As such, they are not likely to abandon their reform agenda at the first sign of weakness, as they traditionally have. Although some measures have already been implemented to ease policy, the current response is not yet as promising for commodity markets as has historically been the case. For one, credit growth is constrained by China's de-leveraging campaign. Although there is some evidence that the clampdown on shadow financing is easing, it is not yet at simulative levels (Chart 11). And while the money impulse is rebounding thanks to Reserve Requirement Ratio cuts, the credit impulse is still falling deeper into negative territory. Chart 11Shadow Banking Restrained By Reform Agenda Additionally, as Peter Berezin who heads BCA's Global Investment Strategy highlights, China's more recent forms of (consumption-based) stimulus such as income tax reforms do not boost commodity demand. The same goes for the other way in which Chinese authorities are trying to stabilize their economy: by depreciating the RMB. This is in clear contrast to traditional measures such as fixed asset investment, which stimulate demand for raw materials and capital goods.5 Overall, the current level of stimulus is not sufficient to boost the Chinese economy. Nor, by extension, is it enough to lift EMs, and commodity prices in the process. In fact, copper markets have been oblivious to various announcements by Chinese authorities that they are easing policy (Chart 12). Chart 12Copper Markets Oblivious To Chinese Stimulus Our Geopolitical Strategists warn that the U.S.-China trade war could get worse before it improves. Thus, while policymakers are not yet compelled to throw in the towel with their reform agenda, they are pragmatic and will likely intensify their response if conditions deteriorate further. If authorities were to deploy massively stimulative fiscal and monetary policy by propping up infrastructure and the real estate sector - as they traditionally have done - chances are that we would be able to escape further price weakness in copper markets. For now, the evidence points at a more modest policy approach. Green Dollar, Red Metal As a counter-cyclical currency, the U.S. dollar will shine in the current weaker ex-U.S. growth environment. What's more, limited spare capacity in the U.S. and a strong labor market foreshadow rising U.S. inflation readings. This will justify continued tightening by the Fed. Economic divergences favoring the U.S. economy will amplify the impact. Rising U.S. borrowing costs will be painful for debt-laden EM economies. Their Central Banks will struggle to keep the pace with the Fed. Similarly, the European Central Bank - conscious of turmoil in Italy - will be forced to maintain a more dovish stance. This will weigh down on the EUR/USD. A stronger dollar generally dents demand by making commodities - priced in U.S. dollars - more expensive for foreign consumers. While energy markets dominated by supply risks remain disconnected from their long-term negative correlation with the U.S. dollar, the relationship with metals has re-converged (Chart 13).6 This leaves copper more vulnerable to the downside amid dollar strengthening. The impact will be magnified for Chinese consumers as the RMB weakens further, forcing the top consumer to cut down on imports of the red metal. Chart 13USD-Copper Relationship Re-converged Bottom Line: Headwinds from weakness in China and a stronger dollar will be a drag on demand next year. Unless Chinese policymakers temporarily abandon their reform agenda and stimulate massively, medium term copper prices will face pressures to the downside. Model Updates Given the macro headwinds outlined above, we revised our copper demand forecast. Our balances now point to a slight surplus in 2019 (Chart 14). In the context of 24mm MT of consumption p.a., a 100k MT surplus can be characterized as a balanced market. This makes prices vulnerable to upside or downside surprises, which can easily tip the scale. Chart 14Broadly Balanced Market In line with our market assessment, we simulated forecasts for copper prices based on a 5% and 10% appreciation in the USD over the coming 12 months (Chart 15). Chart 15Macro Headwinds In 2019   Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Reuters published an interesting analysis containing the apparently leaked information re the internal disputes in the Trump administration entitled "Trump's sanctions on Iran tested by oil-thirsty China, India" on October 29, 2018. 2 In the Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report published January 25, 2018, we highlighted the risk to mine supply in 2018 on the back of an unusually large number of labor contract renegotiations taking place this year - representing ~ 5 mm MT worth of mined copper. Most noteworthy was the risk of a strike at the Escondida copper mine in Chile. These have been largely resolved with minimal impact on supply. Please see "Stronger USD, Slower China Growth Threaten Copper," available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Copper: A Break Out, Or A Break Down?" dated May 17, 2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled "China Sticks To The Three Battles," dated October 24, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Chinese Stimulus: Not So Stimulating" dated October 26, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Correlations Vs. USD Weaken," dated June 14, 2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017