Financial Markets

Highlights While the bull market in the Australian dollar might pause temporarily, it will advance further this cycle. The key catalyst for the AUD is an improving balance-of-payments backdrop. Despite its explosive rise, the majority of our models still show the Aussie as relatively cheap. At the crosses, AUD/NZD, AUD/CAD, and AUD/CHF are attractive. Buy AUD/NZD if it drops to 1.05. Feature Chart I-1A V-Shaped Recovery The bounce in the Australian dollar has been remarkable. From a low of 55 cents, the Aussie is up over 30% from the March 19 lows, making it the best performing G10 currency over the period. In technical parlance, the Aussie has entered a bull market. More importantly, the performance of the AUD has been a mirror image of broad stock market indices, suggesting investors have been using both vehicles to reprice a global recovery (Chart I-1). The rise in the Aussie dollar raises a few questions. First, do conditions remain in place for continued appreciation in the exchange rate? Second, at what AUD levels does currency strength tighten domestic financial conditions significantly? Finally, what are the opportunities at the crosses that investors could leverage on? A Terms-Of-Trade Boom For over four decades, one of the key primary drivers of the AUD exchange rate has been the basic balance. For simplicity, our definition of basic balance is just the sum of the current account and long-term capital flows, such as foreign direct investment. Remarkably, Australia’s basic balance is making new secular highs, despite the fact that the commodity boom peaked almost a decade ago (Chart I-2). The big divergence between an improving basic balance and a relatively soft trade-weighted currency suggests room for mean reversion is substantive. Australia’s basic balance is making new secular highs, despite the fact that the commodity boom peaked almost a decade ago. There are three key drivers behind the improvement of Australia’s balance-of-payment dynamics. First, in terms of economic recovery, China has led the pack vis-à-vis other countries by simple virtue of the fact that the authorities started injecting stimulus much earlier on, which helped ease domestic financing conditions. Chart I-3 shows that Chinese domestic imports are tracking the easing in financial conditions we saw earlier this year. As a result, imports of key raw materials such as copper, iron ore, steel, and crude oil have been exploding higher. These have benefited Australian export volumes Chart I-2Improving Balance Of Payments Chart I-3Chinese Imports To Improve Further Remarkably, there have been notable improvements in recent months that suggest economic velocity in China may be picking up: Production of electricity and steel, which are inputs into the overall manufacturing value chain, are inflecting higher. Intuitively, these tend to lead overall industrial production. If these leading indicators continue to advance, as we believe they will, it will suggest further upside in the Chinese industrial cycle (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Chinese End-Use Is Improving The second reason behind Australia’s improving balance-of-payment dynamics has been increasing relative competitiveness in the types of raw materials that China needs and wants. In recent months, both steel and iron ore prices have been soaring. Part of the reason is because Australian exporters produce higher-grade ore, which is more expensive, pollutes less and is in high demand in China. Going forward, Australia’s terms-of-trade improvement is likely to continue. This is because of another tectonic shift in China: an energy policy shift away from coal and towards natural gas (Chart I-5). Beijing’s clear environmental push has lifted the share of liquefied natural gas in Australia’s export mix (Chart I-6). Given that reducing, if not outright eliminating, pollution is a long-term strategic goal in China, this will provide a multi-year tailwind. Already, Australian oil and gas stocks have been outperforming global bourses on the back of this tectonic shift. Such outperformance could help drive portfolio flows into Australia, further buffeting the currency (Chart I-7). Chart I-5A Tectonic Shift In Chinese Energy Policy Chart I-6Australia Is Becoming A Big LNG Player Chart I-7A Bull Market In Aussie Energy? Will Domestic Factors Derail The Aussie? The jobs report out of Australia yesterday was stellar. The economy added 111,000 jobs, pushing the unemployment rate down from 7.5% to 6.8%. This was within the context of a rise in the participation rate to 64.8%. This is an impressive feat given that Melbourne was effectively in complete lockdown in August (Chart I-8). The key takeaway is that as a manufacturing-oriented economy, the impact of social distancing and lockdowns in Australia are less severe than for service-oriented economies. This could be the story over the next year, allowing the AUD to outperform not just the USD but also other currencies with a higher share of services in their economies. Beijing’s clear environmental push has lifted the share of liquefied natural gas in Australia’s export mix.  Monetary and fiscal policy have obviously played a big role as well. The Reserve Bank of Australia has cut interest rates to 0.25% and is doing yield-curve control on three-year maturities at 0.25%. The Liberal-National coalition government has also been very proactive, especially with the “Job Seeker” and “Job Keeper” scheme, which has provided a valuable cushion for domestic economic conditions (Chart I-9). With a very low government debt burden, there is obviously scope to expand the scheme further. Chart I-8The Employment Market Is Recovering Chart I-9A Big Fiscal Thrust The boost in confidence has helped engineer a meaningful recovery in Australian house prices (Chart I-10). More importantly, this recovery is driven by domestic concerns rather than by foreigners (Chart I-11). This suggests that at least at the margin, house prices are being driven by domestic demand/supply fundamentals. The key takeaway is that relative to its commodity-currency peers, Australia is well along its house-price adjustment path. This should favor Australian real estate and bank stocks relative to those in Canada (Chart I-12). Chart I-10A Housing Market Recovery Chart I-11Credit Is Flowing To Households, Not Foreigners/Investors Chart I-12Aussie Real Estate Relative To Canadia The economic recovery is already being priced in by the long end of the Australian bond curve. Long-term rates have collapsed in the US, relative to Australia, the latter offering a 40 basis point premium. Should US real rates move further into negative territory, this could continue to provide an interest-rate cushion for the AUD (Chart I-13). A further steepening in the Australian yield curve will be positive for banks, which have lagged the index, and could play catch up (Chart I-14). Chart I-13AUD Follows Long-Term Rates Chart I-14Australian Banks And The Yield Curve   How High Can The AUD Bounce? Usually, a rise in the AUD over a cycle goes uninterrupted until the cross becomes expensive. On this basis, the Australian dollar remains accommodative. Our purchasing power parity (PPP) models point to an 8% undervaluation in the Australian dollar. One of our favorite metrics for the Australian dollar’s fair value is its real effective exchange rate relative to its terms of trade. On this basis, the Aussie dollar is cheap by about 10% (Chart I-15). Our fundamental intermediate-term timing model, which uses real bond yield differentials and commodity prices, shows the Australian dollar as 5% cheap, or one standard deviation below the mean (Chart I-16). Chart I-15The AUD Is Cheap Chart I-16Our Timing Model Is Buying AUD Importantly, while our momentum indicators are stretched in the short term, speculators are still neutral the currency. Like the US dollar, the Aussie tends to be a momentum currency, with speculators that typically remain long over the cycle driving it to overvalued levels (Chart I-17). In terms of currency performance, the Australian dollar remains 10% below its 2018 peak and almost 35% below its 2011 peak, suggesting there is much scope for mean reversion. Chart I-17Speculators Are Not Yet Bullish Opportunities At The Crosses Long AUD/NZD and long AUD/JPY remain attractive bets. While our momentum indicators are stretched in the short term, speculators are still neutral the currency. As for AUD/NZD, our bias is that terms of trade in Australia will continue to outperform that in New Zealand. AUD/NZD and relative terms of trade tend to move together (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, the exchange rate is cheap on a historical basis. Furthermore, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is likely to continue with more dovish forward guidance, relative to the RBA, which will favor AUD/NZD (Chart I-19). As a percentage of GDP, the RBNZ is more aggressive in terms of asset purchases. Buy the cross if it touches 1.05. Chart I-18AUD/NZD And Terms Of Trade Chart I-19AUD/NZD And Balance Sheet Policy AUD/JPY is a bet on a continued global economic recovery, and any drop below 74 is a buying opportunity. Interestingly, speculators remain short the cross despite a nice run-up from the March lows.    Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been positive: Headline inflation increased from 1% to 1.3% year-on-year in August. Core inflation also edged up from 1.6% to 1.7% year-on-year. The NY Empire State Manufacturing Index jumped from 3.7 to 17 in September. Retail sales increased by 0.6% month-on-month in August. Initial jobless claims increased by 860K for the week ending on September 11. The DXY index increased by 0.3% this week. On Wednesday, the Fed kept interest rates unchanged and made a bold statement that they would keep rates low until inflation comes back to the 2% target. New economic projections show that most policymakers see interest rates on hold through at least 2023. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 A Simple Framework For Currencies - July 17, 2020 DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been positive: The ZEW Economic Sentiment Index surged from 64 to 73.9 in September. The trade surplus widened from €16 billion to €20.3 billion in July, led by a faster decline in imports. Industrial production fell by 7.7% year-on-year in July, following a 12% contraction in June. Both headline inflation and core inflation remained flat at -0.2% and 0.4% year-on-year, respectively. The euro fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. While downside risk still looms for the euro area growth, we believe that the euro will continue to appreciate, as the structural growth rate of the euro area should improve relative to the US amid global economy recovery. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been negative:  Industrial production plunged by 15.5% year-on-year in July. The total trade balance increased from ¥10.9 billion to ¥248.3 billion in August due to a steeper decline in imports. Exports fell by 14.8% year-on-year, while imports slumped by 20.8%. The Japanese yen appreciated by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The BoJ kept interest rates steady this Thursday and upgraded its view on the economy outlook. Moreover, the governor Haruhiko Kuroda said that the Bank will not only monitor inflation trends but also the overall economy, including job growth, for future guidance. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been mixed: The total trade surplus narrowed from £3.9 billion to £1.1 billion in July. The unemployment rate rose to 4.1% from 3.9% in July. Average earnings improved by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter for the three months to July. Headline inflation declined from 1% to 0.2% year-on-year in August. Core inflation slipped from 1.8% to 0.9% in August. The British pound appreciated by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, the BoE kept interest rates on hold at 0.1%. While recent data have been stronger than expected, multiple threats still loom, including a second wave of COVID-19, a no-deal Brexit, and the possibility of persistent high unemployment. The Bank is now considering all options, including negative interest rates, to support the economy. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been positive: House prices fell by 1.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. However, this is a 6.2% increase compared with the same quarter last year. The Westpac Leading Index increased from 0.05% to 0.48% in August. On the labor market front, the unemployment rate fell from 7.5% to 6.8% in August. 111K jobs were added in August, including 74.8K part-time positions and 36.2K full-time positions. The Australian dollar has been flat this week. The RBA minutes released this week stated that the Bank will maintain its “highly accommodative settings” as long as required to further support the economy. Please refer to our front section this week for a more detailed analysis of the Aussie dollar. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been negative: GDP slumped by 12.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2, or 12.4% year-on-year, the largest decline on record. The current account balance shifted to a surplus of NZ$1.8 billion in Q2 from a deficit of NZ$1.47 billion the same quarter last year, led by the sharp decline in domestic demand. The New Zealand dollar appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The latest GDP release, while negative, was better than expectations. Goods industries, which make up 20% of the total economy, declined by 16.3% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. Services industries, which make up more than 50% of the economy, also fell by 10.9%. The path of the recovery will be highly contingent on COVID-19 developments. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been mixed: Manufacturing sales increased by 7% month-on-month in July, following a 20.7% surge the previous month. Headline inflation was flat at 0.1% year-on-year in August, below market expectations of 0.4%. Core inflation edged up from 0.7% to 0.8% year-on-year in August. ADP employment recorded a loss of 205.4K jobs in the month of August. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. The latest inflation report shows that gasoline prices were down 11.1% year-on-year in August, which has been a drag on inflation. On the other hand, prices of personal care services, including haircuts, have been increasing, as the cost to implement COVID-19 safety measures are being passed on to customers. With extremely low inflation, the BoC would most likely maintain interest rates low to support the economy recovery. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been positive: Total sight deposits increased from CHF 702.9 billion to CHF 704.1 billion for the week ending on September 11. Real exports increased by 2.9% month-on-month in August, while real imports fell by 1.3%. The trade surplus widened from CHF 3.3 billion to CHF 3.6 billion in August. PPI fell by 3.5% year-on-year in August. The Swiss franc depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week, as the SNB continues to intervene in the currency market. Our bias is that the franc will fall against the euro but not so much against the US dollar. Moreover, holding the Swiss franc remains a good hedge, as Switzerland still sports the highest real rate in the G10 universe. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been mixed: The trade deficit widened from NOK 1.8 billion to NOK 2.9 billion in August. Exports continued to fall by 13% year-on-year to NOK 57 billion in August due to lower sales of mineral fuels and related materials (-20.1%), chemical and related products (-9.3%), and food and live animals (-13.1%). Imports, on the other hand, remained unchanged at NOK 59.9 billion in August from a year earlier. The Norwegian krone fell by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. While the widening of the trade deficit seems to be bad news for the economy, the resilience of imports reflects a strong domestic demand, which bodes well for the Norwegian economy and the krone. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been positive: The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate dropped from 9.2% to 9.1% in August. The Swedish krona depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The better-than-expected data from the labor market suggests that the economic recovery is underway, which is bullish for the Swedish krona. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019   Kelly Zhong Research Analyst Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Special Report

“Based on a broad set of indicators, it is hard not to see a certain amount of daylight between risky asset prices and economic prospects” – Claudio Borio, Head of Monetary and Economic Department, BIS, September 14, 2020 A pandemic, the resulting sharpest downturn in modern times and soaring government debt have made 2020 an annus horribilis for the US and world economy. Growth has rebounded strongly as economic lockdowns have ended, but most forecasts suggest that the level of activity will not return to its pre-virus level before the end of next year. That implies a lingering problem of high unemployment and there will be ongoing concerns about the eventual consequences of policymakers’ extreme monetary and fiscal actions. The long-run outlook for the US economy was already challenging before Covid-19 appeared on the scene. And this year’s events cannot have improved prospects relative to pre-crisis expectations. Thus, it is reasonable to wonder why the S&P500 hit a new all-time high in early September and currently is only slightly below that level. Is it a classic case of irrational exuberance or a sign that the economic outlook is much better than generally assumed? If we cannot come up with a convincing case for the latter then irrationality is left as a likely explanation. The sharp decline in interest rates certainly supports higher equity valuations, but a bull market that depends largely on stimulative monetary policy is problematic. The Stock Market Is Not The Economy, But… Finance theory states that equity prices should reflect the discounted long-run stream of expected dividend payments. In turn, those payments should be correlated with earnings growth which one would expect to have a close relation to underlying economic conditions. While prices often deviate significantly from so-called fundamentals, it is perfectly reasonable to assume a long-run correlation between the stock market and the performance of the economy. In practice, there is a loose relationship with occasional large deviations. Chart 1The US Economy vs. The Market Chart 1 shows the five-year annualized growth in US real GDP versus both real total returns from the S&P500 and real earnings.1 In making these comparisons, there are a few issues to consider. The stock market only represents quoted companies while GDP also includes the economic contribution of unincorporated businesses and the government. The sectoral composition of the S&P 500 is different from that of businesses at large. Many large US companies earn a significant share of their earnings from overseas operations that may be uncorrelated with domestic economic conditions. The price performance of stocks can reflect large swings in valuations driven by investor sentiment rather than fundamentals. Starting with the first point, corporate sector GDP accounts for only slightly more than half of total GDP, moving within a range of around 55% to 60% for the past 50 years (Chart 2). Yet the real growth in corporate GDP has moved in lockstep with that of total GDP. And aggregate sales of S&P500 companies have broadly tracked the swings in GDP. Thus, it cannot be argued that quoted companies can somehow miraculously avoid the ups and downs of the overall business cycle. The economy is based on a complex set of interconnected relationships and it would be remarkable if the performance of the country’s major corporations could deviate significantly from the economy at large for any length of time. Chart 2The Corporate Sector And Total GDP There certainly is an issue with the second point because the sectoral breakdown of the S&P500 does not exactly match that of the overall economy. While that does not always protect the stock market from general economic trends, it can help explain occasional large equity price moves. Table 1 shows the sector composition of the S&P500, weighted by market capitalization, sales and earnings, versus the composition of GDP. It is difficult to break down GDP exactly in line with the sector classifications of the market, but we have done as close a job as the data allows. Notable differences between the structure of the market and GDP are the relative weightings of the health care, industrials and information technology sectors. The following explanations seem plausible. Table 1Sector Composition: A Comparison For health care, the GDP weighting shown in the table is understated because it also is a significant part of the government sector’s contribution via Medicare and Medicaid. Other data show that total spending on health care accounts for around 18% of US GDP, broadly in line with the S&P index weighting. The large weighting of industrials in GDP compared with its share of the equity index probably reflects the fact that this broadly-defined group has a very large number of small and unquoted companies. On that point, it should be noted that unincorporated businesses account for 21% of national income – a non-trivial share. Last, but not least, there is the huge discrepancy in the weightings of information technology. This is a bit harder to explain, but two reasons come to mind. First, the S&P index market cap weighting has been boosted by the strong share price performance of these companies and high valuations thus flatter their index importance relative to underlying business activity. The IT weights based on sales and earnings are much lower, but still significantly exceed that in GDP. Secondly, some of these companies (Apple being a prime example) produce very little in the US relative to what they sell in the country. As GDP measures domestic output, this affects the relative weightings. Chart 3Growth In Overseas vs. Domestic Profits Let’s explore the issue about overseas earnings more closely. According to national income data, 45% of the corporate sector’s after-tax profits come from overseas earnings. And that is broadly consistent with the overseas share of sales for S&P500 companies. While the relationship is not perfect, the growth of overseas profits roughly tracks that of domestic profits (Chart 3). And where there have been large divergences, such as in 2009, that often has reflected large swings in oil prices. Overall, it hard to make the claim that the large share of earnings coming from overseas has been a factor supporting the strong performance of stocks relative to the underlying economy. This is especially true given that the US has performed better than most other economies in recent years and the dollar has been a strong currency. In sum, our analysis does not give compelling support to the idea that the fundamental performance of large quoted companies can sustainably diverge from that of the underlying economy. But that does not mean that share prices cannot deviate because of large swings in valuation. Is The US Equity Market Overvalued? This should be a simple question to answer, but often is not. Alternative approaches to valuation are sometimes in conflict and that is the current situation. Various valuation measures are shown in Chart 4 with the following observations. Chart 4AMeasures Of US Equity Valuation Chart 4BMeasures Of US Equity Valuation All the measures based on earnings (trailing, forward and cyclically-adjusted) suggest that the market is very expensive. While current earnings are affected by the economy’s second-quarter collapse, there remains considerable uncertainty about the speed of recovery. The current forward price-earnings ratio (PER) assumes that earnings will increase by around 30% over the next 12 months and that could prove to be optimistic. The market also looks significantly overvalued based on the ratios of price-to-book, price-to-sales and total market capitalization to GDP. While the valuation of the aggregate index has been boosted by the exceptional performance of the technology sector, it is important to note that the ratios of price to trailing earnings and to sales also are very elevated using the medians of 58 sub-groups, as calculated by BCA’s US Equity Strategy Service (Chart 5). In other words, this is not a story about overvaluation simply reflecting the hot technology sector. Chart 5Overvaluation Is Not Just About Technology The market looks much more attractive when comparing dividend and earnings yields with the returns available on cash and bonds. This is the so-called TINA argument (there is no alternative). It is hard not to prefer stocks when the dividend yield is above the yield on long-term government bonds. During the market overshoot of the late 1990s, the dividend yield was 500 basis points below the 30-year Treasury yield, highlighting that stocks were in a very risky phase. Moreover, the current environment of unusually low interest rates is unlikely to end any time soon. The Federal Reserve’s newly-released projections indicate that interest rates are expected to remain at current levels at least through the end of 2023. The Fed has made it abundantly clear that it is prepared to take risks with inflation in order to support a revival in economic activity. It is relatively straightforward when the different valuation metrics are all giving the same message, as was the case in the late 1990s. Even then, the market overshoot lasted longer and became more extreme than generally expected. Our composite valuation indicator takes account of 10 different measures and currently supports the idea that the market is indeed very expensive (Chart 6). Chart 6BCA Equity Valuation Indicator It currently is very difficult for institutional investors to favor fixed-income instruments over a higher-yielding equity market. However, there is no free lunch here. We cannot ignore the argument that low interest rates reflect a very bleak long-run outlook for economic growth and thus for earnings and stock prices. The secular stagnation view put forward by Larry Summers looks even more apposite today than when he outlined it several years ago. We are fortunate to have Larry as the opening speaker for our virtual Investment Conference on October 6th and it will be extremely interesting to hear his latest thinking. Some Thoughts On The Economic Outlook Equities are a long-duration asset so it makes sense to consider valuations in the context of the long-run economic outlook rather than the near-term ups and downs of activity. Of course, short-run economic moves do affect investor sentiment so cannot be ignored. The near-term outlook is extremely cloudy because of uncertainty about the future path of the pandemic. While the virus appears to have become less virulent, infection rates could climb sharply over the winter months as schools re-open and people spend more time indoors. In addition, there are doubts about the scale and timing of much-needed additional government stimulus. Chart 7Mixed Data On The US Economy Some recent data have been impressively strong. The value of retail sales has surpassed pre-virus peaks as have new and existing home sales (Chart 7). On the other hand, manufacturing and construction output and overall employment remain far below previous peaks. And we have yet to see the impact of the ending of the $600 a week income support. There are legitimate concerns that early 2021 will see a surge in home evictions and a marked increase in small business bankruptcies. Most likely, the economy will experience a bumpy and moderate recovery after its post-lockdown strong third-quarter growth. The Fed forecasts US growth of 4% in 2021 after a 3.7% drop this year and the OECD’s latest projections are similar. That still means that it will take until the end of 2021 before real GDP gets back to its end-2019 level. And there are downside risks to that forecast if the virus remains a lingering problem. Our conference on October 6th will have what is sure to be a lively debate about the US economic outlook between Ed Yardeni and Dave Rosenberg. These two very smart economists have a very different take on how things are likely to play out and what it means for the markets. This debate will follow the presentation by Larry Summers and after that, Peter Berezin, our Chief Global Strategist, and myself will discuss our views and will be open for audience questions. Should be very interesting! Let’s talk about the longer-run economic outlook. As noted at the outset, it was less than inspiring even before the virus arrived on the scene. The two drivers of long-run economic performance are demographics and productivity and the growth in both has been trending lower. Chart 8Demographics Are A Problem The demographics story is straightforward and essentially locked in place. A falling birth rate means that the working-age population will rise at a meager 0.2% a year over the next ten years compared with more than 1% a year in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, growth is projected to remain low in subsequent decades (Chart 8). And even these forecasts may be optimistic if the current antipathy toward immigration leads to a more closed-door stance. Demographic trends not only imply a slow-growing workforce (impacting potential GDP) but also create a worsening picture for government finances. An aging population boosts spending on health care and pensions when the number of taxpayers is growing very slowly. This shows up in a dramatic drop in the ratio of the working-age population (i.e. potential taxpayers) to those aged 65 and above.2 This is happening when government finances are already in dire straits and implies that future tax rates can only go higher, regardless of which political party is in power. The issue of productivity is more contentious because it is hard to measure, and future trends are less predictable than for demographics.3 Nevertheless, the data present a relatively clear picture: the growth of output per hour in the non-financial corporate sector has slowed markedly after a tech-driven spurt in the second half of the 1990s (Chart 9). We show the trend as a five-year growth rate to smooth out the short-term noise in the series. Chart 9Productivity Growth Has Slowed We discussed the outlook for productivity in a recent Special Report and highlighted some worrying trends.4 These include weak growth in business investment, a retreat from globalization, increased government involvement in the economy and friction caused by new pandemic-related protocols to protect the safety of customers and workers in several industries. On a more positive note, the virus has forced many businesses to streamline their operations and the move to remote working should boost productivity in some cases. What about the issue of technological advances such as artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous vehicles? These clearly have the potential to boost productivity in many areas but with a caveat. Previous major technological breakthroughs (often called general purpose technologies or GPTs) such as steam power, the internal combustion engine, electricity, and the internet had major impacts on both supply and demand. Generally, they were associated with creating completely new activities. For example, steam power led to the locomotive which in turn allowed the opening of the country and the movement of goods to distant markets. Similarly, the automobile led to the development of the suburbs and the associated demand for housing and related services. More recently, the internet boosted the demand for a wide range of tech goods and services. While that is still ongoing, its peak effect has passed, helping to explain the decline in productivity growth from late-1990s level. In contrast, a lot of current ‘new’ technologies simply are associated with doing existing tasks more efficiently (3-D printing would be an example). That is still important but not on the same scale as GPTs. There is no doubt that AI will be a big disruptor in many sectors but its impact on demand is less clear. Maybe one day all households will have a domestic robot but that is still far enough away to be in the realm of science fiction. The bigger near-term impact will be job displacement. And the same can be said for autonomous vehicles. The demand for new self-driving cars will rise, but these will simply replace gas-powered ones and perhaps the overall number of vehicles on the road will decline. In sum, there will be both positive and negative forces acting on future productivity growth and any predictions need to be treated with caution. Nonetheless, a base case should probably assume any improvements will be relatively modest. Finally, any discussion of long-run economic prospects cannot ignore the alarming rise in government debt. The US was already running $1 trillion federal deficits before this year’s crisis led to a further extraordinary explosion of red ink (Chart 10). Chart 10Soaring Government Debt Current large deficits are not fazing investors. In the past, the spread between 30-year and 10-year Treasurys widened as the deficit rose, but this relationship has weakened recently (second panel Chart 10). Fed buying of bonds may have had some impact, but it also reflects the weak economy and low inflation. It is hard to know at what point investors will take fright at US fiscal trends. The experience of other countries that faced sovereign debt crises suggests problems can arrive with little advance notice. One day investors seem complacent and the next they are running scared. The dollar’s status as the world’s main reserve currency gives the US more protection than other countries had when facing debt problems. And central banks’ willingness to be the bond buyers of first and last resort gives debt burdens more room to grow than in the past. However, debt arithmetic is relentless and will turn very ugly when bond yields eventually rise. It is futile to try and pin a date on when bond vigilantes might reassert themselves in the US. But it will happen at some point. Moreover, even before that happens, there will be political pressure to do something about soaring debt levels. Even without a market revolt, the burden of increased spending on entitlements and debt servicing will force the government to pursue austerity. Taxes will rise and spending growth will be curtailed. That is a further reason to be cautious about economic prospects. Increased debt is a way to bring spending forward but unless the money is used to invest in productive assets, the process eventually goes into reverse. Unfortunately, the surge in US government borrowing has been used to prop up consumption rather than to finance capital spending. The short- and long-run economic outlook would have been worse if there had not been a powerful fiscal response. Consumption would have suffered an even sharper decline with a catastrophic impact on employment, profits and capital spending. In that sense, the government really had no choice: the health of government finances becomes irrelevant in the midst of a pandemic-related economic collapse. Market Implications There are several explanations for the remarkable strength of the US equity market. Prime place goes to the Fed’s hyper-easy monetary stance. A policy of zero interest rates with a stated intention to keep them there for a long time has the desired effect of boosting risk-taking. A second factor has been excitement about technology that has created a bubble in that sector. And then there is the view that novice retail investors have been seduced into the market by online applications such as Robinhood that make day trading very easy. Missing from the above list is the suggestion that investors expect the economy to be strong enough to validate the market’s current level. That just does not seem plausible because it is not credible that earnings could grow strongly enough to lower valuations to more reasonable levels over the next five to ten years. If the bull case for stocks rests simply on the TINA argument, then it implies equities will remain in a bubble over the medium term. That certainly is possible but not the foundation for a sound investment strategy. It is not easy to come up with an investment strategy when no asset is cheap. BCA’s House View is still to prefer equities on a cyclical basis and the challenge will be timing when to jump off the train. In conclusion, my answer is that there is indeed a disconnect between the economy and equity market. This may persist for quite a while but does not appear sustainable. I am reminded of the late 1990s when the bull market lasted much longer and moved far higher than I and many others expected. Yet, fundamentals eventually did matter with the S&P500 dropping by almost 50% over the space of 30 months. I am not suggesting that a similar decline is imminent and if the 1990s example is relevant, then the market can continue to rise for quite a while, and I am sure the BCA view will prove to be correct. However, ever the skeptic, my bias is to err on the side of caution rather than try to maximize returns. Let me end by giving our upcoming conference another plug. The outlook for US equities will be discussed by Liz Ann Sonders and Ned Davis, two highly-respected market analysts and we will have a separate important session on coming up with the ideal investment strategy from three different perspectives: the buy side, the sell side and independent research In addition, over the four days of the event, we will have high-level discussions of all the other key issues that will drive markets including China, geopolitics, the US election, currencies, and policy challenges. Find out more at https://www.bcaresearch.com/conference2020.   Martin H. Barnes, Senior Vice President Chief Economist mbarnes@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Total returns and earnings were deflated using the corporate price deflator. 2Obviously, not everyone of working age pays much in the way of taxes and there are many aged 65 above who pay lots of taxes. But that does not abstract from the dramatic change in the ratio.  3If you want to know how many 70-year old people there will be in 10 years’ time, simply count the number of 60-year olds today and apply an appropriate mortality rate. 4Please see BCA Special Report "Beyond the Virus," dated May 22, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com

Dear Client, We will be working on our Fourth Quarter Strategy Outlook next week, which will be published on Tuesday, September 29th. We will also be hosting a webcast on Thursday, October 1st at 10:00 AM EDT (3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 10:00 PM HKT) where we will discuss the outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Investors should favor global equities over bonds on a 12-month horizon. However, stocks remain technically overbought in the short term and vulnerable to a further correction.  Investors are not fully appreciating the degree to which fiscal policy has already tightened in the US. While we ultimately expect a deal to be reached, it may take a stock market sell-off to force Republican leaders to accede to Democratic demands for more spending. US monetary policy will stay accommodative for at least the next two years, a view that this week’s FOMC meeting further validated. Investors should pivot into cheaper areas of the stock market – in particular, deep cyclicals and financials, non-US stocks, and value stocks. Value stocks are especially appealing, as they are now trading at the biggest discount on record relative to growth stocks. The “pandemic trade” will give way to the “reopening trade.” The latter will benefit value stocks. In addition, stronger global growth, ongoing Chinese stimulus, a weaker US dollar, and modestly steeper yield curves all favor value indices. Value investors who want to accentuate their returns should pay special attention to smaller value companies outside the US. Market Commentary Chart 1Drastic Drop In Weekly Unemployment Insurance Payments We continue to favor global equities over bonds on a 12-month horizon. However, stocks remain technically overbought in the short term despite correcting modestly over the past few weeks. Tech stocks rallied hard into September. Aggressive buying of out-of-the-money call options helped fuel the rally. While some big institutional players such as Softbank have reportedly scaled back their positions, many retail investors remain unfazed. The triple leveraged long Nasdaq 100 ETF, TQQQ, experienced the largest weekly inflow on record in September. In addition to being technically stretched, equities face near-term risks from the impasse in the US Congress over a new stimulus bill. Investors are not fully appreciating the degree to which fiscal policy has already tightened in the US. Chart 1 shows that weekly unemployment payments have fallen by $15 billon since the end of July, representing a drop of more than 50%. At an annualized rate, this amounts to 3.7% of GDP in fiscal tightening. On top of that, the funds in the small business Paycheck Protection Program have run out, while many state and local governments face a severe cash crunch. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect a fiscal deal to be reached over the next few weeks. The fact that Speaker Nancy Pelosi has said that Congress will stay in session until both sides agree on an aid package is good news in that regard. Nevertheless, given all the acrimony in Washington in the run up to the November election, there is still a non-negligible chance that a deal falls through. Why, then, are we still bullish on stocks on a 12-month horizon? Partly it is because voters want more stimulus, which means that fiscal policy is likely to be loosened again, even if this does come after the election. It is also because the pandemic seems to be receding. While the number of new cases is rising again in the EU and some other regions, fatality rates remain much lower than during the first wave. Progress also continues to be made on developing a viable vaccine. According to The Good Judgment Project, about 60% of “superforecasters” expect a mass-distributed vaccine to be available by Q1 of 2021, up from 45% just four weeks ago. Only 2% expect there to be no vaccine available by April 2022, down from over 50% in May (Chart 2). Chart 2High Odds Of A Vaccine Within 6-To-12 Months Lastly, monetary policy remains exceptionally accommodative. The Fed this week formally incorporated its new flexible average inflation targeting strategy into its post-meeting statement. The FOMC promised to keep rates at rock-bottom levels until the economy has reached “maximum employment” and inflation “is on track to moderately exceed two percent for some time.” The dot plot indicated that the vast majority of FOMC members did not expect rates to rise until at least the end of 2023. As Chart 3 shows, the global equity risk premium remains quite elevated. This favors stocks over bonds. Not all stocks are equally attractive, however. Four weeks ago, in a report titled “The Return of Nasdog,” we made the case that investors should pivot away from growth stocks towards value stocks. The report generated quite a bit of interest from readers. Below, we review and elaborate on some of the issues raised in a Q&A format. Q: Being long value stocks relative to growth stocks has been a widowmaker trade for more than a decade. Why do you think we have reached an inflection point? A: Value stocks are cheaper now compared to growth stocks than at any point in history – even cheaper than at the height of the dotcom bubble (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Equity Risk Premium Remains Quite Elevated Chart 4Value Stocks Are Extremely Cheap Relative To Growth Stocks     Admittedly, valuations are not a good timing tool. One needs a catalyst to unlock those valuations. Good news on the virus front may end up being such a catalyst. The “pandemic trade” benefited tech stocks, which are overrepresented in growth indices. It also favored health care stocks, which are similarly overrepresented in growth indices, at least globally (Table 1). The “reopening trade” will support companies such as banks, hotels, and transports that were crushed by lockdown measures and which are overrepresented in value indices. Table 1Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector Chart 5 shows that retail sales at physical stores are rebounding, while online sales growth is coming down from highly elevated levels. Bank of America estimates that US e-commerce penetration doubled in just a few short months earlier this year. Some “reversion to the trend” is likely, even if that trend does favor online stores over the long haul. Meanwhile, PC shipments soared during the pandemic as companies and workers rushed out to buy computer gear to allow them to work from home (Chart 6). To the extent that this caused some spending to be brought forward, it could create an air pocket in tech demand over the next few quarters. Chart 5Are Brick-And-Mortar Retailers Coming Back To Life? Chart 6The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge     Q: How are investors positioned towards value versus growth? A: According to the September BofA Global Fund Manager Survey, tech and pharma were the two sectors with the largest reported overweights. Thus, there is significant scope for money to shift out of these sectors. Q: What about the overall macro environment underpinning growth and value? A: While the relationship is far from perfect, value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks when the US dollar is weakening (Chart 7). Recall that growth stocks did very well during the late 1990s, a period of dollar strength. In contrast, value stocks outperformed between 2001 and 2007, a period during which the dollar was generally on the back foot. As we have spelled out in past reports, we expect the dollar to weaken over the next 12 months, which should benefit value stocks. Value stocks also tend to do best when global growth is accelerating (Chart 8). Provided that governments maintain adequate levels of fiscal support and a vaccine becomes available by early next year, global GDP should bounce back swiftly. Chart 7Value Stocks Tend To Outperform Growth Stocks When The US Dollar Is Weakening Chart 8Value Stocks Also Tend To Do Best When Global Growth Is Accelerating   Q: Won’t lower real bond yields favor growth stocks? A: By definition, growth companies generate more of their earnings further in the future than value companies. As such, a decline in real yields will tend to increase the present value of cash flows more for growth companies than for value companies. We do not expect real yields to rise significantly over the next two years. However, given that real yields are already deeply negative in almost all countries, they probably will not fall either. Q: You seem to be making the cyclical case for the outperformance of value stocks. But what about the secular case? It appears to me that the stronger earnings growth displayed by growth stocks will ultimately translate into higher long-term returns. A: Historically, that has not been the case. As Chart 9 and Table 2 illustrate, value stocks have outperformed growth stocks by a wide margin over the past century. In particular, small cap value has clobbered small cap growth. Chart 9Value Stocks Have Outperformed Growth Stocks By A Wide Margin Over The Past Century Table 2Small Caps Vis-A-Vis Large Caps: Comparison of Total Returns How did value stocks manage to triumph over growth stocks if, as you say, growth stocks usually experience faster earnings growth? The answer has to do with what is priced in and what is not. If everyone expects a company’s earnings to grow next year, this will already be reflected in its share price. It is only unanticipated earnings growth that should move share prices. For the most part, both analysts and investors have tended to overextrapolate near-term earnings growth. As we discussed in a special report titled “Quant-Based Approaches To Stock Selection And Market Timing,” while analysts are generally able to predict which companies will display superior earnings growth over the next one-to-two years, they systemically overestimate earnings growth on longer-term horizons (Chart 10). As a result, investors tend to overpay for growth, causing growth stocks to lag value stocks. Chart 10A Mug’s Game Q: That may have been true historically, but it seems that more recently, investors have been guilty of underpaying for growth. A: Yes and no. If one looks at the period between 2007 and 2017, the superior performance of growth stocks was broadly matched by their superior earnings growth. As a result, relative P/E ratios did not change much. Since 2017, however, the P/E ratio for growth indices has soared relative to value indices (Chart 11).  Chart 11AThe Outperformance Of Growth Stocks Over The Past Three Years Has Been Turbocharged By A Rapid P/E Multiple Expansion Chart 11BThe Outperformance Of Growth Stocks Over The Past Three Years Has Been Turbocharged By A Rapid P/E Multiple Expansion   Q: What has happened since 2017 that has caused growth stocks to become so much more expensive? A: FANG, FAANG, FANGMAN, whatever acronym you want to use, it was mainly a story about investors becoming infatuated with mega cap tech stocks. After seeing these companies beat earnings estimates quarter after quarter, investors decided that they deserve to trade at much higher valuation multiples. Q: What about other tech companies? A: For the most part, they were left in the dust. Our proprietary Equity Analyzer system allows us to sort companies based on all types of fundamental and technical factors. Chart 12 shows that “value tech” companies trading in the bottom quartile of price-to-earnings, price-to-operating cash flow, price-to-free cash flow, price-to-book, and price-to-sales have gotten completely clobbered by “growth tech” companies trading in the top quartile of these valuation metrics. Chart 12Value Tech Versus Growth Tech Interestingly, the opposite pattern was true among financials: “Value financials” – financials that trade cheaply based on the valuation measures listed above – have outperformed “growth financials.” The net result is a bit surprising: Since “value tech” underperformed the average tech stock, while “value financials” outperformed the average financial stock, the average “value tech” stock has delivered a return over the past decade that was almost identical to the average “value financial” stock. Chart 13There Was No Money To Be Made By Shifting Value Exposure From Financials To Tech In Recent Years Q: This seems to suggest that value managers would not have made any money by shifting exposure from financials to tech? A: Correct. Consider the iShares MSCI USA Value Factor ETF (ticker: VLUE). It is structured to have the same sector weights as the overall US market. It currently has 27% of its assets in technology and 10% in financials. Compare that to the Vanguard Value Index Fund ETF Shares (ticker: VTV). It has 10% of its assets in technology and 19% in financials. As Chart 13shows, VTV has actually outperformed VLUE over the past five years. Year to date, VTV is down 10%, while VLUE is down 15%. Q: While value managers would not have made money by shifting capital from financials to tech, I presume the same thing could not be said for growth managers. A: You can say that again. “Growth tech” outperformed the average tech stock, while “growth financials” underperformed the average financial stock. Thus, shifting money from “growth financials” to “growth tech” would have supercharged returns. Q: This still leaves open the question of why mega cap stocks were able to grow earnings so rapidly? A: Two explanations come to mind. First, tech companies often gain from so-called network effects: The more people there are who use a particular tech platform, the more attractive it is for others to use it. Second, tech companies benefit from scale economies. Once a piece of software has been written, creating additional copies costs nothing. Even in the hardware realm, the marginal cost of producing an additional chip is tiny compared to the fixed cost of designing it. All of this creates a winner-take-all environment where success begets further success. Q: It seems this process could go on indefinitely? A: Not indefinitely. No company can control more than 100% of its market. There is also a limit to how big the overall market can get. Close to three-quarters of US households already have an Amazon Prime account. Slightly over half have a Netflix account. Nearly 70% have a Facebook account. Google commands 92% of the internet search market. Together, sites owned by Google and Facebook generate about 60% of all online advertising revenue. Q: These companies have plenty of cash. Can’t they try to enter new types of businesses if they want to keep growing? A: They can try, but there is no guarantee they will succeed. Kodak was one of the pioneers in digital photography. However, it could never really reinvent itself and ended up fading into oblivion. Moreover, while first-mover advantage is a powerful force, it is not invincible. At one point during the dotcom bubble, Palm’s market capitalization was over six times greater than Apple’s. The Blackberry superseded the PalmPilot; the iPhone, in turn, superseded the Blackberry. History suggests that many of today’s technological leaders will end up as laggards. Q: And I suppose government policy could also turn less friendly towards tech? A: That is a definite risk. Republicans have been cheap dates for tech companies. Republican politicians have showered tech companies with tax cuts and allowed them to exploit a variety of loopholes in the tax code. They also kept tech regulation to a minimum. All this happened despite the fact that many tech leaders have publicly panned conservative viewpoints, while tech company employees have rewarded Democratic politicians with the lion’s share of campaign donations (Chart 14). Chart 14Tech Company Employees Donate Heavily Towards Democrats Going forward, Republicans are likely to sour on big tech. According to a recent Pew Research study, more than half of conservative Republicans favor increasing government regulation of tech companies (Chart 15). Tucker Carlson, a leading indicator for where the Republican party is heading, has frequently lambasted tech companies on his highly popular television show. Chart 15Conservatives Favor Increased Government Regulation Of Big Tech Companies For their part, the Democrats are moving to the left. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a leading indicator for the Democratic party, has voiced her support for Senator Elizabeth Warren’s calls to break up big tech. She has also accused Amazon of paying starvation wages, adding that "If Jeff Bezos wants to be a good person, he'd turn Amazon into a worker cooperative." Q: The political climate for tech companies may be souring. But couldn’t one say the same thing about banks and energy companies, which are overrepresented in value indices? A: One difference is that tech companies trade at premium valuations, while banks and energy companies trade near book value (Chart 16). Another difference is that banks have already felt the wrath of regulators. Thanks to Dodd-Frank and pending Basel III regulations, banks today function more like utilities than like the casinos of yesteryear. While private credit growth is unlikely to return to its pre-GFC pace, banks will still profit from a revival in global growth and increasing consolidation within their industry. Stronger global growth should also allow for modestly higher nominal bond yields and somewhat steeper yield curves. This will benefit bank shares (Chart 17). Chart 16Tech Firms Trade At Premium Valuations Chart 17Modestly Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Bank Shares     As far as energy stocks are concerned, again, we need to benchmark our views to what the market expects. Oil is not going back above $100 per barrel anytime soon, but it does not need to for energy stocks to go up. Bob Ryan, BCA’s chief commodity strategist, sees Brent averaging $65/bbl in 2021, $19 above what is currently priced in forward markets. Q: What about materials and industrial stocks? They are also overrepresented in value indices. A: Both materials and industrials tend to outperform the broader market when global growth accelerates (Chart 18). To the extent we expect global growth to rise, this is good news for these two sectors. They also trade at attractive valuations. Q: How does China figure into this value/growth debate? A: As we saw during the 2001-2007 period, strong Chinese demand for commodities and industrial goods benefits value indices. Even though trend Chinese GDP growth has decelerated over the past decade, the Chinese economy is five-times as large as it was back then. In absolute terms, Chinese consumption of most metals continues to increase (Chart 19). Chart 18Materials And Industrials Usually Outperform When Growth Accelerates Chart 19Chinese Consumption Of Most Metals Continues To Rise   Chart 20 shows that Chinese GDP would need to grow by about 6% per year over the next decade to keep output-per-worker on track to converge with, say, South Korea by the middle of the century. Thus, Chinese demand for natural resources and machinery is unlikely to weaken anytime soon. Chart 20China Still Has Some Catching Up To Do Q: Let’s wrap up. What final tips would you give investors who want to pivot towards value? A: There are a number of ETFs that track value indices. We expect them to outperform the broad indices over the coming years. For investors who want even higher returns, a selective approach would help. Distinguishing between value stocks and value traps is not easy. True value stocks have often congregated in the shadows of the market, where there is limited analyst coverage and thin institutional ownership. The small-cap sector offers more opportunities for finding such mispriced stocks. Hence, it is not surprising that historically, the value premium has been greater in the small cap realm. The same is true for emerging markets and smaller developed economies (Chart 21).1 Thus, investors who want to accentuate their returns should pay special attention to smaller value companies outside the US. Chart 21AHistorically, The Value Premium Has Been Greater In The Small Cap Realm In Emerging Markets And Smaller Developed Economies Chart 21BHistorically, The Value Premium Has Been Greater In The Small Cap Realm In Emerging Markets And Smaller Developed Economies   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   1 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Value? Growth? It Really Depends!” dated September 19, 2019. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights The great political surprises of 2016 are approaching key deadlines on November 3 and December 31. Investors should not let Brexit take their eye off the US election. Globalization will retreat faster under Trump regardless of what happens in the United Kingdom. The market is starting to price several clear risks: a failure to extend fiscal relief in the US (25% chance); a surprise Trump tariff move (40%); a contested election (20%); or a failure of the UK and EU to seal a deal (35%). Trump is unlikely to pull off a landslide like Boris Johnson in December 2019. The backdrop has darkened and Biden is an acceptable alternative for voters, unlike Jeremy Corbyn. Go long GBP-USD at the 1.25 mark; go long GBP-EUR volatility. Feature The end game is approaching for the two great political shocks of 2016 – Brexit and Trump. November 3 is the US election and December 31 is the deadline for an UK-EU trade deal. Investor sentiment is starting to show some cracks for various reasons, some technical (Chart 1). But we do not believe near-term volatility and risk-off sentiment have fully run their course yet. Either the US election cycle or the UK’s brinkmanship with the EU, or both, will agitate markets as the deadlines approach. The former is a much weightier factor. Chart 1Market Starts To Price Bevy Of Near-Term Risks ... But Cyclical View Still Constructive The risks in play are a failure to extend fiscal relief in the US (25% chance); a conflict between Trump and one of America’s foreign rivals such as China, whether due to Trump’s reelection or lame duck status (40%); a contested election (20%); or a failure of the UK and EU to seal a deal, setting back their economic recovery (35%). Maybe all of these risks will dissipate by mid-November, but maybe not. The market has not discounted any of them fully. So investors should buy insurance now. Vox Populi Is The Biggest Constraint For global investors Brexit is far less consequential than President Trump’s “America First” policy but the UK does punch above its economic weight in financial markets (Chart 2). Chart 2Brexit: Why Should We Care? UK Punches Above Its Economic Weight In Financial Markets Geopolitical analysis teaches that limitations on policymakers should be the starting point of analysis. For democracies, the biggest constraint of all is the vox populi – the voice of the people, or popular will. The Brexit movement faced a vociferous “Resistance” that won over the media and financial market consensus until reality struck in the general election of December 12, in which the Conservative Party won a historic victory. Chart 3Joe Biden Is Not Jeremy Corbyn The election vindicated Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s brinkmanship and “hard Brexit” terms, while once again chastening the elites and experts – including an innovative Supreme Court. Johnson’s single-party majority, combined with COVID-19 and the surge in domestic economic stimulus, have increased the odds that the UK will choose sovereignty over the economy and walk away from trade talks. Trump’s supporters show the same enthusiasm as Brexiteers and the same scorn for conventional wisdom and opinion polls. Will they be similarly vindicated? Beyond any knee-jerk equity rally, that would entail a “Phase Two” trade war with China – and possibly a new trade war with Europe or a global trade war. However, Trump faces much worse odds than Boris Johnson did. First, Johnson’s snap election took place at the top of the business cycle, back when a novel coronavirus was just starting to be discovered in Wuhan, China. This is how Harry Truman won his surprise victory in 1948, in defiance of all the opinion polls. Had Truman run in 1949, after a deep recession, the story would have gone differently – which is a problem for both Trump and the near-term equity market. Second, the political alternative was not acceptable in the United Kingdom but it is in the United States. Johnson led Jeremy Corbyn, a far-left rival for the premiership, by around 15%-20% in the polls. The Conservative Party itself led the Labour Party by 10%. By contrast, former Vice President Joe Biden is a center-left Democrat who has many flaws but is not out of the mainstream. He leads President Trump in the polling, as do Democrats over Republicans, though only by single digits. There is no contest between Biden and Corbyn (Chart 3). Trump might still win, but an American version of the UK landslide in 2019 is unlikely. Trump will lose the popular vote even if he wins the Electoral College, and Republicans have a very slim chance of winning the House of Representatives. The implication for financial markets is doubly negative, at least in the near term: there is about a 35% chance that the UK will leave without a deal and about a 35% chance that Trump will win. He could also kick China in the interim period if he loses. Won’t stocks cheer a Trump comeback and victory? Perhaps, but a data-dependent approach suggests that a “blue sweep” is still the base case, and that would be a good trigger for a full equity correction. Nor would a Trump win be positive for long-term equity returns in the final analysis. Trump is reflationary, but a larger trade war would hamper the global economic recovery and thus keep earnings suppressed. There is a 35% chance that Trump will win re-election. Trump is unlikely to win the national vox populi, like Brexit did, but he obviously can win the popular vote in the critical regions – the Sun Belt and the Rust Belt. If he does, the revolution in the global system will be confirmed: the retreat of globalization will accelerate. If he does not, then Brexit alone cannot confirm de-globalization; rather the UK will face even more pressure to make concessions and get a trade deal. Trump’s Path To Victory Chart 4Sitting Presidents Win Half The Time If Recession Ends In H1 We may well be forced to upgrade Trump’s odds of winning if his comeback gains momentum. Our subjective odds of a Trump win come from the historical record – incumbent parties only retain the White House amid recessions five out of 13 times in American history – but there are some important exceptions. First, the longest-serving American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, served during the Great Depression. So obviously a bad economy does not always disqualify a president. Nevertheless FDR got lucky with the timing of the fluctuations and he was personally popular, unlike President Trump. Second, an incumbent president wins 50% of the time if the recession ends before the election – namely in 1900, 1904, and 1924 (contrasted with defeats in 1888, 1912, and 1980). Today’s market performance looks similar to these cases, though premature fiscal tightening is now jeopardizing Trump’s bid (Chart 4). Assuming new stimulus passes, it is extremely beneficial for President Trump that COVID-19 cases are subsiding (Chart 5). Chart 5COVID-19 Subsides In Nick Of Time For Trump? Chart 6Even Approval Of Trump’s Pandemic Response Improving His approval rating on handling COVID-19 is somewhat recovering at the moment (Chart 6). Trump’s “law and order” message is also benefiting him amid the rise in vandalism, rioting, and homicide, judging by his improvement in national approval rating across almost all demographic groups, including many that are otherwise averse to Trump. Finally, Trump’s Abraham Accords – a potentially major peace deal between Israel and an expanding list of Arab states – could give his image another boost (Table 1). Foreign policy will not decide the election but these peace deals should not be underrated because they underscore a more important argument for voters: that the US should withdraw from its endless foreign wars and pursue peace and prosperity instead. If Trump’s typically weak approval rating on foreign policy starts to rise then his comeback gains breadth. Table 1The Abraham Accords Give Boost To Trump Image As Peacemaker We will upgrade our 35% odds of Trump’s re-election if Congress passes a new fiscal relief package, assuming Trump’s polling continues to improve. Our quantitative model is now giving Trump a 45% chance, which is in line with the consensus view but well above our subjective odds (Chart 7). We will upgrade our view if Congress passes a new fiscal relief package, assuming Trump’s polling continues to improve. Chart 7Quantitative US Election Model Puts Trump Win At 45% Odds Chart 8Stimulus Hiccups Cause Market To Sell The stock market does not perform well during periods in which fiscal cliff negotiations are prolonged – the failure of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in 2008 is one thing, but today’s impasse is more reminiscent of the debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013. Trump is now directly pressuring Senate Republicans to capitulate to House Democratic spending demands. If Republican senators abandon him, market turmoil will undercut his argument that he is the best man to revive the economy and he will lose the election (Chart 8). We do not think they will – and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s pledge to keep the House in session until a deal is passed is very positive news – but until the deal is sealed the market is vulnerable. As mentioned above we give a 25% chance of a failure to pass any stimulus bill in September or October. The next chance for stimulus will be in late January or February. Trump stands for growth at all costs, which will be received well by equity markets, other things being equal. But a Trump victory implies more trade war and that the GOP will retain the Senate, creating a steeper fiscal cliff next year – so any relief rally will be short-lived. Meanwhile a Trump defeat raises the risk he will take aggressive actions on the way out to cement his legacy as the Man Who Confronted China, and bind the Biden administration to decoupling policy. This is not a favorable outlook for investor sentiment or the economic recovery over the next few months. Brexit: The Three Kingdoms Will Force A Trade Deal Chart 9Sterling Will Fall Before It Bounces Back On A Deal In December 2016 we pointed to the three kingdoms – England, Ireland, and Scotland – as the origin of the geopolitical and constitutional crisis that would arise from the Brexit referendum and act as a powerful bar against a no-deal Brexit. That framework remains salient today as the risk of no-deal escalates due to quarrels over Northern Ireland Protocol, which was agreed in October 2019 as part of the formal Withdrawal Agreement that made Brexit happen on January 31, 2020. The implication is that the pound has not bottomed yet, though we see a buying opportunity around the corner (Chart 9). No one should doubt that the UK could walk away from the EU without a deal this December: The Tories’ single-party majority gives them the raw capability to push through plans they decide on – and raises the risk that they will overreach. The tariff shock of a no-deal exit is frequently exaggerated. The UK would suffer a tariff shock of about 1.38% of GDP, larger than what the US suffered in its tariff-war with China but hardly a death knell (Table 2). (The costs of losing single-market access would grow over time, however.) Table 2A No-Trade-Deal Brexit Would Create A Minimum Tariff Shock Of 1.4% Of GDP COVID-19 has supplanted the worst-case outcome of a no-deal exit by producing a much worse recession than anyone feared. The US is using the disruption to decouple from China and the UK could do the same with the EU. The result of COVID-19 is massive domestic stimulus that raises the UK’s and Europe’s threshold for pain. Any failure of trade talks would spur more stimulus. The Bank of England still has some bond-buying ammunition left and parliament, again, is undivided. Given that Boris Johnson has until 2024 before the next election, there is theoretically time for his personal and party approval ratings to improve as the economy recovers from the pandemic and any messy Brexit (Chart 10). Chart 10Bojo Has Until 2024 To Recover From Crises Chart 11UK Would Face WTO-Level Tariffs If No Deal The UK’s position in the quarrel over Ireland is rational – but so is the EU’s. If the trade talks collapse, the UK will need to remove any regulatory or customs divisions with Northern Ireland. Yet in preparing to do so it vitiates trust with the EU and makes a trade deal less likely. However, weighing all these points up, an UK-EU trade deal is still the most likely outcome (65% chance), as the economic and political costs are crystal clear while the benefits of a hard break are not so clear. Allow us to explain. Northern Ireland is the latest cause of tensions, although it was inevitable that tensions would arise ahead of the end-of-year deadline for a trade deal. Westminster has proposed an Internal Market Bill, which has passed with solid majorities in two readings in parliament, to reclaim aspects of sovereignty over Northern Ireland that were traded away to clinch the Withdrawal Agreement last year. The Johnson government’s position should be seen as a negotiating tactic to build leverage in the talks but also as a real fallback position if the talks fail. The House of Lords could delay the bill by a year, meaning that it may not take effect until end of 2021 – but a trade deal would make it moot. The Northern Ireland Protocol solved the riddle of how to preserve the integrity of the EU’s single market after Brexit yet avoid a return to a hard customs border with the Republic of Ireland. Customs checks were removed with the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement in 1998, which ended the Troubles between the two Irelands. The Protocol introduces a pseudo-customs border on the Irish Sea, requiring declarations on exports to Great Britain and EU oversight of UK state aid for Northern Irish firms, so that Northern Ireland can stay in the EU customs area while the UK can leave and still preserve a semblance of its own customs area in Northern Ireland. If the UK and EU get a trade deal, then all trade is tariff-free and the Protocol becomes redundant. Also, the Protocol enables a Joint Committee to review disputes over exports to Northern Ireland that are “at risk” of making their way into the EU without duties. The Protocol is supposed to operate even if the UK and EU fail to get a trade deal. Yet it is politically untenable for the UK to subject trade within its own country to EU rules or duties, or allow the EU to supervise state corporate subsidies across the UK, if no deal is agreed. The UK is more likely to violate the treaty to preserve its internal integrity. As Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis admitted, “Yes, this [Internal Market Bill] does break international law in a very specific and limited way.” While the EU’s threat to slap tariffs on British food exports to Northern Ireland is the proximate trigger of the Internal Market Bill, another key reason for the UK’s aggressive shift is the issue of state aid. All governments are extending emergency aid to major corporations to keep them from insolvency amid the recession. This will be the case for some time and it is even more true of the EU than of the United Kingdom. However, under the Protocol, the EU would be able to penalize companies in Great Britain that receive subsidies if goods or firms in Northern Ireland can be shown to benefit. Northern Ireland is supposed to operate within the EU’s standards on state aid. London obviously bristles at this backdoor for letting in EU regulation, not least because, in the event that a trade deal is not reached, it will need to pump the country full of state aid to compensate for the shock of seeing exports to the EU rise by 3% across the board according to Most Favored Nation status under the World Trade Organization (Chart 11). An UK-EU trade deal is the most likely outcome. As Dhaval Joshi of BCA’s European Investment Strategy points out, Boris needs to keep his own Tories under his heel (Chart 12). The Internal Market Bill provoked a backlash among 30 moderates. If that number rises to 40 Johnson loses his majority. This is a problem that he is seeking to address by giving parliament a veto over any future uses of the bill that would violate international law (this is an acceptable compromise because he has a majority). But a failure to drive a hard bargain with the EU would cause a much bigger rebellion among hard Brexit Conservative MPs and threaten his job. Chart 12Bojo Must Balance Hard Brexit Tories Geopolitics is about might, not right – the UK can assert its sovereignty and violate these international agreements, while the EU can then apply punitive tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and sanctions under the Withdrawal Agreement. Brexit is a power-political struggle that could devolve into a trade war. Obviously that would be a very bad outcome for the market, particularly for the UK, which is overmatched (Chart 13). But this risk is also a key limitation on the UK that will prevent this worst-case outcome. Indeed, despite all of the above, our base case is still that the UK and EU will get a deal. First, the economy will clearly suffer without a deal. After all, the US-China tariffs produced a negative effect for these two economies in 2019 and the impact on the UK would be bigger than that on the US (Chart 14). Chart 13The Brick Wall The UK Cannot Avoid Chart 14UK Faces Trade Shock If No Deal Second, the public doesn’t support a no-deal exit (Chart 15). Northern Ireland itself voted against Brexit in the referendum and as such would rather see an agreement that groups the UK and the EU under a single zero-tariff free trade agreement. Third, Boris faces a rebellion in Scotland if he pursues a hard break. The Scottish National Party would revive ahead of Scottish elections in May 2021 and demand a second independence referendum (Chart 16). The Irish Sea is a natural division that makes a more intrusive customs presence more supportable than otherwise. A little more paperwork is an acceptable cost to keep the United Kingdom from falling apart. Scotland is much more likely to go independent than Ireland is to unite. Chart 15Only 25% Think 'No Deal' A Good Outcome Boris is now prime minister, not just party leader, and he will ultimately have to decide whether he wants to be the last prime minister of a United Kingdom. Assuming Boris is at least focused on the next election, he will have to decide if he wants the rest of his premiership to be consumed with a self-inflicted double-dip recession and democratic revolt in Scotland, or a recovery on the back of a functional if uninspiring trade deal enabling him to head off the Scottish threat and save the union. Chart 16No Deal' Would Boost Scottish Independence Movement Obviously the final deal may not be clinched until the eleventh hour. The October 15 deadline can be delayed but talks must conclude in November or December in time to be ratified by the EU member states by December 31. US Election Drives Geopolitics, But Not The Brexit Outcome One factor that will not play much of a role in the UK’s decision-making is the US election. It is true that the Johnson government would benefit from President Trump’s reelection. But the EU is a much bigger market for the UK and the UK’s best strategy is to focus on its national interest regardless of what the US does. The US election may not be decided in mid-December in time for the UK to agree to a deal that can be ratified by year’s end anyway. Moreover the UK’s best strategy is to conclude a deal with the EU first, and then pursue a deal with the United States. This is because President Trump will be inclined to sign at least an executive deal, while a congressional deal requires support from the Democrats, which is only possible if Northern Ireland is resolved without hard border checks. Because the EU makes up such a larger share of British trade, an American deal does not give the UK much leverage in negotiating with the EU, but an EU deal does give the UK greater leverage in negotiating with the US. As Diagrams 1 and 2 show, this strategic logic holds even if the UK knows the outcome of the US election ahead of time: the scenarios with the least benefit and the greatest cost would still be scenarios involving no deal with the European Union. Diagrams 1 & 2United Kingdom Wants An EU Trade Deal (Regardless Of Trump/Biden) Diagram 3 boils all of this down to a single decision tree. First, the diagram shows that the economic costs are not prohibitive and therefore the risk of a no-deal exit is substantial – we would say 35%. Second, it shows that the risks of the negotiation are skewed to the downside. Third, it highlights that the UK will settle its affairs directly with the EU and not hinge its actions on the US election cycle. Diagram 3No-Deal Brexit Cost Not Prohibitive, But Best Strategy Is To Get A Deal Clearly the best strategy and best outcome involve seeking a trade deal with the EU, and hence it is our base case. This means an opportunity to buy the pound and domestic-oriented British equities, and turn neutral on gilts, is just around the corner. Investment Takeaways The GBP-EUR is the best measure of the market’s sensitivity to Brexit risks, so it should fall in the near term and rally sharply after resolution. However, the US election complicates things. The euro’s response is fairly binary: it is one of the biggest winners if Biden wins and one of the biggest losers if Trump wins. Hence GBP-EUR volatility will rise in the coming months (Chart 17). We recommend going long 1-month implied volatility contracts for October and November. The pound sterling, by contrast, will ultimately rise regardless of US election result, since the UK will pursue a trade deal out of its own national interest. Trump is less negative for the US dollar than Biden and a comeback and victory will drive a counter-trend dollar bounce. However, in the medium term we expect the dollar to fall regardless due to debt monetization and global growth recovery. Thus we recommend going long GBP-USD on a strategic basis when political risks peak over the next two-to-three months and GBP-USD falls to around 1.25, as recommended by our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor (Chart 18). Chart 17EUR-GBP Volatility Will Rise Sterling bears are forgetting that the sound defeat of Corbyn ruled out a sharp left-wing turn in domestic economic policy (higher taxes), while the Tories have made a clear turn against fiscal austerity. Therefore the worst-case scenario is a failure to agree to a trade deal by the end of this year. But that is not the base case and the risk will be priced within a month or two. Chart 18Pound Will Rally After Deal Concluded In November Or December Chart 19Yes, China Is Opening The Taps We remain tactically cautious and defensive even though the US fiscal negotiations are improving. The market is underrating too many clear and concrete risks to sentiment and the corporate earnings outlook, so the current bout of volatility can continue until there is greater clarity on US fiscal spending, the US election cycle, associated geopolitical risks, and the Brexit showdown. Book gains on long Brent trade for a return of 69.7%. We initiated this trade on March 27 in our “No Depression” report, which marked our shift to a strategic risk-on positioning. We remain bullish on oil prices and commodities on the back of global stimulus and our assessment that the OPEC 3.0 cartel will maintain discipline overall, but the next three-to-six months are crowded with downside risk. Cyclically, we see a global economic recovery deepening and broadening. China’s stimulus is surprising to the upside, as we have long written and the latest credit numbers bear this view out (Chart 19), which is critical for global reflation.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights If it can maintain production discipline over the next 2-3 years, OPEC 2.0 will be the oil market’s most important determinant of price levels for years. The massive increase in OPEC 2.0 spare capacity resulting from COVID-19-induced demand destruction, along with its low-cost production, global storage and distribution will allow it to bring crude to market quicker than US shale-oil producers, and to manage an orderly drawdown in global inventories, which remains its raison d'être.  As spare capacity is drawn down over the next couple of years, Brent and WTI forward curves will backwardate in in 1H21, as spare capacity and the slope of the forward curve are inversely related (lower spare capacity leads to higher backwardation). This will keep spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge (Chart of the Week). Parsimonious capital markets will continue to deny funding to all but the most profitable producers, which will continue to limit E+P ex-OPEC 2.0.  ESG-focused investments will increasingly favor energy producers outside the oil and gas sector.  As demand growth resumes, this will sow the seeds for higher oil prices in the mid-2020s. We will be updating our oil balances and 2H20 and 2021 forecasts – $46/bbl and $65/bbl for Brent in 2H20 and 2021 – next week.  Feature While the hit to oil producers’ revenues from the demand destruction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has been severe – particularly for those states comprising OPEC 2.0, which are so heavily dependent on oil exports – it set the stage for the producer coalition to take control of global oil-price dynamics for the next couple of years. If the OPEC 2.0 coalition can maintain its production discipline, its member states could extend this control for years into the future, just as they are attempting to diversify their economies from this dependence on hydrocarbons. Once OPEC 2.0 member states manage to diversify a large part of their economies, the next optimal strategy will be to monetize their reserves and market share. Until then, it is our contention it is in these states' interest to have higher prices via gaining control of supply. The producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia today sits on some 7mm b/d of spare capacity that is a direct result of the global collapse in demand. This gives it a powerful lever to restrain the recovery of production growth in the US shales and elsewhere. Spare Capacity Turns The Tables On Shale Oil The enormous spare capacity now held by OPEC 2.0 – the majority of which is in KSA – allows the coalition to turn the tables on the US shales and producers ex-US Since its inception in late 2016, OPEC 2.0 has accommodated higher US shale production by reducing its output and then expanding it at a slower rate, as US production soared to meet domestic demand and, increasingly, global oil demand (Chart 2). OPEC 2.0 has been in operation since January 2017. Over that period, the coalition reduced its output growth ~ 0.37% for every 1% increase in crude and liquids output ex-OPEC 2.0. Within that adjustment, OPEC 2.0’s output falls by 0.16% for every 1% increase in US output, most of which was accounted for by the unprecedented growth of shale production.1 The enormous spare capacity now held by OPEC 2.0 – the majority of which is in KSA – allows the coalition to turn the tables on the US shales and producers ex-US (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekFalling OPEC 2.0 Spare Capacity Will Backwardate Brent Forward Curves Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Accommodated US Shales Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Would Benefit From Maintaining Spare Capacity At High Levels Along with its low-cost production, global storage and distribution, this spare capacity allows OPEC 2.0 member states to bring crude to market quicker than US shale-oil producers as the need for additional supply becomes apparent. This was demonstrated earlier this year by KSA when it engaged in a brief market-share war with Russia following the breakdown of negotiations to extend OPEC 2.0’s production cuts.2 The spare capacity also allows the coalition to manage an orderly drawdown in global inventories, which remains its raison d'être, by making crude available out of production on short notice. As a result, Brent and WTI forward curves will backwardate in 1H21, keeping spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge. By keeping forward curves backwardated, the amount of revenue – i.e., price x quantity – hedged is limited by lower forward prices vs. spot prices. This limits the volume of oil a producer can bring to market in the future. Extending OPEC 2.0’s Low-Cost Spare Capacity In the near term, we expect OPEC 2.0’s production to come back faster and stronger than that of the US shales. The advantage OPEC 2.0 realizes from holding spare capacity – KSA in particular – can be extended at low cost going forward.3 And, if OPEC 2.0 communicates its intent to maintain spare capacity at higher levels than have prevailed recently, as was indicated last week by Aramco’s CEO, who announced KSA intends to raise capacity 1mm b/d to 13mm b/d, this could, at the margin, disincentivize investment in production ex-OPEC 2.0 in the future.4 Developing spare capacity for low-cost producers like Aramco is akin to building a portfolio of deep-in-the-money options to increase output quickly at minimal expense. These options can be exercised – i.e., output can be increased in short order at low cost – before competitors can mobilize to meet the market need. What makes this strategy credible is KSA’s capacity to surge production and put oil on the water in VLCCs at astonishing speed, as noted above vis-à-vis the breakdown in negotiations earlier this year in Vienna to extend production cuts. In the near term, we expect OPEC 2.0’s production to come back faster and stronger than that of the US shales (Chart 4). This will allow them to begin rebuilding revenues sooner as demand recovers (Chart 5). Any demand increase in excess of OPEC 2.0’s flowing supply – which could be restrained to force refiners to draw storage (Chart 6) – can be met with spare capacity and storage held or controlled by coalition members. Chart 4OPEC 2.0 Supply Recovers Faster Than US Shales Chart 5Rate Of Demand Growth Will Exceed Supply Growth Chart 6Forcing Inventories Lower Capital-Market Parsimony Will Tighten Supply Equity investors have abandoned the oil and gas sector, as can be seen in the collapse in the percentage of the overall market accounted for by energy stocks (Chart 7). Chart 7Energy Share Of Overall Market Collapses This no doubt is fueled by underperformance vs. technology stocks and other alternatives available to investors, and to a migration toward Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) investing (Chart 8). Indeed, as our colleagues in BCA’s Global Asset Allocation Strategy noted, “ESG-related equities have outperformed global benchmarks over the past two years, as well as during the recent equity selloff.” In addition, “green energy” investments account for half of the $300 billion G20 governments have allocated to clean energy policies and renewable energy programs as part of the COVID-19 fiscal stimulus deployed worldwide.5 Chart 8ESG Investment Surge We believe this combination of a long-standing aversion to oil and gas equities and OPEC 2.0’s clear advantage in terms of its spare capacity, low-cost production and global storage and distribution networks will result in under-funding of new E+P, and will lead to a tighter market by the mid-2020s. This is particularly true for oil, which, is not confronting the competitive threat faced by natural gas vis-à-vis renewable energy. We will continue to develop these themes, and subject this thesis to fiery critique, borrowing from Kant’s methodology.6 Risks To Our View There are two major risks to the thesis developed here: OPEC 2.0 breaks down, as it came close to doing earlier this year (discussed above).  A breakdown of the coalition would lead to lower E&P investment via very low oil prices that almost surely would occur if this were to happen. This would be a far more volatile path to higher prices, which also would discourage investment. A battery-technology breakthrough that makes electric vehicles viable – i.e., unsubsidized – competitors to internal-combustion engine technology powering the vast majority of transportation. We expect Brent and WTI forward curves to backwardate in 1H21, keeping spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0’s massive spare capacity resulting from COVID-19-induced demand destruction, its low-cost production and global storage and distribution network allow it to take control of crude-oil pricing dynamics over the next couple of years. These endowments also allow it to orchestrate an orderly drawdown in global inventories, which remains its raison d'être. As a result, we expect Brent and WTI forward curves to backwardate in 1H21, keeping spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge. Parsimonious capital markets and a preference for ESG-focused investment will increasingly favor energy producers outside the oil and gas sector. As demand growth resumes, this will sow the seeds for higher oil prices in the mid-2020s.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight JKM and TTF natural gas prices are up 49% and 27% over the past four weeks. The price spreads for December 2020 futures contracts between the US and Europe and Asia reached $1.6/MMBtu and $1.9/MMBtu this week. This will support the ongoing recovery in US LNG exports – which was briefly halted last month by Hurricane Laura – during the coming winter season (Chart 9). Separately, Libyan oil exports could be set to rebound following statements by General Haftar – the leader of Libyan National Army (LNA) – that he was committed to lifting the current blockade on the country’s exports, according to the US Embassy in Libya. Base Metals: Neutral China’s expansionary monetary and fiscal stimulus continued in August. The country’s total social financing (TSF) climbed past market expectations of CNY 2.59 trillion to CNY 3.58 trillion (Chart 10). This will provide further support to base metals prices – chiefly copper – over the coming months. The increase in TSF reflects the strong local government bond issuance and reinforces our view that the recovery in copper prices will be policy-driven – i.e. dictated by Chinese policymakers’ decisions on the allocation of total social financing funds in its economy with domestic supply adjusting to demand. Precious Metals: Neutral Palladium prices are up 7% since the beginning of September, supported by rebounding car sales and production in China. In August, vehicle sales grew by 12% y/y. We expect fiscal and credit stimulus in the country will allow car sales to continue growing y/y in the coming months. Ags/Softs:  Underweight Soybean prices remain strongly bid, looking to re-test 2018 highs. The latest weekly USDA crop progress report indicated continued deterioration in the number of soybean crops in good or excellent condition. Investor sentiment is fueled by China maintaining its promise to import record amounts of U.S. agricultural goods this year, as part of the Phase 1 trade deal. Last week, the U.S. Agriculture Department reported that Chinese buyers booked deals to buy 664,000 tonnes of soybeans, the largest daily total since July 22.  Chart 9LNG Chart 10COPPER PRICES       Footnotes 1     These estimates were generated by an ARDL model used to determine the sensitivity of OPEC 2.0 total liquids output to non-OPEC 2.0 production and consumption.  2     For a recap of this market-share war, please see KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War, which we published March 19, 2020.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.  Briefly, KSA put millions of barrels on the water in a matter of months after Russia launched its market-share war at the end of OPEC’s March 2020 meeting in Vienna.  This demonstrated an ability to mobilize supply and deliver it that greatly surpassed the eight-month time frame we estimate is required for shale production to reach the market after prices signal the need for additional crude. 3    Please see The $200 billion annual value of OPEC’s spare capacity to the global economy published by The King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC) July 17, 2018, for a discussion of the global impact of KSA’s spare capacity. 4    Please see Aramco CEO: Saudi Arabia to raise oil production capacity to 13 million barrels per day published by Oil & Gas World Magazine September 9, 2020. 5    Please see ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream, published by BCA’s Global Asset Allocation Strategy August 25, 2020.  It is available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see O’Shea, James R. (2012), “Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, An Introduction and Interpretation,” Acumen Publishing Limited, Durham, UK.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

This report contains an error in the section related to consumer spending and fiscal policy. That error somewhat changes the conclusions from the report, and it particularly impacts Chart 3, Table 2 and Table 3. The attached note explains the mistake and includes corrected versions of Chart 3, Table 2 and Table 3. Highlights Duration: A re-rating of Tech stock valuations is likely not a near-term catalyst for significantly lower bond yields. Congress’ continued failure to pass a follow-up to the CARES act is a greater near-term risk for bond bears. We continue to recommend an “at benchmark” portfolio duration stance alongside duration-neutral yield curve steepeners. Fiscal Policy: Without additional household income support from Congress, at least on the order of $500 - $800 billion, consumer spending will massively disappoint expectations during the next 6-12 months. Inflation: Inflation will continue its rapid ascent between now and the end of the year, but it is likely to level-off in 2021. We recommend staying long TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being, but we will be looking to take profits on that position later this year. Feature Bond Implications Of A Tech Stock Sell-Off Risk-off sentiment reigned in equity and credit markets during the past two weeks. The S&P 500 fell 7% between September 2nd and 8th and the average junk spread widened from 471 bps to 499 bps. This represents the largest sell-off since June when the equity market saw a similar 7% decline and the junk spread widened from 536 bps to 620 bps (Chart 1). Chart 1Two Equity Sell-Offs, Two Different Bond Market Reactions A comparison between the September and June episodes is particularly interesting for bond investors because Treasuries behaved very differently in each case. In June, bonds benefited from a flight to quality out of equities and the 10-year Treasury yield fell 22 bps. But this month, Treasuries actually delivered negative returns and the 10-year Treasury yield rose 3 bps (Chart 1, bottom panel). Table 1Selected Asset Class Performance During Last Two Equity Sell-Offs Why would Treasuries perform so well in June but fail in their role as a diversifier of equity risk in September? The answer lies in the underlying drivers of the stock market’s decline, which are easily identified when we look at the performance of different equity sectors. Table 1 shows the performance of different equity sectors in both the June and September sell-offs. In June, it was the cyclical equity sectors – Industrials, Energy and Materials – that led the decline. These sectors tend to be the most sensitive to global economic growth. This month’s equity drawdown was led by Tech stocks, while cyclical and defensive sectors saw much smaller drops. Table 1 also shows that a broad measure of commodity prices – the CRB Raw Industrials index – rose by 0.79% during the September equity sell-off, significantly outpacing gains in the gold price. In June, the CRB index still rose but it lagged gold by a wide margin. The underlying drivers of the stock market’s decline explain why Treasuries performed well in June and underperformed in September. We bring up the performance of different equity sectors, commodity prices and gold because bond yields correlate most strongly with: The performance of cyclical equities over defensive equities (Chart 2, top panel). The ratio of CRB Raw Industrials over gold (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2High-Frequency Bond Indicators These correlations explain why bond yields fell a lot in June but not in September. June’s equity sell-off was more like a traditional risk-off event that saw investors questioning the sustainability of the global economic recovery. The cyclical equity sectors that are most exposed to the global economic cycle experienced the worst losses and demand for safe-haven gold far outpaced the demand for growth-sensitive industrial commodities. In contrast, this month’s sell-off was driven by a re-rating of Tech stock valuations, not so much expectations for a negative economic shock. Technology now makes up such a large portion of the equity index’s market cap that this sort of move can cause the entire stock market to fall, but the pass-through to bonds will be much smaller for any equity sell-off that isn’t prompted by a negative economic shock and led by cyclical equity sectors. Implications For Bond Investors Even after this month’s drop, there remains a legitimate concern about extreme Tech stock valuations. The fact that many of the larger Tech names, like Microsoft and Apple, have benefited from the pandemic only makes it more likely that their stock prices will suffer as the world slowly returns to normal. From a bond investor’s perspective, we doubt that even a large drop in Tech stock prices would lead to significantly lower bond yields, especially if that drop occurs in the context of an economy that continues to recover. Bond yields will only turn down if the market starts to question the sustainability of the economic recovery, an event that would be negative for cyclical equity sectors but much less so for the big Tech names. With that in mind, our base case outlook calls for continued economic recovery during the next 6-12 months, but we do see a significant risk that the failure to pass a follow-up to the CARES act will lead to just such a deflationary shock during the next couple of months. We therefore recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark, while positioning for continued economic recovery via less risky duration-neutral yield curve steepeners. The Outlook For Consumer Spending And The Necessity Of Fiscal Stimulus After plunging during the lock-down months of March and April, consumer spending has rebounded strongly during the past few months. But can this strong rebound continue? Our view is that it cannot. That is, unless Congress delivers more income support to households. Even a large drop in Tech stock prices is unlikely to lead to significantly lower bond yields, especially if that drop occurs in the context of an economy that continues to recover. In this section we consider several different economic scenarios and estimate the amount of further income support that is necessary to sustain an adequate level of consumer spending. First off, to make forecasts for consumer spending we need to consider two main parameters: household income and the personal savings rate (Chart 3). More income leads to more spending in most cases. The only exception would be if cautious households decide to increase the amount they save relative to the amount they spend. Chart 3Consumer Spending Driven By Income & The Savings Rate We’ve actually seen that exception play out somewhat during the past five months. The CARES act provided households with an income windfall, but the savings rate also shot higher. This suggests that households had enough income to spend even more during the past few months but have been much more cautious than usual. We cannot overstate the role the CARES act has played in supporting household incomes since March. Disposable income has grown 7.4% during the past five months compared to the five months prior to COVID, and the CARES act’s provisions pressured income 10.3% higher during that period (Chart 4). The CARES act’s one-time $1200 stimulus checks and expanded $600 weekly unemployment benefits were the two most important provisions in this regard. Together, they pushed disposable income higher by 7.5%. Chart 4Disposable Personal Income Growth And Its Drivers This presents an obvious problem. The income support from the CARES act is now expired and Congress has yet to pass a follow-up stimulus bill. How vital is it that we get a new bill? And how large does it need to be? To answer these questions, we first need to set a target for adequate consumer spending growth. The second panel of Chart 3 shows 12-month over 12-month consumer spending growth. That is, it looks at total consumer spending during the last 12 months and shows how much it has increased (or decreased) compared to the previous 12 months. Notice that the worst 12-month period during the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) saw 12-month over 12-month consumer spending growth of -3%. During the economic recovery that followed, consumer spending growth fluctuated between +2% and +6%. Exercise 1: The March 2020 To February 2021 Period Chart 5Three Scenarios For Income And Savings In our first exercise, we consider the 12-month period starting at the very beginning of the COVID recession in March 2020 and ending in February 2021. As a bare minimum, we target consumer spending growth of -3% for this 12-month period on the presumption that 12-month spending growth equal to the worst 12 months seen during the GFC is the bare minimum that markets might tolerate. We also consider somewhat rosier scenarios of 0% and 2% spending growth. In addition to consumer spending targets, we also make assumptions for household income and the savings rate. We consider income coming from all sources including automatic government stabilizers, but without assuming any additional fiscal support from the government. We consider three scenarios (Chart 5): A pessimistic scenario where both income and the savings rate hold steady at current levels. An optimistic scenario where both income and the savings rate return to pre-COVID levels by February 2021. A “split the difference” scenario where both income and the savings rate get halfway back to pre-COVID levels by next February. Table 2 shows how much additional income support from the government is needed between now and February to achieve each of our consumer spending growth targets in each of our three scenarios. For example, in the optimistic scenario the government will need to provide $434 billion of additional income support between now and February for consumer spending to hit our minimum -3% threshold. In the more realistic “split the difference” scenario, households will require another $777 billion of stimulus. Table 2 also shows that stimulus on a monthly basis and compares the monthly rate of stimulus to the rate provided by the CARES act. For example, an additional $777 billion of income doled out between August and February works out to $111 billion per month, 61% of the amount of monthly stimulus provided by the CARES act between April and July. Table 2Without More Stimulus COVID's Impact On Consumer Spending Will Be Worse Than The GFC Two main conclusions jump out from this analysis. The first is that more income support from Congress is absolutely required. Otherwise, consumer spending will come in worse during the March 2020 to February 2021 period than it did during the worst 12 months of the GFC. Second, unless we assume a truly dire economic scenario, the follow-up stimulus does not need to be as large as the CARES act. In our most realistic “split the difference” scenario, that $777 billion of required stimulus is only 61% of what the CARES act doled out on a monthly basis. In that same scenario, a follow-up bill that delivered the same monthly stimulus as the CARES act would lead to positive 12-month consumer spending growth. Exercise 2: The August 2020 To July 2021 Period Chart 6One More Scenario One potential problem with our last exercise is that our target was for total consumer spending between March 2020 and February 2021. This period includes five months for which we already have data and the exercise is therefore partially backward-looking. A more relevant analysis might target consumer spending on a purely forward-looking basis from August 2020 to July 2021. We therefore perform our calculations again for the August 2020 to July 2021 period. This time, we consider only one economic scenario where income and the savings rate both return to pre-COVID levels by July 2021 (Chart 6). This scenario works out to be slightly more optimistic than the “split the difference” scenario we considered earlier. Also, since our target 12-month spending growth period no longer contains the downtrodden months of March and April, we require a more ambitious target than -3% growth. A return to the post-GFC range of 2% to 6% represents a target that is likely more representative of market expectations. Table 3 shows the results of this second analysis. Once again, we see that some additional government stimulus is necessary to meet our spending targets. Even to achieve 0% spending growth over the next 12 months will require another $249 billion from the government, and that outcome would almost certainly disappoint markets. We calculate that an additional $534 billion is required to achieve 2% spending growth during the August 2020 to July 2021 timeframe. This result is consistent with the $777 billion we calculated in Table 2, though it has come down a bit because we have made slightly more optimistic economic assumptions. Table 3At Least Half A Trillion More Government Income Support Is Needed Bottom Line: Our analysis suggests that further stimulus is needed to sustain the recovery in consumer spending. A new stimulus package doesn’t need to be as large as the CARES act on a monthly basis, but it should provide at least $500 - $800 billion of additional income support to households. With Congress still dithering on this issue, financial markets appear overly complacent in the near-term. While the economic constraints suggest that a deal should be reached soon, policymakers may need to see a spate of negative economic data and/or poor market performance before being spurred into action. In acknowledgement of this significant near-term risk to the economic outlook, bond investors should refrain from getting too bearish, and keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for the time being. Inflation’s Snapback Phase Chart 7Inflation Coming In Hot The core Consumer Price Index rose 0.4% in August, the third large monthly increase in a row (Chart 7). We see inflation continuing to come in hot between now and the end of the year, before tapering off in 2021. As of now, we would describe inflation as being in a snapback phase. That is, back in March and April, when lock-down measures were widespread across the country, the sectors that were most affected by the shutdowns experienced massive price declines. However, notice that core inflation fell by much more than median or trimmed mean inflation during this period (Chart 7, panels 2 & 3). The median sector’s price didn’t fall that much, but the overall inflation number moved down because of deeply negative prints in a few sectors. Now that the economy is re-opening, many of the sectors that were most beaten down in March and April are coming back to life. As a result, those massive price declines are turning into massive price increases. Once again, the median and trimmed mean inflation figures have been much more stable. This “snapback” dynamic is illustrated very clearly in Chart 8 which shows the distribution of monthly price changes for 41 different sectors in April and in August. Notice that while the middle of the distribution hasn’t changed that much, April’s massive left tail has morphed into August’s massive right tail. Chart 8Distribution Of CPI Expenditure Categories The continued wide divergence between core inflation and the median and trimmed mean measures suggests that this snapback phase has further to run. In other words, we will likely continue to see strong inflation prints for a few more months as the sectors that were most downbeat in March and April continue their rebounds. However, once core catches back up to the median and trimmed mean inflation measures, this snapback phase will come to an end and inflation’s uptrend will probably level-off. The continued wide divergence between core inflation and the median and trimmed mean measures suggests that this inflation’s snapback phase has further to run.  We recommend that bond investors continue to favor TIPS over nominal Treasuries during this snapback phase, but we will be looking for an opportunity to go underweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries later this year, once core inflation moves closer to the median and trimmed mean measures and the snapback phase ends. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success.   Table 4Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Special Report

Highlights In a world with low expected returns from various asset classes and still-elevated target returns among largely underfunded pension funds, asset allocators may have to consider the use of leverage to meet liability requirements. Canadian pension funds have been more open to using leverage than their US counterparts, but even the very conservative Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has an allocation to levered asset classes such as private equity, albeit at a very low weight. Retail investors do not have access to low-cost financing as institutional investors do. Still, they too can add leverage via ETFs and Liquid Alts mutual funds. When leverage is used at the asset-class level such as in alternative asset classes, financing costs play an important role in investment decisions. For pension funds with access to low-cost financing, “direct investing” in alternative assets is more advantageous than indirect investment via alternative funds. When leverage is used at the portfolio level, such as via a risk-parity structure, the financing cost impacts mostly just the return, but the leverage constraints impact both return and volatility. Risk-parity strategy is more advantageous when it’s used as one of the strategies in a total portfolio, rather than at the total-fund level because usually a sub-portfolio can have a much higher leverage ratio than the total fund. Leverage should be managed in a centralized risk-management system at the total-fund level, together with all other risk exposures. 1. Why Should Leverage Be Considered? In a Global Asset Allocation Special Report on long-term return assumptions,1 the key conclusion was that, for the next decade, investors would not be able to achieve the kind of return targets they were used to over the previous two decades because all asset classes would see much lower returns going forward, with the largest reductions coming from fixed-income and alternative assets such as farmland, REITs, and commodities. This is bad news for investors, especially pension fund investors with long-term liabilities to match. For example, according to Wilshire Consulting,2 at the end of 2018, the aggregate funded ratio (defined as the fund assets as a percentage of the fund obligations) of 134 US state retirement systems was 72.2%, which is better than the low at the end of 2016 (Chart 1). However, as shown in Chart 2, there were still about 11% of the funds with assets at less than 50% of liabilities. Chart 1US Pensions' Funded Status* Chart 2US Pensions' Funded Ratio Distribution* Over the past two decades, the risk-return profile of traditional assets like equities and government bonds has already been much less attractive than historical averages, as shown in Chart 3, but investors have diversified into credit and alternative asset classes (which contain embedded leverage) to enhance their portfolios’ risk-return profile. Chart 3Future Risk-Return Profiles Less Attractive Than Historical Averages According to the above-mentioned Global Asset Allocation Special Report, with a conventional 50/30/20 (equities/bonds/alts) allocation, a US investor could comfortably achieve a 7% annual return over the past two decades. Now, alternative asset classes have become mainstream, likely producing a much lower future return. The same 50/30/20 portfolio would currently generate only about 4.9% annually, much less than what’s required to match liabilities. In fact, alternatives’ future return expectations have been cut to 6.1% from their past 20-year average of 15.1% annually, meaning that even if 100% of assets are fully invested in alternatives, the expected return will still be lower than the 7% that’s still assumed by some US state pension funds.3 Not to mention that at the end of 2018, over 34% of US retirement pension funds had long-term rate-of-return expectations higher than 7.5%, as shown in Chart 4. Chart 4Challenging Long-Term Return Expectations Chart 5Why Should Leverage Be Considered? According to Modern Portfolio Theory, to achieve a higher return investors can take higher risk in three different ways, as shown in Chart 5:  1) Allocating more funds to higher-return/higher-risk assets, i.e. moving upwards to the right along the efficient frontier (red line) – for example, a 60-40 equity/bond portfolio is well to the upper-right side of the “optimal” allocation; 2) Levering up one or more assets to alter the shape of the frontier (grey line) – for instance, incorporating private-equity and infrastructure funds that contain embedded leverage; and 3) Levering up the “optimal” (in terms of return per unit of risk) risky portfolio with funds borrowed at the total-fund level (green line). Risk parity is a close proximation. For more detail about the basics of leverage, please see Appendix 1 on pages 21-22. Chart 5 illustrates three different frontiers based on the assumed risk-return forecast for US equities, US Treasurys, and alternative assets.4 We can observe the following: When the target return is low (at target 1), leverage does not provide significant benefit no matter which form is used; As the return target moves up relative to what the underlying assets can provide (target 2), direct leverage produces a better return/risk profile than embedded leverage, which in turn is better than the portfolio without any leverage; When the target return is higher than what any efficient combination from the available asset classes can achieve (target 3), investors must consider the use of direct leverage. In theory, investors should always prefer to use leverage at the total-fund level to lever up the “optimal” portfolio. In reality, however, some investors are constrained from borrowing. In addition, some investors do not have the expertise or infrastructure to manage the additional complexity that results from the use of direct leverage. In fact, direct leverage has typically been considered dangerous by many investors. Misuse of leverage was attributed to some high-profile failures, such as Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. So how has leverage been used by asset allocators? What are the key factors that determine if and how leverage should be used? What are the key risks associated with the use of leverage, and how should leverage be managed? In the sections below, we first review how some pension funds and retail investors have been using leverage (we ignore hedge funds, even though they are the most obvious users of leverage, because they are a part of the “alternative” asset class with embedded leverage). From there, we attempt to address, 1) How does financing cost impact leverage at the asset-class level? and 2) How does financing cost impact the decision to use leverage at the portfolio level if investors are constrained by the amount of leverage that can be used? Finally, we suggest a centralized leverage management framework to monitor and manage leverage at the total-portfolio level. 2. Use of Leverage By Pension Funds Leverage can be applied in many different ways. In general, the use of leverage by pension funds can be grouped into four categories: First, with a focus on return-seeking. This is achieved mainly by using alternative asset funds such as private-equity funds, hedge funds, real-estate funds, and infrastructure funds. These funds have embedded leverage, but with much higher costs. They provide diversification and higher risk-adjusted returns, partly because of their embedded leverage and lock-up advantages. Large pension funds, especially the Canadian pension funds which all have excellent credit ratings and strong in-house talent, have also taken advantage of their solid balance sheets to acquire low-cost financing to invest directly in alternatives. For example, the first bond issued by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) in 2001 was $600 million at 5.7%, while the Canada Public Pension Investment Board (CPPIB) even issued euro-denominated bonds in both 2017 (2 billion euros, 7-year, 0.375% coupon) and 2018 (1 billion euros, 15-year, 1.5% coupon).5 Proceeds from these bond issues have mostly been used to invest in alternative assets, which now account for a large proportion of the major Canadian pension funds’ assets under management (Table 1). Table 1“Alternatives” Have Become Mainstream For The Canadians                     Most US state pension funds are more conservative than their Canadian peers. They too have been gradually adding exposure to alternatives with embedded leverage such as private equity, real estate, and hedge funds, as shown in Chart 6. Even Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), the very conservative Japanese sovereign wealth fund, in its current operating guideline has a 5% allocation to alternatives such as private equity, real estate, and infrastructure.6 That’s an impressive amount considering its first investment in the space was in 2013, as shown in Chart 7. Chart 6The Americans Are Catching Up On Alternatives Chart 7GPIF’s Push Into Alternatives* However, the push into alternative asset classes by large pension funds has made it increasingly difficult to allocate funds to alternative assets. For example, CalPERS has only an 8% allocation to private equity,7  yet its most recent exposure as of June 2019 stood at only 7.1% – because it could not find enough suitable private-equity investments to build the asset class to the desired scale.8 Second, with a focus on liability matching. Pension funds who follow the liability-driven investing (LDI) approach often construct two portfolios. One is the liability-matching portfolio and the other is the active portfolio. The former matches the liabilities, while the latter generates alpha to cover management fees and to provide a cushion for estimation errors. Since most pension liabilities are indexed to inflation, liabilities are often modelled as a combination of nominal bonds and inflation-linked bonds with leverage. The leverage ratio can often be higher than two or three times because of the ultra-long duration of the liabilities versus the available bond instruments. For example, the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP) uses an LDI approach, which is why its leverage ratio is much higher than some other pension plans, as shown in Chart 8.  Chart 8Use Of Leverage By Some Pension Funds Third, with a focus on risk diversification. Risk-based strategies such as risk parity generate a more diversified portfolio with lower absolute returns compared to a conventional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio, but in general have a much higher Sharpe ratio, and therefore require leverage to achieve the required return/risk objective.9 Even though most risk-parity believers dedicate a portion of their assets to risk-parity strategies (either internally with direct leverage or externally with embedded leverage), some pension funds have adopted such a risk-diversification approach at the total-fund level. Danish pension fund ATP and the Missouri State Employees Retirement System (MOSERS) are two examples. As shown in Chart 8, as of June 2019, MOSERS’ leverage was about 50%,10 a lot higher than CalPERS’ newly augmented total-fund leverage limit of 20% (from 5% previously),11 because CalPERS does not use the same approach to apply leverage. Fourth, with a focus on more tactical moves, such as tail-risk hedging, revenue generation, and opportunistic strategies to take advantage of short-term dislocations in the marketplace. These tactics are achieved mostly using derivatives such as futures, options, and swaps. For example, equity and bond futures or swaps are often used to tactically adjust asset allocation at the total-fund level without impacting the underlying asset-class management. 3. Use of Leverage By Retail Investors Retail investors do not enjoy low-cost financing as large institutions do. They can use lines of credit or margin accounts to invest, and they can also use derivatives if they are qualified to do so. For those who are not qualified or not comfortable using leverage themselves, there are two types of retail products with embedded leverage: Levered or inverse ETFs and “Liquid Alts” mutual funds or ETFs. Levered or Inverse ETFs: These products are rebalanced daily to a fixed leverage multiple, often -3X, -2X, -1X, 2X, and 3X of the underlying assets. As such, only daily performance matches the intended performance objective. Because of the daily realization of gain and loss, they are not suitable for long-term buy-and-hold investors because the longer the holding period, the larger the drift due to the compounding effect. For example, Chart 9 shows the Nasdaq-100 ETF (QQQ) and the associated levered ETFs. It’s interesting to note that in several annual periods ending in 2011, 2016, 2018 and 2019, QQQ’s one-year return was slightly positive, yet 3X ETF’s corresponding returns were negative! This is due to the “negative diversification return” effect as defined by Qian.12 Chart 9NASDAQ-100 Linked ETF Performances* Liquid Alternative Mutual Funds/ETFs: These are the “liquid” version of alternative investment strategies aimed at retail investors. They are easy to buy and sell. In Canada, since National Instrument 81-102 became effective in January 2019, retail investors who do not have the sophistication to directly invest in alternatives now have access to such investments via mutual funds and ETFs. As shown in Table 2,13 these funds can utilize leverage up to 3X based on gross aggregate exposure by borrowing or short-selling. In the US, liquid alts have been available to retail investors since 2013, and the market has grown rapidly to over US$225 billion.14 Now there are signs emerging that even some institutional investors are starting to look into liquid alts ETFs.15 Table 2Canadian Regulation On Liquid Alts Mutual Funds 4. Leverage At Asset-Class Level Alternative funds, such as funds that invest in private equity, private debt, and infrastructure, typically use leverage. These funds carry a high cost because 1) investors in these funds must pay a premium for not managing leverage, and 2) these funds often have much higher financing costs. For example, the average financing cost for leveraged buyouts in 2014 was more than 5%,16 while the average risk-free rate in 2014 was 0.03%. Research has shown that private-asset performance can be proxied by using leverage and the corresponding public asset. In Table 3, the base case is based on the forecast for US equities and Treasurys without leverage, and a risk-free rate of 2.6%.17 Then equities are leveraged by 1.5 times to proximate private equity. The low-cost case has a financing cost of 1.57% (which is what the average 3-month T-Bill rate was in 2019), while the high-cost case with a financing cost of 3.92%, which is 2.5 times the low-cost rate. Table 3Assumed Returns/Risks* Chart 10Financing-Cost Impact On The Use Of Embedded Leverage Chart 10 shows the corresponding frontiers of the three cases. It’s clear that leverage expands the frontier to the right, meaning that leverage helps to achieve a higher return with better diversification, albeit with higher volatility. However, the financing cost plays a very important role in the feasibility of the leverage decision. When the financing cost is low, leverage is better than the base case at any return-target level. When the financing cost is high, however, leverage is worse – so long as the return target is lower than what the underlying assets can achieve without leverage. This supports the shift to “direct investing” by some institutional investors with access to lower financing when investing in alternative asset classes. 5. Leverage At Portfolio Level Risk parity is an obvious example of using leverage at the portfolio level. As shown in our previous report on risk parity, there are different approaches to implementing risk parity, and they can generate different results – especially when there are more than two assets.18 To analyze the impact of leverage constraints and financing costs, we use a two-asset (US equity/Treasury) risk-parity portfolio as the basis of our analysis. One definitive conclusion we arrived at in our previous report was that risk-parity approach historically always outperforms in recessions. This conclusion has passed the real-time test in the most recent pandemic-induced recession. As shown in Chart 11A, risk-parity portfolios that target the same volatility as a 60/40 US equity/Treasury portfolio have outperformed the latter significantly. The same holds true for the portfolios that target the same volatility as an equity portfolio (Chart 11B).   Chart 11AUS Risk Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Chart 11BUS Risk Parity With Same Vol As US Stocks However, as described in the previous Special Report on risk parity, we did not impose any cap on the use ofleverage. As such, some strategies that use a relatively short lookback period to calculate historical statistics required very high leverage ratios at some time periods in our back-tests. What would happen if we set a cap on the leverage ratio? And what if the financing cost is higher than the 3-month T-bill rate assumed in most academic research, and also in our previous report? Chart 12A and Chart 12B show the results when leverage is capped at three times and the financing cost is Libor +25 basis points. It’s clear that Chart 12A looks the same as Chart 11A because the leverage cap is higher than the required leverage employed, while the cost impact is negligible for such a short period. But Chart 12B shows that, even though the risk-parity portfolio still outperformed, the outperformance has been much less so far this year because the required leverage was a lot higher than three times. Chart 12AImpact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Low-Vol Target Risk-Parity Chart 12BImpact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On High-Vol Target Risk-Parity The impact of financing costs in Chart 12A is barely seen because the time period was short and the interest rate was low. What is the long-run impact of leverage restrictions and financing costs then? Chart 13A and Chart 13B show the long-run statistics from April 1945 to July 2020 based on a 180-month look-back period for two portfolios: RPL1, the risk-parity portfolio with the same volatility target as a 60/40 US equity/Treasury portfolio; and RPL2, the risk-parity portfolio with the same volatility as MSCI US equity index. Chart 13C shows the risk-adjusted returns for three portfolios with constant volatility targets at 10%, 12%, and 15%, respectively. Chart 13ALong-Term Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity With Low Vol Target* Chart 13BLong-Term Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity With High Vol Target*     Chart 13CLong-Tem Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity Portfolio* Some observations are worth highlighting: Financing costs mainly impact average return, but have very little impact on volatility. As such, higher financing costs reduce risk-adjusted returns. When there is no financing cost, all risk-parity portfolios with different volatility targets should have the same risk-adjusted return as the underlying unlevered risk-parity portfolio. When financing costs are present, however, this is no longer the case. Leverage constraints impact both returns and volatility in the same direction – i.e., stricter constraints on leverage reduce both return and volatility, and vice versa. The magnitude of the impact from leverage constraints, however, varies because the target volatility of the portfolio plays a key role in the required leverage. For a constant-volatility target, a tighter control on leverage will reduce volatility more than return, resulting in a higher risk-adjusted return (Chart 13C); for a variable-volatility target such as RPL1 and RPL2, however, the same conclusion cannot be drawn (Charts 13A and 13B) Long-run statistics do not tell the full story because they really depend on the period chosen. Chart 14A shows the dynamic impact of financing when there were no constraints on leverage, and Chart 14B shows the dynamic impact of leverage when there were no additional financing costs. Chart 15 shows the combined impact when leverage is capped at three times and the financing cost at Libor+25 basis points. They are for five different risk-parity portfolios with different volatility targets with a lookback window length of 180 months. (For different lookback window, please see Appendix 2 on pages 23-25). Chart 14ADynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity Without Leverage Constraint* Chart14BDynamic Impact Of Leverage Cap On Risk Parity Without Extra Financing * Chart 15Dynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity With Leverage Being Capped At 3X It is interesting to note the following: When there is no restriction on leverage, additional financing cost eats away cumulative total return in a much more significant way when an risk parity portfolio has a higher-volatility target than a lower-volatility target (Chart 14A). This is simply because a higher-volatility target requires higher leverage. When there was no additional cost of financing, constraint on leverage ate away total returns – mostly in the early years of the back-test when required leverage was often very high. In recent years, the impact was significant only when the leverage cap dropped to three times or lower. Also, the higher the volatility target, the more reduction in return risk-parity portfolio would suffer compared to its base case (Chart 14B). When the lookback window length is changed, the impact of leverage and financing cost also changes. The shorter the window length, the larger the impact (Charts in Appendix 2). A 180-month lookback period was the preferred choice in our previous report, and it is still more appropriate to use than 36 months or 360 months. Since additional cost and restriction on leverage eat away total return so much, is it really worthwhile to even consider using a risk-parity approach at all? Charts 16A and 16B show that overall total returns were worse during the entire period from April 1945 to July 2020, when additional cost and leverage constraints are applied. Since the burst of the tech bubble, however, risk-parity portfolios with the same volatility target as US 60/40 and also MSCI US have generated higher total returns than US 60/40 and MSCI US, respectively.  Chart16ADoes Risk-Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Outperform US 60/40? Chart 16BDoes Risk-Parity With Same Vol As MSCI USI Outperform MSCI US? We are in a low interest-rate environment, and rates may stay low for a long time to come. In addition, when futures contracts are used to implement leverage, the implied cost is very close to 3-month T-Bills; Libor or Libor + may be present mostly when swaps are used due to factors such as supply/demand and counterparty risk. As such, financing costs will likely play less of a role than leverage constraints until interest rates rise significantly. Given that total-fund leverage is much lower than individual strategy/portfolio leverage, the implication is that risk-parity is more advantageous when it is used as a strategy in a sub-portfolio other than at the total fund level. 6. Suggestion For Leverage Management In a low-return environment, asset allocators face more challenges to meet return targets than in the past. Unless return targets are lowered to what the underlying assets can reasonably provide, asset allocators may have to consider the use of leverage to beef up overall portfolio returns. However, leverage is also a double-edged sword because it also increases portfolio volatility. As such, we suggest a centralized risk-management system to monitor and manage all risks, including risks associated with leverage, in line with our suggestion on currency hedging outlined in our 2017 Special Report. Appendix 1: Leverage Basics Leverage is an investment strategy of using borrowed money – specifically, the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital – to increase the potential return of an investment. It also amplifies the loss potential if the levered investment does not work out as expected. This is why it is also often called a “double-edged sword.” Leverage has many different forms and is used in many different places. For example, residential home mortgages are a form of leverage that the general public understands very well, yet the leverage embedded in a futures contract may sound alien to some retail investors. For asset allocators, the most important decision on leverage is whether to apply leverage directly at the total-portfolio level or use assets with embedded leverage. For example, issuing bonds to lever up a diversified portfolio (a mean-variance optimal portfolio or a suboptimal risk-parity portfolio) is an example of the former. On the other hand, investing in a private equity fund is an example of the latter. Research has shown that for large pension funds with excellent credit ratings, the latter is less efficient than the former due to the much higher cost of financing.1  For example, in 2014, the average cost of financing for leveraged buyouts was in excess of 5% when the short-term interest rate was close to zero.2 It’s not surprising that pension investors have formed joint ventures to invest in alternative assets directly instead of relying on specialty funds. In terms of financing, there is on-balance-sheet leverage and off-balance-sheet leverage. On-balance-sheet leverage raises liabilities, such as via bond issuance. Off-balance-sheet leverage uses the balance sheet of a counterparty, such as OTC financial derivatives. A repo agreement is a repurchase agreement that involves selling a security (often a government bond) to a counterparty (a lender) with the promise of buying it back after a pre-defined period at a pre-defined price. It’s often used for short-term liquidity management.  Depending on the form of financing, the measurement of leverage differs. Accounting leverage or balance-sheet leverage is calculated as total assets divided by net assets. This measurement is accurate only if on-balance-sheet leverage is used for long-only investments. When off-balance-sheet leverage is used or when shorting is involved, then accounting leverage severely understates the actual leverage. For example, Appendix Table A1 below is a snapshot from the 2018 annual report of Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP). The notional value of its derivatives was $333 billion, which is over 10 times the fair value of these instruments, and over four times the fund’s net asset value. Appendix Table A1HOOPP's Use Of Derivatives* So, when derivatives are used, accounting leverage is often adjusted for derivative exposure by taking the delta-adjusted notional value of derivative contracts.3 When there are short positions, leverage can be measured as Gross and Net Leverage after derivatives exposure is delta-adjusted. Gross Leverage is defined as the total exposure of long and short positions divided by net assets. This is accurate when the long and short positions are totally separate active bets. Net Leverage, is defined as the net exposure between long and short positions, divided by net assets. This is an accurate measure of leverage when the long and short positions are taken as hedges for one another. 1  Dr. Serguei Zernov, “Leverage to Meet the Pension Promise,” Global Risk Institute, Jan 24, 2019. 2  L’her, J.F., Stoyanova, R., Shaw, K., Scott, W. and Lai, C, “A bottom-up approach to the risk-adjusted performance of the buyout fund market”, Financial Analysts Journal, July/August 2016. 3  Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy and Gregoty B. van Inwegen, “Hedge Fund Leverage,” Journal of Financial Economics, January 25, 2011. Appendix 2: Impact Of Leverage Caps And Financing Costs With Different Lookback Window Lengths In Section 5, Chart 14A, Chart 14B and Chart 15 were presented using a lookback window of 180 months, a prefered window length based on our previous research on risk parity. However, practioners have been using different lookback windows. Below are the corresponding charts showing lookback windows of 360 months and 36 months, respectively. It’s easy to see that, the shorter the lookback window, the more significant the impact of  both financing costs and leverage constraints. The reason is simple: a shorter lookback window generates much higher leverage compared to a longer lookback window. APPENDIX 2 Chart 1AImpact Of Financing With 360-Month Lookback APPENDIX 2 Chart 1BImpact Of Financing With 36-Month Lookback   APPENDIX 2 Chart 2AImpact Of Leverage Cap With 360-Month Lookback APPENDIX 2 Chart 2BImpact Of Leverage Cap with 36-Month Lookback   APPENDIX 2 Chart 3AImpact Of Financing When Leverage Capped At 3X With 360-Month Lookback APPENDIX 2 Chart 3BImpact Of Financing When Leverage Capped At 3X With 36-Month Lookback   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 2 Ned McGuire and Brice Shirimbere, "2019 Wilshire Consulting Report on State Retirement Systems: Funding Levels and Asset Allocation," Wilshire Associates, March 2019. 3 “State Pension Funds adjust to ‘New Normal’ of Lower Returns,” Chief Investment Officer, January 2, 2020, 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 5 Martha Porado, “A look at how Canadian pension funds are using leverage,” dated Aug 10, 2018. 6GPIF (Government Pension Investment Fund) 2018 annual report. 7 "2017-18 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report,"CalPERS. p106, 2018 annual report. 8 "CalPERS Falling Short of Private Equity Goals," dated November 18, 2019. 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Demystifying Risk Parity," dated May 8, 2019. 10 https://www.mosers.org/funding/annual-reports 11 Arleen Jacobius, "CalPERS shifts $150 billion as part of new strategic asset allocation," Pensions And Investments, dated August 20, 2019. 12 Edward Qian, “Rebalance and Diversification Returns of Leveraged Portfolios,” Investment Insight, Panagora, December 2011. 13https://www.mackenzieinvestments.com/content/dam/mackenzie/en/2019/03/mm-investing-in-liquid-alternatives-en.pdf 14 https://perspectives.scotiabank.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Liquid-A… 15 "5 Use Cases for Liquid Alt ETFs," Institutional Investor dated November 18, 2019. 16 L’ her et al, “A bottom-up approach to the risk-adjusted performance of the buyout fund market,” Financial Analysts Journal, 72(4), 2016. 17 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 18 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, Demystifying Risk Parity," dated May 8, 2019.

Highlights Overweighting the SIFI banks is our highest-conviction call, … : Our enthusiasm for the four banks deemed to be systemically important financial institutions is founded on the view that generous monetary and fiscal policy will lead to considerably smaller credit losses than the SIFIs’ depressed valuations imply. … but investors are none too sure of it, inside and outside of BCA: The SIFIs have underperformed the broad market since we overweighted them in late April, and they will likely run in place until our mild-credit-loss thesis can be borne out. Banks’ fortunes are not tied to the slope of the yield curve … : Banks do not borrow short to lend long and the widespread belief that their stocks are hostage to the yield curve has no empirical support. … and the US banking industry is not in structural decline: US banks have experienced steady growth in real loans, net interest income and net income. Their businesses have yet to be disrupted by new entrants; so far, technology has increased profitability and we expect that the pandemic will point the way to future efficiency improvements. Feature In response to ongoing client questions and a lively internal debate, we are devoting this week’s report to reviewing our highest-conviction call: overweighting the SIFI banks.1 After restating our thesis and what it would take to get us to abandon it, we challenge two arguments that have been cited in support of a bearish view. We hold fast to our underlying rationale, though we concede that it will likely take more time for the call to pan out. We always recommended it for investors with a time frame of at least a year, and it may take until first quarter 2021 earnings to start generating alpha, but we still believe it will. A Feature, Not A Bug Our entire editorial staff gathers every month to define the consensus view on all the major asset classes, which becomes the BCA House View until we revisit it the next month (or sooner, if need be). The House View is not a party line that we all parrot; any individual managing editor is free to express an opposing view, provided s/he clearly states that s/he is departing from the House View and, ideally, explains why. Although this policy does not always lead to neatly packaged views, it affords clients a window on our internal debates, allowing them to evaluate the merits of opposing points of view for themselves. It also helps us attract and retain the informed, opinionated researchers we seek. Banking On Washington The pandemic, and the lockdown measures imposed to limit its spread, tore a huge hole in the economy. Policymakers swiftly mobilized to build a bridge across the hole until the virus could be contained. Before March was out, the Fed had soothed the Treasury market, prized open the corporate bond market and had set bond spreads on a path to tighten. Congress passed measures providing nearly $3 trillion of aid, highlighted by the massive CARES Act. Although another significant round of federal aid is not assured, it would be in the House's, the Senate's and the White House's interest, so we expect it will eventually materialize. Thanks to the CARES Act’s copious household support, personal income reversed its March slide and comfortably exceeded February's pre-pandemic level in April, May, June and July (Chart 1). With much of the economy still in suspended animation, absent another round of direct payments to households, unemployment insurance benefit supplements, support for badly disrupted businesses and aid to state and local governments facing severe revenue shortfalls, potentially dire economic consequences loom. With even run-of-the-mill recessions dooming incumbent administrations’ election prospects, it is in the White House’s best interests to advocate for more spending to hold back the flood. Republican control of the Senate also lies in the balance. Chart 1Fiscal Transfers Have Kept Households Afloat With the Democrats seeking to demonstrate that bigger government is the solution, House, Senate and White House interests all align with the passage of a major new aid package ahead of the election. Despite the worsening climate, we expect that elected officials’ self-interest will carry the day. All creditors stand to benefit, since fiscal transfers have been vital to limiting bankruptcies and defaults, and the SIFIs would get a major boost as we attribute their dreadful year-to-date performance to market fears of credit losses well in excess of the loan loss reserves they’ve already set aside. The key to our pro-SIFIs call is that we see them as the foremost beneficiary of continued fiscal largesse. Just The SIFIs, Please We are not enamored of the entire banking industry. Low rates are likely to undermine net interest margins for an extended period and weakening loan growth, a function of borrower and lender caution, will hurt lending volumes. Banks that principally take deposits and make loans to the households and businesses within their geographic footprint will suffer. Several community banks face stiff headwinds as do some regionals. The SIFIs have quite a few earnings streams, though, and only get around half of their revenues from net interest income. They are hybrids that combine investment banks boasting bulge-bracket underwriting, top-tier sales and trading, and formidable wealth management businesses with a nationwide commercial banking footprint. These companies do not live and die by loan volumes and interest rate spreads, as much of their loan originations are securitized and their loan books are not bound to the intrinsic risk of their local economies. The SIFIs trade slightly below book value and only slightly above tangible book value (Table 1, left panel). This would be cold comfort if their book values were at risk of falling because of optimistic carrying values for their assets or impending reserve builds that would eat away at retained earnings. We are not at all worried about bad marks, however – post-GFC regulation kept the SIFIs from getting out over their skis in the just-concluded expansion – and we think that they are adequately reserved in the aggregate. Assuming that the virus will be contained by the end of the year, we stick to our initial projection that they would need to build sizable loan loss reserves only through this year's first three quarters. Table 1SIFI Book Values On their second quarter earnings calls, the SIFIs were of the view that their reserve building was nearly complete. National infection rates have remained high, however, and the supplemental federal unemployment insurance benefit has since lapsed. We expect that the rollback of re-opening measures and the interruption of CARES Act relief provisions will force the SIFIs to add to their reserves this quarter in amounts approaching first and second quarter levels, but if Congress does provide another round of meaningful aid this month or next, we think that will be the end of the big builds. Equity investors do not seem to have recognized that the SIFIs’ earnings power has allowed them to take their sizable reserve builds in stride. Book values didn’t budge in the first two quarters (Table 1, right panel), and if they continue to hold their ground, the selling in their stocks is way overdone. We are quite happy to find a group that’s so inexpensive against a backdrop in which nearly every public security is trading at elevated levels relative to history, especially when that group will be a clear winner from continuing fiscal support. If further aid on a meaningful scale is not forthcoming, however, we will exit our SIFI overweight. We are not irresolute, but we close out positions when their underlying rationale no longer applies. Psst. The Yield Curve Doesn’t Matter Old superstitions die hard. US Investment Strategy has been presenting evidence for ten years that the yield curve does not drive bank earnings.2 Although the intuition behind the view is logical, it fails to acknowledge that banks do not borrow short to lend long. As the gargantuan interest rate swap market and the FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile demonstrate, all but the smallest community banks rigorously match the duration of their assets and liabilities. We typically show line charts overlaying the slope of the yield curve (the 10-year Treasury yield less the 3-month T-bill rate) with aggregate net interest income or net income, showing that there has been no consistent relationship between the two series. We’ve even shown that the yield curve is largely uncorrelated with bank net interest margins. Alas, one may as well try to convince a native New Yorker that s/he is not the most important element of the universe, or an English soccer fan that his/her side is not among the favorites to capture the next World Cup. Fiscal aid has held defaults way below levels that would typically be associated with such a severe economic shock and another hearty round of it would position SIFI credit losses to come in way below the market's worst fears. This time around, we present over 60 years of monthly data in one scatterplot after another that takes the shape of an amorphous blob. They demonstrate that there is no coincident relationship between the level of the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ performance relative to the S&P 500 (Chart 2), or the change in the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ relative performance (Chart 3). They also show that there is no leading relationship over six- (Chart 4A) or twelve-month periods (Chart 4B) between the level of the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ relative performance. The change in the slope of the yield curve also comes a cropper with six- (Chart 5A) and twelve-month lead times (Chart 5B). With every one of the six regressions generating r-squareds below 1%, we conclude that neither the level of the slope of the yield curve, nor its direction, explains any element of relative bank stock performance. Chart 2The Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Influence Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Chart 3The Change In The Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Influence Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Chart 4AThe Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 6 Months Chart 4BThe Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 12 Months Chart 5AChanges In Yield Curve Steepness Do Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 6 Months Chart 5BChanges In Yield Curve Steepness Do Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 12 Months Rumors Of The Banks’ Structural Decline Have Been Greatly Exaggerated We submit that US banks are not in the throes of a structural decline. Adjusted for inflation, growth in their core lending business has been steady, except during recessions and their aftermath, for 70 years (Chart 6). Despite a persistent trend toward increasing non-bank intermediation that has reduced the industry’s market share, loan volumes continue to expand. Chart 6Real Bank Loan Balances Have Steadily Grown For 70 Years Industry viability is not only about sales volume, however. Participants in a declining industry could retain or even grow volumes, only to see their profits shrink in the face of competition from incumbents or new entrants. Real net interest income has continued to grow, however, more or less in line with real loan growth (Chart 7), demonstrating that margins have not eroded. Real net income, which includes credit costs and fees and other non-interest items that are more sensitive to the business cycle, is much more volatile, but has also followed a broad upward trend (Chart 8). Chart 7Real Net Interest Income Growth Has Decelerated, But It's Still Positive ... Chart 8... While Real Net Income Quickly Surpassed Its Pre-GFC Peak Futurists see fintech and cryptocurrencies as looming disruptive threats to the banking industry, but they have yet to make a significant dent in its volumes or its profits. To this point (Chart 9), technological advances have done more to reduce the industry’s operating costs than they have to undermine its moat. One would expect that a meaningful downward move in the efficiency ratio might be in store, based on what the banks have learned from the pandemic about optimizing human inputs, virtual applications and their costly branch footprints. The data do not support the claim that the industry is in the midst of a structural decline and an efficiency tailwind is likely in the offing once the acute phase of the pandemic passes. Chart 9Banks' Non-Interest Expenses Relative To Revenue Are Structurally Declining Concluding Thoughts Stocks that are oversold can become even more oversold and cheap does not necessarily mean valuable. It is entirely possible that the SIFI banks are a value trap; our call has underperformed since the late May/early June backup in long yields was summarily unwound (Chart 10). Something seems off, however, when the SIFIs are performing nearly as badly year-to-date as office and retail REITs. The latter face a structural shrinking of their businesses while banks are looking at nothing more than a cyclical ebb. Chart 10A Marathon, Not A Sprint Fiscal policymakers demonstrated their ability to counter the cyclical drag over the spring and summer; if they recover their willingness to do so, the SIFIs' outlook is far less grim than markets are currently discounting. Given our view that both the administration’s re-election prospects and Republican control of the Senate depend on staving off severe adverse economic consequences from the pandemic, we think that Congress will rediscover its resolve. If it doesn’t, we will have to close our position and potentially seek a better entry point after the new session of Congress convenes in January. It won't be all hearts and rainbows for the SIFIs over the next year, but concerns about the yield curve and the banking industry's trend earnings and revenue growth are misplaced. They are positioned to climb a wall of worry as soon as the pandemic begins to loosen its grip. Under our base-case policy scenario, the selling in the SIFIs has gone way too far. With policymakers squarely in the SIFIs’ corner, we’re thrilled to have a chance to take a shot at them from the long side below book value. The market is right to recognize that the banks will not have smooth sailing even if Congress eventually comes through, but we think it has failed to consider how much more protected the SIFIs are than their smaller brethren. If it’s holding them down because of yield curve concerns, or the idea that the banking industry is in the midst of a long-run decline, it simply has its facts wrong and we’re confident that they will rise over the next six to nine months. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     JPM, BAC, C and WFC are the commercial/universal banks that regulators have deemed systemically important. 2     Please see the February 28, 2011 US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Banks And The Yield Curve,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights We remain bearish on the US dollar over the next 12 months. The best vehicle to express this view continues to be the Scandinavian currencies (NOK and SEK). Precious metals remain a buy so long as the dollar faces downside. However, we remain more bullish on silver than gold. Go short the gold/silver ratio (GSR) again at 75. At the crosses, our favorite trade is short NZD against other cyclical currency pairs. These include the CAD, AUD, and SEK. Sterling is selling off as we anticipated, but our timing was offside. That said, the pound is cheap. We will go long cable if it falls below 1.25. Short EUR/GBP at current levels. The Swiss franc will continue to appreciate versus the USD, but will lag behind the euro. EUR/CHF will touch 1.15. We prefer the JPY to the CHF as a currency portfolio hedge. We argued last week that Prime Minster Shinzo Abe’s resignation does not change the yen’s outlook. Feature Our trade basket this year has been centered on a dollar-bearish theme. Since the top in the DXY index on March 19th, we have been expressing this view via various vehicles, most of which have been very profitable. Our favorites have been the Scandinavian currencies, silver, and the AUD, either at the crosses or against the US dollar. So far, these are among the best-performing trades in the G10 currency world (Chart I-1). Chart I-1A Currency Report Card Going into the final leg of 2020, the key question is which currency pairs will provide the most upside. In this report, we revisit the rationale behind our high-conviction trades. The Case For Scandinavian Currencies A review of Q2 GDP across the G10 reveals which countries have been doing relatively better during the pandemic. Norway emerges as the economy that had the best quarter-on-quarter annualized growth (Chart I-2). Swedish growth held up very well in Q1 and even the drop in Q2 still puts it well ahead of the US, the euro area, and the UK. As small, open economies which are very sensitive to global growth conditions, this is a very impressive feat for Sweden and Norway. Part of the reason for this is that over the years, the drop in their currencies, both against the US dollar and euro, has made them very competitive. Chart I-2A Currency Report Card Norway benefited from a few things during the pandemic. First, as a major oil exporter, the sharp fall in the NOK helped cushion the domestic economy against the crash in crude prices. Second, the handling of the pandemic was swift and rigorous, and this has almost completely purged the number of new infections in Norway. Third, aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus (zero rates, quantitative easing, and the first budget deficit in 40 years) has set the economy on a recovery path. As a result, consumption is rebounding smartly and the Norges Bank expects mainland GDP to touch pre-crisis levels by 2023. Already, real retail sales have exploded higher (Chart I-3). Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks (and value stocks in general) could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Norwegian Consumption Has##br##Recovered Chart I-4A Bounce In Oil & Gas Stocks Will Help The Krone In the case of Sweden, the sharp rebound in the manufacturing PMI also suggests the industrial base is recovering. This will also coincide with a solid bounce in exports, cementing Sweden’s rise in relative competitiveness and its exit from the pandemic-induced recession (Chart I-5). The Riksbank’s resource utilization indicator has stabilized, suggesting deflationary pressures are abating. Meanwhile, home prices are on the cusp of a recovery, which should help boost consumer confidence and support consumption. With our models showing the Swedish krona as undervalued by 19% versus the USD, there is much room for currency appreciation before financial conditions tighten significantly. Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher. The bottom line is that both Norway and Sweden are well poised to benefit from a global economic recovery, with much undervalued currencies that will bolster their basic balances. We expect both the SEK and NOK to be the best performers versus the USD in the coming year (Chart I-6).  Chart I-5The Swedish Economy Is On The Mend Chart I-6The Scandinavian Currencies Remain Cheap Stay Long Precious Metals, Especially Silver In a world of ample liquidity and a falling US dollar, gold and precious metals are bound to benefit. This is especially the case on the back of a central bank that is trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. Gold has a long-standing relationship with negative interest rates, though the correlation has shifted over time. The intuition behind falling real rates and rising gold prices is that low rates reduce the opportunity cost of holding non-income-generating assets such as gold. But more importantly, the correlation is between the rise in gold prices and the level of real interest rates, meaning as long as the latter stays negative, it is sufficient to sustain the gold bull market (Chart I-7). Gold tends to be a “Giffen good,” meaning demand increases as prices rise. This can be seen in the tight correlation between our financial demand indicator (proxied by open futures interest on the Comex and ETF holdings, Chart I-8) and gold prices. The conclusion is that, just like the US dollar, gold tends to be a momentum asset, where higher prices beget more demand – at least until the catalyst of easy money and negative rates vanishes Chart I-7Gold Prices And Real Yields Chart I-8Gold Is A Giffen Good There is reason to believe that the bull market in gold might be sustained for longer this time around. The reason is that central banks have become important (and price-insensitive) buyers. Foreign central banks have been amassing almost all of the gold annual output in recent years. It is remarkable that for most of the dollar bull market this past decade, the world’s major central banks (and biggest holders of US Treasurys) have seen rather stable exchange rates relative to the gold price (Chart I-9). This suggests that gold price risks could be asymmetric to the upside. A fall in prices encourages accumulation by EM central banks as a way to diversify out of their dollar reserves, while a rise in prices encourages financial demand and boosts the value of gold foreign exchange reserves. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. During precious metals bull markets, prices tend to move in sequence, starting with gold, then silver. Meanwhile, the gold/silver ratio (GSR) tends to track the US dollar (Chart I-10), since silver tends to rise and fall more explosively than gold. Part of the reason is that the silver market is thinner and more volatile. Silver’s rising industrial use has also led to competition with investment demand in recent years. Chart I-9Central Banks Will Put A Floor Under Gold Prices Chart I-10Silver Should Outperform Gold As The Dollar Falls The next important technical level for silver will be the 2012 highs near $35/oz. After this, silver could take out its 2011 highs that were close to $50/oz, just as gold did. Globally, the world produces much more gold than silver, with a supply ratio that is 7:1. Meanwhile, the price ratio between gold and silver is near 70:1. Back in the 1800s, Isaac Newton concluded that the appropriate ratio was 15.5:1. We initially shorted the GSR at 100 and eventually took 25% profits when our rolling stop was triggered. We recommend putting a limit sell at 75. More speculative investors can buy silver outright. Stay Short NZD At The Crosses, Especially Versus The CAD Chart I-11Stay Long CAD/NZD In our currency portfolio, trades at the crosses are equally important as versus the USD in terms of adding alpha. Over the past year, we have successfully been playing the short side of the kiwi trade. We closed our long SEK/NZD trade for a profit of 7.8% on March 20, and our long AUD/NZD trade for a profit of 5.2% on June 26. Today, we remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. First, the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the G10, while Canadian bourses are heavy in cyclical stocks. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD cross. Second, immigration was an important source of labor for New Zealand, and COVID-19 has eaten into this dividend for the economy. As such, the neutral rate of interest is bound to head lower. And finally, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy will fare better than agriculture, boosting Canada’s relative terms of trade. At the Bank of Canada’s meeting this past Wednesday, the tone was slightly optimistic as it kept rates on hold. Recent data has been rather strong in Canada, especially in housing and goods consumption. This allows for the possibility of the BoC tapering asset purchases faster than the market expects, as argued by my colleague Mathieu Savary. This arbitrage is already being reflected in real interest rates, where they offer a premium of 180 basis points in Canada relative to New Zealand (Chart I-11). What To Do About Sterling? Trade negotiations between the UK and EU are once again hitting a brick wall. The key issue is around Northern Ireland. Ireland wants to remain bound to the EU’s customs and trade regime. The UK is seeking an amendment to be able to intervene, if there is “inconsistency or incompatibility with international or domestic law.” In short, it allows for UK discretion in the movement of goods to and from Northern Ireland, as well as state aid to Northern Ireland. The EU argues this is a clear breach of the treaty agreed to last year.    We remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. As negotiations go on, our base case is that a deal will eventually be reached. This is because neither side wants the worst-case scenario, namely, a no-deal Brexit. Should no deal be reached, the sharp rise in the trade-weighted euro will be exacerbated by a drop in the pound. This is deflationary for the euro area. And while the drop in the pound could be beneficial to the UK in the longer term, it will be very destabilizing since the UK is highly dependent on capital flows. Our roadmap for sterling is as follows: Historically, odds of a “hard” Brexit have usually been associated with cable near 1.20. This occurred after the UK referendum in 2016 and after Prime Minister Boris Johnson was elected with a mandate to take the UK out of the EU (Chart I-12). Intuitively, this suggests that maximum pessimism on the pound, driven by Brexit fears, pins cable at around 1.20. A “weak” deal cobbled together at the eleventh hour will still benefit cable. Depending on the details, 1.35-1.40 for cable will be within striking distance. In the case where both the UK and EU come to a “perfect” agreement, the pound could be 20%-25% higher. The real effective exchange rate for the pound is now lower than where it was after the UK exited the ERM in 1992, with a drawdown that has been similar in size. A good deal should cause the pound to overshoot the mid-point of its historical real effective exchange rate range (Chart I-13). Chart I-12GBP Has Historically Bottomed At 1.20 Chart I-13The Pound Is Cheap The pound is also cheap versus the euro, and we expect the EUR/GBP to start facing significant headwinds near 0.92. It is remarkable that UK data continues to outperform both the US and euro area (Chart I-14). As such, cable should be bought on weakness. Tactically, we would be buyers of the pound in the 1.24-1.25 zone, and our limit sell on EUR/GBP was triggered yesterday at 0.92.   Chart I-14The UK Economy Is Improving Thoughts On The ECB The main takeaways from the European Central Bank (ECB) conference were threefold. First, data in the euro area was better than the ECB expected. Second, the ECB did not give any hints on its policy review or extend forward guidance. Keeping policy easy until inflation is up to, but still below, 2% appears more hawkish than the Federal Reserve, which is now trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. And finally, the ECB said they are monitoring the exchange rate, but fell short of providing any hints that they will actively lean against the currency. The euro took off, both against the dollar and other European currencies. We outlined in last week’s report why we do not believe the euro can fall much from current levels. These include the common currency being cheap and having a large share of exports in the eurozone. A Few Words On The CHF Finally, a few clients have asked what happens to the Swiss franc in an environment where the euro is rising (and the dollar is falling). Our bias is that the Swiss National Bank lets a rising EUR/CHF ease financial conditions in Switzerland, and even leans into it. The Swiss National Bank has been stepping up its pace of intervention since EUR/CHF touched 1.05 this year and will continue to do so (Chart I-15). Unfortunately, there is not much it can do about a falling USD/CHF. This suggests the franc will fall against the euro, but not so much against the dollar. In a world where global yields eventually converge to zero, holding the Swiss franc is an attractive hedge. Chart I-15USD Weakness Will Be A Headache For The SNB   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been positive: On the labor market front, nonfarm payrolls fell to 1371K from 1734K in August. The average hourly earnings increased by 4.7% year-on-year. The unemployment rate declined from 10.2% to 8.4%. Initial jobless claims increased by 884K for the week ending on September 4th.  Finally, the NFIB business optimism index increased from 98.8 to 100.2 in August. The DXY index initially rose to a 4-week high of 93.6 earlier this week with positive data releases, then fell back to 93. Our bias is that while the dollar has been rebounding since the beginning of the month, the rally could prove to be a healthy counter-trend move in the long-term dollar bear market. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 A Simple Framework For Currencies - July 17, 2020 DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been mixed: The Sentix investor confidence increased from -13.4 to -8 in September. GDP plunged by 11.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, or 14.7% year-on-year.  The euro declined by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The ECB decided to keep its interest rate and PEPP program unchanged on this Thursday. President Christine Lagarde sounded quite hawkish in the press conference, saying that incoming data since the last monetary policy meeting suggest “a strong rebound in activity broadly in line with previous expectations.” We continue to favor the euro against the US dollar. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been mixed: The coincident index increased from 74.4 to 76.2 in July. The leading economic index also climbed up from 83.8 to 86.9 in July. The current account balance widened from ¥167 billion to ¥1,468 billion in July. GDP plunged by 7.9% quarter-on-quarter in Q2, or 28.1% on an annualized basis. Preliminary machine tool orders continued to fall by 23.3% year-on-year in August. Overall household spending contracted by 7.6% year-on-year in July. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The expansion in Japan’s current account balance is mainly driven by the decline in domestic demand. Exports fell by 19.2% year-on-year in July while imports slumped at a faster pace by 22.3%. This suggests that deflationary forces are returning to Japan, which will boost real rates and buffet the yen. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been mostly positive: Retail sales continued to increase, rising by 4.7% year-on-year in August, following a 4.3% increase the previous month. Halifax house prices increased by 5.2% year-on-year for the 3 months to August. The Markit construction PMI declined from 58.1 to 54.6 in August. The British pound extended its sell-off this week, depreciating by 2.5% against the US dollar, making it the worst-performing G10 currency. Under ongoing trade negotiations, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit is now putting more downward pressure on the pound after the summer rally. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been mixed: The AiG services performance index fell from 44 to 42.5 in August. The NAB business confidence increased from -14 to -8 in August while the business conditions index fell from 0 to -6. The Australian dollar appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Spending fell sharply during the pandemic, pushing Australia’s savings rate to 19.8% from 6%. Until consumer spending returns in earnest, the RBA is unlikely to raise rates, which puts a cap on how far the AUD can rise. The good news is that household balance sheets are being mended, which reduces macroeconomic risk. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been mixed: Manufacturing sales plunged by 12.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. The preliminary ANZ business confidence index increased from -41.8% to -26% in September. The ANZ activity outlook index also ticked up from -17.5% to -9.9%. The New Zealand dollar fell initially against the US dollar, then recovered, returning flat this week. The ANZ New Zealand Business Outlook shows that most activity indicators have increased to the highest levels since the beginning of the pandemic but are still well below pre-COVID-19 levels. We like the New Zealand dollar against the US dollar but believe that it will underperform against other pro-cyclical currencies including the Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been positive: On the labor market front, the unemployment rate declined from 10.9% to 10.2% in August. The participation rate increased from 64.3% to 64.6%. Average hourly wages surged by 6% year-on-year in August. Housing starts increased by 6.9% month-on-month to 262.4K in August, the highest reading since 2007. The Canadian dollar depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of Canada maintained its target rate at 0.25% on Wednesday. It is also continuing large-scale asset purchases of at least C$5 billion per week of government bonds. Moreover, the Bank suggested that the bounce-back in activity in Q3 was better than expected, which bodes well for the loonie. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been mixed: FX reserves continued to increase from CHF 847 billion to CHF 848 billion in August. The unemployment rate remained unchanged at 3.4% in August. The Swiss franc appreciated by 1% against the US dollar this week. The SNB Chairman Thomas Jordan said that “stronger currency market interventions relieve over-valuation pressure on the Swiss franc and protect the Swiss economy”. Recent dollar weakness could be another headache for the SNB, accelerating SNB’s currency intervention. While we like the franc as a safe-haven hedge with high real rates, the upside potential is likely to be more gradual as the SNB leans against it. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been positive: Manufacturing output increased by 1.8% month-on-month in July. Headline consumer price inflation ticked up from 1.3% to 1.7% year-on-year in August. Core inflation continued rising to 3.7% year-on-year from 3.5% the previous month. The Norwegian krone depreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The increase in headline inflation was mainly driven by furnishings and household equipment (10%), communications (4.9%) and food (3.7%). However, the Norwegian krone is still tremendously undervalued against the US dollar according to our models. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been mostly positive: The current account surplus fell to SEK 63.2 billion in Q2 from SEK 75.5 billion in Q1. However, this compares favorably to a surplus of SEK 34.7 billion the same quarter last year. Manufacturing new orders continued to fall by 6.4% year-on-year in July. This is an improvement compared to the 13.1% contraction the previous month. Headline consumer prices inflation increased from 0.5% to 0.8% year-on-year in August. Core inflation also climbed up from 0.5% to 0.7% year-on-year. The Swedish krona appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. We continue to favor the Swedish krona amid global economy recovery. Moreover, our PPP model shows that the krona is still undervalued by 19% against the US dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Stocks face near-term downside risks from further delays in passing a new US fiscal stimulus package, a potentially slower-than-expected rollout of a Covid-19 vaccine, and the unwinding of speculative call option positions in large-cap US tech companies. Nevertheless, we continue to favor equities over bonds over a 12-month horizon. One key reason is that the global equity risk premium – proxied by the difference between the stock market earnings yield and the real government bond yield – remains quite large. Many observers argue that the bond yield component of the equity risk premium is distorted by central bank manipulation. They also contend that low bond yields reflect poor economic prospects and that structurally low borrowing costs could lead to malinvestment down the road. In this report, we push back against these views. We argue that today’s low bond yields do, in fact, provide a reliable estimate of the risk-free component of the discount rate; that the drop in yields over the past year mainly reflects higher private-sector savings and easier monetary policy rather than pessimism about growth and earnings; and that instead of leading to overinvestment, the main effect of falling interest rates, at least so far, has been to inflate the rents earned by companies with monopoly power. All of this means that lower interest rates really do justify higher market valuations. The Correction Is Not Over, But We Are Sticking With Our Bullish 12-Month View On Stocks Chart 1Tech Stocks At Greatest Risk Of A Pullback After recouping some of their losses on Wednesday, stocks stumbled again on Thursday. Since reaching new highs last week, global equities have dropped by 5.3%. US equities have taken the brunt of the beating. They are down 7% from last week’s top, compared to 3% for non-US stocks (Chart 1). The tech-heavy Nasdaq remains 9.4% off its record high. We continue to see near-term downside risks to global stocks, particularly US equities. It has now been six weeks since emergency US federal unemployment benefits lapsed. The US economy is set to rebound at a brisk pace in the third quarter – the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model projects that output will grow 30% at an annualized pace – but GDP is rising from a very low base. In the absence of a new fiscal package, US growth could slow sharply in the fourth quarter and beyond, causing more workers to become permanently unemployed. Concern over the safety of the vaccines being developed to fight Covid-19 could also unsettle investors. On Wednesday, AstraZeneca announced that it had temporarily paused the Phase 3 trial of its vaccine co-developed with the University of Oxford after a patient suffered a severe reaction. Such delays are normal in the conduct of vaccine testing, but they do raise memories of the 1976 debacle with the Swine flu vaccine, which caused 450 Americans to come down with Guillain-Barré syndrome, a life-threatening neurological disorder.1 Chart 2Nasdaq Volatility Declined Even As Share Prices Tumbled These worries come on the heels of a six-month rally in tech stocks – one that was dangerously amplified by speculative call option purchases by retail investors. The preference among retail investors for short-dated calls allowed them to gain control of large swathes of shares at relatively little cost. Market makers and other counterparties who sold the calls were forced to buy the underlying stock to hedge their exposure. This created a self-reinforcing feedback loop where rising call option prices generated more purchases of the underlying stock, leading to even higher call prices. Starting last week, the process began to go in reverse. It is noteworthy that Nasdaq implied volatility actually fell on both Monday and Wednesday as tech stocks imploded, a possible sign that nervous investors were liquidating their call positions (Chart 2). It is difficult to know how much further this process has to run, but our guess is that a capitulation point has not yet been reached. This suggests that the correction is not yet over.   TINA’s Siren Song Despite our near-term concerns, we expect global equities to be higher in 12 months’ time. At least one of the nine vaccine candidates currently in Phase 3 trials is likely to produce a viable formula. Policymakers are also liable to heed the will of voters and maintain generous fiscal stimulus measures. All this should allow global growth to pick up. Stocks usually do well when global growth is accelerating (Chart 3). And then there is TINA. TINA — There Is No Alternative — has become a popular adage on Wall Street. As the argument goes, no matter how expensive stocks seem to get, bonds and cash are even less attractive. There is some logic to this view. Today, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 stands at 1.6%. While this dividend yield is well below its historic average of 4.3%, it is still higher than the 0.68% yield on the 10-year Treasury note (Chart 4). Chart 3Stocks Usually Do Well When Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 4Bond Yields Have Fallen Below Dividend Yields Imagine an investor having to decide whether to place their money in an S&P 500 index fund or a 10-year Treasury note. Dividends-per-share paid by S&P 500 companies have almost always increased over time. However, even if we make the pessimistic assumption that dividends-per-share remain unchanged for the next ten years, the value of the S&P 500 would still have to fall by 9% over the next decade to equal the return on the 10-year note. Assuming that inflation averages 2% over this period, the real value of the S&P 500 would need to drop by 25%. The picture is even more dramatic outside the US. In the euro area, the index would have to fall by over 30% in real terms for investors to make more money in bonds than stocks. In the UK, it would need to fall by over 50%. Elevated Equity Risk Premia Granted, stocks are riskier than bonds. However, based on a comparison of dividend yields with bond yields, stocks today are significantly cheaper than usual (Chart 5). Chart 5AStocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Chart 5BStocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds The relative attractiveness of stocks can also be inferred by subtracting the real bond yield from the cyclically-adjusted earnings yield on stocks in order to get an implied equity risk premium (ERP)2 (Chart 6). Outside the US, the ERP is high both because earnings yields are elevated and because real bond yields are depressed. In the US, which accounts for 56% of global stock market capitalization, the earnings yield is below its long-term average. Nevertheless, the US ERP is still quite high because real bond yields reside deep in negative territory. In fact, the US ERP has barely fallen since March because the decline in real yields has largely offset the rise in stock prices (Chart 7). Chart 6Equity Risk Premia Are Elevated Chart 7The Decline In US Real Yields Since March Has Largely Offset The Rise In Stock Prices   Are Bond Yields Fake News? Stock market bears will argue that the ERP is overstated by the abnormally low level of bond yields. Their argument typically centers on three points: Quantitative easing, forward guidance, NIRP and ZIRP have distorted bond yields to such an extent that we can no longer use them as a reliable measure of the risk-free component of the discount rate. Even if one accepts the premise that current bond yields are a valid proxy for the risk-free rate, the fact that yields are so low is hardly a cause for celebration. This is because today’s low yields reflect dismal economic prospects, which justifies a higher-than-normal equity risk premium. Low bond yields are incentivizing all sorts of malinvestment. With time, this will depress the rate of return on capital, leading to lower stock prices. Let’s examine all three arguments in turn. Are Bond Yields Being Manipulated? The term financial repression gets bandied around quite often these days. There is no doubt that central banks would like to keep yields low, but how much higher would yields be in the absence of any unorthodox monetary measures? Our guess is not much higher. The simplest test of whether bond yields are above or below their equilibrium level is to look at whether growth is above or below trend. The recovery following the financial crisis was anemic, suggesting that monetary policy was only modestly accommodative. If anything, one can argue that in much of the world, bond yields would be even lower today were it not for the fact that nominal interest rates cannot go much below zero. Do Low Bond Yields Reflect Bad News? Bond yields can decline for many reasons. Some of these reasons are positive for equity investors, while others are negative. If yields fall on the expectation of weaker economic growth, that is clearly bad for stocks. On the flipside, if yields drop because monetary policy has turned more dovish, that is good for stocks. The impact on equities from other factors influencing bond yields can be ambiguous. For example, consider the case of an increase in private-sector savings. All things equal, higher savings will lead to less spending. A decline in spending is likely to result in lower output and diminished corporate profits. That is bad for stocks. However, if governments absorb the excess private-sector savings by running larger budget deficits, there may end up being no net loss in aggregate demand. In that case, stock prices may not fall. Indeed, one can very easily envision a scenario where an adverse shock to private-sector spending leads to an increase in equity valuations. To see this point, consider a standard dividend discount model. Suppose something happens that leads the private sector to spend less at any given interest rate. Let us also suppose that the central bank reacts to this shock by cutting interest rates all the way down to zero, at which point governments, taking advantage of cheaper borrowing costs, step in and increase fiscal stimulus. The upshot could be a lower interest rate but at the same level of aggregate spending (See Box 1 for a formal economic discussion of how this process works). If aggregate demand – and by extension, corporate earnings and dividends — drop temporarily, while interest rates fall permanently (or at least semi-permanently), the present value of cash flows will rise. As far-fetched as this scenario may seem, something along these lines appears to have happened over the past six months. Chart 8 shows that analysts expect global profits to contract by 19% in 2020, but then rebound by 29% in 2021 and rise a further 16% the following year, leaving 2022 profits 21% above 2019 levels. Like everywhere else, analysts expect US profits to return to their long-term trend over the next few years. Meanwhile, the 30-year TIPS yield – a proxy for the risk-free component of the discount rate – has fallen by 94 basis points since the start of the year. Even if one assumes, contrary to the optimistic forecasts of analysts, that the level of US EPS does not return to its pre-pandemic trend until 2030, this would still leave the fair value of the S&P 500 17.5% higher than it was at the start of the year (Chart 9). Chart 8Analysts Expect Global Profits To Contract This Year Before Rebounding Chart 9The Present Value Of Earnings: A Scenario Analysis Will Low Interest Rates Lead To Malinvestment? A drop in interest rates may seem like a free lunch for shareholders: It increases the present value of future cash flows without reducing the cash flows themselves. In fact, one could argue that lower rates actually increase future cash flows by shrinking net interest payments on outstanding debt. That might be all fine and dandy, but what about the effect of low interest rates on future investment decisions? To the extent that lower rates increase the market value of a firm’s capital stock relative to its replacement cost – the so-called Tobin’s Q ratio – lower rates could spur more investment. Higher investment, in turn, could drive down the rate of return on capital, leading to lower profits (Box 2 illustrates this point with a simple example featuring a lemonade stand). While there is some truth to this logic, it is less compelling than it once was. This is because much of the capital stock of listed companies today takes the form of intangible capital – which is often difficult to reproduce – rather than physical capital. Such intangible capital may include patents and trademarks as well as monopoly power. In particular, internet companies have gained significant monopoly power from network effects: The more people use their service, the more valuable their service becomes. This is a key reason why falling interest rates have helped the tech giants more than other companies. The Path Ahead The section above argued that today’s low bond yields do, in fact, provide a reliable estimate of the risk-free component of the discount rate; that the drop in yields over the past year mainly reflects higher private-sector savings and easier monetary policy rather than pessimism about growth and earnings; and that instead of leading to overinvestment, the main effect of falling interest rates, at least so far, has been to inflate the rents earned by companies with monopoly power. All this means that lower interest rates really do justify higher market valuations. Looking out, while bond yields are unlikely to rise significantly over the next two years in the absence of any meaningful inflationary pressures, yields are unlikely to fall either given how low they already are. This is not necessarily bad news for stocks. As mentioned above, the equity risk premium is quite high, which means that stocks can rise even if bond yields do edge somewhat higher. The more interesting action is likely to occur beneath the broad indices. If bond yields stabilize, this will remove a major headwind to bank shares (Chart 10). On the flipside, the reopening of economies will benefit companies that were crushed by lockdown measures. Money will shift from “pandemic plays” to “recovery plays.” Chart 10Stabilization In Bond Yields Would Remove A Major Headwind To Bank Shares Chart 11US Stocks Are More Expensive   As we predicted three weeks ago in a report titled “The Return Of Nasdog,” tech and health care stocks will go from leaders to laggards. The US has a higher concentration of tech and health care stocks than most other regions. US stocks are also quite expensive based on standard valuation measures, including the Tobin's Q ratio discussed above (Chart 11). The bottom line is that investors should remain overweight global equities over a 12-month horizon, while pivoting towards value stocks and non-US markets.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1The Role Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy Following Savings Shocks Box 2Fancy Some Lemonade? An Example Of Tobin’s Q Footnotes 1 Rick Perlstein, “Gerald Ford Rushed Out a Vaccine. It Was a Fiasco,” The New York Times, September 2, 2020. 2 It is necessary to subtract the real bond yield, rather than the nominal bond yield, from the earnings yield because the earnings yield provides an estimate of the real total expected return to shareholders. For further discussion on this, please see Appendix A of the Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “TINA To The Rescue?” dated August 23, 2019.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores