Economy

Highlights Duration: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration. Corporate Bonds: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Disposable personal income fell in February compared to January, but it has risen massively since last year’s passage of the CARES act. The large pool of accumulated household savings will help drive economic growth as the pandemic recedes. Feature There is widespread anticipation that the economic recovery is about to kick into high gear. To us, this anticipation seems rather well founded. The United States’ vaccination roll-out is proceeding quickly and the federal government is pitching in with a tsunami of fiscal support. But it’s important to acknowledge that this positive outlook is still a forecast, one that has not yet been validated by hard economic data. The risk for investors is obvious. Market prices have already moved to price-in a significant amount of economic optimism and they are vulnerable in a situation where that optimism doesn’t pan out. In this week’s report we look at how much economic optimism is already discounted in both the Treasury and corporate bond markets. We conclude that the most likely scenario is one where the economic data are strong enough to validate current pricing in both markets. Investors should keep portfolio duration below-benchmark and continue to favor spread product over Treasuries, with a down-in-quality bias. Optimism In The Treasury Market The most obvious way to illustrate the economic optimism currently embedded in Treasury securities is to look at the rate hike expectations priced into the yield curve relative to the Fed’s own projections (Chart 1). The market is currently looking for four 25 basis point rate hikes by the end of 2023 while only seven out of 18 FOMC participants expect any hikes at all by then. Chart 1Market More Hawkish Than Fed We addressed the wide divergence between market and FOMC expectations in last week’s report.1 We noted that the main reason for the divergence is that while the market is focused on expectations for rapid economic growth the Fed is making a concerted effort to rely only on hard economic data. This sentiment was echoed by Fed Governor Lael Brainard in a speech last week:2 The focus on achieved outcomes rather than the anticipated outlook is central to the Committee’s guidance regarding both asset purchases and the policy rate. The emphasis on outcomes rather than the outlook corresponds to the shift in our monetary policy approach that suggests policy should be patient rather than preemptive at this stage in the recovery. The upshot of the Fed’s excessively cautious approach is that its interest rate projections will move toward the market’s as the hard economic data strengthen during the next 6-12 months, keeping the bond bear market intact. As evidence for this view, consider that the US Economic Surprise Index remains at an extremely high level, consistent with a rising 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 2). Further, 12-month core inflation rates are poised to jump significantly during the next two months as the weak monthly prints from March and April 2020 fall out of the 12-month sample (Chart 3). Then, pipeline pressures in both the goods and service sectors will ensure that inflation remains relatively high for the balance of the year (Chart 3, bottom panel).3   Chart 2Data Surprises Remain Positive Chart 3Inflation About To Jump Finally, the hard economic data still do not reflect the truly massive amount of fiscal stimulus that is about to hit the US economy. Chart 4 illustrates how large last year’s fiscal stimulus was compared to what was seen during recent recessions, and this chart does not yet incorporate the recently passed $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan (~8.7% of GDP) or the second infrastructure focused reconciliation bill that is likely to pass this fall. Our political strategists expect 2021’s second budget bill to be similar in size to the American Rescue Plan though tax hikes will also be included and, due to the infrastructure-focused nature of the bill, the spending will be more spread out over a number of years.4  Chart 4The Era Of Big Government Is Back Bottom Line: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration.  Optimism In The Corporate Bond Market Chart 5What's Priced In Junk Spreads? The way we assess the amount of economic optimism baked into the corporate bond market is to calculate the 12-month default rate that is implied by the current High-Yield Index spread (Chart 5). We need to make a few assumptions to do this. First, we assume that investors require an excess spread of at least 100 bps from the index after subtracting 12-month default losses. In past research, we’ve noted that High-Yield has a strong track record of outperforming duration-matched Treasuries when the realized excess spread is above 100 bps. High-Yield underperforms Treasuries more often than it outperforms when the realized excess spread is below 100 bps.5 Second, we must assume a recovery rate for defaulted bonds. The 12-month recovery rate tends to fluctuate between 20% and 60%, with higher levels seen when the default rate is low and lower levels when the default rate is high (Chart 5, bottom panel). For this week’s analysis, we assume a range of recovery rates, from 20% to 50%, though we expect the recovery rate to be closer to the top-end of that range during the next 12 months, given our expectations for a rapid economic recovery. With these assumptions in mind, we calculate that the High-Yield Index is fairly priced for a default rate between 2.8% and 4.5% for the next 12 months (Chart 5, panel 2). If the default rate falls into that range, or below, then we would expect High-Yield bonds (and corporate credit more generally) to outperform a duration-matched position in Treasuries. If the default rate comes in above 4.5%, then we would expect Treasuries to beat High-Yield. To figure out whether the default rate will meet the market’s expectations, we turn to a simple model of the 12-month speculative grade default rate that is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (aka total debt over pre-tax profits) and C&I lending standards (Chart 6). If we make forecasts for nonfinancial corporate 12-month debt growth and pre-tax profit growth, we can let the model tell us what default rate to anticipate. Chart 6Default Rate Model Debt Growth Expectations We expect corporate debt growth to be quite weak during the next 12 months (Chart 7). This is mainly because firms raised a huge amount of debt last spring when the Fed and federal government made it very attractive to do so. Now, we are emerging from a recession and the nonfinancial corporate sector already holds an elevated cash balance (Chart 7, bottom panel). Debt growth was also essentially zero during the past six months, and very low (or even negative) debt growth is a common occurrence right after a peak in the default rate (Chart 7, top 2 panels). It is true that the nonfinancial corporate sector’s Financing Gap – the difference between capital expenditures and retained earnings – is no longer negative (Chart 7, panel 3). But it is also not high enough to suggest that firms need to significantly add debt. Chart 7Debt Growth Will Be Slow For our default rate calculations, we assume that corporate debt growth will be between 0% and 8% during the next 12 months. However, our sense is that it will be closer to 0% than to 8%. Profit Growth Expectations Chart 8Profit Growth Will Surge Our expectation is that profit growth will surge during the next 12 months, as is the typical pattern when the economy emerges from recession. Year-over-year profit growth peaked at 62% in 2002 following the 2001 recession, and it peaked at 51% in 2010 coming out of the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 8). More specifically, if we model nonfinancial corporate sector pre-tax profit growth on real GDP and then assume 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021, in line with the Fed’s median forecast, then we get a forecast for 31% profit growth in 2021. If we use a higher real GDP growth forecast of 10%, in line with our US Political Strategy service's "maximum impact" scenario, then our model forecasts pre-tax profit growth of 40% for 2021.6 Default Rate Expectations Table 1 puts together different estimates for profit growth and debt growth and maps them to a range of 12-month default rate outcomes, as implied by our Default Rate Model. For example, profit growth of 30% and debt growth between 0% and 8% in 2021 maps to a 12-month default rate of between 3.2% and 3.8%. This falls comfortably within the range of 2.8% to 4.5% that is consistent with current market pricing. Table 1Default Rate Scenarios In fact, for our model to output a default rate range that is higher than what is priced into junk spreads, we need to assume 2021 profit growth of 20% or less. This is quite far below the estimates we made above based on reasonable forecasts for real GDP. Bottom Line: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Household Income Update Last week’s personal income and spending report showed that disposable household income was lower in February than in January, a decline that is entirely attributable to the fact that the $600 checks to individuals that were part of the December stimulus bill were mostly delivered in January. These “Economic Impact Payments” totaled $138 billion in January and only $8 billion in February. This drop-off of $130 billion almost exactly matches the $128 billion monthly decline seen in disposable personal income. Consumer spending also fell in February compared to January, a result that likely owes a lot to February’s bad weather conditions, particularly the winter storm that caused much of Texas to lose power. Though spending has recovered a lot from last year’s lows, it remains significantly below its pre-COVID trend (Chart 9). In contrast to spending, disposable income has skyrocketed since the pandemic started last March. Chart 10 shows that disposable personal income has increased 8% in the 12 months since COVID struck compared to the 12 months prior. Moreover, it shows that the increase is entirely attributable to fiscal relief. Chart 9Households Have Excess ##br##Savings Chart 10Disposable Personal Income Growth And Its Drivers The result of below-trend spending and a surge in income is a big jump in the savings rate. The personal savings rate was 13.6% in February, well above its average pre-COVID level (Chart 9, panel 3), as it has been since the pandemic began. This consistently elevated savings rate has led to US households building up a $1.9 trillion buffer of excess savings compared to a pre-pandemic baseline (Chart 9, bottom panel). Perhaps the biggest question for economic growth is whether households will deploy this large pool of savings as the economy re-opens or whether they will continue to hoard it. In this regard, the individual checks that were part of last year’s CARES act are the most likely to be hoarded, as these checks were distributed to all Americans making less than $99,000. The income support provisions in this month’s American Rescue Plan are much more targeted. Only individuals making below $75,000 will receive a $1,400 check and the bill also includes expanded unemployment benefits and a large amount of aid for state & local governments. All in all, we anticipate that a substantial amount of household excess savings will be spent once the vaccination effort has made enough progress that people feel safe venturing out. This will lead to strong economic growth and higher inflation in the second half of 2021.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward”, dated March 23, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210323b.htm 3 For more details on our outlook for core inflation in 2021 please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Limit Rate Risk, Load Up On Credit”, dated March 16, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on this excess spread analysis please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Trading The US Corporate Bond Market In A Time Of Crisis”, dated March 31, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 The "maximum impact" scenario assumes that the full amount of authorized outlays from the American Rescue Plan will be spent, with 60% of the outlays spent in FY2021. For more details see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Special Report

The inflation/deflation debate has been dominating the news flow and we are compelled to offer our thoughts in two-part series of Special Reports on this widely discussed, but also widely misunderstood topic. Over the past year, we have been inundated with countless questions about our outlook on inflation given the dual monetary and fiscal stimuli that have been ongoing since Covid-19 hit (Chart 1). We take this opportunity to provide detailed answers on everything inflation in this series of Special Reports. Specifically, in this first report we focus on the long-term and structural forces behind US core CPI inflation. We go in depth into the drivers behind the current deflationary trend and also examine what other variables might break that trend in the future. We also try to ignore the medium-term outlook because the inflation story is well-known as the financial media is littered with charts that slice and dice the ISM manufacturing release in every possible way showing that inflation will rebound. Hence, there is no disagreement about the medium-term path for the core CPI inflation. Chart 12020 Stimuli The important question that we look to answer in this Special Report is whether this rebound is a paradigm shift that will push the US into a new era of consistently high (i.e. above 3%/annum) core CPI inflation, or is it a merely counter trend inflationary spike within the broader deflationary megatrend? Laying The Groundwork Before we wrestle with the structural forces behind inflation, first we must get the question of quantitative easing (QE) and its effects on the real economy and inflation out of the way. Undoubtedly, QE is an integral part of any discussion about the real-word and/or financial asset price inflation, and while it tickles the public’s imagination with hyperinflationary fears, the reality is that those fears are largely misplaced (Chart 2). In fact, pundits have established a consensus: “QE only affects the financial economy as it increases bank reserves that can never escape in the real economy. On the other hand, fiscal stimulus affects the real economy and can cause genuine inflation.” There clearly hasn’t been any material inflation since the GFC, so the argument of “QE only affecting the financial economy” appears to be correct, but at closer look there is room for a different interpretation. What is important to understand is that QE is nothing but a tool, sometimes a signaling tool, in the Fed’s arsenal, and like any tool, it can be used in different ways. Chart 2Boogeyman?  The fact that there has not been any material real-world inflation since the housing bubble is neither because QE is structurally deflationary nor because it “cannot touch” the real economy, but because policy makers chose to use the QE tool to rescue creditors (the financial sector) rather than debtors (the real economy) during the GFC. Delving deeper in the Great Recession, the banks were largely undercapitalized with cash accounting for a tiny portion of overall assets and Treasury holdings being at historic lows (Chart 3). The rest of the assets were tied to loans and other risky securities. Once NINJA loans and other subprime loans along with the derivative CLOs/CDOs house of cards began imploding, the banking sector could not stomach the losses owing to the nonexistent cash buffer, and the entire system went into insolvency mode. This is when the Fed stepped in with QE (and the Treasury with TARP in order to recapitalize the banks) to bail out the nervous system of the US economy by boosting reserves and giving freshly printed money to the banks in exchange for their Treasurys, MBS and other risky securities. By providing support to the banking system, the Fed was counterbalancing a deflationary financial industry shutdown (the Richard Koo balance sheet type recession) rather than injecting an inflationary real economic stimulus. As a result, nearly all of the newly created money was stuck in the financial system in the form of new reserves, and as far as the real economy was concerned, no new money entered directly into the real world. This is how the consensus of “QE only affecting the financial economy” was formed, and why we did not observe a long-lasting rise in CPI despite all of the GFC-brought about stimuli. Chart 3Banks Were Well-capitalized Fast-forward to today, and the backdrop could not be more different. The banking sector was well capitalized, so doing an aggressive QE to boost reserves and to stimulate the financial sector would have only provided marginal benefits. The deflationary shock came through the real economy, not the financial economy, meaning that a real (i.e. fiscal) stimulus was needed. Once again, the QE tool comes to the rescue. This time however, QE was also used to finance Main Street stimulus programs as the Fed bought long dated Treasury (and other) securities that pushed interest rates to rock bottom levels and helped facilitate government stimulus spending. Consequently, a more meaningful fraction of QE money reached Main Street and had an effect on the real economy and was not just locked in new reserves. As a reminder, when rates fall to zero and the Fed embarks on QE, the lines between monetary and fiscal policies get blurred. When QE (instead of the foreign or private sectors) is used to facilitate government expenditures, which later on gets distributed into the real economy, QE can provide inflationary support and can reach the real economy. Chart 42008 Versus Today Perhaps the best way to illustrate the difference between 2008 and 2020 is by showing M2 money supply data. The spike in M2 data in 2020 dwarfs the one in 2008; in 2020 QE money reached the real economy and ended up in private sector’s bank accounts (thus contributing to M2 growth), whereas in 2008 QE money was mainly locked in bank reserves. True the money multiplier and M2 money stock velocity are still in hibernation, and were we to see a sustainable inflationary impulses both of these indicators would have to show signs of life (Chart 4). So does this mean that there are grounds for longer-term inflationary concerns since in 2020 QE actually reached the real economy? To answer this question, we now dig deeper into the secular inflation forces and split them in two camps: pro-inflationary and anti-inflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #1: The Buenos Aires Consensus Our view since last June has been that fiscal deficits are here to stay as far as the eye can see and the shift from the Washington to the Buenos Aires Consensus1 is a paradigm shift with staying power. The most important long-term consequence of the Buenos Aires Consensus will be higher inflation. And we are not talking just the asset price kind – which investors have enjoyed over the past decade – but of the more traditional flavor: consumer price inflation. Crudely put, as long as fiscal support remains in place (proverbial helicopter drop, Chart 5) after the pandemic is long forgotten it can serve as a meaningful catalyst for structural inflation, instead of being a one-off counterbalancing short-term boost. To reiterate just how much more powerful fiscal spending is outside of a recession, we conduct a labor market analysis and show that a large percentage of the present-day stimulus is being used to counterbalance the deflationary pandemic shock, rather than contributing to driving inflation higher. Table 1 shows our proxy for total payroll losses incurred by America households as a direct result of the pandemic. Our estimate is $501 billion from March 2020 until today. Chart 5Helicopter Checks The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget also publishes detailed statistics on the dollar flow of every pandemic stimulus program to a specific economic sector. As of today, US households received $1,400 billion, but some of the stimulus categories simply defer a payment that households still have to make in the future, instead of injecting brand-new money. After stripping those categories out, we arrive to a cleaner number of roughly $1,000 billion – that is how much new money US households received. Next, we subtract our total payroll loss proxy resulting into a net inflow of approximately $500 billion or 2.3% of 2020 US GDP. This is a respectable sum and 2.3% is significant. However, it has one major drawback. The 2.3% GDP stimulus number assumes that every single dollar was actually spent into the real economy, which we know is not true. Table 1The Counterbalancing Effect A recent New York Fed study on how American households used their stimulus money concluded that: “36.4% of the stimulus money was used to boost savings, 34.5% to paydown debt, 25.9% was spent on essentials and non-essentials, and finally the rest of the money (3.2%) was donated”. It is worth noting that this study also looked at the expected spending patterns for the new round of stimulus checks, and the results were generally the same. To obtain a more realistic number of how much of the net $500 billion inflow actually entered the economy, we multiply it by 25.9% (how much money was used on spending according to the NY Fed) and arrive at a better estimate of $130 billion or 0.6% of 2020 US GDP, which is by no means an astronomical number that will shatter into pieces the current deflationary megatrend. This empirical exercise demonstrated how a large percentage of the present-day stimulus is being used to counterbalance the deflationary pandemic shock. However, if our thesis of a Buenos Aires Consensus in which governments spend even outside of recessions pans out, then there will not be the aforementioned counterbalancing effect, and all the fiscal dollars will go straight to contributing to rising inflation until the deflationary megatrend is broken. Pro-Inflationary Driver #2: Demographics In the long run, inflation tends to oscillate alongside a country’s demographics. More specifically, it is the relative size of the three age cohorts (young, working-age, and old) that plays a key role in driving inflation. People who are in the working-age cohort are at their peak productivity, which implies that their contribution to the production of goods and services is greater than the demand for new credit they generate, meaning that they produce a deflationary pull. The opposite is true for the other two age cohorts (the young and the old). Neither one is contributing to the production of goods & services, while both still generate new credit in the economy (for example student loans), and the end result is an inflationary pull. Hence, it is the interplay between these three age cohorts that serves as a structural force behind inflation. To put some numbers behind this conceptual framework, we turn our attention to a paper “The enduring link between demography and inflation” written by Mikael Juselius and Előd Takáts. In the paper, the authors conduct rigorous cross-country analysis and find that indeed, people 30-60 years of age (the working-age cohort) exert deflationary pressure, while the other two cohorts contribute to rising inflation. Chart 6 plots the age-structure effect for the US against inflation. The authors also quantified that over the 40-year period (1970-2010) the increase in the working-age population (due to baby-boomers) has lowered inflationary pressures by almost five percentage points in the US (Chart 7). Meanwhile, by extrapolating the likely path of demographic data by 40 years (2010-2050), the authors observed a shift from deflationary to inflationary age pressure mainly due to the incoming increase in the proportion of the old cohort. Their estimate of the expected pull on inflation in the US will be approximately two and a half percent (Chart 8). Chart 6Demographics Are A Mighty Force Chart 7From Deflationary... Chart 8...To Inflationary Going forward, US demographics will be more inflationary than deflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #3: De-Globalization The “apex of globalization” or “de-globalization” is our third pro-inflationary driver. We have written about this theme extensively at BCA Research and it is the mega-theme of our sister Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. Odds are high that countries will continue looking inward as the US sustains its aggressive trade policy, China’s trend growth slows, and US-China strategic tensions intensify. Chart 9 shows that we are at the conclusion of a period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. The US is in a relative decline after decades of geopolitical stability allowed countries like China to rise to “great power” status and rivals like Russia to recover from the chaos of the 1990s. Chart 9The Tide Is Turning De-globalization has become the consensus since the election of Donald Trump. But Trump is not the prophet of de-globalization; he is its acolyte. And now, President Biden is continuing in Trump’s footsteps. Globalization is ending because of structural factors, not cyclical ones. And its decline was pre-written into its “source code.” Three factors stand at the center of this assessment, first outlined in a 2014 GPS Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization – All Downhill From Here”: multipolarity, populism and protectionism. Events have since confirmed this view. The three pillars of globalization are the free movement of goods, capital, and people across national borders. We expect to see marginally less of each in the future and this should prove inflationary. Pro-Inflationary Driver #4: US Dollar Bear Market The path of least resistance is lower for the US dollar and it represents our final pro-inflationary driver. Chart 10 highlights the ebbs and flows of the trade-weighted US dollar since it floated in the early-1970s. The DXY index has moved in six-to-ten year bull and bear markets. The most recent trough was during the depths of the Great Recession, while the peak was in early-2020. If history repeats, eventually the dollar will mean revert lower in the 2020s, especially given the fiscal profligacy (Buenos Aires Consensus) of the current administration that may continue into 2024. Chart 10Time For A Downcycle? True, the US dollar remains the global reserve currency, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fraying on the edges as the balance-of-payments dynamics are heading in the wrong direction. While the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects some normalization in the US budget deficit over the next 4 years since the pandemic shock will be over, looking further into the future the CBO forecasts a further reacceleration in deficit spending. Assuming a stable to grinding lower current account deficit in the next several years, the path of least resistance is lower for the currency. BCA’s US dollar model also corroborates the twin deficit message and suggests ample structural downside for the USD (Chart 11).  The apex of globalization will also hurt the greenback in a reflexive manner. In a world where all the markets are integrated, borrowers in EM nations often use the reserve currency to issue liabilities at a lower cost. This boosts the demand by EM central banks for US dollar reserves to protect domestic banking systems funded in USD. Moreover, some countries like China implement pegs (both official and unofficial) to the US dollar in order to maintain their competitiveness and export their production surpluses to the US. To do so they buy US assets. If the global economy becomes more fragmented and the Sino-US relationship continues to deteriorate structurally as we expect, then these sources of demand for the dollar will recede. Overlay the widening US current account deficit, and you have the perfect recipe for a depreciating trade-weighted US dollar. Importantly, the 1970s is an interesting period to examine in more detail. As the Nixon administration floated the greenback this aggravated the inflationary pressures (Chart 12) that were building all along the 1960s when the US adopted the Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine along with the Cold War space race that eventually saw the US landing on the moon in 1969. Chart 11A Bearish Outlook Chart 12The Greenback In The 1970s A lower greenback is synonymous with rising commodity and import prices and given that the US is the consumer of last resort (70% PCE), the commodity/import price pendulum will swing from a deflationary to an inflationary force. Anti-Inflationary Driver #1: Technology’s Creative Destruction Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” forces dominate technology companies in general and Silicon Valley in particular, and represent our fist anti-inflationary driver. These creative destruction forces in the tech industry are inherently deflationary. As a result, tech business models have evolved to thrive during disinflationary periods. Chart 13 shows the software sector deflator derived from national accounts, and since the mid-1980s more often than not it has been mired in deflation. US semiconductor prices, computer hardware prices, and almost any tech related category from the PCE, PPI and CPI releases looks more or less the same as software, underscoring that this is a technology sector wide modus operandi. More recently, Uber Technologies and Airbnb, to name a few, continually bring existing capacity online and that adds another layer of deflation forces at work in select industries they operate in. Tack on technology infiltrating finance and soon the extremely opaque health care services industry that comprises almost 20% of US GDP or $4tn and a deflationary impulse will likely reverberate across these large segments of the US economy that have managed to sustain high pricing power over the decades. Chart 13Technological Progress Is Deflationary Thus, these creative destruction processes remain alive and well in tech land and will continue to exert deflationary/disinflationary pressure (of the good kind) on the US economy. Anti-Inflationary Driver #2: Income & Wealth Inequality The growing trend in income and wealth inequality is our second anti-inflationary force. We first want to focus on the issue of income inequality as it leads to wealth inequality. Income inequality refers to the distribution of wages and profits generated by the economy. It is the proverbial “share of the pie” that households from different socioeconomic brackets receive. The link with inflation comes through the marginal propensity to save statistic of those different brackets. Lower income households have nearly nonexistent propensity to save as they live paycheck to paycheck. Therefore, any additional income inflow they receive gets immediately syphoned into the real economy. In contrast, the top 10% have a high propensity to save as all of their living expenses are well covered, so any additional income they receive is stashed away into savings and does not enter the real economy. This is why following the Trump’s tax cut that benefitted the top 10% there has not been a durable spike in CPI inflation. The fact that in the US the income share of the top 10% is growing at stratospheric rates at the same as time as the bottom 90% are struggling to cover even a $400 unexpected expense needs no introduction. The exact reasons as to why that happened would require a separate Special Report, but one of the main reasons is the multi-decade suppression of unions, which does not allow employees to bargain effectively for a larger slice of corporate profits. Given that profits are an exact mirror image of labor expenses, it is not surprising that the union movement is being marginalized (Charts 14 & 15). Staying on the topic of inflation, as we already outlined, when the lower and medium socioeconomic brackets receive more income, it does not disappear in the savings accounts, but instead it is redirected into the real economy causing a healthy inflationary uptick. Chart 14No Power = No Money Chart 15The Tug Of War​​​​​​​ Chart 16 shows the wealth share of the top 10% of American households on inverted scale. Since the 1920s, inflation and the wealth share of the top 10% has moved in opposite directions. There were two distinct periods when the wealth share of the bottom 90% rose: from the early 1930s until the early 1950s, and from the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s. Both of these periods were accompanied by rising CPI inflation. Chart 16Wealth Equality Is Inflationary At the same time, when looking at any other period outside of those golden days for the bottom 90%, US inflation was anemic. This empirical evidence further underscores the importance of income and wealth distribution in the economy, and given the current US political and economic realities, we do not expect any material changes in labor dynamics to take root. The top 10% will continue benefitting at the expense of the bottom 90%, which will keep US CPI inflation suppressed. Concluding Thoughts In this Special Report our goal was to look beyond the already known medium term inflation outlook, and present both sides of the argument about the long-term inflation trend. We took a deep dive into six structural forces behind inflation that we identified. Four of those forces were pro-inflationary, while the remaining two were anti-inflationary (Table 2). We also assigned a value on our subjective strength scale for each force. Each value incorporates how quickly a particular force will come to fruition, and how strong it will be over the next 5-to-10 year period. Based on our analysis, we conclude that there are rising odds that the deflationary megatrend has run its course and has reached an inflection point of turning inflationary. Table 2Inflation Dots In the next Special Report from our Tinkering With Inflation series, we will conduct a thought experiment and explore a world in which our forecasts prove to be accurate, and a new inflationary paradigm engulfs the US economy. Under such a backdrop what will the US equity sector winners and losers, especially given the related shift in the stock-to-bond correlation? Stay tuned.   Arseniy Urazov Research Associate ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Buenos Aires Consensus is our catchall term for everything that is opposite of the Washington Consensus: less globalization, fiscal stimulus as far as the eyes can see, erosion of central bank independence, and a dirigiste (as opposed to laissez-faire) approach to economics that seeks to protect “state champions,” stifles innovation, and ultimately curbs productivity growth.

Highlights Global manufacturing activity will soon peak due to growing costs and China’s policy tightening. This process will allow the dollar’s rebound to continue. EUR/USD’s correction will run further. This pullback in the euro is creating an attractive buying opportunity for investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon. Eurozone banks will continue to trade in unison with the euro. Feature The correction in the euro has further to run. The dollar currently benefits from widening real interest differentials, but a growing list of headwinds will cause a temporary setback for the global manufacturing sector, which will fuel the greenback rally further. Nonetheless, EUR/USD will stabilize between 1.15 and 1.12, after which it will begin a new major up-leg. Consequently, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current softness to allocate more funds to the common currency. A Hiccup In Global Industrial Activity Global manufacturing activity is set to decelerate on a sequential basis and the Global Manufacturing PMI will soon peak. The first problem for the global manufacturing sector is the emergence of financial headwinds. The sharp rebound in growth in the second half of 2020 and the optimism created by last year’s vaccine breakthrough as well as the rising tide of US fiscal stimulus have pushed US bond yields and oil prices up sharply. These financial market moves are creating a “growth tax” that will bite soon. Mounting US interest rates have lifted global borrowing costs while the doubling in Brent prices has increased the costs of production and created a small squeeze on oil consumers. Thus, even if the dollar remains well below its March 2020 peak, our Growth Tax Indicator (which incorporates yields, oil prices and the US dollar) warns of an imminent top in the US ISM Manufacturing and the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Already, the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index has dipped below the 50% line, which usually ushers in downshifts in global growth. A deceleration in China’s economy constitutes another problem for the global manufacturing cycle. Last year’s reflation-fueled rebound in Chinese economic activity was an important catalyst to the global trade and manufacturing recovery. However, according to BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy service, Beijing is now tightening policy, concerned by a build-up in debt and excesses in the real estate sector. Already, the PBoC’s liquidity withdrawals are resulting in a decline of commercial bank excess reserves, which foreshadows a slowing of China’s credit impulse (Chart 2). Chart 1The Global Growth Tax Will Bite Chart 2Chinese Credit Will Slow In addition to liquidity withdrawals, Chinese policymakers are also tightening the regulatory environment to tackle excessive debt buildups and real estate speculation. The crackdown on property developers and house purchases will cause construction activity to shrink in the second half of 2021. Meanwhile, tougher rules for both non-bank lenders and the asset management divisions of banks will further harm credit creation. BCA’s Chief EM strategist, Arthur Budaghyan, notes that consumer credit is already slowing. Chinese fiscal policy is unlikely to create a counterweight to the deteriorating credit impulse. China’s fiscal impulse will be slightly negative next year. Chinese financial markets are factoring in these headwinds, and on-shore small cap equities are trying to break down while Chinese equities are significantly underperforming global benchmarks. Chart 3Deteriorating Surprises Bottom Line: The combined assault from the rising “growth tax” and China’s policy tightening is leaving its mark. Economic surprises in the US, the Eurozone, EM and China have all decelerated markedly (Chart 3), which the currency market echoes. Some of the most pro-cyclical currencies in the G-10 are suffering, with the SEK falling relative to the EUR and the NZD and AUD both experiencing varying degrees of weakness. The Euro Correction Will Run Further… Until now, the euro’s decline mostly reflects the rise in US interest rate differentials; however, the coming hiccup in the global manufacturing cycle is causing a second down leg for the euro. First, the global economic environment remains consistent with more near-term dollar upside, due to: Chart 4Commodities Are Vulnerable A commodity correction that will feed the dollar’s rebound. Aggregate speculator positioning and our Composite Technical Indicator show that commodity prices are technically overextended (Chart 4). With this backdrop, the coming deceleration in Chinese economic activity is likely to catalyze a significant pullback in natural resources, which will hurt rates of returns outside the US and therefore, flatter the dollar. The dollar’s counter-cyclicality. The expected pullback in the Global Manufacturing PMI is consistent with a stronger greenback (Chart 5). The dollar’s momentum behavior. Among G-10 FX, the dollar responds most strongly to the momentum factor (Chart 6). Thus, the likelihood is high that the dollar’s recent rebound will persist, especially because our FX team’s Dollar Capitulation Index has only recovered to neutral from oversold levels and normally peaks in overbought territory.  Chart 5The Greenback's Counter-Cyclicality Chart 6The Dollar Is A High Momentum Currency Second, the euro’s specific dynamics remain negative for now. Based on our short-term valuation model, the fair value of EUR/USD has downshifted back to 1.1, which leaves the euro 7% overvalued (Chart 7). Until now, real interest rate differentials and the steepening of the US yield curve relative to Germany’s have driven the decline in the fair value estimate. However, the deceleration in global growth also hurts the euro’s fair value because the US is less exposed than the Eurozone to the global manufacturing cycle. Chart 7The Euro's Short-Term Fair Value Is At 1.1 Chart 8Speculators Have Not Capitulated The euro is also technically vulnerable, similar to commodities. Speculators are still massively net long EUR/USD and the large pool of long bets in the euro suggests that a capitulation has yet to take place (Chart 8). The euro responds very negatively to a weak Chinese economy. The Eurozone has deeper economic ties with China than the US. Exports to China account for 1.7% of the euro area’s GDP, and 2.8% of Germany’s compared to US exports to China at 0.5% of GDP. Indirect financial links are also larger. Credit to EM accounts for 45% of the Eurozone’s GDP compared to 5% for the US. Thus, the negative impact of a Chinese slowdown on EM growth has greater spillovers on European than on US ones rates of returns. A weak CNY and sagging Chinese capital markets harm the euro. The euro’s rebound from 1.064 on March 23 2020 to 1.178 did not reflect sudden inflows into European fixed-income markets. Instead, the money that previously sought higher interest rates in the US left that country for EM bonds and China’s on-shore fixed-income markets, the last major economies with attractive yields. These outflows from the US to China and EM pushed the dollar down, which arithmetically helped the euro. Thus, the recent EUR/USD correlates closely with Sino/US interest rate and with the yuan because the euro’s strength reflects the dollar demise (Chart 9). Consequently, a decelerating Chinese economy will also hurt EUR/USD via fixed-income market linkages. Finally, the euro will depreciate further if global cyclical stocks correct relative to defensive equities. Deep cyclicals (financials, consumer discretionary, energy, materials and industrials) represent 59% of the Eurozone MSCI benchmark versus 36% of the US index. Cyclical equities are exceptionally overbought and expensive relative to defensive names. They are also very levered to the global business cycle and Chinese imports. In this context, the expected deterioration in both China’s economic activity and the Global Manufacturing PMI could cause a temporary but meaningful pullback in the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio and precipitate equity outflows from Europe into the US (Chart 10). Chart 9EUR/USD And Chinese Rates Chart 10EUR/USD Will Follow Cyclicals/Defensives Bottom Line: A peak in the global manufacturing PMI will hurt the euro, especially because China will meaningfully contribute to this deceleration in global industrial activity. Thus, the euro’s pullback has further to run. An important resistance stands at 1.15. A failure to hold will invite a rapid decline to EUR/USD 1.12. Nonetheless, the euro’s depreciation constitutes nothing more than a temporary pullback. … But The Long-Term Bull Market Is Intact We recommend buying EUR/USD on its current dip because the underpinnings of its cyclical bull market are intact. Chart 11Investors Structurally Underweight Europe First, investors are positioned for a long-term economic underperformance of the euro area relative to the US. The depressed level of portfolio inflows into Europe relative to the US indicates that investors already underweight European assets (Chart 11). This pre-existing positioning limits the negative impact on the euro of the current decrease in European growth expectations (Chart 11, bottom panel). Second, as we wrote last week, European growth is set to accelerate significantly this summer. Considering the absence of ebullient investor expectations toward the euro, this process can easily create upside economic surprises later this year, especially when compared to the US. Moreover, the deceleration in Chinese and global growth will most likely be temporary, which will limit the duration of their negative impact on Europe. Third, the US stimulus measure will create negative distortions for the US dollar. The addition of another long-term stimulus package of $2 trillion to $4 trillion to the $7 trillion already spent by Washington during the crisis implies that the US government deficit will not narrow as quickly as US private savings will decline. Therefore, the US current account deficit will widen from its current level of 3.5% of GDP. As a corollary, the US twin deficit will remain large. Meanwhile, the Fed is unlikely to increase real interest rates meaningfully in the coming two years because it believes any surge in inflation this year will be temporary. Furthermore, the FOMC aims to achieve inclusive growth (i.e. an overheated labor market). This policy combination forcefully points toward greater dollar weakness. The US policy mix looks particularly dollar bearish when compared to that of the Eurozone. To begin with, the balance of payment dynamics make the euro more resilient. The euro area benefits from the underpinning of a current account surplus of 1.9% of GDP. Moreover, the European basic balance of payments stands at 1.5% of GDP compared to a 3.6% deficit for the US. Additionally, FDI into Europe are rising relative to the US. The divergence in the FDI trends will continue due to the high probability that the Biden administration will soon increase corporate taxes. Chart 12The DEM In The 70s The combination of faster vaccine penetration and much larger fiscal stimulus means that the US economy will overheat faster than Europe’s. Because the Fed seems willing to tolerate higher inflation readings, US CPI will rise relative to the Eurozone. In the 1970s, too-easy policy in Washington meant that the gap between US and German inflation rose. Despite the widening of interest rate and growth differentials in favor of the USD or the rise in German relative unemployment, the higher US inflation dominated currency fluctuations and the deutschemark appreciated (Chart 12). A similar scenario is afoot in the coming years, especially in light of the euro bullish relative balance of payments. Fourth, valuations constitute an additional buttress behind the long-term performance of the euro. Our FX strategy team Purchasing Power Parity model adjusts for the different composition of price indices in the US and the euro area. Based on this metric, the euro is trading at a significant 13% discount from its long-term fair value, with the latter being on an upward trend (Chart 13).  Furthermore, BCA’s Behavioral Exchange Rate Model for the trade-weighted euro is also pointing up, which historically augurs well for the common currency. Lastly, even if the ECB’s broad trade-weighted index stands near an all-time high, European financial conditions remain very easy. This bifurcation suggests that the euro is not yet a major hurdle for the continent and can enjoy more upside (Chart 14). Chart 13EUR/USD Trades Well Below Long-Term Fair Value Chart 14Easy European Financial Conditions Chart 15Make Room For the Euro! Finally, the euro will remain a beneficiary from reserve diversification away from the USD. The dollar’s status as the premier reserve currency is unchallenged. However, its share of global reserves has scope to decline while the euro’s proportion could move back to the levels enjoyed by legacy European currencies in the early 1990s (Chart 15). Large reserve holders will continue to move away from the dollar. BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy team argues that US tensions with China transcend the Trump presidency.  Meanwhile, the current administration’s relationship with Russia and Saudi Arabia will be cold. For now, their main alternative to the dollar is the euro because of its liquidity. Moreover, the NGEU stimulus program creates an embryonic mechanism to share fiscal risk within the euro area. The Eurozone is therefore finally trying to evolve away from a monetary union bereft of a fiscal union. This process points toward a lower probability of a break up, which makes the euro more attractive to reserve managers. Bottom Line: Despite potent near-term headwinds, the euro’s long-term outlook remains bright. Global investors already underweight European assets, yet balance of payment and policy dynamics point toward a higher euro. Moreover, valuations and geopolitical developments reinforce the cyclical tailwinds behind EUR/USD. Thus, investors with a 12- to 24-month investment horizon should use the current euro correction to gain exposure to the European currencies. Any move in EUR/USD below 1.15 will generate a strong buy signal. Sector Focus: European Banks And The Istanbul Shake The recent decline in euro area bank stocks coincides with the 14% increase in USD/TRY and the 17% decline in the TUR Turkish equities ETF following the sacking of Naci Ağbal, the CBRT governor. President Erdogan is prioritizing growth over economic stability because his AKP party is polling poorly ahead of the 2023 election. The Turkish economy is already overheating, and the lack of independence of the CBRT under the leadership of Şahap Kavcıoğlu promises a substantial increase in Turkish inflation, which already stands at 16%. Hence, foreign investors will flee this market, creating further downward pressures on the lira and Turkish assets. European banks have a meaningful exposure to Turkey. Turkish assets account for 3% of Spanish bank assets or 28% of Tier-1 capital. For France, this exposure amounts to 0.7% and 5% respectively, and for the UK, it reaches 0.3% and 2%. As a comparison, claims on Turkey only represent 0.3% and 0.5% of the assets and Tier-1 capital of US banks. Unsurprisingly, fluctuations in the Turkish lira have had a significant impact one the share prices of European banks in recent years, even after controlling for EPS and domestic yield fluctuations (Table 1). Table 1TRY Is Important To European Banks… Nonetheless, today’s TRY fluctuations are unlikely to have the same lasting impact on European banks share prices as they did from 2017 to 2019 because European banks have already shed significant amounts of Turkish assets (Chart 16).  This does not mean that European banks are out of the woods yet. The level of European yields remains a key determinant of the profitability of Eurozone’s banks, and thus, of their share prices (Chart 17, top panel). Moreover, the euro still tightly correlates with European bank stocks as well (Chart 17, bottom panel). As a result, our view that the global manufacturing cycle will experience a temporary downshift and the consequent downside in EUR/USD both warn of further underperformance of European banks. Chart 16… But Less Than It Once Was Chart 17Higher Yields And A stronger Euro, These Are Few Of My Favorite Things These same views also suggest that this decline in bank prices is creating a buying opportunity. Ultimately, we remain cyclically bullish on the euro and the transitory nature of the manufacturing slowdown implies that global yields will resume their ascent. The cheap valuations of European banks, which trade at 0.6-times book value, make them option-like vehicles to bet on these trends, even if the banking sectors long-term prospects are murky. Moreover, they are a play on Europe’s domestic recovery this summer. We will explore banks in greater detail in future reports.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds Corporate Bonds Equity Performance Major Stock Indices Geographic Performance Sector Performance  

Dear Client, We are sending you our Strategy Outlook today, where we outline our thoughts on the macro landscape and the direction of financial markets for the rest of 2021 and beyond. Next week, please join me for a webcast on Thursday, April 1 at 10:00 AM EDT (3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 10:00 PM HKT) where I will discuss the outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Growth outlook: The global economy will rebound over the course of the year, with momentum rotating from the US to the rest of the world. Inflation: Structurally higher inflation is not a near-term risk, even in the US, but could become a major problem by the middle of the decade. Global asset allocation: Investors should continue to overweight equities on a 12-month horizon. Unlike in the year 2000, the equity earnings yield is still well above the bond yield. Equities: Value stocks will maintain their recent outperformance. Investors should favor banks and economically-sensitive cyclical sectors, while overweighting stock markets outside the US. Fixed income: Continue to maintain below average interest-rate duration exposure. Spread product will outperform safe government bonds. Favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. Currencies: While the dollar could strengthen in the near term, it will weaken over a 12-month period. Large budget deficits, a deteriorating balance of payments profile, and an accommodative Fed are all dollar bearish. Commodities: Tight supply conditions and a cyclical recovery in oil demand will support crude prices. Strong Chinese growth will continue to buoy the metals complex. I. Macroeconomic Outlook Global Growth: The US Leads The Way… For Now The global economy should rebound from the pandemic over the remainder of the year. So far, however, it has been a two-speed recovery. Whereas the Bloomberg consensus has US real GDP growing by 4.8% in the first quarter, analysts expect the economies in the Euro area, UK, and Japan to contract by 3.6%, 13.3%, and 5%, respectively. Chart 1Dismantling Of Lockdown Measures Occurring At Varying Pace Chart 2US Is Among The Vaccination Leaders Two things explain US growth outperformance. First, the successful launch of the US vaccination campaign has allowed state governments to begin dismantling lockdown measures (Chart 1). Currently, the US has administered 40 vaccine shots for every 100 inhabitants. Among the major economies, only the UK has performed better on the vaccination front (Chart 2). In contrast, parts of continental Europe are still battling a new wave of Covid infections, prompting policymakers there to further tighten social distancing rules. Second, US fiscal policy has been more stimulative than elsewhere (Chart 3). On March 11, President Biden signed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act into law. Among other things, the Act provides direct payments to lower- and middle-class households, extends and expands unemployment benefits, and offers aid to state and local governments (Chart 4). Unlike President Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the Democrats’ legislation will raise the incomes of the poor much more than the rich (Chart 5). Chart 3The US Tops The Stimulus Race We expect growth leadership to shift from the US to the rest of the world in the second half of the year. Nevertheless, US real GDP in Q4 of 2021 will probably end up 7% above the level of Q4 of 2020, enough to close the output gap. In Section II of this report, we discuss whether this could cause inflation to take off on a sustained basis. We conclude that such an outcome is unlikely for the next two years. However, materially higher inflation is indeed a risk over a longer-term horizon. Chart 4Composition Of The American Rescue Plan Act Chart 5Biden’s Package Will Boost The Income Of The Poor More Than The Rich   The EU: Recovery After Lockdown The EU will benefit from a cyclical recovery later this year as the vaccination campaign picks up steam. The recent weakness in Europe was concentrated in services (Chart 6). The latest European PMI data shows that the service sector may have turned the corner. As in the US, European households have accumulated significant excess savings. The unleashing of pent-up demand should drive consumption over the remainder of the year (Chart 7). Chart 6For Now, The Service Sector Is Doing Better In The US Than The Euro Area Chart 7European Households Have Accumulated Excess Savings Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector continues to do well, with the Euro area manufacturing PMI hitting all-time highs in March. Sentiment indices such as the Sentix and ZEW surveys point to further upside for manufacturing activity (Chart 8).   Chart 8Positive Outlook For Euro Area Manufacturing Activity Fiscal policy should also turn modestly more expansionary. The EU recovery fund will begin disbursing aid in the second quarter. This should allow the southern European economies to maintain more generous levels of fiscal support. It also looks increasingly likely that the Green Party will either lead or join the coalition government in Germany, which could translate into greater spending. UK: Recovering From A One-Two Punch The UK had to shutter its economy late last year due to the emergence of a new, more contagious, strain of the virus. The resulting hit to the economy came on top of a decline in exports to the EU following Brexit. The economic picture will improve over the coming months. Thanks to the speedy vaccination campaign, the government plans to lift the “stay at home” rules on March 29. Most retail, dining, and hospitality businesses are scheduled to reopen on April 12. A strong housing market and the extension of both the furlough schemes and tax holidays should also sustain demand. Japan: More Fiscal Support Needed Like many other countries, Japan had to introduce new lockdown measures in late 2020 after suffering its worst wave of the pandemic. While the number of new cases has dropped dramatically since then, they have edged up again over the past two weeks. Japanese regulations require that vaccines be tested on Japanese people. Prime Minster Yoshihide Suga has promised that vaccine shots will be available to the country’s 36 million seniors by the end of June. However, with less than 1% of the population vaccinated so far, strict social distancing will persist well into the summer. The Japanese government passed a JPY 73 trillion (13.5% of GDP) supplementary budget in December. However, only 40 trillion of that has been allocated for direct spending. Due to negative bond yields, the Japanese government earns more interest than it pays on its debt. It should be running much more expansionary fiscal policy. China: Policy Normalization, Not Deleveraging Chart 9China: Tailwind For Easier Monetary And Fiscal Policies Will Fade Over The Remainder Of The Year China’s combined credit/fiscal impulse peaked late last year (Chart 9). The impulse leads growth by about six months, implying that the tailwind from easier monetary and fiscal policies will fade over the rest of the year. Nevertheless, we doubt that China’s economy will experience much of a slowdown. First and foremost, the shock from the pandemic should fade, helping to revive consumer and business confidence. Second, the Chinese authorities are likely to pursue policy normalization, rather than outright deleveraging. Jing Sima, BCA’s chief China strategist, expects the general government deficit to remain broadly stable at 8% of GDP this year. She also thinks that the rate of credit expansion will fall by only 2-to-3 percentage points in 2021, bringing credit growth back in line with projected nominal GDP growth of 8%. Total credit was 290% of GDP at end-2020. Thus, credit growth of 8% would still generate 290%*8%=23% of GDP of net credit formation, providing more than enough support to the economy. II. Feature: Will The US Economy Overheat? As of February, US households were sitting on around $1.7 trillion in excess savings. About two-thirds of those savings can be chalked up to reduced spending during the pandemic, with the remaining one-third arising from increased transfer payments (Chart 10). The recently passed stimulus bill will boost household savings by an additional $300 billion, bringing the stock of excess savings to $2 trillion by April. This cash hoard will support spending. Already, real-time measures of economic activity have hooked up. Traffic congestion in many US cities is approaching pre-pandemic levels. OpenTable’s measure of restaurant occupancy is progressing back to where it was before the pandemic (Chart 11). J.P. Morgan reported that spending using its credit cards rose 23% year-over-year in the 9-day period through to March 19 as stimulus payments reached bank accounts. Anecdotally, airlines and cruise line companies have been expressing optimism on the back of a surge in bookings. Chart 10Lower Spending And Higher Income Led To Mounting Excess Savings Chart 11Real-Time Measures Of Economic Activity Have Hooked Up   Meanwhile, the supply side of the economy could face temporary constraints. Under the stimulus bill, close to half of jobless workers will receive more income through to September from extended unemployment benefits than they did from working. This could curtail labor supply at a time when firms are trying to step up the pace of hiring. The Fed Versus The Markets In the latest Summary of Economic Projections released last week, the median “dot” for the fed funds rate remained stuck at zero through to end-2023. The bond market, in contrast, expects the Fed to start raising rates next year. Why is there a gap between the Fed and market expectations? Part of the answer is that the “dots” and market expectations measure different things. Whereas the dots reflect a modal, or “most likely” estimate of where short-term rates will be over the next few years, market expectations reflect a probability-weighted average. The fact that rates cannot fall deeply into negative territory – but can potentially rise a lot in a high-inflation scenario – has skewed market rate expectations to the upside. That said, there is another, more fundamental, reason at work: The Fed simply does not think that a negative output gap will lead to materially higher inflation. The “dots” assume that core PCE inflation will barely rise above 2% over the next two years, even though, by the Fed’s own admission, the unemployment rate will fall firmly below NAIRU in 2023 (Chart 12). Chart 12The Fed Sees Faster Recovery, Same Rate Path Chart 13Just Like It Did In 2011, The Fed Will Disregard What It Sees As Transitory Price Shocks Is the Federal Reserve’s relaxed view towards inflation risk justified? The Fed knows full well that headline inflation could temporarily reach 4% over the next two months due to base effects from last year’s deflationary shock, lingering supply chain disruptions, the rebound in gasoline prices, and the lagged effect from dollar weakness. However, as it did in late 2011, when headline inflation nearly hit 4% and producer price inflation briefly topped 10%, the Fed is inclined to regard these price shocks as transitory (Chart 13). The Fed believes that PCE inflation will tick up to 2.4% this year but then settle back down to 2% by the end of next year as supply disruptions dissipate and most fiscal stimulus measures roll off. Our bet is that the Fed will be right about inflation in the near term, but wrong in the long term. That is to say, we think that core inflation will probably remain subdued for the next two years, as the Fed expects. However, inflation is poised to rise significantly towards the middle of the decade, an outcome that is likely to surprise both the Fed and market participants. War-Time Inflation, But Which War? In some respects, the Fed sees the current environment as resembling a war, except this time the battle is against an invisible enemy: Covid-19. Chart 14 shows what happened to US inflation during WWI, WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In the first three of those four wars, inflation rose but then fell back down after the war had concluded. That is what the Fed is counting on. What about the possibility that the coming years could resemble the period around the Vietnam War, where inflation continued to rise even though the number of US military personnel engaged in the conflict peaked in 1968?   Chart 14Inflation During Wartime: Which War Is Most Relevant For Today? Chart 15Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s In the near term, this does not appear to be a major risk. In 1966, when the war effort was ramping up, the US unemployment rate was two percentage points below NAIRU (Chart 15). As of February, US employment was still more than 5% below pre-pandemic levels.   Chart 16Employment Has Been Weak And Edging Lower At The Bottom Quartile Of The Wage Distribution We estimate that the US output gap currently stands at around 5%-to-6% of GDP. Among the bottom quartile of the wage distribution, employment is 20% below pre-pandemic levels, and has been edging lower, not higher, since last October (Chart 16). Thus, for now, hyperbolic talk of how fiscal stimulus is crowding out private-sector spending is unwarranted. Inflation Nation Looking further out, the parallels between today and the late sixties are more striking. As we discussed in a report titled 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again, much of what investors believe about how inflation emerged during the late 1960s is either based on myths, or at best, half-truths. To the extent that there are differences between today and that era, they don’t necessarily point to lower inflation in the coming years. For example, in the late sixties, the baby boomers were entering the labour force, supplying the economy with a steady stream of new workers. This helped to temper wage pressures. Today, baby boomers are leaving the labour force. They accumulated a lot of wealth over the past 50 years – so much so that they now control more than half of all US wealth (Chart 17). Over the coming two decades, they will run down that wealth, implying that household savings rates could drop. By definition, a lower savings rate implies more spending in relation to output, which is inflationary. Chart 17Baby Boomers Have Accumulated A Lot Of Wealth III. Financial Markets A. Portfolio Strategy Overweight Stocks Versus Bonds Stocks usually outperform bonds when economic growth is strong and money is cheap (Chart 18). The end of the pandemic and ongoing fiscal stimulus should support growth over the next 12-to-18 months, allowing the bull market in equities to continue. With inflation slow to rise, monetary policy will remain accommodative over this period. Chart 18AStocks Usually Outperform Bonds When Economic Growth Is Strong... Chart 18B... And Money Is Cheap The recent back-up in long-term bond yields could destabilize stocks for a month or two. However, our research has shown that as long as bond yields do not rise enough to trigger a recession, stocks will shrug off the effect of higher yields (Chart 19 and Table 1). Indeed, there is a self-limiting aspect to how high bond yields can rise, and stocks can fall, in a setting where inflation remains subdued. Higher bond yields lead to tighter financial conditions. Tighter financial conditions, in turn, lead to weaker growth, which justifies an even longer period of low rates. It is only when inflation rises to a level that central banks find uncomfortable that tighter financial conditions become desirable. We are far from that level today. Chart 19What Happens To Equities When Treasury Yields Rise?   Table 1As Long As Bond Yields Don’t Rise Into Restrictive Territory, Stocks Will Recover   It’s Not 2000 In recent months, many analysts have drawn comparisons between the year 2000 and the present day. While there are plenty of similarities, ranging from euphoric retail participation to the proliferation of dubious SPACs and IPOs, there is one critical difference: The forward earnings yield today is above the real bond yield, whereas in 2000 the earnings yield was below the bond yield (Chart 20). The US yield curve inverted in February 2000, with the 10-year Treasury yield peaking a month earlier at 6.79%. An inverted yield curve is one of the most reliable recession predictors. We are a far cry from such a predicament today. By the same token, the S&P 500 dividend yield was well below the bond yield in 2000. Today, they are roughly the same. Even if one were to pessimistically assume that US companies are unable to raise nominal dividend payments at all for the next decade, the S&P 500 would need to fall by 20% in real terms for equities to underperform bonds. Many other stock markets would have to decline by an even greater magnitude (Chart 21). Chart 20Relative To Bonds, Stocks Are More Favorably Valued Now Than In 2000 Chart 21Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds   Protecting Against Long-Term Inflation Risk The bull market in stocks will end when central banks begin to fret over rising inflation. In the past, central banks have used forecasts of inflation to decide when to raise rates. The Federal Reserve’s revised monetary policy framework, which focuses on actual rather than forecasted inflation, almost guarantees that inflation will overshoot the Fed’s target. This is because monetary policy fully affects the economy with a lag of 12-to-18 months. By the time the Fed decides to clamp down on inflation, it will have already gotten too high. Investors looking to hedge long-term inflation risk should reduce duration exposure in fixed-income portfolios, favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds, and own more “real assets” such as property. In fact, one of the best inflation hedges is simply to buy a nice house financed with a high loan-to-value fixed-rate mortgage. In a few decades, you will still own the nice house, but the value of the mortgage will be greatly reduced in real terms. Gold Versus Cryptos Historically, gold has offered protection against inflation. Increasingly, many investors have come to believe that cryptocurrencies are a better choice. We disagree. As we recently discussed in a report titled Bitcoin: A Solution In Search Of A Problem, not only are cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin highly inefficient mediums of exchange, they are also likely to turn out to be poor stores of value. Bitcoin’s annual electricity consumption now exceeds that of Pakistan and its 217 million inhabitants (Chart 22). About 70% of Bitcoin mining currently takes place in China, mainly using electricity generated by burning coal. Much of the rest of the mining takes place in countries such as Russia and Belarus with dubious governance records. Bitcoin and ESG are heading for a clash. We suspect ESG will win out. Chart 22Bitcoin Is Not Your Eco-Currency B. Equities Favor Cyclicals, Value, And Non-US Stocks Chart 23Cyclicals And Ex-US Stocks Do Best When Global Growth Is On The Upswing The vast majority of stock market capitalization today is concentrated in large multinational companies that are more leveraged to global growth rather than to the growth rate of countries in which they happen to be domiciled. Thus, while country-specific factors are not irrelevant, regional equity allocation often boils down to figuring out which stock markets will gain or lose from various global trends. The end of the pandemic will prop up global growth. In general, cyclical sectors outperform when global growth is on the upswing (Chart 23). As Table 2 illustrates, stock markets outside the US have more exposure to classically cyclical sectors such as industrials, energy, materials, and consumer discretionary that usually shine coming out of a downturn. This leads us to favor Europe, Japan, and emerging markets. We place banks in the cyclical category because faster economic growth tends to reduce bad loans, while also placing upward pressure on bond yields. Chart 24 shows that there is a very close correlation between the relative performance of bank shares and long-term bond yields. As government yields trend higher, banks will benefit. Table 2Financials Are Overrepresented In Ex-US Indices, While Tech Dominates The US Market Chart 24Close Correlation Between Relative Performance Of Banks And Long-Term Bond Yields Banks and most other cyclical sectors dominate value indices (Table 3). Not only is value still exceptionally cheap in relation to growth, but traditional value sectors have seen stronger upward earnings revisions than tech stocks since the start of the year (Chart 25). The likelihood that global bond yields put in a secular bottom last year, coupled with the emergence of a new bull market in commodities, makes us think that the nascent outperformance of value stocks has years to run.   Table 3Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector Chart 25AValue Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (I) Chart 25BValue Is Attractive On Multiple Levels (II) US Corporate Tax Hikes Coming Finally, there is one country-specific factor worth mentioning, which reinforces our view of favoring non-US, cyclical, and value stocks: US corporate taxes are heading higher. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect the Biden Administration and the Democrat-controlled Congress to raise the statutory corporate tax rate from 21% to as high as 28% later this year in order to fund, among other things, a major infrastructure investment program. Capital gains taxes will also rise. While tax hikes are unlikely to bring down the whole US stock market, they will detract from the relative performance of US stocks compared with their international peers. Cyclical sectors will benefit from the infrastructure spending. To the extent that such spending boosts growth and leads to a steeper yield curve, it should also benefit banks. In contrast, tech companies outside the clean energy sector will lag, especially if the bill introduces a minimum corporate tax on book income and raises taxes on overseas profits, as President Biden pledged to do during his campaign. C. Fixed Income Expect More US Curve Steepening As discussed above, inflation in the US and elsewhere will be slow to take off. However, when inflation does rise later this decade, it could do so significantly. Investors currently expect the Fed to start raising rates in December 2022, bringing the funds rate to 1.5% by the end of 2024 (Chart 26). In contrast, we think that a liftoff in the second half of 2023, preceded by a 6-to-12 month period of asset purchase tapering, is more likely. This implies a modest downside for short-dated US bond yields. Chart 26The Market Sees The Fed Rate Hike Cycle Kicking Off In Late 2022 Chart 27Long-Term US Real Yield Expectations Have Recovered But Remain Below Pre-Pandemic Levels In contrast, long-term yields will face upward pressure first from strong growth, and later from higher inflation. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS yield currently stands at 0.35%, which is still below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 27). Given structurally looser fiscal policy, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS yield should be at least 50 basis points higher, which would translate into a 10-year Treasury yield of a bit over 2%. Regional Bond Allocation While the Fed will be slow out of the gate to raise rates, most other central banks will be even slower. The sole exception among developed market central banks is the Norges bank, which has indicated its intention to hike rates in the second half of this year. Conceivably, Canada could start tightening monetary policy fairly soon, given strong jobs growth and a bubbly housing market. While the Bank of Canada is eager to begin tapering asset purchases later this year, our global fixed-income strategists suspect that the BoC will wait for the Fed to raise rates first. An early start to rate hikes by the Bank of Canada could significantly push up the value of the loonie, which is something the BoC wants to avoid. New Zealand will also hike rates shortly after the Fed, followed by Australia. Bank of England governor Andrew Bailey has downplayed the recent rise in gilt yields. Nevertheless, the desire to maintain currency competitiveness in the post-Brexit era will prevent the BoE from hiking rates until 2024. Among the major central banks, the ECB and the BoJ will be the last major central banks to raise rates. Putting it all together, our fixed-income strategists advocate maintaining a below-benchmark stance on overall duration. Comparing the likely path for rate hikes with market pricing region by region, they recommend overweighting the Euro area and Japan, assigning a neutral allocation to the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and an underweight on the US. Credit: Stick With US High Yield Corporates Corporate spreads have narrowed substantially since last March. Nevertheless, in an environment of strong economic growth, it still makes sense to favor riskier corporate credit over safe government bonds. Within corporate credit, we favor high yield over investment grade. Geographically, we prefer US corporate bonds over Euro area bonds. The former trade with a higher yield and spread than the latter (Chart 28). CHART 28Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (I) Chart 28Favor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade And US Corporates Over Euro Area (II) One way to gauge the attractiveness of credit is to look at the percentile rankings of 12-month breakeven spreads. The 12-month breakeven spread is the amount of credit spread widening that can occur before a credit-sensitive asset starts to underperform a duration-matched, risk-free government bond over a one-year horizon. For US investment-grade corporates, the breakeven spread is currently in the bottom decile of its historic range, which is rather unattractive from a risk-adjusted perspective. In contrast, the US high-yield breakeven spread is currently in the middle of the distribution. In the UK, high-yield debt is more appealing than investment grade, although not quite to the same extent as in the US. In the Euro area, both high-yield and investment-grade credit are fairly unattractive (Chart 29). Chart 29US High-Yield Stands Out The Most D. Currencies Faster US Growth Should Support The Dollar In The Near Term… Chart 30US Has A Smaller Share Of Manufacturing Than Most Other Developed Economies The US has a “low beta” economy. Compared to most other economies, the US has a bigger service sector and a smaller manufacturing base (Chart 30). The US economy is also highly diversified on both a regional and sectoral level. This tends to make US growth less volatile than growth abroad. The relatively low cyclicality of the US economy has important implications for the US dollar. While the US benefits from stronger global growth, the rest of the world usually benefits even more. Thus, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the US to other economies, dragging down the value of the dollar. This relationship broke down this year. Rather than lagging other economies, the US economy has led the charge thanks to bountiful fiscal stimulus and a successful vaccination campaign. As growth estimates for the US have been marked up, the dollar has caught a temporary bid (Chart 31). Chart 31US Growth Outperformance Could Be A Near-Term Tailwind For The Dollar … But Underlying Fundamentals Are Dollar Bearish As discussed earlier in the report, growth momentum should swing back towards the rest of the world later this year. This should weigh on the dollar in the second half of the year. To make matters worse for the greenback, the US trade deficit has ballooned in recent quarters. The current account deficit, a broad measure of net foreign income flows, rose by nearly 35% to $647 billion in 2020. At 3.1% of GDP, it was the largest shortfall in 12 years (Chart 32). Consistent with the weak balance of payments picture, the dollar remains overvalued by about 10% on a purchasing power parity basis (Chart 33). Chart 32The Widening US External Gap Chart 33The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value Historically, the dollar has weakened whenever fiscal policy has been eased in excess of what is needed to close the output gap (Chart 34). Foreigners have been net sellers of Treasurys this year. It is equity inflows that have supported the dollar (Chart 35). However, if non-US stock markets begin to outperform, foreign flows into US stocks could reverse. Chart 34The Greenback Tends To Weaken When Fiscal Policy Is Eased Relative To What The Economy Needs Chart 35Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (I) Chart 35Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year (II) Meanwhile, stronger US growth has pushed long-term real interest rate differentials only modestly in favor of the US. At the short end of the curve, real rate differentials have actually widened against the US since the start of the year, reflecting rising US inflation expectations and the Fed’s determination to keep rates near zero for an extended period of time (Chart 36). Chart 36Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (I) Chart 36Real Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve, But Not At The Short End (II) On balance, while the dollar could strengthen a bit more over the next month or so, the greenback will weaken over a 12-month horizon. Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s chief currency strategist, expects the dollar to fall the most against the Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, Australian dollar, and British pound over a 12-month horizon. In the EM space, stronger global growth will disproportionately benefit the Mexican peso, Chilean peso, Colombian peso, South African rand, Czech koruna, Indonesian rupiah, Korean won, and Singapore dollar. Chart 37Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (I) Chart 37Weak Dollar Is Usually A Tailwind For Cyclicals, Non-US Stocks, And Value Stocks (II) Consistent with our equity views, a weaker dollar would be good news for cyclical equity sectors, non-US stock markets, and value stocks (Chart 37). E. Commodities Favorable Outlook For Commodities Strong global growth against a backdrop of tight supply should sustain momentum in the commodity complex over the next 12-to-18 months. Capital investment in the oil and gas sector has fallen by more than 50% since 2014 (Chart 38). BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service, led by Robert Ryan, expects annual growth in crude oil demand to outstrip supply over the remainder of this year (Chart 39). Chart 38Oil & Gas Capex Collapses In COVID-19’s Wake Chart 39Crude Oil Demand Growth To Outstrip Supply Over The Remainder Of This Year A physical deficit in the metals markets – particularly for copper and aluminum – should also persist this year (Chart 40). While the boom in electric vehicle (EV) production represents a long-term threat to oil, it is manna from heaven for many metals. A battery-powered EV can contain more than 180 pounds of copper compared with 50 pounds for conventional autos. By 2030, the demand from EVs alone should amount to close to 4mm tonnes of copper per year, representing about 15% of annual copper production. Chart 40ACopper Will Be In Physical Deficit... Chart 40B...As Will Aluminum China’s Commodity Demand Will Remain Strong Chart 41China Keeps Buying More And More Commodities Strong demand for metals from China should also buoy metals prices. While trend GDP growth in China has slowed, the economy is much bigger in absolute terms than it was in the 2000s. China’s annual aggregate consumption of metals is five times as high as it was back then. The incremental increase in China’s metal consumption, as measured by the volume of commodities consumed, is also double what it was 20 years ago (Chart 41). As we discussed in our report To Deleverage Its Economy, China Needs MORE Debt, the Chinese government has no choice but to continue to recycle persistently elevated household savings into commodity-intensive capital investment. This will ensure ample commodity demand from China for years to come. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores