Developed Countries

Highlights We were on the road last week, discussing our economic and market outlooks: We met with a range of Midwestern clients who focus primarily on the U.S. A majority of our meetings were with fixed-income teams. The Fed will ultimately decide the fate of the expansion, … : Nearly everyone wanted to get a read on how much longer the expansion will last. We offered the view that the Fed will induce the next recession, provided that an exogenous event doesn’t beat it to the punch. … and inflation will be the catalyst that prompts the Fed to act: Inflation was typically far from investors’ minds, and several of our meetings centered on what will drive it, and where and when we expect it will show up. Feature We traveled throughout the Midwest last week, discussing our outlook for financial markets and the economy with a range of investors. We got the sense that our clients are constructive about the economy and are generally open to tilting portfolios in a risk-friendly direction, albeit somewhat grudgingly. They recognized the challenge that worsening U.S.-China trade relations would pose to a constructive call, but were content to wait for more information before adjusting their views or their portfolios. Our views continue to follow the outline we’ve laid out in our written reports. In the absence of economic or financial market excesses, or an exogenous shock that induces a material slowdown, we expect the expansion to roll on until the Fed begins to fear that it’s gone too far and imposes restrictive monetary policy settings to rein it in. Until it does, we expect that the equity bull market will continue and spread product will deliver positive excess returns over Treasuries. The investment strategy takeaway is that it is too early to de-risk portfolios. De-risking will become the order of the day once the Fed resumes tightening monetary conditions via rate hikes. There is currently no sign that the Fed is contemplating a meaningfully hawkish shift, but we expect that inflation pressures will eventually force its hand. Ten years of subdued inflation have made a mockery of recurring post-crisis inflation warnings, and clients have developed a robust immunity to them. What, they wanted to know, has changed enough to resuscitate inflation? Steroid-Fueled Demand Aggregate demand crashed during the crisis and was far short of the economy’s capacity when it bottomed in mid-2009. In economics lingo, that meant that the U.S. economy faced a sizable negative output gap when it embarked on the recovery/expansion. Although the economy grew at a tepid 2% rate over the ensuing decade, capacity grew even more slowly, held back by consistently weak capital expenditures, and the output gap finally closed around the beginning of 2018 (Chart 1), removing a stout inflation-absorbing buffer. Chart 1The Excess Capacity Cushion Is Gone The United States then poured fuel on the fire by injecting a significant quantity of stimulus into an economy that was already operating at capacity. Corporations and other businesses that viewed the pickup in aggregate demand as a one-off event refrained from expanding capacity to meet that demand, as it appeared as if it would be a poor use of capital. Imported goods from economies that still have excess capacity can relieve some of the pressure of inadequate domestic supply, but they’re unlikely to absorb all of the pressure from excess demand, even in the absence of new tariff barriers. The aggregate 2018-19 stimulus shapes up as a catalyst for higher prices. Capacity vastly exceeded demand when the economy began to turn around ten years ago, but the stimulus package has made it look a little thin. The trouble is that no one can pinpoint exactly when upward price pressures will reveal themselves. Inflation is the mother of all lagging indicators, peaking and bottoming well after business cycle transitions suggest it should (Chart 2). All we can say is that the steroid injection from the stimulus planted the seeds of inflation. Just when they’ll begin to sprout is uncertain, but we believe the Fed’s pause will give them a chance to take root. Wage Inflation The labor market is so tight that it squeaks. The unemployment rate has fallen to a 49-year low; baby boomer retirements will cap the labor force participation rate around its current level (Chart 3, top panel); and discouraged workers (Chart 3, middle panel) and involuntary part-time workers are few and far between (Chart 3, bottom panel). Now that it has been absorbed, the glut of idled workers will no longer serve as a buffer neutralizing upward wage pressures. The labor market is tight as a drum. The pool of discouraged workers and involuntary part-timers is smaller than it was at the last two cyclical peaks, while employer demand is more robust. Employees are starting to gain bargaining power. The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) indicates that demand for new workers is intense. As a share of total filled positions, job openings are at an all-time high in the 18-year history of the series (Chart 4, middle panel). No one quits a job unless s/he has another one lined up, and it almost always requires higher pay to induce an employee to jump from Employer A to Employer B. The elevated quit rate thus reveals that employers are poaching workers from each other to meet that demand (Chart 4, bottom panel). After Employer B lures an employee away from Employer A, Employer A hires a worker from Employer C or Employer D, which now has an opening it needs to fill. The employment merry-go-round creates a self-reinforcing cycle pushing wages higher and endowing employees with newfound bargaining power. Chart 3With Fewer Workers On The Sidelines … Chart 4… Employers Have Turned To Poaching Self-sustaining wage gains could produce price-level increases via a demand-pull or a cost-push mechanism. In a demand-pull framework, businesses observing steady payroll expansions and increased household income may well attempt to push through selling price increases. Under cost-push, corporations raise prices in an attempt to offset increased labor costs. Then again, the pass-through from wage inflation to price inflation might not occur at all, as the dynamics of inflation are not fully understood. What The Fed Believes Investors may be frustrated by the lack of a clear connection between wages and prices, but they should not be put off by a little ambiguity – there would be no alpha without uncertainty. An absence of realized inflation does not eliminate the prospect of rate hikes. Our Inflation → Rate Hikes → Restrictive Monetary Policy → Recession → Bear Market roadmap may still come to pass. The first step in the chain would simply have to be perceived inflation as opposed to realized inflation, and it’s the Fed’s perception that drives monetary policy, not the public’s. As we stressed in our Special Report on the Phillips curve,1 there is no alternative explanation in mainstream economics connecting the dots between the elements of the Fed’s dual mandate. Every mainstream economic model posits an inverse relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate. Every economist learned about the expectations-augmented Phillips curve multiple times in the course of his or her undergraduate and graduate studies. Until the profession settles on an alternative narrative, the Fed and other major central banks will be beholden to the Phillips curve. The connection between wages and prices is a mystery, but the Phillips curve’s place in mainstream economics remains secure. It’s easy to talk of patience when inflation has been hibernating for ten years, even with the unemployment rate at 49-year lows, but once wage gains begin to exceed 3.5% and 4%, we expect the Fed will change its tune. Wages do not respond to changes in the unemployment rate when there’s ample slack in the labor market, but they do once it becomes difficult to find employees. The varying sensitivity of changes in wages at different levels of unemployment explains the kink in the Phillips curve, but we found the NAIRU-based unemployment gap2 to be a reliable proxy for identifying the point at which the labor market meaningfully tightens (Chart 5). Chart 5NAIRU, … The natural rate of unemployment is only a concept, however, and the CBO series we use to calculate the unemployment gap is subject to retroactive adjustments intended to better match the CBO’s estimates with real-world observations. We therefore incorporated two alternative measures of labor market slack to test the robustness of the unemployment-gap framework. The first is the Jobs Plentiful/Jobs Hard To Get responses from the Conference Board’s consumer confidence survey. The top panel of Chart 6 calculates the difference between Jobs Hard To Get and Jobs Plentiful; when it’s positive (negative), survey respondents are indicating that the labor market is soft (tight). The disparity in wage growth between the soft and the tight states, as estimated by the hoi polloi, is a little larger than under the CBO’s revised NAIRU estimates, suggesting Main Street may be better positioned to evaluate labor-market dynamics than D Street (the CBO’s address). Chart 6… The Consumer Confidence Survey, … To get away from the arbitrariness of the unemployment rate and the uncertainty of NAIRU estimates, we considered the employment gap from the perspective of the prime-age (non-)employment-to-population ratio (Chart 7). It also supports the conclusion that wage gains are a function of the degree of labor market slack, but the outlier results from the crisis render the mean non-employment ratio since 1985 a less-than-perfect boundary between tightness and slack. The prime-age (non-)employment-to-population ratio better fits the standard Phillips curve framework, producing a solidly linear relationship (Chart 8). It points to further wage gains as prime-age employment increases. Chart 7… And Prime-Age (Non-)Employment All Point To Faster Wage Gains If productivity continues to grow by leaps and bounds – the fourth-quarter gain was impressive, the first-quarter’s was eye-popping – the Fed won’t feel much pressure to hike rates. Productivity is a function of capital expenditures; workers are able to increase output when they’re provided with more and better tools. Capex has been extremely weak ever since the crisis in the U.S. and the rest of the world, however, and we do not think that investors should count on productivity remaining much above its low 1%-plus trend level of the last several years. Investment Implications The ultimate effect of the Fed’s pause will be to extend the duration of the expansion, assuming that an exogenous shock does not pull the plug on it. Extending the expansion will have the effect of extending the equity bull market, and the period in which spread product generates positive excess returns over Treasuries. There is no free lunch, and dovishness now will be offset by hawkishness later. Larger bull-market gains will ultimately be countered by larger bear-market losses. That is a concern for another day, however, and we continue to recommend that investors remain at least equal weight equities and spread product in balanced portfolios. We do not see a recession until the second half of 2020 at the earliest. Our best guess is that it will begin around the middle of 2021, so it is too early to de-risk portfolios or shift to a more defensive asset allocation profile.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report,  “The Phillips Curve: Science Or Superstition?”, published February 26, 2019. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The unemployment gap in the top panel of Chart 5 is calculated by subtracting the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of NAIRU from the official unemployment rate. NAIRU, or the natural rate of unemployment (u*), is the minimum unemployment rate that would exist even in a full-employment economy. It results from structural factors like skill and geographic mismatches. The CBO currently estimates that NAIRU is 4.7%; the Fed’s dots suggest that it estimates u* is around 4.6%.  

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Firming relative demand and input cost dynamics, the Medicare For All (MFA)-induced panic selling in HMOs coupled with 5G euphoria buying in semis have set the stage for an exploitable pair trade opportunity: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. Relative supply/demand dynamics, crumbling lumber prices, lower interest rates and compelling valuations and technicals all suggest that the long homebuilding/short home improvement retail pair trade is in the early innings. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors trade today, with a tight stop loss at -7%. Table 1 Feature Equities hit a speed bump last week, as President Trump’s trade related tweets instilled some fear back into the markets. Investor complacency reigned supreme and, given the liquidity crunch, risk premia exploded higher with the VIX more than doubling from the recent lows. Historically, a parabolic rise in policy uncertainty is synonymous with an equity market selloff and a widening in risk premia; last week was no different (economic policy uncertainty shown inverted, second panel, Chart 1). Adding insult to injury, given that the forward P/E multiple expansion explained all of the equity market’s advance year-to-date as we highlighted three weeks ago, the trade-related melt up in policy uncertainty caused a mini meltdown in the forward multiple as financial conditions tightened (financial conditions shown inverted, third panel, Chart 1). The implication is that short-term equity market caution is still warranted as we have been writing over the past few weeks, at least until the U.S./China trade dispute dust settles. Chart 1Caution Still Warranted Chart 2Tenuous Trio The recent simultaneous rise of three asset classes, that we call “the tenuous trio”, warned that something had to give: stocks, bond prices and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar cannot all go up in tandem for an extended period of time. When this happens it is typically a forewarning of an equity market snap (Chart 2). One simple explanation is that a rising greenback comes back and haunts equities via a negative P&L hit, albeit with a lagged effect. Irrespective of where the U.S. dollar will move in the coming months, it will continue to weigh on EPS as the surge in the greenback took root from April to November last year. Thus, with a six-to-nine month lag it will continue to infiltrate EPS and Q2 – which the sell-side already expects to barely breach year ago levels – will also feel the U.S. dollar’s wrath. Were the dollar to continue its ascent from current levels, it would put in jeopardy the back half of this year’s EPS growth numbers, especially Q4/2019 that sell-side analysts forecast to jump to 8%, according to I/B/E/S data. This week we recommend putting on a new pair trade involving an unloved health care subgroup and a mighty tech sector subindex but with a tight stop, and also update an intra-consumer discretionary market-neutral housing-levered pair trade. Importantly, the 12-month forward EPS number is artificially rising. Chart 3 shows that calendar 2019 and 2020 EPS estimates continue to build a base, but the 12-month forward number has been rising since early-February. What explains the increase in the 12-month forward estimate is arithmetic. In other words, despite a multi-month downgrading of calendar 2019 and 2020 EPS, the first two quarters of next year are forecast to come in significantly higher than 2019’s first six months. As the latter roll off and the former get added to the 12-month forward EPS number, a deceiving jump occurs. For next year, we continue to expect $181 EPS, and we would lean against the double-digit EPS growth in 2020 that the sell-side currently forecasts. Our top down macro S&P 500 EPS model softened anew recently, warning that mid-single digit growth, at best, is more likely than low double-digit growth (Chart 4).   Chart 3Artificial EPS Rise Chart 4SPX Macro EPS Model Forecasts Softness Finally, one of the tech sector’s invincible subgroups is cracking with the S&P semis relative performance hitting a wall both versus the broad market ex-TMT and versus the NASDAQ 100. This is significant not only from a sentiment perspective, but also because semis have high international sales exposure in general and China in particular (Chart 5). Chart 5Vertigo Warning This week we recommend putting on a new pair trade involving an unloved health care subgroup and a mighty tech sector subindex but with a tight stop, and also update an intra-consumer discretionary market-neutral housing-levered pair trade. New High-Octane Pair Trade Idea While health care and tech stocks started the year on a similar footing, a wide gulf has opened that is likely to, at least partially, reverse in the back half of the year. This dichotomy is most evident at the subsector level where managed health care stocks are still down in absolute terms for the year, whereas chip stocks are up roughly 20% year-to-date (Chart 6). This is an exploitable gap and today we suggest a new pair trade: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. Chart 6Exploitable Reversal Looms Bernie Sanders’ revamped MFA bill sent the managed health care group to the ER. While there is heightened uncertainty surrounding MFA and we are working on a joint Special Report with our sister Geopolitical Strategy service due on June 3rd, this is likely a 2022 story. Not only will Sanders have to win the Democratic candidacy and subsequently the Presidential election, but also the GOP would have to lose the Senate. This is an extremely low probability event that has dealt a massive blow to HMO stocks. On the flip side, semis are priced for perfection. The recent catalyst for this group’s stratospheric rise was Apple’s patent settlement with Qualcomm that set in motion a 5G-related euphoria. Again 5G is a late-2021 story and a lot of good news is already priced in to semis stocks. Moreover, historically, semi cycles last four-to-five quarters and investors’ neglect of the semi downcycle is puzzling as we have recently concluded just two down quarters. Explicitly, what is truly baffling is that 12-month forward EPS are slated to contract in absolute terms and forward sales are hovering near the zero line, yet the Philly SOX index recently vaulted to all-time highs. Taken together, we would lean toward health care insurers at the expense of semiconductor stocks. Netting it all out, relative demand and input cost dynamics, the MFA-induced panic selling in HMOs coupled with 5G euphoria buying in semis have set the stage for an exploitable pair trade opportunity: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. With regard to relative macro drivers, managed health care has the upper hand. Chart 7 shows that relative demand dynamics clearly favor HMOs and are working against chip stocks. Non-farm payroll growth is trouncing global semi billings. The message from the small business sector is similar with the labor market upbeat compared with declining global semi revenues. Finally, on the relative pricing power gauge front, overall wage inflation is outpacing DRAM prices. On all three fronts, the message is to expect a mean reversion higher in the relative share price ratio. Chart 7Buy Managed Health Care… Chart 8…At The Expense… Input cost/inventory dynamics suggest that HMOs also have the advantage. The health care insurance employment cost index is growing on a par with inflation, but semi industry employment is climbing at a rate over 5%/annum (bottom panel, Chart 8). Taking stock of medical cost inflation, costs are still melting, however global semi inventories are expanding. The upshot is that relative share prices have ample upside (middle panel, Chart 8). Finally, the previous relative valuation overshoot has returned to the neutral zone and, encouragingly, relative technicals are probing multi-year lows near one standard deviation below the historical mean. Importantly, over the past two decades every time our Technical Indicator has hit such a depressed level, a playable rebound in relative share prices has ensued (bottom panel, Chart 9). Chart 9…Of… Chart 10…Semis Nevertheless, this highly volatile market-neutral trade faces one big risk we previously alluded to: relative profit expectations are extended. In other words, the bombed out S&P semiconductor forward EPS and revenue projections are masking the relative profit and revenue backdrop (Chart 10). Netting it all out, relative demand and input cost dynamics, the MFA-induced panic selling in HMOs coupled with 5G euphoria buying in semis have set the stage for an exploitable pair trade opportunity: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. Bottom Line: Initiate a long S&P managed health care/short S&P semis pair trade today with a stop loss at the -7% mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P managed health care and S&P semi indexes are: BLBG: S5MANH – UNH, ANTM, HUM, CNC, WCG and BLBG: S5SECO – INTC, AVGO, TXN, NVDA, QCOM, MU, ADI, XLNX, AMD, MCHP, MXIM, SWKS, QRVO, respectively. Homebuilding/Home Improvement Retail Pair Trade Update In late-January we put on a market, sector and subindustry neutral trade preferring homebuilders to home improvement retailers (HIR) as a way to benefit from the increase in residential construction at the expense of residential investment. This trade moved in the black from the get-go and is now generating alpha to the tune of 7% since inception, but more gains are in store in the coming months. President Trump’s hawkish tariff rhetoric should keep interest rates at bay, at least for a short while, and bond market nervousness is more of a boon to homebuilders than to HIR (top panel, Chart 11). The drop in the price of mortgage credit along with minor price concessions from homebuilders are causing sales of new homes to take off versus existing home sales (middle panel, Chart 11). Granted, bankers remain willing extenders of residential loans and the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey revealed that demand for residential credit is making a comeback following a near yearlong decline (not shown). As a result, relative loan growth metrics also underpin the relative share price ratio (bottom panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Still In Early Innings In sum, relative supply/demand dynamics, crumbling lumber prices, lower interest rates and compelling valuations and technicals all suggest that the long homebuilding/short HIR pair trade is in its early innings. Importantly, the new/existing home sales–to-inventory ratio is an excellent leading indicator of relative share prices and is currently emitting an unambiguously bullish signal for homebuilders at the expense of HIR (Chart 12). Chart 12Supply/Demand Backdrop Says Stick With This Pair Trade Chart 13Relative Sales ##br##Expectations… Examining the relative demand backdrop reveals that homebuilders will continue to outshine HIR. Current readings in the NAHB home sales survey versus the remodeling survey and future expectations both point to more gains in the relative share price ratio (Chart 13). The felling in lumber prices also represents a benefit to homebuilders to the detriment of HIR. Lumber is a key building input cost in new home construction so any price liquidation is a boon for homebuilding margins. In contrast, HIR makes a set margin on lumber sales, therefore deflating lumber prices cut HIR profits (Chart 14). Chart 14…Felling Lumber Prices And … Chart 15…Bombed Out Valuations Signal More Relative Share Price Gains Finally, on the relative valuation and technical fronts, there is anything but froth. In fact, the relative price to book ratio is perched near an all-time low and relative momentum has only recently troughed and has yet to reach the neutral zone (Chart 15). In sum, relative supply/demand dynamics, crumbling lumber prices, lower interest rates and compelling valuations and technicals all suggest that the long homebuilding/short HIR pair trade is in its early innings.       Bottom Line: Stick with a long S&P homebuilders/short S&P HIR pair trade. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P homebuilding and S&P HIR indexes are: BLBG: S5HOME – PHM, DHI, LEN and BLBG: S5HOMI – HD, LOW, respectively.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Special Report

We are strongly committed to our 2 percent inflation objective and to achieving it on a sustained and symmetric basis. – Jerome Powell, May 1, 2019 St Louis Fed President James Bullard, a voting member of the central bank’s policy committee, said he “certainly would be open to a cut” should inflation continue to fall short of expectations after the summer. – Financial Times, May 3, 2019 The Federal Reserve’s preferred measure of prices (the core personal consumption deflator) rose by 1.6% in the year to March, a shortfall from the 2% inflation target. Moreover, the 10-year-moving average of core inflation has remained persistently below the 2% level over the past 17 years (Chart 1). Recent comments from some policymakers and market analysts highlight growing concerns about this shortfall. Personally, I see little to worry about. Chart 1Core Inflation: Not Quite At 2% For investors, high and rising inflation is a terrible thing, as is its even more evil twin, a high and accelerating pace of deflation. The Holy Grail for investors and policymakers alike is for actual inflation and inflation expectations to remain both low and stable. It seems to me that this has been achieved, with resulting huge benefits to the economy and financial markets. It matters little that inflation has fallen slightly short of the arbitrary 2% target. If inflation was problematically low, what might we expect to see? Importantly, companies would be complaining about a tough pricing environment and pressure on profits. Yet, S&P 500 profit margins are close to an all-time high (Chart 2). And that is providing powerful support to the stock market, with the S&P 500 also close to its highs. If there were building deflationary pressures in the economy, then it also would be reasonable to expect spreading signs of economic distress. While not every indicator is flashing green, the overall economy is doing just fine. Healthy employment growth, rising real wages and strong profits are more consistent with a nascent inflation problem than with deflation. According to the National Federation of Independent Business survey, small companies’ main problem is the quality of labor, not concerns about demand. Excessively low inflation is a problem for debtors, but loan delinquency rates – albeit a lagging indicator – are well contained. The Fed makes a big deal about the importance of keeping inflation expectations anchored – i.e. stable at a low level. There does not appear to be any major problem on this front. For example, the New York Fed’s survey of consumers shows median expected inflation of 2.9% in three years’ time (Chart 3). The University of Michigan Survey of Consumers shows expected inflation of 2.3% over the next 5-10 years. The gap between nominal and real 10-year Treasury yields – a proxy for financial market inflation expectations – is lower (currently 1.88%), but that measure moves around a lot and is highly correlated with oil prices. No measures of expected inflation are in free-fall or dangerously low. Chart 2No Signs Of Pricing Distress Chart 3Inflation Expectations Are Contained   What If? Suppose that the Fed had been prescient enough to realize 10 years ago that, despite its best efforts, core inflation would average only 1.6% rather than the desired 2% over the coming decade. Presumably, the Fed would have taken even more extreme actions than actually occurred, implying a bigger expansion of its balance sheet. It is unclear whether it would have been any more successful in pushing up actual inflation. But we can be sure that it would have further inflated asset prices and encouraged even more leverage in the corporate sector. Increased financial imbalances in the economy – asset price overshoots and greater leverage – would not have been an attractive trade-off to pushing up inflation by an average 40 basis points. The core problem is that monetary policy is ill-equipped to deal with the forces that have held back economic growth. A combination of demographics, high debt and slower productivity growth have limited the U.S. economy’s potential. Thus, I have a lot of sympathy for Larry Summer’s secular stagnation thesis. Yes, that implies that the real equilibrium interest rate is very low and, therefore, that monetary policy needs to be accommodative. But it also implies that force-feeding the system with easy money is more likely to lead to asset bubbles and financial distortions than to increased consumer price inflation. What About Policy Ammo For The Next Downturn? One of the main arguments for getting inflation up is to give the Fed more scope to ease policy in the next recession. In the past, the Fed has cut the funds rate by an average of around 500 basis points during recessions. Going into the next downturn with inflation and thus interest rates close to current levels means it would not take long for the funds rate reach the constraints of the zero bound. However, this also would be the case if core inflation was at or modestly above the 2% target. That is why some commentators (e.g. Olivier Blanchard and Larry Summers) have argued for an inflation target of 4% during good times in order to allow for a large fall in interest rates when times turn bad. As long as inflation is in moderate single digits, its stability probably is more important than its level. In other words, if inflation was at 4% and was expected by all economic and financial agents to remain at that level for the foreseeable future, then the economy should not perform any worse than if inflation had stabilized at 2% - and it might even perform better. However, central banks have long had the view that the higher the inflation rate, the less stable it would be. And the same logic would apply to the downside if there was deflation. For example, once inflation rises from 2% to 4%, then it could easily move from 4% to 6% etc. Given the challenges of fine-tuning monetary policy, that view has merit. Raising the inflation target is all very well, but if central banks are having trouble getting the rate to 2%, how on earth would they get it to 4%. And the same point applies if the Fed were to shift from targeting the inflation rate to targeting the level of prices or of nominal GDP. If boosting the Fed’s balance sheet from less than $1 trillion to $4.5 trillion did not get inflation to 2%, what would it take to get inflation to 4%? It is always possible to increase inflation. For example, the government could give all households a check for $10,000 that had to be spent on domestically-produced goods and services. Furthermore, assume the checks were valid only for one year and the fiscal costs were directly financed by the Fed. This would undoubtedly unleash a powerful consumer boom and a spike in inflation. And the government could keep repeating the exercise until a sustained inflation upturn took hold. But that is an unrealistic scenario except in the event of an Armageddon economic situation. And it hardly would fit in with keeping inflation stable at a modestly higher pace. A recession is very likely within the next couple of years and monetary policy will indeed face major constraints on its actions. We undoubtedly would see renewed quantitative easing on a heroic scale with an expanded range of assets purchased by the central bank. And advocates of Modern Monetary Theory may well have their wishes granted with direct monetary financing of fiscal deficits. But, as already noted, policymakers would face these policy challenges regardless of whether inflation was modestly below or above the 2% target. Be Careful What You Wish For The Fed spent three decades squeezing inflation out of the system. In the 1970s and 1980s, high inflation expectations were deeply embedded in the behavior of consumers, companies and investors. It was a long and at times painful process to change that psychology. With inflation expectations now in the range of 2% to 3%, the Fed can claim success. Why would they want to risk undoing that achievement? Letting the economy run hot to try and offset sub-2% inflation with a period of above-2% inflation would be a dangerous strategy. History shows us that central banks have both limited understanding of the inflation process and limited control over the economy. If policymakers were successful in raising inflation, they run the risk that expectations would no longer be anchored. Moreover, the Fed would have a massive problem in communicating the logic of a pro-inflation strategy. Having spent so long in selling the message that low and stable inflation is the best way to maximize long-run economic growth, it likely would create considerable confusion to then say that a period of higher inflation was acceptable. Investors and businesses would face huge uncertainty about the magnitude and duration of an inflation overshoot and about whether the Fed could even control the process. The Fed’s credibility undoubtedly would suffer. It is true that policymakers know how to bring inflation back under control – they simply have to tighten policy. But that introduces increased instability into the economy and financial markets. Rather than be obsessed about hitting the 2% target, policymakers should be happy that they have met the requirements of the Federal Reserve Act: “to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” The Policy Outlook And Market Implications The Fed was right to stop raising interest rates. The economy does not appear to be on the verge of overheating and there are enough risks to the outlook to warrant a cautious wait-and-see approach to policy. Yet, I am somewhat troubled by the dovish tone of some Fed officials. Thank goodness President Trump’s recent choices for Fed Board positions are now out of the picture. If I am worried now, I can only imagine how much worse I would have felt with Stephen Moore and Herman Cain on the Board. With no recession on the horizon and the labor markets extremely tight, I fully expect to see inflation gather steam later this year. But I suspect that the Fed will be slow to react. And then the timing of the 2020 elections will become a factor. The FOMC is not particularly sensitive to political considerations, but this is no ordinary President. The Fed would have to be very sure of itself before it started raising rates again in the midst of the election cycle. The bottom line is that we are setting up for a monetary policy error with the Fed falling behind the inflation curve later this year or in early 2020. This will be positive for risk assets in the short run, but poses a big threat down the road. Notwithstanding our concerns about the near-term market impact of current U.S.-China trade tensions, our strategy is thus to remain overweight equities and corporate credit until we see signs that financial conditions are about to significantly tighten.   Martin H. Barnes, Senior Vice President Economic Advisor mbarnes@bcaresearch.com

Overweight (Downgrade Alert) When we moved to an overweight recommendation on the S&P airlines index in the fall of last year, we noted three pillars supporting the onset of an earnings outperformance: a drubbing in oil prices significantly lowered the key input cost while rebounding consumer spending supported higher ticket prices and soaring consumer confidence encouraged expanding volumes.  The latter two of these pillars remain robust (third and bottom panels) while the former has given up much of its benefit (jet fuel shown inverted, second panel).  We had further noted that the major carriers had shelved plans to expand their domestic capacity which reduced the risk of a profit-destroying fare war. However, news reports have been highlighting intensifying competition on the key domestic transcontinental market, driven by excess capacity being deployed by all major transcon carriers. The Wall Street Journal reported this week that the premium cabin on these routes was selling for as little as 20% of the transatlantic fare. While passengers should be celebrating, investors should take a much dimmer view of this level of discounting. Bottom Line: Though consumer confidence remains near all-time highs, rising fuel prices and fare competition could put our S&P airlines relative earnings outperformance thesis offside. We are adding a downgrade alert to our overweight recommendation today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, UAL, AAL and ALK.