Special Report
Highlights Contrary to popular belief, the correlation between changes in interest rates and equity returns is not fixed: Stock prices have generally risen as yields have fallen over the last four decades, but there is no rule that states equity returns and bond yields will be inversely related. Tech stocks’ tight recent inverse correlation with interest rates is a new phenomenon and we expect it will be temporary: Relative differences in earnings have driven relative returns since the global financial crisis and their mirror image correlation with interest rates was a pandemic anomaly that has already withered. Rising interest rates are not a good reason for equity investors to reduce their Tech exposures: The conventional wisdom is not always wrong, but it almost never generates alpha. In this case, we believe the crowd has fallen for a fleeting illusion that will not persist. Feature Table 1Lapping The Field Perhaps nothing has lately generated more consensus agreement among equity strategists and other top-down observers than the claim that Tech stocks are particularly vulnerable to rising interest rates. Thanks to the Tech sector’s track record of generating outsized growth (Table 1), its future earnings streams are expected to be larger for longer than other sectors’, making them somewhat akin to long-maturity bonds from a duration perspective. Go-go growth stocks and Treasuries make for strange bedfellows, no matter how logical the earnings-stream reasoning may appear to be at first glance, and we view the application of duration concepts to equities as a stretch in any event. In this Special Report, we make the case that the recently observed tight inverse correlation between relative Tech sector performance and the 10-year Treasury yield is anomalous and should not be expected to persist. Right Church, Wrong Pew Duration is the weighted-average term to maturity of a bond’s cash flows and describes its price sensitivity to changes in interest rates. It is an essential feature of fixed income markets but attempts to extend the concept to equities necessarily fall flat. Bondholders receive interest and principal payments subject to a contractually fixed schedule that makes valuing a bond, especially one with negligible credit risk, a simple exercise in arithmetic. The present value of any bond (PV) is equal to the sum of its discounted series of cash flows, as in the equation , where x = one of a series of n semi-annual payments, r = the discount rate and t = the time in years when the next payment will be received. Assuming that all the interest payments and the principal payment will be received on time, the only variable term in the bond present value equation is the discount rate, r. As r appears solely in the denominator, a bond’s present value is inversely related to its moves. The cash streams accruing to stockholders are inherently unpredictable, however, and the present value of an equity interest is subject to fluctuations in the realized and estimated future values of x as well as changes in discount rate r. Forces that move r may or may not also move x and it is uncertain whether the numerator or denominator will exert a greater impact if they move together, as they might be expected to do in the case of the high-growth Tech sector. The explanatory power of changes in interest rates weakens as cash flow uncertainty increases. Month-over-month changes in the 10-year Treasury note yield1 explain virtually all the variation in one-month Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index total returns (Chart 1, top panel). As cash flows become more uncertain with the introduction of modest credit risk, the correlation slips to -40% (Chart 1, middle panel). It weakens even further and flips its sign with equities, which have done better since the financial crisis when the 10-year yield rises than when it falls (Chart 1, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Duration is a metric for measuring bonds’ price sensitivity to changes in interest rates. Because of the uncertain nature of a company’s future cash flows and the multitude of independent variables that influence them, duration is an ill fit with equities. The Post-Crisis Experience The empirical record poses several challenges to the conventional wisdom about Tech stocks and interest rates, beginning with their desultory relationship in the first ten years following the financial crisis. From 2009 through 2018, changes in the 10-year yield are unable to explain any of the variability in relative Tech returns, though they exhibit a tight correlation beginning in 2019 (Chart 2). Tech stocks were utterly indifferent to the yield spikes of 2009 and 2010-11, as well as the sharp intervening decline in 2010, and only began to separate themselves from the field following the Brexit vote, outperforming the overall S&P 500 by 30 percentage points in just two years while the 10-year yield rose from 1.5% to 3%. They then proceeded to blow away the index as yields fell from 2.75% at the end of 2018 to 0.5% at the mid-2020 COVID bottom and have since fought the index to a draw despite a 100-basis point backup above 1.6%. Chart 2Nothing More Than A Lockdown Fling In contrast to their all-over-the-map relationship with the level of interest rates, Tech stocks have exhibited a consistently tight fit with relative trailing earnings. A quantitatively inclined visitor from outer space viewing Chart 3 might reasonably conclude that relative Tech stock performance is fully explained by earnings, and all other variables are noise. The series have moved nearly in lockstep with each other and show that Tech’s relative trailing P/E multiple has been quite stable since the crisis. Until relative prices and relative earnings began heading in separate ways as the latter began to slip this Spring, Tech’s relative post-crisis outperformance had entirely been earned, not given. Chart 3Case Closed? Multiples provide an opportunity for interest rate changes to re-enter the discussion. In a direct sense, Tech earnings are comparatively immune to moves in interest rates (the sector’s biggest constituents have immaterial amounts of debt and do not sell big-ticket items that have to be financed), though one might expect the price investors are willing to pay to claim a share of their comparatively backloaded future cash flows may well fluctuate with them. Chart 4, however, shows that the Tech sector’s relative forward multiple has not exhibited a consistent relationship with rates – the correlation between multiples and rates was positive and fairly strong from 2009 through 2018 but weakened and turned negative beginning in 2019. From 1995, when the forward multiple series began, through 2008 (not shown in the chart) the relationship was very weak and negative, generating an r-squared of just 1.4%. Chart 4Defying The Duration Intuition The relationship between relative four-quarter forward earnings expectations and the 10-year yield sheds some light on how so many observers have been hoodwinked into mistaking correlation for causation. Excepting stretches at the beginning and the end of the 2009-2018 period, when relative forward estimates paid no heed to swings in interest rates, they exhibited a modest negative correlation with the 10-year yield (Chart 5). They moved together with one mind across all of 2020, but that solidarity appears anomalous when viewed against the entire post-crisis record generally and the years that bracket it specifically. In 2018-19, the two years preceding peak pandemic conditions, and 2021, the year following them, Tech’s relative forward earnings expectations have been flatly indifferent to the rate backdrop. Chart 5One-Off We submit that the recently observed tight correlation between the 10-year yield and relative forward earnings expectations is an isolated pandemic phenomenon. As bond yields plunged in 2020 due to extraordinary monetary accommodation and fears of a worst-case economic outcome, Tech’s heavy concentration of pandemic winners shot the lights out in terms of actual and projected earnings. Away from the narrow 2020 sample, however, the other twelve years of post-crisis data suggest that there’s no relationship between forward earnings expectations and interest rates. Tech outearned the broader market at a steady rate for the ten years preceding the pandemic without regard for the rates market’s gyrations. Investment Implications Interest rates are a red herring for explaining variations in relative Tech stock performance. The ubiquity of the view that Tech stocks’ relative performance will be heavily influenced by changes in interest rates turns out to be another instance in which something everybody knows turns out not to be true. This finding does not make us Tech bulls; we think the big-picture backdrop is sufficiently mixed to justify our US Equity Strategy and Global Asset Allocation services’ neutral recommendations. We simply wanted to call out the flaws in a popular notion before it becomes even more entrenched. Changes in interest rates do not solely effect equity prices via a denominator effect. They impact the numerator as well. The numerator impacts are multifaceted and vary based on which factor comes to the fore in a given instance. They are much harder to anticipate and therefore hold much more promise for investors who can suss them out in advance. The denominator effect is immediately apparent to any undergraduate who has been introduced to the time value of money and therefore isn’t likely to generate alpha. What’s more, as Tech stocks’ relative performance history illustrates, the relationship between equities and rates is not fixed. The rise of globalization and the Fed’s post-Volcker inflation vigilance ushered in a multi-decade disinflationary trend that ultimately culminated in rampant deflation fears following the global financial crisis. Now that concerns about stagflation have shunted aside concerns about secular stagnation, investors are much less likely to cheer rate backups while wringing their hands over rate declines. As Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s Chief Emerging Markets strategist, has written, the about-face in market perceptions of interest rates could flip the correlations between equity prices and interest rates from positive (stocks advance as rising interest rates are perceived as evidence of economic improvement) to negative (stocks fall when rates rise and rise when rates fall). Our colleague Jonathan LaBerge, managing editor of the Bank Credit Analyst, has noted that extended valuations increase growth stocks’ vulnerability to rising interest rates. We do not disagree, but they do not have all that much to fear if the backup in Treasury yields is in line with our US Bond Strategy service’s year-end 2021 and 2022 targets of 1.75% and 2-2.25%, respectively. Tech’s outperformance may well have run its course – relative performance is extended, the law of large numbers makes it increasingly difficult to sustain historic growth rates, the legal and regulatory outlook is darkening and a shift from pandemic winners to pandemic losers may be in train – but rising rates alone are not a good basis for trimming Tech exposures. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to a parallel shift in the yield curve, but we use the 10-year Treasury yield as a proxy for the entire curve in our simple regressions of asset class returns against price changes.
