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Special Report

Executive Summary Autocracy Hurts Productivity Over the next six-to-18 months, the Xi Jinping administration will “let 100 flowers bloom” – i.e., relax a range of government policies to secure China’s economic recovery from the pandemic. The first signs of this policy are already apparent via monetary and fiscal easing and looser regulation of Big Tech. However, investors should treat any risk-on rally in Chinese stocks with skepticism over the long run. Political risk and policy uncertainty will remain high until after Xi consolidates power this fall. Xi is highly likely to remain in office but uncertainty over other personnel – and future national policy – will be substantial. Next year China’s policy trajectory will become clearer. But global investors should avoid mistaking temporary improvements for a change of Xi’s strategy or China’s grand strategy. Beijing is driven by instability and insecurity to challenge the US-led world order. The result will be continued economic divorce and potentially military conflicts in the coming decade. Russia’s reversion to autocracy led to falling productivity and poor equity returns. China is also reverting to autocratic government as a solution to its domestic challenges. Western investors should limit long-term exposure to China and prefer markets that benefit from China’s recovery, such as in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Bottom Line: The geopolitical risk premium in Chinese equities will stay high in 2022, fall in 2023, but then rise again as global investors learn that China in the Xi Jinping era is fundamentally unstable and insecure. Feature Chart 1Market Cheers China's Hints At Policy Easing In 1957, after nearly a decade at the helm of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman Mao Zedong initiated the “Hundred Flowers Campaign.” The campaign allowed a degree of political freedom to try to encourage new ideas and debate among China’s intellectuals. The country’s innovative forces had suffered from decades of foreign invasion, civil war, and repression. Within three years, Mao reversed course, reimposed ideological discipline, and punished those who had criticized the party.  It turned out that the new communist regime could not maintain political control while allowing liberalization in the social and economic spheres.1 This episode is useful to bear in mind in 2022 as General Secretary Xi Jinping restores autocratic government in China. In the coming year, Xi will ease a range of policies to promote economic growth and innovation. Already his administration is relaxing some regulatory pressure on Big Tech. Global financial markets are cheering this apparent policy improvement (Chart 1). In effect, Xi is preparing to let 100 flowers bloom. However, China’s economic trajectory remains gloomy over the long run – not least because the US and China lack a strategic basis for re-engagement. Chinese Leaders Fear Foreign Encroachments Mao’s predicament was not only one of ideology and historical circumstance. It was also one of China’s geopolitics. Chinese governments have always struggled to establish domestic control, extend that control over far-flung buffer territories, and impose limits on foreign encroachments. Mao reversed his brief attempt at liberalization because he could not feel secure in his person or his regime. In 1959, the Chinese economy remained backward. The state faced challenges in administration and in buffer spaces like Tibet and Taiwan. The American military loomed large, despite the stalemate and ceasefire on the Korean peninsula in 1952. Russia was turning against Stalinism, while Hungary was revolting against the Soviet Union. Mao feared that the free exchange of ideas would do more to undermine national unity than it would to promote industrialization and technological progress. The 100 flowers that bloomed – intellectuals criticizing government policy – revealed themselves to be insufficiently loyal. They could be culled, strengthening the regime. However, what followed was a failed economic program and nationwide famine. Fast forward to today, when circumstances have changed but the Chinese state faces the same geopolitical insecurities. Xi Jinping, like all Chinese rulers, is struggling to maintain domestic stability and territorial integrity while regulating foreign influence. Although the People’s Republic is not as vulnerable as it was in Mao’s time, it is increasingly vulnerable – namely, to a historic downshift in potential economic growth and a rise in international tensions (Chart 2). The Xi administration has repeatedly shown that it views the US alliance system, US-led global monetary and financial system, and western liberal ideology as threats that need to be counteracted. Chart 2China: Less Stable, Less Secure In addition, Russia’s difficulties invading Ukraine suggest that China faces an enormous challenge in attempting to carve out its own sphere of influence without shattering its economic stability. Hence Beijing needs to slow the pace of confrontation with the West while pursuing the same strategic aims. Xi Stays, But Policy Uncertainty Still High In 2022  2022 is a critical political juncture for China. Xi was supposed to step down and hand the baton to a successor chosen by his predecessor Hu Jintao. Instead he has spent the past decade arranging to remain in power until at least 2032. He took a big stride toward this goal at the nineteenth national party congress in 2017, when he assumed the title of “core leader” of the Communist Party and removed term limits from its constitution. This year’s Omicron outbreak and abrupt economic slowdown have raised speculation about whether Xi’s position is secure. Some of this speculation is wild – but China is far less stable than it appears. Structurally, inequality is high, social mobility is low, and growth is slowing, forcing the new middle class to compromise its aspirations. Cyclically, unemployment is rising and the Misery Index is higher than it appears if one focuses on youth employment and fuel inflation (Chart 3). The risk of sociopolitical upheaval is underrated among global investors. Chart 3AStructurally China Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Chart 3BCyclically China Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Yet even assuming that social unrest and political dissent flare up, Xi is highly likely to clinch another five-to-ten years in power. Consider the following points: The top leaders control personnel decisions. The national party congress is often called an “election,” but that is a misnomer. The Communist Party’s top posts will be ratified, not elected. The Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee select the members of the Central Committee; the national party congress convenes to ratify these new members. The Central Committee then ratifies the line-up of the new Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, which is orchestrated by Xi along with the existing Politburo Standing Committee (Diagram 1). Xi is the most important figure in deciding the new leadership. Diagram 1Mechanics Of The Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress There is no history of surprise votes. The party congress ratifies approximately 90% of the candidates put forward. Outcomes closely conform to predictions of external analysts, meaning that the leadership selection is not a spontaneous, grassroots process but rather a mechanical, elite-driven process with minimal influence from low-level party members, not to mention the population at large.2  The party and state control the levers of power: The Communist Party has control over the military, state bureaucracy, and “commanding heights” of the economy. This includes domestic security forces, energy, communications, transportation, and the financial system. Whoever controls the Communist Party and central government exerts heavy influence over provincial governments and non-government institutions. The state bureaucracy is not in a position to oppose the party leadership. Xi has conducted a decade-long political purge (“anti-corruption campaign”). Upon coming to power in 2012, Xi initiated a neo-Maoist campaign to re-centralize power in his own person, in the Communist Party, and in the central government. He has purged foreign influence along with rivals in the party, state, military, business, civil society, and Big Tech. He personally controls the military, the police, the paramilitary forces, the intelligence and security agencies, and the top Communist Party organs. There may be opposition but it is not organized or capable. Chart 4China: Big Tech Gets Relief ... For Now There are no serious alternatives to Xi’s leadership. Xi is widely recognized within China as the “core” of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders. The other leaders and their factions have been repressed. Xi imprisoned his top rivals, Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, a decade ago. He has since neutralized their followers and the factions of previous leaders Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Premier Li Keqiang has never exercised any influence and will retire at the end of this year. None of the ousted figures have reemerged to challenge Xi, but potential rivals have been imprisoned or disciplined, as have prominent figures that pose no direct political threat, such as tech entrepreneur Jack Ma (Chart 4).  Additional high-level sackings are likely before the party congress. China’s reversion to autocracy grew from Communist Party elites, not Xi alone. China’s slowing potential GDP growth and changing economic model raise an existential threat to the Communist Party over the long run. The party recognized its potential loss of legitimacy back in 2012, the year Xi was slated to take the helm. The solution was to concentrate power in the center, promoting Maoist nostalgia and strongman rule. In essence, the party needed a new Mao; Xi was all too willing to play the part. Hence Xi’s current position does not rest on his personal maneuvers alone. The party has invested heavily in Xi and will continue to do so. Characteristics of the political elite underpin the autocratic shift. Statistics on the evolving character traits of Politburo members show the trend toward leaders that are more rural, more bureaucratic, and more ideologically orthodox, i.e. more nationalist and communist (Chart 5). This trend underpins the party’s behavior and Xi’s personal rule. Chart 5China: From Technocracy To Autocracy Chart 6China: De-Industrialization Undermines Stability Xi has guarded his left flank. By cornering the hard left of the political spectrum Xi has positioned himself as the champion of poor people, workers, farmers, soldiers, and common folk. This is the political base of the Communist Party, as opposed to the rich coastal elites and westernizing capitalists, who stand to suffer from Xi’s policies. Ultimately de-industrialization – e.g. the sharp decline in manufacturing and construction sectors (Chart 6) – poses a major challenge to this narrative. But social unrest will be repressed and will not overturn Xi or the regime anytime soon. Xi still retains political capital. After centuries of instability, Chinese households are averse to upheaval, civil war, and chaos. They support the current regime because it has stabilized China and made it prosperous. Of course, relative to the Hu Jintao era, Xi’s policies have produced slower growth and productivity and a tarnished international image (Chart 7). But they have not yet led to massive instability that would alienate the people in general. If Chinese citizens look abroad, they see that Xi has already outlasted US Presidents Obama and Trump, is likely to outlast Biden, and that US politics are in turmoil. The same goes for Europe, Japan, and Russia – Xi’s leadership does not suffer by comparison.  Chart 7China’s Declining International Image External actors are neither willing nor able to topple Xi. Any outside attempt to interfere with China’s leadership or political system would be unwarranted and would provoke an aggressive response. The US is internally divided and has not developed a consistent China policy. This year the Biden administration has its hands full with midterm elections, Russia, and Iran, where it must also accept the current leadership as a fact of life. It has no ability to prevent Xi’s power consolidation, though it will impose punitive economic measures. Japan and other US allies have an interest in undermining Xi’s administration, but they follow the US’s lead in foreign policy. They also lack influence over the political rotation within the Communist Party. The Europeans will keep their distance but will not try to antagonize China given their more pressing conflict with Russia. Russia needs China more than ever and will lend material support in the form of cheaper and more secure natural resources. North Korean and Iranian nuclear provocations will help Xi stay under the radar.  There is no reason to expect a new leader to take over in China. The Xi administration’s strategy, revealed over the past ten years, will remain intact for another five-to-ten years at least. The real question at the party congress is whether Xi will be forced to name a successor or compromise with the opposing faction on the personnel of the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. But even that remains to be seen – and either way he will remain the paramount leader. Bottom Line: Xi Jinping has the political capability to cement another five-to-ten years in power. Opposing factions have been weakened over the past decade by Xi’s domestic political purge and clash with the United States. China is ripe for social unrest and political dissent but these will be repressed as China goes further down the path of autocracy. Foreign powers have little influence over the process. Policy Uncertainty Falls In 2023 … Only To Rise Again What will Xi Jinping do once he consolidates power? Xi’s administration has weighed heavily on China’s economy, foreign relations, and financial markets. The situation has worsened dramatically this year as the economy struggles with “A Trifecta Of Economic Woes” – namely a rampant pandemic, waning demand for exports, and a faltering housing market (Chart 8). In response the administration is now easing a range of policies to stabilize expectations and try to meet the 5.5% annual growth target. The money impulse, and potentially the credit impulse, is turning less negative, heralding an eventual upturn in industrial activity and import volumes in 2023. These measures will give a boost to Chinese and global growth, although stimulus measures are losing effectiveness over time (Chart 9).  Chart 8China's Trifecta Of Economic Woes Chart 9More Stimulus, But Less Effectiveness This pro-growth policy pivot will continue through the year and into next year. After all, if Xi is going to stay in power, he does not want to bequeath himself a financial crisis or recession at the start of his third term. Still, investors should treat any rally in Chinese equity markets with skepticism. First, political risk and uncertainty will remain elevated until Xi completes his power grab, as China is highly susceptible to surprises and negative political incidents this year (Chart 10). For example, if social unrest emerges and is repressed, then the West will impose sanctions. If China increases its support of Russia, Iran, or North Korea, then the US will impose sanctions.     Chart 10China: Policy Uncertainty And Geopolitical Risk To Stay High In 2022, Might Improve In 2023 Chart 11China Needs To Court Europe The regime will be extremely vigilant and overreact to any threats this year, real or perceived. Political objectives will remain paramount, above the economy and financial markets, and that means new economic policy initiatives will not be reliable. Investors cannot be confident about the country’s policy direction until the leadership rotation is complete and new policy guidance is revealed, particularly in December 2022 and March 2023. Second, after consolidating power, investors should interpret Xi’s policy shift as “letting 100 flowers bloom,” i.e., a temporary relaxation that aims to reboot the economy but does not change the country’s long-term policy trajectory. Economic reopening is inevitable after the pandemic response is downgraded – which is a political determination. Xi will also be forced to reduce foreign tensions for the sake of the economy, particularly by courting Europe, which is three times larger than Russia as a market (Chart 11). However, China’s declining labor force and high debt levels prevent its periodic credit stimulus from generating as much economic output as in the past. And the administration will not ultimately pursue liberal structural reforms and a more open economy. That is the path toward foreign encroachment – and regime insecurity. The US’s sanctions on Russia have shown the consequences of deep dependency on the West. China will continue diversifying away from the US. And, as we will see, the US cannot provide credible promises that it will reduce tensions. US-China: Re-Engagement Will Fail The Biden administration is focused on fighting inflation ahead of the midterm elections. But its confrontation with Russia – and likely failure to freeze Iran’s nuclear program – increases rather than decreases oil supply constraints. Hence some administration officials and outside observers argue that the administration should pursue a strategic re-engagement with China.3  Theoretically a US-China détente would buy both countries time to deal with their domestic politics by providing some international stability. Improved US-China relations could also isolate Russia and hasten a resolution to the war in Ukraine, potentially reducing commodity price pressures. In essence, a US-China détente would reprise President Richard Nixon’s outreach to China in 1972, benefiting both countries at the expense of Russia.4  This kind of Kissinger 2.0 maneuver could happen but there are good reasons to think it will not, or if it does that it will fall apart in one or two years. In 1972, China had nowhere near the capacity to deny the US access to the Asia Pacific region, expel US influence from neighboring countries, reconquer Taiwan, or project power elsewhere. Today, China is increasingly gaining these abilities. In fact it is the only power in the world capable of rivaling the US in both economic and military terms over the long run (Chart 12). Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently outlined the Biden administration’s China policy and declared that China poses “the most serious long-term challenge” to the US despite Russian aggression.5  Chart 12US-China Competition Sows Distrust, Drives Economic Divorce While another decade of US engagement with China would benefit the US economy, it would be far more beneficial to China. Crucially, it would be beneficial in a strategic sense, not just an economic one. It could provide just the room for maneuver that China needs – at this critical juncture in its development – to achieve technological and productivity breakthroughs and escape the middle-income trap. Another ten-year reprieve from direct American competition would set China up to challenge the US on the global stage. That would be far too high of a strategic price for America to pay for a ceasefire in Ukraine. Ukraine has limited strategic value for the US and it does not steer US grand strategy, which aims to prevent regional empires from taking shape. In fact Washington is deliberately escalating and prolonging the war in Ukraine to drain Russia’s resources. Ending the war would do Russia a strategic favor, while re-engaging with China would do China a strategic favor. So why would the defense and intelligence community advise the Biden administration to pursue Kissinger 2.0? Chart 13US Unlikely To Revoke Trump Tariffs Biden could still pursue some degree of détente with China, namely by repealing President Trump’s trade tariffs, in order to relieve price pressures ahead of the midterm election. Yet even here the case is deeply flawed. Trump’s tariffs on China did not trigger the current inflationary bout. That was the combined Trump-Biden fiscal stimulus and Covid-era supply constraints. US import prices are rising faster from the rest of the world than they are from China (Chart 13). Tariff relief would not change China’s Zero Covid policy, which is the current driver of price spikes from China. And while lifting tariffs on China would not reduce inflation enough to attract voters, it would cost Biden some political credit among voters in swing states like Pennsylvania, and across the US, where China’s image has plummeted in the wake of Covid-19 (Chart 14).   Chart 14US Political Consensus Remains Hawkish On China If Biden did pursue détente, would China be able to reciprocate and offer trade concessions? Xi has the authority to do so but he is unlikely to make major trade concessions prior to the party congress. Economic self-sufficiency and resistance to American pressure have become pillars of his support. Promises will not ease inflation for US voters in November and Xi has no incentive to make binding concessions because the next US administration could intensify the trade war regardless.  Bottom Line: The US has no long-term interest, and a limited short-term interest, in easing pressure on China’s economy. Continued US pressure, combined with China’s internal difficulties, will reinforce Xi Jinping’s shift toward nationalism and hawkish foreign policy. Hence there is little basis for a substantial US-China re-engagement that improves the global macroeconomic environment over the coming years. Investment Takeaways Chart 15Autocracy Hurts Productivity Xi Jinping will clinch another five-to-ten years in power this fall. To stabilize the economy, he will “let 100 flowers bloom” and ease monetary, fiscal, regulatory, and social policy at home. He will also court the West, especially Europe, for the sake of economic growth. However, he will not go so far as to compromise his ultimate aims: self-sufficiency at home and a sphere of influence abroad. The result will be a relapse into conflict with the West within a year or two. Ultimately a closed Chinese economy in conflict with the West will result in lower productivity, a weaker currency, a high geopolitical risk premium, and low equity returns – just as it did for Russia (Chart 15). Any short-term improvement in China’s low equity multiples will ultimately be capped. Over the long run, western investors should hedge against Chinese geopolitical risk by preferring markets that benefit from China’s periodic stimulus yet do not suffer from the break-up of the US-China and EU-Russia economic relationships, such as key markets in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Charts 16 & 17). Chart 16China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For … Latin America Chart 17China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For … Southeast Asia     Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Modern scholarship has shown that Mao intended to entrap the opposition through the 100 Flowers Campaign. For a harrowing account of this episode, see Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), pp. 409-17. 2     “At least 8% of CPC Central Committee nominees voted off,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, english.www.gov.cn. 3    Christopher Condon, “Yellen Says Biden Team Is Looking To ‘Reconfigure’ China Tariffs,” June 8, 2022, www.bloomberg.com. 4       Niall Ferguson, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Détente And Engage With China,” Bloomberg, June 5, 2022, www.bloomberg.com. 5    See Antony J Blinken, Secretary of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” George Washington University, Washington D.C., May 26, 2022, state.gov. Additionally, see President Joe Biden’s third assertion of US willingness to defend Taiwan against China, in a joint press conference with Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference,” Akasaka Palace, Tokyo, Japan, May 23, 2022, whitehouse.gov.

Executive Summary Is Relative Inflation Peaking In The US? The dollar has likely peaked in the near term. An unwinding of speculative bets, based on structurally higher inflation in the US, is the key driver (Feature Chart). Our theme of central bank convergence continues to play out. Rates in the euro area are headed higher. The next bet for higher rates is in Japan. The key for picking currency winners will be global growth barometers. The US dollar embeds a huge safety premium that will be eroded as we get more clarity on global growth and inflation. RECOMMENDATIONS INCEPTION LEVEL inception date RETURN Short DXY 104.80 2022-05-13 2.22   Bottom Line: We are short the DXY index as of 104.8. We recommend sticking with this position. Feature The dollar very much remains well bid (Chart 1). But the macroeconomic environment that has helped the dollar is likely to reverse. As inflation in the US cools, especially relative to other DM economies, the policy divergence between the US and other economies will move in the opposite direction (Chart 2 and Chart 3).  Chart 1Long Dollar Positions Still Profitable Chart 2Is Relative Inflation Peaking In The US Chart 3The Dollar And Interest Rates Last month, we posited that interest rate differentials played a key role in pushing the dollar higher but have not been the sole factor. The safe-haven premium in the DXY is around 8-10%. That premium will remain if growth concerns are at the forefront of investors’ minds but will evaporate otherwise. Over the last few weeks, we have had a few surprises from central banks, notably the ECB and the RBA. In this Month-In-Review, we go over our current currency thinking, and implications for portfolio strategy. US Dollar: Peak Hawkishness? Chart 4Is Inflation Peaking In The US The dollar DXY index is up 7.4% year to date. However, over the last month, there has been a big reversal in the dollar, down 1.5% month-to-date. As a momentum currency, technical forces are moving against the greenback. Incoming data for the US remains robust, but a peak in inflation expectations, that will temper the pace of Fed interest rate hikes, has been driving dollar momentum. Headline CPI is expected to come in at 8.3% in May, while the core measure should decelerate to 5.9%. It is possible that these numbers surprise to the downside. For example, used car prices, an important contribution to US CPI, are rolling over sharply (panel 2). Overall, supply-side price pressures appear to be easing (panel 3). The US added 390K jobs in May, so the employment report remains robust. Encouragingly, the participation rate is also picking up. This suggests the US can absorb more willing workers before we see additional upward pressure in wage growth. We are closely watching the Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker (panel 4). The ISM manufacturing index had a solid print of 56.1 in May, but the prices paid index dipped from 84.6 to 82.2. As we highlighted above, these developments have sapped market expectations for aggressive interest rate increases in the US relative to other G10 countries. Speculative froth in the dollar is also unwinding (panel 5). We went short the DXY index at 104.8, with a stop loss at 107. We recommend sticking with this position.  The Euro: A European Soft Landing? Chart 5The Euro Has Priced A Recession The euro is down 6.6% year-to-date. Over the last month, the euro is up 0.7%. The ECB cemented the fact that interest rates are headed higher this week. With a mandate of taming inflation, the central bank faces a tough job of reigning in price pressures, while engineering a soft landing in the economy. From the perspective of the euro, it is our view that most of the downside risks to this scenario have been priced in, while upside surprises have not (panel 1). Incoming data from the euro area has been improving. The Sentix Investor Confidence index ticked up in June. Energy prices remain high, but momentum has been softening. The ZEW expectations survey also delivered an upside surprise in May. The key point from an FX perspective is that the euro has already priced a recession in the European economy, but no prospect of a soft landing. That is positive from a contrarian perspective. With HICP inflation at 8.1% (panel 2), emergency monetary settings are no longer required, and the ECB should lift rates. As we suggested last month, a “least regrets” approach will gently nudge rates higher to address inflationary pressures but pay attention to cyclical sectors of the economy (panel 3). It is important to remember that interest rates in the eurozone are still at -0.5%. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyMonth In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar We remain long EUR/GBP on the prospect that the ECB could better engineer a soft landing, compared to the BoE. We also remain sellers of the EUR/JPY cross. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY will collapse. In a Goldilocks scenario, the cross has already priced in a much stronger global economy (panel 4). This is also a perfect hedge for a pro-cyclical currency positioning. The Japanese Yen: Back To Carry Trades Chart 6The Yen Will Soon Bottom The Japanese yen is down 14.3% year-to-date, the worst performing G10 currency this year. Over the last month, the yen is down 2.9%. The yen is a classic case of the risks of fighting the trend in currency markets (panel 1). That said we remain buyers, rather than sellers, on weakness. The drivers of the yen have been very clear and absolute. First, rising interest rates abroad, as we saw this week, have put selling pressure on the JPY (panel 2), given the BoJ will maintain yield curve control. Second, the pickup in energy prices continues to deflate the Japanese trade balance. These are negative shocks that are likely to continue inflicting pain on yen long positions in the near term. From a contrarian perspective, there is solace for yen bulls. First, it is the cheapest G10 currency according to our PPP models. It also happens to be one of the most heavily shorted currencies, according to CFTC data (panel 4). In terms of data, there have also been positive surprises over the last month. The Eco Watcher’s Survey surprised to the upside. PMIs have rebounded above 50. Inflation is above the 2% target and should keep rising. Machinery orders are picking up. The Bank of Japan is likely to stay dovish next week but that is largely priced in. Meanwhile, the BoJ will have no choice but to pivot if inflationary pressures prove stronger than they anticipate, and/or the output gap in Japan closes much faster as demand recovers. We have no active position on the yen right now but will be buyers on weakness.  British Pound: Sterling And A Policy Mistake Chart 7Cable Is At Risk Near Term The pound is down 7.6% year to date. Over the last month, the pound is up by 1.3%. We wrote a report on sterling last week. In our view, sterling faces headwinds in the near term but is likely to be a profitable long position for investors with a more structural view. First, the deterioration in the UK’s trade balance is cyclical and not structural. Fuels constitute 11% of UK imports so higher energy prices are affecting the balance of trade. This will soon reverse. Second, goods imports have picked up, but it is encouraging that a huge share has been machinery and transport equipment. Inflation remains a problem in England, with CPI at 9%. In our view, while sterling is pricing in a policy mistake by the BoE – tightening too fast into a slowing economy, our bias is that the BoE can engineer a soft landing for the economy. Only one-third of the rise in UK inflation has been driven by demand-side pull, with the balance related to supply-side factors. The latter have been the usual suspects – rising energy costs, supply shortages, and even legacies of the Brexit shock (Chart 10). These could ease going forward. We are currently long EUR/GBP. This cross still heavily underprices the risks to the UK economy in the near term. However, if recession fears ease, our suspicion is that cable is poised for a coiled spring rebound.  Canadian Dollar: The BoC Will Stay Hawkish Chart 8CAD Should Benefit From Terms Of Trade The CAD is down 0.6% year to date. Over the last month, it is up 2.4%. The CAD has been the best performing G10 currency this year after the DXY, and the key drivers of loonie strength will persist. First, the CAD will benefit from a terms-of-trade boost, given it is trading at a discount to prevailing oil prices. Second, the BoC will stay hawkish, having hiked interest rates by 50 bps last month, and telegraphing more tightening going forward. Economic data out of Canada suggests tighter monetary policy is warranted. Both headline and core inflation remain strong, with headline inflation at 6.8% in April. The common, trim, and median inflation prints were at 3.2%, 5.1%, and 4.4%, respectively, well above the BoC’s target. This continues to suggest inflationary pressures in Canada are broad based (panel 2). House prices are rolling over so the wealth effect could temper hawkishness from the BoC. However, recent speeches from policy officials have highlighted a need to tame housing price pressures in Canada (panel 4). We remain buyers of the CAD on a lower dollar but are monitoring risks from a tightening in financial conditions.     New Zealand Dollar: Will Weaken At The Crosses Chart 9The RBNZ Is Trying To Engineer A Soft Landing The NZD is down 6.6% this year. Over the last month, the kiwi is down 1.0%. The RBNZ hiked interest rates by 50 bps in May, taking the overnight rate to 2%. This seems to be having the intended effect, with house price inflation rolling over as mortgage rates adjust higher. This “least regrets” approach is likely to continue in the short term. The labor market is extremely tight, with a shortage of high skilled labor given immigration has slowed. This is leading to substantial wage increases. As such, the RBNZ has been increasing guidance for annual CPI inflation, and therefore, interest rates, raising its overnight projection for June 2023 to 3.9% from 2.8%. There is reason to believe the RBNZ will tone down its hawkish rhetoric. For one, terms of trade are softening. Dairy prices, circa 20% of exports, are down 1% this month after reaching a 10-year high in May. A domestic slowdown is also likely to nudge the RBNZ toward more accommodation. In a nutshell, the kiwi has upside versus the dollar, but will underperform at the crosses.        Australian Dollar: Our Top Pick Against The Dollar Chart 10The RBA Will Continue To Hike The Australian dollar is down 2.3% year to date. Over the last month, the AUD is up 2%. The Reserve Bank of Australia raised interest rates by 50 bps this week, a surprise to markets, but in line with the hawkish tone telegraphed in prior meetings. Inflation in Australia is surprising to the upside. Meanwhile, unemployment remains well below NAIRU. As a result, an exit from emergency monetary settings makes sense. The key will be whether the RBA can engineer a soft landing in the Aussie economy. Job gains remain robust, and both the unemployment rate and the participation rate are at healthy levels. Terms of trade are holding up, and wage gains are improving. Home prices are rolling over, but it is a welcome development as the RBA is trying to calibrate financial conditions. We are long the AUD as of 72 cents. The big concern for this trade is China, and the potential for renewed lockdowns that will hurt the external balance. As such, we expect this trade to be volatile near-term, but pay off over a longer horizon.        Swiss Franc: A Safe Haven Chart 11The SNB Will Stay Constructive On The Franc The Swiss franc is down 7% year-to-date, but up versus the dollar over the last month. Swiss economic conditions have been rather resilient. GDP expanded by 0.5% in Q1, slightly above expectations, while industrial production also rose 2.4% in the same period. In April, Switzerland’s trade surplus widened to CHF 3.8bn, boosted by demand for machinery and chemicals. In May, the KOF leading indicator clocked 96.8 and the manufacturing PMI stood at 60, a slowdown month-on-month but still a very healthy reading. Inflation is surprising to the upside in Switzerland. Headline and core CPI growth came in at 2.9% and 1.7% year-on-year in May, respectively. Recently, several SNB board members have voiced the primacy of price stability and preparedness to hike rates if inflation becomes broad based. This has helped support the franc. The market now expects SNB to follow the ECB in removing the NIRP starting in September. But it is always good to remember that the Swiss franc is a defensive currency, so a path to policy normalization still presents upside for EUR/CHF. In our trading book, we are short CHF/SEK, but will take profits if Thomas Jordan proves to be more of an inflationary hawk.   Norwegian Krone: Bullish On A 12-to-18 Month Horizon Chart 12The Norges Bank Will Stay Hawkish NOK is down 8.1% year to date and up 1.5% over the last month. In the three months through March, Norway’s GDP contracted by 1% quarter on quarter, led by drops in private consumption (1.5%), government spending (1.4%), and exports (3.5%). The decline largely reflects restriction measures imposed at the start of the year. That said, economic growth is rebounding and GDP growth will be around 3% in the next 12 months. Meanwhile, the trade surplus remains very healthy at 92.6bn NOK. As a result, the current account surplus hit at an all-time high of 341bn NOK in Q1. From a broader perspective, incoming numbers in Norway reflect a slowdown in global growth. Consumer confidence dropped to the lowest levels since 2016. The manufacturing PMI fell sharply to 54.9 in May, the lowest reading in over a year. Industrial production also decreased by 0.5% month-on-month in April. That said, the labor market continues to tighten. The unemployment rate fell to 1.7% in May, significantly below Norge Bank’s 2% projection. Renewed immigration might help alleviate some of the labor market tightness, but the strength in employment trends is very evident. As a result, our bias is that the committee will stick to its quarterly 25bps hikes, but upside surprises to this baseline are non-trivial. Terms of trade are a tailwind for Norway. In particular, NOK/SEK can be an attractive bet on a 12-month horizon, should oil prices remain firm.  Swedish Krona: Into A Capitulation Phase Chart 13More Hawkish Surprises From The Riksbank The SEK is down 8.7% year to date and up 1.6% over the last month.  Sweden sits right at the crosshairs of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As a result, inflation remains a problem with CPIF at 6.4%, year-over-year in April, above updated projections from Riksbank. The issue is that there are rising risks that inflation will not be transitory, raising the prospect of a policy surprise from the Riksbank. The OIS curve is now pricing in a 1.75% policy rate by year-end. In our view, this will be a baseline scenario. The critical point is whether the Riksbank is on the verge of making a policy mistake. Economic growth is slowing. Swedish GDP contracted by 0.8% in Q1 from the previous quarter. However, if policymakers are overly fixated on inflation, the prospect of grinding the Swedish economy to a halt becomes a rising risk. Major rounds of collective wage negotiations early next year, affecting as much of as 40% of total labor force, is a risk to monitor. There is already some evidence of a slowdown in economic activity. Consumers reported the lowest level of confidence since the Global Financial Crisis. PMIs remain resilient, well above 50 but the risk is to the downside. Should the Chinese credit impulse bottom and supply constraints ease, economic activity will pick up in the second half of the year, but the risk of downside surprises are worth monitoring. The bottom line is that SEK has already priced in much of the negative news and remains undervalued in our models. We are short CHF/SEK on these grounds, a position 1.5% in the money.    Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary Singapore stocks are at risk as an impending contraction in global trade will hurt this very open economy and its markets. The country’s foreign reserves are already shrinking as the balance of payments has slid into deficit. The Monetary Authority of Singapore’s (MAS) attempts to rein in inflation by pushing up the currency is also causing foreign reserves to contract, and local money supply to decelerate sharply. Inflationary pressures in Singapore are not entrenched and will soon subside. Wage growth is under control, and unit labor cost increases are subdued. Singapore’s export competitiveness remains robust; yet that does not preclude it from a period of shrinking exports over the next 6-12 months. Falling exports, shrinking foreign reserves, decelerating money supply and peaking inflation will dissuade MAS from pushing up the Singapore dollar much higher from current levels. Manufacturing Cycles Dictate The Performance Of Singapore Stocks Recommendation Inception Date RETURN Downgrade Singapore stocks from overweight to neutral May 10, 2021 2.3% Bottom Line: Equity investors should reduce their exposure to Singapore stocks in EM and Asian portfolios by downgrading their allocation from overweight to neutral. Absolute return investors should wait for a better entry point. Feature Chart 1Singapore Stocks' Outperformance Is Set To Take A Breather Like most global markets, Singapore stocks have sold off materially since early this year. Relative to EM and Asian counterparts, however, they have fared well – in line with our call back in May 2021 when we upgraded this bourse to overweight (Chart 1). The question is, given the changing macro backdrop − where a whiff of stagflation has permeated global investment landscapes – what should investors now do about this market? We believe that higher inflation in Singapore is a temporary phenomenon and will subside sooner rather than later. Contracting global trade, on the other hand, is a much more vital risk for this very open economy and its equity markets; and is a reason to downgrade this bourse. Indeed, Singapore stocks in absolute US dollar terms face more downside over the next several months. Relative to its EM and Asian counterparts also, this bourse’s outperformance is likely to take a breather.  Asian and EM equity portfolios would therefore do well to downgrade this market by a notch from overweight to neutral in EM and Asian equity baskets. Absolute return investors should stay on the sidelines for now. Unfavorable Settings Contracting global trade and tightening liquidity will weigh on Singapore stocks in the months ahead. Global trade volumes will fall as developed countries’ demand for goods (ex-auto) shrinks following the pandemic-era binge. Chinese growth will also likely be struggling to recover. What this means is that both global manufacturing and exports are heading towards a contraction. As a very open economy where goods exports make up 115% of GDP (and services exports another 55%), manufacturing and exports of goods drive income for the entire Singaporean economy and influence its stock market cycles. Chart 2 shows how ebbs and flows in manufacturing new orders dictate Singapore’s equity market performances. Chart 2Manufacturing Cycles Dictate The Performance Of Singapore Stocks The performances of financial and real estate stocks, which make up two-thirds of the MSCI Singapore index, are also highly dependent on business cycles − which in turn, are driven by swings in manufacturing and exports (Chart 3). One reason for that is, at 23% of GDP, manufacturing is the single largest sector in the economy. By comparison, finance and insurance make up 14% of the nation’s output, and real estate 3%. Any acceleration or deceleration in manufacturing activity therefore has a strong impact on the performance of tertiary sectors, including those of banking and real estate. In addition, MAS’ tightening is causing local money supply to decelerate (discussed in more detail later). Slower money growth is never bullish for stock prices (Chart 4). Chart 3Banks And Real Estate Stocks Also Move With Manufacturing And Exports Chart 4Decelerating Money Supply Is A Bad Omen For Share Prices   In sum, given the changing global macro backdrop of slowing manufacturing and trade, and elevated US inflation, Singapore stocks have not yet found a sustainable bottom in absolute terms. Relative to their EM counterparts, Singapore’s outperformance could also take a breather. During periods of weakening global trade and manufacturing, Singapore stocks usually do poorly relative to their EM peers. The top panel of Chart 5 shows US manufacturing PMI new orders as decelerating rapidly. Periods of falling and/or sub-50 PMI prints usually herald Singapore stocks’ underperformance relative to EM, with a few months lag. Singapore’s own new export orders are also about to slip into contraction territory. If history is any guide, this too entails a period of underperformance of this bourse versus EM going forward (Chart 5, bottom panel). Is Inflation Genuine In Singapore? The short answer is no; there is little genuine inflation in Singapore. The country is not witnessing any wage-price spiral either, unlike in the US. What we see there instead is just a one-off surge in inflation. Average monthly wages in Singapore have accelerated in the past year but are not out of line when compared to the past 20 years (Chart 6, top panel). Chart 5Weakening Manufacturing Orders Foreshadow Singapore Equities' Underperformance Chart 6Limited Wage Growth And Subdued Unit Labor Costs Will Rein In Inflationary Pressures   A controlled rise in wages has helped keep Singaporean firms’ unit labor costs (ULCs) in check. The middle panel of Chart 6 shows ULCs for the overall economy vis-à-vis the consumer price index. ULCs are much below pre-pandemic levels. This happens to be the case even in the service sector of the economy where productivity gains are much harder to achieve. In the goods producing sector, where productivity gains are relatively easier to achieve, ULCs have remained particularly low (Chart 6, bottom two panels). What this means is that firms are facing little wage-related cost pressures. They are, therefore, less likely to pass it on to customers via higher selling prices. That, in turn, will help cap inflationary pressures in the economy. Chart 7Sharply Slowing Money Growth Points To Peaking Inflation In fact, much of the recent rise in headline and core consumer inflation in Singapore has had to do with the explosive money growth seen during the pandemic. Both narrow (M1) and broad money (M3) growth rates in Singapore accelerated in 2020 to levels not seen since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Inflation usually follows money growth with several months lag, and this time was no different. That said, both measures of money have since decelerated markedly this year. This will rein in inflationary pressures going forward (Chart 7).  Looking forward, money supply itself will likely decelerate further in the months ahead. A critical reason for that is the manner in which the central bank (MAS) uses the currency to achieve its monetary policy objectives (i.e., to maintain price stability).   When inflation rises, MAS typically guides the trade-weighted Singapore dollar to appreciate, in an attempt to rein in inflation. In so doing, MAS buys local currency and sells foreign currency. This reduces local liquidity and money supply. Chart 8 shows that MAS is indeed guiding the Singapore dollar up: the trade weighted currency has risen by over 3% in the past six months tracking inflation. Not surprisingly, money growth in Singapore has decelerated meaningfully. In time, that will help pull inflation lower. There was an external factor too. In the past couple of years, the country had witnessed a massive improvement in its balance of payments (BoP). It skyrocketed from a minus 3% of GDP in 2019 to a plus 27% in 2021. To prevent the currency from surging, the central bank had resorted to a rapid accumulation of foreign reserves. As MAS pumped local currency into the system while purchasing foreign currencies, local money supply boomed (Chart 9). Chart 8In Order To Check Inflation, The MAS Has Pushed The Singapore Dollar Up... Chart 9...Causing Foreign Reserves To Drop, And Money Supply To Decelerate Materially Chart 10The Trade Surplus Will Narrow, Putting More Pressure On The Balance Of Payments But the tide has turned this year. The trade surplus has rolled over and will continue to shrink as global trade is set to weaken further this year as explained above. As such, Singapore’s current account surplus will also likely roll over. The capital account has already slipped back into massive deficits; so has the BoP (Chart 10). The upshot is that foreign reserves have begun to contract. This means MAS is now selling foreign reserves to buy back local currency. This is causing a deceleration in local money supply (Chart 9, above). In sum, the absence of meaningful wage pressures, a decelerating money supply, and a strengthening currency will help Singapore see its inflation ease sooner than in the US. Can Singapore Withstand A Stronger Currency? As discussed above, Singapore’s monetary policy entails tackling higher inflation by letting the Singapore dollar appreciate in nominal terms. But given the high inflation prints, an appreciating currency would mean that it gets even stronger in real terms (i.e., in inflation-adjusted terms). An expensive currency in real terms could erode competitiveness. So, the question is, can the Singapore economy withstand a stronger currency? The short answer is yes. Chart 11 shows that while the Singapore dollar has appreciated to new highs in nominal trade weighted terms, in real terms (ULC-based) it remains at around 15-year lows. As such, currency competitiveness should not be an issue anytime soon. Notably, real exchange rates calculated using ULCs are more representative of currency competitiveness than the use of consumer prices allows. The reason is that employee compensation is a major component of any company’s overall cost structure; and therefore, ULCs matter for a company much more directly than do consumer prices. The very low levels of the ULC-based real exchange rate indicates that the Singapore dollar is still very competitive. Indeed, Singapore’s export volumes have been on an upward trend relative to global exports (Chart 12). Chart 11The Singapore Dollar Remains A Highly Competitive Currency Chart 12Singapore Is Grabbing Export Market Share From The Rest Of The World Notably, Singapore continues to attract a very high amount of FDI. This will help raise productivity going forward, thereby keeping ULCs in check down the line. All that said, strong competitiveness (i.e., the ability to maintain global market share) does not preclude Singapore from experiencing a drop in its export revenues over the next 6-to-12 months. The reason is faltering goods demand in the US and Europe after a pandemic-era overconsumption. Falling exports, in turn, will lead to shrinking foreign reserves, decelerating money supply, and finally slowing growth and inflation. This will discourage MAS from pushing the Singapore dollar much higher from current levels. As Chart 11 showed, the Singaporean currency is already at an all-time high in trade-weighted terms. The rally in the trade-weighted Singapore dollar is therefore in late stages. Investment Recommendations Chart 13The Singapore Dollar's Outperformance Vesus Other Asian Currencies Is Late Singapore stocks, with a P/E ratio of 21.5, have become relatively expensive vis-à-vis their EM (13.1) and Asian (14.1) counterparts. In terms of the price-to-book value ratio however, they are not expensive. Considering all, we recommend that investors reduce their exposure to Singapore stocks in EM and Asian equity portfolios by downgrading their allocation from overweight to neutral. Our overweight stance since May 10, 2021, has yielded a gain of 2.3% so far. Absolute return investors should wait for a better entry point. The depreciation of the Singapore dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar likely has some more room given the impending deterioration in global trade. But the latter will also soon check the appreciation of the Singapore dollar versus other Asian currencies − as MAS will be dissuaded from guiding the currency up in view of peaking domestic inflation and shrinking trade (Chart 13). Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is flawed. This Holy Grail of financial economics assumes that investors are a homogenous bunch with identical investment horizons, when the reality is that investors have a wide spectrum of time horizons. The alternative but less well-known Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) recognizes that investors with different time horizons interpret the same facts and information differently. The key conclusion of the FMH is that when the different investment horizons are all active in the market, the price reflects all available information, meaning that the market is efficient, liquid, and stable. But when the different investment horizons start to converge and coalesce, the market becomes inefficient, illiquid, and vulnerable to a trend reversal. Using the FMH over the past six months, 5 structured recommendations were closed in profit: Short ILS/GBP, Short Coffee versus Cocoa, Short World Basic Resources versus Market, Long EUR/CHF, and Short Semiconductors versus Tech. Against this, 3 structured recommendations were closed in loss: Short Nickel versus Silver, Long Polish Bonds versus US Bonds, and Short World Semiconductors versus Biotech. Within the 10 open trades, 3 are in healthy profit, 4 are flat, and 3 are in loss. The Efficient Market Hypothesis Does Not Describe The Truth; The Fractal Market Hypothesis Does Bottom Line: As few investors are aware of the Fractal Market Hypothesis, it gives a competitive advantage to those that use it to identify potential trend reversals. Feature For nations and societies, disagreement and conflict are unhealthy. But for financial markets, the opposite is true – it is the lack of disagreement and conflict that is unhealthy. This is because the market needs disagreement to generate liquidity, the ability to trade quickly and in large volume without destabilizing the market price. If I want to buy a share, then somebody must sell me that share. It follows that I and the seller must disagree about the attractiveness of the share at the current price. Likewise, if I and like-minded individuals want to buy ten million shares, it follows that lots of market participants must disagree with us. If lots of market participants do not disagree with us, there will be insufficient liquidity to complete the transaction without a price change. And if too many people are engaged in groupthink, the price change could be extreme. Markets Become Inefficient When There Is Not Enough Disagreement How can there be major disagreement about the attractiveness of an investment when we all have access to the same facts and information? According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) there cannot be, because asset prices always reflect all available information.1   Unfortunately, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is flawed. This Holy Grail of financial economics assumes that investors are a homogenous bunch with identical investment horizons, when the reality is that investors have a wide spectrum of time horizons – ranging from the milliseconds of momentum-driven high-frequency trading (HFT) to the decades of a value-driven pension fund. The market is efficient only when a wide spectrum of investment horizons is setting the price, signified by the market having a rich fractal structure. The alternative but less well-known Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) recognizes the reality of different time horizons. Crucially, the FMH acknowledges that investors with different time horizons interpret the same facts and information differently. In other words, they disagree (Box I-1). Box 1-1The Efficient Market Hypothesis Does Not Describe The Truth; The Fractal Market Hypothesis Does For example, the momentum-based high frequency trader might interpret a sharp one-day sell-off as a sell signal, but the value-based pension fund might interpret the same information as a buying opportunity. This disagreement will create liquidity without requiring a big price adjustment. Thereby it also fosters market stability. The key conclusion of the Fractal Market Hypothesis is that when the different investment horizons are all active in the market, the price does reflect all available information, meaning that the market is efficient, liquid, and stable. But when the different investment horizons start to converge and coalesce, the market becomes inefficient, illiquid, and vulnerable to a trend reversal. Buy and sell orders will no longer match without a price change, possibly extreme. Can we measure the loss of efficiency in a specific investment, and thereby anticipate a potential trend reversal? The answer is yes, by monitoring its fractal dimension, using the expression in the Appendix. Although many readers may find the concept of a fractal dimension intimidating, the idea is simple and intuitive. It just measures the complexity – or information content – in an object or structure. Thereby, when an investment’s fractal dimension reaches its lower limit, it warns that the information content of longer-term investors is missing from the price.  When the longer-term investors do ultimately re-enter the price setting process, the question is: will they endorse the recent trend because of some major change in the fundamentals – such as the start of the Russia/Ukraine war? Or will they reject it, as an unjustified deviation from a fundamental anchor. In most cases, it is the latter: a rejection and a trend reversal. As few investors are aware of the Fractal Market Hypothesis, it gives a competitive advantage to those that use it to identify potential trend reversals. Fractal Trading Update Using the Fractal Market Hypothesis over the past six months, 5 structured recommendations were closed in profit: Short ILS/GBP, Short Coffee versus Cocoa, Short World Basic Resources versus Market, Long EUR/CHF, and Short Semiconductors versus Tech. A fragile fractal structure warns of a crowded trade. One structured recommendation was closed flat: Short Personal Goods versus Consumer Services. Against this, 3 structured recommendations were closed in loss: Short Nickel versus Silver, Long Polish Bonds versus US Bonds, and Short World Semiconductors versus Biotech. Within the 10 open trades, 3 are in healthy profit, 4 are flat, and 3 are in loss. As for the unstructured recommendations, for which we do not define profit targets or expiry dates, we are pleased to report that out of 31 recommendations, only 2 failed to experience a countertrend reversal. Wins 1) November 18th: Short ILS/GBP Achieved its profit target of 4.2 percent. 2) November 25th: Short Coffee versus Cocoa (Chart I-1) Achieved almost half of its 30 percent profit target at expiry. Chart I-1Fractal Analysis Correctly Predicted A Reversal In Coffee Versus Cocoa 3) January 20th: Short World Semiconductors versus Tech (Chart I-2) Achieved its profit target of 6 percent. Chart I-2Fractal Analysis Correctly Predicted A Reversal In World Semiconductors Versus Technology 4) March 10th: Long EUR/CHF Achieved its profit target of 3.6 percent. 5)  April 14th: Short World Basic Resources versus Market (Chart I-3) Achieved its profit target of 11.5 percent. Chart I-3Fractal Analysis Correctly Predicted A Reversal In World Basic Resources Versus Market In addition, Short World Personal Goods versus Consumer Services which was opened on December 9th reached a high-water mark of 10.5 percent but expired flat. Losses 1) December 2nd: Short World Semiconductors versus Biotech Hit its stop loss of 9.5 percent. 2) January 13th: Long Poland versus US: 10-Year Government Bonds Reached a high-water mark of 3.7 percent, but then reversed to hit its stop loss of 8 percent. In the current geopolitical crisis, Poland has been a casualty due to its lengthy border with Ukraine. 3) February 3rd: Short Nickel versus Silver (Chart I-4) Hit its stop loss at 20 percent following an explosive short-squeeze rally in the Nickel price. Chart I-4Nickel's Short-Squeeze Rally Forced A Price Trend Prolongation Open Trades 1) January 27th: Long MSCI Korea versus All-Country World (Chart I-5) Open, in profit, having reached a high-water mark of 6 percent (versus an 8 percent target). Chart I-5Fractal Analysis Correctly Predicted A Rebound In Korea Versus All-Country World 2) February 24th: Long US Biotech versus US Tech Open, in profit, having reached a high-water mark of 10.5 (versus a 17.5 percent target). 3) March 3rd: Short World Banks versus Consumer Services Reached a high-water mark of 7.3 percent (versus a 12 percent target), but then reversed and is in loss. 4) March 24th: Long 5-Year T-bond Open, in modest loss. 5) April 7th: Short World Non-Life Insurance versus Homebuilders (Chart I-6) Open, in profit having reached a high-water mark of 12.4 percent (versus a 14 percent target). Chart I-6Fractal Analysis Correctly Predicted A Reversal In World Non-Life Insurance Versus Homebuilders 6) April 7th: Long JPY/CHF Reached a high-water mark of 3.4 percent versus a 4 percent target, but then reversed into modest loss. This suggests that the trade needed a narrower profit target. 7) April 28th: Short High Dividend ETF versus US 10-Year T-bond Open, in modest loss, having reached a high-water mark of 2.9 percent (versus a 6 percent target). 8) May 19th: Short FTSE 100 versus STOXX Europe 600 Open, and flat. 9) June 2nd: Long JPY/USD (Chart I-7) Open, and flat. Chart I-7The Sell-Off In JPY/USD Has Reached A Potential Turning Point 10) June 2nd: Short Australia Basic Resources versus World Market (Chart I-8) Open, and flat. Chart I-8The Australian Basic Resources Sector Is Vulnerable To Reversal   Our full watchlist of 29 investments that are at, or approaching turning points, is available on our website: cpt.bcaresearch.com Appendix: Calculating The Fractal Dimension Of A Financial Market Chart 1AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 2Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 3Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 4US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 5BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 6Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 7CNY/USD Has Reversed Chart 8CAD/SEK Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 9Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 10The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 11The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 12FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Reversing Chart 13Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Is Ending Chart 14The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 15The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 16Food And Beverage Outperformance Exhausted Chart 17The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 18The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 19A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 20Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 21Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 22Cotton Versus Platinum Is Reversing Chart 23Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Ended Chart 24The Rally In USD/EUR Has Ended Chart 25The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 26A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 27Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart 28US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 29GBP/USD At A Turning Point Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Hadi Elzein Research Associate hadi.elzein@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Strictly speaking, the EMH assumes there is some disagreement, but that this disagreement is random and follows a standard Gaussian (bell-curve) distribution. Therefore, the EMH assumes that a share price just follows a random walk until new (unpredictable) fundamental information arrives. Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Sentiment On Sterling Is Depressed The pound will suffer in the short term, setting the stage for a coiled-spring rebound. Cable is extremely cheap by most measures (Feature chart). The BoE could engineer a soft landing in the UK economy. If successful, it will annihilate sterling vigilantes, in a volte-face of the ERM crisis. We are cognizant of near-term risks. As such, we are long EUR/GBP with a target of 0.90, but will be buyers of cable at 1.20. Ultimately, the pound is undervalued on a longer-term basis. GBP/USD should touch 1.36 over the next 12-18 months. RECOMMENDATIONS INCEPTION LEVEL inception date RETURN long eur/gbp 0.846 2021-10-15 0.27 Bottom Line: The pound will likely face pressure in the near term, but will fare well over a cyclical horizon. Our 12-month target is 1.36. This target is based on a modest reversion towards PPP fair value, and some erosion in the “crisis” discount. Admittedly, sentiment on the pound is very depressed, and we could be wrong in our near-term assessment and cable has indeed bottomed. Feature Chart 1A Play On Cable Downside There has been much discussion around the premise that the pound could enter a capitulation phase, akin to an emerging market-style currency crisis. With inflation sitting at 9%, well above the Bank of England’s 2% target, the narrative is that interest rates need to rise substantially but will, at the same time, kill any recovery. The result will be a sharp fall in the pound. We began to highlight the near-term risks to cable in October of last year, going long EUR/GBP in the process, as a way to play sterling downside (Chart 1). That said, our longer-term view on the pound remained positive. In this report, we review what has changed since, and if a negative longer-term view is now warranted.   UK Balance Of Payments Almost all currency crises are rooted in a deterioration of the external balance, and this is certainly true for the UK. The trade deficit sits at 7.9% of GDP, the worst among G10 countries (Chart 2). As a result, the current account is also in deficit. That said, there are reasons for optimism. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyAn Update On Sterling The Office for National Statistics (ONS) suggests that a change in methodology in January 2022 could be exarcebating the deterioration in the latest release of the trade balance. In our view, there are two key reasons why the UK’s balance of trade is worsening. The first is the oil shock – fuels constitute 11% of UK imports. Second, unprecedented fiscal stimulus led to an overshoot in goods imports. These negative forces are likely cyclical in nature, rather than structural. It is also noteworthy that most of the goods imported into the UK are machinery and transport equipment, which could go a long way in improving its productive capacity (Chart 3). Chart 2The UK Trade Balance Has Deteriorated Chart 3Goods Imports Have Been A Hit To The UK Trade Balance In parallel, there has been a structural improvement in the UK’s current account balance. This has mostly been driven by a rising primary income balance. In short, investments abroad are earning more, relative to domestic liabilities (Chart 4). The UK runs a large negative international investment position. Despite this, it has maintained the ability to issue debt bought by foreigners, while investing in high-return assets abroad. Secondary income has admittedly been in a structural deficit, but a falloff in transfer payments under the Brexit agreement will significantly improve this balance (Chart 5). Chart 4The UK Current Account Is Improving Chart 5A Fall In Brexit Payments Will Mend Secondary Income Finally, the pound’s share of global foreign exchange turnover is 12.8%, just behind the dollar, euro, and yen. That said, London dwarfs New York, Hong Kong, and Tokyo as a hub for foreign exchange trading (Chart 6). The pound also very much remains among the most desirable global currencies. Global allocation of FX reserves in sterling have been rising over the last decade (Chart 7). It currently stand at 4.8%, higher than the RMB at 2.8%, and all other emerging market currencies combined. Chart 6London Remains An Important Financial Center Chart 7The Pound Is Still A Reserve Currency It is noteworthy to revisit the period the pound experienced an EM-style crisis – under the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), when cable was effectively pegged to the German mark at an expensive level. At the time, UK inflation was running hot, while German inflation was more subdued. By importing monetary policy from the Bundesbank, the BoE was able to tame inflation, but at a high cost to growth. In Germany, the reunification boom warranted much higher interest rates, which was not appropriate for the UK . Cable eventually collapsed by 32.9% peak-to-trough, as the UK ran out of foreign currency reserves. Chart 8Cable Is Very Cheap There are three key differences between that episode and today: The pound is freely floating. Foreign exchange markets are extremely fluid and adjust to expectations quite quickly. A collapse in the pound seems unlikely, unless the UK faces a new large exogenous shock. Inflation is running hot in many countries, not just the UK. The pound is extremely cheap, and stimulative for the economy. On a real effective exchange rate basis, the pound is at record lows (Chart 8).     Will The BoE Make A Policy Mistake? Sterling is pricing in a policy mistake by the BoE. First, inflation is well above its 2% target. Second, the labor market has tightened significantly. The unemployment rate hit a 47-year low of 3.7%, and job vacancies are low, pushing wages higher. As such, either the BoE allows inflation expectations to become unmoored, destroying the purchasing power of the pound, or kills the recovery to maintain credibility (Chart 9). Chart 9The UK Labor Market Is Tight While difficult, there are reasons to believe the BoE can achieve a soft landing. According to an in-house study, only one-third of the rise in UK inflation has been driven by demand-side pull, with the balance related to supply factors.1 The latter have been the usual suspects – rising energy costs, supply shortages, and even legacies of the Brexit shock (Chart 10). UK electricity prices have cratered since the opening of the 1,400MW undersea cable with Norway (Chart 11). Chart 10Most Of The Increase To UK Prices Is Supply-Driven Chart 11A Sharp Drop In Electricity Prices Second, it is likely that the neutral rate of interest in the UK is lower in a post-Brexit, post-COVID-19 world. This is visible in trend productivity growth, but even the size of the labor force has shrunk significantly. The UK workforce is down by 560,000 people since the start of the pandemic. This has been partly due to less immigration and more retirees, but the vast majority has been due to health side-effects from the pandemic, and delays in getting adequate medical care. As a result, there has barely been a recovery in the UK participation rate (Chart 12). Chart 12AThe Participation Rate In The UK Is Below Trend Chart 12BA Low Participation Rate Across Many Regions In hindsight, a least-regrets strategy to policy tightening – lift rates faster now, and then back off if financial conditions tighten sufficiently – seems appropriate. Frontloading the pace of tightening will flatten the UK gilts curve further. With most borrowing costs in the UK tied to the longer end of the curve, refinancing costs might not edge up that much, while inflation expectations will be well contained. The real canaries in the coal mine from this strategy are the economies of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, where household debt is much more elevated (Chart 13), and the percentage of variable rate mortgages  are higher. Chart 13Household Debt Is Not Alarming In The UK Larger fiscal stimulus will partially offset the near-term hit from tighter monetary policy. The additional £15 billion cost-of-living package announced last month is quite substantial at 0.7% of GDP. This gives the BoE breathing room to tighten policy in the near term. The redistributionist nature of the plan – taxing windfall profits from large energy companies, and using that to subsidize consumers most in need – could be what is required to achieve a soft landing, if the energy shock is temporary. Our Global Fixed Income colleagues upgraded UK gilts to overweight last month, on the basis that market pricing further out the SONIA curve was too aggressive. In our prior report on sterling, we also suggested that market expectations for interest rate increases may have overshot. Money markets are discounting a peak in the bank rate at 2.8%. The BoE’s new Market Participants survey suggests it will peak at 1.75%. While the BoE will deliver sufficient monetary tightening to lean against near-term inflationary pressures, it will be very wary to overdo it. This is especially true if the neutral rate in the economy is much lower. What Next For The Pound? Our view is that the pound faces near-term risks but is a buy longer term. There is an old adage that credibility is hard to earn, but easy to lose. For the UK in particular, this hits the mark. The Bank of England is the oldest central bank in the world, after the Riksbank. Yes, the BoE can make a policy mistake (as it has in the past), but treating the pound as an emerging market asset is a stretch (Chart 14). That said, our Chief European Strategist, Mathieu Savary, believes stagflation is not fully priced into UK assets. In the near term, he might be right. The UK’s large trade deficit puts the onus on foreigners to dictate movements in the pound. The pound does well when animal spirits are fervent. So far, markets have bid up a substantial safe-haven premium into the dollar (Chart 15). As a proxy, the pound has been sold. Northern Ireland could also return as a thorn in the side of sterling.  Chart 14The Pound Is A Risk-On Currency Cable And EM Stocks Chart 15The Dollar Has A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium From a bird’s eye view, three factors tend to drive currencies – the macroeconomic environment, valuation, and sentiment. For now, markets have latched on to the GBP’s vulnerability to an EM-style crisis. That said, cable is very cheap, even accounting for elevated UK inflation. Our in-house PPP model suggests the pound could appreciate by 4% per year, over the next 10 years, just to revert to fair value (Chart 16). Chart 16Cable Is Cheap Admittedly, the UK desperately needs an improvement in productivity growth for further currency gains. To encourage capital inflows that the pound depends on, the UK needs to be at the forefront of disruptive technologies such as electric cars, digital currencies, 3D printing, and even innovations in gene therapy. High finance and fashion will remain relevant for London, but the need for innovation is high.  Investment Conclusions Chart 17Sentiment On Sterling Is Depressed The pound will likely face pressure in the near term, but will fare well over a cyclical horizon. Our 12-month target is 1.36. This target is based on a modest reversion towards PPP fair value, and some erosion in the “crisis” discount. Admittedly, sentiment on the pound is very depressed, and we could be wrong in our near-term assessment if cable has indeed bottomed. Our intermediate-term timing model suggests that GBP is undervalued and has bottomed. Technical indicators also warn that cable is ripe for a fervent rebound (Chart 17). Particularly, our intermediate-term technical indicator is rebounding from oversold levels. The Aussie would outperform the pound in the long term, but AUD/GBP is vulnerable to a commodity relapse in the shorter term.   Housekeeping We were stopped out of our short EUR/JPY trade for a loss of -2.78%, as oil prices and bond yields rebounded. This trade is a hedge to our pro-cyclical portfolio, so we will look to reenter it at more attractive levels. We are also lowering the stop-loss on our short RUB trade. This is a speculative bet many clients will not be able to play, but we expect it to payoff over the longer term.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Michael Saunders, "The route back to 2% inflation," (Speech given at the Resolution Foundation), May 9, 2022.   Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Listen to a short summary of this report.       Executive Summary Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap The Chinese economy faces a trifecta of economic woes: 1) The threat of renewed Covid lockdowns; 2) Cooling export demand; 3) A floundering housing market. Trying to reflate the Chinese housing bubble would only damage the long-term prospects of China’s economy. A much better option would be to adopt measures that boost disposable income. Not only would this help offset the drag from slowing export growth and a negative housing wealth effect, but it would also take some of the sting out of China’s zero-Covid policy. With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, the political incentive to shower the economy with cash will only intensify. Chinese equities are trading at only 10-times forward earnings and about 1-times sales. A significant upward rating for equity valuations is likely if the government adopts broad-based income-support measures. Go long the iShares MSCI China ETF ($MCHI) as a tactical trade. Bottom Line: China faces a number of economic woes, but these are fully discounted by the market. What has not been discounted is a broad-based stimulus program focused on income-support measures.   Dear Client, I will be visiting clients in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi next week. No doubt, the outlook for oil prices will feature heavily in my discussions. I will brief you on any insights I learn in my report on June 17. In the meantime, I am pleased to announce that Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, will be the guest author of next week’s Global Investment Strategy report. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Triple Threat The Chinese economy faces a trifecta of economic woes: 1) The threat of renewed Covid lockdowns; 2) Cooling export demand; 3) A floundering housing market. Let us discuss each problem in turn.   Problem #1: China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Age of Omicron Chart 1China’s Lockdown Index Remains Elevated China was able to successfully suppress the virus in the first two years of the pandemic. However, the emergence of the Omicron strain is challenging the government’s commitment to its zero-Covid policy. The BA.2 subvariant of Omicron is 50% more contagious than the original Omicron strain and about 4-times more contagious than the Delta strain. While 89% of China’s population has been fully vaccinated, the number drops off to 82% for those above the age of 60. And those who are vaccinated have been inoculated with vaccines that appear to be largely ineffective against Omicron. Keeping a virus as contagious as measles at bay in a population with little natural or artificial immunity is exceedingly difficult. While the authorities are starting to relax restrictions in Shanghai, China’s Effective Lockdown Index remains at elevated levels (Chart 1). A number of domestically designed mRNA vaccines are in phase 3 trials. However, it is not clear how effective they will be. Shanghai-based Fosun Pharma has inked a deal to distribute 100 million doses of Pfizer’s vaccine, but so far neither it nor Moderna’s vaccine have been approved for use. Our working assumption is that China will authorize the distribution of western-made mRNA vaccines later this year if its own offerings prove ineffectual. The Chinese government has already signed a deal to manufacture a generic version of Pfizer’s Paxlovid, which has been shown to cut the risk of hospitalization by 90% if taken within five days of the onset of symptoms. In the meantime, the authorities will continue to play whack-a-mole with Covid. Investors should expect more lockdowns during the remainder of the year.   Problem #2: Weaker Export Growth China’s export growth slowed sharply in April, with manufacturing production contracting at the fastest rate since data collection began. Activity appears to have rebounded somewhat in May, but the new export orders components of both the official and private-sector manufacturing PMIs still remain below 50 (Chart 2). Part of the export slowdown is attributable to lockdown restrictions. However, weaker external demand is also a culprit, as evidenced by the fact that Korean export growth — a bellwether for global trade — has decelerated (Chart 3).  Chart 2China’s Export Growth Has Rolled Over Chart 3Softer Export Growth Is Not A China-Specific Phenomenon Spending in developed economies is shifting from manufactured goods to services. Retail inventories in the US are now well above their pre-pandemic trend, suggesting that the demand for Chinese-made goods will remain subdued over the coming months (Chart 4). The surge in commodity prices is only adding to Chinese manufacturer woes. Input prices rose 10% faster than manufacturing output prices over the past 12 months. This is squeezing profit margins (Chart 5). Chart 4Well-Stocked Shelves In The US Bode Poorly For Chinese Export Demand Chart 5Surging Input Costs Are Weighing On The Profits Of Chinese Commodity Users A modest depreciation in the currency would help the Chinese export sector. However, after weakening from 6.37 in April to 6.79 in mid-May, USD/CNY has moved back to 6.66 on the back of the recent selloff in the US dollar. Chart 6The RMB Tends To Weaken When EUR/USD Is Rising We expect the dollar to weaken further over the next 12 months as the Fed tempers its hawkish rhetoric in response to falling inflation. Chart 6 shows that the trade-weighted RMB typically strengthens when EUR/USD is rising. Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s Chief Currency Strategist, expects EUR/USD to reach 1.16 by the end of the year.   Problem #3: Flagging Property Market Chinese housing sales, starts, and completions all contracted in April (Chart 7). New home prices dipped 0.2% on a month-over-month basis, and are up just 0.7% from a year earlier, the smallest gain since 2015. The percentage of households planning to buy a home is near record lows (Chart 8). Chart 7The Chinese Property Market Has Been Cooling Chart 8Intentions To Buy A House Have Declined China’s property developers are in dire straits. Corporate bonds for the sector are, on average, trading at 48 cents on the dollar (Chart 9). Goldman Sachs estimates that the default rate for property developers will reach 32% in 2022, up from their earlier estimate of 19%. The government is trying to prop up housing demand. The PBoC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate by 15 bps on May 20th, the largest such cut since 2019. The authorities have dropped the floor mortgage rate to a 14-year low of 4.25%. They have also taken steps to make it easier for property developers to issue domestic bonds. BCA’s China strategists believe these measures will foster a modest rebound in the property market in the second half of this year. However, they do not anticipate a robust recovery – of the sort experienced following the initial wave of the pandemic – due to the government’s continued adherence to the “three red lines” policy.1 China is building too many homes. While residential investment as a share GDP has been trending lower, it is still very high in relation to other countries. China’s working-age population is now shrinking, which suggests that housing demand will contract over the coming years (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Property Developer Bonds Are Trading At Distressed Levels Chart 10Shrinking Working-Age Population Implies Less Demand For Housing Chinese real estate prices are amongst the highest anywhere. The five biggest cities in the world with the lowest rental yields are all in China (Chart 11). The entire Chinese housing stock is worth nearly $100 trillion, making it the largest asset class in the world. As such, a decline in Chinese home prices would generate a sizable negative wealth effect. Chart 11Chinese Real Estate Is Expensive A Silver Bullet? Trying to reflate the Chinese housing bubble would only damage the long-term prospects of China’s economy. Luckily, one does not need to fill a leaky bucket through the same hole the water escaped. As long as there is enough demand throughout the economy, workers who lose their jobs in declining sectors will eventually find new jobs in other sectors. China needs to reorient its economy away from its historic reliance on investment and exports towards consumption. The easiest way to do that is to adopt measures that boost disposable income, which has slowed of late (Chart 12). Not only would this help offset the drag from slowing export growth and a negative housing wealth effect, but it would also take some of the sting out of China’s zero-Covid policy. The authorities have not talked much about pursuing large-scale income-support measures of the kind adopted by many developed economies during the pandemic. As a result, market participants have largely dismissed this possibility. Yet, with the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, the political incentive to shower the economy with cash will only intensify. Chinese equities are trading at only 10-times forward earnings and about 1-times sales (Chart 13). A significant upward rating for equity valuations is likely if the government adopts broad-based income-support measures. As we saw in the US and elsewhere, stimulus cash has a habit of flowing into the stock market; and with real estate in the doldrums, equities may become the asset class of choice for many Chinese investors. With that in mind, we are going long the iShares MSCI China ETF ($MCHI) as a tactical trade. Chart 12Disposable Income Growth Has Been Trending Lower Chart 13Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap At a global level, a floundering Chinese property market would have been a cause for grave concern in the past, as it would have represented a major deflationary shock. Times have changed, however. The problem now is too much inflation, rather than too little. To the extent that reduced Chinese investment injects more savings into the global economy and knocks down commodity prices, this would be welcomed by most investors. China’s economy may be heading for a “beautiful slowdown.” Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn Twitter   Footnotes   1      The People’s Bank of China and the housing ministry issued a deleveraging framework for property developers in August 2020, consisting of a 70% ceiling on liabilities-to-assets, a net debt-to-equity ratio capped at 100%, and a limit on short-term borrowing that cannot exceed cash reserves. Developers breaching these “red lines” run the risk of being cut off from access to new loans from banks, while those who respect them can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most. View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Executive Summary What Will Be The Implications Of China’s Common Prosperity Policies? On the one hand, Chinese stocks are oversold, equity valuations are attractive and investor sentiment is downbeat. This means that a lot of bad news has already been priced into Chinese share prices, which is positive from a contrarian perspective. On the other hand, the government remains committed to its dynamic zero-COVID policy and will resort to lockdowns whenever there is an outbreak. The Omicron variants have extremely high transmission rates, which means that the probability of new lockdowns is non trivial. Hence, the biggest risk to Chinese share prices is renewed outbreaks and lockdowns – developments which are impossible to forecast. That is why, in our opinion, Chinese stocks are facing fat tails risks. Infrastructure spending will recover modestly in H2 2022. The property sector rebound will be very muted. Chinese exports will contract. The structural outlook is unfriendly for shareholders of platform companies. The known unknowns are: Will the dynamic zero-COVID policy be successful in containing the virus? Will “animal spirits” among consumers and businesses be revived? Will western investors come back to Chinese stocks? The RMB is facing near-term risks as its interest rate differential versus the US dollar dips deeper into negative territory. Bottom Line: For absolute return investors, one way to play such a bifurcated market outlook is to buy out-of-money call options and out-of-money put options simultaneously while maintaining a core / benchmark allocation in Chinese stocks. We maintain our long A-shares / short investable Chinese stocks strategy. Feature As strict lockdowns in key cities are lifted, the Chinese economy is bound for a snap back. Consumer spending will improve, and the government’s infrastructure push will revive capital spending modestly. What does this mean for Chinese stocks? Numerous crosscurrents make the current outlook for Chinese stocks hard to navigate. This report elaborates on variables that we can forecast and those we cannot. Odds of a material rally are not insignificant, but the probability of another relapse is not trivial either. That is why Chinese stocks presently have fat tails. For absolute return investors, one way to play such a bifurcated market outlook is to buy out-of-money call options and out-of-money put options simultaneously while maintaining a core/ benchmark allocation in Chinese stocks. The rationale for maintaining a neutral position is that Chinese share prices could also be range-bound in the coming months. In other words, positives could offset negatives, and the fat tails outcomes might not transpire. In regard to relative performance and regional allocation, we continue to recommend that emerging market portfolios overweight Chinese A-shares and maintain a neutral stance on investable stocks. Meanwhile, global equity portfolios should remain neutral on A-shares while underweighting investable ones. This positioning is consistent with our overall EM allocation – we continue to recommend underweighting EM within a global equity portfolio. What We Know Equity Valuations And Investor Sentiment Are Depressed To begin with, there are a number of indicators that point to low equity valuations and depressed investor sentiment towards Chinese stocks: Analysts’ net EPS revisions for both Chinese A-shares and investable stocks have plunged deep into negative territory (Chart 1). Chinese net EPS revisions are also low relative to EM and global stocks (Chart 2). Chart 1Sentiment On Chinese Stocks Is Downbeat Chart 2Net EPS Revisions: China vs. EM And China vs. Global Stocks   The average of the NBS manufacturing PMI new orders and backlog of orders suggests that A-shares EPS will shrink considerably (Chart 3). A-share valuations have become attractive. Our composite valuation indicator points to below average valuations (Chart 4, top panel). This indicator is based on three variables: (1) median multiples; (2) 20% trimmed-mean multiples; and (3) equal-weighted multiples. The latter uses equal weights rather than market cap weights for sub-sectors in the calculation. Chart 3China: Corporate Profits Are Contracting Chart 4Chinese A-Shares Are Attractive   In turn, each component is constructed using the averages of the trailing P/E, forward P/E, price-to-cash earnings, price-to-book value (PBV) and price-to-dividend ratios. The 20%-trimmed mean excludes the top 10% and the bottom 10% of sub-sectors, i.e., it removes outliers. Our cyclically adjusted P/E ratio for A-shares currently stands at close to one standard deviation below its mean (Chart 4, bottom panel). The trailing and forward P/E ratios for the equal-weighted A-share index are 18 and 12, respectively. As to the investable universe, any valuation measure for the index is not useful because banks and SOEs continue to be “cheap” for a reason. In turn, internet stocks are fallen angels and their past valuations are not a good roadmap for the future. We discuss the structural outlook for their profitability below. Chart 5Chinese Investable Stocks Have Reached Technical Support Lines Finally, Chinese equities have become oversold. Investable non-TMT share prices are back to their lows of the past 12 years while TMT/growth stocks are at their long-term moving average (Chart 5). In sum, a lot of bad news has already been priced into Chinese share prices, which is positive from a contrarian perspective. Dynamic Zero-COVID Policy We have a very high conviction level that the government will remain committed to its dynamic zero-COVID policy for now. COVID cases in Shanghai and Beijing have declined following the lockdowns. This will only embolden authorities to pursue their dynamic zero-COVID policy and resort to lockdowns whenever outbreaks occur. Consistent with the dynamic zero-COVID policy, the government will inject more stimulus into the economy to offset the negative impact of past and potential future lockdowns. With inflation very subdued, the central government will not shy away from stimulating demand. In fact, the PBoC is allegedly resorting to “window guidance”, i.e., instructing banks to increase their loan origination. However, we do not have a high conviction view on: (1) whether lockdowns could prevent the virus from spreading and (2) whether stimulus will lift household and business confidence and their willingness to consume and invest. See more on this below. Infrastructure Investment Will Recover Modestly So far, the data does not suggest that a recovery in infrastructure investment is underway. Chart 6 illustrates that the number of investment projects approved by National Development and Reform Commission and the length of newly installed electricity transmission lines are not yet rising (Chart 6). Also, steel bar and cement prices are falling despite low output of these materials (Chart 7). This signifies very weak demand. Chart 6Few Signs of Recovery In Infrastructure Investment Chart 7Falling Prices of Raw Materials = Weak Demand   Furthermore, land sales make up 40% of local government revenue and the value of land sales is down substantially from a year ago. Lower land sales weighing on local government finances and their ability to spend. Nevertheless, odds are that the central government will force local governments to boost infrastructure investment modestly by providing more funding and increasing their special bond issuance quota. For example, Beijing ordered state-owned policy banks to set up an 800 billion yuan ($120 billion) line of credit for infrastructure projects. Chart 8A Snapback in Home Sales Is Possible That said, a revival in traditional infrastructure investment will be more muted than it has been in past cycles. Beijing has been very clear in recent years that local governments should not pursue inefficient debt-fueled infrastructure spending, to the point that local officials have been warned that they will be held responsible for debt-financed spending during their lifetime, i.e., even after they retire from their positions. This risk – and the lack of funding due to the shortfall in land sales – will structurally limit local governments’ capacity and drive to invest in traditional infrastructure.  The Property Sector Rebound Will Be Muted Residential property sales will likely tick up after having crashed by 30% in the past 12 months (Chart 8). Yet, this will be a mean-reversion rebound rather a full-fledged cyclical recovery. Even though authorities have been easing restrictions for property buyers, any rebound in home sales and construction activity will be modest for the following reasons: The economic slump of the past 12 months and recent lockdowns have weighed on household incomes, which will hinder demand. Housing remains unaffordable for many households who live in poor conditions. Meanwhile, many affluent households already own multiple properties. A lack of confidence in the outlook for house prices will reduce high-income household’s willingness to invest in new properties. Even though restrictions have eased, property developers – which have experienced a major crackdown, are still overleveraged, and face uncertain housing demand – will be reluctant to increase their debt and start new projects. Rather, the lack of funding for property developers points to a major drop in completions in the near term (Chart 9). As we argued in the report titled China: Is The Property Carry Trade Over?, the real estate market is experiencing a structural breakdown, rather than a cyclical one. The performance of property developers stocks supports this hypothesis (Chart 10, top panel). As such, any recovery will be tame and fragile. Chart 9Shrinking Property Developer Funding = Less Housing Completion Chart 10Structural Breakdowns in Stocks And Bonds Of Property Developers   In addition, the prices of property developers offshore bonds remain in a clear downtrend (Chart 10, bottom panel). Exports Are Set To Contract Chinese exports will contract in H2 2022 due to reduced spending on goods in the US and Europe as well as in the developing world. Specifically, in the US and euro area, consumption of goods ex-autos boomed during the pandemic and will revert to their means as households spend more on services and less on goods (Chart 11). Declining real household disposable income will also reinforce this trend (Chart 12). Chart 11US and Euro Area ex-Auto Goods Consumption Will Shrink Chart 12US And Euro Area Household Real Disposable Income Is Contracting     In fact, US retail inventory of goods ex-autos has already surged (Chart 13). As retailers cut back on their new orders, Chinese exports will contract materially. Chart 13US Retail Goods ex-Auto Inventories Have Swelled In addition, domestic demand in developing economies will also disappoint. EM household spending on consumer goods will underwhelm as more of their income is spent on food and energy. Also, high and rising local interest rates will curb credit origination in mainstream emerging economies. Consequently, their capital spending, employment and income growth will remain subdued. In China, exports as a share of GDP has increased to 19% from 17.5% in 2019. Hence, a contraction in exports will be painful for the overall economy. The Structural Outlook Is Unfriendly For Shareholders Of Platform Companies The government has toned down its rhetoric and its actions related to platform/internet companies. However, we view this development as a tactical rather than a structural change. The key economic policymaker Liu He made market friendly statements towards platform companies on March 16 and May 17 when their share prices were plunging. We believe that the aim of his comments was solely to calm the market and restore investor confidence. We maintain that the structural outlook for shareholders of platform companies remains negative for the following reasons: Higher uncertainty about their business model = higher equity risk premium = lower equity multiples. The government will be regulating their profitability like those of monopolies and oligopolies, which justifies lower multiples. These companies will be performing social duties – i.e. redistributing profits from shareholders to the Chinese people. Beijing’s involvement in their management and the prioritization of national and geopolitical objectives over shareholder interests. Risks of delisting from US stock exchanges are significant. Common prosperity policies pose a risk to the broader corporate sector. These policies will redistribute national income from corporates to households. Chart 14 illustrates that the share of employee compensation has been rising and the share of corporate profits in national income has been falling since 2011-12. These trends will be reinforced by common prosperity policies in the coming years. This is an negative development for shareholders of Chinese companies. Chart 14What Will Be The Implications Of China's Common Prosperity Policies? The Known Unknowns Will The Dynamic Zero-COVID Policy Be Successful? The biggest risk to Chinese share prices is renewed virus outbreaks and lockdowns. It is impossible to forecast these risks. That is why, in our opinion, Chinese stocks are facing fat tail risks. On the one hand, Omicron variants have extremely high transmission rates, making the virus very hard to contain. On the other hand, the government has shown that its dynamic zero-COVID policy has for now succeeded in containing the virus in both Shanghai and Beijing. It is certain, however, that the Chinese economy will incur considerable costs to prevent Omicron from spreading. In addition to the financial costs of ongoing widespread testing, there are also logistical impediments and inefficiencies that these testing and verification policies introduce, even in the absence of lockdowns.  Will “Animal Spirits” Among Consumers And Businesses Revive? Another major unknown is whether confidence among consumers and businesses will recover so that they resume spending. If private sector sentiment remains weak, then stimulus measures will have a low multiplier. In other words, the ongoing stimulus will likely fail to boost economic activity. Our proxies for marginal propensity to spend by households and enterprises have been very depressed (Chart 15). Other sentiment/confidence surveys convey the same message. Further, credit demand is non-existent. Banks have lately been buying corporate acceptance bills to fulfill their loan quota (Chart 16). Chart 15Chinese Households And Enterprises Are Reluctant To Spend More Chart 16China: Banks Bought Refinancing Bills in April To Make Their Loan Quota   Critically, the property market has always been a key determinant of overall consumer and business sentiment. Since 2008, there has been no recovery in the Chinese economy without a recovery of property sales, prices and construction (Chart 17). We are doubtful that property sales and construction will stage a strong recovery in the next six to nine months. Thus, our bias is that the multiplier effect of Chinese stimulus will underwhelm in the coming months. Will Western Investors Come Back To Chinese Stocks? Geopolitical tensions between the US and China and the events around the US-Russia clash reduce the likelihood that western investors will come back to Chinese markets, even as growth prospects improve. Chart 18 demonstrates that foreign investors have only marginally reduced their holdings of Chinese onshore stocks (A-shares) and bonds. These data encompass not only western investors, but also investors from other emerging Asian countries. Chart 17China: Housing Cycle = Business Cycle Chart 18Foreigners Sold A Small Portion Of Their Onshore Equity and Bond Holdings   The risk is that western investors will use any rebound in Chinese shares to reduce their exposure. This will weigh on investable stocks and preclude any significant and durable rally. A Word On The Exchange Rate The RMB will remain volatile in the coming months and will likely depreciate further against the US dollar: Shrinking exports will weigh on foreign exchange availability from exporters. With Asian currencies depreciating against the US, Beijing will be willing to tolerate moderate and gradual yuan depreciation against the greenback to maintain its export competitiveness. The one-year interest rate differential between China and the US has recently turned negative which has probably triggered a shift of deposits from RMB into the USD (Chart 19). In Hong Kong, deposits have recently begun shifting from yuan to HKD, i.e., USD (Chart 20). This development has coincided with the China-US, and hence, China-HK, interest rate differential turning negative. Chart 19China-US: The Interest Rate Differential Has Turned Negative Chart 20A Shift From RMB To HKD or USD Deposits   Finally, there will be more foreign capital outflows if either (1) COVID outbreaks and, hence, lockdowns persist, or (2) US-China tensions escalate. As Chart 18 above illustrates, foreign portfolio capital outflows have so far been modest. Bottom Line: The near-term outlook for the US dollar remains positive as the Fed maintains its hawkish stance. Consistently, the RMB will struggle in the near term but its multi-year outlook is positive. Investment Recommendations The outlook for Chinese stocks is characterized by fat tails. Odds of a material rally are not insignificant but also the probability of another relapse is not trivial either. For absolute return investors, one way to play such a bifurcated market outlook is to buy out-of-money call options and out-of-money put options simultaneously while maintaining a core / benchmark allocation in Chinese stocks. In regard to relative performance /regional allocation, we continue to recommend that emerging market portfolios overweight Chinese A-shares and maintain a neutral stance towards investable stocks. Meanwhile, global equity portfolios should remain neutral on A-shares while underweighting investable ones. This positioning is in-line with our overall EM allocation – we continue to recommend underweighting EM within a global equity portfolio. Consistently, we maintain our long A-shares / short investable Chinese stocks strategy. Onshore government bond yields will continue sliding as the main problem in China is deflation and weak growth, not inflation. The RMB is facing near term risks as its interest rate differential versus the US dollar dips deeper into negative territory. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com