Global
The situation in Saudi Arabia is still unfolding following the weekend’s drone strikes that removed ~5.7 mm barrels per day from the global oil market. The price of Brent crude oil spiked yesterday, from $61 to $68, and depending on how long it takes Saudi…
In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's massive 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil fields, which produces close to 2mm b/d, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom…
BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin, has noted that global manufacturing cycles average three years from peak to peak. As the last growth cycle began in late spring of 2017, this means that we are likely close to the bottom of the current cycle and…
The dovish turn of global monetary policy in 2019 has been fairly limited in terms of the size of cuts, but broad in terms of the number of countries that have delivered cuts. Our Global Monetary Easing Indicator (GMEI), which measures the percentage of…
Commodity demand appears to be turning up, based on our assessment of global industrial activity. As demand picks up, we expect industrial commodity prices will move higher (Chart of the Week, top panel). For all practical purposes, central banks and numerous governments have moved into recession-fighting mode, following the contraction in manufacturing activity brought on by the U.S. Fed’s rates-normalization policy last year, and China’s deleveraging campaign in 2017-18. Together, these policies severely retarded credit and liquidity available to markets, and drove the USD higher, to the detriment of commodity demand (Chart of the Week, middle panel). Current policy responses will support a revival of manufacturing, and with it, global trade (Chart of the Week, bottom panel). While we continue to expect a weaker USD on the back of additional Fed easing this year and recovery of ex-U.S. economic growth in line with our House view, we remain wary uncoordinated global monetary accommodation by a large number of central banks could leave the dollar well bid. This could stifle the commodity-demand revival by keeping local-currency commodity costs high (Chart 2). This would be especially bearish for base metals prices.1 Chart of the WeekGlobal Industrial Activity Moving Higher Chart 2USD Strength Will Pose Risk To Industrial Commodity Demand Highlights Energy: Overweight. The appointment of Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s (KSA) new Energy Minister signals the royal family will push harder to manage production and reduce global oil inventories ahead of the IPO of Saudi Aramco. The prince brings more than 30 years of experience to the role, making him something of an outlier among KSA’s ministers – technocrats typically have occupied the position, and he is the first royal to serve as Energy Minister. We believe the prince’s immediate goal is to get Brent into the mid- to high-$70/bbl ahead of the IPO later this year or early next year. The first leg of the IPO reportedly will be done locally in the Kingdom, with Saudi investors taking ~ 1% of the Saudi Aramco float. Base Metals: Neutral. China imported 1.82mm MT of copper concentrates in August, a 9.3% increase y/y, as smelters continue to buy partly processed ores to feed expanding capacity. Concentrate imports in July were a record 2.07mm MT. Precious Metals: Neutral. The World Platinum Investment Council (WPIC) forecasts a 9% increase in platinum demand this year, driven primarily by ETF investors. This “more than offsets expected demand decreases in the automotive and jewellery segments of 4% and 5% respectively.” WPIC reduced its expected physical surplus this year to 345k ounces, from its earlier expectation of 375k ounces. Our tactical long platinum position recommended August 29, 2019 is up 1.9%. Separately, we are taking profits on our Long 10-year TIPS position at tonight’s close. It was up 9.3% on September 10, 2019. The position was recommended July, 27, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. A wet start to the planting season points to lower corn and bean yields this year vs. 2018. AccuWeather expects 2019 corn yields will fall 7.35% y/y to 13.36 billion bushels, and soybean yields will be down 19.5% y/y to 3.658 billion bushels. Besides stressing crops at the beginning of the season, weather-related delays also increase the risk some of this year’s crop will be exposed to frost at the end of the season before it is harvested. Weather effects continue to be apparent in the USDA’s crop conditions report, particularly for corn, where the USDA now rates 55% of the U.S. crop good or excellent, vs. 68% a year earlier. Last week, the USDA rated 58% of the corn crop good or excellent. Feature Leading indicators are signaling the slowdown in global growth – i.e., aggregate-demand growth – likely bottomed ex-Europe (Chart 3). The chart shows easing global financial conditions, along with fiscal stimulus, most likely have arrested the slowdown in industrial commodity demand (Chart 4). Chart 3Manufacturing Downturn Likely Arrested Following Broad Monetary Stimulus Chart 4Global Financial Conditions Are Supportive Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth We expect the recovery in demand will be most visible in the LMEX base metals index and in oil markets. Base metals demand is highly concentrated in China – accounting for ~ 50% of global demand – and EM Asia. Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast continues to signal oil demand also will revive in 2H19 as GDP growth picks up (Chart 5). Markets still could wobble, which is why the evolution of EM import volumes remains important, given their high correlation with GDP levels. A number of gauges we follow closely – particularly those associated with the movement of good on the sea (Chart 6) and in the air (Chart 7) – have turned up in 3Q19. We expect this to continue into 4Q19 and next year. Chart 5Monetary, Fiscal Stimulus Will Lift Oil Demand Chart 6Shipping Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods Chart 7Air Freight Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods USD Strength Keeps Us Wary The contraction in manufacturing and EM trade volumes is largely the result of the Fed’s rates-normalization policy last year, and China’s deleveraging campaign in 2017-18, in our view. These policies raised the value of the USD, which raised local-currency costs of dollar-denominated commodities, and all other goods and services invoiced and funded with dollars (Chart 8). Indeed, as Chart 2 shows, oil prices and base metals prices in local-currency terms ex-U.S. are closer to their earlier highs when Brent was trading above $100/bbl. This redounded to the detriment of commodity demand.2 The Sino-U.S. trade war certainly does not help commodity demand. For the most part, however, we believe this affects demand expectations – i.e., capex- and investment-driven demand. We believe firms and households will reduce outlays and increase precautionary savings, as a buffer against an expansion of the trade war into a larger global conflict, which likely would impair global supply chains and growth prospects. Chart 8Strong USD Keeps Us Wary While we expect the USD to weaken as the Fed cuts its policy rate, in line with our House view, we reiterate the non-trivial risk that global monetary accommodation still could leave the dollar well bid.3 Rising negative yielding debts globally makes U.S. yields relatively attractive despite the ongoing easing, supporting capital inflows in U.S. fixed income markets. Investment Implications The coincidence of fiscal and monetary policy easing is showing up in our gauges of global economic activity and in our leading indicators. We remain long oil exposure and precious metals – gold on a strategic basis, silver and platinum on a tactical basis. As we see industrial commodity demand picking up, we will look to go long copper. Bottom Line: Our gauges of economic activity continue to point to a bottoming of the global ex-U.S. slowdown in industrial activity, particularly in manufacturing, which has been hard-hit by a downturn in auto output. We expect USD weakness to become a tailwind for industrial commodities; however, we are wary continued strength in the dollar – it is above its 1Q02 peak – could crimp industrial metals, and maybe even oil, prices (Chart 9). Chart 9USD TWIB Strength Hampers Industrial Commodity Demand Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We use base metals demand, particularly for copper, as an indicator of EM industrial activity in our modeling. These markets are somewhat removed from the idiosyncratic forces driving oil supply-demand dynamics, particularly on the supply side, where OPEC 2.0 continues to maintain its policy of production discipline to reduce global inventory levels. OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition lead by KSA and Russia, which was formed in 2016 with the explicit mission of reducing the global oil-inventory overhang resulting from the 2014-15 market share war launched by the original OPEC states in 2H14. 2 Last week we discussed USD strength vis-à-vis oil demand. Please see Central Bank Easing Key To Oil Prices. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 A non-trivial risk is bounded at the lower end by Russian-roulette odds – i.e., 1:6 – in our usage of the phrase. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Anecdotal evidences from industry specialists suggest that many manufacturers have been engaging in re-routing their supply chains to avoid the U.S.-China tariffs. This is welcome news. Manufacturing slowdowns have tended to last 18 months peak-to-trough,…
The tug of war between deteriorating global growth and easing liquidity conditions cannot last forever. Either the dollar breakout morphs into a panic buying frenzy or proves to be a bull trap. Are we at the cusp of a bottom in global growth, or approaching a…
The Markit global manufacturing PMI remained below 50 for the fourth month in a row in August. While the global PMI did edge up slightly from July’s reading, this was largely due to a modest rebound in the Chinese PMI, which rose from 49.9 to 50.4. The…
Highlights Growth & Yields: The massive bond rally of 2019 is in its dying days - the sharp downward momentum of global bond yields is fading, just as leading economic indicators are starting to move higher. Data Surprises & Yields: The risk of a snapback in yields is growing in countries where there are more positive economic data surprises but where yields remain depressed – like the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Duration Strategy: We still recommend investors to stick to a neutral (at benchmark) stance on overall portfolio duration in the near term (0-3 months). Markets will need more than just one or two positive data points to be convinced that global growth is rebounding, and U.S.-China trade tensions remain a lingering concern. On a cyclical horizon (6-12 months), however, once it is clear that we’ve entered into a new global manufacturing up-cycle, global yields will rise more sustainably, justifying reduced duration exposure. Feature Chart of the WeekA Potential Bottoming Of Growth & Yields Is The Great Global Bond Rally of 2019 finally running out of gas? Government bond yields in the major developed economies have stabilized and are now starting to drift a bit higher. Benchmark 10-year yields are all up by healthy amounts from the inter-day lows reached on September 3rd (U.S. +18bps, Germany +17bps, U.K. +24bps, Canada +24bps). Yields remain well below intermediate term trend measures like the 200-day moving average, however, suggesting that these rebounds may only be corrective in nature and not yet the start of a more sustained cyclical move higher. Reliable economic data like our global manufacturing PMI are still falling and remain at levels suggesting weakening global growth. Yet on a rate-of-change basis, the pace of the decline in the PMI is fading, indicating that the worst of the downturn is likely behind us. A bottoming of the downward momentum of the PMI typically coincides with fading downward momentum in bond yields (Chart of the Week), which suggests that, at a minimum, bond yields are unlikely to fall below the recent lows. A similar signal is given by our global leading economic indicator (LEI), which has clearly bottomed and is now starting to drift higher. We shifted to a tactically neutral stance on global duration exposure back in early August, based on our near-term concerns that the ratcheting up of U.S.-China trade tensions through new tariffs would further raise economic uncertainty and heighten the demand for safe assets like government bonds – especially given the decline in global manufacturing activity. Last week’s announcement that U.S.-China trade talks would resume in early October was a positive step towards a potential de-escalation of trade tensions, which did help provide a pro-risk lift to global bond yields (at least for one day). For now, however, we are staying with a near-term neutral view on duration until we see more concrete signs of progress from the October 5 U.S.-China trade meetings in D.C. The heightened political drama in the U.K. is another reason to be cautious, with the October 31 Brexit deadline – and potentially a U.K. election before then – fast approaching (NOTE: we will be publishing a joint Special Report on the U.K. with our colleagues at Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy on September 20). More fundamentally, we will look to reduce our recommended duration exposure back to below-benchmark once global manufacturing data (i.e. U.S. ISM, Markit PMIs) and economic sentiment data (i.e. global ZEW, German IFO) stabilize – an outcome that grows increasingly likely given the signs of improvement we are seeing in the global LEI. Finding The Biggest Disagreements Between Economic Data & Bond Yields One time-tested way to identify a potential cyclical market top or bottom, for any asset class and not just bonds, is to look for divergences in prices from fundamentals. For example, when bond yields continue to fall despite signs that economic data are starting to improve (or, at least, when there is less data underperforming expectations). We can see such a divergence today when looking at bond yields versus data surprise indices. The most visible divergences between better data surprises and low bond yields are in the U.S., Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In Charts 2 & 3, we show the 26-week change in the benchmark 10-year government bond yield (in basis points) versus the widely followed Citigroup Economic Data Surprise Indices for the U.S., euro area, Japan, the U.K., Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden The broad relationship is that yields fall faster when data is weaker than expected, and vice versa. The relationship is stronger in some countries like the U.S. and the U.K., and very weak in Japan, but we can still look for divergences between yield changes and data surprises for signs of bond yields deviating from economic growth. Chart 2Data Surprises Diverging From Yields In The U.S. … Chart 3… And In "The Dollar Bloc" The most visible such divergences are in the U.S., Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand; in those countries, more data releases have been surprising to the upside versus consensus forecasts of late, yet bond yields have been falling at a very rapid rate. In the euro area, the U.K. and Sweden, data has been disappointing versus expectations, justifying the rapid move down in bond yields in those countries purely from an economic growth perspective. For all countries shown, interest rate markets are now priced for aggressive monetary easing. Our 12-month discounters, based on pricing from Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves, all show that money markets expect central banks to ease policy over the next year. Our discounters remain highly correlated to the level of government bond yields (Charts 4 & 5), which means that the biggest risk to the Great Global Bond Rally of 2019 is that policymakers do not deliver the full amount of easing discounted by markets. Chart 4Bond Yields Are Vulnerable To A Rebound … Chart 5… Given Overly Dovish Policy Expectations That risk looks greatest in countries where there is both a divergence between improving data surprises and low bond yields AND a significant amount of interest rate cuts priced into the OIS curve – like the U.S. (98bps of cuts discounted), Australia (42bps), Canada (32bps) and New Zealand (33bps). Japan (13bps), the euro area (22bps) and Sweden (4bps) are all cases where central bank policy rates (and bond yields) are negative but where additional rate cuts are still discounted. Data continues to disappoint to the downside in the euro area and Sweden, however, suggesting that bond yields there are less at risk of a corrective snapback. A similar argument applies in the U.K. (25bps), where there is not a divergence between weak data and falling Gilt yields. Given the weak correlation between data surprises and changes in bond yields in Japan – an unsurprising outcome given the Bank of Japan’s outright manipulation of JGB yields – we find it difficult to make any conclusions on the next move in yields based solely on an analysis of Japanese data surprises. That risk of higher bond yields is greatest in countries where data surprises are diverging from bond yields AND a significant amount of interest rate cuts are discounted. Bottom Line: The massive bond rally of 2019 is in its dying days - the sharp downward momentum of global bond yields is fading, just as leading economic indicators are starting to move higher. The risk of a snapback in yields is growing in countries where there are more positive economic data surprises but where yields remain depressed – like the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Increasingly Schizophrenic Nature Of Global Central Banks The dovish turn of global monetary policy in 2019 has been fairly limited in terms of the size of cuts, but broad in terms of the number of countries that have delivered cuts. Our Global Monetary Easing Indicator (GMEI), which measures the percentage of central banks (out of a list of 29) that have cut policy rates from three months earlier, is a simple way to measure the “breadth” of the global monetary policy cycle. In Chart 6, we compare the GMEI (shown on an inverted scale) to our global LEI. Historically, the GMEI has peaked around three months after the global LEI troughs. Afterward, facing prospects of improving growth, central banks gradually took their feet off the gas pedal, with the GMEI moving to zero as the global LEI continued to climb. Chart 6Introducing Our Global Monetary Easing Indicator The ups and downs of central banker actions have become more complicated since 2008. After the financial crisis, policymakers had to keep rates at or near the zero lower bound. For the Fed looking over at its Japanese counterpart, the prospect of keeping rates too low for too long, and thereby eventually losing the ability to stimulate the economy through rate cuts in the next downturn, was a fearful one. At the same time, creating overly easy financial conditions and indirectly causing the next asset bubble was another concern for policymakers in the aftermath of the financial crisis. After 2016, central bank behavior became particularly misguided. This “bi-polar” policy environment clearly caused a change in the reaction function of global central banks. Post-crisis, they have been slower to react to signs of global weakness. In 2016, for example, the GMEI peaked a full six months after the trough in the LEI – a longer reaction time compared to previous cycles. Even when they did react, however, it was at a lower intensity, with smaller easings by fewer banks, compared to previous cycles After 2016, however, central bank behavior became particularly misguided. The subsequent monetary tightening was clearly too abrupt. Investor sentiment and expectations of global growth, captured by our GFIS duration indicator (Chart 7), were on their way down while global central banks were all too eager to stop easing, ignoring the data showing signs of global weakness – especially from China. Chart 7Central Banks Are Zigging When They Should Be Zagging By June 2018, none of the central banks included in the GMEI were easing, despite the global LEI having peaked six months earlier. In September 2018, despite facing persistent global weakness – the global manufacturing PMI had fallen from its peak of 54.4 nine months earlier to 52.1 and the global LEI was already in negative territory indicating more weakness to come – only a meagre 3% of central banks had begun stimulating. The Fed exemplified this complacency with its rate hike in December 2018 and its refusal to clearly pivot in a dovish direction until three months later. When they ultimately delivered a rate cut in late July of this year, it was clear they had waited too long. Chart 8How Will Dovish Policymakers Respond To Improving Growth? Globally, the overall policy response was non-existent all the way until May 2019, when central banks finally got with the program and scrambled to ease. Now, with the Fed having cut rates and facing the possibility of further rate cuts (possibly hastened by the Tweeter-in-Chief), global central bankers will not want to be left behind, lest they suffer unwanted currency strength and forgo export competitiveness. However, they might be once again misreading the data and the global easing cycle might be much closer to its end than its beginning. BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin, has noted that global manufacturing cycles average three years from peak to peak. As the last growth cycle began in late spring of 2017, this means that we are likely at the bottom of the current cycle and therefore, global growth should start to pick up soon. This message is reinforced by our Global LEI diffusion index (Chart 8), which indicates that the Global LEI has put in a bottom and will continue climbing higher in the coming months. The easing of global financial conditions, and the lagged impact of China’s policy stimulus measures from earlier in 2019, corroborate the message from the global LEI. With bonds as overbought as they are today, we expect yields to rebound once investors realize that the sky is not really falling. A pick up in the global LEI, in turn, suggests that the global PMI will follow and should soon move higher, with a lead time of six months based on past cycles (as we show in the bottom panel of Chart 1). Another reliable leading growth indicator, the level of high-yield corporate bond spreads, is also signaling a rebound in both the U.S. and euro area economies over the next few quarters (Chart 9). Chart 9High-Yield Spreads Are A Leading Economic Indicator Global bond yields, meanwhile, seem stuck between a rock and a hard place. As shown in Chart 10, yields move with expectations of future growth. Bond investors are sensitive to declines in expectations of future growth, captured by the global LEI, as this necessitates central bank intervention in the future to lower short-term rates, thus bringing down the expectations component of long-term yields. At the same time, a slowdown in growth in the present increases the safe-haven demand for bonds which again drives down yields. Chart 10Potential Triggers For Higher Bond Yields Although the global is ticking back up, global policy uncertainty (Chart 10, middle panel) is near all-time highs due to the U.S.-China trade war. In such an environment, investors will naturally flock to the safety of bonds. In previous reports, we have shown how similar the current backdrop is to the 2015/2016 episode, when nervous bond investors were less likely to be forward-looking and needed to see firm evidence of a pickup in global growth before they started to push up yields on a sustained basis. Given the increasing likelihood that global central banks will not be able to fully deliver the amount of aggressive easing discounted by markets because of a more stable growth backdrop, any lessening of trade tensions – a growing possibility with U.S. President Donald Trump gearing up for the 2020 election – should allow calmer heads to once again prevail as global economic momentum improves and policy uncertainty wanes. With bonds as overbought as they are today, we expect yields to rebound once investors realize that the sky is not really falling. It remains to be seen how policymakers respond to that outcome. Given recent history, however, we fear that central bankers could end up turning more hawkish once again faster than markets expect, which would set the stage for a more sustainable rise in global bond yields in 2020. Bottom Line: We still recommend that investors stick to a neutral benchmark overall portfolio duration stance in the near term (0-3 months). Markets will need more than just one or two positive data points to be convinced that global growth is rebounding. On a cyclical horizon, once it is clear that we’ve entered into a new global manufacturing up-cycle, global yields are likely to rise. As Trump reaches for a deal ahead of the 2020 election, the decline in global policy uncertainty will contribute to a more bond-bearish environment. Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma, Research Associate shaktis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Global bond yields have closely tracked the trajectory of global growth. While the global economy remains fragile, some positive signs are emerging: Our global leading economic indicator has moved off its lows; global financial conditions have eased significantly; U.S. household spending remains resilient; and China is set to further increase stimulus. Neither a severe escalation of the trade war nor a hard Brexit is likely. A simple comparison between current dividend yields and bond yields implies that global equities would need to fall by an outsized amount over the next decade for bonds to outperform stocks. As global growth stabilizes and then begins to recover over the coming months, bond yields will rebound from depressed levels. Investors should overweight stocks versus bonds for now, and look to upgrade EM and European equities later this year. Feature Global Growth Driving Bond Yields Chart 1Global Bond Yields: How Low Will They Go? Global bond yields rose sharply yesterday on word that U.S. and Chinese trade negotiators will meet in October. The announcement by China’s State Council of additional stimulus measures and better-than-expected data on the health of the U.S. service sector also drove the bond sell-off. The jump in yields follows a period of almost unrelenting declines. After hitting a high of 3.25% last October, the U.S. 10-year yield fell to 1.43% this Tuesday, just shy of its all-time low of 1.34% reached on July 5, 2016. The 30-year Treasury yield broke below 2% for the first time in history on August 15, falling to as low as 1.91% this week. It now stands at 2.07%. In Japan and across much of Europe, bond yields remain firmly in negative territory (Chart 1). The large movements in bond yields can be attributed to both the state of the global economy as well as to changes in how central banks are reacting to economic uncertainty. Just as stronger global growth pushed yields higher between mid-2016 and early-2018, the deceleration in growth since then has pulled yields lower. Chart 2 shows that there has been a close correlation between changes in the U.S. 10-year yield and the ISM manufacturing index. The release on Tuesday of a weaker-than-expected ISM manufacturing print for August was enough to push the 10-year yield down by seven basis points within a matter of minutes. Chart 2The Deceleration In Growth Has Pulled Yields Down The forward-looking new orders component of the ISM manufacturing index sunk to a seven-year low. The export orders component fell to the lowest level since 2009. Export volumes track ISM export orders quite closely (Chart 3). Not surprisingly, the ISM press release noted that trade remains “the most significant issue” for U.S. manufacturers. Chart 3Export Volumes Track The ISM Export Component The only redeeming feature in the report was that the customers’ inventories index dropped a notch from 45.7 in July to 44.9 in August. A reading below 50 for this subindex indicates that manufacturers believe that their customers are holding too few inventories, which is positive for future production. Global Manufacturing PMI Not Looking Much Brighter The Markit global manufacturing PMI remained below 50 for the fourth month in a row in August. While the global PMI did edge up slightly from July’s reading, this was largely due to a modest rebound in the Chinese PMI, which rose from 49.9 to 50.4. The improvement in the China Markit-Caixin PMI stands in contrast to the further deterioration observed in the “official” National Bureau of Statistics PMI. The former is more heavily geared towards private-sector exporting companies, and hence may have been influenced by the front-loading of exports ahead of the planned tariff increase on Chinese exports to the United States. Some Positive Signs Chart 4Global LEI Has Moved Off Its Lows In light of the disappointing manufacturing data, it is too early to call a bottom in the global industrial cycle. Nevertheless, there are some hopeful signs. Our Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has moved off its lows (Chart 4). It usually leads the PMIs by a few months. Sterling will probably be the best performing currency in the G7 over the next five years. Despite ongoing weakness in the manufacturing sector, household spending has held up in most economies. In the U.S., the nonmanufacturing ISM index jumped to 56.4 in August from 53.7 in July. Real personal consumption is still on track to grow by 2.8% in Q3 according to the Atlanta Fed (Chart 5). The euro area services PMIs have also been resilient (Chart 6). In Germany, where the manufacturing PMI stood at 43.5 in August, the services PMI rose to 54.8. Chart 5Inventories And Net Exports Have Subtracted From U.S. Growth In Q2 And Q3 Chart 6AThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) Chart 6BThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) Global financial conditions have eased significantly, mainly thanks to the steep decline in bond yields. The current level of financial conditions implies that global growth could rebound swiftly (Chart 7). The Chinese government is also likely to step up fiscal/credit stimulus over the coming months in an effort to shore up growth. In a boldly worded statement released on Wednesday, the Chinese State Council promised to further increase bond issuance to finance infrastructure projects, while cutting interest rates and reserve requirements. A stronger Chinese economy should benefit global growth (Chart 8). Chart 7Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth Chart 8Stronger Chinese Growth Should Benefit The Global Economy The Trade War: Moving Towards A Détente? The announcement that the U.S. and China will resume trade negotiations on October 5th is a step in the right direction. As we noted last week, both parties have an incentive to de-escalate the trade conflict. President Trump wants to prop up the stock market and the economy in order to improve his re-election prospects. China also wants to bolster growth.1 Chart 9Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? As difficult as it has been for China to deal with Donald Trump, trying to secure a trade deal with him after he has been re-elected would be even more challenging. This would be especially the case if Trump thought that the Chinese had tried to sabotage his re-election bid. Even if Trump were to lose the election, it is not clear that China would end up with someone more palatable to deal with on trade matters. Does the Chinese government really want to negotiate over labor standards and human rights with President Warren, who betting markets now think has a better chance of becoming the Democratic nominee than Joe Biden (Chart 9)? While Republicans in Congress would be able to restrain a Democratic president on domestic issues, the president would still enjoy free rein over trade policy. Brexit Uncertainty Adding To Investor Angst Two weeks before the Brexit vote on June 23, 2016, I wrote that “Just like my gut told me last August that Trump would do much better at the polls than almost anyone thought possible, I increasingly feel that come June 24th, the EU may find itself with one less member.”2 Chart 10Brexit Opposition Has Been Growing Soon after the shocking verdict, we argued that a hard Brexit would prove to be politically infeasible, meaning that the U.K. would either end up holding another referendum or be forced to negotiate some sort of customs union with the EU. Our view that a hard Brexit will not happen has not changed. Chart 10 shows that opposition to Brexit has only grown since that fateful day. Boris Johnson does not have enough votes in Westminster to force a hard Brexit. Another election would not change this outcome, given that it would almost certainly produce a hung parliament. In any case, it is not clear that Johnson actually wants a hard Brexit. The Times of London recently reported that the government’s own contingency plans for a hard Brexit, weirdly code-named “Operation Yellowhammer,” predicted a crippling logjam at British ports leading to shortages of fuel, food and medicine.3 Boris Johnson is all hat and no cattle. He will be forced to make a deal with the EU. Buy the pound on any dips. Sterling will probably be the best performing currency in the G7 over the next five years. Central Banks: Cut First, Ask Questions Later Chart 11Inflation Expectations Are Low Across The Globe Despite a few glimmers of good news, central banks are in no mood to take any chances. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard said it bluntly last week: “Our job is to get the yield curve uninverted.”4 If history is any guide, global growth will stabilize and begin to recover over the coming months. Inflation expectations are below target in most economies (Chart 11). Central banks know full well that if the current slowdown morphs into a full-blown recession, they will be out of monetary ammunition very quickly. In such a setting, it does not make sense to hold your punches. Much better to generate as much inflation as possible, and as soon as possible, so that real rates can be brought deeper into negative territory if economic circumstances later warrant it. What If The Medicine Works? The risk of easing monetary policy too much is that economies will eventually overheat, producing more inflation than is desirable. It is easy to forget that the aggregate unemployment rate in the G7 is now below its 2007 lows (Chart 12). True, inflation has yet to take off, but this may simply be because inflation is a lagging indicator (Chart 13). Chart 12Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower Chart 13Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator For all the talk about how the Phillips curve is dead, the empirical evidence suggests it is very much alive and well (Chart 14). Ironically, this means that lower interest rates today could set the stage for much higher rates in the future if hyperstimulative monetary policies ultimately generate a bout of inflation. Chart 14The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well Chart 15The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Investment Conclusions Like most economic forecasters, central banks tend to extrapolate recent trends too far into the future. Global growth has been weakening since early 2018 so it seems reasonable to assume that this trend will persist into next year. However, as we have documented, global industrial cycles tend to last about three years – 18 months of rising growth followed by 18 months of falling growth.5 If history is any guide, global growth will stabilize and begin to recover over the coming months. Should that occur, we will enter an environment where the lagged effects of easier monetary policy are hitting the economy just when the manufacturing cycle is taking a turn for the better. Stocks are likely to fare well in such a setting, while long-term bond yields will move higher. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will also start to weaken anew (Chart 15). Granted, an intensification of the trade war or some other major adverse shock would upset this rosy forecast. Nevertheless, current market pricing offers a fairly large cushion against downside risks. Thanks to the drop in bond yields, the equity risk premium is quite high globally (Chart 16). Even if one were to assume that nominal dividend payments remain unchanged for the next ten years, the S&P 500 would still need to fall by more than 20% in real terms over the next decade for bonds to outperform stocks (Chart 17). Euro area stocks would need to drop by more than 42%. U.K. stocks would need to plummet by at least 60%! Chart 16AEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Chart 16BEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) Chart 17AStocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (I) Chart 17BStocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (II) Investors should remain overweight stocks versus bonds over the next 12 months. We intend to upgrade EM and European equities once we see a bit more evidence that global growth has troughed. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Psychological Recession?” dated August 30, 2019. 2Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Worry About Brexit, Not Payrolls,” dated June 10, 2016. 3Rosamund Urwin and Caroline Wheeler, “Operation Chaos: Whitehall’s Secret No-Deal Brexit Preparations Leaked,” The Times, August 18, 2019. 4“Fed’s Bullard Sees ‘Robust Debate’ Over Half-Point Cut,” Bloomberg, August 23, 2019. 5Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Cycles,” dated July 26, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades