Economy

Highlights Bank of Canada: Rising inflation, high capacity utilization, and monetary policy constraints will force the Bank of Canada to taper further and move up the timing of its first rate hike to H1/2022. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds in global government bond portfolios. Also, upgrade Canadian real return bonds to neutral within the underweight allocation to better reflect the mixed signals from our suite of Canadian inflation breakeven indicators. Bank of England: Markets have aggressively shifted UK interest rate expectations, with a rate hike now expected before year-end. We expect that outcome to occur, but the vote will be close. Stay underweight UK Gilts in global bond portfolios. Maintain a curve steepening bias that would win if a hike is delayed to 2022 or, counterintuitively, even if the Bank of England does indeed hike in November or December - longer-term UK yields are still too low relative to the likely peak in Bank Rate. Feature Chart of the WeekAn Inflation Shock For Bond Yields Steadily climbing inflation expectations, fueled by rising energy prices and persistent supply-chain disruptions, remain a thorn in the side of global bond markets. 10-year US TIPS breakevens have climbed to a 15-year high of 2.7%, while breakevens on 10-year German inflation-linked bonds are at a 9-year high of 2%. Rising inflation expectations are keeping upward pressure on nominal bond yields in the major developed economies, as markets start to slowly reprice the pace and timing of future interest rate increases (Chart of the Week). Market expectations on interest rates, however, can adjust much more quickly when policymakers change their tune. We have already seen that recently in smaller countries like Norway and New Zealand. Rate hikes delivered by the Norges Bank and Reserve Bank of New Zealand over the past month - which were telegraphed well in advance by the central banks – were a negative shock that pushed up bond yields in those countries. The next central bank “liftoff” within the developed economies is expected to occur in the UK and Canada, according to pricing in overnight index swap (OIS) curves (Table 1). In this report, we consider the outlook for monetary policy and government bond yields in both countries, which represent two of our highest conviction underweight recommendations. Table 1Markets Are Pulling Forward Rate Hikes Canada: Watch For A Bond Bearish Policy Shift In Canada, given the economic backdrop and policy constraints, we believe the Bank of Canada (BoC) will have to deliver on the hawkish market-implied path for interest rates, which calls for an initial rate hike to occur in Q2/2022 – much sooner than the central bank’s current messaging on liftoff. Chart 2ACanadian Inflation Not Looking So "Transitory" Anymore First on the BoC’s mind is inflation. Canadian CPI inflation came in at 4.4% year-over-year in September, blowing through analyst expectations and hitting an 18-year high (Charts 2A and 2B). The CPI-trim, a measure of core inflation which strips out extreme price movements, hit 3.4% year-over-year, the highest reading since 1991. All eight major components of the CPI rose on a yearly basis. On an annualized monthly basis, the energy-driven Transportation aggregate declined and less volatile components like Shelter (+1.1%) and Clothing (+0.7%) led the pack in terms of their contribution to the overall figure.   The data show that inflationary pressures are clearly broadening out in the Great White North, no longer constrained to “transitory” sectors. The effect of this inflationary pressure is also starting to make its mark on consumer and business sentiment. Chart 3Rising Inflation Expectations Are Hurting Canadian Consumer Sentiment According to the BoC Survey of Consumer Expectations, the 1-year-ahead forecast of inflation reached a series high of 3.7% in Q3/2021 (Chart 3). While longer-term inflation expectations are more subdued, that doesn’t mean that inflation is not a worry for the Canadian consumer. With inflation expected to run much higher than expected wage growth (+2%) over the next year, consumers expect a decline in their real purchasing power. Correspondingly, consumer confidence is taking a hit—the Bloomberg/Nanos consumer sentiment index has fallen 7.3 points since the July peak. Canadian businesses are much more upbeat. The overall summary indicator from the BoC’s Business Outlook Survey for Q3/2021 climbed to the highest level in the 18-year history of the series (Chart 4). Firms reported continued expectations of strong demand, but with capacity constraints starting to weigh on sales - a quarter of firms surveyed reporting that a lack of capacity and skills will have a negative impact on sales over the next twelve months. In response, more companies are planning on increasing capital expenditure and hiring over the next year (Chart 4, middle panel). More than half of firms surveyed by the BoC indicated that investment spending will be higher over the next two years compared to typical pre-pandemic levels. Chart 4Canadian Businesses Are Brushing Up Against Capacity Constraints However, hiring plans will likely face difficulty, given the large share of firms (64%), reporting more intense labor shortages (Chart 4, bottom panel). A net 50% of respondents now expect wage growth to accelerate over the coming year, driven by a need to attract and retain workers amid strong labor demand. With regards to inflation, the BoC Business Outlook Survey measures the share of respondents that expect inflation over the next two years to fall within four different ranges—below 1%, between 1% and 2%, between 2% and 3%, and above 3% (Chart 5). We can “back out” a point estimate of expected inflation for Canadian firms by assigning a specific level to each of these ranges – 0.5, 1.5%, 2.5%, and 3.5%, respectively – and using the shares of respondents to calculate a weighted average expected inflation rate for the next two years.1 Based on this estimate, Canadian business inflation expectations have bounced rapidly since the 2020 trough and are now at all-time highs. The BoC has already begun to respond to the normalization of the economy and rising inflationary pressures indicated by its business survey by tapering the pace of its bond buying program. The Bank is now targeting weekly bond purchases of C$2bn, down from C$5bn at the start of the program and with another reduction expected at this week’s policy meeting (Chart 6). The size of the balance sheet has also fallen in absolute terms, driven by the Bank drawing down its holdings of treasury bills to virtually zero while also ending pandemic emergency liquidity programs. Chart 5Putting A Number To Canadian Business Inflation Expectations Chart 6The BoC Is Moving Towards Normalizing Policy The BoC now owns a massive 36.5% of Canadian government bonds outstanding – a share acquired in a very short time for this pandemic-era stimulus program. Thus, tapering now is not only necessary from a forward guidance perspective, signaling an eventual shift to less accommodative monetary policy and rate hikes, but also to ensure liquidity in the Canadian sovereign bond market. The remaining BoC tapering will be fairly quick, setting up the more important shift to the timing of the first rate increase. The Canadian OIS curve is currently pricing in BoC liftoff in April 2022, ahead of the BoC’s current guidance of a likely rate hike in the second half of the year (Chart 7). Given the developments on the inflation front, we are inclined to side with the market’s assessment of an earlier hike. In the longer run, rates might even be able to rise further than discounted in swap curves. The real policy rate, calculated as the policy rate minus the BoC’s CPI-trim measure, is negative and a significant distance from the New York Fed’s Q2/2020 estimate of the natural real rate of interest (R-star) for Canada of 1.4%. Admittedly, those estimates have not been updated by the New York Fed for over a year, given the uncertainties over trend growth and output gap measurement created by the pandemic shock. The BoC’s own estimates for the neutral nominal policy interest rate - last updated in April 2021 and therefore inclusive of any structural impacts of the pandemic on potential growth - range from 1.75% to 2.75%.2 The OIS forward curve expects the BoC to only lift rates to 2% in the next hiking cycle, barely in the lower end of the BoC’s neutral range of estimates. After subtracting the mid-point of the BoC’s 1-3% inflation target, presumably a level of inflation consistent with a neutral policy rate, the BoC’s implied real policy rate range is -0.25% to +0.75%. The current level of the real policy rate is near the bottom of that range. Thus, real rates, and the real bond yields that track them over time, have room to rise if the BoC begins to hike rates at a faster pace, and to a higher level, than the market expects. We see this as a likely outcome given the extent of the Canadian inflation overshoot and the robust optimism evident in Canadian business sentiment, thus justifying our current negative view on Canadian government bonds. To think about this mix of rising inflation expectations and increased BoC hawkishness down the road, and its implication for the Canadian inflation-linked bond market, we turn to our Canadian comprehensive breakeven indicator (Chart 8). This indicator combines three measures, on an equal-weighted and standardized basis, to determine the upside potential for 10-year inflation breakevens: the distance from fair value based on our models, the spread between headline inflation and the midpoint of the BoC’s 1-3% target inflation, and the gap between market-based and survey-based measures of inflation expectations. Going forward, we will be using the Canadian Business Outlook Survey measure of inflation expectations, introduced in Chart 5, for this indicator. Chart 8Upgrade Canadian Inflation-Linked Bonds To Neutral Two out of three measures point towards Canadian breakevens having further upside. Firstly, they are cheap under our fair value model, where the rise in breakevens has lagged the yearly growth in oil prices. Secondly, breakevens are a long distance away from the survey-based business inflation expectations. However, both forces are more than counteracted with Canadian headline inflation nearly two standard deviations from the BoC’s target, which indicates that the central bank must step in to address high realized inflation. Given these diverging signals on the upside potential for breakevens, we see a neutral allocation to Canadian linkers as more appropriate for the time being Bottom Line: Rising inflation, high capacity utilization, and monetary policy constraints will force the Bank of Canada to taper further and move up the timing of its first rate hike to H1/2022. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds in global government bond portfolios. Also, upgrade Canadian real return bonds to neutral within the underweight allocation to better reflect the mixed signals from our suite of Canadian inflation breakeven indicators. Will The BoE Actually Hike By December? Chart 9UK Gilts Have Been Hammered By BoE Hawkishness We downgraded our recommended stance on UK government bonds to underweight on August 11 and, since then, Gilts have severely underperformed their developed market peers (Chart 9).3 We had anticipated that the Bank of England (BoE) would be forced to shift their policy guidance in a less dovish direction because of rising UK inflation expectations. Yet we have been surprised by how quickly the BoE has shifted to an open discussion about the potential for imminent interest rate hikes. The BoE’s new chief economist, Huw Pill, commented in the Financial Times last week that UK inflation will likely hit, or even exceed, 5% by early next year, and that the November 4 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) was “live” with regards to a potential rate hike.4 This followed BoE Governor Andrew Bailey’s comment that the Bank “will have to act” to contain rising inflation expectations. Mixed signals on economic momentum are not making the BoE’s decisions any easier. The preliminary October Markit PMIs ticked higher for both manufacturing and services, but remain below the peak seen last May. At the same time, UK consumer confidence has fallen since August, thanks in part to rapidly rising inflation that has reduced the perceived real buying power of UK consumers. High Inflation Might Last Longer Chart 10Why The BoE Is More Worried About Inflation The BoE’s last set of economic forecasts, published in August, called for headline inflation to temporarily climb to 4% by year-end, before gradually returning to the central bank’s 2% target level in 2022. Yet the BoE’s newfound nervousness over inflation is well-founded, for a number of reasons (Chart 10): The domestic economic recovery has led to a robust labor market, with job vacancies relative to unemployment fully recovering to pre-COVID levels. The 3-month moving average of wage growth remains elevated at 6.9%, although the BoE believes some of that increase could be due to compositional issues related to the pandemic. The BoE is projecting that the UK output gap is narrowing rapidly and would be fully closed in the second half of 2022. This suggests growing underlying inflation pressures were already in place before the latest boost to inflation from global supply-chain disruptions. UK energy costs are soaring, particularly for natural gas which remains the main source for UK electricity production. UK natural gas inventories are the lowest within Europe, yet the supply response from major providers has been slow to develop – most notably, Russia, which is seeking regulatory approval to begin shipping gas through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. While natural gas prices have stopped rising, for now, inadequate supplies during an expected cold UK winter could keep the upward pressure on UK inflation from energy. UK house price inflation remains well supported, even with the recent expiration of the stamp duty reductions initiated as a form of pandemic economic stimulus. According to the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), the ratio of UK home sales to inventories is still quite elevated (bottom panel). Given a still-favorable demand/supply balance, and low borrowing costs, UK house price inflation will likely not cool as much as the BoE would prefer to see. Stay Defensive On UK Rates Exposure The combination of rising UK inflation and increasingly hawkish BoE comments has resulted in a rapid upward repricing of UK interest rate expectations over the past few months (Chart 11). Markets now expect the BoE to raise Bank Rate to 1%, from the current 0.1%, by late 2022. More interesting is what is discounted after that. The OIS curve is pricing in no additional rate increases in 2023 and a rate cut in 2024. In other words, the market now believes that the BoE is about to embark on a policy mistake with rate hikes that will need to be quickly reversed. Chart 11Markets Are Pricing In A BoE Policy Error We think there is a risk of a more aggressive-than-expected BoE tightening cycle. The surge in UK inflation expectations is not trivial nor “transitory”. Looking at survey-based measures of expectations like the YouGov/Citigroup survey, or market-based measures like CPI swaps, inflation is expected to reach at least 4% both in the short-term and over the longer-run (Chart 12). If Bank Rate were to peak at a mere 1%, as indicated in the OIS curve, that would still leave UK real interest rates in deeply negative territory even if there was a pullback in inflation expectations. We expect the votes on whether to hike rates at either the November or December MPC meetings to be close. There will be a new Monetary Policy Report published for the November 4 meeting, which will include a new set of economic and inflation forecasts that will give the BoE a platform to signal, or deliver, a rate hike. In the end, we think that the senior leadership on the MPC has already revealed too much of its hawkish hand, and a rate hike will occur by year-end. Looking beyond liftoff into 2022, we still see markets pricing in too shallow a path for Bank Rate over the next couple of years, leaving us comfortable to maintain our underweight stance on UK Gilts. With regards to positioning along the Gilt yield curve, however, we see the potential for more curve steepening even if after the BoE begins to lift rates. The implied path for UK real interest rates, taken as the gap between the UK OIS forwards and CPI swap forwards, shows that markets expect the BoE to keep policy rates well below expected inflation for well into the next decade (Chart 13). At the same time, the wide current gap between the actual real policy rate (Bank Rate minus headline inflation) and the New York Fed’s most recent estimate of the UK neutral real rate (r-star) suggests that the Gilt curve is far too flat (bottom panel). Chart 12The BoE Cannot Ignore This Perversely, this creates a situation where the UK curve steepeners can be an attractive near-term hedge to an underweight stance on UK Gilts. If the BoE does not deliver on the strongly hinted rate hike in November or December, the Gilt curve can steepen as shorter-maturity Gilt yields fall but longer-dated yields remain boosted by high inflation expectations.However, if the BoE does hike and more tightening is signaled, longer-term yields will likely rise more than shorter-term yields as the market prices in a higher future trajectory for policy rates. Bottom Line: Stay underweight UK Gilts in global bond portfolios, but maintain a curve steepening bias that would win if a hike is delayed to 2022 or, counterintuitively, even if the Bank of England does indeed hike in November or December - longer-term UK yields are still too low relative to the likely peak in Bank Rate. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For this calculation, we exclude firms that did not provide a response to the BoC Business Outlook Survey. 2 The Bank of Canada’s Staff Analytical Note on neutral rate estimation can be found here: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2021/04/staff-analytical-note-2021-6/ 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy and European Investment Strategy Report, "The UK Leads The Way", dated August 11, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4https://www.ft.com/content/bce7b1c5-0272-480f-8630-85c477e7d69 Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights Treasuries: Bond investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and continue to short the 5-year note versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. For those investors who want to take an outright long position in US Treasuries, the 2-year Treasury note looks like the best security to choose. Municipal Bonds: This week we upgrade our recommended allocation to municipal bonds from overweight (4 out of 5) to maximum overweight (5 out of 5). Investors who can take advantage of the muni tax exemption should favor municipal bonds over Treasuries and over corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. In particular, we recommend that investors focus on long-maturity municipal bonds. Fed: Given our view that inflation will fall during the next 12 months, we still view December 2022 as the most likely liftoff date. However, we will continue to monitor our Five Factors For Fed Liftoff to see if our forecast needs to be revised. Feature Our call for a bear-flattening of the US Treasury curve has worked out well during the past few weeks. Long-maturity Treasury yields have almost risen back to their March highs, and the short-end of the curve has also participated in the recent bout of selling (Chart 1). In light of these moves, it makes sense to re-evaluate our nominal Treasury curve positioning. First, we consider whether, at current yield levels, it still makes sense to run below-benchmark portfolio duration. Second, we consider whether our current recommended yield curve trade (short the 5-year note versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell) remains the best way to extract returns from changes in the yield curve’s shape. The next section of this report answers these questions by looking at forecasted returns for different Treasury maturities across a variety of plausible economic and monetary policy scenarios. Later in the report we look at municipal bond valuation and provide a quick update on last week’s Fedspeak. Forecasting Treasury Returns Three sources of Treasury bond return need to be considered when creating a forecast. Income Return: The return earned from the bond’s coupon payments. Rolldown Return: The return that a bond accrues simply by moving closer to its maturity date in an unchanged yield curve environment. Capital Gains/Losses: The return earned by a bond due to changes in the level and slope of the yield curve. We like to combine the income and rolldown return into one measure called “carry”. The carry can be thought of as the return an investor will earn in a specific bond if the yield curve remains unchanged throughout the investment horizon. Though carry is not the be all and end all of bond returns, it can be illuminating to look at the yield curve in terms of carry instead of the typical yield-to-maturity. Chart 2 shows the usual par coupon yield curve alongside the 12-month carry for each Treasury security. At present, the steepness of the 3-7 year part of the curve means that bonds of those maturities benefit a lot from rolldown. In fact, we see that a 7-year Treasury note will earn more than a 10-year Treasury note during the next 12 months if the curve remains unchanged. After calculating carry, the next step is to calculate capital gains/losses for each bond. To do this, we create some possible scenarios for future changes in the fed funds rate and assume that the yield curve moves to fully price-in that funds rate path over the course of a 12-month investment horizon.1  Next, we calculate the capital gains/losses for each bond based on the new shape of the yield curve in each scenario. Tables 1A-1D show the results from four different scenarios where the Fed starts to lift rates in December 2022. We then assume that the Fed will lift rates at a pace of 75-100 bps per year and that the funds rate will level-off at a terminal rate of either 2.08% or 2.58%. The 2.08% terminal rate corresponds to the median estimate of the long-run neutral fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants. The 2.58% terminal rate corresponds to the median forecast from the Fed’s Summary of Economic Projections.2  The scenario shown in Table 1B is the closest to our base case. In this scenario, some short-maturity bonds deliver positive returns, but returns are negative for the 5-year maturity and beyond. Also, the 5-year note delivers the worst total return of all the maturities we examine. Unsurprisingly, expected returns for the longer maturities drop significantly if we raise our terminal rate assumption to 2.58% (Tables 1C & 1D). Therefore, any call to short the 5-year note versus the long-end relies on an assumption that the market will trade as though the terminal rate is closer to 2% than to 2.5% during the next 12 months. This is in line with our expectation. Finally, we observe that slowing our pace assumption from 100 bps per year to 75 bps raises expected returns across the board, but the 5-year still performs worse than the other maturities (Table 1A). Due to our expectation that inflation will fall during the next 12 months, a December 2022 liftoff remains our base case.3  However, the market has recently moved to price-in an earlier start to rate hikes. As of last Friday’s close, the fed funds futures curve was priced for liftoff in September 2022 and for a total of 49 bps of tightening by the end of 2022 (Chart 3). Chart 3Market Priced For September 2022 Liftoff Tables 2A-2D incorporate these recent market moves into our forecast by looking at the same scenarios as in Tables 1A-1D but assuming a September 2022 liftoff instead of December. The results are not all that different. Expected returns are worse across the board, but the 5-year still looks like the worst spot on the curve unless the market starts to price-in a higher terminal rate. Investment Conclusions Most of the scenarios we examined had negative expected returns for most maturities. We therefore still think it makes sense to keep portfolio duration low. Further, in every scenario the best expected returns can be found in the shorter maturities. In fact, the 2-year Treasury note offers positive returns in every scenario we examined. An outright long position in the 2-year Treasury note looks like a decent trade for investors forced to hold bonds. As for the yield curve, our results suggest that we should continue with our current positioning: short the 5-year note versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. The 5-year note performs worst in every scenario that assumes a 2.08% terminal rate. While it’s conceivable that investors will eventually push their terminal rate expectations higher, we think this is more likely to occur once the Fed has already lifted rates a few times. Bottom Line: Bond investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and continue to short the 5-year note versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. For those investors who want to take an outright long position in US Treasuries, the 2-year Treasury note looks like the best security to choose. The Duration Drift In Municipal Bond Valuations One under-discussed aspect of municipal bonds is that the securities tend to pay higher coupons than other bonds. That is, the bonds will often be issued with coupon rates well above prevailing yields. Investors therefore must pay a higher price to purchase the bonds, but they receive more return in the form of coupon payments. This feature of municipal bonds has important implications for how we should value them. For example, while the average maturity of the Municipal Bond index is much higher than the average maturity of the Treasury index, the muni index’s higher coupon rate makes its average duration significantly lower (Chart 4). This means that any valuation measure that compares a municipal bond’s yield with the yield of another bond with the same maturity will be unflattering for the muni. Chart 4Munis Pay High Coupons, Have Low Durations Further, since Treasury securities and corporate bonds tend to issue at par, the coupon rates paid by those securities have fallen alongside yields during the past few decades. Meanwhile, municipal bond coupons have been relatively stable (Chart 4, panel 3). This means that, over time, municipal bond durations have fallen significantly compared to the durations of other US bond sectors. A fair valuation measure would compare municipal bond yields with equivalent-duration Treasury yields and that is exactly what we’ve done. Chart 5A shows the spread between General Obligation (GO) muni bond yields and equivalent-duration Treasury yields. Chart 5B shows the spreads expressed as percentile ranks. For example, a percentile rank of 50% means that the spread is at its historical median, a percentile rank of 10% means the spread has only been tighter 10% of the time. Chart 5AGO Muni/Treasury Spreads I Chart 5BGO Muni/Treasury Spreads II The first thing that jumps out from our analysis is that municipal bonds are not that expensive. Shorter-maturity spreads were tighter than current levels as recently as 2019/20 and the long-maturity (17-year+) spread is positive, despite the muni tax exemption. In terms of percentile rank, spreads for all GO maturity buckets are only just below the historical median. However, spreads traded much tighter prior to the 2008 financial crisis and it may not be reasonable to expect munis to return to those tight mid-2000 valuations. Charts 6A and 6B repeat the exercise from Charts 5A and 5B but for Revenue bonds instead of GOs. The message is similar. Muni valuations are not that stretched compared to history, and investors can earn a before-tax spread pick-up in munis versus Treasuries if they focus on the long maturities. Chart 6ARevenue Muni/Treasury Spreads I Chart 6BRevenue Muni/Treasury Spreads II In fact, municipal bonds offer a before-tax yield advantage versus Treasuries for Revenue bonds beyond the 12-year maturity point and for GO bonds beyond the 17-year maturity point. Further, the breakeven tax rate for 12-17 year GOs versus Treasuries is a mere 1% and the breakeven tax rate for 8-12 year Revenue bonds is only 8%. Investors facing a tax rate above the breakeven rate will earn an after-tax yield pick-up in munis versus duration-matched Treasuries (Table 3). Table 3Muni/Treasury And Muni/Credit Yield Ratios Of course, municipal bonds also carry a small credit risk premium relative to duration-matched Treasuries. The GO and Revenue indexes have average credit ratings of Aa1/Aa2 and Aa3/A1, respectively, compared to a Aaa rating for US Treasuries. But we can control for credit risk as well by comparing municipal bonds to the US Credit Index and matching both the duration and credit rating. Even this comparison looks favorable for municipal bonds. Once again, long-maturity munis offer a before-tax yield advantage compared to credit rating and duration-matched US Credit. Meanwhile, breakeven tax rates for other maturities are low enough to attract most investors. Bottom Line: This week we upgrade our recommended allocation to municipal bonds from overweight (4 out of 5) to maximum overweight (5 out of 5). Investors who can take advantage of the muni tax exemption should favor municipal bonds over Treasuries and over corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. In particular, we recommend that investors focus on long-maturity municipal bonds, noting that the relatively low duration of these bonds makes them attractive relative to other bonds with similar risk profiles. Five Fed Factors A lot of Fedspeak hit the tape last week. Of particular interest were an interview with Chair Jay Powell on Friday and speeches by Fed Governors Randy Quarles and Chris Waller on Wednesday and Tuesday. One takeaway from their remarks is that a tapering announcement at the next FOMC meeting is very likely, with net asset purchases expected to hit zero by the middle of next year. The market, however, seems to have already taken the taper announcement on board. The more interesting aspects of the speeches were the discussions about how the Fed will decide when to lift rates and how elevated inflation readings may or may not influence that decision. We’ve noted in prior reports that five factors will determine when the Fed finally decides to lift rates, and last week’s comments gave us confidence that we’re on the right track. We run through our Five Factors For Fed Liftoff below, with some additional comments on why each factor is important (Table 4). Table 4Five Factors For Fed Liftoff 1. The Unemployment Rate The Fed has officially pledged through its forward guidance not to lift rates until “maximum employment” is reached. While the exact definition of “maximum employment” can be debated, there is widespread agreement that it includes an unemployment rate below its current adjusted level of 4.9%.4 More specifically, we inferred from the September Summary of Economic Projections that most FOMC participants view an unemployment rate of around 3.8% as consistent with “maximum employment” (Chart 7).5 Chart 7Defining "Maximum Employment" We expect that the Fed will refrain from lifting rates until the unemployment rate reaches 3.8%. 2. Labor Force Participation We explored the debate about labor force participation in a recent report.6 In short, there are some policymakers who believe that “maximum employment” cannot be achieved until the labor force participation rate has returned to pre-COVID levels. There are others, however, who think that an aging population and the recent uptick in retirements make such a return impossible. Randy Quarles, for example: I expect that as conditions normalize, [the labor force participation rate] will pick up, but it is unlikely to return to its February 2020 level. One reason is that a disproportionate number of older workers responded to the initial shock of the COVID event by retiring, which may be an area where participation and employment struggle to retrace lost ground.7 In his speech, Governor Waller also mentioned “2 million jobs” that will be lost forever due to retirements.8 While many policymakers cite increased retirements as a reason why the overall labor force participation rate will remain permanently lower, there is much broader agreement that a reasonable definition of “maximum employment” should include the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate being much closer to its February 2020 level (Chart 7, bottom panel). We think the Fed will refrain from lifting rates until the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate is close to its February 2020 level. 3.  Wage Growth Accelerating wages are a tried-and-true signal that the labor market is running hot. While wage growth is rising quickly right now (Chart 8), there is a strong sense that this is due to pandemic-related labor supply shortages and that wage growth will moderate as pandemic fears (and labor shortages) wane. Chart 8Wage Growth What will be more important is what wage growth looks like when the unemployment rate is close to the Fed’s target of 3.8%. At that point, accelerating wages will give the Fed a strong signal that a 3.8% unemployment rate really does constitute “maximum employment”. 4.  Non-Transitory Inflation Of our five factors, this is admittedly the most difficult to pin down. However, Governor Quarles did a good job of explaining non-transitory inflation in last week’s speech: The fundamental dilemma that we face at the Fed now is this: Demand, augmented by unprecedented fiscal stimulus, has been outstripping a temporarily disrupted supply, leading to high inflation. But the fundamental productive capacity of our economy as it existed just before COVID – and, thus, the ability to satisfy that demand without inflation – remains largely as it was, constraining demand now, to bring it into line with a transiently interrupted supply, would be premature. Essentially, Quarles is saying that the Fed does not want to respond to a pandemic-related supply shock by lifting rates and curtailing aggregate demand. The Fed only wants to tighten policy if it sees an increase in broad-based inflationary pressures that will not be contained naturally by a return to more normal aggregate supply conditions. Accelerating wages would be one signal of such broad-based inflationary pressures, as would be measures of core inflation excluding those sectors that have been most impacted by the pandemic supply disruptions (Chart 9). Lastly, we could also look at indicators of inflation’s breadth across its different components, which have recently spiked to concerning levels (Chart 10). Chart 9Non-Covid Inflation Chart 10CPI Breadth Has Spiked 5.  Inflation Expectations Inflation expectations are also critical to monitor. While all Fed participants seem to agree that inflation will fall during the next year, there is also widespread agreement that if high inflation causes inflation expectations to rise to uncomfortably high levels, then the Fed will be forced to act. Chris Waller: A critical aspect of our new framework is to allow inflation to run above our 2 percent target (so that it averages 2 percent), but we should do this only if inflation expectations are consistent with our 2 percent target. If inflation expectations become unanchored, the credibility of our inflation target is at risk, and we likely would need to take action to re-anchor expectations at our 2 percent target. At present, inflation expectations remain well-anchored near levels consistent with the Fed’s target (Chart 11). In particular, we like to track the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate targeting a range of 2.3% to 2.5% as consistent with the Fed’s target. Incidentally, Governor Waller also flagged TIPS breakeven inflation rates as his “preferred” measure of inflation expectations in last week’s speech.  Chart 11Inflation Expectations Remain Well-Anchored The Fed will move much more quickly toward rate hikes if the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate moves above 2.5%. Bottom Line: Given our view that inflation will fall during the next 12 months, we still view December 2022 as the most likely liftoff date. However, we will continue to monitor our Five Factors For Fed Liftoff to see if our forecast needs to be revised.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 All of our scenarios use a 12-month investment horizon and assume a term premium of 0 bps. 2 In both cases we assume that the fed funds rate trades 8 bps above its lower-bound, as is currently the case. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Right Price, Wrong Reason”, dated October 19, 2021. 4 We adjust the unemployment rate for distortions in the number of people employed but absent from work. Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Overreaction”, dated July 13, 2021 for further details. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Damage Assessment”, dated September 28, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “2022 Will Be All About Inflation”, dated September 14, 2021. 7 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/quarles20211020a.htm 8 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20211019a.htm Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns