Economy

Special Report

This is US Bond Strategy’s final report of the year. Our regular publication schedule will resume on January 11th with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for January 2022. Highlights Interest Rate Policy: The Fed will tighten policy in 2022. Our baseline expectation is that the first hike will occur in June 2022 and that rate increases will proceed at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter through the end of the year. An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations would cause the Fed to tighten more quickly. An abrupt tightening of financial conditions would cause the Fed to move more slowly. The Flexible Average Inflation Target: The re-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations suggests that the Fed’s new FAIT framework is viewed as credible and is working as intended. It is likely here to stay. The Long-Run Neutral Rate: We think it’s likely that consensus estimates of a 2.0% to 2.5% long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be too low, but we don’t recommend trading on that view in 2022. The low neutral rate narrative is very well-entrenched, and it will only be questioned after several rate hikes have been delivered and their economic impact is assessed. A Year Of Tightening The Fed started 2021 with three conditions for lifting rates (Table 1). Now, as we head into 2022, the Fed has officially acknowledged that the two conditions related to inflation have been met, and Fed Chair Jay Powell said that the economy is making “rapid progress” toward the final condition of “maximum employment”. Table 1The Fed's Liftoff Criteria Based on this, it looks like rate hikes are imminent. The Fed recently doubled its pace of asset purchase tapering so that net purchases will reach zero by mid-March. This opens up the March 2022 FOMC meeting as the first “live meeting” where a rate hike could occur. Our base case expectation is that the Fed will wait a tad longer, but that liftoff will occur at the June FOMC meeting. Rate hikes will then proceed through the end of the year at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter. Next, we discuss why the Fed has adopted this hawkish posture. We also consider the factors that would cause tightening to proceed more quickly or more slowly in 2022. Reasons For The Fed’s Hawkish Pivot Chart 1Labor Market Indicators It might sound odd to say that the US economy is rapidly approaching maximum employment. After all, the labor market is still 3.9 million jobs short of where it was in February 2020 (Chart 1). What’s more, only 59.2% of the population is employed today compared to 61.1% prior to the pandemic (Chart 1, panel 2). But Fed Chair Powell wasn’t referring to either of those figures when he said that the economy is making “rapid progress” toward maximum employment. Rather, he was referring to the unemployment rate, which currently sits at 4.2% (Chart 1, panel 3). This is only 0.2% above the Fed’s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment and only 0.7% above the pre-pandemic level of 3.5%. The fact that the unemployment rate has declined sharply means that the bulk of the shortfall in the economy-wide number of jobs is the result of people dropping out of the labor force (Chart 1, bottom panel), not the result of an increase in the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed. As recently as the November FOMC meeting, the Fed wasn’t drawing a sharp distinction between these two trends. In fact, Chair Powell said in his post-meeting press conference that “there is still ground to cover to reach maximum employment, both in terms of employment and in terms of participation.” But just one month later, at the December FOMC press conference, Chair Powell struck a much different tone. He said: Chart 2Participation Trends The Demographic Downtrend In Participation But the reality is, we don’t have a strong labor force participation recovery yet and we may not have it for some time. At the same time, we have to make policy now. And inflation is well above target. So this is something we need to take into account. It appears that the Fed is no longer confident that labor force participation is about to rise. There are a few good reasons for this. First, the aging of the US population imparts a structural demographic downtrend to the labor force participation rate as an increasing number of people reach retirement age (Chart 2). In addition, there was a sharp drop in 55+ participation at the onset of the pandemic that has so far not recovered at all (Chart 2, panel 2). It is debatable whether people in this older age cohort will ever return to work. Finally, there is a shortfall in participation for people in their prime working years (ages 25-54) (Chart 2, bottom panel). These people are likely not working because of factors related to the pandemic (e.g. fear of getting sick, caregiving requirements). It is likely that prime-age participation will rise as pandemic concerns fade, but the Fed is no longer confident that these pandemic concerns will fade quickly. Faced with elevated inflation right now, the Fed has decided that it must act against inflation earlier than it had intended, before prime-age labor force participation makes a full recovery. For bond investors, the important takeaway from the recent shift in Fed policy is that a recovery in labor force participation is no longer a pre-condition for liftoff. That being the case, we are very close to the Fed pulling the trigger on rate hikes. Table 2 shows the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth required to reach different target unemployment rates by different future dates, assuming the labor force participation rate remains at its current level. With the participation rate held flat, it only takes average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 224 thousand to reach the pre-COVID unemployment rate of 3.5% by June. That same rate of growth would cause the unemployment rate to fall below the Fed’s 4% natural rate estimate by January. Table 2Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth (Thousands) Required To Reach Unemployment Rate Target By Given Date The message is clear. With rising participation no longer a pre-condition for hikes, the Fed’s “maximum employment” liftoff condition will be met within the next few months. We expect this will lead to the first Fed rate hike at the June 2022 FOMC meeting. What Happened To “Transitory” Inflation? Chart 3Core CPI Components The Fed’s view of the labor force participation rate is very similar to its view of inflation. Both are being influenced by the pandemic, but the Fed is no longer confident that pandemic concerns will fade in a timely manner. Looking at the inflation picture, it’s easy to see the impact of the pandemic. Core goods inflation is running at a year-over-year rate of 9.4%. It was close to 0% prior to COVID (Chart 3). This is obviously the result of pandemic-related supply chain disruptions and the shift in consumer spending away from services and toward goods. Just like with labor force participation, these trends should reverse as pandemic concerns fade. However, given the pandemic’s uncertain duration, the Fed is no longer willing to wait for that to happen. The Fed’s Interest Rate Projections In line with its hawkish shift on the definition of “maximum employment”, FOMC participants revised up their interest rate projections at the December meeting. The median FOMC participant is now looking for three 25 basis point rate hikes in 2022. This is consistent with liftoff in June followed by a pace of one rate hike per quarter (Chart 4). Interestingly, the market is reasonably well priced for this near-term path for rates. The deviation between market pricing and Fed expectations occurs further out the curve. As such, we recommend that US bond investors keep portfolio duration low and favor the 2-year Treasury note over the 10-year.1 Chart 4Rate Expectations What Would Make The Fed Go Faster? Chart 5No Wage/Price Spiral Yet As noted above, our base case forecast is that the Fed will start lifting rates in June 2022 and continue to hike at a pace of 25 bps per quarter. This is roughly consistent with the Fed’s own median projections. However, we acknowledge that the Fed will tighten policy more quickly if it sees evidence of an emerging wage-price spiral. Specifically, the Fed has pointed to the risk that real wage growth might exceed the rate of productivity growth. If that were to occur, the Fed would be worried about a wage-price spiral where firms lift prices to meet wage demands, but that only causes employee inflation expectations to rise further, leading to even greater wage demands. So far, this is not occurring. Real wage growth is negative and long-dated inflation expectations remain well-anchored near the Fed’s target levels (Chart 5). An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations during the next few months would cause the Fed to bring forward the liftoff date and increase the pace of rate hikes in 2022. What Would Make The Fed Go Slower? The main thing that would cause the Fed to tighten more slowly in 2022 would be if its hawkish shift prompted a severe tightening in overall financial conditions. Chart 6 shows that the ends of Fed tightening cycles typically coincide with the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index moving above 100. This tightening in financial conditions also typically precedes a slowdown in economic growth (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 6Watch Financial Conditions And Treasury Slope As The Fed Tightens Financial conditions are incredibly easy at present. But it is conceivable that risky assets will sell-off on fears of Fed rate hikes, and a large enough sell-off would cause the Fed to pause. The slope of the Treasury curve could also be a useful indicator in this regard. The 2/10 slope is usually close to inversion when the Fed ends its rate hike cycles (Chart 6, panel 3). Bottom Line: The Fed will tighten policy in 2022. Our baseline expectation is that the first hike will occur in June 2022 and that rate increases will proceed at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter through the end of the year. An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations would cause the Fed to tighten more quickly. An abrupt tightening of financial conditions would cause the Fed to move more slowly. US bond investors should position for this outcome by keeping portfolio duration low and by favoring the 2-year Treasury note over the 10-year. FAIT Accompli It’s been roughly one year since the Fed concluded its Strategic Review and released a revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.2 One year on, it seems appropriate to consider how much Fed policy actually changed as a result. We focus on what, in our view, are the two most significant changes to the Fed’s Statement. 1.  No More Pre-Mature Tightening First, the Fed changed its strategy to focus on “shortfalls of employment from its maximum level” rather than “deviations from its maximum level”. In the Fed’s words, “this change signals that high employment, in the absence of unwanted increases in inflation […], will not by itself be a cause for policy concern.” In the past, the Fed would tighten policy in response to a low unemployment rate on the expectation that inflation was about to increase. The new strategy is to wait for inflation to emerge before tightening, even if the unemployment rate is very low. Inflation has obviously emerged, so policy tightening is justified even under the new framework. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that the Fed has waited longer than usual to tighten. Chart 7A shows the change in the unemployment rate since the previous trough for the current cycle alongside the previous three cycles. For prior cycles, the lines end when the Fed delivers its first rate hike. While it’s notable that the unemployment rate has improved much more quickly this time around, it’s just as notable that the Fed still hasn’t lifted rates. This is despite the fact that the unemployment rate is only 0.7% above its pre-recession trough. This is more progress than was made before tightening in the 1990 and 2000 cycles, and about the same amount of progress as was made in the 107 months since the unemployment rate troughed before the Great Financial Crisis. A broader measure of labor market utilization, the prime-age (25-54) employment-to-population ratio, tells a similar story (Chart 7B). By this metric, the labor market has already made more progress than it did during the prior two cycles and the Fed still hasn’t increased the funds rate. All in all, even though inflation has emerged earlier this cycle than most expected, it’s pretty clear that the Fed’s new focus on employment “shortfalls” instead of “deviations” has made it act more dovishly. 2. Flexible Average Inflation Targeting (FAIT) The second big change that the Fed made to its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy was the introduction of a Flexible Average Inflation Target (FAIT). Under the FAIT framework, the Fed will no longer view its 2% inflation target as purely forward looking. Rather, the Fed will seek to achieve average 2% inflation over time. This means that, “following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” While the Fed doesn’t specify a period over which it seeks 2% average inflation, it seems clear that the new inflation target has been achieved. PCE inflation is well above where it would have been if it averaged 2% since the new framework was adopted in August 2020 (Chart 8). This is also true if we pick February 2020, the peak of the last cycle, as our starting point. In fact, PCE inflation has almost made up for the entire inflation shortfall since January 2010. Chart 8The FAIT Framework While it’s interesting to look at average inflation over different lookback periods, it’s more important to note that the actual goal of the FAIT framework is to keep long-dated inflation expectations anchored near target levels. In the Fed’s own words: By seeking inflation that averages 2 percent over time this will help ensure that longer-run inflation expectations do not drift down and remain well anchored at 2 percent.3 If we judge the effectiveness of FAIT based on trends in long-term inflation expectations, then the only reasonable conclusion is that it has been a massive success. By any measure, long-term inflation expectations were well below levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% target in fall 2020. Now, they are very close to target levels. This is true whether we look at market-based measures (Chart 9A), survey measures (Chart 9B), trend measures (Chart 9C) or a composite indicator of many different measures (Chart 9D). Chart 9AMarket-Based Inflation Expectations Chart 9BSurvey-Based Inflation Expectations Chart 9CTrend Measures Of Inflation ##br##Expectations Chart 9DThe CIE Index The Fed's New Index Of Common Inflation Expectations (CIE) The Verdict All told, it looks like the Fed has made good on its promises. It refrained from lifting rates as the unemployment rate fell and has only now moved toward tightening in response to extremely high inflation. Also, the re-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations suggests that the Fed’s new FAIT framework is viewed as credible and is working as intended. Neutral Rate Expectations In 2022 Chart 10Neutral Rate Estimates There is one key issue for both Fed policy and bond markets that we have not yet discussed, and that’s the long-run neutral fed funds rate. This is the interest rate that, on average, will be consistent with the Fed’s price stability and maximum employment goals in the long run. As of today, the consensus among central bankers and investors is that the neutral rate is very low compared to history. There is also a widespread belief that it will remain low for the foreseeable future. For example, here is a sentence from the Fed’s Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy: The Committee judges that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with maximum employment and price stability over the longer run has declined relative to its historical average. Therefore, the federal funds rate is likely to be constrained by its effective lower bound more frequently than in the past. The top panel of Chart 10 shows that the Fed has revised its median estimate of the long-run neutral rate substantially lower since 2012, down from 4.3% to 2.5%. And it’s not just the Fed that has done so. The same downward revisions are seen in the Surveys of Market Participants and Primary Dealers (Chart 10, bottom 2 panels). Incidentally, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield – a market-derived proxy for the long-run neutral rate – is below even the survey estimates. This is a key reason for our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Why Does The Fed Believe That The Neutral Rate Is Low And Will Stay Low? Chart 11The Demographic Effect New York Fed President John Williams has cited three key reasons for the low neutral fed funds rate: demographics, lower productivity growth and a heightened demand for safe and liquid assets.4 Of those factors, Fed research has determined that demographics are particularly important. The trend of increasing life expectancy, specifically, has been shown to be an important factor pushing interest rates down as people increase their savings in anticipation of a longer retirement (Chart 11).5 Could The Fed Be Wrong? We aren’t as confident that the neutral rate will stay low. In fact, we think it’s possible that both Fed and investor estimates understate the current long-run neutral rate. Our own Bank Credit Analyst has observed that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield was very close to trend nominal GDP growth up until the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 12). Then, it dipped below as a protracted period of household deleveraging caused private sector credit demand to dry up. With household balance sheets no longer in disrepair, we are starting to see an increase in household debt, one that could eventually push bond yields back toward trend growth.6 It’s not just our own research that is starting to question the popular narrative of a low neutral fed funds rate. At the most recent Jackson Hole summit, Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi presented a paper that shows that rising income inequality is predominantly responsible for today’s low neutral rate (Chart 13), not the demographic effect previously identified by the Fed.7 Chart 13Rising Income Inequality ##br##Since 1980 Chart 12Household Deleveraging Kept Rates Low Post-2008 This research has important implications for the future evolution of the neutral rate. Unlike demographics, income inequality can be altered by changes in tax policy and by shifts in the power struggle between capital owners and workers. In this regard, our US Investment Strategy service has written several reports demonstrating the ongoing structural shift toward greater labor power.8 If this structural trend continues, it suggests that the long-run neutral rate may also rise. Trading The Neutral Rate While we suspect that the long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be higher than both the market and Fed anticipate, we don’t think it’s wise to trade on that view in 2022. The reason is that expectations of a low neutral fed funds rate are extremely well-entrenched. It will take a lot of contrary evidence to shift those expectations, evidence we probably won’t get next year. As noted above, survey estimates of the long-run neutral rate range roughly from 2.0% to 2.5%. Our sense is that those estimates will only be revised higher if the fed funds rate gets much closer to those levels, say at least above 1%, and the economic data suggest that further rate increases will be required. This is a story for 2023, not 2022. A recent paper documented some interesting facts about the relationship between monetary policy and market expectations.9  It observed that the entire decline in the 10-year Treasury yield since 1990 has occurred during 3-day windows around FOMC meetings (Chart 14). This is not what we would expect to see if the long-run neutral rate was determined by independent macroeconomic factors that are distinct from Fed interest rate decisions. Chart 14Fed Rate Decisions Drive Long-Maturity Bond Yields We find this research very compelling. It suggests that the market changes its neutral rate expectations in response to Fed interest rate moves. In our view, this strengthens our conviction that a series of rate hikes will eventually cause the market to push its neutral rate expectations higher, leading to a sell-off in long-maturity bonds. Bottom Line: We think it’s likely that consensus estimates of a 2.0% to 2.5% long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be too low, but we don’t recommend trading on that view in 2022. The low neutral rate narrative is very well-entrenched, and it will only be questioned after several rate hikes have been delivered and their economic impact is assessed.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For our full set of recommendations please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Key Views 2022: US Fixed Income”, dated December 14, 2021. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/guide-to-changes-in-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-qas.htm#7 4 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/wil181130#footnote3 5 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2017-27.pdf 6 For more details on this argument please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks”, dated March 31, 2021. 7 https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/8337/JH_paper_Sufi_3.pdf 8 Please see January 13, January 20 and February 3, 2020 US Investment Strategy Special Reports, “An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History”, “Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them” and “The Public-Approval Contest”. 9 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550593 Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Highlights Industry Deep-dive Report: The Semiconductor and Semiconductor Equipment Industry (“Semis”) has had a fantastic run over the past 12 months. We have been overweight it since June and the trade is ahead of the market by 14%. In this deep-dive report into the sector, we aim to decipher the outlook for 2022. To do so, we review the supply chain, target markets, macroeconomic backdrop, and fundamentals. Production Model: Semiconductor production is divided among IC designers and manufacturers. This separation of design and manufacturing is called the fabless model, which has grown in prominence as the pace of innovation made it increasingly difficult for firms to manage both the capital intensity of manufacturing and the high levels of R&D spending for design. Designed In The US, Made In Asia: The entire semiconductor industry depends on the cooperation between two regions: North America that houses global leaders in designing the most sophisticated chips, and Asia which is home to companies that have the technology to manufacture them. Geopolitical risks: As a result, the Semis are in the crosshairs of rising tensions between China and the US with both countries seeking chips independence and pushing for onshoring. Conventional end-demand markets span the entire US economy but can be grouped into several main categories. Computing or data processing electronics is one of the largest markets, followed by Communications, Consumer Electronics, and Autos. Growth rates vary across segments. The novel markets for semis came on the back of emerging technologies, such as IoT, 5G, automation, AI, self-driving vehicles, and others, all of which require increasing chip sophistication. These markets present a tremendous long-term opportunity for the industry. Global semis sales grew at 25 percent in 2021. In 2022, market growth is expected to slow to 10 percent. Earnings growth has also been slowing. The industry is not immune to rising costs of raw materials, labor shortages, and supply-chain disruptions. While earnings growth is slowing, operating margins are set to expand over the next 12 months. Valuations are extended: The semis' earnings growth expectations are on par with the S&P 500, but trade with a 14% premium to forward multiple. The macroeconomic backdrop is unfavorable: Tighter monetary policy, slowing economic growth, and a slowdown in China, are headwinds for this hyper-cyclical industry. Investment Outlook: We conclude that we are bullish on the industry on a structural basis but are more ambivalent about its prospects over the next 3-6 months downgrading our portfolio overweight to an equal-weight. Feature Performance The Semiconductors and Semiconductor Equipment industry (“Semis”) has received an unexpected boost during the pandemic: Lockdowns, coupled with helicopter cash drops, have spurred demand for durable goods, and foundries could not work fast enough to produce chips, direly needed by autos, consumer electronics, and computer manufacturers. Since the beginning of the pandemic, Semis have outperformed the S&P 500 by roughly 62%, and the Tech sector by just under 30% (Chart 1). Only this year, Semis are almost 20% ahead of the market (Table 1). This poses a question – can this outperformance continue in 2022, or will the economic growth slowdown and waning demand for goods end this superior run? Chart 1Shortages Boosted Performance Of Semis Sneak Preview: While we believe in Semis as a multi-year structural theme, we recommend a tactical equal weight. We have been overweight Semis since June and the trade is ahead of the market by 14.5%. We are closing the overweight on the back of a strong run, rich valuations, slowing earnings growth, and an unfavorable macroeconomic backdrop. Table 1Semis Had A Strong Run Over The Past 12 Months Semiconductor Primer What Are Semiconductors? I have a confession to make – I have always had only the fuzziest idea of what is inside my computer or under the hood of my car. Well, apparently, it is semis, aka chips, that are the brains of any electronic device that we come across in our daily life. I like the comparison of chips to modern-day bricks, serving a wide range of industries. The American Semiconductor Association (ASA) calls them a “marvel of modern technology,” which they truly are, being a foundation of modern life, packed with up to tens of billions of transistors on a piece of silicon the size of a quarter. Chips power not only our phones and vacuum cleaners, but also innovative medical devices, robots, and wireless internet. Semiconductors make all sectors of the US economy, from farming to manufacturing, more efficient. The number of applications of semis is innumerable, and recent shortages made all of us more aware of these, behind-the-scenes, engines of our daily life. The US Semis Brag Sheet The US semiconductor industry is the worldwide industry leader with about half of the global market share (47%) and sales of $208B in 2020.1 The industry employs over a quarter-million people and supports nearly 1.6 million additional US jobs. Semis are a top-five US export, with more than 80% of industry sales going to overseas customers. The US exported $49B in semiconductors in 2020. Rapid innovation has allowed the industry to produce exponentially more products at a lower cost, a principle known as Moore’s law. How Are Semiconductors Made? R&D is the first step in the production process. Firms involved in semiconductor design develop nanometer-scale integrated circuits that perform the critical tasks that make electronic devices work, such as connectivity to networks, computing, storage, and power management. Chip designers must use highly advanced electronic design automation (EDA) software and reusable architectural building blocks (“IP cores”) to do this task.2 The process requires significant investment: Developing a new chip can cost over 100M dollars and requires many years of work by hundreds of engineers. As chips have become increasingly complex, development costs have rapidly risen. Design is the part of the process that differentiates one type of chips from another and constitutes a competitive moat for the companies that design them. Design is chiefly knowledge- and skill-intensive, accounting for 65% of the total industry R&D and has the highest value-add of the entire production process. Manufacturing is a complex process. Once chips are designed, the process moves to production. Often the chip production starts with processing sand that contains a large amount of silicon. Sand is purified and melted into solid cylinders, that are then sliced into very thin silicon discs, polished to a flawless finish, called “blank wafer.” Wafers are then printed with intricated circuit designs, which are later divided into tiny individual semiconductors, called dies. Dies are later packaged into finished semiconductors that can be embedded into electronic devices. This process is summarized in Chart 2. Cross-Border Supply Chains Types Of Semiconductor Production Companies The chip production process is usually divided between the three types of players that operate in the different segments of the supply chain. IC designing companies or fabless firms focus only on design and outsource fabrication to pure-play foundries and outsourced assembly and test (OSAT) firms. This segment of the value chain is dominated by the US firms such as Qualcomm, Broadcom, Nvidia, and AMD, which account for roughly 60% of all global fabless firm sales (Chart 3). Semiconductor manufacturing companies, aka foundries, receive orders from the IC designing companies and purchase raw materials and equipment to proceed in the chip manufacturing process. TSMC, Global Foundries, and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) are some of the largest and are located in Asia. The share of chips manufactured in China, South Korea, Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and other regions in East Asia has soared to 75% (Chart 4). Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDM) cover the entire production process from design to manufacturing. In terms of revenue, Samsung, Intel, and SK Hynix are the world’s three top IDM companies. Recently, there was a global push towards reintegration for geopolitical reasons (more about that later). The fabless model, or separation of chip design and manufacturing, has grown along with the demand for semiconductors since the 1990s, as the pace of innovation made it increasingly difficult for many firms to manage both the capital intensity of manufacturing and the high levels of R&D spending for design. Since China joined the WTO in late 2001, global manufacturing offshoring switched to a higher gear with the semiconductor industry becoming a poster child for the movement. Except for Intel, which is the only US company that both designs and manufacturers chips, other US corporations completely outsourced their manufacturing to Asia. Designed In The US, Made In Asia As of 2020, the US market share of the global semiconductor market was 47% (Chart 5), dominated by fabless firms. Given the importance of semiconductor design in terms of value-added in the manufacturing process, the US must remain a leader in this stage of production. The US firms spend 17% of sales on R&D, more than any other country, to maintain a competitive edge (Chart 6). And this decisive advantage translates into a disproportionate share of industry revenue. While specializing in chip design creates a competitive moat for the US semi companies, it also makes them vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions: At present only a little over 10% of all chips are manufactured in the US compared to 37% back in the ‘nineties (Chart 7), with the lion’s share of the most sophisticated chips manufactured in Asia. With the separation of design and manufacturing, the US, which is a leader in design, is falling behind as a location for manufacturing technology. As a result, the entire semiconductor industry depends on the cooperation between two regions: North America that houses global leaders in designing the most sophisticated chips, and Asia that is home to companies that have the technology to manufacture the most complex of chips. Both ends (design and manufacturing) of the semiconductor industry also have high barriers to entry due to the technology required to compete in the field, which creates a big problem since major geopolitical players now aim to break down existing supply-chains and to push their corporations towards domestic vertical integration. Supply Chain Fragility The fragility of the semiconductor supply chains was best revealed during the pandemic-induced shutdown. With the global economy coming to a virtual hold, various industries had to cancel their semi orders, and foundries took some of the capacity offline. However, demand for goods rebounded unexpectedly and sharply, jump-started by global fiscal and monetary stimulus. It is important to note that a semiconductor manufacturing plant cannot be simply turned on after a period of inactivity. Not only does it require time to be brought back to life, but also the chip production itself is a month-long process. Semiconductor companies did their best during the lockdown to meet demand and even got an exemption from government-imposed lockdowns as “essential” businesses. The industry managed to increase production to address high demand, shipping more semiconductors every month than ever before by the middle of 2021 (Chart 8). However, chip shortages ensued, because supply, despite its best efforts, could not keep pace with the demand. Expanding semi manufacturing capacity was not an option: Building a fab and bringing it up to full capacity can take anywhere from 24 to 42 months at a price tag of anywhere from $1.7bn to $5.4bn, depending on the quality of the chips manufactured.3 Most industry analysts expect the shortage to linger into 2022.4 Chart 8The Industry Worked Hard To Meet Demand For Chips Geopolitics Semiconductor Industry Is At The Epicenter Of Geopolitical Tensions The semi shortages also came within the broader context of the changing world order and the resulting competition for the key resource. As a result, governments around the globe took action to secure the key commodity for themselves and to establish its production on domestic soil. In the US, once semi-conductor shortages started crippling US manufacturing back in April 2021, President Biden held a semiconductor summit at the White House. In addition, he signed an executive order calling for a 100-day review of the US supply chains. In June, the US Senate passed the bipartisan US Innovation and Competition Act, which includes $52 billion in federal investments for semiconductors (building from the CHIPS for America Act announced in January). The House of Representatives excluded the $52 billion from its version of the bill but most of this semiconductor funding will likely be reinstated in the final compromise version of the bill. We expect the funding to help US-based firms, like Intel, as well as non-US firms, such as Taiwan Semiconductor, which is putting billions of dollars into its next-generation production plant in Arizona. And last, the administration agreed with Japan to cooperate on semiconductor development and supply chains.5 Moving east, the European Commission also expressed its concerns that the Old Continent was naïve to outsource chip manufacturing and now plans to double the EU’s share of global chip production from the current 10% to 20% by 2030 under its new Digital Compass plan which aims to boost “digital sovereignty” by funding various high-tech initiatives. In China, policymakers realized the importance of semis in 2013, and while China will not achieve full self-sufficiency anytime soon, ongoing US sanctions and political pressure will only accelerate the Middle Kingdom’s push for semiconductor supply independence. Already, the new five-year plan that was released this year, prioritizes technological innovation including in the semiconductor space. Japan and South Korea are also devoting state resources to the industry, and global policymakers are seeking ways to reduce dependency on Taiwan due to the risk of conflict over the long run. The broader implication of the global semiconductor production onshoring is two-fold. First, existing supply chains will come under pressure as nations will force their respective semiconductor companies to undergo a complete vertical integration, resulting in much steeper chip prices, unless governments come out with further extravagant subsidies. This transformation also implies higher demand for the output of semiconductor equipment manufacturers as nations are scrambling to build onshore manufacturing facilities. Target Markets Most industries are run on chips, but overall usage can be grouped into several key categories, such as Computers, Communications, Consumer Goods, Autos. These traditional markets account for most of the demand for chips. Conventional Chip Uses Computing aka Data Processing Electronics is one of the largest segments and comprises nearly one-third of all semiconductor usage. This segment represents the demand for chips used for personal computers, servers, and cloud storage. This is one of the fastest-growing categories, which SIA projects to grow at 21% per year6 (Chart 9). While this expected rate of growth is impressive, it is set to slow in the coming year as demand for personal computers is starting to decelerate (Chart 10). On the upside, annual growth in servers continues to rebound, with the year-on-year increase in global server shipments close to 15% (Chart 11). Chart 10Demand For PCs Is Coming Off High Levels... Chart 11While Demand For Servers Is On The Rise   Communications Electronics is the second largest chips market. These chips power wireless communications and are getting a boost from the rollout of 5G networks. This segment also benefits from the recently passed US Infrastructure Bill, which has funds earmarked for wireless communication. However, communications chips expect tepid growth of just 1% as the speed of the 5G rollout is disappointing, and many consumers are unwilling to upgrade their phones: Demand for smartphones has only recently turned up (Chart 12). Consumer Electronics is a segment that is expected to contract in the coming year as spending on consumer goods has already exceeded the pre-pandemic trend and has turned down (Chart 13). Chart 12Demand For Smart Phones Has Started To Pick Up Chart 13Demand For Consumer Goods Is Waning   Automotive segment – Modern vehicles are increasingly reliant on chips for advanced brakes, steering systems, fuel efficiency, safety, and other features. So missing chips can easily stall production. While the segment is only 12% of the total, it has gotten the industry’s most negative rap. Auto manufacturers, for example, could experience a $61bn loss in revenue due to supply constraints in 2021.7 However, this segment is expected to grow in the high single digits due to significant pent-up demand for autos (Chart 14). Interestingly, EV makers that deploy the most sophisticated chips were somewhat spared from shortages, which afflicted mostly mainstream chip categories. Chart 14Auto Segment Is Expected To Grow Due To Pent-Up Demand For Cars Chips Power The Fourth Industrial Revolution Besides these well-established markets, Semis are also intrinsically a play on every single emerging technology theme. Semiconductors are at the core of disruptive technologies and the fourth industrial revolution. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) rely heavily on computing power delivered by sophisticated chips to process massive datasets looking for insights. As AI becomes widely deployed in a wide range of industries, demand for powerful chips is bound to soar: The size of the AI chip market is forecast to increase eight-fold from an estimated $10.14bn in 2020 to $83.25bn by 2027.8 Internet of Things (IoT), or interconnectedness of electronics, is another source of demand for chips. However, to realize the full potential of this new-generation technology, processors, modems, and other communication infrastructure must be modernized. 5G adoption is starting to accelerate as new applications are being developed such as the metaverse, immersive gaming, and virtual reality. The higher data rates and lower latencies made possible by 5G are expected to be a driver of demand for advanced semiconductors. In a 2021 KPMG survey, 53% of semiconductor companies believe 5G will become a significant driver of revenue growth in one to two years, and 19% believe it could happen in less than a year.9 Automation: Be it self-driving cars or the installation of manufacturing assembly robots, both require semiconductors. Recent labor shortages and rising wages are another reason automation is to come to the fore: US manufacturers are a case in point, lagging their European and Asian counterparts in new robot installation and in dire need of catching up. While it’s true that automation does not bring an explosive demand shock like IoT and AI do, we would not underestimate the power of that structural force (Chart 15). Fundamentals Sales Growth And Profitability According to the WSTS, the worldwide semiconductor market is expected to show an outstanding growth rate of 25 percent in 2021. The largest growth contributors are Memory with 37.1 percent, followed by Analog with 29.1 percent, and Logic with 26.2 percent. By 2022, the global semiconductor market growth is expected to slow and is projected to grow by 10.1 percent. Americas are expected to grow at 12% next year.10 These forecasts align rather well with bottom-up sales growth forecasts by street analysts at 10.8% (Chart 16), which exceed projected nominal GDP growth of 7.6% and expected sales growth of the S&P 500. This industry continues to be powered by pent-up demand, backlogs of orders, and adoption of brand-new technologies. Earnings growth has recently slowed (Chart 17). Semis is an R&D intense industry, especially for the fabless US companies, which continue to plow funds into research and design of chips to retain a competitive edge. After a pandemic hiatus, the industry now is starting to ramp up its Capex outlays (Chart 18). Chart 16Sales Growth Is To Stay Robust... Chart 17But Earnings Growth Is Set To Decelerate Recent labor shortages and rising wages have not bypassed highly educated segments of the labor market, cutting into the profitability of these high-tech labor-intensive businesses. And of course, this industry is not immune to rising costs of raw materials and supply-chain disruptions, albeit less so than many businesses further downstream in the value chain, such as Autos. Chart 18After Pandemic Hiatus, Capex Is On The Way Back Chart 19Margins Are Expected To Expand Further Despite all the production challenges, Semis is one of the few industries that are projected to further expand its margins in the coming year (Chart 19). However, just like many other industries, their pricing power is overextended (Chart 20) and is likely to mean revert, constraining companies to pass on higher costs of design, raw materials, and manufacturing to customers. Chart 20Pricing Power Is Extreme And Is Likely To Mean Revert Valuations Semis is an industry whose earnings are expected to grow at 8% over the next 12 months, which is on par with the S&P 500. However, Semis are trading at 24x forward earnings, or with a 14% premium to the S&P 500 (21.3x) (Chart 21). Further, earnings growth is decelerating. It is hard to justify this valuation premium, especially in the context of imminent rate hikes. Of course, valuations may reflect the fact that demand for chips is still extremely strong both from conventional markets and nascent technology applications. The industry is also highly profitable, and margins are expected to expand in 2022. To break the tie, we will turn to the analysis of the macroeconomic backdrop in 2022 and whether it is going to be favorable for the industry. Chart 21Valuations Are Overextended Macroeconomic Backdrop Semiconductor stocks as a group aren’t just highly sensitive to economic growth, they’re nearly immediately so, sniffing out economic rebounds and downturns before they become evident in broad market data. As a result, investors have to remain on their guard and be very nimble. Subtle shifts in the economic outlook can have a big impact on relative performance. At the moment, several macro trends constitute a headwind for the outperformance of the industry: Global bond yields are expected to rise due to the concerted action of Central Banks, dampening demand for chips, dragging down the sales growth of the Semis, and diminishing future cash flows (Chart 22). The US ISM Manufacturing index has peaked, while the ISM New Orders index is in a downward trend, suggesting an emerging decline in production and diminished demand for chips (Chart 23) Chinese growth is slowing and BCA Research’s house view is that a rebound is not likely until later in 2022. Chart 22Rising Bond Yields Will Be A Headwind For Semis Chart 23Decline In The ISM New Orders Signal Less Demand For Semis Therefore, we conclude that, while economic growth is to remain strong in 2022, and will provide a tailwind for many cyclical sectors, semiconductor growth is set to slow, and valuations are likely to compress as a reaction to rising bond yields. The macroeconomic outlook for the industry is contingent upon the direction of the interest rates and is sensitive to economic growth disappointments. In short, the macroeconomic backdrop is unfavorable. Investment Implications The semiconductor industry is positioned at the very core of the global economy. It is one of the key growth engines of the US economy, and one of its top exports. This is an industry highly geared to economic growth and exposed to a variety of emerging technology themes, such as 5G, self-driving vehicles, and the metaverse among many others. It is R&D and Capex intensive and sophisticated. We believe in Semis as a long-term structural theme. Tactically, we are concerned that in 2022 this industry may face macroeconomic headwinds being highly sensitive to slowing growth and rising rates, which are detrimental to the performance of this growth-oriented and cyclical sector. From a fundamental standpoint, sales and earnings growth are slowing and are on par with that of a broad market, yet Semis are trading with a premium to the S&P 500. Tactically, we are neutral on a sector, but structurally we are bullish. We recommend investors with longer holding horizons explore the following ETFs (Table 2), that are designed to capture Semis as an investment theme. Table 2Semis ETFs Bottom Line In this deep-dive report on the Semiconductor industry, we review the supply chain, the key labor division between fabless chip designers and chips manufacturers, and the issues underpinning a recent push towards onshoring. We explore target markets and look at sales growth rates and fundamentals. We conclude that we are bullish on the industry on a structural basis but are more ambivalent about its prospects over the next 3-6 months downgrading our portfolio overweight to an equal-weight.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) "2021 Industry Facts" May 19, 2021 2     Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) "2021 STATE OF THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY" 3    Global X "Putting the Chip Shortage into the Context of Long-Term Trends" May 24, 2021 4    Ibid 5    Ibid 6    Ibid 7     Bloomberg, “Chip Shortage: Taiwan, South Korea’s Manufacturing Lead Worries U.S., China” March 3, 2021 8    Ibid 9    Ibid 10   World Semiconductor Trade Statistics "Semiconductor Market Forecast Fall 2021" November 30, 2021   Recommended Allocation

Dear Client, Thank you for your continued readership and support this year. This is the last European Investment Strategy report for 2021. In this piece, we review ten charts covering important aspects of the European economy and capital markets. We will resume our regular publishing schedule on January 10th, 2022. The European Investment Strategy team wishes you and your loved ones a wonderful holiday season, and a healthy, happy, and prosperous new year. Best regards, Mathieu Savary   Highlights European growth continues to face headwinds as it enters 2022. The ECB will be slow to remove more accommodation than what is implied by the end of the PEPP. Value stocks and Italian equities will enjoy a modest tailwind from rising Bund yields. The lower quality of European stocks creates a long-term headwind versus US benchmarks. The outperformance of European cyclicals relative to defensives will resume and financials will have greater upside. The relative performance of small-cap stocks will soon stabilize, but a weak euro will create a near-term risk. President Emmanuel Macron’s real contender is the center-right candidate Valerie Pécresse, not populists. Feature Chart 1: Wave Dynamics The current wave of COVID-19 infections continues to surge in Europe. As Chart 1 highlights, Austria and the Netherlands just witnessed intense waves that eclipsed those experienced earlier this year. However, these waves are already ebbing because of the containment measures implemented in recent weeks. In these two severely hit nations, hospitalization rates also increased significantly; however, they did not reach the degree experienced in France or the UK in the first half of 2021 (Chart 1, right panel). Chart 1Wave Dynamics Chart 1Wave Dynamics Europe will experience another test in the coming weeks as the highly contagious Omicron variant becomes the dominant COVID-19 strain. However, data from South Africa continues to suggest that this mutation is much less pathogenic than previous variants and will not place as much strain on the healthcare system as potential case counts would indicate. Nonetheless, it is too early to make this prognosis with great confidence. Importantly, even if a small proportion of infected people is hospitalized, a large enough a pool of infections could cause a rupture in the healthcare system. As a result, politicians will likely remain cautious until a larger share of the population receives its booster dose. Hence, Omicron still represents a near-term risk to economic activity, albeit one that will prove ephemeral. Chart 2: The Economy Is Not Out Of The Woods Yet European growth remains highly dependent on the fluctuations of the global economy because exports and capex account for a large share of the continent’s output. Consequently, global economic trends remain paramount when considering the European economic outlook. In the near-term, Europe continues to face headwinds beyond the uncertainty caused by the potential effects of the Omicron variant. Global economic activity, for instance, is likely to face some further near-term headwinds caused by the supply shock typified by elevated commodity prices and bottlenecks (Chart 2). Not only does this shock limit the ability of producers to procure important inputs, but it also increases the costs of production. Historically, this combination results in downward pressure on global manufacturing activity. Chart 2The Economy Is Not Out Of The Woods Yet Chart 2The Economy Is Not Out Of The Woods Yet The second problem remains the deceleration in the Chinese economy. Declining credit growth in China results in slower European exports, which also hurts the region’s PMI. The recent Central Economic Work Conference suggests that China is ready to inject more stimulus in its economy, which will help Europe. However, the beginning of 2022 will still witness the lagged impact of previous tightening in credit conditions on European economic indicators. Moreover, BCA’s China Investment Strategy team expects the stimulus to be modest at first and only grow in intensity later.  It is unlikely to be as credit-heavy as in the past, which also means it will be less beneficial to Europe. Chart 3: A Careful ECB Last week, the European Central Bank aggressively upgraded its inflation forecast for 2022 and announced the end of the PEPP for March, however, it will increase temporarily the APP program to EUR40bn. Moreover, President Christine Lagarde remains steadfast that the Governing Council will not raise rates in 2022. Our Central Bank Monitor points to the need for tighter policy, yet the ECB continues to adopt a cautious tone, even if the Eurozone HICP inflation has reached 4%—the highest reading in thirteen years. First, the ECB still runs the risk of dislocation in the periphery, where Italian and Spanish spreads may easily explode if monetary accommodation is removed too quickly. Second, European inflationary pressures remain significantly narrower than they are in the US (Chart 3, left panel). Our Eurozone trimmed-mean CPI continues to linger well below core CPI readings, while in the US both measures track each other closely. Third, the decline in energy prices and the ebbing transportation bottlenecks mean that odds are growing that sequential inflation will soon experience an interim peak (Chart 3, right panel). Chart 3A Careful ECB Chart 3A Careful ECB This view of the ECB implies that German yields will not rise as much as US yields next year, which BCA’s US Bond Strategy team expects to reach 2.25% by the end of 2022. Moreover, the more tepid pace of the removal of accommodation and the implicit targeting of peripheral bond markets also warrant an overweight position in Italian bonds. Spreads will be volatile, but any move upward will be self-limiting because of their role in the ECB’s reaction function. As a result, investors should continue to pocket the additional income over German paper. Chart 4: A Murky Outlook For The Euro The market continues to test EUR/USD. Any breakdown below 1.1175 is likely to prompt a pronounced down leg toward 1.07-1.08, near the pandemic lows. The euro suffers from three handicaps. First, Europe’s economic links with China are greater than those of the US with China. Consequently, the Chinese economic deceleration hurts European rates of returns more than it hurts those in the US. Second, the acceleration of US inflation is inviting investors to reprice the path of the Fed’s policy rate, which accentuates the upside pressure on the dollar. Finally, the energy crisis is ramping up anew following Germany’s suspension of the approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the buildup of Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders. Surging European natural gas prices act as a powerful headwind for EUR/USD because they accentuate stagflation risks in the Eurozone (Chart 4, left panel). While these create downside pressures on the euro, the picture is more complex. Our Intermediate-Term Timing Model shows that EUR/USD is one-sigma oversold (Chart 4, right panel). Over the past 20 years, it was more depressed only in 2010 and in early 2015. Such a reading indicates that most of the bad news is already embedded in EUR/USD and that sentiment has become massively negative. Thus, we are not chasing the euro lower, even though we will respect our stop-loss at 1.1175 if it were triggered. Instead, we will look to buy the euro at lower levels in the first quarter of 2021. Chart 4A Murky Outlook For The Euro Chart 4A Murky Outlook For The Euro Chart 5: German Yields Are Key To Value Stocks And Italian Equities The performance of European value stocks relative to that of growth stocks continues to exhibit a close relationship with the evolution of German Bund yields (Chart 5, left panel). Value stocks are less sensitive than growth stocks to higher yields because they derive a smaller proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows; which suffer more from rising discount factors than near-term cash flows. Moreover, value stocks overweight financials, whose profitability increases when yields rise. The same relationship exists between the performance of Italian equities relative to the Eurozone benchmark (Chart 5, right panel). This correlation holds because of Italy’s significant value bias and its large exposure to financials. Chart 5German Yields Are Key To Value Stocks And Italian Equities Chart 5German Yields Are Key To Value Stocks And Italian Equities Based on these observations, BCA’s view that German Bund yields will rise toward 0.25% is consistent with a modest outperformance of value and Italian equities in 2022. For a more robust outperformance by value and Italian stocks, the Chinese economy will have to re-accelerate clearly and the dollar will have to fall significantly. However, these two outcomes could take more time to materialize than our bond view. Chart 6: Europe’s Quality Deficit The gyrations in the performance of European equities relative to US stocks continue to be influenced by China’s economic fluctuations. The deterioration in various measures of China’s credit impulse remains consistent with further near-term underperformance of European equities (Chart 6, left panel). Moreover, if Omicron has a significant impact on consumer behavior (via personal choices or government measures), it will once again hurt spending on services and boost the appeal of growth stocks, which Europe underrepresents. These headwinds will not be long lasting. Europe has an opportunity to outperform next year if global yields rise. However, European equity markets continue to suffer from a potent long-term disadvantage relative to those of the US. American benchmarks are composed of higher quality stocks than European ones. As a result of greater market concentration, more innovative applications of research, and the development of greater moats, US stocks generate wider profits margins than European companies and have a higher utilization of their asset base. Consequently, US shares sport significantly higher RoEs and earnings growth than European large-cap names (Chart 6, right panel). Historically, the quality factor has been one of the top performers and is an important contributor to the current strength of growth equities. Thus, even if Europe’s day in the sun arrives before the middle of 2022, it will again be a temporary phenomenon. Chart 6Europe’s Quality Deficit Chart 6Europe’s Quality Deficit Chart 7: Will the Cyclicals Outperformance Resume? For most of 2021, European cyclicals equities have not performed as well against defensive stocks as many investors hoped. In fact, the relative performance of cyclicals is broadly flat since March. Going forward, cyclicals will resume their uptrend against defensive equities and even break out of their range of the past twenty years. From a technical perspective, cyclicals have expunged many of their excesses. By the spring, European cyclicals had become prohibitively expensive compared to their defensive counterparts (Chart 7, left panel). However, their overvaluation has now passed and medium-term momentum measures are not overbought anymore, which creates a much better entry point for cyclical equities. From a fundamental perspective, cyclicals will also enjoy rising yields after being hamstrung by Treasury yields that have moved sideways for more than nine months (Chart 7, right panel). Moreover, the eventual stabilization of the Chinese economy will create an additional tailwind for these stocks. Chart 7Will The Cyclicals Outperformance Resume? Chart 7Will The Cyclicals Outperformance Resume? The biggest risk to cyclical stocks lies in inflation expectations. Ten-year CPI swaps have stopped increasing despite rising inflation. As the yield curve flattens and long-term segments of the OIS curve invert, markets register their fears that the Fed might tighten too much over the next two years. In other words, markets continue to agonize over the effect of a very low perceived terminal rate. These worries may cause the CPI swaps to decline significantly as the Fed hikes rates next year, creating a headwind for cyclicals. Chart 8: Favor Financials Financials in general and banks in particular have outperformed the European benchmark this year. This trend will persist in 2020. More than the positive impact of higher yields on the profitability of financials justifies this view. One of the key drivers supporting our optimism toward this sector is the continued improvement in the balance-sheet health of the European banking sector (Chart 8, left panel). Capital adequacy ratios remain in an uptrend and NPLs continue to be well-behaved. Meanwhile, both the governments’ liquidity support during the pandemic and the nonfinancial sector’s cash buildup over the past 18 months limit the risk that a brisk rise in insolvencies would threaten the viability of the banking system. European bank lending is also likely to remain superior to that of the post-GFC years. Consumer confidence is still sturdy, despite the recent increase in COVID cases and the tax hike created by rapidly climbing energy prices (Chart 8, right panel). Companies also benefit from an environment of low real rates and limited fiscal austerity. Unsurprisingly, capex intentions are elevated, which should support credit demand from businesses going forward. Chart 8Favor Financials Chart 8Favor Financials These factors imply that the current large discount embedded in European financials’ valuations remains excessive (even if a smaller discount is still warranted). As long as peripheral spreads do not blow out durably, financials will have scope to outperform further. Banks should also beat insurance companies. Chart 9: Small-Caps Are Nearly There Despite a sideways move followed by a 4% dip, the performance of European small-cap stocks remains in a pronounced uptrend relative to large-cap equities. The recent bout of underperformance is likely to end soon, unless a recession is around the corner. Small-cap stocks are becoming oversold (Chart 9, left panel) and will benefit from their pronounced procyclicality, especially if the recent improvement in global economic surprises continues next year. Moreover, above-trend European growth as well as an ECB that will maintain accommodative monetary conditions will combine to prevent a significant widening in European high-yield spreads, particularly once natural gas prices are turned down after the winter. This process will also help small-cap equities. The biggest risk for the European small-caps’ relative performance is the currency market. The relative performance of small-cap names is still closely correlated to the euro (Chart 9, right panel). As a result, if EUR/USD were to falter in the coming weeks, the underperformance of small-cap stocks could deepen. At the very least, small-cap stocks would languish before resuming their uptrend later in the year. Chart 9Small-Caps Are Nearly There Chart 9Small-Caps Are Nearly There Chart 10: A Risk to Macron’s Second Term The emergence of the new populist candidate Éric Zemmour has galvanized the media in recent weeks. However, he is very unlikely to pose a credible threat to French President Emmanuel Macron, unlike center-right candidate Valerie Pécresse, who just won the Les Républicains (LR) primary. In a Special Report published conjointly with our geopolitical strategists last summer, we identified the emergence of a single candidate able to unite the center-right as one of the biggest risks to Macron. As Chart 10 shows, Pécresse has made a comeback in the polls and is now expected to face Macron in the second round. According to an Elabe poll conducted after her victory in the primary, if the second round of the elections were held now, she would beat Macron. Will Pécresse manage to keep her momentum going until April 2022? First, she has to ensure the center-right remains united behind her. Up until the primaries, the center-right was divided. While she won the primary by a wide margin, her main opponent Éric Ciotti won the first round (25.6%), and Michel Barnier as well as Xavier Bertrand came close behind, with 23.9% and 22.7% respectively. Second, Pécresse must work hard to prevent voters from succumbing to the siren songs of Zemmour and Marine Le Pen, or to lean toward former Prime Minister Phillippe Edouard, a declared supporter of Macron. Investors should ignore Le Pen and Eric Zemmour. The real threat to Macron lies in Valerie Pécresse’s ability to keep the center-right united under her banner. Considering that the center-left does not represent an option and that the far-right is entangled in a tug-of-war, there is a high probability that Pécresse will reach the second round.   Footnotes Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Dear Client, This week we present our annual Commodities & Energy Strategy outlook, which contains our key views on the principal markets we cover – energy, base metals and bulks, precious metals, and ags.  Over the coming decade, we expect industrial commodity prices to move higher in an increasingly volatile fashion, not unlike these markets' recent experience.  In the short term, commodity markets will remain exquisitely sensitive to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The highly transmissible omicron variant of the coronavirus – now spreading at more than 4x the rate of the delta variant – appears to be less lethal than previous mutations, suggesting it could become the dominant variant globally.  We remain wary, however, particularly as China still is operating under a zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, and has relied on less efficacious vaccines that appear to offer no protection against the omicron variant of the coronavirus.  This also is a risk for EM economies that rely on these vaccines.  However, the roll-out of mRNA vaccines globally via joint ventures will be gathering steam in 2H22, which is bullish for commodity demand. Longer term, the effort to decarbonize global energy markets is gaining traction, with the three largest economies in the world – the US, China and EU – embarked on a massive transition to renewables.  This will be a multi-decade undertaking that literally could transform the world.  We expect this to continue to unfold in an erratic and uncoordinated fashion, as states work out how to decarbonize the production, delivery and consumption of goods and services.  Markets critical to this transition, particularly base metals, face long odds developing the supply that will be necessary for this effort.  Conventional energy markets – oil, gas and coal – are in a forced wind-down imposed by courts, investors, governments, climate activists, public opinion and policymakers, which is reducing supply at a faster rate than demand.  This leaves markets exposed to volatile price bursts.  As is our custom, this will be the last CES report of the year.  This decade promises to be extraordinary for commodities, and we are hopeful we will continue to be of service in navigating the epic transition to a low-carbon future.  As you gather with friends and loved ones, we wish you all the best in this beautiful season, Robert Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist Highlights Macro: Bullish. Systematically important central banks will remain wary of moving too strongly too soon, in the wake of the COVID-19 omicron variant. US real rates will remain low and the USD will weaken, which will support commodities. Energy: Bullish. OPEC 2.0 and the price-taking cohort will maintain existing production policies, which will restrain oil supply. The omicron variant likely will dent demand, not tank it. Our 2022 Brent forecast is slightly weaker on omicron risk, averaging $78.50/bbl, with most of the demand hit in 1H22 made up in 2H22, while our 2023 forecast is $80/bbl. Base Metals: Bullish. Supply-demand balances will remain tight. Climate activism in courts and boardrooms; ESG-related costs, local and geopolitical uncertainty will continue to weigh on supply. COMEX copper will average $4.80/lb next year and $6.00/lb in 2023. Precious Metals: Bullish. Rising commodity prices will feed directly into inflation gauges favored by the Fed. Inflation and inflation expectations will remain elevated. Gold will push to $2,000/oz and silver to $30/oz in 2022. Ags/Softs: Neutral. Ag markets will remain balanced, with a bias to the upside from higher costs of fertilizer and transportation. Erratic weather remains an upside risk. Risk: Elevated. On the upside, a less lethal omicron variant that dominates other COVID-19 variants will rally markets. A more virulent mutant would hit demand harder and push prices lower. Hospitalizations/Cases and Deaths/Cases remain the critical ratios – trajectories need to remain flat to downward for growth (Chart of the Week). Recommendations: Our COMT ETF position was stopped out on 13 December 2021, which is when the ETF went ex-dividend. The ETF paid $5.4941/share for an 18.44% dividend (p.a.). Our stop-loss is being overridden, and we remain long the COMT ETF, in the expectation commodity markets will remain tight and backwardation will continue to drive returns. Feature COVID-19 continues to determine the trajectory of global growth – hence commodity demand – and how it will be distributed in the short run. Reports this week indicating the widely used Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine used in China and EM states is ineffective in neutralizing the omicron variant will renew the focus on an underappreciated risk: High vaccination rates in and of themselves are not useful indicators of successful public-health responses.1 More than anything, what appears to matter most is the vaccine that's been used to address the public-health threat posed by COVID-19. A booster of the Pfizer-BioNTech mRNA vaccine, e.g., appears to neutralize the omicron variant, and to convey a higher likelihood of avoiding serious illness and hospitalization.2 This will be important going forward, as the COVID-19 omicron variant appears to be transmitted at a rate that is 4.2x as contagious as the delta variant. This raises the odds that hospital beds will fill faster as the omicron mutant spreads.3 This could again lead to reduced availability of health care, and additional lockdowns to contain the spread of the omicron variant, which would again radiate through global supply chains. Oil Market Outlook Hinges On Omicron Response The risk exposed in these public-health developments is the global commodity recovery – particularly for crude oil and refined products like gasoline and jet fuel – could become more bifurcated this year, with economies using primarily mRNA technology continuing to open and recover. States without access to or distribution of these vaccines will have to rely more on social distancing and lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. We would expect this to be a powerful inducement to accelerate local production and distribution of mRNA vaccines in Asia, Latin America and Europe. Successful implementation of this strategy would boost commodity demand, particularly for transportation fuels.4 Our prior regarding the omicron variant is it will dent demand but not tank oil demand. To account for the so-far-unknown effects of omicron, we are assuming 1H22 global crude and refined-product demand falls to 100.4mm b/d, versus our earlier estimate of 101.5mm b/d. Most of this demand is recovered in 2H22, when we expect oil consumption to average 101.8mm b/d versus our earlier expectation of 102.5mm b/d. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 core producers – KSA, Russia, Iraq, UAE and Kuwait – will continue to implement the coalition's production-management strategy – i.e., keeping the level of supply just below demand. Meanwhile, the price-taking cohort led by the US shale-oil producers will continue to focus on profitability, not production for the sake of production. Accelerating production too rapidly at this point would undo much of the work and effort undertaken to establish oil and gas companies as attractive alternatives for investors. Our 2022 Brent forecast is weaker by $1.50/bbl vs last month's estimate, averaging $78.50/bbl. Our 2023 forecast is $1/bbl lower, with our average expectation at $80.00/bbl (Chart 2). Longer term, oil + gas capex remains weak (Chart 3). As we have stressed repeatedly, this is wicked bullish for prices in 2024 and beyond. Chart 2Brent Forecast Slightly Weaker In 2022 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Weak Capex Keeps Base Metals Outlook Bullish Weak capex is a common theme in the industrial commodities – oil and base metals – which points to tight supply-demand balances for these markets going forward. This is as true for base metals as it is for oil (Chart 4). The principal drivers of the capex squeeze are similar in both markets: A desire to regain investors' favor after years of poor returns. This has managements focused on returning capital to shareholders either in the form of share buybacks or higher dividend payments. However, there are additional pressures adding to the cost structures of industrial commodities, particularly the seismic shifts in the political underpinnings of commodity-exporting countries, where left-of-center politicians are proving more attractive to the median voter in states with contestable elections. Once elected – e.g., in Peru, and, likely Chile after this weekend's elections – politicians push hard to secure a greater share of mining revenues for long-neglected poor and indigenous populations.5 The bellwether base metal market – copper – best highlights these factors, which, in our view, will keep base-metals capex tentative and restrained over the medium term. Miners are almost forced to exercise capex restraint until they get greater clarity on how newly elected governments will deliver on their avowed intent to secure a greater share of mining revenues for their constituents. This is particularly true in Chile and Peru – which together account for a combined 40% of global copper ore output – where poor and indigenous populations are engaging in more frequent civil disobedience.6 In addition to the contentious changing of the guard at the political level, ESG-related initiatives brought to the fore by climate activists elected to corporate boards and in court proceedings are adding new layers of cost to base-metals mining (and oil and gas exploration for that matter). This week, Reuters reported on separate court decisions in Australia and Chile that redress mistreatment of aboriginal peoples in key metals-exporting states.7 We believe political and ESG-related costs will raise miners' all-in sustaining costs, which will have to be covered by higher prices going forward. The additional costs that will be imposed on miners trying to meet the demand that will be driven by the global decarbonization and renewable-energy buildout now kicking into high gear will require prices to spur investment in new mine production, and to keep existing and brownfield production up and running.8 Copper prices will get an assist from a weaker USD, which will boost demand for the metal ex-US (Chart 5). We are expecting copper to push to $4.80/lb on average next year and $6.00/lb in 2023 on the COMEX, on the back of stronger supply fundamentals and a weaker USD. Chart 5A Weaker USD Will Boost Copper Gold Will Rally As Inflation, Uncertainty Remain Elevated Gold prices will move higher in 2022 – our target remains $2,000/oz – as investors seek cover from higher commodity prices, which will feed directly through to higher inflation (Chart 6).9 This has been apparent in the recent US PCEPI and core PCEPI – the Fed's preferred inflation gauge – and CPI data, and at the wholesale level in PPI data. Most of this results from tight supplies for commodities and strong demand for goods, which is driving the price increases. We expect this to continue into 2022, as pent-up consumer demand continues to drive goods purchases and supply-side tightness for most manufacturing inputs. Higher prices across commodity markets will keep inflation gauges elevated in 2022. In addition to the inflation-hedging demand we expect next year, investors also will turn to gold as a hedge against economic policy uncertainty: As inflation and policy uncertainty increase, gold prices move higher (Chart 7). Chart 6Higher Commodity Prices Will Pressure Inflation Higher Chart 7Investors Will Use Gold To Hedge Inflation, Uncertainty   Lastly, in line with our colleagues in BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy service, we remain USD bears in 2022. As is the case with all commodities, gold will benefit from a weaker USD.10 Ags Remain Balanced In 2022 Global ag markets, by and large, will remain balanced over the current crop year (Chart 8), with a bias to the upside as input and transportation costs – chiefly fertilizers and grain vessels, respectively – remain high (Charts 9 and 10). Erratic weather, as always, remains an upside risk. Chart 10… And Fertilizer Costs Will Push Grains, Beans Higher While we remain neutral grains, the periodic price spikes resulting from higher freight rates and natural gas prices will support overall commodity exposures. Over the short term, the risk of higher prices is acute: Markets still are contending with the possibility of another colder-than-normal winter. This would push natgas prices – and, because it is 70% natgas, fertilizer costs – sharply higher next year. This will have to be recouped by higher food prices, particularly if shipping costs spike higher due to COVID-19-induced port closures. Surging food prices will keep inflation rates higher globally, making them more persistent (vs. transitory). Investment Implications Global supply-demand fundamentals continue to support our conviction commodity markets will remain tight in 2022. As such we remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF – expecting market tightness to result in renewed backwardation. We also remain long the PICK expecting continued tightness in base metals. Risks to our views remain elevated – and occur in both directions. On the upside, commodities will rally if a less-lethal omicron variant becomes the dominant COVID-19 strain and does not overly tax hospital resources or drive death rates higher. It could actually convey a global benefit as the dominant strain, crowding out other mutations and pushing states to herd immunity. On the downside, it's still too early to tell how this new variant and other mutations will behave. Given the fragility of the current global recovery and reopening shown in the initial response to omicron, a more virulent mutant likely would hit aggregate demand hard, forcing yet another supply-side adjustment in commodities generally. Upside risks dominate in our assessment, but, as always, we remain cautious.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see Sinovac shot offers inadequate shield from Omicron variant, says HK study published by straitstimes.com on December 15, 2021. The Sinovac vaccine is almost half as effective as mRNA-based vaccines, and is widely distributed in EM economies. We flagged this risk earlier in July in our report titled Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views; it is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see Pfizer Booster Shots Are Effective Against Omicron Variant, Israeli Study Says published by wsj.com on December 12, 2021. 3    Please see Omicron four times more transmissible than Delta in Japan study published by straitstimes.com on December 9, 2021. 4    Please see Upside Price Risk Rises For Crude, which we published on September 16, 2021, for addition discussion of the global joint-ventures engaged in local production of mRNA vaccines. 5    Please see Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published on November 25, 2021 and Chile: Prepare For A Boric Win, published by BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service on December 15, 2021. The latter report discusses the growing odds of a victory for the left-of-center candidate in Chile's election this weekend. 6    Please see, e.g., Peru's poor Andean hamlets, backed by state, unleash anger at mines, published by reuters.com on December 14, 2021. 7     Please see Australian mining state passes Aboriginal heritage protection law, and Chile's Supreme Court orders new evaluation of Norte Abierto mining project published by reuters.com on December 15 and 14, 2021, respectively. 8    Incremental investment needed to meet 2050 net-zero climate goals will come to almost $2 trillion per year, half of which will go into renewable power generation, industrial processes, and transportation, according to estimates by Goldman Sachs, published on December 13, 2021. 9    Please see More Commodity-Led Inflation On The Way, which we published on December 9, 2021. It is worthwhile reiterating Granger-causality between realized and expected inflation gauges (US PCEPI, core PCEPI, CPI, along with 5-year/5-year CPI swap rates) and commodity price indices (the S&P GSCI and Bloomberg Commodity Index) is very strong. 10   Please see 2022 Key Views: Tug Of War, published by BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy service on December 10, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021