Disasters/Disease
The recent selloff in US risky assets has been triggered by the continued surge in COVID-19 cases, and concerns that US fiscal policy is no longer supportive of the nascent recovery in economic activity. Against this backdrop, the chart above highlights that…
Your feedback is important to us. Please take our client survey today. Highlights For now, there is little evidence that the pandemic has adversely affected the global economy’s long-run growth potential. Even if one counts those who will be unable to work due to long-term health complications from the virus, the pandemic will probably reduce the global labor force by only 0.1%-to-0.15%. Labor markets have healed more quickly over the past few months than after the Great Recession. In the US, the ratio of unemployed workers-to-job openings has recovered most of its lost ground. Thanks in part to generous government support for businesses and the broader economy, commercial bankruptcy filings remain near historic lows. Meanwhile, new US business formation has surged to record highs. The combination of a vaccine and a decline in rents in city centres should persuade some people who were thinking of fleeing to the suburbs to stay put. This will ensure that most urban commercial and residential real estate remains productively engaged. Judging from corporate surveys, capital spending on equipment and intellectual property should continue to rebound. While the pandemic has caused numerous economic dislocations, it has also opened the door to a variety of productivity-enhancing innovations. An open question is whether all the debt that governments have taken on to alleviate the economic damage from the pandemic could in and of itself cause damage down the road. As long as interest rates stay low, this is not a major risk. However, today’s high government debt levels could become a problem if the pool of global savings dries up. Investors should continue to overweight stocks for the time being, while shifting their equity exposure from “pandemic plays” to “reopening plays.” A more cautious stance towards stocks may be appropriate later this decade. The Pandemic’s Potentially Long Shadow In its latest World Economic Outlook, the IMF revised up its growth estimates for this year. Rather than contracting by 4.9%, as it expected in June, the Fund now sees the global economy shrinking by 4.4%. That said, the IMF’s estimates still leave global GDP in 2020 7.5% below where it projected it to be in January. Perhaps even more worrying, the IMF expects the global economy to suffer permanent damage from the pandemic (Chart 1 and Chart 2). It projects that real global GDP will be 5.3% lower in 2024 compared to what it expected last year. In the G7, real GDP is projected to be nearly 3% lower, with most of the shortfall resulting from a downward revision to the level of potential GDP (Chart 3). Chart 1Covid-19: The IMF Expects The Global Economy To Suffer Permanent Damage (Part I) Chart 2Covid-19: The IMF Expects The Global Economy To Suffer Permanent Damage (Part II) The Congressional Budget Office is no less gloomy in its forecast. The CBO expects US real GDP to be 3.7% lower in 2024 than it projected last August. By 2029, it sees US GDP as being 1.8% below what it had expected prior to the pandemic, almost entirely due to slower potential GDP growth (Chart 4). Chart 3G7 Real GDP Growth Projections Have Been Revised Sharply Lower Due To The Pandemic Chart 4A Gloomy Forecast For The US Thanks To Covid-19 The worry that the pandemic will lead to a major permanent loss in output is understandable. That is precisely what happened after the Global Financial Crisis. Nevertheless, as we discuss below, there are good reasons to think that the damage will not be as pervasive as widely believed. The Drivers Of Potential GDP An economy’s potential output is a function of three variables: 1) the number of workers available; 2) the amount of capital those workers have at their disposal; and 3) the efficiency with which this labor and capital can be transformed into output, a concept economists call “total factor productivity.” Let us consider how the pandemic has affected all three variables. The Impact Of The Pandemic On The Labor Market At last count, the pandemic has killed over 1.1 million people worldwide, 222,000 in the US. While the human cost of the virus is immense, the economic cost has been mitigated by the fact that about four-fifths of fatalities have been among those over the age of 65 (Table 1). In the US, less than 7% of the labor force is older than 65. A reasonable estimate is that Covid deaths have reduced the US labor force by 55,000.1 Table 1Pandemic-Related Deaths Are Tilted Towards The Elderly, Who Are The Least Active Participants Of The Labor Force Chart 5The Number Of New Cases Continues To Increase Globally Granted, mortality is not the only way that the disease can impair one’s ability to work. As David Cutler and Larry Summers point out in a recent study, for every single person who dies from Covid-19, seven people will survive but not before manifesting severe or critical symptoms of the disease.2 Based on the experience from past coronavirus epidemics, Ahmed, Patel, Greenwood et al. estimate that about one-third of these survivors will suffer long-term health complications.3 If one assumes that half of these chronically ill survivors are unable to work, this would reduce the US labor force by an additional 65,000.4 Of course, the pandemic is not yet over. The number of new cases continues to rise in the US and globally (Chart 5). The only saving grace is that mortality and morbidity rates are lower than they were earlier this year. Nevertheless, many more people are likely to die or suffer debilitating long-term consequences before a vaccine becomes widely available. Using the US as an example, if the total number of people who end up dying or getting so sick that they are unable to work ends up being twice what it is so far, the pandemic will reduce the labor force by about 240,000. This is not a small number in absolute terms. However, it is less than 0.15% of the overall size of the US labor force, which stood at 164 million on the eve of the pandemic. The impact of the pandemic on the labor forces of other major economies such as Europe, China, and Japan will be even smaller. Labor Market Hysteresis People can drop out of the labor force even if they do not get sick. In fact, 4.4 million have left the US labor force since February, bringing the participation rate down from 63.4% to 61.4%. How great is the risk of “hysteresis,” a situation where the skills of laid-off workers atrophy so much that they become unwilling or unable to rejoin the labor force? At least so far, hysteresis has been limited. According to surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, most US workers who have dropped out of the labor force still want a job. The pandemic has made it more difficult for people to work even when they wanted to. During the spring, more than four times as many employees were absent from work due to childcare requirements than at the same time last year. Now that schools are reopening, it will be easier for parents to go back to work. Admittedly, not everyone will have a job to return to. While about a third of US unemployed workers are still on temporary layoff, the number of workers who have suffered permanent job losses has been steadily rising (Chart 6). The good news is that job openings have recovered most of their decline since the start of the year. Unlike in mid-2009, when there were 6.5 unemployed workers for every one job vacancy, today there are only two (Chart 7). Chart 6US: Permanent Job Losses Have Been Rising Steadily... Chart 7...But Job Openings Have Recovered Most Of Their Decline Since The Start Of The Year It is also worth noting that the vast majority of job losses during the pandemic has been among lower-income workers, especially in the retail and hospitality sectors. Most of these jobs do not require highly specialized sector-specific skills. Thus, as long as there is enough demand throughout the economy, unemployed workers will be able to find jobs in other industries. Wither The Capital Stock? The pandemic may end up reducing the value of the capital stock in two ways. First, it could render a portion of the existing capital stock unusable. Second, the pandemic could reduce the pace of new investment, leading to a smaller future capital stock than would otherwise have been the case. Let us explore both possibilities. On the first point, it is certainly true that the pandemic has left a lot of the capital stock idle, ranging from office buildings to shopping malls. However, this could turn out to be a temporary effect. Consider, for example, the case of China. After the pandemic began in Wuhan, China first shut down much of its domestic economy and then implemented an effective mass testing and contact tracing system. The strategy worked insofar as China is now nearly free of the virus. Today, few Chinese wear masks, the restaurants are full again, and domestic air travel is back to last year’s level. Even movie theatre revenue has rebounded. The rest of the world may not be able to replicate China’s success in combating the virus, but then again it won’t need to if an effective vaccine becomes available. Chart 8US Housing Is In A Good Place Even if the pandemic ends up leading to deep and lasting changes in the way people live, work, and shop, the market mechanism will ensure that all but the least desirable parts of the capital stock remain productively employed. As first year economics students learn, if the supply curve is vertical and the demand curve shifts inward, the result will be lower prices rather than diminished output. By the same token, if more companies and workers decide to relocate to the suburbs, urban rents will fall until enough people decide that they are better off staying put. An economy’s productive capacity does not change just because rents go down. What falling demand for urban real estate and increased interest in working from home will do is encourage people to buy larger homes in suburban areas. We have already seen this play out this year. Despite flagging commercial real estate construction in the US, residential construction has boomed. Single-family housing starts were up 24% year-over-year in September. Building permits and home sales have reached new cycle highs. Homebuilder confidence hit a new record in October (Chart 8). The Service Sector Is Not Particularly Capital Intensive Most recessions take a greater toll on the goods-producing sectors of the economy than the service sector. The pandemic, in contrast, has mainly afflicted services. The service sector is the least capital-intensive sector of the economy. This is especially the case when it comes to spending on capital equipment and investment in intellectual property (Chart 9). Chart 9Capex-Intensive Industries Have Let Go Of Less Workers During The Pandemic Chart 10Capex Intentions Have Bounced Back As such, it is not surprising that investment in equipment and IP fell less during this recession than one would have expected based on the historic relationship between investment and GDP growth. According to the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model, investment in equipment and IP is set to increase by 23% in the third quarter. The snapback in the Fed’s capex intention surveys suggests that investment spending should continue to rise in the fourth quarter and into next year (Chart 10). Productivity And The Pandemic Just as the impact of the pandemic on the labor supply and the capital stock is likely to be limited, the same is true for the efficiency with which capital and labor is transformed into output. For every person whose productivity is hampered by having to work from home, there is another person who feels liberated from the need to spend an hour commuting to work only to attend a series of pointless meetings. In fact, it is quite possible that the pandemic will nudge society from various “low productivity” equilibria to “high productivity” equilibria. For example, greater use of video conferencing could negate the need to take redeye flights to attend business meetings in person. Remote learning could enhance educational opportunities. More widespread use of telemedicine could eliminate the need to waste time waiting in a doctor’s office. Who knows, the pandemic could even fulfill my life-long mission to replace the unhygienic handshake with the much more elegant Thai wai. Granted, disruptive shifts could produce unintended consequences. There is a fine line between creative destruction and uncreative obliteration. If the pandemic forces otherwise viable businesses to close, this could adversely affect resource allocation. Chart 11New Business Applications Have Surged To Record Highs Chart 12Commercial Bankruptcy Filings Remain In Check Fortunately, at least so far, this does not seem to be happening on a large scale. After dropping by 25%, the number of active US small businesses has rebounded to last year’s levels. New business applications have surged to record highs (Chart 11). According to the American Bankruptcy Institute, commercial bankruptcy filings remain near historic lows. While Bloomberg’s count of large-company bankruptcies did spike earlier this year, it has been coming down more recently (Chart 12). Fiscal Stimulus To The Rescue Chart 13Personal Income Jumped Early On In The Pandemic How did so many households and businesses manage to avoid the financial suffering that usually goes along with deep recessions? The answer is that governments provided them with ample income support. In the US, real personal income rose by 11% in the first few months of the pandemic (Chart 13). Small businesses also benefited from the Paycheck Protection Program, which doled out low-cost loans to businesses which they will be able to convert into grants upon confirmation that the money was used to preserve jobs. Similar schemes, such as Germany’s Corona-Schutzschild, Canada’s Emergency Business Account program, and the UK’s Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme were launched elsewhere. The failure of the US Congress to pass a new stimulus bill could undermine the sanguine narrative presented above. Small businesses, in particular, are facing a one-two punch from the expiration of the Paycheck Protection Program and tighter bank lending standards. Ultimately, we think the US Congress will pass a new pandemic relief bill. However, the size of the bill could depend on the outcome of the election. In a blue sweep scenario, the Biden administration will push through a $2.5-to-$3.5 trillion stimulus package early next year, while laying the groundwork for a further 3% of GDP increase in government spending on infrastructure, health care, education, housing, and the environment. A fairly large stimulus bill could also emerge if President Trump manages to hang on to the White House, while the Democrats take control of the Senate. Unlike some Republican senators, Donald Trump is not averse to big increases in government spending. A continuation of the current political configuration in Washington would result in the smallest increase in spending. Nevertheless, some sort of deal is likely to emerge after the election. Even most Republican voters favor a large stimulus bill (Table 2). Table 2Strong Support For Stimulus A Double-Edged Sword? Bountiful fiscal support has undoubtedly lessened the economic scarring from the pandemic. However, could the resulting increase in government debt lead to supply-side problems down the road? The answer depends on what happens to interest rates. As long as interest rates stay below the growth rate of the economy, governments will not need to raise taxes to pay for pandemic relief. In fact, in such a setting, the public debt-to-GDP ratio will return to its original level with absolutely no change in the structural budget deficit (Chart 14). GDP growth in most developed economies has exceeded government borrowing rates for much of the post-war era (Chart 15). Thus, a free lunch scenario where governments never have to pay back the additional debt they incurred for pandemic relief cannot be ruled out. That said, it would not be prudent to bank on such an outcome. If the excess private-sector savings that have kept down borrowing costs run out, interest rates could rise. In a world awash in debt, this could lead to major problems. Thus, while the structural damage to the global economy from the pandemic appears to be limited for now, that could change in the future. Chart 14A Fiscal Free Lunch When r Is Less Than g Chart 15The Rate Of Economic Growth Has Usually Been Higher Than Interest Rates Investors should continue to overweight equities for the time being. With a vaccine on the horizon, it makes sense to shift from favoring “pandemic plays” such as tech and health care stocks to favoring “reopening plays” such as deep cyclicals and banks. A more cautious stance towards stocks will be appropriate later this decade if, as flagged above, a stagflationary environment leads to higher interest rates and slower growth. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 To estimate the direct impact of Covid-19 on the labor force, we calculate the decline in the labor force by age cohorts using Covid-19 death statistics and labor participation rates. 2 David M. Cutler, and Lawrence H. Summers, “The COVID-19 Pandemic and the $16 Trillion Virus,” JAMA Network, October 12, 2020. 3 Hassaan Ahmed, Kajal Patel, Darren Greenwood, Stephen Halpin, Penny Lewthwaite, Abayomi Salawu, Lorna Eyre, Andrew Breen, Rory O’Connor, Anthony Jones, and Manoj Sivan. “Long-Term Clinical Outcomes In Survivors Of Coronavirus Outbreaks After Hospitalisation Or ICU Admission: A Systematic Review And Meta-Analysis Of Follow-Up Studies,” medRxiv, April 22, 2020. 4 Calculated as 0.5 x (decline in labor force due to Covid-19 deaths) x 7 x (1/3). Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores
We noted in a late-September insight that another wave of COVID-19 had begun, but that this wave was less deadly than before. We highlighted that the incremental mortality rate, defined as fatalities over the past 30 days as a percent of lagged 30-day…
Highlights Our model suggests that more rate hikes are ahead in 2021; we project a less than 50bps increase in the PBoC policy rate from the current level. Chinese stock prices positively correlate with interest rates and bond yields. The relationship has strengthened since 2015. In the next six to nine months, Chinese stock prices will likely trend up alongside a rising policy rate and an accelerating economic growth. Feature China’s policy rate and bond yields have been rising sharply since May and are breaching their pre-COVID 19 levels. Meanwhile, Chinese stock prices have moved sideways since mid-July, despite a steady recovery in the domestic economy. While some commentators view higher interest rates as a harbinger of an impending equity market weakness, our research shows that the relationship between China’s stock prices and short-term rates has been positive since 2015. A rally in Chinese stocks and outperformance of cyclical stocks relative to defensives positively correlate with rising interest rates and bond yields (Chart 1A and 1B). Chart 1ARising Bond Yields Coincide With Ascending Chinese Stock Prices... Chart 1B...And Offshore Cyclicals Chart 2Massive Stimulus In 2020 Will Accelerate Economic Growth Into 1H21 China’s massive stimulus this year generated some self-sustaining momentum that will likely push the nation’s output higher in 1H21(Chart 2). The PBoC may raise the policy rate by as much as 50bps in 2021 from its current level, but strong domestic fundamentals should be able to drive up Chinese stock prices, in both absolute term and relative to global equities in the next six to nine months. PBoC Policy Hikes:Still More Ahead While the PBoC’s policy rate has rebounded sharply, it remains at its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis. Looking forward, will the central bank bring the policy rate (e.g. 3-month SHIBOR) back to its pre-COVID 19 range of 3 – 3.5% or the pre-trade war level near 5%? The acceleration in China’s economic recovery is expected to continue and would boost China’s annual output growth in 1H21 to two to three percentage points above its trend. Based on these estimates, our interest rate model implies more than 200bps in rate increases in 2021 from the current level1 (Chart 3). Chart 3Rising Odds Of PBoC Rate Hikes In 2021 Historically, our model has successfully captured the major turning points in China's policy rate cycles. This time around, however, the pandemic and the subsequent economic recovery may have complicated the model's predictive power. The model suggests that, in 1H21 the policy rate will return to its pre-trade war range of 4-5%, but we think the rate increases will be capped within 50bps. The model follows a modified version of "Taylor's Rule," in which we assume that the PBoC will target its short-term interest rate based on the deviation between actual and desired inflation rates and the deviation between real GDP growth and China’s trend GDP growth rate. The latest data shows across-the-board strengthening in the economy; most indicators have surprised to the upside, confirming our optimistic assessment.2 However, Taylor's Rule is not able to account for sudden shocks in the economy, such as a pandemic-induced global recession. Thus, the model exaggerates the magnitude of interest rate bumps, based on an economic growth acceleration following a one-off economic shock. In a report earlier this year, we noted that the PBoC has been proactive in normalizing its monetary policy following short-term shocks.3 This is contrary to economic downturns when the PBoC has been a reactive central bank and its decisions often lagged a pickup in economic activity. As such, although interest rates have swiftly rebounded after the pandemic-induced growth contraction in Q1, we expect the pace of rate hikes to be slower in 2021. Chart 4Rapid RMB Appreciation Will Bring Headwinds To Chinese Industrial Profits External factors are accounted for in the model, though they may be underestimated. The US Federal Reserve Bank has decisively shifted its monetary policy to broadly accommodative and will stay behind the inflation curve in the next few years. The collapse in interest rate differentials between the US and China has made RMB-denominated assets attractive, boosting strong inflows of foreign capital and rapidly pushing up the value of the RMB (Chart 4, top panel). While we think Chinese policymakers have pivoted to prefer a strong RMB, the recent countermeasures by the PBoC indicate that the central bank will not allow the RMB to climb too rapidly.4 China's drastic tightening in monetary conditions and the sharp rally in the trade-weighted RMB from 2011 to 2014 led to a prolonged economic downturn (Chart 4, bottom panel). Therefore, in the absence of synchronized policy tightening from other central banks, the magnitude of rate hikes by the PBoC will be measured. Bottom Line: The PBoC will continue to push up the policy rate in 2021, but our baseline view is that the magnitude will be capped below 50bps. Interest Rates And Chinese Stocks Chart 5Chinese Stocks/Bond Yields Correlation Became Much More Positive After 2015 Many investors might think that stock prices tend to react negatively to monetary policy tightening because interest rate upturns and mounting bond yields lead to higher costs of funding for corporations and lower profit growth. However, Chinese stock prices started moving in the same direction with policy rates and bond yields following the burst of the 2014/15 stock market bubble (Chart 5 and Chart 1A and 1B on Page 4 and 2). In general, when China’s economic and profit growth accelerates, share prices can rise with higher interest rates. Share prices can still climb with cuts in interest rates even when economic growth slows but profit growth rate remains in positive territory. However, when profit growth is expected to drop below zero, share prices will drop even if rates are falling (Chart 6A and 6B). In this vein, the most pertinent reason for Chinese stocks to move in tandem with bond yields is that Chinese stocks are increasingly driven by economic fundamentals, which are supported by the volume of total credit creation (measured by total social financing) rather than the price of money in China. Furthermore, the reverse relationship between the volume and price of money in China broke down after 2015; China’s credit creation has become less sensitive to changes in interest rates. Chart 6AWhen Interest Rates Rise... Chart 6B...Economic Growth Holds The Key For Stock Performance Since 2015, the PBOC shifted its policy to target interest rates instead of the quantity of money supply (Chart 7). In order to effectively manage the official interbank rates (the 7-day interbank repo rate), the central bank uses tools such as reserve requirement ratio cuts and liquidity injections in the interbank system (Chart 8). In other words, the central bank has forgone its control of the volume of money. Moreover, since late 2016, rather than direct interest rate hikes, the PBoC has been taking monetary policy tightening measures through changes in its macro-prudential assessment (MPA). The changes in the MPA are evident in the 3-month / 1-week repo spread.5 As such, an increase in the 3-month interbank repo rate (and SHIBOR) is often intended to curb shadow-banking activities rather than depress aggregate credit creation and business activities (Chart 9). Chart 7Monetary Policy Regime Shifted In 2015 Chart 8More Open Market Operations Chart 9Most Monetary Tightening Has Been Carried Out Through MPA Since 2016 Another idiosyncrasy is China’s fiscal stimulus, which has become a more relevant driver of total social financing since the onset of the 2014/15 economic downcycle (Chart 10). The amount of government bond issuance is specified by the People’s Congress in March each year and is not affected by changes in interest rates or bond yields. Therefore, growth in total social financing can still accelerate despite a higher price of money (Chart 11). Chart 10Fiscal Lever Has Become More Prominent In Driving Business Cycles Since 2015 Chart 11Changes In Interest Rates Have Little Impact On Fiscal And Quasi-Fiscal Borrowing By the same token, a rising 3-month SHIBOR can also be the result of rapid fiscal and quasi-fiscal expansions, as seen in Q3 this year. A flood of central and local government bond issuance drained liquidities from commercial banks, boosting the banks’ needs to borrow money from the interbank system. Nevertheless, the market’s appetite for risk assets increases because fiscal stimulus provides an imminent and powerful reflationary force in China’s business cycles. Chart 12Bank Lending Rates Can Still Trend Downwards Against A Rising Policy Rate Rising policy rates typically push up corporate bond yields. However, bond yields in China play a relatively small role in driving corporate financing costs on an aggregate level, since commercial banks are still dominant in China’s debt market. Commercial banks' average lending rates closely track the PBoC’s policy rate on a cyclical basis, but Chinese authorities periodically use window guidance to target the Loan Prime Rate (LPR), a reformed bank lending rate. Hence, the direction in both the LPR and the average lending rate can temporarily diverge from the policy rate. These measures can boost bank loan growth even in a rising interest rate environment (Chart 12). Bottom Line: The key driver of Chinese stock performance is the country’s domestic credit, business, and corporate profit growth cycles. Since the 2014/15 cycle, the policy rate has not been the determinant of China’s economic or credit growth. Investment Conclusions We expect that this year’s massive monetary and fiscal stimulus to accelerate the country’s economic recovery into 1H21. Therefore, even if interest rates and bond yields advance, Chinese stock prices can still trend upward. Chinese cyclical stocks should also continue to outperform defensives, in both the onshore and offshore markets (Chart 13A and 13B). Chart 13AStay Invested In Chinese Stocks Chart 13BCyclicals Still Have Upside Potentials Rates will begin to climb and fiscal policy will also become more restrictive if China’s output moves above trend growth through 1H21. Government bond quotas and fiscal budget will be determined at the National People’s Congress in March. If the economy is strong, odds are that fiscal stimulus will be scaled back. At that point, investors should start to look for a peak in China’s business cycle linked to monetary and fiscal policy tightening. As growth expectations start to downshift in the equity market, yields on long-dated government bonds will start to decline while yields on the short end will not drop. Additionally, the small-cap ChiNext market has been considered as a speculative segment of the domestic financial market with higher multiples and greater volatility than large-cap A shares. The bourse's trailing price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book ratio are extremely elevated at 79 and 8.6, respectively, much higher than for broader onshore and offshore Chinese stocks. As such, this market will remain the most vulnerable to domestic liquidity tightening. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 based on our estimates for 1h21: 7.5-8.0% GDP growth, 2.5-2.8% headline CPI, 6.5-6.7 USD/CNY, and the fed holding current fund rate unchanged. 2Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Macro And Market Review," dated October 7, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Don’t Chase China’s Bond Yields Lower," dated February 19, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4On October 12, the PBoC removed financial institutions’ Forex reserve ratio of 20%, making betting against the RMB cheaper. 5Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Dear client, Next Monday, October 19, we will be hosting our quarterly webcast, “From Alpha To Omega With Anastasios”, at 10am EST; Matt Gertken, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist will be our guest on the eve of the US Presidential Election. Our regular weekly publication will resume on Monday October 26, 2020. Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights Portfolio Strategy Homebuilders are more than fully priced, discounting high margins as far as the eye can see and no end to demand. The specter of higher interest rates, lumber inflation, stealing demand from the future, unfriendly bankers and uncertainty with regard to a fresh stimulus package more than offset the positives, and compel us to issue a downgrade alert for the S&P homebuilding index. While the price of credit, loan growth prospects and credit quality all weigh on relative bank performance. A fiscal stimulus bill, depressed valuations and a Fed induced resumption of dividend hikes and share buybacks keep us on the sidelines in the S&P banks index. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities seesawed last week as President Trump returned to the White House (WH) and injected fresh volatility in markets signaling that there will be no fiscal deal prior to the elections. The SPX immediately gapped down and we cannot stress enough the importance of our newly configured Fiscal Policy Loop: fiscal hawkishness causes skittishness in markets culminating to a classic BCA riot point and then policymakers relent and fiscal dovishness restores the equity bull market (Figure 1). While we cannot rule out a slimmed-down stimulus package deal by later this month, fiscal policy- and election-related uncertainties remain elevated. The daily back-and-forth on where Congress and the WH stand with passing a new stimulus bill coupled with the prospects of a contested election that would drag on the presidential race likely into December, have caused investor fatigue. The sooner both of these uncertainties recede, the quicker the SPX will climb to fresh all-time highs (Chart 1). Figure 1The Fiscal Policy Loop Chart 1Receding Uncertainty Will Boost Stocks We have shown in recent research, and update today, that the fourth year of presidential cycles finds the SPX ending the year on average in the green with a calendar return in the high single digits (Chart 2). Peering back in 2016 is instructive as that presidential election cycle year was in some ways similar to the current one. The economy, in particular, was fighting off a manufacturing recession that spread and infected the services sectors as the vast majority of S&P GICS1 sectors saw profit contraction and more importantly revenue declines. Chart 3 shows a number of asset classes and compares 2016 with 2020. The 10-year US Treasury yield appears poised to rebound significantly, especially if Congress passes a fresh fiscal package that aides the parts of the economy that need the stimulus checks most. Fiscal easing uncertainty remains a thorny issue across different markets and if history is an accurate guide, the SPX could glide lower into the November election before rallying into year-end. Chart 2Back Up Near The Average Profile Meanwhile, a number of investors we talk to also experience COVID-19 fatigue (Chart 4). For the better part of the last 10 months media has constantly bombarded the world with pandemic news, and rightly so. However, all this seems dystopian by now, and we cannot wait for a semblance of normality to make a comeback, which a vaccine will definitively bring about. The equity market has been indurated to this news-flow and has shaken-off the recession. When the vaccine does arrive likely next year, profits will also return back to trend, as we have been arguing for some time, because the global economy will fully reopen. Chart 32016 Versus 2020 Already, if we juxtapose leading soft economic data surprises with lagging hard economic data surprises, it is clear that a stellar profit recovery looms (second panel, Chart 5). Similarly, within soft the data universe, the ISM new orders-to-inventories ratio paints a rosy picture for an earnings recovery in 2021 (third panel, Chart 5). Even within hard economic data, a simple liquidity indicator we have used in the past comparing industrial production (IP) with M2 money stock signals that S&P profits have troughed (IP vs. M2 shown advanced, bottom panel, Chart 5) Chart 4COVID Fatigue Finally, the US Equity Strategy’s four-factor macro profit growth model has slingshot higher recently and signals that a return to $162 level of EPS in calendar 2021 is a high probability outcome (Chart 6). Netting it all out, we are in the tail end of the equity market correction and as election and fiscal policy uncertainties ebb, they will pave the way for a robust SPX rally. Chart 5Profit Recovery On Track Chart 6EPS Model Concurs This week, we continue with our strategy of preferring beaten-down cyclicals to defensives and steer the portfolio away from another safe haven staples industry via downgrading a consumer goods subgroup to underweight. We also delve deeper into the banking industry highlighting some cracks in small commercial banks. Put Homebuilders On Downgrade Alert Homebuilders have had a monster run since the depths of the recession back in March and the question a lot of our clients are now asking is: does it make sense to chase them higher at the current juncture? The short answer is no. Before we get into the details of our analysis a brief recap of our recent residential real estate-related moves is in order. Going into the March carnage we were cyclically underweight the niche homebuilding index. Moreover, last December we had identified homebuilders as a high-conviction underweight in our annual Key Views report. We monetized relative gains of 41% and 43%, respectively from both positions and lifted exposure to a benchmark allocation. While in retrospect we should have upgraded all the way to overweight, we did manage to participate in the V-shaped housing-related returns by opting to go overweight the mega cap home improvement retail index instead. In addition, this summer we eked out another 10% return from a long homebuilders/short REITs pair trade. Homebuilders are enjoying the single family home renaissance as the pandemic has turbo-charged the work from home movement and employees are rushing to move into comfortable spaces in the suburbs as the traditional office is literally declared dead. Indeed, housing starts and permits have renormalized, the drubbing in interest rates has boosted affordability and caused a knee jerk reaction in the mortgage application purchase index, and sell-side analysts are fighting hand-over-fist to upgrade profit projections for the homebuilding group (Chart 7). The end result has been a boom in new home sales that are trouncing existing home sales, and the NAHB’s survey of prospective homebuyers continues to paint a rosy picture for additional demand for new single family homes especially given the low inventory of homes (top & third panels, Chart 8). Chart 7Housing Tailwinds Chart 8Price Concessions Generate Volume This is where all the good news ends. With respect to selling prices, homebuilders are making price concessions compared with existing homes and also in absolute terms new home prices are deflating (second & bottom panels, Chart 8). Therefore, at close to 15%, homebuilding profit margins are near all-time highs and under threat especially from a firming industry wage bill (second & third panels, Chart 9). Tack on surging lumber inflation and a profit margin squeeze is a high probability outcome (bottom panel, Chart 9). As a reminder framing lumber, on average, comprises 15% of a new single family home’s total input costs. While the NAHB survey points to brisk demand for new homes, the sister Conference Board survey shows that consumers’ appetite for a new home has crested (second & third panels, Chart 10). With consumers rushing to move to the suburbs due to the pandemic, there is an element of bringing housing demand forward. Chart 9Beware Margin Squeeze Chart 10Good News Fully Priced Worrisomely, if the economy continues to open up then interest rates should continue to back up. From all the major asset classes the 10-year Treasury yield is the one that has yet to discount a V-shaped economic recovery. The implication is that rising interest rate would dent affordability and at the margin weigh on housing demand (10-year Treasury yield shown inverted, top panel, Chart 10). Moving on to the credit backdrop, while demand for residential real estate loans has recovered, bankers refuse to extend mortgage credit (second & third panels, Chart 11). According to the latest Fed H8 weekly credit release, residential real estate loans are on the verge of contraction (bottom panel, Chart 11). Finally, the tug-of-war on the fiscal package front is also threatening to sustain the unemployment rate near double digits, which could jeopardize the housing recovery. Historically, housing starts have been near perfectly inversely correlated with the unemployment rate and the current message is for a leveling off in residential construction activity (middle panel, Chart 12). The recent homebuilding run has pushed relative valuations from undervalued to overvalued. The relative P/S ratio trades roughly 30% above the historical mean (a three-year high), and leaves no cushion for any mishaps (bottom panel, Chart 12). Chart 11Bankers Refusing To Dole Out Loans Chart 12In Desperate Need Of Fiscal Help Netting it all out, homebuilders are more than fully priced, discounting high margins as far as the eye can see and no end to demand. The specter of higher interest rates, lumber inflation, stealing demand from the future, unfriendly bankers and uncertainty with regard to a fresh stimulus package more than offset the positives, and compel us to issue a downgrade alert for the S&P homebuilding index. Bottom Line: Stay neutral the S&P homebuilders index, but it is now on our downgrade watch list. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME – LEN, PHM, DHI, NVR. A Few Words On Banks Pundits around the globe focus on Eurozone and pan-European banks and argue that these outfits have been value destroyers since the history of the data series in late-1986 (bottom panel, Chart 13). Similarly, US banks relative share prices peaked in the mid-1970s and have never looked back, and very recently have tumbled to fresh all-time lows whether one uses monthly, weekly or daily data (top panel, Chart 13). Meanwhile, the recent drubbing in relative share prices suggests that loan loss provisioning is not over. In fact, Q3 loan loss reserves will surpass the level hit in the GFC, and likely close in on the $300bn mark (provisions shown inverted, Chart 14). Chart 13Banks, The World Over, Are Value Destroyers Chart 14More Loan Losses Loom… Historically, loan loss provisions are the mirror image of bank net operating income and most importantly bank profits decline as provisioning increases (Chart 15). Worrisomely, the longer the new stimulus checks take to arrive, the longer it will take banks to rebound. Banks have been semi-sheltered from the recession courtesy of eviction/foreclosure moratorium as well as mortgage forbearance agreements. Absent a fresh stimulus package, the unemployment rate will remain elevated, warning that lagging non-performing loans will skyrocket (bottom panel, Chart 16). Chart 15…Which Will Weigh On Profits Chart 16Fiscal Policy Easing To The Rescue? Tack on the year-to-date more than halving in the 10-year US Treasury yield and the earnings outlook remains grim for banks (top & middle panels, Chart 17). The transmission mechanism is through net interest margins (NIMs). The fourth panel of Chart 17 highlights that the pair have been joined at the hip and all-time lows in the 10-year US Treasury yield have sank bank NIMs below 3%, which is another all-time low since the history of the FDIC data. Credit growth has crested and our loans and leases model suggests that loan growth will continue to decelerate into 2021 (second panel, Chart 17). Not only is there lack of appetite for new overall loan uptake, but bankers are stringent with extending credit to businesses and consumer alike, according to the most recent Fed Senior Loan Officer survey (Chart 18). Chart 17Credit Growth Blues Chart 18Lack Of Loan Demand And Tightening Credit Supply However, there are three significant offsets to all these stiff headwinds that prevent us from downgrading banks to an underweight stance. First, the 10-year US Treasury yield is one of the few assets that has yet to discount any economic recovery. Thus, as uncertainty lifts post the November election, the economy continues to open up and Congress and the new President manage to pass a fresh fiscal stimulus bill, all this could catalyze a catch up phase in the long bond yield. Second, valuations offer a deep enough discount to absorb a little bit of more negative news as analysts and investors alike have thrown in the towel in banks (bottom panel, Chart 19). Finally, the credible Fed’s stress test loom by year-end and assuming banks pass them with flying colors a resumption of shareholder friendly activities will boost the allure of owing banks and unwind extremely oversold conditions (middle panel, Chart 19). In sum, while the price of credit, loan growth prospects and credit quality all weigh on relative bank performance. A fiscal stimulus bill, depressed valuations and a Fed induced resumption of dividend hikes and share buybacks keep us on the sidelines in the S&P banks index. Chart 19Unloved And Under-owned Bottom Line: Stay neutral the S&P banks index, but keep it on the downgrade watch list. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – JPM, BAC, C, WFC, USB, TFC, PNC, FRC, FITB, MTB, KEY, SIVB, RF, CFG, HBAN, ZION, CMA, PBCT. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020 Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth
Following yesterday’s proposal of skinny, targeted fiscal stimulus by President Trump, BCA Research’s geopolitical strategists curtailed the odds of any significant stimulus deal ahead of the election to 20%. The decision was not taken on Tuesday when…
Highlights Aggregate household net worth reached an all-time high in the second quarter and likely rose further in the third quarter: The first quarter’s record quarter-on-quarter decline was completely unwound in the second quarter and resurgent financial and housing markets should have pushed wealth higher in the third quarter. Rising household net worth bodes well for consumption: Increases in household net worth lead increases in personal consumption expenditures by one or two quarters. Spending will roll over at some point in the fourth quarter without a new round of fiscal aid, but households retain some CARES Act support in the form of an enormous buildup of savings. Households do not appear to be overinvested in equities: Aggregate equity allocations are elevated relative to history, but the longstanding trend favoring corporate heft and consolidation may skew comparisons across time. Feature Chart 1A Ginormous Fiscal Response The Fed’s latest quarterly Flow of Funds report reinforced the view that the pandemic provided households with an opportunity to shore up their financial positions. Shock-and-awe monetary and fiscal stimulus (Chart 1), combined with an inability to spend at shuttered businesses, turned out to be a heady brew for household finances. Surging financial markets boosted the value of wealthier households’ investment portfolios; a tidal wave of fiscal transfers produced an income surge for households in the lower half of the distribution; consumer confidence was dented by the myriad uncertainties posed by COVID-19, encouraging increased savings; and even those inclined to spend some of their windfall were hindered by the difficulty of finding an outlet for doing so. Testifying to the roller coaster nature of 2020, household net worth made a new all-time high at the end of the second quarter, thanks to a record three-standard-deviation quarter-over-quarter gain that unwound the first quarter’s record four-standard-deviation decline (Chart 2). Household net worth should make another new high on September 30, given the S&P 500’s 8.5% third-quarter advance, tighter corporate bond spreads, rising home prices and still-surging savings. It is unclear when or even if the wealth increase will translate to more consumption, given that spending ultimately comes down to fickle preferences, though we are confident that income gains will aid credit performance, helping the economy dodge a vicious circle of defaults and bankruptcies. Chart 2Yet Another 2020 Extreme Wealth And Consumption There is no assurance that the formidable amount of wealth that households have amassed since the first quarter via a combination of fiscal transfers and investment gains will be directed to consumption. It is entirely possible that the savings rate will remain elevated for an extended period. Uncertainty still runs rampant for businesses disrupted by the pandemic and their employees, vendors, landlords and lenders. The travel, hospitality, food service, entertainment and real estate industries have a broad reach and their fates will ripple across much of the rest of the economy. There is a clear relationship between wealth gains and spending gains, ... In the past, however, smoothed year-over-year changes in household net worth have reliably correlated with smoothed year-over-year changes in personal consumption expenditures (PCE). The simple regression equation linking PCE and household net worth moves is nearly identical whether the lag between the two series is one or two quarters, as is the share of PCE’s variability that is explained by changes in wealth (r-squared). We show the scatterplot of household net worth growth (x-axis) lagged by two quarters with PCE growth (y-axis) in Chart 3, which reveals how rarely the four-quarter moving average of nominal PCE fails to grow from one year to the next. Every previous smoothed consumption decline occurred in the wake of the GFC in 2009-10 after having been preceded by significant wealth declines. At 6.6 percentage points below the best-fit regression line, the current observation is a notable outlier and suggests that households have stored up considerable dry powder. Chart 3Wealth Gains Typically Lead To Spending Gains When and if that dry powder will be deployed is a mystery. The 62-year history of the savings rate, which is simply savings divided by disposable, or after-tax, income does not suggest a powerful pull toward mean reversion. Rather, the series has been characterized by three long waves: a steadily, albeit modestly increasing trend from inception until the mid-seventies; an extended decline well into the aughts; and a post-GFC increase back to the levels that prevailed in the late-eighties and early-nineties (Chart 4). Regardless of the savings rate’s ultimate normalized range, we view the pandemic levels as an anomaly. Once households become more comfortable inhabiting a post-COVID world, income hoarded this spring and summer will provide a tailwind for consumption. ... but it may not take hold until the savings rate, which rose to record levels in the spring, settles back into a normalized range. Chart 4It Is Not Clear When Or Where The Savings Rate Will Normalize Bottom Line: Capricious sentiment will ultimately dictate when households deploy their pandemic savings, but there is a clear relationship between wealth gains and consumption. The second quarter Flow of Funds report buttresses the conclusion from the monthly personal income data that household wealth has benefited from pandemic policies so far. Are Households Overinvested In Equities? The Flow of Funds report also provides insight into the composition of aggregate household investment, grouping financial assets into five broad categories: Deposits (cash), Fixed Income, Corporate Equity, Life Insurance and Pensions, and Equity in Noncorporate Businesses. (The remainder of household wealth is concentrated in equity in homes and the property inside them.) Leaving out the value of life insurance and pension benefits, we reviewed the financial asset data for signs that households may have gotten over their skis in terms of their aggregate equity allocation. If they have, it might indicate that stocks are ripe for a reversal. Relative to the Flow of Funds’ 70-year history, the aggregate allocation to cash is a little low (Chart 5, top panel). With deposits sure to generate negative real income in a ZIRP world, however, a low cash allocation is rational and follows the historical pattern of moving with short rates (Chart 5, bottom panel). The fixed income allocation is lower, though not extreme (Chart 6, top panel). Households may tend to be backward-looking when allocating between stocks and bonds (Chart 6, bottom panel), but the currently elevated equity risk premium provides forward-looking support for preferring the former. Chart 5Cash Balances Were Low Before The Pandemic, But So Were Short Rates Chart 6Mirror Image On its face, households’ equity allocation looks somewhat frothy at one-and-a-half standard deviations above the mean (Chart 7, top panel). Like the forward P/E ratio, the household share of financial assets invested in equities has only ever been higher in the 1999-2000 crescendo to the dot-com boom. The household share of equity in noncorporate businesses has been plunging since the early eighties, however, and when all equity stakes are considered holistically, households don’t look overinvested (Chart 7, bottom panel). An investor could have reached that conclusion in 1999 to his/her subsequent regret, but household allocations to publicly traded holdings should have increased to reflect secular trends favoring concentration. This indicator is surely yellow, but we do not yet view it as red. Chart 7The Proceeds From Family Business Sales Have To Go Somewhere Bottom Line: Individual investors tend to make allocation decisions based on the action in the rear-view mirror, but the aggregate household exposure to public equities does not appear worrisome after considering the secular decline in noncorporate businesses’ importance. Income And Credit Performance Changes in aggregate wealth do not link cleanly to credit performance. Households service debt out of their income, because if they didn’t need to augment or smooth out incoming cash flows they wouldn’t have borrowed in the first place. While there must be some link between the recent paydowns of credit card balances and increased household wealth, changes in wealth have far less bearing than changes in income when it comes to explaining consumer credit performance. Risk assets will eventually suffer in the absence of an additional fiscal aid package because cracks will start showing up all over the economy without more transfers. Current income in the form of generous fiscal transfers have made it possible for households to take the unprecedented step of paying down their credit card balances at the outset of a recession. Those transfers have also bolstered apartment rent collections and held down consumer loan delinquencies. Much of the transfer income has been saved and could be deployed to continue to service debt and prop up consumption, but the savings are not a panacea. Although August’s personal income release reflected an additional $85 billion in excess savings over what would have occurred under our baseline no-pandemic estimate, bringing the total excess savings from March through August to over $1.1 trillion (Table 1), it cannot plug the income gap indefinitely. Making several generous assumptions to support a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we estimate the average laid-off worker could at most go one more quarter without work before s/he fully ran down the cushion accumulated under the CARES Act (Table 2). Table 1Household Savings, With And Without The Pandemic Table 2How Long Can The Average Worker Hold Out? More help from Washington is needed, then, if the economy is to escape a potentially nasty downdraft. Our base-case scenario still holds that help will come this month, but Republican and Democratic negotiators had not reached an agreement before this report went to press. If they fail to do so before the election, all hope is not yet lost. If our average laid-off worker could hold out for September, October and November, s/he might avoid missed rent and loan payments as long the flow of aid resumed by December under a post-election bill. Investment Implications Since the pandemic arrived in the United States in full flower in March, we have viewed the big-picture economic and market backdrop as a contest between policymakers and the virus. Absent any monetary and fiscal stimulus, the US would have suffered a crippling recession in which cascading defaults and bankruptcies would have dented the economy’s growth capacity well into the long term. No modern policymaker would prescribe a Mellonian course of emetics to “purge the rottenness from the system,” but since no one knows how long COVID-19 will pose an acute threat to public health, no one can know for sure if the Fed and Congress will have the capacity and the will to provide the support to bridge the economic crater it will leave in its wake. Only Congress appears to have meaningful untapped capacity, and we expect it will regain its resolve to deploy it in time to make final campaign appeals. If no unexpected materially adverse virus development occurs – mortality and hospitalization rates remain subdued, testing capacity continues to expand, treatment protocols keep progressing and a vaccine is developed sometime in the first half of 2021 – it looks to us like a bill within the range of the latest proposals from the administration ($1.6 trillion) and the House ($2.2 trillion) would be enough to prevent the self-reinforcing wave of bankruptcies that have always been our worst-case-scenario fear. The devil is in the details, especially on Capitol Hill, but helping vulnerable businesses and workers, and reeling state and local governments, until a vaccine is in hand would support our constructive cyclical (12-month) view on risk assets. It would also support the SIFI banks, a prime beneficiary if the economy can slip the pandemic’s knockout credit punch. The market does not appear ready to embrace the SIFIs any time soon, but we will continue to recommend overweighting them as long as Congress eventually provides another sizable round of fiscal aid. The news of the president’s positive COVID-19 test could quite plausibly shake consumer and business confidence, undermining consumption and investment and making the need for fiscal aid even more acute. If he and other members of his circle recovery fully and quickly, however, economic participants might conclude that they have less to fear, helping to smooth the path of the recovery. His experience with the virus may well reshuffle election probabilities and our geopolitical strategists will be keeping a close eye on all the developments.1 As we go to press, we do not see a clear-cut market implication from the president’s illness and will stand pat with a tactically neutral equity allocation, an underweight bond allocation and an overweight cash position as we await further developments. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the October 2, 2020 Geopolitical Strategy Special Alert, "Trump’s Illness Alone Not A Game Changer" available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Misunderstanding 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its short-term mortality rate. In fact, the danger of Covid-19 is its long-term mortality and morbidity rate. Misunderstanding 2: The government-imposed lockdown causes the pandemic recession. In fact, the pandemic causes the pandemic recession. Misunderstanding 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is output. In fact, the pandemic’s main economic casualty is employment. Misunderstanding 4: The pandemic is a temporary shock to the way we live, work, and interact. In fact, the pandemic is accelerating long-term shifts in the way we live, work, and interact. Misunderstanding 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe apart. In fact, the pandemic is pulling Europe together. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Pandemic Is Pulling Europe Together Covid-19 is a novel disease. And living through a pandemic is a novel experience for most of us. The result is that many things are not fully understood. In this report, we pull together five major misunderstandings about the Covid-19 pandemic. Or at least, five topics on which we disagree with the mainstream narratives. Misunderstanding 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its short-term mortality rate. Truth 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its long-term mortality and morbidity rate. Some people argue that the danger of Covid-19 is overstated. The mortality rate seems low, especially in the new waves of the pandemic. These people argue that we should just let the pandemic rip to achieve so-called ‘herd immunity’. Yet this focus on the low immediate mortality rate misunderstands the true danger (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Focussing On Covid-19’s Low Immediate Mortality Rate Misunderstands The Danger The true danger might come from the long-term impact on mortality and morbidity. A good analogy is a non-lethal dose of radiation. It won’t kill you straightaway, and you might not even feel any immediate ill effects, but the exposure does irreparable long-term harm. Unlike other diseases, Covid-19 appears to have long-term sequelae. Unlike other diseases, Covid-19 appears to have long-term sequelae. It can permanently damage your respiratory, vascular, and metabolic systems. As The Lancet points out:1 “Weeks and months after the onset of Covid-19, people continue to suffer. 78 of 100 patients in an observational cohort study who had recovered from Covid-19 had abnormal findings on cardiovascular MRI and 36 reported dyspnoea and unusual fatigue… these patients are not only those recovering from the severe form of the acute disease, but also those who had mild and moderate disease. Long-term sequelae of Covid-19 are unknown… Other concerns are rising: does it cause diabetes, or other metabolic disorders? Will patients develop interstitial lung disease? We owe good answers on the long-term consequences of the disease to our patients and healthcare providers.” Until we know these answers, letting the pandemic rip to achieve herd-immunity is a very dangerous misunderstanding. Misunderstanding 2: The government-imposed lockdown causes the pandemic recession. Truth 2: The pandemic causes the pandemic recession. A pandemic is a classic complex adaptive system, in which there is constant feedback from millions of individual human actions to the pandemic, and from the pandemic to millions of individual human actions. It is this complex adaptive behaviour that generates a pandemic’s classic waves of infection, as well as its recessions. In response to an escalating pandemic, our instinct for self-preservation makes us go into our shells. In response to an escalating pandemic, our instinct for self-preservation makes us go into our shells. We shun crowds and public places, with the result that so-called ‘social consumption’ collapses. The misunderstanding is that the government-imposed lockdown causes the collapse in social consumption. In fact, this is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is that the escalating pandemic is making millions of people go into their shells. But to the extent that an escalating pandemic also leads to an escalating lockdown, many people confuse the correlated lockdown with the underlying cause, the escalating pandemic. As we have previously pointed out, Sweden imposed no lockdown, while its neighbour Denmark imposed the most extreme lockdown in Europe. If it was the government-imposed lockdown that caused the recession, then the economy of no-lockdown Sweden should have fared much better than that of lockdown Denmark. In fact, based on the rise in unemployment rates, no-lockdown Sweden performed worse than lockdown Denmark (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3No-Lockdown Sweden Performed No Better... Chart I-4...Than Lockdown Denmark Misunderstanding 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is output. Truth 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is employment. The widespread use of physical distancing and face masks restricts any activity that requires the use of your mouth and nose in proximity to others. These activities are concentrated in three highly labour-intensive sectors: hospitality, retail, and transport. Using the US as a template, hospitality, retail, and transport contribute 12 percent of economic output, but employ 25 percent of all workers (Table I-1). If the pandemic forces these sectors to operate one third below full capacity, the economy will lose a tolerable 4 percent of output. But it will lose a devastating 8.3 percent of jobs. And on less optimistic assumptions, the job destruction could rise to well over 10 percent. Table I-1Sectors Hurt By Social Distancing Employ 25% Of All Workers Conversely, sectors which are unaffected by physical distancing and face masks make a much bigger contribution to economic output relative to employment. Financial activities generate 19 percent of economic output, but just 6 percent of jobs. Information technology generates 5 percent of output, but just 2 percent of jobs. Sectors hurt by social distancing employ 25 percent of all workers. Hence, the main economic casualty of the pandemic is not output. The main casualty is employment (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Worse, as employment suffers much more than output, the pandemic is devastating low-paid jobs. Chart I-5The Main Economic Casualty Of The Pandemic Is Employment… Chart I-6…Not ##br##Output Misunderstanding 4: The pandemic is a temporary shock to the way we live, work, and interact. Truth 4: The pandemic is accelerating long-term shifts in the way we live, work, and interact. The pandemic appears to have crystallised many shifts in consumer and business behaviour: for example, de-urbanisation, the shift from offline to online retailing, the shift from office working to remote working, and the shift from business travel to virtual meetings. In fact, these shifts were already in motion well before the pandemic hit (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The Pandemic Is Accelerating The Structural Shifts To De-Urbanisation… Chart I-8…And Online ##br##Shopping If the pandemic suddenly ended tomorrow, would people flock back to full-time office work in city centres? Would they flock back to bricks and mortar retailers? Would they return to the same intensity of long-haul business travel? We think not, because the shifts from these activities are not temporary. They are structural. The pandemic is devastating low-paid jobs. The pandemic has accelerated the hollowing out of labour-intensive industries such as bricks and mortar retailing, city centre cafes, bars and restaurants, and commercial travel. Combined with the ongoing threat to jobs from AI, this hollowing out process is blighting the job prospects of a generation, creating large numbers of underemployed and unemployed workers. Misunderstanding 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe apart. Truth 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe together. Let’s end on a positive note. The pandemic has allowed Europe to smash two major taboos: explicit fiscal transfers across countries, and the large-scale issuance of common EU bonds. The EU recovery plan also starts discussions on how the EU can ‘increase its own resources’. Which is to say, raise its own taxes. 2020 might turn out to be the most important year for European integration. The EU’s €750 billion ‘Next Generation’ recovery plan comprises €390 billion of grants whose main beneficiaries will be Italy and Spain – and these grants will be funded by common EU issuance. In breaking the long-standing taboos of fiscal transfers and common issuance, Next Generation constitutes a giant step towards European integration. Specifically, Italy’s net grant entitlement is likely to outweigh its contributions to the EU’s 2021-27 budget cycle. Thereby, Italy will flip from a net contributor to a net recipient of EU funds. The willingness to flip the sign of Italy’s contribution marks a sea-change in the EU’s attitude on fiscal solidarity, whose long-term significance should not be underestimated. 2020 might turn out to be the most important year for European integration. The irony is that it took a global pandemic to achieve it. Investment Conclusions The huge and growing slack in labour markets means that zero and negative interest rate policy will become a permanent feature of our lives. Hence, the relatively higher yielding 30-year US T-bond remains an effective hedge against stock market dislocations, as it did in March. Equity sectors whose profits can thrive off the shifts in the way we live, work, and interact, will outperform – specifically, technology, biotechnology, healthcare, and communications. Thereby, stock markets with an overweighting to these sectors will also outperform. The devastation of low-paying jobs means that bank credit growth is set to remain structurally weak or even non-existent. As such, banks should be bought for tactical countertrend moves (as now), but not for the long term. The yield spreads on euro area ‘periphery’ bonds over Germany and France will continue to tighten, and ultimately reach zero (Chart of the Week and Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Pandemic Is Pulling Europe Together Fractal Trading System* Within the EM universe, the strong outperformance of India versus Czech Republic is vulnerable to a countertrend sell-off. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short MSCI India versus MSCI Czech Republic. The profit target and symmetrical stop-loss is set at 8 percent. Chart I-10MSCI: India Vs. Czech Republic In other trades, long USD/PLN achieved its 4 percent profit target, and short AUD/CHF reached the end of its holding period in profit. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 57 percent. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see The Lancet, Long-term consequences of Covid-19: research needs, September 1, 2020. 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