Developed Countries

Highlights Year One Performance: The GFIS recommended model bond portfolio returned 1.1% (hedged into USD) in its first year of existence, slightly underperforming the custom benchmark index by -2bps. Our bearish duration tilts were a drag on performance, while our overweights to U.S. corporate debt were a major contributor. Risk Management Lessons: The maximum overweight to low-beta, but low-yielding, Japanese Government Bonds was a drag on performance by reducing the portfolio yield. This highlights the classic bond management trade-off between controlling portfolio risks, like duration or tracking error, and maximizing sources of return, like interest income. Future Drivers Of Returns: Over the next 6-12 months, we expect the model portfolio returns to again benefit mostly from our below-benchmark duration stance (as global bond yields grind higher) and from our overweight stance on U.S. corporates (as the U.S. economy maintains a solid pace of growth). Feature In September of 2016, we introduced a new element to the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) service - our recommended model bond portfolio.1 This represented a bit of a departure from the usual macroeconomic analysis and forecasting of financial markets that has been the hallmark of BCA. Yet we felt that it was important to add an actual portfolio, with specific allocations and weightings, given the needs and constraints faced by our readers. With so many of our clients being traditional fixed income managers (or multi-asset managers) who measure investment performance versus benchmark indices, we felt that it was important to have a way to communicate our views within a framework akin to what they deal with each day. Even for clients who are not professional bond managers, the model portfolio can be useful as a way to express how much we prefer one bond market (or sector) versus others. It also gives us a forum to discuss portfolio management issues as an addition to the macro analysis. So far, the reception from clients to this new addition to the GFIS service has been a warm one, and we look forward to additional feedback in the months and years ahead. With the model portfolio just passing its first birthday, we are dedicating this Weekly Report to an overview of the final Year One performance numbers. We will evaluate our winning and losing recommendations, look back at the lessons learned as the model portfolio framework has evolved, and identify what we expect will be the biggest drivers of performance in Year Two based on our current views. Year One Model Portfolio Performance: Winners & Losers Chart 1GFIS Model Portfolio Performance The GFIS model portfolio produced a total return of 1.09% (hedged into U.S. dollars) over first full year since inception on September 20, 2016 (Chart 1). This essentially matched the performance of our custom benchmark index, with the model portfolio lagging by a mere -2bps.2 In terms of the breakdown between government bonds and credit (spread product), the former underperformed the benchmark by -18bps while the latter outperformed by +16bps. A more traditional period to evaluate investment performance is on a calendar year-to-date basis. We also show the 2017 year-to-date (YTD) numbers in Chart 1, measured from January 1st to October 3rd. Over that time period, the total returns are much higher - the model portfolio has returned 2.78%, lagging the index by -6bps. This higher absolute return is mostly due to the strong outperformance of corporate bond markets and the decline in government bond yields seen since March. Broadly speaking, that breakdown of returns lines up with what were our largest strategic market calls: to be underweight overall portfolio duration and overweight U.S. corporate bond exposure (bottom panel). This is obviously a welcome property to see in our returns, which we hope will always line up with our desired tilts! When looking at the detailed decomposition of the returns on the government bond side of the portfolio (Table 1), however, a few points stand out: Table 1A Detailed Breakdown Of The GFIS Model Portfolio The underperformance on the government bond side of the portfolio (Chart 2) came from underweight positions at the long-end (maturities beyond seven years) of yield curves in the U.S. (-4bps), U.K. (-5bps), Germany (-5bps) and, most notably, France (-18bps). Chart 2GFIS Model Portfolio Government Bond Performance Attribution By Country The underweight position in Italy, across the curve, generated another -7bps of underperformance, although this was paired against an overweight to Spanish government bonds that positively contributed to returns (+3bps). Overweights to bonds in the middle and shorter ends of yields curves (maturities less than seven years) positively contributed to returns in the U.S. (+6bps), Germany (+2bps) and France (+2bps). Our significant overweight to Japanese government bonds, intended as a way to reduce portfolio duration by increasing exposure to a market with a low beta to global bond yields, also helped boost performance (+8bps). The conclusion? By concentrating our recommended duration underweights on longer-maturity bonds, and raising the weightings on shorter-maturity government debt, we imparted a bearish curve steepening bias on top of the reduced duration exposure. It is no surprise that our recommended government bond allocations underperformed during the bull-flattening move in global yield curves seen earlier this year. By contrast, the returns on the credit (spread) product allocations within the GFIS model portfolio tell a more positive story (Chart 3): Chart 3GFIS Model Portfolio Spread Product Performance Attribution The outperformance came from our overweight allocations to U.S. Investment Grade (IG) corporate debt, focused on Financials (+14bps) and Industrials (+4bps), and U.S. High-Yield (HY), concentrated on Ba-rated (+13bps) and B-rated (+8bps) bonds. U.S. Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) were a laggard during the first year of the model bond portfolio (-12bps), which largely came from an ill-timed tactical move to overweight in the 4th quarter of 2016. More recently, our underweight stance on MBS has been only a modest drag on the total return of the portfolio since the peak in U.S. bond yields back in March. Our decisions to reduce exposure to Euro Area IG (-5bps) and HY (-2bps) corporate debt earlier in the year, and our more recent decision to downgrade Emerging Market (EM) sovereign (-1bp) and corporate debt (-4bps), were both small negative contributors to performance. Summing it all up, our spread product allocations performed well because of the overweight to U.S. IG and HY corporates. The underweights in Euro Area and EM credit were set up as relative value allocations versus U.S. equivalents, so the underperformance versus the benchmark should be viewed against the substantial outperformance from U.S. corporates. The MBS underperformance was small on a YTD basis, but we see an opportunity for that to soon turn around, as we discuss later. Bottom Line: The GFIS recommended model bond portfolio returned 1.1% (hedged into USD) in its first year of existence, slightly underperforming the custom benchmark index by -2bps. Our bearish duration tilts were a drag on performance, while our overweights to U.S. corporate debt were a major contributor. Lessons Learned On Risk Management As the first year of the GFIS model portfolio progressed, we added elements to the framework to help us manage the overall risk of the portfolio. Specifically, we began to include a tracking error calculation to show the relative volatility of the portfolio to its benchmark.3 When we first introduced that tracking error back in April, we were running far too little risk in the portfolio given the relatively modest position sizes (Chart 4). Rather than be an "index hugger", we decided to increase the sizes of all our relative tilts (Chart 5), and the tracking error rose accordingly from a mere 25bps to over 60bps. This is still below the 100bps limit that we decided to impose on the relative volatility of the model portfolio, but we were comfortable not running less-than-maximum risk given that valuations on many spread products were not extraordinarily cheap. The time to max out a risk budget is early in the credit cycle when spreads are wide, not when the cycle is far advanced and spreads are relatively tight. Yet one lesson that was learned in Year One was that too much focus on tracking error can result in lost opportunities to boost the performance of the portfolio. As part of our strategic call to maintain a below-benchmark overall duration stance, we upgraded Japan to maximum overweight in the model portfolio back on July 4th.4 With Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) having such a low beta to yield changes in the overall Developed Markets (Chart 6), adding more Japan exposure was a way to get more defensive on duration in a way that would also boost our desired tracking error (since we were adding more of an asset less correlated to the other government bonds in the portfolio). Chart 4Tracking Error Of##BR##The Model Portfolio Chart 5Allocations Between##BR##Government Bonds & Spread Product Chart 6Are JGBs The##BR##Optimal Duration Hedge? Yet by increasing the allocation to low-beta JGBs, we were also adding exposure to "no-yield" JGBs. The overall yield of the model portfolio suffered as a result, fully offsetting the bump to the portfolio yield from the increase in allocations to spread product in April (Charts 7 & 8). With the benefit of hindsight, increasing the allocation even more to something like U.S. HY corporate bonds would have a been a more prudent way to redirect government bond exposure to a low-beta market that would have boosted the overall portfolio yield (Chart 9). Chart 7Too Much Japan##BR##In The Portfolio ... Chart 8... Offsetting The Yield Pick-Up##BR##From Spread Product Chart 9There Is Not Enough Yield##BR##In The Model Portfolio Going forward, we will pay more attention to managing the portfolio yield more actively as another piece of our model bond portfolio framework that can help boost expected returns. Bottom Line: The maximum overweight to low-beta, but low-yielding, Japanese Government Bonds was a drag on performance by reducing the portfolio yield. This highlights the classic bond management trade-off between controlling portfolio risks, like duration or tracking error, and maximizing sources of return, like interest income. The Outlook For The Next Year Looking towards the next twelve months, the biggest expected drivers of returns in our model bond portfolio are expected to come from the following allocations: Below-benchmark overall duration exposure: We are sticking to our guns on the future direction of global bond yields, which have more room to rise over the next 6-12 months. The coordinated global economic upturn is showing little sign of slowing, with leading indicators still rising and pointing to upward pressure on real bond yields (Chart 10). At the same time, inflation expectations in the developed economies remain too low relative to current levels of inflation (bottom panel). Thus, we expect government bond yield curves to bear-steepen as central banks will respond slowly to the rise in inflation. This will benefit the steepening bias we have in the model portfolio from the underweights in longer maturity buckets in the U.S., Europe and the U.K. (Chart 11). Chart 10Future Drivers Of Performance:##BR##Below-Benchmark Duration Chart 11An Unexpected##BR##Bull Flattening This Year Overweight U.S. corporate bonds (both IG and HY): Looking over the indicators from our U.S. Corporate Bond Checklist, the backdrop is not yet pointing to a period of expected underperformance for U.S. corporates (Chart 12). While balance sheet fundamentals do appear stretched, as indicated by our Corporate Health Monitor (2nd panel), the overall stance of U.S. monetary conditions is neutral (3rd panel), while bank lending standards are not yet restrictive (4th panel). We expect the Fed to deliver another 25bp rate hike in December, and at least another 2-3 hikes in 2018, which will shift monetary conditions into more restrictive territory. A very rapid rise in the U.S. dollar would worsen this trend, but we expect only a moderate grind higher in the greenback as the Fed slowly delivers additional rate hikes and non-U.S. growth remains robust. While the solid global economic backdrop should benefit all growth-sensitive assets like corporate debt, we see more attractive relative valuations on U.S. corporates versus Euro Area or EM equivalents. The upcoming tapering of asset purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB) also represents a major risk to Euro Area corporate debt, as the ECB will be slowing the pace of its corporate bond buying. One other sector that can potentially boost the portfolio performance in Year Two versus Year One is U.S. MBS. Our colleagues at our sister service, U.S. Bond Strategy, now see MBS valuations as looking attractive to other U.S. spread product like IG corporates (Chart 13).5 The relative option-adjusted spreads (OAS) on MBS and U.S. IG are a good leading indicator of the relative performance of the two asset classes and current spread levels should lead to a better return profile for MBS over IG. Another factor benefitting MBS is the continued rising trend in U.S. bond yields (and mortgage rates) that we expect over the next 6-12 months, which will reduce mortgage prepayments that would weigh on MBS returns (bottom panel). Chart 12Future Drivers Of Performance:##BR##Overweight U.S. Corporates Chart 13Upgrade U.S. MBS##BR##To Neutral This week, we are upgrading our MBS allocation to neutral from underweight in our model portfolio. However, given that our allocations to U.S. corporates are already fairly significant, we are choosing to "fund" the MBS upgrade by lowering our weighting on U.S. Treasuries (see the model portfolio allocations on Page 14). Bottom Line: Over the next 6-12 months, we expect the model portfolio returns to again benefit mostly from our below-benchmark duration stance (as global bond yields grind higher) and from our overweight stance on U.S. corporates (as the U.S. economy maintains a solid pace of growth). We are also now more constructive on valuations on U.S. MBS, thus we are upgrading our allocation to neutral at the expense of U.S. Treasuries. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Model Special Report, "Introducing Our Recommended Global Fixed Income Portfolio", dated September 20th, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The GFIS model portfolio custom benchmark index can most simply be described as the Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very highly-rated spread product. We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Adding A Risk Management Framework To Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated June 20th 2017, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Banks Are Now Playing Catch-Up", dated July 4th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: Yet Another Debate", dated October 10th 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Appendix - Selected Sectors From The GFIS Model Portfolio Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Duration: The global economic recovery is more synchronized than at any time since 2011. This suggests that foreign demand will be less of an impediment to the bond bear market and that Treasury yields will rise once U.S. data start to surprise on the upside. Stay at below-benchmark duration. MBS: Agency MBS option-adjusted spreads have widened significantly and no longer look expensive. With Treasury yields moving higher and mortgage refinancings likely to stay depressed, we advise upgrading MBS from underweight to neutral. Economy & Inflation: The U.S. economic data are starting to outperform beaten-down expectations. Survey data point to further GDP acceleration in the second half of this year and we expect inflation will soon follow growth higher. Feature Chart 12-Factor Treasury Model The relationship between the global breadth of economic growth, the value of the dollar and the outlook for Treasury yields has been a running theme in this publication.1 To summarize, stronger global growth pressures bond yields higher (and vice-versa). But how that growth is distributed across different countries matters as well. For example, if global growth is mostly concentrated in the U.S., then yield spreads will widen between the U.S. and the rest of the world and the dollar will appreciate as money pours in from overseas. Investors then respond to a stronger dollar by downgrading their U.S. growth and rate hike expectations. This caps the upside in long-dated U.S. Treasury yields. Conversely, if global growth is more evenly spread out throughout the world, then the dollar will come under less upward pressure when U.S. growth accelerates and Treasury yields can rise further. We developed a simple two-factor model to show how the trade-off between global growth and the exchange rate impacts the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 1). The model uses the Global Manufacturing PMI as its proxy for global growth and a survey of bullish sentiment toward the dollar as its proxy for growth synchronization. So far this year, the Global PMI has moved higher and sentiment toward the dollar has become less bullish. Both developments have bond-bearish implications and our model now pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.65%, 28 bps above the current 10-year yield. In Sync The Global PMI came in at 53.2 in September, the same as in August, but still a strong reading compared to recent history (Chart 2). But the most stunning detail of the September PMI releases is that 33 out of the 36 countries we track had PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line. As a result, our Global PMI Diffusion Index hit 90% for only the second time since 2011 (Chart 2, panel 1). The elevated reading of our diffusion index leads us to two market related observations. First, stronger growth outside of the U.S. explains why the 10-year Treasury yield is only 8 bps lower than at the start of the year despite U.S. economic data that have severely undershot expectations (Chart 2, bottom panel). Second, it suggests that when U.S. economic data inevitably start to surprise on the upside - a process which is only now beginning (see Economy & Inflation section below) - the dollar will appreciate by less than it would have when our PMI diffusion index was near 50. This removes a huge impediment from the bond bear market. In Chart 3 we see that the recent peak in 7-10 year U.S. bond yields occurred at 2.54% on Dec 16th. On that same date the spread between 7-10 year U.S. bond yields and average 7-10 year yields in the rest of the world was 178 bps, and bullish sentiment toward the dollar was above 80%. With the global recovery now more synchronized than it was last year, we anticipate that by the time U.S. yields take out that prior peak, the yield spread and dollar bullish sentiment will still be lower than they were last December. This means that less foreign capital will be encouraged into the U.S. and yields will rise even further. Chart 2Broad Based Recovery Chart 3Spreads Less Of A Constraint Where Is Growth Coming From? Considering the major economic blocs, the biggest change during the past year has been the surging Eurozone PMI (Chart 4). The U.S. PMI is still firmly above the 50 boom/bust line but has actually moderated in 2017. The Japanese PMI is similarly entrenched above 50 and while the Chinese PMI was weak earlier this year, it has rebounded during the past four months. At roughly 20%, China carries the largest weight in the Global PMI. The outlook for the Chinese economy is therefore crucial for the path of bond yields. On that note, while the Chinese PMI has been strong in recent months, a couple of warning signs are beginning to flash (Chart 5). Chart 4Global Manufacturing PMIs Chart 5Chinese Monetary Conditions Commodity prices - which correlate strongly with Chinese PMI - have declined since early September, although they remain above levels seen last year and do not yet pose a major risk. What's more important is that monetary conditions are starting to tighten (Chart 5, panel 2). If tighter monetary conditions persist, then we should expect growth to slow. The mild tightening in monetary conditions that has already occurred will probably lead to some near-term moderation in Chinese growth. But our China Investment Strategy service thinks it's unlikely that monetary conditions will tighten enough to cause a meaningful slowdown.2 Our China strategists note that with GDP growth within the government's target range, inflation exceedingly low and signs that financial excesses have been reigned in, there should not be much appetite for draconian policy tightening. We would also add that the causes of this year's tightening in monetary conditions have been relatively benign. The monetary conditions index shown in Chart 5 has fallen because the trade-weighted RMB is no longer depreciating and because real interest rates have moved a tad higher. Crucially, the RMB has only stabilized, it is not appreciating in trade-weighted terms. Also, the nominal policy rate remains flat at a low level. The increase in real interest rates resulted purely from weaker consumer price inflation. Bottom Line: The global economic recovery is more synchronized than at any time since 2011. This suggests that foreign demand will be less of an impediment to the bond bear market and that Treasury yields will rise once U.S. data start to surprise on the upside. Stay at below-benchmark duration. Buy The News In MBS Last week we upgraded our allocation to Agency MBS from underweight to neutral, noting that spreads had become more attractive during the past few months. In all likelihood this is the result of the market pricing in the wind-down of the Fed's balance sheet.3 With the Fed's plans now well known (and unlikely to change), there is an opportunity to increase MBS exposure from a more attractive starting point. After having sold the rumor, we think it's time to buy the news. The Value Proposition Chart 6OAS Look Attractive To be clear, we are not forecasting stellar excess returns from Agency MBS. But with spreads compressed across the entire U.S. fixed income universe, we would note that the option-adjusted spread (OAS) differential between conventional 30-year Agency MBS and investment grade corporate bonds (in duration-matched terms) has risen back to levels last seen in 2014 (Chart 6). The lagged OAS differential is a decent predictor of relative returns between MBS and corporate credit, and at current levels it suggests that MBS could even outperform corporate bonds at some point during the next 12 months (Chart 6, panel 2). This year's decline in Treasury yields has also biased OAS differentials between MBS and corporate bonds wider. Because of negative convexity, MBS duration is positively correlated with yields (Chart 6, bottom panel). If yields rise from here, as we expect they will, then MBS duration will also extend. This means that MBS OAS will start to appear less and less attractive relative to duration-matched comparables. In other words, MBS are less likely to cheapen relative to other spread product in an environment of rising Treasury yields. The Drivers Of MBS Spreads A simplified formula for excess MBS returns, relative to duration-matched Treasuries, could be written as follows: Excess Return = Starting OAS - Duration*(Change in nominal spread) + 0.5*Convexity*(Change in yield) 2 That is, OAS is the correct measure of MBS carry because it adjusts for expected losses due to prepayments. However, it is the change in the nominal spread (not the OAS) that will determine capital gains and losses during the investment horizon. On that note, we observe that nominal MBS spreads have rarely been tighter during the past 30 years (Chart 7). However, it is also hard for us to see a catalyst for significantly wider nominal spreads during the next 6-12 months. The two factors that correlate most closely with nominal MBS spreads are credit spreads and mortgage refinancings. Chart 7Nominal MBS Spreads Are Driven By Credit Spreads And Refinancings On credit spreads, we have repeatedly outlined why they are unlikely to widen materially in the absence of more significant inflationary pressure.4 As for refis, we are also hard pressed to see much upside for three main reasons: First, changes in mortgage rates are the number one driver of refinancings (Chart 8). Refis only increase when mortgage rates fall, making the proposition of refinancing more attractive. As yields rise during the next 6-12 months, refis will stay low. Second, the distribution of outstanding mortgages across the coupon stack impacts how sensitive refis are to changes in rates. The second panel of Chart 8 shows our measure of "moneyness", aka the dispersion of outstanding mortgages around the current coupon rate.5 Given today's dispersion levels we can calculate that even if the current coupon mortgage rate falls back to its recent low of 2.24%, our measure of moneyness would not get back to its late-2016 peak. For our moneyness indicator to rise back to 2013 levels the current coupon mortgage rate would have to fall all the way to 1.68%. Needless to say, we would characterize that risk as low. Third, the final factor that can impact the pace of mortgage refinancing is the seasoning of outstanding mortgages. Typically, we think of mortgages between 30 and 60 months old as being the most likely to refinance. Given that net mortgage origination was close to zero between 30 and 60 months ago and that mortgage purchase applications were at multi-year lows (Chart 9), most of the outstanding mortgage universe probably falls outside of this zone. Chart 8Refis Will Stay Low Chart 9Most Mortgages Are Not Yet Seasoned Bottom Line: Agency MBS option-adjusted spreads have widened significantly and no longer look expensive. With Treasury yields moving higher and mortgage refinancings likely to stay depressed, we advise upgrading MBS from underweight to neutral. Economy & Inflation Bring On The Upside Surprises As was alluded to in the opening section of this report, after have disappointed expectations year-to-date, we are just now starting to see U.S. economic data surprise to the upside (see Chart 2). The most recent datapoints that caught our eye were the ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs.6 Our inclination is to mostly ignore last Friday's employment report as an outlier due to the recent hurricanes.7 The ISM non-manufacturing survey jumped to 59.8 in September, its highest level since 2005. Taken together with other survey indicators that tend to track GDP growth - the BCA Beige Book Indicator and the BCA Composite New Orders Indicator - the case is quite strong for further GDP acceleration in the third and fourth quarters (Chart 10). Of course the pressing issue for bond markets is whether that growth acceleration translates into higher inflation. On that note, we would suggest that the weak inflation we have seen during the past six months was a reaction to the growth slowdown witnessed in 2015 and the first half of 2016. The stronger ISM manufacturing index, in particular, sends a powerful signal that inflation is poised to put in a bottom (Chart 11). Chart 10Survey Indicators Of U.S. Growth Chart 11Inflation Lags Growth Bottom Line: The U.S. economic data are starting to outperform beaten-down expectations. Survey data point to further GDP acceleration in the second half of this year and we expect inflation will soon follow growth higher. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: Another Update", dated January 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "On A Higher Note", dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Return Of The Trump Trade", dated October 3, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Won't Back Down", dated September 26, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For each coupon bucket in the Bloomberg Barclays Conventional 30-year Agency MBS index we calculate the squared deviation between its coupon and the current coupon rate. We then weight those squared differences by the market capitalization of each coupon bucket. 6 These are different than the Markit PMI that is included in our 2-factor Treasury model. 7 Please see BCA Daily Insights, "U.S. Jobs Report: All Noise, No Signal", dated October 6, 2017, available at din.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights It's ok to ignore the September jobs report. Is the small cap comeback sustainable? Assessing the threat to the consumer from higher rates and oil prices. The ISM is over 60, now what? Feature Risk assets outperformed again last week, as the S&P 500, the dollar, and the 10 year- Treasury yield all moved higher. Oil was an exception, as WTI dipped back below $50 per barrel, but BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects WTI to end the year over $55/bbl. Small-cap stocks outperformed as well and conditions are in place for the rise in small caps to continue. The rise in risk assets in recent weeks occurred alongside a marked improvement in the Citi Economic Surprise Index (Chart 1), which moved into positive territory last week for the first time since April, despite the impacts of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Chart 1S&P And 10 Year Treasury Yield Tracks Economic Surprise The lack of impact from the hurricanes on the economic data is surprising. Before Hurricane Harvey made landfall, the Atlanta Fed GDP Now reading for Q3 was 3.4%, but moved as low as 2.1% in late September as the August economic data was reported. The most recent Atlanta Fed forecast pegged Q3 GDP at 2.5%. The 60+ readings on September's manufacturing ISM composite and 70+ reading on prices were notably strong, as was the 18.6 million reading on September vehicle sales, the strongest in 12 years. That said, the impact of the storms was evident in the employment data released last week (See below). U.S. Jobs Report: All Noise, No Signal U.S. nonfarm payrolls fell 33,000 in September, which was entirely due to the hurricanes. According to the BLS, 1.47 million workers could not show up for their jobs due to the weather. Because this data series is not seasonally adjusted, one cannot simply add it back to the headline payrolls number. Unfortunately, the separate household survey does not help to shed any better light on the state of the labor market. The household survey is known to be much more volatile than the establishment survey. This was quite apparent with the 906,000 surge in jobs, which followed a 74,000 decline in the previous month. The outsized and unbelievable surge in household employment was the main reason for the decline in the jobless rate to 4.2% from 4.4%. The labor force actually grew by a hefty 575,000 and the participation rate rose to 63.1%, the highest since March 2014 (Chart 2). The 0.5% m/m gain in average hourly earnings needs to be discounted as well. Employment in the low-paying leisure and hospitality sector fell by 111,000 in September, helping to boost the aggregate average hourly wage. As these workers return to their jobs, average hourly wages will correct lower. Bottom Line: Investors should ignore the September jobs report. The 3-month average of payrolls growth from June to August was 172K. This is probably the best gauge of underlying jobs growth and this pace is above the trend growth in the labor force. To the extent that the Fed believes the tightening labor market will push inflation to its 2% target, the calculus for the December FOMC should not change after today's report. Small Caps Make A Comeback Rising prospects for tax cuts have lifted the Trump trades, including small-cap equities. We first initiated an overweight to small caps on November 14, 20161 (Chart 3). Since then, small caps have underperformed large by 162 bps, but not uniformly. The trade was successful from the start through to late January, but faded by late summer along with the prospects for Trump's tax cuts. Starting in mid-August, small cap made a comeback as odds of the tax cut troughed. Chart 2The September Jobs Report Is More Noise Than Signal Chart 3The Trump Trades Are Back On Several factors support our overweight view. According to BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service S&P 600 valuation indicator, small caps are even more undervalued today than when we last discussed them in June2 (Chart 4). Moreover, the Cyclical Capitalization Indicator (CCI) moved sharply into positive territory following the U.S. election despite a modest dip in subsequent months (Chart 5). In addition, small cap stocks have been a reliably high-beta segment of U.S. capital markets since the middle of the last economic cycle (Chart 5, panel 2). That characteristic of small caps argues for a bullish stance given our upbeat view on growth and our overweight positions in U.S. equities versus bonds. BCA's outlook for regulation, inflation, the dollar, the Fed and the consumer also favor small over large caps. Trump has already made significant progress in slowing the pace of new regulations,3 which has long been a concern for small businesses. We expect inflation to move back to 2% in the coming quarters and then begin to climb higher in 2018. Chart 6 shows that small caps often thrive when inflation accelerates. BCA's outlook is that the dollar will see modest appreciation over the next 12 months. Small-cap stocks are less sensitive to dollar movements than large caps. Gradually rising rates will not impede small caps and credit conditions remain favorable. Finally, small caps are more closely linked to the consumer than the S&P 500, and BCA's view on household spending remains upbeat. Chart 4Small Caps Are Cheap, But Not Historically Cheap Chart 5Our CCI Supports Small Caps Chart 6Accelerating Inflation Usually Supports Small Caps Despite the upbeat prospects for small caps, some risks linger. Tighter credit conditions for consumers and businesses, an abrupt pullback in housing that would trigger a consumer retrenchment, persistent weakness in the dollar, and a "risk off" environment would see small caps underperform large caps. Bottom Line: It is too early to abandon our bullish bias toward small caps. Conditions remain in place for small caps to outpace large caps. Favorable valuation and encouraging prospects for Trump's pro-small business platform are key to BCA's view, as our favorable outlook for the U.S. consumer. Will Higher Rates And Oil Prices Crush The Consumer? Supports remain in place for continued strength in U.S. consumer spending despite rising interest rates and oil prices. That support was confirmed by September's reports on employment and vehicle sales, and August's personal income and spending data, all released in the past two weeks. However, investors should be aware of hurricane-related distortions in the August and September figures.4 Moreover, BCA's position is reinforced by elevated readings on consumer confidence and booming household net worth statistics, and record high FICO scores (Chart 7). The conditions that crushed the consumer ahead of the 2007-2008 recession are not in place and will not be for some time. Chart 8 shows that at 41%, household purchases of essentials as a percentage of disposable income are near an all-time low and have dropped by 1.3 percentage points since 2012. In contrast, spending on necessities rose by a record 3.5% in the five years ending in 2008, matching the bruising impact of higher rates, surging inflation and soaring oil prices seen by the end of 1980. Wrenching consumer-driven economic downturns ensued after both episodes. We see gradual increases ahead for both oil prices and interest rates, but nothing that would trigger the collapse of the consumer.5 Furthermore, BCA forecasts only a modest rise in inflation and an acceleration in wage growth; both will provide a boost to disposable income. Personal tax cuts as part of the plan Trump proposed last month would also enhance incomes. Chart 7Plenty Of Support For The Consumer Chart 8Consumer In Good Shape Despite Rise In Oil, Rates BCA's research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles get underway only when businesses see evidence that consumer final demand is on the upswing. The latest reading on the manufacturing ISM composite and the 60+ readings on the new orders component of ISM since February suggest that managements are starting to note the robust pace of consumer spending. Signals From Elevated ISM Readings September's numbers on the ISM manufacturing index support BCA's case for accelerating corporate profits in the coming quarters. The ISM is a good proxy for industrial production, which in turn tracks S&P 500 sales. The recent strong data on ISM suggests that IP should pick up in the next six months (Chart 9). A rollover in the 12-month change in IP would challenge our constructive stance on earnings. While a decline is possible given that the index is already lofty, the leading components of the ISM, including the new orders index and the new orders-to-inventory ratio, indicate that the ISM will remain above 50 in the months ahead (Chart 10). Chart 9Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Chart 10ISM Components Suggest IP Poised To Accelerate Some investors question how long the composite and new orders indices will remain beyond 60 and what that will mean for risk assets. Additionally, the second 70+ reading on the ISM Prices index this year challenges the notion that inflation is dormant. Other investors are concerned about what will happen after these ISM components are so elevated. Others may fear that the index will soon fall below 50. We analyze the historical periods when the ISM and its sub-indexes were above the 60 threshold, and then what happens to the returns of risk assets 12 months after they fall below the 60 threshold (Chart 11A, Chart 11B and Chart 11C). Chart 11AComposite ISM And Risk Assets Chart 11BISM New Orders And Risk Assets Chart 11CISM Prices And Risk Assets Historically, the relative performance of large cap equities to Treasuries is typically poor when the ISM Manufacturing Composite Index is over 60, but investment-grade credit outperforms and both gold and oil usually gain. The performance of these assets is similar even excluding the period around the 1973 OPEC oil embargo and the 1987 stock market crash (Chart 11A and Appendix Table 1). The ISM Manufacturing Composite Index ticked up to 60.8 in September, the first 60+ reading since 2004. The indicator also reached 60 three times in the 1970s and twice in the 1980s, and it stayed above 60 on average for 8 months. The last time it breached 60, it remained at that level for 6 months (December 2003 through June 2004). That interval, along with most of the others, was accompanied by tightening monetary policy and accelerating inflation late in the latter half of economic cycles. Gold and oil perform strongly in the 12 months after ISM Composite Index goes below 60, large-cap equities barely do better than Treasuries, while investment-grade credit underperforms. Surprisingly, high-yield bonds and small-cap stocks outperform 12 months after the ISM falls back below 60, although the sample size is limited. In 1974-1975, the economy was in recession. In all but one other instance (the mid- 1980s), the economy was in a late stage of the cycle, nearing full employment and inflation was on the rise. Risk assets also are strong performers when the New Orders component of the ISM exceeds the 60 threshold (Chart 11B and Appendix Table 2). Moreover, the episodes are more numerous (14 since 1971 versus only 6 for the composite) but, on average, they persist as long as the signal from the ISM Composite. New Orders have been above 60 since February 2017 (7 months), just shy of the 46-year average (8 months). Large cap equities and credit (both investment-grade and high-yield) have outperformed Treasuries, and gold has climbed since February. This performance matches the historical pattern when the New Orders index exceeds 60. In the past 8 months, the underperformance of small caps and the drop in oil prices in that span runs counter to history. The performance of risk assets in the year after the new orders index moves below 60 is mixed, at best. In these periods, while the S&P 500 outperforms Treasuries on average, and small caps outperform large caps, credit underperforms. The big winners when the New Orders index is falling from over 60 are gold (average 14% gain) and oil (22%). Chart 11C and Appendix Table 3 shows the performance of risk assets when the ISM Prices index is greater than 70 and then 12 months after the index crosses below 70. Gold and oil are standouts in the first case, and small cap tends to outperform large. Note that 3 of these 11 episodes coincided with recessions (early 1970s, 1980 and 2008) and 1 occurred during the 1987 stock market crash. Small-cap equities continue to outperform as the Prices index fades, and returns on gold and oil are muted. High-yield bonds underperform Treasuries when the ISM Prices index dips back below 70, and the total return on investment-grade corporate struggles, but it beats Treasuries. Moreover, 3 of these 11 occurred during recessions (early 1980s, 2001, 2008-2009). Separately, there has been a tight relationship between the 12-month change in the 10-year Treasury yield and both the overall ISM, the New Orders and Prices component of the ISM in the past 25 years (Chart 12). Nonetheless, the relationship between the ISM Prices component and the 10-year Treasury has broken down since oil prices peaked in 2014. The 12-month jump in ISM Prices surge in 2016 was met with a decline in Treasury yields. Prior to that, a rise in Prices index was almost always accompanied by a move higher in bond yields. BCA's view is that the ISM manufacturing Composite will remain elevated (although not necessarily more than 60 in the months ahead), supporting our bullish stance on corporate sales and earnings. However, if we are wrong and the ISM dips below 60 and then down to 50, would that signal a downturn and concomitant selloff in risk assets? The ISM has a mixed track record as a leading indicator of recessions (Chart 13). Since 1948, the ISM has provided 9 false signals, using 3 consecutive months below 50 as the indication of an economic decline. Furthermore, 5 of the 9 examples occurred since 1985, as the U.S. economy became less reliant on manufacturing. In the 6 instances that the ISM warned of contractions, the average lead time was 4 months. In the 4 other economic slumps, the ISM moved and stayed below 50 for 3 consecutive months only after the start of recession. The lag averaged 4 months. This was the case in the 2007-2009 episode when the ISM did not send a recession signal until May 2008, 5 months after the official start of the downturn. Chart 1210 Year Treasury Vs. ISM Chart 13The Rocky Relationship Between ISM And Recessions Bottom Line: Elevated readings on ISM support BCA's view that profit growth will accelerate for a few more quarters while the recent rise in the ISM Prices index confirms the move higher in Treasury yields. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds and underweight duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Easier Fiscal, Tighter Money?," November 14, 2016. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Waiting For The Turn," June 26, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Waiting for Inflation, "August 14, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Shelter From the Storm," September 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "Global Debt Titanic Collides With Fed Iceberg?," February 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. Appendix: Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Go long industrials/short discretionary. Leading indicators of interest rates, relative sentiment, relative demand and relative exports all signal that industrials stocks will outperform their consumer discretionary peers. A price war is gripping airlines anew, and it will suck the air out of the industry. Recent Changes Long S&P Industrials/Short S&P Consumer Discretionary - Initiate this pair trade today. Table 1 Feature Tax relief euphoria propelled the S&P 500 to fresh all-time highs last week. While such exuberance has rekindled the "Trump trade" with small caps outshining mega caps and banks soaring (as a reminder we have a small cap size bias and are overweight financials/banks1), it will likely prove fleeting unless the tax bill becomes law. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service believes that a tax bill passage is likely in Q1/2018.2 Were that to materialize, it would serve as a catalyst to further fuel the blow off phase in equities. Why? Empirical evidence suggests that easy fiscal policy outweighs the drag from Fed interest rate tightening. Filtering the post WWII era for periods of easing fiscal and tightening monetary policies during expansions is revealing. We define easy fiscal policy as increasing fiscal thrust (year-over-year change in cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance as a percentage of potential GDP, shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 1) and tight monetary policy as a rising fed funds rate. Chart 1Easy Fiscal + Tight Money = Buy SPX While this is a rare occurrence, it has clearly happened seven times since the mid-1950s (shaded areas, Chart 1). As a clarification, we omitted the brief periods in the early-1960s, early-1970s and twice in the early-1980s as they were very close to the end of those recessions and positively skewed the results. All iterations resulted in positive stock returns with the SPX rising on average by over 16%. Table 2 details all seven periods that have an average duration of 16 months. There are high odds that a tax bill enactment coupled with a potential infrastructure spending bill will more than cushion the blow from the Fed's interest rate hikes in 2018, and sustain the overshoot phase in equities. As we recently showed in our equity market indicator White Paper, the business cycle stays intact during Fed tightening cycles, and historically a peak in the fed funds rate presages a recession.3 Importantly, the highly cyclical part of the U.S. economy is humming. The latest ISM manufacturing survey showed that new orders are running 20% higher than inventories, with the headline number soaring to a 13 year high (third panel, Chart 2). Prices paid also spiked to above 70, signaling that commodity inflation is looming. And, were the capex revival to gain steam as most of the leading indicators we track suggest (see Chart 8 from the October 2nd Weekly Report), then late cyclicals will continue to benefit from end-demand resurgence. Table 2SPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Chart 2It's Deep##br## Cyclicals' Time As a result, we reiterate last week's upgrade of the S&P industrials sector to overweight, and this week we add more deep cyclical exposure to our portfolio by initiating a market-neutral pair trade to benefit from this enticing macro backdrop. Industrials Will Outmuscle Consumer Discretionary In the past few weeks, we have tweaked our cyclical portfolio exposure by downgrading early-cyclical consumer discretionary stocks to a benchmark allocation and lifting the late cyclical industrials complex to overweight. In fact, a once-in-a-generation opportunity to buy industrials at the expense of discretionary stocks has surfaced, and we recommend a new long S&P industrials/short S&P consumer discretionary sector pair trade to exploit this tradable opportunity. Chart 3 shows that relative share prices recently bounced near the early-1970s all-time lows and a mini V-shaped recovery is taking root. The industrials/discretionary price ratio has been in a downtrend for the better part of the past decade and the most recent peak-to-trough collapse has been a 4 standard deviation move (Chart 3). Even a modest relative performance renormalization near the historical mean would translate into impressive returns. Chart 3Compelling Entry Point Four key drivers underpin our warming up to this late over early cyclical pair trade: interest rates, relative sentiment, relative demand and relative export backdrop. The Fed embarked on a fresh tightening interest rate cycle almost two years ago and is on track to lift the fed funds rate another 100bps by the end of 2018 according to the FOMC's median dot forecast. Interest rate-sensitive stocks suffer when the Fed tightens monetary policy, whereas deep cyclicals disproportionately benefit from accelerating economic growth. Chart 4 confirms that over the past four decades a rising fed funds rate has been synonymous with an increase in the relative share price ratio and vice versa. Chart 4Tight Money Is Good For Industrials But Weighs On Discretionary The framework we use on the interest rate front is that higher interest rates represent a sizable hindrance to consumer spending (top and second panel Chart 5). Not only does the price of housing-related credit rise in lockstep with fed hikes, but also auto and credit card interest rates, two major consumer loan categories, increase on the back of the Fed's tighter monetary backdrop. True, C&I loan pricing also suffers a setback, but capital goods producers can bypass banks and raise debt in the bond markets. In fact, this cycle, the global hunt for yield and unconventional monetary policies have suppressed interest rates to the benefit of corporate borrowers. One final relative advantage industrials outfits have this cycle is rising pricing power in the form of firming commodity prices (third panel, Chart 5), while wage growth/median income (a proxy for consumer pricing power) has been subpar. Taken together, higher interest rates and rising commodity prices should continue to underpin relative share price momentum (Chart 5). Relative sentiment readings also suggest that industrials manufacturers have the upper hand versus consumer discretionary companies (Chart 6). The overall ISM manufacturing survey is easily outpacing consumer confidence readings. Importantly, the ISM survey and most of the subcomponents are making multi-year highs, while both the University of Michigan's consumer sentiment survey and The Conference Board's consumer confidence reading peaked in early 2017. Chart 5Commodity Inflation Is A Boon For##br## Industrials But Bane For Discretionary Chart 6Manufacturing Flexing ##br##Its Muscles With regard to the relative demand landscape, a sustained capital expenditure upcycle is promising for capital goods producers (second panel, Chart 7), at a time when personal consumption expenditures (PCE) are anemic at best. Notably, real capital outlays have been rising at a faster clip than real PCE, signaling that the upward trajectory in relative forward EPS estimates is sustainable (middle panel, Chart 7). Our relative pricing power gauge has recently come out of its funk reflecting this improving relative demand backdrop. The implication is that a rerating phase is likely in the coming months (bottom panel, Chart 7). Finally, the relative export backdrop suggests that industrials come out on top of discretionary stocks (top panel, Chart 8). According to FactSet the S&P consumer discretionary sector's foreign revenue exposure stands at 24% of total sales, and it is roughly 60% higher for the S&P industrials sector at 38% of revenues.4 While the year-to-date breakdown in the greenback is stimulative for industrials exporters, it is, at the margin, restrictive for the more domestically oriented consumer discretionary companies (trade-weighted dollar shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 8). Our relative EPS growth models best capture all of these moving parts and suggest that the path of least resistance for relative profit growth is higher in the coming quarters (Chart 9). Chart 7Capex##br## Upcycle... Chart 8... And Export Markets Benefit Industrials##br## At The Expense Of Discretionary Chart 9Relative Profit Growth Models Also Say##br## Buy The Relative Share Price Ratio Adding up, all four key macro variables (interest rates, relative sentiment, relative demand and relative export exposure) signal that the time is ripe for a new industrials versus discretionary pair trade. Bottom Line: Initiate a long S&P industrials/short S&P consumer discretionary sector pair trade. Airlines Update: Mayday While we have turned positive on the broad industrials complex and remain constructive on most transports, we continue to recommend investors avoid the S&P airlines index. This decade has seen a huge recovery in consumer confidence, rising from the depths of the Great Recession. The consumer's revival has been matched by equally steep growth in airline passenger traffic (Chart 10). However, the resurgence in passenger demand has not had the expected uplift in pricing. Rather, the opposite has happened; consumers have not seen a sustainable price increase in years and airline pricing power has collapsed, even in the face of soaring jet fuel costs that eat into profits (Chart 11). The costly price war between the low cost carriers and the largely-restructured legacy airlines the industry is currently embroiled in explains deflating airfares (Chart 12). Chart 10More Passengers... Chart 11... But Higher Fuel Costs... Chart 12... And Price Concessions Crash Profits The industry has been here before, and recently too. 2015 was a tumultuous year that saw pricing collapse as the ultra-low cost carriers entered the traditional hubs, triggering a scramble for market share. Brave airline investors have been whipsawed as the industry recovered and then stumbled again earlier this year. From a profit perspective, airlines have been able to hide poor pricing with efficiency gains (Chart 13). Industry load factors have been steadily moving upward, though those gains appear to have plateaued at peak levels. The implication is that this current price war will hit profit margins and thus the bottom line worse than in the past (Chart 13). Expanding international air travel could provide some relief to the besieged legacy carriers as international airfares look to have pulled out of deflation (Chart 14). However, the sustainability of positive pricing is questionable as international no-frills carriers are gaining greater penetration and often have significantly lower cost structures. Once unheard of trans-Atlantic travel for below $200 is now widely available. Chart 13Masking Poor Pricing Backdrop Chart 14Analysts Ignore Positives At the same time as cash generation appears most threatened, the industry is in the midst of an expensive fleet renewal as airlines seek to replace declining prices and aging fleets with higher volume and more efficient aircraft. In fact, capex as a percentage of sales has nearly tripled since 2012. The result is predictable; the hard deleveraging work the industry put in over the course of this decade is being unwound (Chart 13). An increasingly geared balance sheet, combined with weakening margins should translate directly into a higher risk premium and lower valuation multiples. However, while multiples have fallen from the sky-high levels earlier this decade, they remain well above the lows of 2015-16 (Chart 14). This implies further downside risk should risk premiums expand as we expect. With sell-side analysts jumping on board the bear story, as evidenced by net forward earnings revisions falling off a cliff (Chart 14), this should probably happen sooner rather than later. Bottom Line: With no end in sight to the price war and outsized capacity additions likely to throw fuel on the fire, we think investors should stay away from the S&P airlines index. Accordingly, we reiterate our underweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, AAL, UAL, ALK. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report,"Girding For A Breakout?" dated May 1, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report,"Can Equities And Bonds Continue To Rally?" dated September 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Chart 55 of BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part I)", dated August 7, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 https://www.factset.com/earningsinsight Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

The S&P air freight & logistics group was buffeted this week on reports that Amazon was testing its own delivery service from third-party sellers. The company's interest in operating their own logistics is hardly new news; early last year, Amazon signed agreements to operate an air cargo network that could conceivably handle up to a third of its volume. The declines this week seem like overreactions for 3 reasons. First, Amazon represents approximately 3% of FDX' North American volume and 7% of UPS, according to Moody's, implying relatively small top line impacts from an Amazon shift. Second, those volumes come at extremely low margins and the companies may be able to replace them more profitably. Last, it is highly unlikely that Amazon could replace FDX and UPS completely, with their unmatched 'last mile' infrastructure, nor does this move signal that this is the intention. We think the very positive backdrop driven by surging global trade (second panel), combined with still-cheap valuations (bottom panel), makes any slide in the index an excellent buying opportunity. Anecdotally, staying overweight home improvement retailers when they were under siege from the retail giant has proven to be the right call.1 Net, we reiterate our high-conviction overweight recommendation for the S&P air freight & logistics group. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRF - UPS, FDX, CHRW, EXPD. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, "The Amazon Curse", dated July 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Slowing global money growth, export orders, and a downgrade in earnings revisions of cyclical relative to defensive equities points to a mild slowdown in non-U.S. growth. This slowdown is not worrisome, but could become so if the U.S. dollar rallies significantly. This risk should be kept in mind by investors. Short AUD/USD at 0.79 ¢. EUR/USD is trading at a premium and is over-owned. Conditions are emerging for investors to upgrade their view of the Fed relative to the ECB. EUR/USD has downside risk. Feature Chart I-1Global Growth Is Booming The world economy is on a roll. Nearly all of the world's PMI indexes are in expansionary territory, suggesting we are experiencing a rare global synchronized expansion. A key bellwether of global trade, Korean exports, are surging at a 35% annual rate, confirming that the global economy is very strong (Chart I-1). When all looks great, it is the ideal time to wonder what could go wrong. At this point, the greatest risk to this global expansion may be the dollar. A strengthening dollar would tighten global financial conditions, especially for EM borrowers, and exacerbate the impact of yellow flags that have already emerged. Yellow Flags Investors are in an ebullient mood these days, and for good reason: global growth is strong, and global policy is still very accommodative, even if some central banks have begun removing support for their economies. However, three yellow flags have emerged that in our view warrant some caution. To be clear, these are not grave signs and we do not foresee either a U.S. or a global recession until late 2019 at the earliest. With this in mind, what are the worrying signs that investors should monitor right now? The first yellow flag comes from global money supply growth. Narrow money has decelerated from a 12% annual growth rate to 9% today. Historically, this has been a leading indicator of global industrial production, global export growth and commodity prices (Chart I-2). While the surge in money growth in 2016 and 2017 was a key reason behind the rebound in global economic activity, especially outside the U.S., its recent slowdown points to an end of the economic upswing, though admittedly not toward a cataclysm. The second yellow flag comes from the U.S. ISM release. While the general tone of the report remains extremely positive, the export component has been in a downtrend since June. The key determinant of export growth for any country tends to be the vigor of its trading partners. Hence, it is not surprising that softness in the export component of the U.S. ISM manufacturing survey tends to be associated with weakening global trade and industrial activity (Chart I-3). The third yellow flag comes from earnings revisions. The earnings revision ratios of cyclical relative to defensive equities in the U.S. and globally have sharply rolled over. While still in positive territory, this development has historically been an early signal that improvements in global growth metrics are ebbing, a signal being flashed today (Chart I-4). Chart I-2Money And Global Growth: ##br##From Tailwind To Headwind Chart I-3A Blemish In An Otherwise##br## Bright Picture Chart I-4EPS Revisions: Cyclicals Have Turned ##br##Vis-A-Vis Defensives Bottom Line: The global economy is experiencing a synchronized upswing, which has left investors in an ebullient mood. However, slowing global money growth, ebbing export sentiment and weakening earnings revisions for cyclical relative to defensive equities suggest this broad-based upswing has reached its zenith. While a mild deceleration is likely to materialize soon, these indicators constitute yellow flags, not red ones. Conditions are still not in place to expect a major global growth slowdown. The Dollar Holds The Key While the factors above point to a mild slowdown, they do not yet indicate a dearth of growth that could prompt panic among investors, especially in the EM space. For this scenario to become reality, another ingredient is needed. In our view, this ingredient is a strong dollar. To begin with, the relationship between global growth and the dollar is well known in the investor community. When global growth is strong and broad-based, the dollar depreciates; when global growth is weak, the dollar appreciates (Chart I-5). The U.S. is a relatively closed economy, and is less exposed to global growth developments than the euro area, Japan or commodities producers (Chart I-6). Thus, when the global economy is in an upswing, the U.S. garners a smaller dividend than the rest of the world. Conversely, when the global economy hits a soft patch, the U.S. suffers less. Chart I-5Strong Global Growth Coincident ##br##With A Weak Dollar Chart I-6The U.S. Is Less Exposed ##br##To Global Growth Factors But the chain of causation is not only from growth to the dollar. The trend in the dollar also affects the trend in global growth. This is because in aggregate, the world remains short the dollar. According to the BIS, there is $27 trillion dollars of foreign-currency liabilities in the world, $14 trillion of which is denominated in U.S. dollars, with an extremely large proportion issued by EM borrowers. When the dollar weakens, the cost of borrowing among companies and banks that finance themselves in USD decreases, incentivizing further borrowing. This eases global liquidity conditions and decreases the cost of financing global trade, leading to increased economic activity and profits as well as expanding global capex. Meanwhile, when the dollar rises, the balance sheet of those foreign firms and governments that have borrowed in U.S. dollars becomes increasingly illiquid, resulting in strong headwinds for additional borrowing, curtailing economic activity, profits and capex. This explains why the dollar and commodities prices, the latter being extremely sensitive to growth and global capex, have displayed such a strong negative relationship over different time periods (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Rising USD Equals Declining Liquidity And Declining Commodity Prices Thanks to these dynamics, the weakness in the dollar this year has been a major boost to growth for the global economy. As Chart I-8 illustrates, the large easing in EM financial conditions was indeed related to the U.S. dollar's weakness. Therefore, as growth momentum could be peaking, a period of renewed strength in the greenback might inflict further damage to a key buttress of EM growth. Moreover, this time around, Chinese policymakers are unlikely to come to the rescue of the global economy as they did in 2015 and 2016. Back then, China was experiencing a deflationary spiral: producer prices were contracting at a 6% annual pace, profits were in free fall and outflows were growing exponentially. The People's bank of China and the central government pulled all the stops, increasing lending and fiscal expenditures and tightening capital controls. Monetary conditions eased massively (Chart I-9). Chart I-8The Falling Dollar Supported Global Growth Chart I-9Tightening Chinese Monetary Conditions Last weekend, the PBoC announced targeted cuts to reserve requirement ratios for banks extending lending to small companies. According to our China Investment Strategy sister publication, this is not a major easing.1 Instead, these are targeted measures aimed at helping small firms that are currently dependent on the predatory lending rates available in the shadow banking sector. Meanwhile, access to credit by large state-owned enterprises and the real estate sector will continue to be slowly curtailed. The mutation of deflation into inflation and the recovery of profit growth imply that China does not currently need the same shot to the arm that it did in 2015 and 2016. Thus, it is unlikely the country will initiate another round of massive credit easing that will boost investment by SOEs and the construction sector, the two main sources of capex and commodities demand. In an environment where global money growth has rolled over and where China is unlikely to press on the gas pedal as hard as it did two years ago, a strong dollar would thus have a nefarious impact on global financial conditions, global growth, and, in turn, EM currencies and commodities currencies. While we remain very negative on the yen for now, the Japanese currency could benefit from a meaningful slowdown in international growth, as such a slowdown would likely exert downward pressure on global bond yields, including in the U.S. Obviously, the rally in the USD will have to be much more pronounced than what has been experienced in the past month before its negative impact on growth begins to be felt in bond yields and the yen. Thus, we remain long USD/JPY for now. The AUD could prove to be a key victim of the developments highlighted above. The AUD is highly levered to global growth and EM financial conditions. Moreover, it is now very expensive on a long-term basis, having overshot terms of trade by a very significant margin (Chart I-10). Adding to the vulnerability in the Aussie, the Australian economy has been incapable of generating any inflationary pressures. The output gap remains very deep, the level of underemployment is still at a 37-year high, and wages continue to hover near record lows, limiting the capacity of the Reserve Bank of Australia to tilt to a hawkish stance (Chart I-11). Yet, investors expect rates to be 42 basis points higher 12 months from now. Finally, speculators are currently very long the AUD. Thus, we will use any rebound above 0.79 to short the AUD/USD, setting a limit-sell at this level with a target at 0.73. Chart I-10The AUD Is Vulnerable Chart I-11Litle Inflationary Pressures In Australia Bottom Line: While the three yellow flags highlighted do not represent a terminal danger to global growth, a stronger dollar at the hands of tightening global financial conditions, especially in EM economies, would be a much bigger threat to the global economy. We do anticipate the dollar to strengthen over the coming 12 months, but it will take a significant move before the USD puts enough of a brake on global growth to hurt global yields. We therefore remain positive on the USD/JPY. However, with this risk lurking in the background, we are implementing a short position on the AUD, a currency that is both expensive and over-owned, and underpinned by an economy full of slack. An Update On EUR/USD We continue to expect some downside to EUR/USD over the remainder of the year. As we have already highlighted, the euro has greatly overshot its implied interest rate parity (IRP) relationships. Our intermediate-term time model - an enhanced IRP model accounting for short- and long-term real rate differentials, global risk aversion, commodities prices and the trend in the pair - shows that EUR/USD remains near its largest premium to fair value since 2009. Confirming this assessment, the euro has also overshot its equilibrium implied by the level of interest rates five years out (Chart I-12). Valuations offer some insight on the potential size of the euro move, but they offer very little information in terms of timing. Instead, we should rely on technical and macro considerations. On this front, we have already highlighted that speculators are currently net long the euro by the largest margin since 2011. Philosophically, we often look at the euro as the anti-dollar, a highly liquid inverse bet on the dollar. Since EUR/USD constitutes 57.6% of the DXY, a short bet on this dollar index and a long bet on the euro are similar wagers. Currently, the sum of both bets is at a level normally followed by sharp drops in EUR/USD, suggesting that euro buying is hitting exhaustion levels (Chart 13). Meanwhile, with investors having very few short bets on the euro, especially when compared to the large stock of short bets on the DXY, a short squeeze in favor of the USD could emerge if European data disappoints relative to the U.S. (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Downside In EUR/USD Chart I-13Tactical Risk To EUR/USD On the macro front, a few developments have caught our eye. We are entering the window where based on historical lags, the euro area's industrial production is likely to start feeling the pain of the common currency's previous strength (Chart I-14). Compounding this worry for euro longs, euro area earnings revisions are lagging those in the U.S. by the greatest margin since 2014, suggesting the euro's strength has sapped some of the euro area's vigor and is in the process of redistributing it to the U.S. economy. Historically, this has led to a period of weakness in EUR/USD (Chart I-15). Chart I-14The Strong Euro ##br##Will Soon Be Felt Chart I-15Falling Relative EPS Revisions ##br##Equals A Weaker EUR/USD Confirming this insight are relative financial conditions. Euro area financial conditions have been tightening relative to the U.S. since the beginning of 2016 - a move that has become especially pronounced this year. The euro area's inflation outperformance vis-à-vis the U.S. this year was first and foremost a reflection of the previous easing in relative European financial conditions (Chart I-16). Thanks to these strong relative inflation dynamics, investors have brought forward the first rate hike expected from the ECB, while simultaneously removing interest rate hikes out of the U.S. OIS curve. This move has been wildly euro bullish. However, the window of opportunity for this bet is closing; the tightening in European financial conditions now points to a reversal in relative inflation, with U.S. prices set to now take the lead over the euro area. This could force a repricing of the Fed relative to the ECB, implying that monetary divergences could once again play against EUR/USD. Catalonia is not a reason to be bearish on the euro. Marko Papic, BCA's Chief Political Strategist, argues that the northeastern region is unlikely to leave Spain.2 The vast majority of Catalonia still favors remaining part of Spain (Chart I-17). Moreover, the region has received immigrants from the rest of the country for many decades, reflecting its superior economic performance. As a result, only 31% of the population speaks Catalan as a first language. In aggregate, the independentists' victory last weekend only reflects a low turnout rate, as individuals who opposed leaving Spain stayed at home, like they did in 2014. Chart I-16The Fed Will Be Repriced ##br##Against The ECB Chart I-17Will Of The People: ##br##Catalonia Will Stay In Spain Bottom Line: The euro will exhibit downside risk in the coming months. EUR/USD is trading well above its fair value implied by its IRP relationship. Additionally, euro buying has hit nosebleed levels, and the dollar is unloved. Moreover, the euro's recent strength could begin to negatively affect growth, especially as European earnings revisions have collapsed versus the U.S. Finally, financial conditions point to a fall in euro area inflation relative to the U.S., highlighting the risk that the policy path for the Fed could be upgraded against that of the ECB. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, titled "On A Higher Note", dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Is King Dollar Back?", dated October 4, 2017, and Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, titled "The Geopolitical Risks For The Equity Bull Market", dated May 14, 2014 at gps.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S data has been strong this week: Markit and ISM Manufacturing PMIs beat expectations at 53.1 and 60.8 respectively; ISM Prices Paid rose sharply to 71.5 from 64.0; Markit Services and ISM Non-Manufacturing PMIs also beat expectations at 55.3 and 59.8 respectively; ADP employment change and continuing and initial jobless claims also came out better than expected; The DXY has rebounded meaningfully after a string of stronger data and growing hopes on the fiscal policy front recently. Bond markets have picked up on these developments, with the 10-year yield rising 30 basis points from its bottom last month. However, stronger U.S. inflation is needed in order for the greenback to meaningfully rally. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data has been mixed: The latest headline and core inflation readings for the euro area were weaker than expected, at 1.5% and 1.1% respectively; German retail sales also underperformed expectations, however, German unemployment rate decreased; Euro area manufacturing PMI also underperformed, while the services PMI outperformed; Euro area producer prices beat expectations, coming in at 2.5%. With U.S. data outperforming, the euro has softened versus the greenback, but has not displayed similar movements against other currencies. While it is true that European inflation is higher than a year ago, it is still not near the ECB's target. A stronger euro would further restrict inflationary pressures, which would be a cause for concern for ECB officials. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Japanese data has been mixed the past weeks: The jobs/applicants ratio came in at 1.52, underperforming expectations and decreasing from the previous month. Additionally, retail trade and overall housing spending yearly growth both disappointed, coming in at 1.7% and 0.6% respectively. However, on the bright side, Nikkei Manufacturing PMI outperformed expectations, coming in at 52.9. Overall, we continue to be bullish on USD/JPY, as yields in the U.S. will continue to rise vis-à-vis Japanese ones. Economic data has been tepid, and wages continue to contract or remain flat, even if some underlying pressures are slowly emerging. Furthermore we expect that the BoJ will continues its extreme measures of yield curve targeting in order to spur inflation expectations. Nevertheless, the yen could appreciate against carry currencies like the AUD or NZD if Chinese monetary conditions become tight enough. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Markit services PMI outperformed expectations coming in at 53.6, and increasing from last month's reading However, Markit manufacturing PMI came in under expectations at 55.9, and decreased from last month. Moreover Construction PMI unperformed, coming in at 48.1, the lowest level since July 2016. We would lean against any further strength of the pound against the U.S. dollar. The risks associated with Brexit still looms in the background, while data has been mixed, particularly when it comes to consumption and the housing market. Additionally, the market has already fully priced a rate hike by December. Thus, it seems that any good news for the pound are already in the price, as the BoE certainly has little incentives to follow a hawkish policy beyond removing its post-Brexit emergency measures. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was mixed: AiG Performance of Manufacturing Index decreased to 54.2 from 59.8; TD Securities Inflation came in at 2.5%, down from 2.6%; HIA New Home Sales increased by 9.1% MoM in August, up from the 15.4% contraction in July; Building permits are still contracting 15.5% annually, but better than the expected 16.2% contraction. This week, the RBA decided to leave rates unchanged at 1.5%. The monetary policy statement focused on the lack of wage pressures in the Australian economy and on the higher exchange rate, which is "expected to contribute to continued subdued price pressures in the economy", as well as "weighing on the outlook for output and employment", stating further that "an appreciating exchange rate would be expected to result in a slower pick-up in economic activity and inflation than currently forecast." Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Last week the RBNZ decided to leave rates unchanged at 1.75%. The RBNZ continued with its dovish slant, arguing that monetary policy will remain accommodative for a considerable period. An important development, however, is that the central bank toned down its cautious tone about the kiwi. In previous instances, the RBNZ had been very aggressive in stating that the NZD was too expensive and an adjustment was needed. However, in its most recent statement the RBNZ was much less aggressive in its rhetoric, highlighting the fall in the NZD. Overall, we believe that the NZD will continue to have upside against the AUD, as domestic inflationary pressures are much stronger in New Zealand than in Australia. Meanwhile, global developments, such as a downturn in the Chinese industrial cycle would affect Australia much more than New Zealand. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Canadian data was mixed: Industrial product price grew at a 0.3% monthly pace, less than the expected 0.5%; Raw materials increased by 1%, above the expected 0.3%; GDP stagnated in July on a monthly basis, below the expected 0.1% growth; Merchandise trade slipped even further into a deficit from CAD 2.6 bn to CAD 3.41 bn. Furthermore, Governor Poloz's September 27 speech sent the CAD tumbling, stating that "monetary policy will be particularly data dependent" and that it could be "surprised in either direction". Probability of a hike in October and December declined from 48% to 23%, and 75% to 63%, respectively. While growth is robust, inflation has been declining since January, which may be a cautious sign for the BoC. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Data in Switzerland has outperformed to the upside: The KOF Leading Indicator outperformed expectations, coming in at 105.8 and increasing from last month's reading. The SVME Purchasing Manager's Index also outperformed, coming in at 61.7 Finally, headline inflation also outperformed expectations, with a reading of 0.7%, increasing from 0.5% on August. This recent strength in the Swiss economy is most likely reflective of the sharp appreciation that EUR/CHF has experienced in recent months. However, despite the increase in inflation, the Swiss economy is still too weak for the SNB to stop intervening in the foreign exchange market or to remove their ultra-dovish monetary measures. Once we see both headline and core inflation climb closer to their historical averages, we will reassess this view. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Data in Norway has been mixed: Register unemployment came in line with expectations at 2.5%, decreasing from last month's 2.7% reading. However the credit growth issued by national institutions in Norway, decreased since last month, coming in at 5.6%. Finally, both retail sales and real retail sales yearly growth came below expectations, coming in at -0.6% and 0.2% respectively. These few data points are interesting given that both retail and real retail sales growth dipped into contractionary territory. This shows that the Norwegian economy is still too weak to sustain a higher krone and higher rates. For this reason we continue to be bullish on USD/NOK. This cross is more correlated with rate differentials than with oil. Thus even if oil continues to rise, rising rates in the U.S. will still put upward pressure on USD/NOK. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The 11-year ruling governor of the world's oldest central bank, Stefan Ingves, will now sit at the helm of the Riksbank for five more years, until 31 December 2022. While Sweden's economy is still performing above par with CPIF at 2.3%, our bullish case for the SEK is under threat by the extension of the governor's term, who introduced negative interest rates to Sweden and who is consistently vigilant over the SEK's appreciation, even threatening intervention if needed. EUR/SEK appreciated 0.6% on the news, but has since given up some those gains as economic data in Sweden rebounded sharply. The Riksbank will still likely hike, but the timing is now in question. It is likely that the tightening cycle will now coincide with the ECB's tapering program, which will limit the SEK's appreciation for now. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Automotive components companies (as well as auto manufacturers) just finished their best month of the year in September (top panel), lifted by expectations of a spike in sales to replace the estimated 700,000 light vehicles destroyed by hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Yesterday's best monthly auto sales report since the end of the recession (second panel) validated this expectation. It is too soon to break out the party hats for three reasons. First, vehicle replacement does not translate one-for-one into new vehicle sales as the used vehicle market will likely take up the bulk of the demand. Second, August lost a week of normal sales in the southern states which were pushed into September, skewing the month. Lastly, and most importantly, manufacturer incentives reached their highest level ever (according to J.D. Power) in an effort to clear out the end-of-model-year inventory; neither this nor weak pricing (third panel) support the idea of a strong auto consumer and constrained supply. Bottom Line: Exceptionally strong September (and probably October as well) vehicle sales are masking still-weak core auto demand. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AUTC - DLPH, BWA, GT.

Highlights Expect Spain's strong growth to fade somewhat as its credit impulse appears to have peaked. The Catalan independence debate is an inconvenience but not a long term tail-risk. Expect Italy's growth to pick up as the Italian banking system is repaired. Brave investors could go long Italian bonds versus Spanish bonds now. More cautious investors might wait until after the Italian election in the first half of next year. France's CAC40 is our preferred mainstream euro area equity market right now. Feature Recent history teaches us that to leave the European Union is inconvenient, but to leave the euro is disastrous. To leave the EU means redefining laws, institutions and trading relationships, but to leave the euro means redenominating the entire banking system's assets and liabilities into different currencies - leading to bank runs and chaotic insolvencies. For this reason, even tiny Greece chose to suffer an extended depression rather than to leave the euro. Chart of the WeekSpain Fixed Its Banks In 2013, Italy Is Fixing Its Banks Now Leaving The EU Is Inconvenient, Leaving The Euro Is Disastrous To leave the EU, there is a broadly defined process but the process is inconvenient and protracted, as the United Kingdom is now discovering. The U.K. will technically leave the EU on March 31 2019, but Prime Minister May has proposed a further transition period of "around two years." Therefore the U.K. will remain in the European single market and customs union - and fully subject to EU laws and regulations - until at least 2021, five years after the U.K. voted to leave the EU. This protraction of the exit process creates a tasty irony. Not long after the U.K. fully leaves in 2021, the Leave vote's 1.25 million majority will have disappeared - counting those who voted in 2016 who are still alive. This is because out of the 0.625 million deaths in the U.K. in each of the coming years, there is a very heavy skew to Leave's much older voters1 (Chart I-2). As the U.K is not in the euro there is no secondary issue of whether to leave the single currency. But this does raise an interesting hypothetical question. If a euro area country - or region like Catalonia - inconveniently left or was ejected from the EU, does it follow that it must also crash out of the euro? No. Several non-EU countries already use the euro. There are the European microstates of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City. More significantly, Montenegro and Kosovo have adopted the euro as their de facto currency. To be clear, we do not expect Catalonia to secede. Polls consistently show a significant majority in Catalonia do not want full independence (Chart I-3). The unionists mostly boycotted the independence referendum because Madrid deemed it illegal. Given the low turnout, the 89% vote for independence equalled just 37% of eligible voters. Chart I-2The Vote For Brexit Was ##br##Driven By Older Voters Chart I-3A Significant Minority In Catalonia##br## Do Not Want Full Independence But even if Catalonia did become independent, this hypothetical eventuality would not involve a catastrophic exit from the euro. Catalonia, in its economic interest, would want to keep the euro, and the EU would let it. The Spain/Italy Conundrum The much bigger threat would be if a major euro area country felt that the single currency was not in its economic interest, and decided to jettison the euro. In this regard, the problem - at first sight - appears to be Italy. Through the 19 years of the euro, Italy's real GDP per head has grown by just 6%, substantially less than any other major economy. If the single currency is to blame for the significant underperformance of its third largest economy with 60 million people, then the euro's long-term viability has to be in question. But it is hard to blame the euro per se for Italy's painful underperformance. For the first half of the euro's life, 1999-2007, Italian real GDP per head performed more or less in line with the United States, Canada and France (Chart I-4) - even without a substantial tailwind from a credit-fuelled boom which the other economies had. Then, in the post-2007 years, there was little to distinguish the economic performances of Italy and Spain until 2013 (Chart I-5). At which point, Spain took off, with real GDP per head subsequently expanding by 15%. Whereas Italy struggled to grow. The conundrum is: what explains this stark recent difference between Spain and Italy? Chart I-4Through 1999-2007, Italy Grew In Line ##br##With Other Major Economies Chart I-5Post-Crisis, There Was Little To Distinguish##br## Italy and Spain Until 2013 The start of Italy's underperformance in 2008 and the start of Spain's strong recovery in 2013 provide the solution to the conundrum. Following the global financial crisis in 2008, Italy has still to repair its banking system. Whereas Spain fixed its banks in 2013. Significantly, Spain ring-fenced bad assets within a bad bank while recapitalising good banks. In effect, it finally did what other economies - most notably the U.S., U.K. and Ireland - had done several years earlier in response to their own housing-related banking crises. Therefore in 2013, Spanish banks' aggressive deleveraging ended. The result was that Spain's credit impulse - which measures the change in bank credit flows - rebounded very sharply and has remained positive for four years. This explains Spain's remarkably strong recovery (Chart I-6). In contrast, Italy's still dysfunctional banking system means that its own credit impulse has been much more muted and barely positive over the past four years (Chart I-7). Begging the question: why has Italy been so slow to fix its dysfunctional banking system? One reason is that Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the credit booms in the U.S., U.K., Ireland and Spain did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown banking crises, requiring urgent policymaker response. A second reason is that the Italian government is more highly indebted than other governments, making it more difficult to raise public funds to fix the banking system. The good news is that the Italian government, the EU and the ECB are now on the same page and finally progressing to repair the banking system. Italian banks' equity capital is rising (Chart I-8), their solvency is improving, and the share of non-performing loans has fallen sharply this year (Chart of the Week). Chart I-6Spain's Credit Impulse Rebounded Sharply Chart I-7Italy's Credit Impulse Has Been More Muted Chart I-8Italian Banks Are Raising Equity Capital Moreover, the recent smooth winding down of the failing Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Bank showed that the EU's new rules for resolving failing banks is working. Admittedly, the rules mean that institutional investors could still suffer losses. But a pragmatic solution will permit public funds to protect 'widows and orphans' retail investors. Some Investment Thoughts As the Italian banking system is repaired, there will be a pickup in Italy's growth just as there was in Spain. However, the strong tailwind to Spain's growth that started in 2013 is now fading given that Spain's credit impulse has peaked. This suggests that the yield spread between Italian BTPs and Spanish Bonos - which measures the extra risk premium in Italy - is at a cyclical peak from which it is likely to compress (Chart I-9). Brave investors could go long Italian bonds versus Spanish bonds now. More cautious investors might wait until after the Italian election in the first half of next year. On the face of it, a fading risk of euro breakup should also boost euro area equity relative performance. The trouble is that the relative performance of the broad Eurostoxx50 index is entirely at the mercy of its major sector skews - specifically, a huge underweighting to Technology and an overweighting to Banks (Chart I-10). The way around this dilemma - to like euro area equities but to dislike the overall sector skew - is to steer towards mainstream indexes which have less of a distorting skew. On this basis, the mainstream euro area equity market we would pick right now is France's CAC40 (Chart I-11). Chart I-9The Yield Spread Between Italian And ##br##Spanish Bonds Is At A Cyclical Peak Chart I-10Eurostoxx50 Relative Performance Is ##br##At The Mercy Of Its Sector Skews Chart I-11Prefer the CAC40 To##br## The Eurostoxx50 Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In the U.K. around 625,000 people die every year and the vast majority of these are aged over 65. But in this older age cohort, 64% voted Leave (source: YouGov). So we can infer that of the 625,000 deaths, about 400,000 voted Leave and 225,000 voted Remain, eroding the Leave majority who are still alive by 175,000 every year. Fractal Trading Model This week, we note that the Canadian 10-year government bond is oversold and due a trend reversal. We prefer to express this as a new relative trade: long Canadian 10-year bond / short 10-year German bund with a profit target / stop-loss of 1% and double position size. In other trades, long USD/CAD hit its 2.5% profit target - the second success in this specific trade in the last three months. We now have three open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Highlights 2017/18 fundamentals are supportive for corn. Lower production and stronger demand will put the market into a deficit. China's E10 mandate is a boon for ethanol, and the ags used to produce it. Imports will be needed in the transition phase. Fed's interest-rate normalization is a headwind to U.S. ag exports and will encourage foreign production. Move ags to neutral, stay strategically long corn/short wheat. Feature Lower production and stronger demand will put the corn market in a supply deficit. Wheat and soybeans, meanwhile, are projected to record a smaller surplus in 2017/18 compared to 2016/17 (Chart of the Week). The corn supply deficit will draw down ending stocks. Still, with a stocks-to-use (STU) ratio of 26%, global grain inventories remain at healthy levels. The small dip in STU ratios projected for the 2017/18 crop year signals a minor change from the generally upward trend since the 2007/08 world food-price crisis (Chart 2). However, China's still-massive inventories have been distorting our view of global grain markets. Policymakers are moving to reduce huge corn stocks and encourage ethanol production. This will be bullish for corn. We are lifting our weighting to neutral for ags, and are recommending a strategic long corn vs. short wheat position at tonight's close (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekGlobal Grain Markets##BR##Slowly Rebalancing Chart 2Despite Dip,##BR##Global STU Remain Healthy Chart 3Move Ags to Neutral On##BR##Shrinking Supply Surplus China's Massive Stockpiles Blur The View Of Grains Vulnerability World grains STU ratios remain more or less unchanged at ~ 27% since 2014/15. Within the grains complex, we see a decline in projected corn area planted in 2017/18, and an increase in area harvested for wheat and, to a larger extent, soybeans (Chart 4). In the case of corn and soybeans, this also reflects acreage expectations in the U.S., where corn farmers are projected to decrease their 2017 planted area by 3%, and increase soybean planted area by 7%. However, when we remove Chinese stocks from the world tally, the global STU ratio stands much lower, at ~ 20%. China's grains and soybean STU ratios have been holding at ~ 50% since 2014/15 (Table 1). Nonetheless, given China's relatively higher prices, we believe it is safe to say that Chinese stocks are not accessible to the world. China accounted for only ~0.3% of world grain exports in recent years. Thus, we do not consider them a supply-side risk factor. STU ratios are an indication of a commodity's vulnerability to demand- or supply-side shocks. When STU ratios are healthy, a shortage can be cushioned by the stored inventory. Thus, a lower ratio signifies that a shock would have a greater impact on the price. However, given that China's STU ratios are significantly greater than the rest of the world - China accounts for ~ 22% of world grain demand, and more than 60% of the world's grain inventories - they skew our view of the market (Chart 5). Chart 4Farmers Favor##BR##Soybeans Over Corn Table 1Stocks-To-Use*:##BR##China Is Distorting Our View Chart 5China's Inventories Account For##BR##Huge Chunk Of World Inventories Consequently, we find that excluding China from world inventory levels and STU ratios gives us a better indicator of the susceptibility of world ag markets to price shocks. This reveals that corn is more vulnerable to price changes compared to wheat and soybeans. Nevertheless in terms of demand, China remains an important market driver. Thus, ongoing changes to China's agriculture policies are a significant factor affecting our outlook. China's Evolving Ag Policies China's government is continuing down its path towards modernizing the country's agriculture policies by making them more market-oriented, and moving away from its one-policy-fits-all strategy. In the past, China's ag policies were motivated by efforts to prioritize food security and promote farming incomes. These policy goals manifested themselves in price floors across the board, which were continuously adjusted to the upside with rising input prices. While these policies were successful in incentivizing farmers to increase agricultural output, they also resulted in a "triple high" phenomenon: (1) high domestic production, (2) high imports, and (3) high domestic stocks (Chart 6). Domestic consumers increased their imports to take advantage of lower international prices, which meant that state agriculture stockpiles ballooned (Chart 7). Chart 6China "Triple High" Phenomenon Chart 7China Prices Still Too High In acknowledgement of these drawbacks, China has taken steps to remedy the "triple high phenomenon," most recently communicating the following changes: In rice and wheat markets, policymakers will attempt to improve the minimum-procurement price policy to reorient incentives. In cotton and soybean markets, a new target-price system will be put in place, which ensures that farmers are compensated when market prices fail to reach the stated target prices. Corn markets will see the biggest change in the government's procurement policy, as it will be eliminated and replaced with market-driven pricing. Subsidies to farmers will be unrelated to corn prices. Although the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council has communicated a more receptive attitude towards imports in its "No. 1 Central Document," tariff rate quotas remain in place for wheat, rice, corn, cotton and sugar.1 Bottom Line: China's massive inventories distort global STU ratios. Nevertheless in term of demand, China remains significant. Do not discount the impact of China's evolving ag policies. Among Ags, Corn Is China's Priority Chart 8China Corn Deficit To Widen Among the changes outlined above, the largest shift in policy will be in the corn market. Tackling the huge stockpiles and rising output is a clear priority for the Chinese government. In fact, according to the latest USDA projections, China's corn market will be in a deficit in 2017/18 for the second year in a row. This follows five years of strong imports, which persisted despite domestic surpluses. What is notable about the 2017/18 deficit is that, according to USDA projections, it is largest on record. At 23mm metric tonnes (MT) it is more than 1.5 times the second-largest deficit recorded in 2000/01 (Chart 8). Although China's corn stockpiles make up more than 40% of global stocks, and the government has expressed a keenness to draw them down, there are reports that the corn in storage has deteriorated so much that it is no longer fit for animal or human consumption. Thus, in face of falling corn area harvested in China, and amidst higher domestic prices, corn imports are expected to continue filling the void.2 They are projected to record only a slight decline in 2017/18. The global corn balance will likely show the same trend. Even though world ex-China corn market is expected to remain in surplus, production is projected to fall while consumption is expected to increase. This will bring the surplus down to 1.8mm MT from 54.4mm MT in 2016/17. In fact, ending stocks in both China and the rest of the world are expected to come down in 2017/18. This will be the second year of declining inventories for China following five successive years of buildup, and is a clear result of the change in China's agricultural policies. Bottom Line: The biggest shift in China's policies is in the corn market. Efforts will remain focused on bringing down the massive stockpiles. However, domestic prices remain relatively high. This will continue incentivizing cheaper imports. China Ethanol Mandate: Two Birds With One Stone In an effort to get rid of the corn glut and reduce pollution, China's National Energy Administration (NEA) recently announced 2020 as the target for introducing E10 ethanol to the gasoline pool in the world's largest automobile market. Although Beijing had previously announced plans to double ethanol production by 2020, the E10 mandate is a more concrete step in that direction. It is a reiteration of the state's intention to draw its massive corn stocks and prioritize environmental conservation. Meeting China's ethanol needs would require an additional 36 ethanol plants, each with an annual capacity of 379mm liters, adding up to an additional 45mm MT of corn a year - more than 4% of current world demand - according to estimates from Reuters.3 However, as one of the main goals of the ethanol mandate is to reduce corn stockpiles, a Chinese official recently refuted the view that China will need to rely on imports. This seems overly optimistic. It is doubtful these ethanol plants will all be up and running in China by 2020. Thus, the country will likely rely on ethanol imports during the transition phase. This would be a boon for ethanol, and the ags used to produce it. Amid low corn prices, U.S. ethanol producers have been producing record quantities of the gasoline additive. However, the "blend wall" - which describes the limitation of mandating more ethanol content in gasoline due to its harmful effects on car engines - has limited domestic consumption of the biofuel. Furthermore, U.S. car sales have been anemic this year (Chart 9). Nonetheless, U.S. farmers have been able to take advantage of their low-cost production and export excess supplies to Brazil, where sugarcane-based ethanol has recently been relatively more expensive (Chart 10). Chart 9Strong U.S. Ethanol Production##BR##Despite Blend Wall Chart 10Tariffs A Buzzkill For##BR##U.S. Ethanol Exports The Ethanol Trade War Is On On August 23, as U.S. corn farmers prepared for a record harvest, Brazil - the main export destination for U.S. ethanol - imposed a 20-percent tariff-rate quota on ethanol imports from the U.S., which covered more than 1 million gallons a year. This came after U.S. exports to Brazil swelled by 300% in 1H17, and represented a serious blow for the U.S. ethanol export market. Similarly, China increased its tariffs on U.S. ethanol earlier this year. However, in an effort to protect its food crops, Beijing reportedly will invest in large-scale cellulose-based ethanol production and advanced biofuels by 2025.4 If successful, this would make the corn and sugar rally short-lived. Bottom Line: China's E10 mandate is a boon for ethanol, and the ags used to produce it. Especially given declining corn plantings. Imports will be needed in the transition phase. China Policies Encourage Soybean Production Chart 11Chinese Farmers Also Favor##BR##Soybeans Over Corn While state-directed incentives in China are set to reduce corn stockpiles, farmers are now shifting towards soybean production over corn (Chart 11). The area of corn harvested in China is projected to continue shrinking - and at a faster rate. The second annual decline in land dedicated to corn plantings comes after 12 years of continuous expansions at an average 4% p.a. On the flip side, Chinese farmers are expected to increase land dedicated to soybeans by 8% in 2017/18, after expanding it by 11% in the previous year. These increases follow a 6% average annual decline since 2010/11 to reach the smallest soybean area harvested on record in 2015/16. This is in line with China's efforts to ensure food security. Unlike other ag commodities, soybean STU ratios in China have been consistently below the global ratio. Weak USD Improved Competitiveness Of U.S. Exports A subdued U.S. dollar benefitted U.S. ag exports this year, and kept ag markets tight. With the exception of the Argentine Peso - which depreciated ~ 10% vis-à-vis the USD since the beginning of the year - currencies that are relevant to ags have strengthened slightly or remained largely stable since the beginning of the year (Chart 12). On one hand, a relatively weak USD makes U.S. ags more affordable for foreign markets. On the other hand, since commodities are priced in dollars, while costs are in local currencies, farmers in other ag-exporting nations lose on exchange-rate differentials. In trade-weighted terms, the USD reached its 2017 nadir in the beginning of September - depreciating by almost 9% since the beginning of the year. It has since appreciated by ~ 2% (Chart 13). The exchange-rate effect is evident in the data: U.S. ag exports were up in 2016/17 - by an estimated 36% year-on-year (yoy) for wheat, 21% for corn, and 12% for soybeans (Chart 14). Chart 12Ags Relevant Currencies##BR##Have Held Their Ground Chart 13But Strengthening USD##BR##Bearish For Ags Going Forward Chart 14U.S. Exports:##BR##Will Slow Down In 17/18 In fact, U.S. wheat, which has been losing market share since 2012/13, is estimated to have accounted for 16% of the global export market in 2016/17, up from 12% in the previous year. With its exchange-rate advantage, the U.S. beat the EU as the top wheat exporter in 2016/17, exporting an estimated 29mm MT - a 36% yoy jump. The global market balance will become more fluid as the Fed proceeds on its path of interest-rate normalization. A stronger USD likely will favor grain exporters ex-US. At the September FOMC meeting, Fed Chair Janet Yellen strongly indicated a December rate hike was still on the table. If the Fed's normalization policy results in an additional one to two rate hikes by the end of next year - BCA's House view - then U.S. exports of wheat and corn can be expected to be especially hard hit by the currency headwind. The USDA projects an 8% and 19% fall in U.S. exports of wheat and corn in 2017/18, respectively. However, supportive weaker fundamentals in the soybean market are expected to keep U.S. exports strong. Unlike wheat and corn, Chinese imports of soybean are expected to continue increasing in 2017/18. Bottom Line: A subdued U.S. dollar benefitted U.S. exporters since the beginning of 2017. Going forward, the global market balance will become more fluid as the Fed proceeds with interest-rate normalization. Views And Recommendations Despite expanding soybean acreage, we do not foresee much price downside. Supportive China fundamentals in the form of an STU ratio that is below the rest of the world - an abnormality for agriculture commodities - will ensure that China's demand remains strong. However, U.S. supplies - and, most importantly, exports - will remain strong. Thus, within the grains complex, we are neutral soybeans. The corn market is a different story. Given that China's ethanol mandate will draw down the state's massive corn reserves, we have a strategically bullish bias when it comes to corn. Although China has expressed its intention to be self-sufficient in ethanol production, we expect that it will need to import the biofuel, at least in the short run. This is expected to be a boon for ethanol producers, especially since it comes as Chinese farmers divert their land away from corn. While wheat is expected to remain in surplus in 2017/18, corn is projected to record a 21mm MT deficit. Furthermore, STU ratios are projected to fall in the case of corn, and increase in the case of wheat. Bottom Line: We are tactically neutral grains, but have a strategically bullish bias for corn. In addition to China's continued focus on modernizing its agricultural policies, we expect stronger oil prices to pull up costs in the longer run. A stronger-than-expected USD is a downside risk to our view. It would encourage foreign farmers to increase production, and render U.S. ags less competitive in international markets. We are lifting our overall weighting to neutral, given our assessment of global fundamentals. In addition, we are recommending a strategic long corn vs. short wheat position to capitalize on the bullish fundamentals we see emerging in corn. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 The WTO responded to U.S. complaints over Chinese tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on certain agricultural commodities. It set up a dispute panel on September 22, 2017. 2 Please see "China to import more corn to meet ethanol fuel use: analyst," dated September 21, 2017, available at reuters.com. 3 Please see "China set for ethanol binge as Beijing pumps up renewable fuel drive," dated September 13, 2017, available at reuters.com. 4 Cellulosic ethanol is produced by breaking down cellulose in plant fibers. However, its production process is more complicated than the ethanol fermentation process. While large potential sources of cellulosic feedstocks exist, commercial production of cellulosic fuel ethanol is relatively small. Potential feedstocks include trees, grasses and agricultural residues. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Weak spots in the U.S. economy have become increasingly hard to find. That said, two standouts are non-residential construction and light vehicle production, both of which remain in contraction despite the overall economic expansion (second panel). Importantly, growth in both of these sectors relies heavily on expanding credit; in the most recent Fed senior loan officer survey, these categories both saw tightening lending standards, implying a negative credit impulse (third panel). All of this is bad news for domestic steel producers, for whom non-residential construction and light vehicle production are the key end markets. Even worse news is that steel imports are gaining share of an increasingly diminished market (fourth panel), despite the Trump administration's pledge to protect domestic steel production through tariffs. Iron ore prices in China, which have struggled to climb off lows (bottom panel), imply that tariffs will need to be substantial to stem foreign inflows. Bottom Line: Weak demand, policy uncertainty and increasing offshore competition should sustain downward pressure on steel stocks. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P 1500 steel index are: BLBG: S15STEL - NUE, STLD, RS, X, ATI, CRS, CMC, WOR, AKS, TMST, SXC, HAYN, ZEUS.