Developed Countries

Special Report

Feature It was an honour and privilege to welcome Professor Daniel Kahneman to our New York Conference this year. Professor Kahneman was the 2002 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, though the great irony is that he hasn't taken a single economics class in his life! That said, he did have a great informal mentor in the form of Richard Thaler who, coincidentally, has just become the 2017 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics. Professor Kahneman's lifetime work demonstrates that our economic and financial decisions are often highly irrational - flying in the face of most mainstream economic models which assume fully rational behaviour. His research culminated in a school of thought called Prospect Theory, for which he ultimately won the Nobel Prize. Feature ChartBonds Become Much More Risky At Ultra-Low Yields Over lunch, Professor Kahneman summarised Prospect Theory to us. And as he spoke, the penny suddenly dropped. Prospect Theory's rich findings may have solved some of the most pressing mysteries of finance. Why do equities typically outperform bonds? Why has QE boosted equity prices so much? What happens next to financial markets? Why Do Equities Typically Outperform Bonds? Let's begin by debunking a popular myth. Many people believe that equities typically outperform bonds because equity income streams grow in line with the economy whereas bond income streams are fixed and do not grow. This reasoning is false. Any income stream can be made to generate any return depending on the price you pay for the income stream upfront. A rapidly growing income stream can still generate a deeply negative return if you overpay for it. And a fixed, or shrinking, income stream can still generate a strongly positive return if you underpay for it. It follows that equities generate a higher return than bonds simply because the financial markets typically price them to deliver this higher return. The question is: why? Prospect Theory provides an answer. One of its great insights is that we significantly overestimate the probabilities of rare but sizeable gains and losses. Indeed, this overestimation of rare events provides the entire foundation of the lottery and insurance industries. We overpay for a lottery ticket to buy the tiny possibility of a large gain, which is called positive skew. And we overpay for insurance to remove the tiny possibility of a large loss, which is called negative skew. We do this because creating the tiny possibility of immense wealth lets us dream pleasant thoughts. While removing the tiny possibility of losing our home lets us sleep soundly. The upshot from Prospect Theory is that income streams with positive skew tend to be overvalued, and so generate poor returns - like the lottery ticket. Whereas income streams with negative skew tend to be undervalued, and so generate high returns. This brings us to the first key point. Equity returns possess negative skew (Chart I-2). On rare occasions, they suffer deep losses. Because of this negative skew, it is our contention that the markets price equities to generate an excess return - a risk premium - over investments that do not have a negative skew. Chart I-2Equity Markets Have Negative Skew: "Equity Markets Walk Up The Stairs But Jump Out Of The Window" To illustrate the point, bear with us as we do some simple maths. Say an equity price could end up at 102 with probability 90%, but could plunge to 82 in a rare event with probability 10%. This makes its expected value 100 (because 102*0.9 + 82*0.1 = 100). But if, as Professor Kahneman suggests, the market overestimates the rare event probability to, say, 20%, it will underprice the equity at 98 (because 102*0.8 + 82*0.2 = 98). Clearly, this pricing will generate an excess return - a risk premium of 2% - because the correct expected value is 100. Next consider a bond price which could end up at 101 or 99 with equal probability, giving it an expected value also at 100. As it does not have negative skew, the market will just price it at 100. Observe that the equity price and bond price have exactly the same expected value of 100, but the financial markets have underpriced the equity at 98 to generate an excess return over the bond - because the equity has negative skew while the bond does not. Why Has QE Boosted Equity Prices So Much? When bond yields fall to very low levels, things get more complicated. Bond returns also exhibit extreme negative skew (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). And the reasons are obvious. At very low bond yields, the prospects for capital appreciation rapidly disappear, while the prospects for large-scale capital losses suddenly increase ( Feature Chart). Chart I-3When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low Bond Markets Have Negative Skew Too Chart I-4When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low Bond Markets Have Negative Skew Too One simple way to quantify an investment's negative skew is to pick an extended period of time - say several years - when the price has gone sideways, and then to calculate the worst 3-month loss as a multiple of the best 3-month gain.1 On this metric, equities typically show a negative skew of around 1.5. Meaning that the worst loss is about 1.5 times the size of the best gain. But for bonds, negative skew varies with the bond yield. At yields above 2.5%, bonds show no skew. Worst losses broadly equal best gains. However, when yields drop below 2%, the negative skew approaches the same level as for equities. And at yields around 1%, the negative skew can even exceed that on equities (Table 1 and Chart I-5). Table 1At Low Bond Yields, ##br##Bonds Have Extreme Negative Skew Chart I-5Bonds Become Much More Risky##br## At Ultra-Low Yields This brings us to a crucial conclusion. At very low bond yields, the equity risk premium must compress, and potentially disappear, because both bonds and equities now have the same undesirable negative skew. Is there any empirical evidence for this? The prospective equity risk premium is hard to capture as it requires an accurate forecast of the prospective excess return from equities over bonds. But the realised equity risk premium is easy to measure as it is just the annualised outperformance of equities over bonds. This shows a clear downtrend in Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. Meanwhile, in Japan where bond yields have been near zero for years, the realised equity risk premium is non-existent (Charts I-6, Chart I-7, Chart I-8, Chart I-9). Chart I-6The Equity Risk Premium ##br##Has Trended Lower In Germany... Chart I-7...And In The U.K. Chart I-8The Equity Risk Premium ##br##Has Trended Lower In The U.S. Chart I-9The Equity Risk Premium Is Non-Existent ##br##In Japan One important takeaway is that central banks, perhaps unwittingly, have driven up equity valuations exponentially. This is because QE has simultaneously compressed both the bond yield and the equity risk premium, giving equity valuations a double shot in the arm. Let's reasonably say that central bank policy depressed the 10-year bond yield by 2%. The resulting increased negative skew on bonds might then reasonably depress the 10-year equity risk premium by 2%. In combination, this would reduce the 10-year required return from equities by 4% a year for ten years. Under these assumptions, central bank policy might well have boosted equity valuations by 50%.2 What Happens Next To Financial Markets? The double shot in the arm to developed market equity valuations may have boosted them by 50%, but they are broadly in the right ballpark as long as bond yields remain ultra-low. However, the conditionality on bond yields is crucial. This is because the process that exponentially boosted equity valuations can also work viciously in reverse. To reiterate, the negative skew on bond returns starts to fade when the bond yield is at 2% and completely disappears at 3%, at which point the equity risk premium must fully re-emerge. Given the tendency of equities to exhibit negative skew and to move en masse in the developed markets, we can infer that the current valuation of equities would be in jeopardy if a mainstream bond yield broke well north of 2.5%. Whereupon the reassessment of equity valuations is likely to catalyse a correction, at the very least. Chart I-10Bond Yields Can Rise More In Europe ##br##Than In The U.S. But one important investment implication is that the subsequent flight to investment havens means that no mainstream bond yield can realistically rise beyond 3% in the foreseeable future. We can also infer that European 10-year bond yields have the potential to rise more than their equivalents in the U.S., given that European yields are much further from the 2.5%-3% 'red zone'(Chart I-10). So an excellent structural position is to underweight European government bonds versus U.S. T-bonds. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Using log returns. 2 Because 1.04^10 = 1.48 Fractal Trading Model* This week we observe that Norwegian equities are technically overbought. A market neutral trade is to go short Norway/long Switzerland with a profit target/stop loss of 2%. We now have five open trades. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Fractal Trading Model The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights The uptick in world oil demand in the wake of a strengthening global upturn - the first since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) - coupled with continued production discipline by OPEC 2.0, will accelerate inventory draws, and lift prices above our previous expectation. Even though we expect - and model for - U.S. shale producers to step up drilling as a result, we are lifting our base case forecast for 2018 Brent and WTI to $65.15/bbl and $62.95/bbl, respectively. These estimates are up $5.51 and $5.98/bbl from our forecast last month.1 Energy: Overweight. Given our view (discussed below), we are taking profits on the long Dec/17 WTI call spread we recommended June 15 - long $50/bbl calls vs. short $55/bbl calls - on the close tonight. This position was up 116% Tuesday. We will replace this spread with long $55/bbl WTI calls vs. short $60/bbl WTI calls in Jul/18 and Dec/18. Base Metals: Neutral. We closed our short Dec 2016 copper trade last week, after our trailing-stop of $3.10/lb was elected, with a 0.75% return. Our trade was up 6% by the end of September, however bullish data in October - including an earthquake in Chile and worries over a potential metal shortage in China - lifted prices back up. Chinese copper import data showed a 26.5% year-on-year (yoy) jump in September. Even so, we expect copper imports to end 2017 with a yoy decline. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium continues to trade premium to platinum following its breakout at the end of September. We expect this to continue, given the supply-demand fundamentals we highlighted in June.2 Ags/Softs: Neutral. The USDA's latest World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) is supportive of our grains view - projections for 2017/18 wheat ending inventories were revised upward, while corn and soybeans stock estimates were lowered. Our long corn vs. short wheat position recommended October 5 is up 1.5% (please see p. 8 for further discussion.) Feature The global uptick in GDP growth noted this month by the IMF, along with continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will lift 2018 average Brent and WTI prices to $65.15/bbl and $62.95/bbl, respectively. These estimates are up $5.51 and $5.98/bbl from our forecast last month (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekHigher Demand, Lower Supply,##BR##Tighter Inventories Lift Prices We expect the fortuitous combination of fundamentals - for oil producers, that is - to accelerate the drawdown in oil inventories globally, which also will be supportive for prices (Chart 2). This, in turn, will set off a new round of U.S. shale-oil production, which will temper the price rise we expect, but still force inventories to draw harder than expected (Chart 3). Our base case calls for OPEC 2.0 to extend its 1.8mm b/d production cutting deal to end-June 2018, and for compliance within the KSA-Russia-led coalition to remain strong. OPEC 2.0 member states compliance with self-imposed quotas stood at 106% of agreed cuts, according to a state-by-state tally published by S&P's Global Platts earlier this month.3 Iraq continues to flaunt its OPEC 2.0 production quota, at 4.54mm b/d by our estimate, or 153k b/d over its quota. OPEC as a whole is producing 32.74mm b/d of crude oil, by our reckoning, vs. Platts' estimate of 32.66mm b/d. We have Libya and Nigeria, which are not parties to the OPEC 2.0 Agreement, producing 930k b/d and 1.71mm b/d last month, vs. Platts' estimates of 910k b/d and 1.84mm b/d, respectively (Table 1). KSA and Russia continue to lead OPEC 2.0 by example, with the former's crude oil production coming in at 9.97mm b/d in September, vs. 9.95mm b/d in August; the latter's total liquids production was 11.12mm b/d, vs. 11.13mm in August (Chart 4). Chart 2Market Will Get##BR##Tighter Sooner Chart 3BCA Expects Sharper##BR##Inventory Draw Than EIA Chart 4KSA And Russia Continue##BR##Providing Leadership To OPEC 2.0 Global GDP, Oil Demand Growth Strengthens The IMF earlier this month raised its forecast for global GDP growth this year to 3.6% and to 3.7% for next year, up 0.1% for each year vs. previous forecasts. In its analysis, the Fund drew attention to: Notable pickups in investment, trade, and industrial production, coupled with strengthening business and consumer confidence, are supporting the recovery. With growth outcomes in the first half of 2017 generally stronger than expected, upward revisions to growth are broad based, including for the euro area, Japan, China, emerging Europe, and Russia. These more than offset downward revisions for the United States, the United Kingdom, and India.4 On the back of the IMF's revised global growth estimates, we lifted our 2017 and 2018 oil demand expectation to just under 47.5mm b/d on average for the OECD and to just under 52mm b/d for non-OECD economies (Table 1). This translates into global demand growth of 1.65mm b/d in 2017 and 1.69mm b/d in 2018. Notably, we expect global demand to exceed 100mm b/d on average next year in our base case. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Our estimated demand is driven by global growth projections, particularly for EM economies, which make up the bulk of demand and growth in our balances estimates (Table 1). And, as before, our estimates remain above the EIA's (Chart 5). The indicators we look at to confirm or refute our demand assessment - global trade, particularly EM imports, and manufacturing - remain strong. Global trade continues to expand, particularly in EM ex-Middle East and Africa, as does manufacturing globally, both of which supports the IMF's assessment of growth generally (Charts 6 and 7). Rising incomes lead to rising trade, and also to increased oil and base metals consumption in EM economies. Chart 5We Continue To##BR##Estimate Higher Demand Than The EIA Chart 6Rising Trade Volumes##BR##Support Growth Story ... Chart 7... Expanding Manufacturing##BR##Does, Too Higher Prices, Greater USD Risk Expected In 2018 Given the upward revisions to global growth and our expectation OPEC 2.0 compliance will remain fairly stout, our baseline forecast now calls for WTI prices to average $56.40/bbl in 4Q17 and $62.95/bbl in 2018. Brent is expected to average $58.40/bbl in 4Q17 and $65.15/bbl next year (Chart 1 and Table 2). These estimates are up from last month's averages of $54.89 and $57.44/bbl for 4Q17 and 2018 WTI, and $56.67 and $59.17/bbl for 4Q17 and 2018 Brent.5 Our increasing bullishness is tempered by the risk of a stronger USD, particularly the broad trade-weighted USD index, which captures EM currency weakness. With the Fed set on a course to lift rates - our House view anticipates a Dec/17 rate hike and two or three hikes next year - and the oil market getting fundamentally tighter, we have seen the oil-USD linkage being re-established recently (Chart 8). Table 2Upgrading Our##BR##Price Forecasts Chart 8Expect The USD To Be Less##BR##Determinant For Oil Prices The persistent negative correlation between oil prices and the USD broke down following the global asset sell-off in 1Q16. However, this relationship converged to its long-term equilibrium in recent months. In our view, this reflects market participants' increasing conviction - expressed in market-cleared prices - that OPEC 2.0 will maintain its supply-management accord for an extended period, and that supply is now stabilizing. With demand remaining robust as the global synchronized upturn continues, the fundamental side of price determination has stabilized, and financial variables once again will strongly influence oil prices at the margin. Given our view the USD will trade off interest-rate differentials going forward, and our expectation that U.S. rates are set to increase relative to other systemically important rates, the USD likely will appreciate over the next 12 months. This will be a headwind for oil prices, and may be an additional factor OPEC 2.0 member states have to account for in 2018. Bottom Line: We are raising our price forecast for 4Q17 and 2018 in line with our expectation for stronger global growth and continued strong compliance from OPEC 2.0. With markets getting tighter, we expect the USD to become more important to the evolution of oil prices in 2018. Ag Update: Stay Long Corn, Short Wheat Global grain fundamentals continue to be supportive to our long corn vs. short wheat position, recommended October 5. The USDA's latest WASDE are projecting higher 2017/18 ending wheat inventories, while corn and soybeans stock estimates were lowered (Chart 9).6 Chart 9Fundamentals Support Long Corn##BR##Vs. Short Wheat Trade The USDA lowered its expected global corn stocks-to-use ratio, and increased its wheat stocks-to-use ratio for the current crop year. Revisions to the estimates for the 2016/17 crop year also reflect similar dynamics. We expected this going into the WASDE report at the beginning of the month when we published our Special Report on the Ag markets, and got long corn vs. short wheat. December 2017 corn futures traded on CME are up 0.14% since October 5, while wheat futures are down 1.36%. This brings the return on our long corn/short wheat trade to 1.5%, to date. Highlights from the current WASDE include: Upward revisions to wheat production from India, the EU, Russia, Australia, and Canada more than offset greater projected global demand, most notably from India and the EU. Overall, global ending stocks were revised up by 4.99mm MT, and are projected to stand at 268mm MT by the end of the 2017/18 marketing year. Greater projected corn demand, most notably from the U.S. and China, more than offset the ~ 6mm MT upward revision to global production in the USDA's estimates. Higher projected Chinese demand reflects greater food and seed demand, and higher expected industrial use. Corn stocks are expected to end 2017/18 at 200.96mm MT - 1.51mm MT below September projections. Similarly, in its October Chinese Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, China's Agriculture Ministry increased its forecast for the 2017/18 corn deficit to 4.31mm MT from 0.89mm MT projected last month. The Ministry expects lower output and greater consumption on the back of stronger demand from ethanol plants.7 Furthermore, in a move towards market pricing, Heilongjiang - China's top corn province - will be reducing the subsidy it gives corn farmers from 153.92 yuan/mu last year to 133.46 yuan/mu. The province will reorient its subsidies to incentivize more soybean production.8 In soybean markets, USDA projections for ending stocks were reduced by 1.48mm MT to 96.05mm MT by end-2017/18, largely on the back of lower expected U.S. and Brazilian inventories in 2016/17. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "OPEC 2.0 Will Extend Cuts To June 2018," published September 21, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Precious Metals Update," in the June 29, 2017 issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "EM Trade Volumes Continue Trending Higher, Supporting Metals". It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see S&P Global Platts OPEC Guide published October 6, 2017. 4 Please see Chapter 1 of the IMF's World Economic Outlook for October 2017, which is available online at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/09/19/world-economic-outlook-october-2017. 5 Our base case continues to call for an end-June 2018 extension of the OPEC 2.0 production deal. Should the deal be extended to end-December 2018, we estimate 2018 WTI prices would average $67.35/bbl, while Brent prices would average just under $70.00/bbl. We are becoming increasingly confident OPEC 2.0 will become a durable production-management coalition, given the increasing cooperation and mutual investment between KSA and Russia. We will be exploring this further in future research. Please see "King Salman Goes To Moscow, Bolsters OPEC 2.0," published October 11, 2017, by BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy. It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report titled "Ags In 2017/18: Move To Neutral," dated October 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "China Raises Forecast For 2017/18 Corn Deficit On Lower Output," dated October 12, 2017, available at reuters.com. 8 Please see "Top China Corn Province Cuts Subsidy For Farmers Growing the Grain," dated October 16, 2017, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

In this week's Weekly Report, we are highlighting what we expect to be the key macro theme we see dominating markets in 2018: the nascent recovery in capital outlays transforming into a full blown capex upcycle. The second panel shows that the recent V-shaped recovery in operating EPS should morph into a sizable capex upcycle. Vibrant capex then feeds back into profits, leading to a virtuous cycle. Empirical evidence suggests that a lagged relationship exists between these two variables: since the early 1980s capex growth has typically trailed profit growth by one year. Intuitively, as earnings recover, CEOs have more confidence in the outlook for final demand and choose to deploy longer-term oriented capital. National accounts data also confirm the positive correlation between capex1 and corporate non-financial operating earnings2 growth, albeit with a shorter lag. Our chart shows that since the 1980s recession, all four recessions were preceded by stock market reported capex soaring to roughly a 20% annual growth rate. At the current juncture, capex is merely on the cusp of entering expansion territory and, if history at least rhymes, a significant capex upcycle is looming and higher beta/higher operating leverage deep cyclicals sectors are going to be in the driver's seat. Please see Monday's Weekly and Special Reports for more details. 1 Source: National Income and Product Accounts 2 Source: Financial Accounts of the United States - Z.1

We have been shifting our portfolio toward a cyclical over defensive tilt recently and in this week's Special Report, we are highlighting five compelling reasons to buy cyclicals at the expense of defensives. Capital expenditures upcycle. The capex upcycle will disproportionately benefit capital goods producers versus their defensive brethren. Leading indicators of capital outlays have taken off (top panel), suggesting both capex and the relative share price ratio will surge higher. Synchronized global growth in general and emerging markets (EM) growth in particular. Synchronized global growth typically boosts global final demand and is also conducive to a coordinated global capex upcycle. The resurgent global manufacturing PMI suggests that cyclicals have the upper hand (second panel). U.S. dollar softness. The U.S. dollar has a critical influence on the relative share price ratio. The currency remains in the red year-to-date, on a trade-weighted basis, representing a bullish backdrop for cyclical compared with defensive EPS prospects as a lagged currency effect should boost relative profitability (third panel). Bottom Line: Shift to a cyclical over defensive portfolio bent. Please see yesterday's Special Report for more details and our other reasons for the portfolio shift.

Highlights This week, we are reviewing all our current active trades in our Tactical Overlay. As a reminder, these positions (Table 1) are meant to complement our strategic GFIS Model Fixed Income Portfolio, typically with shorter holding periods and occasionally in smaller or less liquid markets outside our usual core bond market coverage (i.e. U.S. TIPS or Swedish interest rate swaps). This report includes a short summary of the rationale behind each position, as well as a decision on whether to continue holding the trade, close it out or switch to a new position that may more efficiently express our view. The trades are grouped together by the country/region that is most relevant for the performance of each trade. Table 1GFIS Tactical Overlay Trades Feature U.S. Short July 2018 Fed Funds futures (HOLD). Long 5-year U.S. Treasury (UST) bullet vs. 2-year/10-year duration-matched UST barbell (HOLD). Long U.S. TIPS vs. nominal USTs (HOLD). Short 10-year USTs vs. 10-year German Bunds (HOLD). The tactical trades that we have been recommending within U.S. markets all have a common theme - positioning for an expected rebound in U.S. inflation that will push up U.S. bond yields. We are maintaining all of them. The drift lower in realized inflation rates since the spring has been a surprise given the backdrop of above-potential growth, low unemployment and a weakening U.S. dollar. On the back of this, markets have priced out several of the Fed rates hikes that had been expected over the next year, leaving U.S. Treasury yields at overly-depressed levels. Back on July 11th, we initiated a recommendation to short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract (Chart 1). This was a position that would turn a profit if the market moved to once again discount multiple Fed rate hikes by mid-2018. The trade has a modest profit of 9bps, but with scope for additional gains if the market moves to discount 2-3 hikes by the middle of next year. Our base case scenario is that the Fed will lift rates again this December, and deliver additional increases next year amid healthy growth and with inflation likely to grind higher towards the Fed's 2% target. With the market discounting 46bps of rate hikes over the next year, there is scope for additional profits in our fed funds futures trade. Another tactical position that we've been recommending is a butterfly trade within the U.S. Treasury (UST) curve, long a 5-year UST bullet versus a duration-matched 2-year/10-year UST barbell. This is a position that would benefit from a bearish steepening of the UST curve as the market priced in higher longer-term inflation expectations (Chart 2). We have held that trade for a much longer period than a typical tactical trade, going back nearly a full year to December 20th, 2016. Yet while the UST curve has flattened since that date, our trade has delivered a return of +18bps. This outperformance can be attributed to the undervalued level of the 5-year bullet at the initiation of the trade. Chart 1Stay Short July 2018##BR##Fed Funds Futures Chart 2Stay Long The 5yr UST Bullet Vs.##BR##The 2yr/10yr UST Barbell While that valuation cushion no longer exists (bottom panel), longer-term TIPS breakevens are back to the levels seen last December (middle panel), thanks in no small part to much higher energy prices (top panel). This leaves the UST curve at risk of a bearish re-steepening on the back of rising inflation expectations. Add in a U.S. dollar that is -2.5% weaker from year-ago levels (Chart 3, middle panel), and a solid U.S. economic expansion that should eventually translate into rising core inflation momentum (bottom panel), and the case for a steeper UST curve over the next 3-6 months is a strong one. The above logic also supports our trade recommendation to go long U.S. TIPS vs. nominal USTs, which is up +248bps since inception on August 23, 2016. We have been holding this trade for much longer than our usual tactical recommendations, but we will not look to take profits until we see the 10-year breakeven (now at 186bps) return back to levels consistent with the Fed's 2% PCE inflation target (i.e. headline U.S. CPI inflation back to 2.5%). One final tactical trade that will benefit from higher UST yields is our recommendation to position for a wider spread between 10-year USTs and 10-year German Bunds. This trade was initiated on August 9th of this year, and has delivered a profit of +9bps. Yet the UST-Bund spread still looks too low relative to shorter-term interest rate differentials that favor the U.S. (Chart 4, top panel). With U.S. data starting to surprise more on the upside than Euro Area data (middle panel), and with UST positioning still quite long (bottom panel), there is potential for additional near-term UST-Bund spread widening. The upcoming decision by the European Central Bank (ECB) on potential tapering of its asset purchases next year represents a potential risk for the long Bund leg of our recommended trade. Any hawkish surprises on that front would be a likely catalyst for us to close out this position. Chart 3Stay Long U.S. TIPS Vs. Nominal USTs Chart 4Stay Short 10yr USTs Vs. German Bunds Euro Area Long 10yr Euro Area CPI swaps (HOLD). Long 5-year Spain vs. 5-year Italy in government bonds (HOLD). We have two recommended tactical trades that are specifically focused on developments in the Euro Area. We are maintaining both of them. As a way to position for an eventual pickup in European inflation, we entered a long position in 10-year Euro Area CPI swaps back on December 20th, 2016. That trade is now estimated to have a profit of +29bps, as market-based inflation expectations have drifted higher in the Euro Area. The simple reason for that increase is that realized inflation has moved higher on the back of rising energy costs, as there is a very robust correlation between the annual growth rate of oil prices (denominated in euros) and headline Euro Area inflation (Chart 5). More importantly, the booming Euro Area economy, which has eaten up much of the spare capacity in the Europe, has boosted wage growth and core inflation to levels seen prior to the disinflation shock from the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices (bottom panel). With no signs of any imminent slowing of Euro Area growth that could raise unemployment and slow underlying inflation pressures, the trend for inflation expectations in Europe is still upward. The current 10-year Euro Area CPI swap at 1.5% is still well beneath the ECB's inflation target of "just below" 2% on headline CPI, so there is room for inflation expectations to continue drifting higher. ECB tapering of asset purchases is not an immediate threat to this trade, as the central bank is still likely to keep buying bonds next year (at a slower pace), while holding off on any interest rate increases until late 2019. In other words, the ECB will not be looking to act to slow economic growth to bring down Euro Area inflation anytime soon. Our other tactical trade recommendation in Europe is a relative value spread trade, long 5-year Spanish government debt versus 5-year Italian bonds. This trade was initiated on December 13th, 2016 and currently has only a modest gain of +9bps, although the profits were much larger earlier this year. Italian bonds have been outperforming on the back of improving Italian economic growth (Chart 6, top panel) and, recently, a generalized sell-off in Spanish financial assets on the back of the political uncertainty in Catalonia. Chart 5Stay Long 10yr##BR##Euro Area CPI Swaps Chart 6Stay Long 5yr Spanish Government Bonds Vs.##BR##5-Year Italian Debt Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy have been downplaying the threat to Spanish political stability from the Catalonian independence movement, given that the polling data shows only 35% for outright independence from Spain. At the same time, the poll numbers in Italy for the upcoming parliamentary elections are much closer, with parties favoring less integration with Europe holding a slight lead over more "establishment" parties (bottom two panels). With the bulk of the cyclical convergence between Italian and Spanish growth now largely completed, and with a greater potential for future political instability in Italy compared to Spain, we expect that Spain-Italy spreads will tighten further back to the lows seen at the beginning of 2017 (-64bps on the 5-year spread). That is a level we are targeting on our current tactical trade recommendation. Canada Short 10-year Canadian government bonds vs. 10-year USTs (TAKE PROFITS). Long Canada/U.K. 2-year/10-year government bond yield curve box, positioning for a relatively flatter Canadian curve (TAKE PROFITS). Short 5-year Canada government bond versus a duration-matched 2-year/10-year barbell (TAKE PROFITS). We have three different Canadian fixed income trades in our Tactical Overlay, all of which were biased towards tighter monetary policy in Canada: a Canada-U.S. bond spread widener, a yield curve box trade versus the U.K. and a curve flattener expressed as a barbell trade (Chart 7) All three positions are in the money, but we now recommend taking profits. We had initiated these recommendations in a very timely fashion earlier in the year at a time when the Bank of Canada (BoC) was sending a relative dovish message. In our view, the Canadian economy was building significant upward momentum that would eventually force the central bank to shift its policy bias. This would especially be true with the Fed also in a tightening cycle, given the typical tendency for the BoC to follow the Fed's policy actions. Several members of the BoC monetary policy committee began to sing a more hawkish tune over the summer, particularly after the release of the Q2 BoC Business Outlook Survey. That robust report, which was confirmed by a 2nd quarter GDP growth rate of nearly 4% (Chart 8), led the BoC to deliver not one by two unexpected interest rate hikes in July and September. Markets reacted accordingly, driving Canadian bond yields higher and flattening the yield curve. Chart 7Take Profits On Bearish Canadian Bond Trades Chart 8Canadian Growth Set To Cool Off A Bit Now, we see the market pricing as having gone a bit too far, too quickly. The Q3 Business Outlook Survey, released yesterday, was still positive but with readings softer than the booming Q2 report. Meanwhile, the commentary from the BoC has become more balanced, with BoC Governor (and BCA alumnus) Stephen Poloz describing the central bank as being more "data dependent" after the recent rate hikes. Markets are now pricing in another 72bps of rate hikes over the next year, even with our own BoC Monitor off the peak (Chart 9). Chart 9Our BoC Monitor Is Peaking From a tactical perspective, the repricing of the BoC that we expected earlier this year is now largely complete. Thus, we are taking profits on all three Canadian trades: Canada-U.S. spread trade: initiated on January 17th, profit of +43bps. Canada/U.K. box trade: initiated on May 16th, profit of +67bps. Canada 2yr/5yr/10yr butterfly trade: initiated on December 6th, 2016, profit of +95bps. From a strategic perspective, we still see a case where the BoC can deliver additional rate hikes and keep upward pressure on Canadian bond yields. The output gap in Canada is now closed, according to BoC estimates, and additional strength in the economy now has a greater chance in translating to higher inflation. Strong global growth, especially in the U.S., will also support Canadian export growth and feed into rising capital spending. While the rate hikes have help boost the value of the Canadian dollar (CAD), the exchange rate (on a trade-weighted basis) also largely reflects a rising value of energy prices and is, therefore, should provide an additional boost to growth via stronger terms-of-trade (bottom panel). In other words, the rising CAD will not prevent additional BoC rate hikes if oil prices remain strong. Thus, we are maintaining our underweight recommendation on Canadian government bonds in our strategic model bond portfolio, even as we take profits on our bearish Canadian tactical trades. Australia Long a 2-year/10-year Australia government bond curve flattener (SELL AND SWITCH TO NEW TRADE). On July 25th of this year, we entered into a 2-year/10-year curve flattener trade for Australia. Though employment was improving and house prices were booming in Australia, the wide output gap, high level of consumer indebtedness and lack of real wage growth was keeping the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) inactive. In our view, nothing has changed since then; the RBA remains in a very difficult position. While the yield curve flattened substantially following the initiation of our trade, the global rise in long-term yields since mid-September lifted Australian longer-maturity yields, and the yield curve with it (Chart 10). Now, Australian long-term yields are not reflecting domestic fundamentals but are instead driven by improving global growth. As such, we are closing the trade and initiating a new position - long Dec 2018 Australian Bank Bill futures - as a more focused way to express the view that the RBA will stay on hold for longer than markets expect. Markets are currently pricing in 30bps of RBA rate hikes over the next twelve months. We believe this will be unlikely, for several reasons. Macroprudential measures on the Australian housing market will continue to dampen credit growth. Core inflation is slowly rising but still far below the central bank's target. Additionally, there is plenty of slack in the labor market despite the spike in employment growth. This is evidenced in anemic real wage growth, stubbornly high underemployment rate, low hours worked and high percentage of part-time to full-time workers (Chart 11). Chart 10Close Australian Government##BR##Bond 2yr/10yr Flattener Chart 11RBA Unlikely To Deliver##BR##Discounted Rate Hikes The biggest risk to our new trade would if signs of a tighter Australian labor market started to feed through into faster wage growth, which would likely coincide with faster underlying price inflation and a more hawkish turn by the RBA. New Zealand Long 5-year NZ government bonds vs. 5-year USTs (currency hedged). Long 5-year NZ government bonds vs. 5-year Germany (currency unhedged). Chart 12Stay Long 5yr NZ Government Bonds##BR##Vs. U.S, & Germany We entered two New Zealand (NZ) tactical bond trades on May 30th, going long 5-year government bonds vs. U.S. and Germany (Chart 12). We expected NZ spreads to tighten faster than the forwards based on our more hawkish views on the Fed and, to a lesser extent, the ECB relative to the more dovish view on the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). The outright bond spreads have tightened and, on a currency-hedged basis, both trades are in the money. Our dovish view on the RBNZ came from the central bank's own forecasts, which called for slowing headline inflation on the back of softer "tradeables" inflation and a sharp cooling of domestic "non-tradeables" inflation through a slowing housing market (Chart 13, bottom two panels). Our own RBNZ Monitor has been calling for the need for higher interest rates in NZ, mostly from the strength in the labor market. Yet we have been ignoring that signal, as has the market which has priced out one full expected RBNZ rate hike since the beginning of the year. With business confidence rolling over, and with the trade-weighted NZ dollar still staying at stubbornly strong levels, the case for the RBNZ to deliver even a single rate hike is not a strong one - especially given the soft inflation forecasts of the central bank. Thus, we are sticking with our tactical spread trades for NZ versus the U.S. and Germany. We are maintaining the currency hedge on the U.S. version of the trade, as we typically do for the vast majority of our cross-country spread trade recommendations. Occasionally, however, we will make an active decision to do a spread trade UN-hedged if we felt very strongly about a currency move. We did that for our NZ-Germany spread trade and this has cost us in the performance of the trade, which is down -3.4%. This is because of a surprisingly large decline in the New Zealand dollar (NZD) versus the euro since the inception of our trade. Yet a review of the technical indicators on the NZD/EUR currency cross shows that the currency pair is now very stretched versus its medium-term trend (the 40-week moving average), with price momentum also at some of the most negative levels of the past decade (Chart 14). These measures suggest that the worst of the downturn in the currency is likely over. The relative positioning on the two individual currencies is now neutral, as long positions on the NZD have been reduced (bottom panel). Chart 13RBNZ Dovishness Is Justified Chart 14Keep NZ/Germany Position Currency Unhedged Given these technical indicators, and from these current levels, we see greater upside potential for NZD/EUR in the months ahead. This leads us to maintain our unhedged currency position on the NZ-Germany spread trade so as not to realize the current mark-to-market losses on the trade. Sweden Pay 18-month Sweden Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate (TAKE PROFITS). We entered into a bearish Swedish rates position back on November 22nd, 2016, paying Sweden 18-month Overnight Index swap rates (Chart 15). At the time, we expected the Riksbank to begin hiking interest rates earlier than what was priced in the markets IF inflation reached the central bank target faster due to a weaker Swedish krona. We also believed that the economy would continue to expand at a robust pace when the economy had no spare capacity, creating additional upside inflation surprises. According to the Riksbank's latest Monetary Policy Statement (MPS), the central bank will likely keep the repo rate at -0.5% until mid-2018, while continuing its asset purchase program until the end of this year - even with an overheating economy. This is because realized inflation has remained below the Riksbank target for a long period of time and, although current inflation is above target, it was not necessary to immediately tighten conditions. More likely, the Riskbank is worried about the potential for the krona to appreciate - especially versus the euro - if rate hikes are delivered. It will only be a matter of time before the central bank is forced to tighten policy with the economy likely to strengthen further, led by solid domestic demand, strong productivity growth, and improving exports. Consumption is also expected to increase as households have scope to cut back their high level of savings. Combining the Riksbank's easing policy with the current strength of the economy and the tightness of the labor market, inflation is very likely to return to the 2% target in the next year or two (Chart 16). Chart 15Close Sweden OIS Trade Chart 16Riksbank More Worried About SEK Than Inflation However, if the Riskbank remains too concerned about the currency versus the euro, as we suspect, then this will prevent any shift to a more hawkish stance before any change from the ECB. That is unlikely to happen over the next year, at least, even if the ECB slows the pace of asset purchases as we expect. Thus, we are closing out our Sweden 18-month Overnight Index Swap position at a small profit of 12bps. We have already kept this trade for longer than the typical investment horizon for one of our tactical overlay trades. We will investigate the potential for more profitable trade opportunities in the Swedish fixed income markets in a future report. Korea Long a 2-year/10-year Korean government bond yield curve steepener (HOLD). We recommended entering into a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the Korean government bond yield curve on May 30th, 2017. Since then, the yield curve has flattened by 7bps, which was mainly caused by an unexpected rise in the 2-year yield, rather than a decline in 10-year yield (Chart 17). Korea is currently enjoying a solid business cycle upturn. Leading economic indicators are rising, the year-over-year growth in exports has risen to a 7-year high and previously sluggish private consumption has also rebounded recently. The Bank of Korea (BoK) is of the view that the recovery will continue and consumer price inflation will stabilize at the target level over the medium-term. This recovery should cause the 2/10 curve to steepen as longer-term inflation expectations rise. Based on South Korean President Moon's aggressive fiscal plans to increase welfare spending and create jobs in the public sector, at a time when the economy is good shape, we still believe that long-end of the curve (10-year) will rise. In addition, as shown in Chart 18, the 26-week rolling beta of changes in the 10-year UST yield and Korean 10-year bond is very high, nearly 1. Given our bearish view on USTs, this implies Korean yields can follow suit. On the other hand, the correlation between the 2-year UST yield and equivalent maturity Korean yields is much lower (4th panel), as Korean rate expectations have not been following those of the U.S. higher - even with a stronger Korean economy. Most likely, this is due to investors downplaying the potential for the BoK to match Fed rate hikes tick-for-tick given the heightened tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. Chart 17Stay In Korea 2yr/10yr##BR##Government Bond Steepener Chart 18Long-Term Korean##BR##Yields Are Too Low We still believe the Korean curve can steepen as longer-term yields rise, although we will be monitoring the behavior of shorter-dated Korean yield as the situation between D.C. and Pyongyang evolves. If investors begin to demand a higher risk premium on Korean assets, particularly the Korean won, then 2-year Korean yields may rise much faster and our curve trade may not go our way. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights High-Yield: High-Yield spreads are 149 bps away from being more expensive than they have ever been. But in the absence of inflation it is difficult to pinpoint a catalyst for sharp spread widening. We expect excess high-yield returns between 2% and 5% (annualized) during the next 6-12 months. EM Sovereigns: There is no compelling valuation argument in favor of hard currency EM Sovereign debt versus U.S. corporate bonds. We will look to shift into EM once the pace of Fed rate hikes starts to slow later in the cycle. Economy & Inflation: Core inflation disappointed expectations in September, but the details of the report showed some silver linings. Inflation looks to be past the worst of its downtrend and should be strong enough during the next two months for the Fed to lift rates in December. Feature Chart 110-Year Treasury Yield Breakdown Just past the three quarter mark of 2017 and stubbornly low inflation remains the story of the year in U.S. bond markets. Quite simply, if inflation rebounds during the next two-and-a-half months, as the Federal Reserve expects, then Treasury yields will move sharply higher and Treasury total returns for 2017 will be close to zero. Otherwise, yields are likely to remain near current levels and 2017 Treasury total returns will approximate carry, in the range of 2.5%. Our valuation framework for the 10-year Treasury yield underscores the importance of inflation for the duration call. The real 10-year Treasury yield (currently 0.43%) is consistent with market expectations for just under two Fed rate hikes during the next 12 months (Chart 1). With the median Fed member calling for 3-4 hikes during that period, the potential remains for somewhat higher real yields in the near-term. But with all but one Fed member forecasting a terminal fed funds rate of 3% or below (1% or below in real terms), the long-run upside in real yields appears limited. On the other hand, the compensation for inflation embedded in 10-year bond yields is still far too low. At 1.85%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is well below the 2.4% to 2.5% range consistent with the Fed hitting its inflation target. This continues to be the case even as our Pipeline Inflation Indicator has accelerated in recent weeks (Chart 1, bottom panel). Bond investors are waiting for inflation to show up in the core CPI and PCE data before liquidating their positions. We retain our below-benchmark duration bias on a 6-12 month horizon on the view that inflation will soon resume its cyclical uptrend. 10-year inflation compensation has 55-65 bps of upside in this scenario, while 10-year real yields will probably stay close to current levels. The outlook for core inflation is discussed in more detail in the Economy & Inflation section below. High-Yield: Just A Carry Trade At this late stage of the credit cycle, low inflation is also the key support for excess returns in both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds. We see limited scope for further spread tightening but think it's likely that the carry trade will continue until inflation turns the corner and long-maturity TIPS breakevens settle into the 2.4% to 2.5% range consistent with the Fed's target.1 In this week's report we explore what this carry trade means for excess high-yield returns, and put those returns into context with what the asset class has typically delivered for bond investors. Table 1 shows historical annual excess returns for the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index since 1995.2 On average High-Yield has returned 3.42% over Treasuries each year, but with significant variation. Most of that variation results from years when the default rate is either rising quickly during a recession or falling fast in the early stages of economic recovery. Since neither of those scenarios is likely during the next 6-12 months we filter out those periods by looking at years when the average index option-adjusted spread (OAS): Widened by more than 100 bps Tightened by more than 100 bps Was range bound between -100 bps and +100 bps The average excess return is 4.9% in years when the spread is confined to a -100 bps to +100 bps range. High-Yield has returned 5.46% in excess of Treasuries so far this year, and the OAS has tightened 61 bps. It is unlikely that junk spreads will tighten by 100 bps or more during the next 12 months. The average index OAS is currently 348 bps, only 115 bps above its all-time low (Chart 2). However, to properly assess current spread levels we also need to consider that the average index duration has declined during the past fifteen years. All else equal, the same spread level is more attractive today because index duration is lower. Table 1Historical Annual High-Yield##br## Excess Returns* (%) Chart 2Junk Spreads Not Far ##br##From All-Time Tights We adjust for index duration by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread.3 At 93 bps, the breakeven spread is currently 40 bps above its all-time low (Chart 2, bottom panel). In other words, at current duration levels, the junk OAS can tighten another 149 bps before the sector is more expensive than it has ever been. Either way, what's clear from Chart 2 is that we should probably not expect much more than 100 bps of further tightening this cycle. Or, put differently, it would definitely make sense to reduce high-yield exposure as we approach all-time expensive valuations. But we can get even more specific about our expectations for high-yield excess returns. Excess junk returns can be approximated using the following formula: Excess return = Starting OAS - Default Losses - Duration*(Change in OAS) The expected return from carry during the next 12 months can be thought of as today's index spread less our expectation for default losses. Capital gains and losses can be approximated using today's index duration and the expected change in spreads. For simplicity we ignore convexity effects. This excess return approximation is shown in the second panel of Chart 3, where the dashed line assumes a base case scenario where default losses fall in line with our expectation and the OAS remains flat. Table 2 shows what 12-month excess returns would be in this base case scenario, as well as in several other scenarios. Chart 3High-Yield ##br##Expected Returns Table 2High-Yield 12-Month Excess ##br##Return* Projections In a base case scenario, where default losses are 1.09% and the OAS is flat, we would expect excess junk returns of 2.39% during the next 12 months. In a more bullish scenario where the OAS tightens by another 100 bps - bringing it to within striking distance of all-time tights - we would expect excess returns of 6.15%. We also consider scenarios where default losses differ from our forecast of 1.09%. For context, that 1.09% forecast is derived from Moody's baseline default rate forecast of 2.26% and our own model-based recovery rate forecast of 51%. For example, in a scenario where default losses are somewhat higher than expected (2%) but where the OAS stays flat, we would expect excess returns of only 1.48%. We should note that 12-month high-yield default losses have never been lower than 0.5%. So we present that optimistic scenario as an upper-bound on potential excess returns to junk. Notice that even in the most optimistic scenario we can envision, default losses reaching all-time lows and spreads contracting to within a hair of all-time tights, expected excess high-yield returns still only reach 6.74%. We would view that as the absolute best case scenario for high-yield. Realistically, default losses will probably fall into a range between 1% and 2% during the next 12 months. Assuming also that spreads come under neither strong upward nor downward pressure, we would expect excess high-yield returns between 2% and 5% (annualized) during the next 6-12 months. Bottom Line: High-Yield spreads are 149 bps away from being more expensive than they have ever been. But in the absence of inflation it is difficult to pinpoint a catalyst for sharp spread widening. We expect excess high-yield returns between 2% and 5% (annualized) during the next 6-12 months. Is Hard Currency EM Debt A Substitute For Junk? Chart 4Favor U.S. Corporates Over EM Sovereigns With relatively feeble expected returns from U.S. high-yield bonds, it's logical to explore whether there are any more attractively valued alternatives in the U.S. bond universe. One potential candidate is the U.S. dollar denominated debt of Emerging Market governments. Unfortunately, valuation in that space does not look much better than in U.S. corporates. In an effort to control for differences in both credit rating and index duration, we compare 12-month breakeven spreads between the Bloomberg Barclays EM USD Sovereign Index and a credit rating matched benchmark consisting of a combination of U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporate bond indexes. We notice that hard currency EM Sovereigns and similarly rated U.S. corporate bonds offer almost exactly the same breakeven spread, and also that EM Sovereigns have been getting comparatively cheaper since early last year (Chart 4). At the moment there is no compelling argument to favor one sector over the other on pure valuation grounds. We therefore also consider the main macro drivers of relative excess returns between EM Sovereigns and U.S. corporates (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). The last two significant periods of EM outperformance coincided with falling U.S. rate hike expectations - as evidenced by our declining fed funds discounter - and a weaker U.S. dollar. With our 24-month fed funds discounter at only 62 bps - meaning the market expects less than three rate hikes during the next 24 months - we think it is likely to move higher from here. This should lead to one more bout of EM cheapening relative to U.S. corporates. At that point, once we are past peak rate hike expectations for the cycle, we will likely get a more attractive entry point to move into EM. Interestingly, an examination of country level spreads also does not identify any clear pockets of cheapness in EM (Chart 5). Mexico and Turkey both offer similar breakeven spreads to equivalently rated U.S. corporates, but our Emerging Markets Strategy service has a dim view of both the Turkish Lira and Mexican peso versus the U.S. dollar.4 The higher-rated EM countries: Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar offer the most attractive relative spreads. But, at least for Qatar, that elevated spread is most likely compensation for a highly volatile currency (Chart 6).5 Chart 5Breakeven Spreads: USD EM Sovereign Vs. U.S. Corporates Chart 6USD EM Sovereign Breakeven Spread Differentials Vs. Exchange Rate Volatility Bottom Line: There is no compelling valuation argument in favor of hard currency EM Sovereign debt versus U.S. corporate bonds. We will look to shift into EM once the pace of Fed rate hikes starts to slow later in the cycle. Economy & Inflation Some Silver Linings In September's CPI The September CPI report was released last week and it disappointed expectations with core CPI rising only 0.13% month-over-month. For context, an environment where inflation is well anchored around the Fed's target would be consistent with core CPI prints of 0.2% every month, roughly 2.4% annualized. However, despite the disappointing month-over-month figure, we continue to see evidence that inflation is past the worst of its recent downtrend. First, while year-over-year core CPI was roughly flat in September, the 3-month rate of change increased for the fourth consecutive month. The year-over-year rate of change tends to converge toward the 3-month rate of change (Chart 7). Second, a look at the underlying components of core CPI shows the following (Chart 8): Chart 7CPI Inflation Chart 8Core CPI Components Shelter inflation fell from 3.30% to 3.24% year-over-year in September. This mild deceleration is consistent with the reading from our model, and will persist going forward (Chart 8, panel 1). Chart 9Wireless No Longer A Drag Core goods inflation also fell in September, but should soon start to rise as the weaker dollar and rising import prices pass through to overall core goods prices (Chart 8, panel 2). Core services inflation, excluding shelter and medical care, increased for the third consecutive month (Chart 8, panel 3). This component of inflation is most sensitive to wage growth, and it is where we would expect most of the inflation to come from going forward. Medical care inflation continues to decelerate sharply (Chart 8, bottom panel), but as we have discussed previously, this mostly reflects a convergence between CPI and PCE inflation.6 The Fed's 2% target refers to PCE inflation. The acceleration in core services inflation (excluding shelter and medical care) is particularly important as it is yet another signal that tight labor markets are starting to pressure wages higher. This is the dynamic that must continue to play out if inflation is to return to the Fed's target, and we would tend to view increases in inflation as more sustainable if they are driven by this component. Additionally, the critical core services inflation (excluding shelter and medical care) component has been depressed in recent months by an incredibly sharp decline in cellular service (aka wireless) inflation (Chart 9). The decline occurred when both Verizon and AT&T unveiled unlimited data plans in the same month, but that drop has since reversed. When we exclude wireless from core services inflation, in addition to shelter and medical care, we see that the resulting series tracks wage growth much more closely in recent months. This underscores our conviction that core services inflation will respond to tightening labor markets and mounting wage pressure going forward. Consumer Sentiment Is Sky High There was one other notable datapoint released last week, and that was the University of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment survey which surged to its highest level since 2004 (Chart 10)! This should lend support to consumer spending (and hence GDP growth) in Q3 and Q4 and is consistent with the message from the New York Fed's GDP tracking estimate which projects GDP growth to average 2.3% in the second half of 2017. This is well above the Fed's 1.8% estimate of trend. Chart 10Consumer Spending & Sentiment With growth coming in solidly above trend, it is unlikely that September's disappointing month-over-month CPI print will be enough to prevent the Fed from lifting rates in December. As long as inflation is flat or higher during the next two months, then another rate hike this year is probably in the cards. Bottom Line: Core inflation disappointed expectations in September, but the details of the report showed some silver linings. Inflation looks to be past the worst of its downtrend and should be strong enough during the next two months for the Fed to lift rates in December. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Excess returns are calculated relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. 3 The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required on a 12-month investment horizon to deliver zero excess returns. For simplicity we ignore convexity effects and calculate the breakeven spread as OAS divided by duration. 4 For Turkey please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Is The Dollar Expensive, And Are EM Currencies Cheap?" dated October 11, 2017. For Mexico please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Questions From The Road", dated September 20, 2017. Both available at ems.bcaresearch.com 5 Both Saudi Arabia and UAE have pegged exchange rates and are not shown in Chart 6. 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Unwind", dated September 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Revisiting the shadow banking system 10 years later. The September CPI data is unlikely to resolve the inflation debate at the Fed. How to invest in a late cycle environment. Wage Inflation was on the rise even before the hurricanes. Feature Chart 1September CPI And Retail Sales Keep##BR##The Fed On Track To Tighten The state of the U.S. business cycle, and what could end it, were key topics of conversation at BCA's semi-annual Research Advisory Board meeting in early October. Most participants agreed with the BCA view that the economy is in the late stages of the economic cycle, and a few suggested that another bubble in the shadow banking sector may end the expansion. With those discussions in mind, we review the state of the shadow banking in the first section of this report and then examine how key aspects of the economy and U.S. asset classes behave while the U.S. economy is in the final stages of an expansion. In the final section, we take another look at wage inflation signals from the hurricane impacted September jobs report, and conclude that wage growth has accelerated even excluding the effect of the storms. The September CPI and retail sales data were also impacted by the storm, but the message is that the underlying economy is strong enough to generate some inflation (Chart 1), although the September CPI is unlikely to resolve the inflation debate at the Fed. The minutes of last month's FOMC meeting (released last week) indicate that the upcoming inflation data could be pivotal to whether the Fed delivers another rate hike in December. There are two more CPI reports ahead of the December FOMC meeting (with the second release coming on the day of the policy announcement). While the September CPI data was hard to interpret due to the storms, the next few data prints need to affirm the Fed's forecast that core inflation is indeed recovering from the "transitory weakness" seen earlier this year. BCA's U.S. bond strategists believe that inflation will be strong enough for the Fed to justify a hike in December and recommend below-benchmark duration for fixed income portfolios. Shadow Banking Update At current levels, shadow banking activity in the U.S. is not a threat to the economic expansion. The ratio of financial sector debt to non-financial sector debt is a rough proxy of how the system can leverage existing debt into new securities and boost credit creation (Chart 2). As financial innovation and deregulation boosted system liquidity, outstanding financial debt as a percentage of non-financial debt climbed from 10% in the mid-1970s to over 50% in 2008. In Q2 2017, the shadow banking proxy stands at only 33%, because the global financial crisis and subsequent reregulation of the financial sector have reigned in excesses. The last time that the ratio was this low was in the late 1990s. Bank lending standards highlight key differences between the backdrop in the mid-2000s and today (Chart 3). In the mid-2000s, even as the Fed had boosted rates by 425 basis points, lending standards were easy and loosening. In contrast, the 100 bps increase in the Fed funds rate since late 2015 was accompanied by a tightening of lending requirements. Moreover, lending criteria were already tight when the Fed began its latest rate hikes. Chart 2The Shrinking Shadow##BR##Banking Sector Chart 3Bank Lending Standards Tighter##BR##Today Than In Mid '00s The Fed and other regulators are more attuned to financial excesses than they were a decade ago. The central bank under Yellen has raised the profile of financial stability.1 BCA views "financial stability" as a third mandate for the central bank, along with low and stable inflation, and full employment. That said, the Fed did not assess financial stability at the September FOMC meeting and the topic was only briefly mentioned by Fed staff and FOMC participants. At the July 2017 meeting, the central bank's staff characterized the "financial vulnerabilities of the U.S. financial system" as moderate on balance. BCA expects that the Fed will return to the topic at either one or both remaining FOMC meetings in 2017. The October 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report2 provided a checklist of liquidity measures to watch as the U.S. economy enters the end of an elongated expansion. In view of these indicators, we would describe liquidity conditions in the U.S. as fairly accommodative, although not nearly as abundant as prior to the Lehman event in 2008. Monetary conditions are super easy, while balance sheet and financial market liquidity are reasonably constructive. In contrast, funding liquidity, while vastly improved since the global financial crisis, is still a long way from the pre-Lehman go-go years (as per indicators such as bank leverage). The Fed is set to begin the process of unwinding the massive amount of monetary liquidity created by its quantitative easing program. This has the potential to undermine other types of liquidity in the financial system, leading to a correction in risk assets. However, the BCA Special Report argues that the reaction of the bond market is more important for risk assets than the balance sheet adjustment itself. If inflation only edges higher and market expectations for the upward path of the Fed funds rate remain gentle, then risk assets should take the balance sheet unwind in stride. An abrupt upward shift in inflation would be an altogether different story. Bottom Line: The U.S. expansion entered a late-cycle environment near the close of 2016 as the unemployment rate dipped below NAIRU. Nonetheless, none of our recession-timing indicators warns that a downtown is imminent3 and the financial excesses in the end stage of the 2001-2007 economic expansion are not present today. If the next recession begins in the second half of 2019, then global equities will probably peak earlier that year or in late 2018. Given the starting point for valuations, U.S. equities may decline by 20% to 30% peak-to-trough. Stay overweight equities for now. The time to trim exposure could come in mid-2018. Late-Cycle Playbook Chart 4Easier Financial Conditions##BR##Will Boost U.S. Growth Easing financial conditions will lead to faster U.S. GDP growth in the next few quarters. Financial conditions have eased sharply this year due to a strengthening stock market, narrower credit spreads and a weaker dollar. Changes in financial conditions lead growth by about 6 to 9 months, implying that U.S. growth could reach 3% early next year (Chart 4). This could drop the unemployment rate to 3.5% by end-2018, more than one point below the Fed's estimate of full employment and even lower than the 2008 low of 3.8%. Rising inflation will compel the Fed to lift rates aggressively next year to cool the economy and push the unemployment rate back above NAIRU. The U.S. has never averted a recession in the post-war era when the unemployment rate has increased by more than one-third of a percentage point. BCA's stance is that the U.S. economy enters the expansion's final stage when the unemployment rate dips below NAIRU. Chart 5 shows that the unemployment rate moved below NAIRU in November 2016. In the past 45 years, the economy has spent an average of 33 months in late-cycle mode ahead of 5 recessions. The exception was 1981-82 when the unemployment rate did not dip below NAIRU ahead of the recession; we treated the separate 1980 and 1981-82 recessions as one episode. Note that several of these late-cycle intervals overlap with recessions (vertical lines on Charts 5, 6 and 7 indicate the start of recessions). Chart 5Late Cycle Performance Of Stocks, Bonds, & Commodities The late-cycle environment favors equities over Treasuries, gold and oil, but other risk assets (small caps, investment-grade and high-yield corporates) underperform (Table 1). The dollar drops by an average of 5% in late cycles and it moved lower in 4 of the 5 previous episodes. Oil is a consistent late-cycle performer, climbing in all the stages in our analysis. The average returns across all assets classes are similar, even excluding the 1973 OPEC oil embargo and the 1987 stock market crash. Nonetheless, asset class returns in the current environment have mostly run counter to history. Table 1Late Cycle Performance Of Stocks, Bonds, & Commodities In typical late-cycle performance, U.S. stocks have outperformed Treasuries since November 2016, the dollar has weakened and oil is up, though by far less than in an average late cycle. However, both investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds have outpaced Treasuries, and small caps have beaten large caps. Moreover, gold prices have dropped. However, the current late-cycle period has been in place for only 10 months, which is more than two years short of the 33-month average of late cycles since 1972 (Table 1). Furthermore, the level of S&P 500 earnings, both trailing and forward, also rise uniformly in late cycles. That said, earnings growth tends to peak about halfway through each cycle, but we note that we have only forward EPS data for three of the five episodes in our analysis. Profit margins take the same course as earnings and earnings growth (Chart 6). The late-cycle climb in wages and labor compensation impacts margins. Additionally, inflation tends to escalate during late cycles (Chart 7). Chart 6S&P 500 Earnings And Margins In Late Cycle Chart 7Inflation And Interest Rates During Late Cycles Bottom Line: The late-cycle environment may persist for another two years or so, favoring stocks over bonds, a weaker dollar and higher oil prices. Although we are overweight both investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, these two asset classes tend to underperform Treasuries as the business cycle fades. We also expect wages and inflation to continue to mount, suggesting that duration should be kept short. The late-cycle pattern is at odds with BCA's view that the dollar will appreciate modestly in the next 12 months. However, the dollar's trajectory depends both on Fed policy and the direction of rates in the economies of the major U.S. trading partners. The Bank of Canada will be lifting rates in the coming quarters, but policy rates will be flat for some time in the Eurozone and Japan, such that interest rate differentials will shift in favor of the dollar on a multi-lateral basis. Another Look At Wage Inflation In last week's report4 we indicated that the September jobs report was difficult to interpret due to the impacts of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Specifically, we stated that the unexpected 0.5% month-over-month gain in average hourly earnings should be discounted. Employment in the low-paying leisure and hospitality sector fell by 111,000 in September, helping to boost the aggregate average hourly wage. These wages will correct lower as these workers return to their jobs post-hurricane recovery. A closer look at the wage data, however, suggests that the acceleration in wage growth in September 2017 to 2.9% from 2.7% in August and a recent low of 1.9% in 2014, has been in place for some time. Admittedly, the 2.9% year-over-year reading on wage inflation, may have overstated labor costs in September. That said, at 56% in August, the percentage of U.S. states where the year-over-year percentage change in average hourly earnings is rising has been on the upswing since mid-2014. The August reading was the highest since 2012 (Chart 8). In Chart 9, we created an "equally-weighted" AHE measure to adjust for shifts in the composition of the labor market, but we found that the recent deceleration is not linked to compositional effects. Since wage growth bottomed out in late 2012, the compositional shifts slightly lowered wage inflation on average, but the growth rates today are roughly the same. Chart 10 updates research by the Kansas City Fed5 that found only a few industries (mostly in the goods-producing sector) account for most of the rise in wages, notably manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade. Financial services, retail, professional and business services, and leisure and hospitality - all service sector industries - were the laggards. The report shows that although earnings growth has fallen behind in service-oriented industries since 2015, hours worked have increased faster than in the goods-producing sector. Chart 856% Of States Have Seen##BR##Higher Wage Inflation Chart 9Compositional Effects Do Not##BR##Explain Recent Wage Weakness Chart 10Acceleration In Hours Worked##BR##Should Lead To Faster Wage Growth Moreover, the August JOLTS data also provides evidence that the labor market began to tighten before the effects of Harvey and Irma. The quit rate matched a 15-year high in August, and job openings were at an all-time high. Job openings in the leisure and hospitality sector were at all-time highs in August, and the quit rate in that storm-impacted industry stood at 4.2% (Chart 11). Even excluding the leisure and hospitality industry from the average hourly earnings data, wage growth has unambiguously climbed in the past 1- and 3- months (Chart 12). Chart 11Overall Job Openings And Quit Rates##BR##Vs. Leisure And Hospitality Chart 12Wage Acceleration Evident Even##BR##Excluding Leisure And Hospitality Bottom Line: Wage inflation was on the upswing even before the hurricanes hit in late August and September. Persistent wage inflation will allow the Fed to raise rates again in December and three or four times next year. This supports BCA's underweight stance on duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate," July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "Liquidity And The Great Balance Sheet Unwind," October 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," October 4, 2017. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Small Cap Surge," October 9, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 "Wage Leaders and Laggards: Decomposing The Growth In Average Hourly Earnings," Willem Van Zandweghe, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, February 15, 2017.

Special Report

Underappreciated Capex Table 1Evolution Of S&P 500 Q3 2017 Estimates Equities moved laterally last week, consolidating recent gains. Loosening fiscal policy coupled with synchronized global growth remain the dominant macro themes. Earnings season got underway and since our early October Q3 EPS analysis, overall forecasts have collapsed further to a mere 4.3% year-over-year growth rate trailing even expected revenue growth (Table 1). Importantly, the financials sector (which we are overweight) is heavily weighing on the overall profit picture and is expected to contract profits by 9% (Table 1). While the insurance sub-sector (which we are underweight) may be behind the bulk of the negative EPS revisions owing to the recent hurricane catastrophes, such extreme pessimism is unwarranted and the bar is set extremely low both for the financials sector and the overall market. While still early in the season, better than expected bank reports are hinting that surprises will be to the upside. If bank cash has already been put to work following the late-June mega buyback announcements, then profits will most certainly overwhelm. Following up from last week's easy fiscal/tight money analysis1, the ongoing capex upcycle (and any assistance from a possible infrastructure bill) is likely to add fuel to the fire and propel equities deeper into overshoot territory. This nascent recovery in capital outlays transforming into a full blown capex upcycle is the key macro theme we see dominating markets in 2018. Investors and pundits alike are dismissing the potential positive thrust from a capital spending upturn that is not only a common late-cycle phenomenon, but also the result of a virtuous EPS cycle. Chart 1 shows that the recent V-shaped recovery in operating EPS should morph into a sizable capex upcycle. Vibrant capex then feeds back into profits, leading to a virtuous cycle. Empirical evidence suggests that a lagged relationship exists between these two variables: since the early 1980s capex growth has typically trailed profit growth by one year. Intuitively, as earnings recover, CEOs have more confidence in the outlook for final demand and choose to deploy longer-term oriented capital. Granted, this also works in reverse: when profits contract, all spending ceases and preservation of cash takes center stage. This is the nature of animal spirits, and currently they are in takeoff mode. National accounts data also confirm the positive correlation between capex2 and corporate non-financial operating earnings3 growth, albeit with a shorter lag. Bear in mind that one key difference between the stock market reported capex data and the national accounts is the energy/basic resource sectors' unusually large slice of the stock market-reported overall capex pie (Chart 2). Chart 1Virtuous Cycle Chart 2Resources Retrenchment Is Over Nevertheless, the message is clear and consistent from both data sets and most importantly from forward looking indicators of cyclical spending: a sustainable capex upcycle is brewing (Chart 3). It would be unprecedented if the current business cycle ended without a visible capex upcycle. The bottom panel of Chart 1 shows that since the 1980s recession, all four recessions were preceded by stock market reported capex soaring to roughly a 20% annual growth rate. At the current juncture, capex is merely on the cusp of entering expansion territory and, if history at least rhymes, a significant capex upcycle is looming. Drilling beneath the surface on sector capex composition is revealing. Chart 4 shows that basic resources (energy, industrials & materials) reported financial statement capex is still contracting. The rest of the eight sectors combined are also experiencing a sizable capex deceleration, signaling a wide-ranging capex slowdown (Charts 5, 6 & 7 break down the top eleven sector capex growth rate). Chart 3Expect A Capex... Chart 4...Recovery... Chart 5... Across... Similar to the recent 2015/16 broad-based EPS contraction phase that was not limited to the three resource related industries but permeated most GICS1 sectors, all segments of the market have been in capex retrenchment mode, suffering the aftermath of the recent profit recession. If our thesis of a virtuous EPS-to-capex cycle takes root in the coming quarters, then a synchronized capex upcycle is in the cards, and higher beta/higher operating leverage deep cyclicals sectors are going to be in the driver's seat (Chart 7). Chart 6... All... Chart 7...Sectors Our October 2nd S&P industrials sector boost to overweight4 shifted our portfolio to a modest cyclical over defensive tilt, and this week's Special Report highlights five key reasons to prefer cyclicals over defensives (please see below). Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives Following last November's Trump election victory euphoria, the S&P cyclicals/defensives ratio has been marking time, oscillating in a tight 5% trading range, and digesting the impressive run up. Factors are now falling into place for a playable breakout in the cyclical/defensive ratio. Five key macro drivers outline our warming up to a cyclical over defensive portfolio tilt: Capital expenditures upcycle Synchronized global growth in general and emerging markets (EM) growth in particular U.S. dollar softness Risk premia suppression Diverging operating metrics Capex Upcycle The capex upcycle, which should take root globally, not just in the U.S. (second panel, Chart 8), will disproportionately benefit capital goods producers versus their defensive brethren. Basic resources manufacturers are extremely capital intensive/high operating leverage businesses that flex their earnings power muscle when capex is on the upswing. In fact, if our thesis of a generalized capex upcycle materializes, then even defensive sector manufacturers will boost spending (Chart 6) and reinforce capital goods producers' top and bottom line growth prospects. Chart 8Capital Expenditures Upcycle... The worst for deep cyclicals-related capex is likely over and as confidence returns, purse strings will loosen and lead to fresh investment decisions in order to satisfy upbeat final demand. Keep in mind that capex is starting from an historically low point for the complex, and there are high odds that the recent tick up in capex will gain traction (Chart 2) as resource companies are now more flush with cash. As a reminder, the most opportune time to buy cyclicals at the expense of defensives is in full expansion mode during a virtuous cycle and not in retrenchment mode. Leading indicators of capital outlays have taken off at full throttle (top panel, Chart 8), and the reviving global credit impulse (courtesy of the Bank for International Settlements) suggests that bankers will continue to extend credit and fulfil loan demand. This credit fuel will likely propel both capex and the relative share price ratio higher (bottom panel, Chart 8) or, at the very least, remove the critical constraint to firms growing their balance sheets. Synchronized Global Growth Synchronized global growth typically boosts global final demand and is also conducive to a coordinated global capex upcycle. The resurgent global manufacturing PMI and buoyancy in most of its subcomponents suggests that cyclicals have the upper hand (fourth panel, Chart 9). Importantly, the IMF's most recent World Economic Outlook upgraded global growth, penciling in 2.1% and 5.3% real GDP growth for the back half of 2018 for advanced and developing economies, respectively. Historically, this growth differential has been positively correlated with relative share prices and the recent IMF upgrade of forward output growth should add impetus to the upswing in the relative share price ratio (top panel, Chart 9). Indeed, emerging markets economies are gaining steam and EM assets reflect recent resiliency: EM stock prices in particular both in local currency and U.S. dollars are at multi year highs painting a bright picture for the cyclical/defensive ratio (third panel, Chart 9). Within the EMs, China remains a key source of uncertainty. The economy has likely passed the point of peak growth momentum, and economic data surprises have recently turned negative. Still, shorter-term measures of money & credit growth have turned positive, and global growth indicators continue to point to a robust external demand (which will, in turn, support Chinese import growth). All told, while China is likely to decelerate from current levels, the slowdown is likely to be benign and will cause the economy to settle into a stable growth range. This is a positive outcome for trades that are sensitive to the potential for a sharp decline in Chinese economic activity, such as cyclicals versus defensives. Soft U.S. Dollar The U.S. dollar has a critical influence on the relative share price ratio. The currency remains in the red year-to-date, on a trade-weighted basis, and cyclical momentum will likely linger in negative territory at least for the remainder of the year given that the greenback peaked in late 2016. This represents a bullish backdrop for cyclical compared with defensive EPS prospects as a lagged currency effect should boost relative profitability (Chart 10). Chart 9...Synchronized Global Growth... Chart 10...The Dollar's Softness... The S&P cyclicals sectors sport, on average, 47% foreign sales exposure, whereas defensives garner a mere 14% of total revenue from abroad according to FactSet.5 The implication is that a depreciating U.S. dollar gooses cyclicals EPS three times more than defensives, ceteris paribus. Our relative export proxy corroborates this profit advantage that cyclicals enjoy at the expense of defensives (third panel, Chart 10). One final way that the U.S. currency depreciation benefits cyclicals is via the commodity channel. In general, commodities are priced in U.S. dollars, thus any drop in the currency is almost immediately mirrored in rising commodity prices and vice versa. In contrast, fluctuating commodity prices represent an input cost for select defensives and commodity inflation tends to eat into profit margins. Our relative pricing power gauges do an excellent job capturing these pricing dynamics and the forward looking ISM manufacturing prices paid sub-index signals additional relative pricing power gains (fourth panel, Chart 10). Low Risk Premia Chart 11...Suppressed Risk Premia... The fall in the greenback has historically been correlated with reviving global real output, "risk on" phases and a decline in risk premia. The opposite is also true. Currently, investor euphoria reigns supreme and the suppression in risk premia across asset classes is flashing green for a cyclical over defensive portfolio tilt. All four major asset volatilities we track have collapsed of late (Chart 11), and there are high odds they will remain depressed as long as coordinated global economic growth chugs along. Financial conditions remain easy both in DM and across most of EM. The St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index6 is also plumbing multi year lows. Similarly, globally, junk bond spreads are narrow and even the level of junk yields is no longer "high yield", especially in the Eurozone. Finally, the Bloomberg calculated soft versus hard data surprise index is at all-time highs and will likely rekindle relative share price momentum. The upshot is that the runway is clear for the cyclical/defensives ratio (Chart 11). Diverging Operating Metrics Turning to operating metrics, cyclicals clearly have the upper hand. The top panel of Chart 12 shows that the overall business sales-to-inventories ratio troughed in early 2016 and reflects a brighter final demand backdrop for cyclicals relative to defensives. This pickup in end demand is conducive to a further widening of relative operating margins, a message corroborated by the multi-year highs in the ISM manufacturing survey (second panel, Chart 12). The most important development exiting the late-2015/early-2016 global manufacturing recession is that deep cyclicals have made major strides in deleveraging balance sheets and significantly improving their liquidity while in massive retrenchment mode (Chart 12). That era is now over and cyclical cost structures are adjusting, albeit slowly, to higher revenue run rates. The commodity price recovery since early 2016 has considerably improved net debt-to-EBITDA and interest coverage for cyclicals versus defensives. Moreover, relative free cash flow growth generation in isolation is also expanding for the first time in three years and should sustain the valuation rerating phase (middle panel, Chart 13). Our relative Cyclical Macro Indicators best encapsulate the shifting macro landscape: the current message is to expect more gains in the relative share price ratio (top panel, Chart 13). Chart 12...Divergent Operating Metrics... Chart 13...And Cyclical Macro Indicators, All Support Cyclicals Over Defensives Risks Most of the indicators we track point to additional gains in relative share prices, however, three risks bear close attention. While relative valuations are slightly on the expensive side and cash flow generation should sustain the cyclical valuation premium, if cyclicals compared with defensives profits disappoint in the coming quarters, then the lack of a valuation cushion is a key risk to our constructive cyclicals over defensives view. Related to this profit mishap risk, any severe Chinese/EM slowdown or global growth scare would put our view offside as relative EPS growth would underwhelm. A spike in the U.S. dollar is the final risk to our thesis. Any surge in the U.S. dollar would short circuit relative performance and a relapse to the 2016 lows could materialize. Either a more hawkish than expected Fed or a destabilizing Chinese currency devaluation (similar to August 11, 2015) can cause tremors in global markets that would reverberate via a soaring greenback. Such an outcome would deal a blow to commodity prices and cyclicals profits and, as a result, cyclicals share prices would bear the brunt of the U.S. dollar's might. Investment Implications Adding it up, the revving capital expenditures upcycle, synchronized global growth in general and firming EM growth in particular, U.S. dollar softness, risk premia suppression and diverging operating metrics all favor cyclicals at the expense of defensives. Bottom Line: Shift to a cyclical over defensive portfolio bent. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?"dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Source: National Income and Product Accounts 3 Source: Financial Accounts of the United States - Z.1 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Earnings Take Center Stage,"dated October 2, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.factset.com/earningsinsight 6 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI

Special Report

Highlights Since the release of our currency hedging report on September 29, 2017,1 we have received an overwhelming positive response from clients around the globe. We thank our clients for their appreciation of our research. Instead of answering client requests individually, we have decided to publish this follow-up report, in which we apply the same methodology to analyze both static and dynamic hedging strategies to hedge a global equity portfolio for the remaining three home currencies (Swiss franc, Swedish krona and Norwegian krone) in our nine-currency global equity universe. For investors based in Switzerland and Sweden, BCA's dynamic hedging framework, based on the proprietary currency indicators from BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy (FES) service,2 has also outperformed all the static hedging strategies on a risk-adjusted basis since 2001. For Norway-based investors, however, BCA's dynamic hedging strategy does not generate consistently superior performance. Using static hedging, we find that the Swiss franc, together with U.S. dollar and Japanese yen, maintain their "safe-heaven currency" status, in the sense that CHF-, JPY- and USD-based investors should fully hedge foreign-currency exposure to minimize risk. However, our proposed dynamic hedging can achieve a better return/risk profile with less than 100% hedging. Over a four-year moving performance cycle (in line with how most portfolio managers are evaluated), BCA's dynamic hedging adds little career risk to portfolio managers in Switzerland and Sweden, compared to the "least regret" 50% static hedging, but the same cannot be said for Norwegian PMs. We recommend global equity investors based in the U.S., U.K., euro area, Japan, Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Sweden to use the BCA dynamic hedging framework to manage their foreign currency exposure. For Norwegian investors, we suggest "the least regret" 50% static hedging. Feature Dynamic Hedging Vs. Static Hedging We apply the same methodology as described in the previously published Special Report 3 to hedge an identical global equity portfolio into CHF, SEK and NOK using static and dynamic hedging strategies. As shown in Chart I-1, BCA's dynamic hedging strategy, based on the proprietary Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM)4 indicators from the Foreign Exchange Strategy service, outperforms all static hedging strategies on a risk-adjusted basis for the CHF and SEK portfolios, in line with our findings for the other six home currencies. However, the same is not true for the NOK portfolio. Chart I-1Identical Investment, But Different Risk/Return Profiles The Swiss Perspective: On a static-hedging basis, the Swiss franc holds its "reserve currency" status as classified by Campbell et al,5 in the sense that risk-minimizing Swiss-based investors should fully hedge foreign currency exposure. Unlike the other two "safe-haven" home currencies, the USD and JPY, for which a higher hedge ratio results in lower risk and lower return in both the 16-year period from 2001 and the 41-year period form 1976, the CHF-based portfolio has achieved higher return/lower risk in the 16-year period from 2001 as the hedge ratio increases. The ITTM-based dynamic hedging outperforms the best static hedging (100%) in the shorter period, but the simple momentum-based dynamic hedging is inferior to the best static hedging (90%) in the longer period (Chart I-1, top two graphs and Tables II-1 and II-2). Chart I-2Little Career Risk For Swiss ##br##And Swedish Portfolio Managers The Swedish Perspective: On a static-hedging basis, the SEK-based portfolio behaves in a similar way to the euro-based portfolio in both the shorter and longer periods. In the shorter period from 2001, a higher hedge ratio results in higher returns, albeit gradually, but risk decreases until the hedge ratio hits 30% and then starts to increase such that the full hedge has the highest risk. In the longer period from 1976, a higher hedge ratio results in a lower return, while risk decreases until the hedge ratio hits 70% and then starts to rise, such that the unhedged portfolio has the highest risk and the fully hedged portfolio has the lowest return. On a risk-adjusted basis, the best static hedge ratio is 50% for both the shorter and longer periods. Both the ITTM-based dynamic hedging and the momentum-based dynamic hedging are superior to the best static hedge ratio of 50% (Chart I-1, middle 2 graphs and Table II-3 and II-4). The Norwegian Perspective: On a static-hedging basis, the NOK-based portfolio behaves like the GBP-based portfolio in the longer period from 1976, with return increasing and risk decreasing as hedge ratio increases, but it behaves like the euro- and SEK-based portfolios in the shorter period from 2001. On a risk-adjusted return basis, both the ITTM-based and momentum-based dynamic hedging strategies underperformed the best static hedge which is about 80% hedged (Chart I-1, bottom 2 graphs and Tables II-5 and II-6). Little Career Risk for Swiss and Swedish Portfolio Managers: As shown in Chart I-2, on a rolling four-year basis, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy has outperformed the best static hedging strategy for CHF portfolio (which is 100%) and the best static hedging strategy for SEK portfolio (which is 50%). For the NOK portfolio, however, neither the ITTM-based dynamic strategy, nor the "best static hedging" strategy (which is 80%) can consistently outperform the "least regret" 50% hedging strategy. Equal Playing Field: In theory, if hedges were effective, then an identical global investment should have similar returns for all investors, no matter which home currency they hold. While neither the static hedging strategies nor the momentum-based dynamic hedging approach pass this criteria, BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedging approach has indeed achieved this: it levels out the playing-field for all investors globally. As shown in Chart I-3, in the period from March 2001 to August 2017, if left unhedged, the same global investment exhibits very different annualized returns for investors in different home currencies, with CHF investors at the low end at around 2.8%, and GBP investors at the high end at around 7%. With BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedge, however, returns for all investors are similar, no matter which currency is their home currency. Chart I-3BCA Dynamic Hedging Strategy Levels Out The Playing Field Bottom Line: We have back-tested the efficacy of BCA's proprietary currency indicators from the Foreign Exchange Strategy team's Intermediate-Term Timing Models to dynamically hedge a global investment portfolio into nine different home currencies. These indicators have proven to add significant value to eight out of the nine home currencies. Granted, back-tests show good results by default. But our FES team will strive to ensure that these indicators continue to work well going forward. We recommend global equity investors based in the U.S., U.K., euro area, Japan, Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Sweden to use BCA's ITTM currency indicator-based dynamic hedging framework to manage their foreign currency exposure. For Norway-based global equity investors, we suggest the "least regret" 50% static hedging. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1: Dynamic Hedging For Three Home Currencies 1.1 The Swiss Perspective Correlations: For Swiss investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have generally been positively correlated with foreign equities and domestic equities (Chart II-1). In addition, the Swiss franc has strengthened over time, especially after 1999. This explains why, on a static basis, the fully hedged portfolio generates the best risk/return profile. (Table II-1 and Table II-2). Chart II-1Swiss Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Table II-1Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In CHF (2001-2017) Table II-2Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In CHF (1976-2017) Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in CHF. The risk is slightly higher than the best static hedging (which is 100%), but the return is over 200 bps higher, resulting in a 40% increase in the risk-adjusted return (Table II-1). In addition, this is achieved with far fewer hedging transactions than the fully hedged strategy as shown in Chart II-2 panel 2. Over the longer period from 1976, the optimal static hedge ratio is about 90%, almost fully hedged as well, as shown in Table II-2. Chart II-2Swiss Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging On a 60-month rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-2, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Current State: Currently our indicators show that Swiss investors should not hedge any foreign currency. Chart II-3 shows how the Swiss investors should have hedged their exposure in U.S. dollar. Chart II-3Swiss Perspective: MSCI U.S. Index Dynamically Hedged 1.2 The Swedish Perspective Correlations: For Swedish investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have little correlation with domestic equities as the average correlation from 1980 is almost 0. This overall average can be misleading, however, as evidenced by the rolling 60-month correlation, which was positive before 1998 and then was negative until recently, and is now in the positive territory again (Chart II-4). This is a typical case where dynamic hedging would outperform static hedging, because the latter assumes constant mean and covariance for the chosen time period (Tables II-3 and II-4) Chart II-4Swedish Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Table II-3Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In SEK (2001-2017) Table II-4Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In SEK (1976-2017) Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return in SEK for a global portfolio. The risk profile looks similar to that of the 50% hedged portfolio, but return is much higher, resulting in a 35% increase in the risk-adjusted return (Table II-3). Over the longer period, the optimal static hedge ratio is also 50%, as shown in Table II-4. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-5, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Chart II-5Swedish Perspective: Dynamics Vs. Static Hedging Current State: Currently Sweden-based investors should be hedging only their exposure in Norwegian krona. Chart II-6 shows how the Swedish investors should have hedged their exposure in Canadian dollar. Chart II-6Swedish Perspective: MSCI Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged 1.3 The Norwegian Perspective Correlations: For Norway-based investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have a slightly negative correlation with domestic equities as the average correlation from 1980 is -0.12. This overall average can be misleading, however, as evidenced by the rolling 60-month correlation, which was above this long-run average before the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), but has been in negative territory ever since. On the other hand, the correlations between foreign currencies and foreign equities, and between foreign equities and domestic equities, have also gone though some regime changes (Chart II-7). Chart II-7Norwegian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced 7% lower risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in NOK compared to the best static hedging strategy of 80% (Tables II-5). In the longer period from 1976, the momentum-based dynamic also underperformed the 80% static hedging strategy by 3% on a risk-adjusted return basis (Tables II-6). Table II-5Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In NOK (2001-2017) Table II-6Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In NOK (1976-2017) On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-8, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also looks less attractive. Chart II-8Norwegian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Why does dynamic hedging not work? We do not have a good understanding on this yet. Looking at the individual currency pairs, we notice that our indicators work very well for CAD/NOK, SEK/NOK and JPY/NOK, but not for other pairs, especially during the period between 2011 and 2016 when NOK was strong against most of these currencies. Chart II-9 and Chart II-10 show how JPY/NOK and USD/NOK should have been hedged based on our indicators. The former worked very well, while the latter failed terribly in the period between 2013 and 2016. Chart II-9Norwegian Perspective: MSCI Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Chart II-10Norwegian Perspective: MSCI U.S. Index Dynamically Hedged 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation and Foreign Exchange Strategy joint Special Report "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Gide For Global Equity Investors," dated September 29, 2017. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "In Search Of A Timing Model", dated June 22, 2016 3 Please see Global Asset Allocation and Foreign Exchange Strategy joint Special Report "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Gide For Global Equity Investors," dated September 29, 2017. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "In Search of A Timing Model", dated June 22, 2016 5 Campbell, J., K. de Medeiros and L. Viceira, 2010, "Global Currency Hedging," Journal of Finance LXV, 87-122