Special Report
Highlights Investment Grade: Investors should overweight investment grade corporate bonds relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities, with a particular focus on bonds that are eligible for the Fed’s purchase programs. High-Yield: Caution is still warranted in the high-yield market. At current levels, spreads do not adequately compensate investors for the coming default cycle. We would recommend buying high-yield if the average index spread rises to a range of 1075 bps – 1290 bps. Fed Purchases: Fed corporate bond purchases will cause investment grade spreads to tighten, particularly out to the 5-year maturity point. However, the program won’t stop the coming onslaught of ratings downgrades. High-Yield Sectors: The Energy, Transportation, Capital Goods, Consumer Cyclical and Consumer Noncyclical sectors are all highly exposed to the looming default cycle. Financials and Utilities look like the best places to hide out. Feature Chart 1Will The Fed's Corporate QE Mark The Top In Spreads? The COVID pandemic and associated recession have already caused turmoil in financial markets and prompted a policy response from the Federal Reserve that is unprecedented in its aggressiveness. US investment grade and high-yield corporate spreads widened 280 bps and 764 bps, respectively, to start the year. Then, they tightened by 78 bps and 179 bps, respectively, after the Fed announced it is stepping into the corporate bond market for the first time (Chart 1). Clearly, this is a challenging time for corporate bond investors. But sifting through all the noise, we think there are three key questions to stay focused on: How will the Federal Reserve’s support for the corporate bond market impact spreads? At what level do spreads fully discount the looming default cycle? What sectors within the corporate bond market are most/least at risk of experiencing large-scale defaults? What Can The Fed Hope To Accomplish By Buying Corporate Debt? As part of its package of monetary policy stimulus measures to combat the US COVID-19 recession, the Fed has undertaken a dramatic new step to try and lower borrowing costs for US businesses – the outright buying of US investment grade corporate bonds. The main details of these new programs are as follows: The Fed will purchase investment grade corporate bonds, loans and related exchange-traded funds (ETFs) as part of these programs. Bonds can be purchased in the primary (newly-issued) and secondary markets. The purchases will not be held on the Fed’s balance sheet. Instead, two off-balance sheet Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), one for primary market purchases and one for secondary market purchases, will buy the bonds. Both SPVs are initially funded by the US Treasury and will be levered up via loans from the Fed. The primary market SPV will buy newly-issued bonds with credit ratings as low as BBB- and maturities of four years or less. Eligible issuers are US businesses with material operations in the United States; that list of companies may be expanded in the future. Eligible issuers do not include companies that are expected to receive direct financial assistance from the US government (i.e. no buying of bonds from companies getting bailout funds). The secondary market SPV will buy bonds with maturities of up to five years and credit ratings as low as BBB-, with a buying limit of 10% of the entire stock of eligible debt of any single company. This secondary market SPV will also buy investment grade bond ETFs, up to 20% of the outstanding shares of any single ETF. Through the primary market facility, any eligible company can “borrow” from the Fed, through bond purchases or direct loans, an amount greater than its maximum outstanding debt (bonds plus loans) on any day over the past twelve months. Specifically: 140% of all debt for AAA-rated issuers, 130% for AA-rated issuers, 120% for A-rated issuers and 110% for BBB-rated issuers. Since those percentages are all greater than 100, this effectively means that the Fed will allow eligible companies to potentially roll over their entire stocks of debt through this program, plus some net new borrowing. With the primary market facility, issuers can even defer interest payments on the funds borrowed from the Fed for up to six months, with the interest payments added to the final repayment amount (any company choosing this option cannot do share buybacks or make dividend payments). These programs are set to run until September 30 of this year, with an option to extend as needed. The Fed’s new initiatives represent a new step for the central bank, providing direct lending to any company that needs it. The Fed had to do this through off-balance-sheet SPVs, since direct buying of corporates is not permitted under the Federal Reserve Act. With this structure, it is technically the US Treasury department that bears the initial credit risk through its seed funding of each SPV. The BoJ was the first of the major central banks to start buying corporate bonds. This structure is different than the recent corporate bond QE programs of the European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of England (BoE) and Bank of Japan (BoJ), where the credit risk was directly taken onto the central bank balance sheets. But from an investment perspective, the difference in structure between the Fed’s corporate bond buying program and that of other central banks is nothing more than a technicality. It is still worthwhile to see if any lessons can be learned from these other countries. The Corporate Bond Buying Experience Of Other Central Banks The BoJ was the first of the major central banks to start buying corporate bonds, in a program that began in February 2009 and continued until October 2012. The program initially involved only the purchase of very high-quality corporate debt (rated A or higher) and only for maturities up to one year. The pool of eligible bonds was later increased to allow for lower credit quality (rated BBB or higher) and longer maturities (up to three years). The BoJ ended up buying a total of 3.2 trillion yen (US$30 billion) of bonds during that program, representing nearly 50% of total Japanese investment grade nonfinancial debt (Chart 2). Credit spreads tightened modestly over the life of the program, particularly for the shorter maturity debt that the BoJ was directly buying.1 Research from the BoJ concluded that the corporate bond buying did improve liquidity for the bonds that were eligible for the program, although there was no discernable pickup in overall Japanese corporate bond issuance.2 The BoE started its Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS) in August 2016, as part of a package of stimulus measures to cushion the economic blow from the UK’s stunning vote to leave the European Union. The CBPS bought £10bn of UK nonfinancial investment grade corporate bonds over a period of 18 months, with ratings as low as BBB-. This was a relatively modest share of all eligible nonfinancial bonds (4.7%), but UK credit spreads did tighten over the life of the program (Chart 3). The BoE’s own research has determined that the spread tightening was due to lower downgrade/default risk premiums, and that the program triggered a surge in investment grade issuance in the weeks and months following its launch.3 Chart 2The BoJ's Corporate Bond Buying Experience Chart 3The BoE's Corporate Bond Buying Experience The ECB announced its Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP) in March 2016, with the actual bond purchases beginning three months later. This was an expansion of the ECB’s overall Asset Purchase Program that had previously been focused on government debt. Like the BoJ and BoE programs, only nonfinancial debt of domestic euro area companies rated BBB- or higher was eligible. The ECB did buy bonds across a wide maturity spectrum of 1-30 years. The ECB’s purchases in the first 18 months of the CSPP were sizeable, between €60-80bn per month, reaching a cumulative total of nearly 20% of the stock of eligible bonds (Chart 4). This not only drove credit spreads tighter for bonds in the CSPP, but also pushed spreads lower for bonds that were not directly purchased by the ECB, like bank debt. The ECB described this as evidence of a strong “portfolio balance effect”, where investors who sold their bonds to the central bank ended up redeploying the proceeds into other parts of the euro area corporate bond market.4 One major difference between the ECB CSPP and the BoJ and BoE programs was that the ECB could conduct the necessary purchases in the primary market, if necessary. This represented a major new source of funding for smaller euro area companies that did not previously issue corporate bonds, preferring to get most of their debt financing through bank loans. As evidence of this, the year-over-year growth rate of euro area corporate bond issuance soared from 2.5% to 10% in the first year of the CSPP (Chart 5). Chart 4The ECB's Corporate Bond ##br##Buying Experience Chart 5ECB Primary Market Buying Spurred A Boom In Issuance Investment Conclusions Applying these lessons to the US, the first conclusion we reach is that Fed corporate bond purchases will tighten spreads for eligible securities. In this case, eligible securities include all investment grade rated US corporate bonds with maturities less than five years. In effect, the Fed’s primary market facility could be thought of as adding an agency backing to these eligible bonds since the Fed has effectively guaranteed that this debt can be rolled over and that bond investors will be made whole. It’s noteworthy that last week saw a record amount of new investment grade corporate bond issuance as firms rushed to take advantage of the program. Second, we should see some positive knock-on effects on spreads of ineligible investment grade securities, i.e. investment grade corporate bonds with maturities greater than five years. The impact will not be as large as for eligible securities, but since many of the same issuers operate at both ends of the curve, long-maturity spreads will benefit at the margin from any reduction in interest expense for the issuer. Third, any trickle-down effects to high-yield spreads will be much smaller. No high-yield issuers can benefit from the program, and while the Fed could eventually open up its facilities to include high-yield debt, we wouldn’t count on it. We suspect the moral hazard of “bailing out the junk bond market” would simply be a step too far for the Federal Reserve. We should see some positive knock-on effects on spreads of ineligible securities. In sum, we would advocate an overweight allocation to US investment grade corporate bonds today – especially on securities eligible for the Fed’s programs. We do not recommend a similar overweight stance on US high-yield, where spreads will continue to fluctuate based on the fundamental default outlook (see section titled “Assessing The Value In High-Yield” below). Can The Fed Re-Steepen US Credit Spread Curves And Prevent Ratings Downgrades? Prior to the Fed’s announcement of the new programs, the US investment grade corporate spread curve had become inverted, with shorter maturity spreads exceeding longer maturity ones. This has historically been a harbinger of increased investment grade downgrades and high-yield defaults (Chart 6). With the Fed’s new programs focusing on bonds with maturities of up to five years, the Fed’s buying can potentially lead to a re-steepening of the investment grade spread curve by driving down shorter maturity spreads. Chart 6Inverted US Credit Spread Curves Are Flashing An Ominous Message Already, the investment grade spread curve has begun to disinvert in the first week of the Fed’s programs (Chart 7). At the same time, the bond rating agencies are moving aggressively to adjust credit opinions in light of the US recession. Already, downgrades from Moody’s and S&P are outpacing upgrades by a 3-1 ratio year-to-date – a pace not seen since the depths of the financial crisis, according to Bloomberg.5 Chart 7The Fed's New Programs Are Already Helping Disinvert Investment Grade Spread Curves The Fed’s actions should be successful at re-steepening the investment grade credit curve. However, we doubt that they will have much impact on ratings decisions. While the Fed can reduce borrowing costs and prevent default by rolling over maturing debt for investment grade issuers, this has a relatively minor impact on corporate balance sheet health. In fact, the Fed's programs will only improve balance sheet health for firms that just roll over existing debt loads and don’t take on any new debt. Any firm that takes on new debt during this period will come out of the crisis with more leverage than when it entered. All else equal, that should warrant a downgrade. Bottom Line: Fed corporate bond purchases will cause investment grade spreads to tighten, particularly out to the 5-year maturity point. However, the program won’t stop the coming onslaught of ratings downgrades. Assessing The Value In High-Yield What Kind Of Default Cycle Is Already “In The Price”? High-yield debt may not benefit from the Fed’s corporate bond-buying programs. But, as in every other cycle, there will come a time when spreads discount the full extent of future default losses. At that point it will be appropriate to increase allocations to the sector. Our Default-Adjusted Spread will guide us as we make that determination. Our Default-Adjusted Spread is the excess spread available in the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index after subtracting realized default losses. Specifically, we calculate the Default-Adjusted Spread as: Index OAS – [Default Rate x (1 – Recovery Rate)] The default and recovery rates apply to the 12-month period that follows the index spread reading. For example, the Default-Adjusted Spread for January 2019 uses the index OAS from January 2019 and default losses incurred between February 2019 and January 2020. Table 1 shows that there is a strong link between the Default-Adjusted Spread and excess High-Yield returns relative to duration-matched Treasuries. Specifically, we see that losses are a near certainty if the Default-Adjusted Spread is negative and that return prospects are poor for spreads below 150 bps. A Default-Adjusted Spread above its historical average of 250 bps is an obvious buying opportunity, while a spread above 400 bps virtually guarantees strong returns. Table 1The Default-Adjusted Spread & High-Yield Excess Returns This helps clarify the task at hand. We must make an assumption about what the default and recovery rates will be for the next 12 months, then apply those assumptions to the current index spread. The resulting Default-Adjusted Spread will tell us if High-Yield bonds are worth a look. Table 2 shows the Default-Adjusted Spread that results from different combinations of default and recovery rates.6 For example, a 10% default rate and 35% recovery rate together imply a Default-Adjusted Spread of 271 bps, suggesting an attractive buying opportunity. Table 2Default-Adjusted Spread (BPs) Given Different Assumptions For Default And Recovery Rates What Sort Of Default Cycle Should We Expect? To answer this question we turn to Table 3. Table 3 lists periods since the mid-1980s when the default rate rose above 4%, along with several factors that influence the level of default losses: The magnitude of the economic downturn, proxied by the worst year-over-year real GDP growth reading recorded during that timeframe. The duration of the economic downturn, measured as the number of quarters from the peak to trough in real GDP. Nonfinancial corporate leverage – measured as total debt divided by book value of equity – at the cycle peak. Table 3A Brief History Of Default Cycles Alongside these determining factors, the table also shows the peak 12-month default rate seen during the cycle and the recovery rate that occurred alongside it. First, we notice a strong relationship between the magnitude of the economic shock and the peak default rate. Meanwhile, corporate leverage does a better job explaining the recovery rate. Notice that recoveries were greater in 2008 than in 2001, despite 2008’s larger economic shock. Turning to the current situation, our base case assumption is that we will see severe economic contraction in Q1 and Q2 of this year followed by some recovery in the third and fourth quarters. All told, 2020 annual GDP growth could be close to the -3.9% seen in 2008, though the duration of the peak-to-trough economic shock will be only two quarters instead of six.7 Based on the historical comparables listed in Table 3, this sort of economic shock could generate a peak default rate somewhere between 11% and 13%. As for recoveries, nonfinancial corporate leverage is currently higher than during any of the prior episodes in our study. It follows that the recovery rate will be very low, perhaps on the order of 20%-25%. Turning back to Table 2, we see that our default and recovery rate assumptions imply a Default-Adjusted Spread somewhere between -119 bps and +96 bps. This is too low to be considered a buying opportunity. A Default-Adjusted Spread above its historical average of 250 bps is an obvious buying opportunity, while a spread above 400 bps virtually guarantees strong returns. Table 4 flips this analysis around and shows the option-adjusted-spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index that would generate a Default-Adjusted Spread of 250 bps based on different assumptions for the default and recovery rates. Recall that we consider a Default-Adjusted Spread of 250 bps or above as a buying opportunity. Using the aforementioned default and recovery rate assumptions, we would see a buying opportunity in high-yield if the average index spread rose to a range of 1075 bps – 1290 bps, or above. As of Friday’s close, the index option-adjusted spread was 921 bps. Table 4High-Yield Index Spread (BPs) That Would Imply A Buying Opportunity* In Different Default Loss Scenarios Bottom Line: High-yield spreads do not discount the full extent of the looming default cycle and will not benefit from the Fed’s asset purchase programs. Investors should stay cautious on high-yield for now and look to increase allocations when the average index spread moves into a range of 1075 bps to 1290 bps. Which High-Yield Sectors Are Most Exposed? Even during a period of large-scale defaults, sector and firm selection are vital in the high-yield bond market. In fact, you could argue that sector selection becomes even more important during a default cycle, as some sectors bear the brunt of default losses while others skate through relatively unscathed. To wit, Chart 8plots the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate alongside a diffusion index that shows the percentage of 30 high-yield industry groups – as defined by Moody’s Investors Service – that have a trailing 12-month default rate above 4%. Even at the peaks of the default cycles during the last two recessions, only 47% and 63% of industry groups experienced significant default waves. Chart 8Sector Selection Is Vital In A Default Cycle To help identify which sectors are most at risk during the current default cycle, we consider how the 10 main high-yield industry groups, as defined by Bloomberg Barclays, stack up on three crucial credit metrics: The share of firms rated Caa Growth in par value of debt outstanding since the last recession Change in the median firm’s net debt-to-EBITDA ratio since the last recession8 Charts A1-A10 in the Appendix show how the three credit metrics for each industry group have evolved over time. In the remainder of this report we compare the sectors against each other across each of the above three dimensions. Note that Box 1 provides a legend for the sector name abbreviations used in Charts 9, 10 and 11. Box 1Sector Abbreviations Chart 9OAS Versus Share Of Caa-Rated Debt Chart 10OAS Versus Debt Growth Chart 11OAS Versus Net Debt-To-EBITDA Share Of Caa-Rated Debt Even during a large default cycle the bulk of default losses will be borne by firms rated Caa and below. In Chart 9, we see that if we ignore the outlying Technology, Transportation and Energy sectors, there is a fairly linear relationship between credit spreads and the share of firms rated Caa in each sector. Transportation and Energy currently trade at very wide spreads because those sectors’ revenues are heavily impacted by the current crisis. Technology spreads remain low because, despite the high percentage of Caa-rated debt, the sector has one of the lower net debt-to-EBITDA ratios (see Chart A6). All in all, Chart 9 suggests that Capital Goods, Communications, Consumer Cyclicals and Consumer Noncyclicals all carry a large proportion of low-rated debt. In contrast, Financials and Utilities appear much safer. Debt Growth Another good way to assess which sectors are most likely to experience defaults is to look at which sectors added the most debt during the economic recovery (Chart 10). On that note, the rapid levering-up of the Energy sector clearly sticks out. Beyond that, Capital Goods, Consumer Noncyclicals and Technology also added significant amounts of debt during the recovery. In contrast, the Utilities sector actually reduced its debt load. Change In Net Debt-to-EBITDA Finally, it’s important to note that simply adding debt does not necessarily put a sector at greater risk of default if earnings are rising even more quickly. For this reason we also look at recent trends in net debt-to-EBITDA (Chart 11). Here, we see that wide spreads in Energy and Transportation are justified by large increases in net debt-to-EBITDA. Conversely, Financials and Communications have seen improvement. Bottom Line: Based on a survey of three important credit metrics: The Energy, Transportation, Capital Goods, Consumer Cyclical and Consumer Noncyclical sectors are all highly exposed to the looming default cycle. In contrast, Financials and Utilities look like the best places to hide out. Appendix Chart A1Basic Industry Credit Metrics Chart A2Capital Goods Credit Metrics Chart A3Consumer Cyclical Credit Metrics Chart A4Consumer Non-Cyclical Credit Metrics Chart A5Energy Credit Metrics Chart A6Technology Credit Metrics Chart A7Transportation Credit Metrics Chart A8Communications Credit Metrics Chart A9Utilities Credit Metrics Chart A10Financial Institutions Credit Metrics Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan created a lot of short-term credit spread volatility, but even then, shorter-maturity bonds saw less spread widening than the overall index. 2 https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/18-E-04.pdf 3 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2017/q3/corporate-bond-purchase-scheme-design-operation-and-impact 4 The ECB described this effect in a 2018 report that can be accessed here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb/ebart201803_02.en.pdf 5 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-26/s-p-moody-s-cut-credit-grades-at-fastest-pace-since-2008-crisis 6 Calculations are based on the index spread as of market close on Friday March 27. 7 For more details on BCA’s assessment of the economic outlook please see Global Investment Strategy Second Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook, “World War V”, dated March 27, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 8 Median net debt-to-EBITDA is calculated from our bottom-up sample of high-yield firms that consists of all the firms in the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index for which data are available. Data are retrieved on a quarterly basis and the sample is adjusted once per year based on changes in the composition of the Barclays indexes. As of Q2 2019, this sample includes 354 companies.
