Developed Countries

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Buybacks are down but not out. While financials have been weighing heavily on the S&P buybacks index, we would not write off the artificial engineering of higher EPS via equity retirement, especially in a world of ZIRP likely for the next five-to-seven years. COVID-19 has permanently scarred demand while non-residential construction is elevated. This combination will deflate commercial real estate (CRE) prices further, which risks unraveling a CRE debt deflation spiral. Continue to avoid the S&P real estate sector. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities sunk late last week, as diminishing chances of fiscal easing coupled with news that the POTUS and the First Lady tested positive for COVID-19 more than offset buyers taking advantage of oversold conditions. Our sense is that the SPX will bounce around key moving averages during October (Chart 1), until the election outcome breaks the stalemate. In the back half of the month, banks also kick-start Q3 earnings season, which is important because banks’ wellbeing rests on a fresh stimulus bill. Peering over at the bond market is instructive in order to try to make sense of these crosscurrents. Two weeks ago, we first highlighted that the corporate bond market was waving a yellow flag. The selloff in the LQD ETF will continue to weigh on equities (top panel, Chart 2) and corroborates our view that the Fed is now a bystander, which puts added pressure on fiscal authorities to act. It is not a coincidence that the Fed’s balance sheet impulse peaked first and soon thereafter so did the LQD. Chart 1Trapped Between Moving Averages Worrisomely, the total return stock-to-bond ratio failed to break out to fresh all-time highs and has likely formed a head and shoulders pattern. The implication is that stocks are not out of the woods yet (bottom panel, Chart 2). Chart 2Bond Market… Junk spreads are also firing a warning shot. The high-yield option-adjusted spread (OAS) was in a tight range between 2017 and 2019. Then spreads exploded higher because of the pandemic. However, unlike the SPX making new all-time highs, junk spreads failed to make new all-time lows and more importantly have not settled back down to the 2017-2019 range (middle panel, Chart 3). The VIX index is following a similar pattern to the high-yield OAS, which is quite unnerving for equity bulls. Put differently, still elevated VIX futures in the 30s warn that in the near-term more turbulence lies ahead for the SPX (bottom panel, Chart 3). As a reminder, we first recommended buying the December VIX futures on July 27 in a joined Special Report with our sister Geopolitical Strategy service, and we continue to recommend such a hedge to long equity exposure. Chart 3…And VIX Signal Trouble For Stocks Bye-Bye Buybacks? According to the flow of funds data, a large dichotomy has taken shape between corporate debt issuance and net equity retirement. Up to very recently, the two moved in tandem. But now, the pandemic has caused a knee jerk reaction in non-financial corporate businesses that are tapping their credit lines and issuing debt at a breakneck pace. Worryingly, very little of these funds are used for equity retirement, which is a big break from recent past behavior (Chart 4). Not only does the Fed’s flow of funds data signal that buybacks have nearly ground to a halt, but also Standard and Poor’s data show that SPX buybacks collapsed to $88bn in Q2, from roughly $200bn in Q1. Crudely put, SPX buybacks have fallen by a whopping 67% quarter-over-quarter. Such a corporate buyer’s strike is negative for the near-term prospects of the S&P 500 (top panel, Chart 5). Chart 4Unsustainable Dichotomy Chart 5Buybacks Are Down… True, buybacks have come under intense scrutiny especially for bailed out sectors of the economy, nevertheless, the V-shaped economic recovery all but guarantees a rebound in depressed share buybacks sometime in 2021 (Chart 6). While our conservative $125/quarter buyback estimate proved overly optimistic in Q2, we maintain such an estimate for the next year (which it is the past decade’s average). On a cyclical 9-12 month horizon we have high conviction that SPX profits will return close to trend EPS of $162, and recovering CEO confidence should pave the way for a resumption of shareholder friendly activities, including equity retirement (middle panel, Chart 6). Drilling deeper beneath the surface is revealing. When we disaggregate the headline buybacks number into GICS1 sectors, we observe that once again the tech titans (comprising the S&P technology and the S&P communication services indexes) are doing all the heavy lifting accounting for 70% of the overall number (Chart 7). Q2 was the first time in recent memory where tech accounts for more buybacks that all the other sectors put together (bottom panel, Chart 5)! Chart 6But Not Out Chart 7GICS1 Sector Buyback Breakdown: Q1 & Q2 Chart 8 shows the ebbs and flows of sectoral SPX buybacks since late-2006. In order for our estimate to prove accurate in 2021, the Fed will have to allow financials to resume their buybacks, which collapsed from over $45bn in Q1 to just above $5bn in Q2 (Chart 7). Chart 8GICS1 Sector Buyback Breakdown: An Historical Perspective With regard to investable buyback indexes, financials dominate both the S&P 500 buyback index (Chart 9) and the NASDAQ US buyback achievers index. However, if the Fed does not relent and sustains a tight noose around banks’ shareholder friendly activities next year, then this index composition will change significantly in the 2021 rebalancing. While financials have been weighing heavily on the S&P 500 buyback index, its equal weighting methodology also partially explains why it has trailed the market cap weighted SPX by roughly 20% year-to-date (YTD). Nevertheless, in the long-haul buyback achievers come out on top. In fact, the S&P 500 buyback index has more than doubled the SPX’s return since the turn of the century (top panel, Chart 10) and such a portfolio tilt typically manages to shake off recession-related wobbles. Chart 9S&P 500 Buyback Index Sector Composition Bottom Line: We would not write off the artificial engineering of higher EPS via equity retirement, especially in a world where ZIRP is likely for the next five-to-seven years. Already buyback announcements have troughed (bottom panel, Chart 10) and factors are falling into place for a sizable resumption of buybacks in 2021 as the economy stands back on its own feet. Chart 10Buyback Comeback? Is CRE The Next Shoe To Drop? Last December in our 2020 Key Views report, the S&P real estate sector was one of our high-conviction underweight sectors for the year. However, frenetic trading in March compelled us to close out all our high-conviction trades and cement average relative gains of 3.4% in our eight high-conviction calls including 1.1% in the high-yielding S&P real estate sector. Nevertheless, we remained bearish on the prospects of this sector levered to commercial real estate (CRE) because the aftermath of the pandemic would leave this niche sector badly bruised. Already, YTD relative share prices are down 10%, and were it not for the tech/communications-laden – tower and digital storage – REITs that the S&P specialized REITs subgroup houses, then the relative underperformance would sink to 25% (Chart 11). In other words, the resilience of these mega cap tech-related REITs masks the carnage ongoing beneath the surface. Chart 11Specialized REITs Masking True Picture Charts 12 & 13 break down the YTD relative performance of the real estate sector’s sub-groups and it is clear that most REITs categories are in distress with the exception of specialized and industrial REITs. Chart 12REITs Are Weak… Chart 13…Across The Board Not only will the long-term negative ramifications due to the pandemic scar office-, apartment- and mall-exposed REITs, but also uncertainty surrounding the fiscal stimulus bill risks a fresh down-leg in the S&P real estate sector. According to the latest Q2 Fed release, CRE delinquencies are on the rise (not shown) and CRE prices are on the verge of contracting (bottom panel, Chart 14). A fresh stimulus bill could transfer funds directly to unemployed consumers and to cash-strapped business owners and extend the eviction/foreclosure moratorium as well as mortgage forbearance agreements. Absent this help, CRE will remain distressed. Refinancing risk is another threat that could cause a gap down in CRE prices, as bankers remain unwilling to dole out CRE loans despite a collapse in interest rates. Once the underlying asset gets repriced lower, then the debt related house of cards comes crumbling down (top & middle panels, Chart 14). Recent news that “Cerberus repackaged near junk rated CMBS paper into a AAA rated CDO” (effectively creating a AAA security out of thin air) is eerily reminiscent of the subprime crisis in 2008 and a stark warning that CRE excesses have yet to fully flush out.1 Chart 14More Pain Looms Chart 15Deflation Warning The downdraft in demand for CRE is already showing up in declining occupancy rates (Chart 15). We fear that there are more skeletons hiding in the closet. First the “amazonification” of the economy is still wreaking havoc on retail/shopping center REITs. Second the new “work from home” reality is putting strains on office landlords. Lastly, lodging will remain in distress at least until a vaccine is readily available. As a result, REITs cash flow growth will remain elusive, which will further dampen prospects of a recovery in the relative share price ratio (Chart 15). Finally, the relentless increase in supply is not showing any signs of abating. Non-residential construction is hovering near previous highs, and multi-family housing starts are perched close to prior cyclical peaks of 400K/annum (Chart 16). Undoubtedly, this excess supply backdrop will continue to weigh on CRE prices. Chart 16Mind The Supply Overhang Chart 17Valuations Have Yet To Fully Flush Out Despite all this dour news and near all-time lows in relative performance, valuations have only corrected down to the neutral zone, leaving ample room for an undershoot phase (middle panel, Chart 17). Encouragingly, persistent recent selling has pushed our relative Technical Indicator deep in oversold territory signaling that a near-term reflex rebound may be forthcoming. Netting it all out, COVID-19 has permanently scarred demand while non-residential construction is elevated. This combination will deflate commercial real estate (CRE) prices further, which risks unraveling a CRE debt deflation spiral. Continue to avoid the S&P real estate sector. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P real estate sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RLST-AMT, EQIX, PLD, CCI, DLR, PSA, SBAC, AVB, WELL, ARE, O, SPG, WY, CBRE, EQR, ESS, FRT, PEAK, VTR, BXP, DRE, EXR, MAA, UDR, AIV, HST, IRM, KIM, REG, SLG, VNO.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-01/cerberus-is-repackaging-near-junk-cmbs-into-top-rated-securities   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Highlights Aggregate household net worth reached an all-time high in the second quarter and likely rose further in the third quarter: The first quarter’s record quarter-on-quarter decline was completely unwound in the second quarter and resurgent financial and housing markets should have pushed wealth higher in the third quarter. Rising household net worth bodes well for consumption: Increases in household net worth lead increases in personal consumption expenditures by one or two quarters. Spending will roll over at some point in the fourth quarter without a new round of fiscal aid, but households retain some CARES Act support in the form of an enormous buildup of savings. Households do not appear to be overinvested in equities: Aggregate equity allocations are elevated relative to history, but the longstanding trend favoring corporate heft and consolidation may skew comparisons across time. Feature Chart 1A Ginormous Fiscal Response The Fed’s latest quarterly Flow of Funds report reinforced the view that the pandemic provided households with an opportunity to shore up their financial positions. Shock-and-awe monetary and fiscal stimulus (Chart 1), combined with an inability to spend at shuttered businesses, turned out to be a heady brew for household finances. Surging financial markets boosted the value of wealthier households’ investment portfolios; a tidal wave of fiscal transfers produced an income surge for households in the lower half of the distribution; consumer confidence was dented by the myriad uncertainties posed by COVID-19, encouraging increased savings; and even those inclined to spend some of their windfall were hindered by the difficulty of finding an outlet for doing so. Testifying to the roller coaster nature of 2020, household net worth made a new all-time high at the end of the second quarter, thanks to a record three-standard-deviation quarter-over-quarter gain that unwound the first quarter’s record four-standard-deviation decline (Chart 2). Household net worth should make another new high on September 30, given the S&P 500’s 8.5% third-quarter advance, tighter corporate bond spreads, rising home prices and still-surging savings. It is unclear when or even if the wealth increase will translate to more consumption, given that spending ultimately comes down to fickle preferences, though we are confident that income gains will aid credit performance, helping the economy dodge a vicious circle of defaults and bankruptcies. Chart 2Yet Another 2020 Extreme Wealth And Consumption There is no assurance that the formidable amount of wealth that households have amassed since the first quarter via a combination of fiscal transfers and investment gains will be directed to consumption. It is entirely possible that the savings rate will remain elevated for an extended period. Uncertainty still runs rampant for businesses disrupted by the pandemic and their employees, vendors, landlords and lenders. The travel, hospitality, food service, entertainment and real estate industries have a broad reach and their fates will ripple across much of the rest of the economy. There is a clear relationship between wealth gains and spending gains, ... In the past, however, smoothed year-over-year changes in household net worth have reliably correlated with smoothed year-over-year changes in personal consumption expenditures (PCE). The simple regression equation linking PCE and household net worth moves is nearly identical whether the lag between the two series is one or two quarters, as is the share of PCE’s variability that is explained by changes in wealth (r-squared). We show the scatterplot of household net worth growth (x-axis) lagged by two quarters with PCE growth (y-axis) in Chart 3, which reveals how rarely the four-quarter moving average of nominal PCE fails to grow from one year to the next. Every previous smoothed consumption decline occurred in the wake of the GFC in 2009-10 after having been preceded by significant wealth declines. At 6.6 percentage points below the best-fit regression line, the current observation is a notable outlier and suggests that households have stored up considerable dry powder. Chart 3Wealth Gains Typically Lead To Spending Gains When and if that dry powder will be deployed is a mystery. The 62-year history of the savings rate, which is simply savings divided by disposable, or after-tax, income does not suggest a powerful pull toward mean reversion. Rather, the series has been characterized by three long waves: a steadily, albeit modestly increasing trend from inception until the mid-seventies; an extended decline well into the aughts; and a post-GFC increase back to the levels that prevailed in the late-eighties and early-nineties (Chart 4). Regardless of the savings rate’s ultimate normalized range, we view the pandemic levels as an anomaly. Once households become more comfortable inhabiting a post-COVID world, income hoarded this spring and summer will provide a tailwind for consumption. ... but it may not take hold until the savings rate, which rose to record levels in the spring, settles back into a normalized range. Chart 4It Is Not Clear When Or Where The Savings Rate Will Normalize Bottom Line: Capricious sentiment will ultimately dictate when households deploy their pandemic savings, but there is a clear relationship between wealth gains and consumption. The second quarter Flow of Funds report buttresses the conclusion from the monthly personal income data that household wealth has benefited from pandemic policies so far. Are Households Overinvested In Equities? The Flow of Funds report also provides insight into the composition of aggregate household investment, grouping financial assets into five broad categories: Deposits (cash), Fixed Income, Corporate Equity, Life Insurance and Pensions, and Equity in Noncorporate Businesses. (The remainder of household wealth is concentrated in equity in homes and the property inside them.) Leaving out the value of life insurance and pension benefits, we reviewed the financial asset data for signs that households may have gotten over their skis in terms of their aggregate equity allocation. If they have, it might indicate that stocks are ripe for a reversal. Relative to the Flow of Funds’ 70-year history, the aggregate allocation to cash is a little low (Chart 5, top panel). With deposits sure to generate negative real income in a ZIRP world, however, a low cash allocation is rational and follows the historical pattern of moving with short rates (Chart 5, bottom panel). The fixed income allocation is lower, though not extreme (Chart 6, top panel). Households may tend to be backward-looking when allocating between stocks and bonds (Chart 6, bottom panel), but the currently elevated equity risk premium provides forward-looking support for preferring the former. Chart 5Cash Balances Were Low Before The Pandemic, But So Were Short Rates Chart 6Mirror Image On its face, households’ equity allocation looks somewhat frothy at one-and-a-half standard deviations above the mean (Chart 7, top panel). Like the forward P/E ratio, the household share of financial assets invested in equities has only ever been higher in the 1999-2000 crescendo to the dot-com boom. The household share of equity in noncorporate businesses has been plunging since the early eighties, however, and when all equity stakes are considered holistically, households don’t look overinvested (Chart 7, bottom panel). An investor could have reached that conclusion in 1999 to his/her subsequent regret, but household allocations to publicly traded holdings should have increased to reflect secular trends favoring concentration. This indicator is surely yellow, but we do not yet view it as red. Chart 7The Proceeds From Family Business Sales Have To Go Somewhere Bottom Line: Individual investors tend to make allocation decisions based on the action in the rear-view mirror, but the aggregate household exposure to public equities does not appear worrisome after considering the secular decline in noncorporate businesses’ importance. Income And Credit Performance Changes in aggregate wealth do not link cleanly to credit performance. Households service debt out of their income, because if they didn’t need to augment or smooth out incoming cash flows they wouldn’t have borrowed in the first place. While there must be some link between the recent paydowns of credit card balances and increased household wealth, changes in wealth have far less bearing than changes in income when it comes to explaining consumer credit performance. Risk assets will eventually suffer in the absence of an additional fiscal aid package because cracks will start showing up all over the economy without more transfers. Current income in the form of generous fiscal transfers have made it possible for households to take the unprecedented step of paying down their credit card balances at the outset of a recession. Those transfers have also bolstered apartment rent collections and held down consumer loan delinquencies. Much of the transfer income has been saved and could be deployed to continue to service debt and prop up consumption, but the savings are not a panacea. Although August’s personal income release reflected an additional $85 billion in excess savings over what would have occurred under our baseline no-pandemic estimate, bringing the total excess savings from March through August to over $1.1 trillion (Table 1), it cannot plug the income gap indefinitely. Making several generous assumptions to support a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we estimate the average laid-off worker could at most go one more quarter without work before s/he fully ran down the cushion accumulated under the CARES Act (Table 2). Table 1Household Savings, With And Without The Pandemic Table 2How Long Can The Average Worker Hold Out? More help from Washington is needed, then, if the economy is to escape a potentially nasty downdraft. Our base-case scenario still holds that help will come this month, but Republican and Democratic negotiators had not reached an agreement before this report went to press. If they fail to do so before the election, all hope is not yet lost. If our average laid-off worker could hold out for September, October and November, s/he might avoid missed rent and loan payments as long the flow of aid resumed by December under a post-election bill. Investment Implications Since the pandemic arrived in the United States in full flower in March, we have viewed the big-picture economic and market backdrop as a contest between policymakers and the virus. Absent any monetary and fiscal stimulus, the US would have suffered a crippling recession in which cascading defaults and bankruptcies would have dented the economy’s growth capacity well into the long term. No modern policymaker would prescribe a Mellonian course of emetics to “purge the rottenness from the system,” but since no one knows how long COVID-19 will pose an acute threat to public health, no one can know for sure if the Fed and Congress will have the capacity and the will to provide the support to bridge the economic crater it will leave in its wake. Only Congress appears to have meaningful untapped capacity, and we expect it will regain its resolve to deploy it in time to make final campaign appeals. If no unexpected materially adverse virus development occurs – mortality and hospitalization rates remain subdued, testing capacity continues to expand, treatment protocols keep progressing and a vaccine is developed sometime in the first half of 2021 – it looks to us like a bill within the range of the latest proposals from the administration ($1.6 trillion) and the House ($2.2 trillion) would be enough to prevent the self-reinforcing wave of bankruptcies that have always been our worst-case-scenario fear. The devil is in the details, especially on Capitol Hill, but helping vulnerable businesses and workers, and reeling state and local governments, until a vaccine is in hand would support our constructive cyclical (12-month) view on risk assets. It would also support the SIFI banks, a prime beneficiary if the economy can slip the pandemic’s knockout credit punch. The market does not appear ready to embrace the SIFIs any time soon, but we will continue to recommend overweighting them as long as Congress eventually provides another sizable round of fiscal aid. The news of the president’s positive COVID-19 test could quite plausibly shake consumer and business confidence, undermining consumption and investment and making the need for fiscal aid even more acute. If he and other members of his circle recovery fully and quickly, however, economic participants might conclude that they have less to fear, helping to smooth the path of the recovery. His experience with the virus may well reshuffle election probabilities and our geopolitical strategists will be keeping a close eye on all the developments.1 As we go to press, we do not see a clear-cut market implication from the president’s illness and will stand pat with a tactically neutral equity allocation, an underweight bond allocation and an overweight cash position as we await further developments.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the October 2, 2020 Geopolitical Strategy Special Alert, "Trump’s Illness Alone Not A Game Changer" available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Rotation out of the tech titans is a high probability scenario given that the easy money has already been made as AAPL, MSFT and AMZN each commanded an almost $2tn market capitalization near the peak on September 2. Thus, booking some of these tech gains and redeploying capital in other unloved deep cyclical sectors would go a long way, especially if our thesis that the economic recovery will gain steam into 2021 pans out. Using a concrete rebalancing example to illustrate such a rotation is instructive.1 The tech titans’ (top 5 stocks) market cap weight in the SPX is 22%. Were an investor to take 10% of this weight or 220bps and redeploy it to the materials sector, which commands a 2.7% market cap weight in the SPX, would effectively double the exposure on this deep cyclical sector. The same would apply to the energy sector that comprises a mere 2.2% of the SPX, while industrials with an 8.4% market cap weight would get a sizable 26% lift. Bottom Line: As the economy opens up, it pays to rotate out of fully priced tech titans and into the beaten down deep cyclicals.    Footnotes 1 Our example assumes benchmark allocation in all sectors for illustrative purposes.