Developed Countries

Highlights Economy – The endpoint of easier-for-longer monetary policy may be coming into view: Elevated inflation readings and discomfort among more hawkish FOMC members may signal that a monetary policy inflection is on the way. Markets – Volatility should pick up as investors reprice financial assets to reflect the end of emergency accommodation: The rumblings in bond, currency and precious metals markets that followed the June FOMC meeting are likely to spread as investors pull their liftoff date expectations forward. Strategy – Maintain below-benchmark duration positioning and ensure that portfolios can withstand increased volatility: Don’t be lulled to sleep by the 10-year Treasury yield’s backing and filling or by the VIX’s foray into the low teens. It is a more auspicious time to be buying insurance than selling it. Feature After fourteen years, investors may be weary of focusing so much attention on the Fed, but there’s been no avoiding its impact since the global financial crisis (GFC) emerged. Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), large-scale asset purchases and other emergency measures have exerted a strong pull on financial markets as they have been switched on and off. The extended turn of rushing to the rescue appears to be weighing on the Fed as well. Last August’s revisions to its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy explicitly acknowledged the challenges of operating in a ZIRP world in which its ability to deploy its primary tool for countering economic weakness – cutting the fed funds rate – is constrained by the zero lower bound. The Fed responded by adjusting its approach to each element of its dual mandate. It adopted an average-inflation-targeting framework that seeks to remediate past inflation shortfalls and indicated that it would only intervene to mitigate shortfalls from its maximum employment estimate. The latter move marked a break with the previous four decades, when the Fed, unwilling to give inflation pressures a chance to take root, proactively tightened policy when it judged that the labor market might be getting too strong. Taken together, the changes amounted to a significant break from doing whatever it took to keep inflation from gaining a foothold to making sure it didn’t completely vanish from households’, businesses’ and investors’ consciousness. If the changes were implemented as outlined, the effects could be wide-ranging. Inflation would be able to gain more traction, all else equal, leading to higher bond yields as markets anticipated that a higher terminal fed funds rate would be required to bring it to heel. A higher terminal fed funds rate might lead to a deeper economic slowdown, ushering in lower bond yields than otherwise would have prevailed. By inducing higher highs and lower lows in Treasury yields, the revisions to the Fed’s framework could promote increased financial market volatility, depending on FOMC members’ ongoing commitment to them and the way that commitment interacted with investors’ expectations. Although the revised framework is eleven months old, it is freshly relevant as the interaction between its implementation and investors’ expectations may be approaching an inflection point. When the FOMC announced the framework revisions last August, it didn’t have any immediate monetary policy implications and investors and committee members could reasonably have figured they would cross the new-framework bridge when they came to it. Elevated inflation readings and some differences in views within the FOMC suggest the bridge might now have to be crossed soon enough to fit within most institutional investors’ time horizons. Volatility may well rise as markets attempt to reprice assets against the backdrop of a novel monetary policy approach. End Of An Era The aforementioned changes that the FOMC made to its monetary policy strategy represented a watershed moment for US monetary policy. Beginning with Paul Volcker’s tenure as Fed chair near the end of the high-inflation ‘70s, the Fed has kept a sharp lookout for inflation pressures (Chart 1). Though it only introduced an annual inflation target in the aftermath of the GFC, its one-way view of inflation was well established. Signs that it might be emerging could be grounds for tighter monetary conditions while dormant readings were nothing to worry about. Chart 1Upholding Volcker's Mantle The average inflation target indicates that inflation shortfalls will henceforth be as much of a concern as inflation overshoots and the Fed will attempt to remediate them with an eye towards keeping inflation expectations from slipping below 2%. On the other hand, the new framework shifts from a two-way to a one-way perspective on employment. Where the committee had previously attempted to conduct policy in a way that mitigated any deviations from its maximum-employment assessment, the new framework seeks only to mitigate shortfalls. Citing the post-crisis experience, when inflation remained in check despite a half-century low in the unemployment rate, and a desire to see expansion gains spread more widely across households, Chair Powell has repeatedly emphasized that too much employment is not a concern. Easier Said Than Done When the Fed announced the changes to its approach, we noted that they would be significant for investors provided it were to follow through on them. It is one thing to promise wide-reaching changes in the indefinite future but quite another to execute them in real time under duress. Financial markets seemed to be aware that turning on a dime would be easier said than done and did not bother to adjust their fed funds rate expectations (Chart 2) or reprice assets that might be most affected by the new policy framework. Among investors with a time frame of a year or less, the talk was all theoretical, anyway – of course policy was going to remain extremely easy when the US and the rest of the world were still knee-deep in a once-in-a-century pandemic and the development of an effective vaccine was a ways off. Chart 2Until Recently, Markets Saw Little Chance Of Rate Hikes On A Two-Year Horizon In other words, talk was cheap when the FOMC unveiled its new framework. Its plans would only matter once the pandemic’s grip eased and central banks regained some discretion. The committee’s resolve to adhere to the new framework would only be tested in the face of uncomfortably high inflation prints and/or inflation expectations that threatened to anchor at levels above its target range. Investors wouldn’t bother to reprice financial assets in line with the new framework until they were certain it would apply. Inoculating Against Deflation As it turned out, effective vaccines appeared on the horizon sooner than anticipated. Pfizer and BioNTech announced the enormously encouraging results from their vaccine’s Phase III trials before the New York open on November 9th, and the Moderna vaccine’s similar clinical successes followed shortly thereafter. Vaccine distribution would begin in January, and the long end of the Treasury curve would begin to reprice, nudged along by rising inflation expectations. Agita sparked by March CPI data caused expectations to peak ahead of the April release, and 10-year breakevens briefly edged above the levels consistent with the Fed’s goals (Chart 3, top panel). Chart 3Coloring Within The Lines Chart 4Unsustainable Outliers We share the view of most mainstream economists that the upside surprises in the March and April inflation prints resulted from transitory reopening factors and do not mark an inflection point. Increases in used car prices will slow once rental car companies rebuild their fleets to match burgeoning demand and new car production can resume at its intended pace, lumber prices will continue to ease as sawmills ramp up operations to capture outsized profits, and the pace of increases in airfares will settle down once staffing bottlenecks can be resolved and more flights can be added to meet resurgent demand (Chart 4). Easier For How Much Longer? Markets’ collective shrug upon the release of the revisions to the Fed’s monetary policy framework reflected the view that they did not amount to a meaningful change over most investors’ time horizons. The second wave of COVID-19 infections had peaked a month before, but at least one other was likely in store as students returned to college campuses, and a vaccine was not yet on the horizon. According to Good Judgment’s professional superforecasters, there was roughly an equal 40% probability that 25 million vaccine doses would be available for distribution in the US between October 1st, 2020 and March 31st, 2021 or between April 1st and September 30th, 2021 (Chart 5). The more optimistic estimate turned out to be right, albeit not quite optimistic enough: nearly 25 million doses were administered by the end of February and nearly 50 million by the March 31/April 1 midpoint of the two periods (Chart 6). Chart 5Vaccine Development And Distribution Wound Up Beating August's Expectations ... Chart 6... By A Considerable Margin The vaccine outlook was relevant because it was hard to envision any incremental tightening of monetary policy while the country was still in the throes of the pandemic. Treasury yields at the longer end of the curve weren’t likely to go anywhere in the absence of increases in the fed funds rate (Chart 7) or increases in inflation or real growth expectations. Just as a still-raging virus was likely to keep the FOMC from hiking rates, it would also put a lid on inflation pressures and economic growth. With economic activity sharply limited by social distancing mandates and individuals’ innate reluctance to risk exposure, it was certain that capacity would continue to surpass aggregate demand. Chart 7Treasury Yields Move With Fed Funds Expectations To the extent investors thought about the FOMC’s new framework when it was unveiled, they seem to have taken it as confirmation that monetary policy would remain easier for longer, consistent with the theme that has prevailed since the Bernanke Fed led the charge to counter the GFC. Treasury yields were subdued even after the vaccine news broke in November (Chart 8, top panel), and with the interest rate structure remaining quiet, there was no major repricing in other rate-sensitive markets. Gold, which might have been expected to benefit from more accommodative policy, slipped nearly 15%, from the mid-$1,900s to the high $1,600s, between the release of the new framework and its March trough. After retracing half of its post-August decline, it shed a fresh 5% following the FOMC’s June meeting (Chart 8, second panel). Chart 8Growth Prospects, Not Fed Prospects Commodity currencies had added 10% versus the US dollar before ceding half of those gains in the wake of the June FOMC meeting, but their rally appears to have been driven by the increased global growth expectations that followed the positive vaccine news as they went nowhere in September and October (Chart 8, third panel). Similarly, the DXY Index had taken its post-revision cue from global growth prospects, moving inversely with pandemic news (rising when bad, falling when good), before rallying after the June meeting (Chart 8, bottom panel). The rise in measured inflation has encouraged some committee members to bring forward their anticipated liftoff dates and accelerate their individual dot plots, as disclosed last month. Now that the Fed no longer seems to be of one mind on the easier-for-longer path, investors have begun to reassess the scene. Prices are moving as capital reportedly exits pro-inflation positions and the money markets now call for two-and-a-half rate hikes by mid-2023 (Chart 2). More volatility could be in store amidst a shift in the Fed consensus as markets pull forward or push back their expected liftoff date and the expected pace of hikes speeds up or slows down. Investment Implications With the moves in measured inflation and inflation expectations seeming to have met the FOMC’s first two criteria for hiking rates (Table 1), a return to full employment looms as the final hurdle to liftoff. We reiterate our view that hiring progress is the swing factor that investors should be watching to anticipate the coming shift in monetary policy settings. Net payrolls expanded by 850,000 in June, topping estimates and putting the three-month moving average, 567,000, ahead of the 375-485,000 pace required to return the economy to full employment by the second half of 2022.1 That may sound like an overly ambitious target on its face, but we contend that annualized monthly payroll expansion of 4% for fourteen months or 3.1% for eighteen months is attainable given the magnitude of the pandemic job losses (Chart 9). Table 1A Checklist For Liftoff Chart 9A 2H22 Return To Full Employment Is Entirely Possible Our outlook for sustained net payroll expansion remains near the optimistic end of the expectations continuum, though the money market consensus has lately caught up with our sometime-before-the-end-of-2022 liftoff date view (Chart 10). Given that we expect that the yield curve will steepen as the hiring strength shows itself, we advise maintaining below-benchmark duration in Treasury portfolios. The optimism embedded in our hiring view implies robust growth over the next twelve months and we therefore recommend overweighting spread product within fixed income portfolios via a high-yield overweight, and overweighting equities within multi-asset portfolios. Hot growth will eventually induce the Fed to start pumping the monetary brakes, slowing the economy and investment returns, but the twelve-month outlook remains favorable for risk assets. Chart 10Looking For At Least One Hike By The End Of 2022 Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Making the simplifying (and overly conservative) assumption that returning to full employment will require recovering February 2020’s level of nonfarm payrolls, the US is currently short 6.8 million jobs. Regaining those jobs by August 2022 (14 months from now) will require a monthly average of 485,000 net job gains; regaining them by December 2022 (18 months hence) will require a 375,000 monthly average.

Special Report

Highlights Barring major surprises, President Macron will be re-elected in 2022. Any dramatic reversal in the pandemic that leads to a new recession would benefit the opposition candidate. Otherwise, Macron will remain the frontrunner. A second term for President Macron would see a continuation of the structural reforms started in 2017, but with a longer process for coalition-building in the National Assembly. This is bullish for France. Reducing the size of the state will go a long way to improve France’s economic competitiveness over the long run. Tactically, favor the more defensive Spanish market over the highly cyclical French market. Underweight French consumer discretionary equities relative to their European and global peers. Longer term, overweight French industrials equities relative to German ones, and overweight French tech equities relative to European ones. Ahead of the election, buy the dip on any euro weakness and French OAT/German bund spread widening. Feature The French presidential election is nine months away, and it is already starting to catch investors’ attention as one of the main political events in Europe in 2022. In talks with clients, we’ve been asked repeatedly about the odds we assign to a Marine Le Pen victory and the market implications. Those concerns are understandable but overrated. Le Pen’s personal approval rating is on the rise, and, in most polls, the far-right candidate beats President Emmanuel Macron in the first round vote, although not the critical second round. Although the same polls see Macron being re-elected, the gap between the two has narrowed considerably since the 2017 election, which Macron won by 66 percent of the vote.   Still, Macron is favored for re-election. He has several strong advantages over Le Pen, and it is unlikely she will be able to close the gap further before the election. Macron’s first term has been eventful. Neoliberal structural reforms started with drums beating in the first 18 months of his term. But the pace and breadth of reform eventually became too ambitious or painful for France to bear, and protests erupted in 2018. First came the “Yellow Vest Movement,” and then came protests against pension reform. Macron tried to compromise and continue with his agenda, but COVID-19 forced his hand. Since then, Macron has focused on crisis management, benefiting from the large state sector’s role as an automatic stabilizer amid the downturn. A second term under President Macron would see a reboot of the structural reforms started in 2017, albeit without single-party rule in the National Assembly. Reforms aimed at reducing the size of the state, and its cost, would go a long way to improve France’s economic competitiveness over the long run. Therefore, the prospect of Macron’s reelection is bullish for France, even though the reality of his second term would be more complex. 2017 All Over Again? Yes And No At first glance, the 2022 election seems to be a repeat of 2017. Le Pen and Macron are likely to face off in the second round and the latter, the Europhile centrist candidate, is likely to win once more. However, everything surrounding this election has changed. The Incumbency Effect One of the major changes is favorable for Macron: he is the incumbent running for re-election. Macron had been part of President Francois Hollande’s government since 2014, so he was still viewed in 2017 as a political neophyte and dark horse candidate. His rapid rise to power, along with that of his upstart party, La République En Marche (LREM), was astounding. Chart 1Pro-Incumbency Effect Favors Macron There is a strong pro-incumbency effect in French presidential elections, especially in the first round (Chart 1). Since 1965, five incumbents have run for re-election, and all have made it to the second round. Importantly, four won first place in the first round, with a six percentage-point margin on average. The chief exception is Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012. The reason for Sarkozy’s loss, however, is well known: he attempted to pass an unpopular pension reform in the teeth of the Euro debt crisis, 12 months before facing re-election. The only other incumbent who failed at re-election was Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, who lost to Francois Mitterrand in 1981, when the whole world was in stagflation and upheaval. The incumbency effect is not as pronounced in the second round (Chart 1, bottom panel). However, when facing a far-right candidate, incumbents win by a wide margin. This was the case in 2002 and 2017. Today, Macron still has a 12-point lead on Le Pen. Macron compares well to his predecessors. Chart 2 shows the approval rating for all presidents sitting in office over the past 40 years. The number of people who intend to vote for Macron has increased, the first time this has happened for an incumbent president since 1988. Only three presidents had a higher approval rating at this stage of their term, albeit from a higher starting point. Macron’s approval rating has increased by 10% since February 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit Europe. Chart 2Macron Compares Well To His Predecessors Table 1Incumbency And Recessions Under The Fifth Republic The shock of the pandemic and recession is the greatest change since 2017, and the biggest challenge facing Macron. Four incumbents have made a bid for re-election that was preceded by a recession within 12-24 months (Table 1). The results are mixed, and it is hard to establish a clear anti-incumbency effect. If anything, the timing and nature of this crisis are likely to help Macron rather than hurt him, since the vaccination campaign and easing of lockdown measures will enable the economy to normalize and improve ahead of April 10-24, 2022, when voters cast their first ballots. Nonetheless, another major shock (of any kind) could undermine the incumbent advantage. Economic Recovery Is The Top Priority While the Macron administration’s handling of the pandemic was questioned, public opinion was never aggressively hostile toward his handling of the economy. Macron was instrumental in securing a major European fiscal stimulus package (and joint debt issuance) with the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. He enthusiastically adopted the crisis mentality of “whatever it takes” to wage war against COVID-19, enabling the oversized French state to deploy the most generous furlough scheme in Europe, shielding millions of workers and preventing businesses from going under. This will be one of his winning cards. Chart 3The Handling Of The Pandemic Dictates Macron's Popularity His approval rating began to rebound following the end of lockdowns (Chart 3). This trend should strengthen as the French economy reopens, supported by a government that will play an accommodative and reflationary economic role until the election. Public opinion wants him to focus on the labor market and the economic recovery in the months to come, and he will be happy to oblige. Public opinion also views Macron as the most qualified candidate when it comes to economic matters (Table 2). 42% of respondents think that Le Pen is not qualified “at all” on economic matters, her Achilles’ heel, a perception that was already entrenched when Macron crushed her in a televised debate before the second round of the 2017 election. Table 2Macron Is Perceived As The Most Qualified To Oversee The Economic Recovery Europhile Versus Eurosceptic? The central issue of the 2017 election was Europe and France’s role in it. Following the UK’s disruptive Brexit referendum in 2016, and a long tradition of Euroscepticism within her party, Le Pen campaigned on “Frexit” and the abandonment of the euro. Conversely, Macron embraced the EU and the monetary union as he ran for president and committed to having France play a more important role within the bloc if he won. Chart 4Le Pen And The EU: Not The Divorce We Expected Since then, Le Pen has drastically shifted her stance on the EU. She now claims that the benefits of the common currency and single market outweigh the costs. After all, 70% of the French public support the euro and EU membership (Chart 4). Like clockwork, her personal approval ratings have steadily gone up. This strategic shift aligns her with the median voter, and combined with the Covid crisis, it is the only reason to take her candidacy remotely seriously in 2022, despite Macron’s clear advantages. Nevertheless, Le Pen has not yet risen above her 2012 peak in popular support. She failed to do so between 2014 and 2015, when the lingering European debt crisis, the Syrian refugee crisis, multiple terrorist attacks in France, and sluggish economic growth should have boosted her popularity. Her shifting perspective on the euro was therefore necessary and might be just what she needs to break through her 37% ceiling of popular support. Le Pen’s policy agenda is now focusing on protectionism, immigration, and national security. It is a Trumpian mix. However, while her new stance is more mainstream, it also differentiates her less from the other center-right politicians in France, namely Xavier Bertrand, who recently made local electoral gains in Le Pen’s northern industrial base. Macron is as strong an advocate for Europe as ever. He convinced Germany to break the taboo on joint fiscal policy during the pandemic. Now, he is also mounting a bid to become the natural leader of Europe, given that Merkel is stepping down, and her party is likely to lose standing in the German election in September.  France is set to take over the rotating EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2022, under the theme “Recovery, power, belonging,” which provides Macron with a golden opportunity to pitch himself as Europe’s premier statesman and economic steward in the final months of the election campaign. One Thing Hasn’t Changed: The Outcome Of A Macron/Le Pen Duel Most opinion polls give Macron a 10-12 point lead on Le Pen in the second round of the election. This gap is wide enough to reassure investors that it is not a polling error. However, in 2017, Macron’s average lead over Le Pen was 22%, and he won the election with 66% of votes. It is the narrowing of that gap that raises eyebrows among investors. Table 3Ideological Blocs Also Favor Macron Still, Le Pen’s chances at closing the gap are overrated. She is not a political “unknown” anymore and has very little ability to “surprise” voters into rallying around her next year. She will have trouble persuading those who know all about her. Grouping French voters according to ideological blocs, that is, presidential preference by party affiliation, suggests that the biggest threat to Macron is a strong center-right candidate who can beat Le Pen, especially if this should coincide with a revival of the center-left (Table 3). Otherwise, as in 2017, Macron will be able to count on voters from other parties in the second round of the election (Table 4). While both candidates appeal to right-wing constituents and would have to share their ballots, Macron can count on the green EELV party, as well as left-wing voters, to join center-right voters to elect him. Macron has made environmental issues a part of his mandate, which should help him confront a green neophyte such as Le Pen. Table 4Voting Against Le Pen Implies Voting For Macron The results of the regional elections held last month confirm this analysis. The motivation to keep Le Pen and her Rassemblement National (National Rally) party out of power is still strong (see Box 1). The poor showing of the National Rally means she won’t be able to maintain her current momentum in her personal approval ratings.   Box 1 2021 Regional Elections: Bad Omen For Marine Le Pen In Revival Of The Center-Right? The regional elections took place on June 20 and 27. While limited in relevance for the 2022 presidential race, the result of extremely low voter turnout, regional elections offer a gauge of how constituents feel about the political offerings from anti-establishment parties. Le Pen’s party suffered a heavy blow. It had hoped to consolidate power and build momentum ahead of the presidential election, but it failed even to win in its stronghold of Southern France. Meanwhile, Macron’s party (La République En Marche!) also disappointed. This outcome is not surprising; the local elections last year yielded similar results, highlighting the lack of presence at the local and regional levels for the four-year-old party. The surprise came from the center-right. It managed to win seven of the thirteen regions, beating far-right candidates by wide margins. Importantly, Xavier Bertand, Valérie Pécresse, and Laurent Wauquiez, all predicted to run for president next year, held onto their seats.   Chart 5Strong Demographic Base In The Second Round Both candidates’ demographic bases have remained the same. Macron is still popular among Millennials, white collar workers, and the elderly (Chart 5). He also has a strong base in Paris (and the suburbs) as opposed to Le Pen, and he still outperforms Le Pen among rural voters in today’s polls. Macron also scores high among the employees of the public sector—even though he is in favor of a smaller public sector. Furthermore, the unemployed mostly favor him, which reinforces the perception that he is the best candidate to improve the French economy and cut the unemployment rate. What if Le Pen fails to make it into the second round of the election? We discuss this possibility in the next section. Risks To The Base Case Scenario The greatest risks to our view are a setback in the economic recovery, an outperformance from the center-right, and the emergence of a dark horse. The latest developments in the UK and Israel, where a large share of the population is fully vaccinated, suggest that the “Delta” variant of COVID-19 remains a threat, with the potential to send economies back into lockdowns. The consequences would be dire for Macron. His chances at re-election would likely evaporate if his government imposed new lockdown measures. What about presidential candidates other than Le Pen? Our base case scenario that Macron will win is based on two assumptions: (1) the center-left Socialist Party will remain in shambles, and (2) the center-right remains scattered under different banners and will therefore lack unity. There is very little chance that the center-left will make a comeback in time, but the results from the regional elections suggest that the center-right could surprise to the upside (see Box 1), especially if it decides to rally behind a single candidate ahead of the first round. Could this candidate be a dark horse? Former Prime Minister Edouard Philippe or outsider candidate Xavier Bertrand could make formidable opponents to both Macron and Le Pen. Philippe’s personal approval rating currently stands at 50%, the highest among French politicians. He also appeals to constituents of all political leanings (Chart 6). This scenario could reshuffle the likely outcomes of both the first and second round of the election. Both Bertand and Philippe could win over voters who decided to side with Le Pen in 2017, while Philippe can compete with Macron over LREM voters. Additionally, Xavier Bertrand cuts into Le Pen’s support since he has made blue collar workers and the middle-class a priority. However, Macron and Le Pen each enjoy a strong voters’ base. It is necessary to monitor whether Valérie Pécresse (Soyons libres) and Laurent Wauquiez (Les Républicains) can be brought to endorse Xavier Bertrand ahead of the first round in 2022. Chart 6Edouard Philippe: From Ally To Outcast To Challenger? Beyond The Election Aside from the presidency, the outstanding question is the makeup of the National Assembly in 2022. Macron is not likely to enjoy the strong single-party legislative majority of his first term or to gain control of the Senate. Consequently, he will be more constrained in the legislature in a second term. Nonetheless, the demand for a better economy and a healthier job market requires pro-productivity reforms, which the public knows, and Macron has made reform his banner. Other conventional parties will come under pressure to support Macron’s reform agenda, even though that agenda will be less ambitious than it was in his first term. Chart 7Strong Presence Of Right-Leaning Forces Efforts at cutting back the size of the state are still likely, even though the pandemic has helped rather than hurt statism. This is because the French median voter, who never witnessed the degree of neoliberal reform that took place in the Anglo-Saxon world, has grown weary of the economy’s inefficiencies, just as the Anglo-Saxons have grown weary of laissez-faire neoliberalism. Before the pandemic, the French people understood the need to reduce the size of the state. After all, a larger state implies a larger cost burden borne by both households and corporations. When faced with the choice between paying the bill for the government’s fiscal response to COVID-19 (through higher taxes), or undertaking reforms aiming at reducing the size of the state, the French people will pick the former. Moreover, centrist forces will hold sway in the legislature (Chart 7); hence, some kind of budget normalization is expected in 2023 or thereafter. Other structural reforms If Macron wins would include pension reforms. We should also expect measures to push French companies to bring activities back to France, as well as a greater focus on leading France on the green path. Bottom Line: Barring major surprises, President Macron will be re-elected in 2022. There is a risk to our view if a center-right candidate defeats Le Pen to make it to the second round of the election. Either Macron or a center-right presidency would see a continuation of the structural reforms started in 2017, but with a longer process for coalition-building in the National Assembly. Investment Implications The French economy is currently experiencing an economic upswing. Three factors explain this pick-up: ultra-accommodative monetary conditions in Europe, fiscal largesse, and considerable pent-up demand. In 2021, GDP is projected to expand by 5.75% in annual average terms, higher than the Euro Area average of 4.6%. It should then grow by 4% in 2022 and by 2% in 2023. We remain bullish on French equities on a secular basis, as long as the elections result in further incremental structural reforms over time. As the election draws nearer, investors should treat any French OAT/German Bund spread widening as a buying opportunity and purchase the euro on any election-related dip. French Equities The CAC40 and French equities have had a good run since the beginning of the year. In absolute terms, the CAC40 is one of the best performers year-to-date, up +17%, driven by the outperformance of French consumer discretionary and financials equities, both in absolute and relative terms. However, a period of turbulence is appearing on the horizon; the shift in global growth drivers, the beginning of the global liquidity withdrawal, and lingering COVID worries are creating headwinds for the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio this summer. As such, we recently recommended investors downgrade cyclical equities tactically in Europe from overweight to neutral. With 66% in cyclicals, the French MSCI equity index will underperform in this environment, especially relative to the more defensive Spanish market (Table 5). Table 5Cyclicals Versus Defensives In European Markets Chart 8Three Trade Ideas In fact, our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator (CMVI) shows that French consumer discretionary equities are expensive relative to both their European and global peers (Chart 8). Regarding the reform theme, we stick with our long French industrial equities / short German industrial equities on a long-term horizon (Chart 8, second and third panel). The idea is that French reforms should suppress unit labor costs and make French exports more competitive vis-à-vis their main competitor, Germany. The latter faces a leftward shift in policy in elections this September. Finally, we recommend investors go long French tech stocks relative to their European counterparts. This sector is cheap (Chart 8, bottom panel), and the French tech sector will be supported by additional government spending of EUR7 billion on digital investments over the next two years. Bond Markets & FX A dovish ECB is consistent with a continued overweight in European peripheral bonds and an underweight stance on French government bonds. Chart 9Just Buy The Dip What is more relevant with respect to the French election is the OAT/Bund spread. In the past, unusually wide spreads between the two represented a euro breakup premium. In early 2017, spreads widened when the approval rating of Le Pen increased (Chart 9). However, since “Frexit” and the abandonment of the euro are no longer part of Le Pen’s agenda, investors should view spread widening as a buying opportunity. Similarly, investors should buy the euro on any election-related dip, particularly following the first round. “Frexit” has been removed from the equation, hence the euro should not weaken on breakup risk this time around. Bottom Line: We remain bullish on French equities within a European portfolio on a secular basis. If our views on the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio materialize in the near-term, highly cyclical French equities will temporarily underperform, unlike the more defensive Spanish market. On a 3- to 12-month horizon, investors should short French consumer discretionary equities relative to both their European and global counterparts. Current valuations suggest that betting on the booming French tech sector at the expense of its European neighbors will be profitable. Once the election draws nearer, investors should treat any French OAT/German Bund spread widening as a buying opportunity and purchase the euro on any election-related dip.   Jeremie Peloso, Associate Editor JeremieP@bcaresearch.com

Weekly Performance Update For the week ending Thu Jul 01, 2021 The Market Monitor displays the trailing 1-quarter performance of strategies based around the BCA Score. For each region, we construct an equal-weighted, monthly rebalanced portfolio consisting of the top 3 stocks per sector and compare it with the regional benchmark. For each portfolio, we show the weekly performance of individual holdings in the Top Contributors/Detractors table. In addition, the Top Prospects table shows the holdings that currently have the highest BCA Score within the portfolio. For more details, click the region headers below to be redirected to the full historical backtest for the strategy. BCA US Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA US Portfolio S&P500 TRI 1.13% 1.27% Top Contributors   TX:US AN:US UHAL:US LH:US IT:US Weekly Return 24 bps 18 bps 16 bps 15 bps 13 bps Top Detractors   ENBL:US JLL:US PSB:US ET:US ESGR:US Weekly Return -7 bps -7 bps -6 bps -6 bps -5 bps Top Prospects   ESGR:US ANAT:US MPLX:US BRK.A:US TX:US BCA Score 97.67% 97.62% 97.18% 96.50% 95.46% BCA Canada Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Canada Portfolio S&P/TSX TRI -0.24% -0.13% Top Contributors   TOU:CA CCA:CA CS:CA CFP:CA QBR.A:CA Weekly Return 21 bps 19 bps 12 bps 8 bps 6 bps Top Detractors   IMO:CA CRON:CA LNR:CA BB:CA LNF:CA Weekly Return -17 bps -12 bps -10 bps -10 bps -7 bps Top Prospects   LNF:CA CS:CA RUS:CA IFP:CA NWC:CA BCA Score 99.30% 99.16% 98.35% 98.15% 97.74% BCA UK Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA UK Portfolio FTSE 100 TRI 0.87% 0.23% Top Contributors   NVTK:GB DEC:GB NFC:GB CMCX:GB TUNE:GB Weekly Return 28 bps 21 bps 17 bps 17 bps 16 bps Top Detractors   NLMK:GB FDEV:GB SVST:GB RMG:GB GROW:GB Weekly Return -14 bps -11 bps -7 bps -6 bps -5 bps Top Prospects   SVST:GB NLMK:GB GLTR:GB GROW:GB N91:GB BCA Score 99.74% 99.62% 98.33% 97.69% 95.88% BCA Eurozone Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA EMU Portfolio MSCI EMU TRI 0.52% -0.67% Top Contributors   TL5:ES STR:AT ROVI:ES TESB:BE CNV:FR Weekly Return 17 bps 13 bps 12 bps 10 bps 9 bps Top Detractors   FDJ:FR FLUX:BE IPN:FR MONT:BE LOUP:FR Weekly Return -14 bps -9 bps -6 bps -6 bps -6 bps Top Prospects   STR:AT CNV:FR FDJ:FR POST:AT LOUP:FR BCA Score 99.56% 98.38% 97.45% 97.13% 96.28% BCA Japan Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Japan Portfolio TOPIX TRI 0.80% -0.29% Top Contributors   3468:JP 9543:JP 8595:JP 8979:JP 4326:JP Weekly Return 16 bps 16 bps 12 bps 11 bps 10 bps Top Detractors   3291:JP 9532:JP 5122:JP 4966:JP 6345:JP Weekly Return -11 bps -6 bps -5 bps -5 bps -3 bps Top Prospects   4966:JP 8133:JP 3291:JP 8117:JP 6960:JP BCA Score 99.28% 99.12% 98.82% 98.25% 97.84% BCA Hong Kong Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Hong Kong Portfolio Hang Seng TRI 0.08% 0.01% Top Contributors   316:HK 2380:HK 28:HK 1606:HK 2877:HK Weekly Return 41 bps 13 bps 11 bps 10 bps 10 bps Top Detractors   468:HK 1898:HK 3600:HK 1277:HK 98:HK Weekly Return -25 bps -22 bps -11 bps -10 bps -10 bps Top Prospects   1277:HK 98:HK 1839:HK 2232:HK 857:HK BCA Score 99.98% 99.06% 98.97% 98.49% 98.28% BCA Australia Portfolio Total Weekly Return BCA Australia Portfolio S&P/ASX All Ord. TRI 1.10% 0.17% Top Contributors   GRR:AU JLG:AU FLN:AU HVN:AU CAJ:AU Weekly Return 28 bps 27 bps 20 bps 18 bps 17 bps Top Detractors   NEW:AU PSQ:AU ORG:AU NEC:AU NHC:AU Weekly Return -17 bps -12 bps -12 bps -10 bps -9 bps Top Prospects   ZIM:AU BSE:AU AGI:AU BFG:AU PIC:AU BCA Score 98.58% 97.70% 97.27% 96.91% 96.82%