Energy

Highlights Multipolarity will peak in 2017 - geopolitical risks are spiking; Globalization is giving way to zero-sum mercantilism; U.S.-China relations are the chief risk to global stability; Turkey is the most likely state to get in a shooting war; Position for an inflation comeback; Go long defense, USD/EUR, and U.S. small caps vs. large caps. Feature Before the world grew mad, the Somme was a placid stream of Picardy, flowing gently through a broad and winding valley northwards to the English Channel. It watered a country of simple beauty. A. D. Gristwood, British soldier, later novelist. The twentieth century did not begin on January 1, 1900. Not as far as geopolitics is concerned. It began 100 years ago, on July 1, 1916. That day, 35,000 soldiers of the British Empire, Germany, and France died fighting over a couple of miles of territory in a single day. The 1916 Anglo-French offensive, also known as the Battle of the Somme, ultimately cost the three great European powers over a million and a half men in total casualties, of which 310,862 were killed in action over the four months of fighting. British historian A. J. P. Taylor put it aptly: idealism perished on the Somme. How did that happen? Nineteenth-century geopolitical, economic, and social institutions - carefully nurtured by a century of British hegemony - broke on the banks of the Somme in waves of human slaughter. What does this have to do with asset allocation? Calendars are human constructs devised to keep track of time. But an epoch is a period with a distinctive set of norms, institutions, and rules that order human activity. This "order of things" matters to investors because we take it for granted. It is a set of "Newtonian Laws" we assume will not change, allowing us to extrapolate the historical record into future returns.1 Since inception, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has argued that the standard assumptions about our epoch no longer apply.2 Social orders are not linear, they are complex systems. And we are at the end of an epoch, one that defined the twentieth century by globalization, the spread of democracy, and American hegemony. Because the system is not linear, its break will cause non-linear outcomes. Since joining BCA's Editorial Team in 2011, we have argued that twentieth-century institutions are undergoing regime shifts. Our most critical themes have been: The rise of global multipolarity;3 The end of Sino-American symbiosis;4 The apex of globalization;5 The breakdown of laissez-faire economics;6 The passing of the emerging markets' "Goldilocks" era.7 Our view is that the world now stands at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The transition is not going to be pretty. Investors must stop talking themselves out of left-tail events by referring to twentieth-century institutions. Yes, the U.S. and China really could go to war in the next five years. No, their trade relationship will not prevent it. Was the slaughter at the Somme prevented by the U.K.-German economic relationship? In fact, our own strategy service may no longer make sense in the new epoch. "Geopolitics" is not some add-on to investor's asset-allocation process. It is as much a part of that process as are valuations, momentum, bottom-up analysis, and macroeconomics. To modify the infamous Milton Friedman quip, "We are all geopolitical strategists now." Five Decade Themes: We begin this Strategic Outlook by updating our old decade themes and introducing a few new ones. These will inform our strategic views over the next half-decade. Below, we also explain how they will impact investors in 2017. From Multipolarity To ... Making America Great Again Our central theme of global multipolarity will reach its dangerous apex in 2017. Multipolarity is the idea that the world has two or more "poles" of power - great nations - that pursue their interests independently. It heightens the risk of conflict. Since we identified this trend in 2012, the number of global conflicts has risen from 10 to 21, confirming our expectations (Chart 1). Political science theory is clear: a world without geopolitical leadership produces hegemonic instability. America's "hard power," declining in relative terms, created a vacuum that was filled by regional powers looking to pursue their own spheres of influence. Chart 1Frequency Of Geopolitical Conflicts Increases Under Multipolarity The investment implications of a multipolar world? The higher frequency of geopolitical crises has provided a tailwind to safe-haven assets such as U.S. Treasurys.8 Ironically, the relative decline of U.S. power is positive for U.S. assets.9 Although its geopolitical power has been in relative decline since 1990, the U.S. bond market has become more, not less, appealing over the same timeframe (Chart 2) Counterintuitively, it was American hegemony - i.e. global unipolarity after the Soviet collapse - that made the rise of China and other emerging markets possible. This created the conditions for globalization to flourish and for investors to leave the shores of developed markets in search of yield. It is the stated objective of President-elect Donald Trump, and a trend initiated under President Barack Obama, to reduce the United States' hegemonic responsibilities. As the U.S. withdraws, it leaves regional instability and geopolitical disequilibria in its wake, enhancing the value-proposition of holding on to low-beta American assets. We are now coming to the critical moment in this process, with neo-isolationist Trump doubling down on President Obama's aloof foreign policy. In 2017, therefore, multipolarity will reach its apex, leading several regional powers - from China to Turkey - to overextend themselves as they challenge the status quo. Chaos will ensue. (See below for more!) The inward shift in American policy will sow the seeds for the eventual reversal of multipolarity. America has always profited from geopolitical chaos. It benefits from being surrounded by two massive oceans, Canada, and the Sonora-Chihuahuan deserts. Following both the First and Second World Wars, the U.S.'s relative geopolitical power skyrocketed (Chart 3). Chart 2America Is A Safe-Haven,##br## Despite (Because Of?) Relative Decline Chart 3America Is Chaos-Proof Over the next 12-24 months, we expect the chief investment implications of multipolarity - volatility, tailwind to safe-haven assets, emerging-market underperformance, and de-globalization - to continue to bear fruit. However, as the U.S. comes to terms with multipolarity and withdraws support for critical twentieth-century institutions, it will create conditions that will ultimately reverse its relative decline and lead to a more unipolar tendency (or possibly bipolar, with China). Therefore, Donald Trump's curious mix of isolationism, anti-trade rhetoric, and domestic populism may, in the end, Make America Great Again. But not for the reasons he has promised-- not because the U.S. will outperform the rest of the world in an absolute sense. Rather, America will become great again in a relative sense, as the rest of the world drifts towards a much scarier, darker place without American hegemony. Bottom Line: For long-term investors, the apex of multipolarity means that investing in China and broader EM is generally a mistake. Europe and Japan make sense in the interim due to overstated political risks, relatively easy monetary policy, and valuations, but even there risks will mount due to their high-beta qualities. The U.S. will own the twenty-first century. From Globalization To ... Mercantilism "The industrial glory of England is departing, and England does not know it. There are spasmodic outcries against foreign competition, but the impression they leave is fleeting and vague ... German manufacturers ... are undeniably superiour to those produced by British houses. It is very dangerous for men to ignore facts that they may the better vaunt their theories ... This is poor patriotism." Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (1896) The seventy years of British hegemony that followed the 1815 Treaty of Paris ending the Napoleonic Wars were marked by an unprecedented level of global stability. Britain's cajoled enemies and budding rivals swallowed their wounded pride and geopolitical appetites and took advantage of the peace to focus inwards, industrialize, and eventually catch up to the U.K.'s economy. Britain, by providing expensive global public goods - security of sea lanes, off-shore balancing,10 a reserve currency, and financial capital - resolved the global collective-action dilemma and ushered in an era of dramatic economic globalization. Sound familiar? It should. As Chart 4 shows, we are at the conclusion of a similar period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. There are other forces at work, such as pernicious wage deflation that has soured the West's middle class on free trade and immigration. But the main threat to globalization is at heart geopolitical. The breakdown of twentieth-century institutions, norms, and rules will encourage regional powers to set up their own spheres of influence and to see the global economy as a zero-sum game instead of a cooperative one.11 Chart 4Multipolarity And De-Globalization Go Hand-In-Hand At the heart of this geopolitical process is the end of Sino-American symbiosis. We posited in February that Charts 5 and 6 are geopolitically unsustainable.12 China cannot keep capturing an ever-increasing global market share for exports while exporting deflation; particularly now that its exports are rising in complexity and encroaching on the markets of developed economies (Chart 7). China's economic policy might have been acceptable in an era of robust global growth and American geopolitical confidence, but we live in a world that is, for the time being, devoid of both. Chart 5China's Share Of Global##br## Exports Has Skyrocketed... Chart 6And Now China ##br##Is Exporting Deflation China and the U.S. are no longer in a symbiotic relationship. The close embrace between U.S. household leverage and Chinese export-led growth is over (Chart 8). Today the Chinese economy is domestically driven, with government stimulus and skyrocketing leverage playing a much more important role than external demand. Exports make up only 19% of China's GDP and 12% of U.S. GDP. The two leading economies are far less leveraged to globalization than the conventional wisdom would have it. Chart 7China's Steady Climb Up ##br##The Value Ladder Continues Chart 8Sino-American ##br##Symbiosis Is Over Chinese policymakers have a choice. They can double down on globalization and use competition and creative destruction to drive up productivity growth, moving the economy up the value chain. Or they can use protectionism - particularly non-tariff barriers, as they have been doing - to defend their domestic market from competition.13 We expect that they will do the latter, especially in an environment where anti-globalization rhetoric is rising in the West and protectionism is already on the march (Chart 9). Chart 9Protectionism On The March The problem with this likely choice, however, is that it breaks up the post-1979 quid-pro-quo between Washington and Beijing. The "quid" was the Chinese entry into the international economic order (including the WTO in 2001), which the U.S. supported; the "quo" was that Beijing would open its economy as it became wealthy. Today, 45% of China's population is middle-class, which makes China potentially the world's second-largest market after the EU. If China decides not to share its middle class with the rest of the world, then the world will quickly move towards mercantilism - particularly with regard to Chinese imports. Mercantilism was a long-dominant economic theory, in Europe and elsewhere, that perceived global trade to be a zero-sum game and economic policy to be an extension of the geopolitical "Great Game" between major powers. As such, net export growth was the only way to prosperity and spheres of influence were jealously guarded via trade barriers and gunboat diplomacy. What should investors do if mercantilism is back? In a recent joint report with the BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, we argued that investors should pursue three broad strategies: Buy small caps (or microcaps) at the expense of large caps (or mega caps) across equity markets as the former are almost universally domestically focused; Favor closed economies levered on domestic consumption, both within DM and EM universes; Stay long global defense stocks; mercantilism will lead to more geopolitical risk (Chart 10). Chart 10Defense Stocks Are A No-Brainer Investors should also expect a more inflationary environment over the next decade. De-globalization will mean marginally less trade, less migration, and less free movement of capital across borders. These are all inflationary. Bottom Line: Mercantilism is back. Sino-American tensions and peak multipolarity will impair coordination. It will harden the zero-sum game that erodes globalization and deepens geopolitical tensions between the world's two largest economies.14 One way to play this theme is to go long domestic sectors and domestically-oriented economies relative to export sectors and globally-exposed economies. The real risk of mercantilism is that it is bedfellows with nationalism and jingoism. We began this section with a quote from an 1896 pamphlet titled "Made in Germany." In it, British writer E.E. Williams argued that the U.K. should abandon free trade policies due to industrial competition from Germany. Twenty years later, 350,000 men died in the inferno of the Somme. From Legal To ... Charismatic Authority Legal authority, the bedrock of modern democracy, is a critical pillar of civilization that investors take for granted. The concept was defined in 1922 by German sociologist Max Weber. Weber's seminal essay, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," argues that legal-rational authority flows from the institutions and laws that define it, not the individuals holding the office.15 This form of authority is investor-friendly because it reduces uncertainty. Investors can predict the behavior of policymakers and business leaders by learning the laws that govern their behavior. Developed markets are almost universally made up of countries with such norms of "good governance." Investors can largely ignore day-to-day politics in these systems, other than the occasional policy shift or regulatory push that affects sector performance. Weber's original essay outlined three forms of authority, however. The other two were "traditional" and "charismatic."16 Today we are witnessing the revival of charismatic authority, which is derived from the extraordinary characteristics of an individual. From Russia and the U.S. to Turkey, Hungary, the Philippines, and soon perhaps Italy, politicians are winning elections on the back of their messianic qualities. The reason for the decline of legal-rational authority is threefold: Elites that manage governing institutions have been discredited by the 2008 Great Recession and subsequent low-growth recovery. Discontent with governing institutions is widespread in the developed world (Chart 11). Elite corruption is on the rise. Francis Fukuyama, perhaps America's greatest political theorist, argues that American political institutions have devolved into a "system of legalized gift exchange, in which politicians respond to organized interest groups that are collectively unrepresentative of the public as a whole."17 Political gridlock across developed and emerging markets has forced legal-rational policymakers to perform like charismatic ones. European policymakers have broken laws throughout the euro-area crisis, with the intention of keeping the currency union alive. President Obama has issued numerous executive orders due to congressional gridlock. While the numbers of executive orders have declined under Obama, their economic significance has increased (Chart 12). Each time these policymakers reached around established rules and institutions in the name of contingencies and crises, they opened the door wider for future charismatic leaders to eschew the institutions entirely. Chart 11As Institutional Trust Declines, ##br##Voters Turn To Charismatic Leaders Chart 12Obama ##br##The Regulator Furthermore, a generational shift is underway. Millennials do not understand the value of legal-rational institutions and are beginning to doubt the benefits of democracy itself (Chart 13). The trend appears to be the most pronounced in the U.S. and U.K., perhaps because neither experienced the disastrous effects of populism and extremism of the 1930s. In fact, millennials in China appear to view democracy as more essential to the "good life" than their Anglo-Saxon peers. Chart 13Who Needs Democracy When You Have Tinder? Charismatic leaders can certainly outperform expectations. Donald Trump may end up being FDR. The problem for investors is that it is much more difficult to predict the behavior of a charismatic authority than a legal-rational one.18 For example, President-elect Trump has said that he will intervene in the U.S. economy throughout his four-year term, as he did with Carrier in Indiana. Whether these deals are good or bad, in a normative sense, is irrelevant. The point is that bottom-up investment analysis becomes useless when analysts must consider Trump's tweets, as well as company fundamentals, in their earnings projections! We suspect that the revival of charismatic leadership - and the danger that it might succeed in upcoming European elections - at least partly explains the record high levels of global policy uncertainty (Chart 14). Markets do not seem to have priced in the danger fully yet. Global bond spreads are particularely muted despite the high levels of uncertainty. This is unsustainable. Chart 14Are Assets Fully Pricing In Global Uncertainty? Bottom Line: The twenty-first century is witnessing the return of charismatic authority and erosion of legal-rational authority. This should be synonymous with uncertainty and market volatility over the next decade. In 2017, expect a rise in EuroStoxx volatility. From Laissez-Faire To ... Dirigisme The two economic pillars of the late twentieth century have been globalization and laissez-faire capitalism, or neo-liberalism. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the communist challenge, anointing the U.S.-led "Washington Consensus" as the global "law of the land." The tenets of this epoch are free trade, fiscal discipline, low tax burden, and withdrawal of the state from the free market. Not all countries approached the new "order of things" with equal zeal, but most of them at least rhetorically committed themselves to asymptotically approaching the American ideal. Chart 15Debt Replaced Wages##br## In Laissez-Faire Economies The 2008 Great Recession put an end to the bull market in neo-liberal ideology. The main culprit has been the low-growth recovery, but that is not the full story. Tepid growth would have been digested without a political crisis had it not followed decades of stagnating wages. With no wage growth, households in the most laissez-faire economies of the West gorged themselves on debt (Chart 15) to keep up with rising cost of housing, education, healthcare, and childcare -- all staples of a middle-class lifestyle. As such, the low-growth context after 2008 has combined with a deflationary environment to produce the most pernicious of economic conditions: debt-deflation, which Irving Fisher warned of in 1933.19 It is unsurprising that globalization became the target of middle-class angst in this context. Globalization was one of the greatest supply-side shocks in recent history: it exerted a strong deflationary force on wages (Chart 16). While it certainly lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in developing nations, globalization undermined those low-income and middle-class workers in the developed world whose jobs were most easily exported. World Bank economist Branko Milanovic's infamous "elephant trunk" shows the stagnation of real incomes since 1988 for the 75-95 percentile of the global income distribution - essentially the West's middle class (Chart 17).20 It is this section of the elephant trunk that increasingly supports populism and anti-globalization policies, while eschewing laissez faire liberalism. In our April report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy," we posited that the pivot away from laissez-faire capitalism would be most pronounced in the economies of its greatest adherents, the U.S. and U.K. We warned that Brexit and the candidacy of Donald Trump should be taken seriously, while the populist movements in Europe would surprise to the downside. Why the gap between Europe and the U.S. and U.K.? Because Europe's cumbersome, expensive, inefficient, and onerous social-welfare state finally came through when it mattered: it mitigated the pernicious effects of globalization and redistributed enough of the gains to temper populist angst. Chart 16Globalization: A Deflationary Shock Chart 17Globalization: No Friend To DM Middle Class This view was prescient in 2016. The U.K. voted to leave the EU, Trump triumphed, while European populists stumbled in both the Spanish and Austrian elections. The Anglo-Saxon median voter has essentially moved to the left of the economic spectrum (Diagram 1).21 The Median Voter Theorem holds that policymakers will follow the shift to the left in order to capture as many voters as possible under the proverbial curve. In other words, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are not political price-makers but price-takers. Diagram 1The Median Voter Is Moving To The Left In The U.S. And U.K. How does laissez-faire capitalism end? In socialism or communism? No, the institutions that underpin capitalism in the West - private property, rule of law, representative government, and enforcement of contracts - remain strong. Instead, we expect to see more dirigisme, a form of capitalism where the state adopts a "directing" rather than merely regulatory role. In the U.S., Donald Trump unabashedly campaigned on dirigisme. We do not expand on the investment implications of American dirigisme in this report (we encourage clients to read our post-election treatment of Trump's domestic politics).22 But investors can clearly see the writing on the wall: a late-cycle fiscal stimulus will be positive for economic growth in the short term, but most likely more positive for inflation in the long term. Donald Trump's policies therefore are a risk to bonds, positive for equities (in the near term), and potentially negative for both in the long term if stagflation results from late-cycle stimulus. What about Europe? Is it not already quite dirigiste? It is! But in Europe, we see a marginal change towards the right, not the left. In Spain, the supply-side reforms of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy will remain in place, as he won a second term this year. In France, right-wing reformer - and self-professed "Thatcherite" - François Fillon is likely to emerge victorious in the April-May presidential election. And in Germany, the status-quo Grand Coalition will likely prevail. Only in Italy are there risks, but even there we expect financial markets to force the country - kicking and screaming - down the path of reforms. Bottom Line: In 2017, the market will be shocked to find itself face-to-face with a marginally more laissez-faire Europe and a marginally more dirigiste America and Britain. Investors should overweight European assets in a global portfolio given valuations, relative monetary policy (which will remain accommodative in Europe), a weak euro, and economic fundamentals (Chart 18), and upcoming political surprises. For clients with low tolerance of risk and volatility, a better entry point may exist following the French presidential elections in the spring. From Bias To ... Conspiracies As with the printing press, the radio, film, and television before it, the Internet has created a super-cyclical boom in the supply and dissemination of information. The result of the sudden surge is that quality and accountability are declining. The mainstream media has dubbed this the "fake news" phenomenon, no doubt to differentiate the conspiracy theories coursing through Facebook and Twitter from the "real news" of CNN and MSNBC. The reality is that mainstream media has fallen far short of its own vaunted journalistic standards (Chart 19). Chart 18Europe's Economy Is Holding Up Chart 19 We are not interested in this debate, nor are we buying the media narrative that "fake news" delivered Trump the presidency. Instead, we are focused on how geopolitical and political information is disseminated to voters, investors, and ultimately priced by the market. We fear that markets will struggle to price information correctly due to three factors: Low barriers to entry: The Internet makes publishing easy. Information entrepreneurs - i.e. hack writers - and non-traditional publications ("rags") are proliferating. The result is greater output but a decrease in quality control. For example, Facebook is now the second most trusted source of news for Americans (Chart 20). Cost-cutting: The boom in supply has squeezed the media industry's finances. Newspapers have died in droves; news websites and social-media giants have mushroomed (Chart 21). News companies are pulling back on things like investigative reporting, editorial oversight, and foreign correspondent desks. Foreign meddling: In this context, governments have gained a new advantage because they can bring superior financial resources and command-and-control to an industry that is chaotic and cash-strapped. Russian news outlets like RT and Sputnik have mastered this game - attracting "clicks" around the world from users who are not aware they are reading Russian propaganda. China has also raised its media profile through Western-accessible propaganda like the Global Times, but more importantly it has grown more aggressive at monitoring, censoring, and manipulating foreign and domestic media. Chart 20Facebook Is The New Cronkite? Chart 21The Internet Has Killed Journalism The above points would be disruptive enough alone. But we know that technology is not the root cause of today's disruptions. Income inequality, the plight of the middle class, elite corruption, unchecked migration, and misguided foreign policy have combined to create a toxic mix of distrust and angst. In the West, the decline of the middle class has produced a lack of socio-political consensus that is fueling demand for media of a kind that traditional outlets can no longer satisfy. Media producers are scrambling to meet this demand while struggling with intense competition from all the new entrants and new platforms. What is missing is investment in downstream refining and processing to convert the oversupply of crude information into valuable product for voters and investors.23 Otherwise, the public loses access to "transparent" or baseline information. Obviously the baseline was never perfect. Both the Vietnam and Iraq wars began as gross impositions on the public's credulity: the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But there was a shared reference point across society. The difference today, as we see it, is that mass opinion will swing even more wildly during a crisis as a result of the poor quality of information that spreads online and mobilizes social networks more rapidly than ever before. We could have "flash mobs" in the voting booth - or on the steps of the Supreme Court - just like "flash crashes" in financial markets, i.e. mass movements borne of passing misconceptions rather than persistent misrule. Election results are more likely to strain the limits of the margin of error, while anti-establishment candidates are more likely to remain viable despite dubious platforms. What does this mean for investors? Fundamental analysis of a country's political and geopolitical risk is now an essential tool in the investor toolkit. If investors rely on the media, and the market prices what the media reports, then the same investors will continue to get blindsided by misleading probabilities, as with Brexit and Trump (Chart 22). While we did not predict these final outcomes, we consistently advised clients, for months in advance, that the market probabilities were too low and serious hedging was necessary. Those who heeded our advice cheered their returns, even as some lamented the electoral returns. Chart 22Get Used To Tail-Risk Events Bottom Line: Keep reading BCA's Geopolitical Strategy! Final Thoughts On The Next Decade The nineteenth century ended in the human carnage that was the Battle of the Somme. The First World War ushered in social, economic, political, geopolitical, demographic, and technological changes that drove the evolution of twentieth-century institutions, rules, and norms. It created the "order of things" that we all take for granted today. The coming decade will be the dawn of the new geopolitical century. We can begin to discern the ordering of this new epoch. It will see peak multipolarity lead to global conflict and disequilibrium, with globalization and laissez-faire economic consensus giving way to mercantilism and dirigisme. Investors will see the benevolent deflationary impulse of globalization evolve into state intervention in the domestic economy and the return of inflation. Globally oriented economies and sectors will underperform domestic ones. Developed markets will continue to outperform emerging markets, particularly as populism spreads to developing economies that fail to meet expectations of their rising middle classes. Over the next ten years, these changes will leave the U.S. as the most powerful country in the world. China and wider EM will struggle to adapt to a less globalized world, while Europe and Japan will focus inward. The U.S. is essentially a low-beta Great Power: its economy, markets, demographics, natural resources, and security are the least exposed to the vagaries of the rest of the world. As such, when the rest of the world descends into chaos, the U.S. will hide behind its Oceans, and Canada, and the deserts of Mexico, and flourish. Five Themes For 2017: Our decade themes inform our view of cyclical geopolitical events and crises, such as elections and geopolitical tensions. As such, they form our "net assessment" of the world and provide a prism through which we refract geopolitical events. Below we address five geopolitical themes that we expect to drive the news flow, and thus the markets, in 2017. Some themes are Red Herrings (overstated risks) and thus present investment opportunities, others are Black Swans (understated risks) and are therefore genuine risks. Europe In 2017: A Trophy Red Herring? Europe's electoral calendar is ominously packed (Table 1). Four of the euro area's five largest economies are likely to have elections in 2017. Another election could occur if Spain's shaky minority government collapses. Table 1 Europe In 2017 Will Be A Headline Risk We expect market volatility to be elevated throughout the year due to the busy calendar. In this context, we advise readers to follow our colleague Dhaval Joshi at BCA's European Investment Strategy. Dhaval recommends that BCA clients combine every €1 of equity exposure with 40 cents of exposure to VIX term-structure, which means going long the nearest-month VIX futures and equally short the subsequent month's contract. The logic is that the term structure will invert sharply if risks spike.24 While we expect elevated uncertainty and lots of headline risk, we do not believe the elections in 2017 will transform Europe's future. As we have posited since 2011, global multipolarity increases the logic for European integration.25 Crises driven by Russian assertiveness, Islamic terrorism, and the migration wave are not dealt with more effectively or easily by nation states acting on their own. Thus far, it appears that Europeans agree with this assessment: polling suggests that few are genuinely antagonistic towards the euro (Chart 23) or the EU (Chart 24). In our July report called "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" we posited that the euro area will likely persevere over at least the next five years.26 Chart 23Support For The Euro Remains Stable Chart 24Few Europeans Want Out Of The EU Take the Spanish and Austrian elections in 2016. In Spain, Mariano Rajoy's right-wing People's Party managed to hold onto power despite four years of painful internal devaluations and supply-side reforms. In Austria, the establishment candidate for president, Alexander Van der Bellen, won the election despite Austria's elevated level of Euroskepticism (Chart 24), its central role in the migration crisis, and the almost comically unenthusiastic campaign of the out-of-touch Van der Bellen. In both cases, the centrist candidates survived because voters hesitated when confronted with an anti-establishment choice. Next year, we expect more of the same in three crucial elections: The Netherlands: The anti-establishment and Euroskeptic Party for Freedom (PVV) will likely perform better than it did in the last election, perhaps even doubling its 15% result in 2012. However, it has no chance of forming a government, given that all the other parties contesting the election are centrist and opposed to its Euroskeptic agenda (Chart 25). Furthermore, support for the euro remains at a very high level in the country (Chart 26). This is a reality that the PVV will have to confront if it wants to rule the Netherlands. Chart 25No Government For Dutch Euroskeptics Chart 26The Netherlands & Euro: Love Affair France: Our high conviction view is that Marine Le Pen, leader of the Euroskeptic National Front (FN), will be defeated in the second round of the presidential election.27 Despite three major terrorist attacks in the country, unchecked migration crisis, and tepid economic growth, Le Pen's popularity peaked in 2013 (Chart 27). She continues to poll poorly against her most likely opponents in the second round, François Fillon and Emmanuel Macron (Chart 28). Investors who doubt the polls should consider the FN's poor performance in the December 2015 regional elections, a critical case study for Le Pen's viability in 2017.28 Chart 27Le Pen's Polling: ##br##Head And Shoulder Formation? Chart 28Le Pen Will Not Be##br## Next French President Germany: Chancellor Angela Merkel's popularity is holding up (Chart 29), the migration crisis has abated (Chart 30), and there remains a lot of daylight between the German establishment and populist parties (Chart 31). The anti-establishment Alternative für Deutschland will enter parliament, but remain isolated. Chart 29Merkel's Approval Rating Has Stabilized Chart 30Migration Crisis Is Abating Chart 31There Is A Lot Of Daylight... The real risk in 2017 remains Italy. The country has failed to enact any structural reforms, being a laggard behind the reform poster-child Spain (Chart 32). Meanwhile, support for the euro remains in the high 50s, which is low compared to the euro-area average (Chart 33). Polls show that if elections were held today, the ruling Democratic Party would gain a narrow victory (Chart 34). However, it is not clear what electoral laws would apply to the contest. The reformed electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies remains under review by the Constitutional Court until at least February. This will make all the difference between further gridlock and a viable government. Chart 32Italy Is Europe's Chart 33Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support Chart 34Italy's Next Election Is Too Close To Call Investors should consider three factors when thinking about Italy in 2017: The December constitutional referendum was not a vote on the euro and thus cannot serve as a proxy for a future referendum.29 The market will punish Italy the moment it sniffs out even a whiff of a potential Itexit referendum. This will bring forward the future pain of redenomination, influencing voter choices. Benefits of the EU membership for Italy are considerable, especially as they allow the country to integrate its unproductive, poor, and expensive southern regions.30 Sans Europe, the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) is Rome's problem, and it is a big one. The larger question is whether the rest of Italy's euro-area peers will allow the country to remain mired in its unsustainable status quo. We think the answer is yes. First, Italy is too big to fail given the size of its economy and sovereign debt market. Second, how unsustainable is the Italian status quo? OECD projections for Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio are not ominous. Chart 35 shows four scenarios, the most likely one charting Italy's debt-to-GDP rise from 133% today to about 150% by 2060. Italy's GDP growth would essentially approximate 0%, but its impressive budget discipline would ensure that its debt load would only rise marginally (Chart 36). Chart 35So What If Italy's Debt-To-GDP Ends Up At 170%? Chart 36Italy Has Learned To Live With Its Debt This may seem like a dire prospect for Italy, but it ensures that the ECB has to maintain its accommodative stance in Europe even as the Fed continues its tightening cycle, a boon for euro-area equities as a whole. In other words, Italy's predicament would be unsustainable if the country were on its own. Its "sick man" status would be terminal if left to its own devices. But as a patient in the euro-area hospital, it can survive. And what happens to the euro area beyond our five-year forecasting horizon? We are not sure. Defeat of anti-establishment forces in 2017 will give centrist policymakers another electoral cycle to resolve the currency union's built-in flaws. If the Germans do not budge on greater fiscal integration over the next half-decade, then the future of the currency union will become murkier. Bottom Line: Remain long the nearest-month VIX futures and equally short the subsequent month's contract. We have held this position since September 14 and it has returned -0.84%. The advantage of this strategy is that it is a near-perfect hedge when risk assets sell off, but pays a low price for insurance. Investors with high risk tolerance who can stomach some volatility should take the plunge and overweight euro-area equities in a global equity portfolio. Solid global growth prospects, accommodative monetary policy, euro weakness, and valuations augur a solid year for euro-area equities. Politics will be a red herring as euro-area stocks climb the proverbial wall of worry in 2017. U.S.-Russia Détente: A Genuine Investment Opportunity Trump's election is good news for Russia. Over the past 16 years, Russia has methodically attempted to collect the pieces from the Soviet collapse. Putin sought to defend the Russian sphere of influence from outside powers (Ukraine and Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia). Putin also needed to rally popular support at various times by distracting the public. We view Ukraine and Syria through this prism. Lastly, Russia acted aggressively because it needed to reassure its allies that it would stand up for them.31 And yet the U.S. can live with a "strong" Russia. It can make a deal if the Trump administration recognizes some core interests (e.g. Crimea) and calls off the promotion of democracy in Russia's sphere, which Putin considers an attempt to undermine his rule. As we argued during the Ukraine invasion, it is the U.S., not Russia, which poses the greatest risk of destabilization.32 The U.S. lacks constraints in this theater. It can be aggressive towards Russia and face zero consequences: it has no economic relationship with Russia and does not stand directly in the way of any Russian reprisals, unlike Europe. That is why we think Trump and Putin will reset relations. Trump's team may be comfortable with Russia having a sphere of influence, unlike the Obama administration, which explicitly rejected this idea. The U.S. could even pledge not to expand NATO further, given that it has already expanded as far as it can feasibly and credibly go. Note, however, that a Russo-American truce may not last long. George W. Bush famously "looked into Putin's eyes and ... saw his soul," but relations soured nonetheless. Obama went further with his "Russian reset," removing European missile defense plans from Poland and the Czech Republic. These are avowed NATO allies, and this occurred merely one year after Russian troops marched on Georgia. And yet Moscow and Washington ended up rattling sabers and meddling in each other's internal affairs anyway. Chart 37Thaw In Russian-West##br## Cold War Is Bullish Europe Ultimately, U.S. resets fail because Russia is in structural decline and attempting to hold onto a very large sphere of influence whose citizens are not entirely willing participants.33 Because Moscow must often use blunt force to prevent the revolt of its vassal states (e.g. Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014), it periodically revives tensions with the West. Unless Russia strengthens significantly in the next few years, which we do not expect, then the cycle of tensions will continue. On the horizon may be Ukraine-like incidents in neighboring Belarus and Kazakhstan, both key components of the Russian sphere of influence. Bottom Line: Russia will get a reprieve from U.S. pressure. While we expect Europe to extend sanctions through 2017, a rapprochement with Washington will ultimately thaw relations between Europe and Russia by the end of that year. Europe will benefit from resuming business as usual. It will face less of a risk of Russian provocations via the Middle East and cybersecurity. The ebbing of the Russian geopolitical risk premium will have a positive effect on Europe, given its close correlation with European risk assets since the crisis in Ukraine (Chart 37). Investors who want exposure to Russia may consider overweighing Russian equities to Malaysian. BCA's Emerging Market Strategy has initiated this position for a 55.6% gain since March 2016 and our EM strategists believe there is more room to run for this trade. We recommend that investors simply go long Russia relative to the broad basket of EM equities. The rally in oil prices, easing of the geopolitical risk premium, and hints of pro-market reforms from the Kremlin will buoy Russian equities further in 2017. Middle East: ISIS Defeat Is A Black Swan In February 2016, we made two bold predictions about the Middle East: Iran-Saudi tensions had peaked;34 The defeat of ISIS would entice Turkey to intervene militarily in both Iraq and Syria.35 The first prediction was based on a simple maxim: sustained geopolitical conflict requires resources and thus Saudi military expenditures are unsustainable when a barrel of oil costs less than $100. Saudi Arabia overtook Russia in 2015 as the globe's third-largest defense spender (Chart 38)! Chart 38Saudi Arabia: Lock And Load The mini-détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia concluded in 2016 with the announced OPEC production cut and freeze. While we continue to see the OPEC deal as more of a recognition of the status quo than an actual cut (because OPEC production has most likely reached its limits), nevertheless it is significant as it will slightly hasten the pace of oil-market rebalancing. On the margin, the OPEC deal is therefore bullish for oil prices. Our second prediction, that ISIS is more of a risk to the region in defeat than in glory, was highly controversial. However, it has since become consensus, with several Western intelligence agencies essentially making the same claim. But while our peers in the intelligence community have focused on the risk posed by returning militants to Europe and elsewhere, our focus remains on the Middle East. In particular, we fear that Turkey will become embroiled in conflicts in Syria and Iraq, potentially in a proxy war with Iran and Russia. The reason for this concern is that the defeat of the Islamic State will create a vacuum in the Middle East that the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are most likely to fill. This is unacceptable to Turkey, which has intervened militarily to counter Kurdish gains and may do so in the future. We are particularly concerned about three potential dynamics: Direct intervention in Syria and Iraq: The Turkish military entered Syria in August, launching operation "Euphrates Shield." Turkey also reinforced a small military base in Bashiqa, Iraq, only 15 kilometers north of Mosul. Both operations were ostensibly undertaken against the Islamic State, but the real intention is to limit the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. As Map 1 illustrates, Kurds have expanded their territorial control in both countries. Map 1Kurdish Gains In Syria & Iraq Conflict with Russia and Iran: President Recep Erdogan has stated that Turkey's objective in Syria is to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power.36 Yet Russia and Iran are both involved militarily in the country - the latter with regular ground troops - to keep Assad in power. Russia and Turkey did manage to cool tensions recently. Yet the Turkish ground incursion into Syria increases the probability that tensions will re-emerge. Meanwhile, in Iraq, Erdogan has cast himself as a defender of Sunni Arabs and has suggested that Turkey still has a territorial claim to northern Iraq. This stance would put Ankara in direct confrontation with the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, allied with Iran. Turkey-NATO/EU tensions: Tensions have increased between Turkey and the EU over the migration deal they signed in March 2016. Turkey claims that the deal has stemmed the flow of migrants to Europe, which is dubious given that the flow abated well before the deal was struck. Since then, Turkey has threatened to open the spigot and let millions of Syrian refugees into Europe. This is likely a bluff as Turkey depends on European tourists, import demand, and FDI for hard currency (Chart 39). If Erdogan acted on his threat and unleashed Syrian refugees into Europe, the EU could abrogate the 1995 EU-Turkey customs union agreement and impose economic sanctions. The Turkish foray into the Middle East poses the chief risk of a "shooting war" that could impact global investors in 2017. While there are much greater geopolitical games afoot - such as increasing Sino-American tensions - this one is the most likely to produce military conflict between serious powers. It would be disastrous for Turkey. The broader point is that the redrawing of the Middle East map is not yet complete. As the Islamic State is defeated, the Sunni population of Iraq and Syria will remain at risk of Shia domination. As such, countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia could be drawn into renewed proxy conflicts to prevent complete marginalization of the Sunni population. While tensions between Turkey, Russia, and Iran will not spill over into oil-producing regions of the Middle East, they may cloud Iraq's future. Since 2010, Iraq has increased oil production by 1.6 million barrels per day. This is about half of the U.S. shale production increase over the same time frame. As such, Iraq's production "surprise" has been a major contributor to the 2014-2015 oil-supply glut. However, Iraq needs a steady inflow of FDI in order to boost production further (Chart 40). Proxy warfare between Turkey, Russia, and Iran - all major conventional military powers - on its territory will go a long way to sour potential investors interested in Iraqi production. Chart 39Turkey Is Heavily Dependent On The EU Chart 40Iraq Is The Big, And Cheap, Hope This is a real problem for global oil supply. The International Energy Agency sees Iraq as a critical source of future global oil production. Chart 41 shows that Iraq is expected to contribute the second-largest increase in oil production by 2020. And given Iraq's low breakeven production cost, it may be the last piece of real estate - along with Iran - where the world can get a brand-new barrel of oil for under $13. In addition to the risk of expanding Turkish involvement in the region, investors will also have to deal with the headline risk of a hawkish U.S. administration pursuing diplomatic brinkmanship against Iran. We do not expect the Trump administration to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal due to several constraints. First, American allies will not go along with new sanctions. Second, Trump's focus is squarely on China. Third, the U.S. does not have alternatives to diplomacy, since bombing Iran would be an exceedingly complex operation that would bog down American forces in the Middle East. When we put all the risks together, a geopolitical risk premium will likely seep into oil markets in 2017. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy argues that the physical oil market is already balanced (Chart 42) and that the OPEC deal will help draw down bloated inventories in 2017. This means that global oil spare capacity will be very low next year, with essentially no margin of safety in case of a major supply loss. Given the political risks of major oil producers like Nigeria and Venezuela, this is a precarious situation for the oil markets. Chart 41Iraq Really Matters For Global Oil Production Chart 42Oil Supply Glut Is Gone In 2017 Bottom Line: Given our geopolitical view of risks in the Middle East, balanced oil markets, lack of global spare capacity, the OPEC production cut, and ongoing capex reductions, we recommend clients to follow BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy view of expecting widening backwardation in the new year.37 U.S.-China: From Rivalry To Proxy Wars President-elect Trump has called into question the U.S.'s adherence to the "One China policy," which holds that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China" and that the U.S. recognizes only the People's Republic of China as the legitimate Chinese government. There is widespread alarm about Trump's willingness to use this policy, the very premise of U.S.-China relations since 1978, as a negotiating tool. And indeed, Sino-U.S. relations are very alarming, as we have warned our readers since 2012.38 Trump is a dramatic new agent reinforcing this trend. Trump's suggestion that the policy could be discarded - and his break with convention in speaking to the Taiwanese president - are very deliberate. Observe that in the same diplomatic document that establishes the One China policy, the United States and China also agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region." Trump is initiating a change in U.S. policy by which the U.S. accuses China of seeking hegemony in Asia, a violation of the foundation of their relationship. The U.S. is not seeking unilaterally to cancel the One China policy, but asking China to give new and durable assurances that it does not seek hegemony and will play by international rules. Otherwise, the U.S. is saying, the entire relationship will have to be revisited and nothing (not even Taiwan) will be off limits. The assurances that China is expected to give relate not only to trade, but also, as Trump signaled, to the South China Sea and North Korea. Therefore we are entering a new era in U.S-China relations. China Is Toast Asia Pacific is a region of frozen conflicts. Russia and Japan never signed a peace treaty. Nor did China and Taiwan. Nor did the Koreas. Why have these conflicts lain dormant over the past seventy years? Need we ask? Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have seen their GDP per capita rise 14 times since 1950. China has seen its own rise 21 times (Chart 43). Since the wars in Vietnam over forty years ago, no manner of conflict, terrorism, or geopolitical crisis has fundamentally disrupted this manifestly beneficial status quo. As a result, Asia has been a region synonymous with economics - not geopolitics. It developed this reputation because its various large economies all followed Japan's path of dirigisme: export-oriented, state-backed, investment-led capitalism. This era of stability is over. The region has become the chief source of geopolitical risk and potential "Black Swan" events.39 The reason is deteriorating U.S.-China relations and the decline in China's integration with other economies. The Asian state-led economic model was underpinned by the Pax Americana. Two factors were foundational: America's commitment to free trade and its military supremacy. China was not technically an ally, like Japan and Korea, but after 1979 it sure looked like one in terms of trade surpluses and military spending (Chart 44).40 For the sake of containing the Soviet Union, the U.S. wrapped East Asia under its aegis. Chart 43The Twentieth Century Was Kind To East Asia Chart 44Asia Sells, America Rules It is well known, however, that Japan's economic model led it smack into a confrontation with the U.S. in the 1980s over its suppressed currency and giant trade surpluses. President Ronald Reagan's economic team forced Japan to reform, but the result was ultimately financial crisis as the artificial supports of its economic model fell away (Chart 45). Astute investors have always suspected that a similar fate awaited China. It is unsustainable for China to seize ever greater market share and drive down manufacturing prices without reforming its economy to match G7 standards, especially if it denies the U.S. access to its vast consumer market. Today there are signs that the time for confrontation is upon us: Since the Great Recession, U.S. household debt and Chinese exports have declined as a share of GDP, falling harder in the latter than the former, in a sign of shattered symbiosis (see Chart 8 above). Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasurys have begun to decline (Chart 46). China's exports to the U.S., both as a share of total exports and of GDP, have rolled over, and are at levels comparable to Japan's 1980s peaks (Chart 47). China is wading into high-tech and advanced industries, threatening the core advantages of the developed markets. The U.S. just elected a populist president whose platform included aggressive trade protectionism against China. Protectionist "Rust Belt" voters were pivotal to Trump's win and will remain so in future elections. China is apparently reneging on every major economic promise it has made in recent years: the RMB is depreciating, not appreciating, whatever the reason; China is closing, not opening, its capital account; it is reinforcing, not reforming, its state-owned companies; and it is shutting, not widening, access to its domestic market (Chart 48). Chart 45Japan's Crisis Followed Currency Spike Chart 46China Backing Away From U.S. Treasuries There is a critical difference between the "Japan bashing" of the 1980s-90s and the increasingly potent "China bashing" of today. Japan and the U.S. had established a strategic hierarchy in World War II. That is not the case for the U.S. and China in 2017. Unlike Japan, Korea, or any of the other Asian tigers, China cannot trust the United States to preserve its security. Far from it - China has no greater security threat than the United States. The American navy threatens Chinese access to critical commodities and export markets via the South China Sea. In a world that is evolving into a zero-sum game, these things suddenly matter. Chart 47The U.S. Will Get Tougher On China Trade Chart 48China Is De-Globalizing That means that when the Trump administration tries to "get tough" on longstanding American demands, these demands will not be taken as well-intentioned or trustworthy. We see Sino-American rivalry as the chief geopolitical risk to investors in 2017: Trump will initiate a more assertive U.S. policy toward China;41 It will begin with symbolic or minor punitive actions - a "shot across the bow" like charging China with currency manipulation or imposing duties on specific goods.42 It will be critical to see whether Trump acts arbitrarily through executive power, or systematically through procedures laid out by Congress. The two countries will proceed to a series of high-level, bilateral negotiations through which the Trump administration will aim to get a "better deal" from the Xi administration on trade, investment, and other issues. The key to the negotiations will be whether the Trump team settles for technical concessions or instead demands progress on long-delayed structural issues that are more difficult and risky for China to undertake. Too much pressure on the latter could trigger a confrontation and broader economic instability. Chart 49China's Demographic Dividend Is Gone The coming year may see U.S.-China relations start with a bang and end with a whimper, as Trump's initial combativeness gives way to talks. But make no mistake: Sino-U.S. rivalry and distrust will worsen over the long run. That is because China faces a confluence of negative trends: The U.S. is turning against it. Geopolitical problems with its periphery are worsening. It is at high risk of a financial crisis due to excessive leverage. The middle class is a growing political constraint on the regime. Demographics are now a long-term headwind (Chart 49). The Chinese regime will be especially sensitive to these trends because the Xi administration will want stability in the lead up to the CCP's National Party Congress in the fall, which promises to see at least some factional trouble.43 It no longer appears as if the rotation of party leaders will leave Xi in the minority on the Politburo Standing Committee for 2017-22, as it did in 2012.44 More likely, he will solidify power within the highest decision-making body. This removes an impediment to his policy agenda in 2017-22, though any reforms will still take a back seat to stability, since leadership changes and policy debates will absorb a great deal of policymakers' attention at all levels for most of the year.45 Xi will also put in place his successors for 2022, putting a cap on rumors that he intends to eschew informal term limits. Failing this, market uncertainty over China's future will explode upward. The midterm party congress will thus reaffirm the fact that China's ruling party and regime are relatively unified and centralized, and hence that China has relatively strong political capabilities for dealing with crises. Evidence does not support the popular belief that China massively stimulates the economy prior to five-year party congresses (Chart 50), but we would expect all means to be employed to prevent a major downturn. Chart 50Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Five-Year Party Congresses What this means is that the real risks of the U.S.-China relationship in 2017 will emanate from China's periphery. Asia's Frozen Conflicts Are Thawing Today the Trump administration seems willing to allow China to carve a sphere of influence - but it is entirely unclear whether and where existing boundaries would be redrawn. Here are the key regional dynamics:46 The Koreas: The U.S. and Japan are increasingly concerned about North Korea's missile advances but will find their attempts to deal with the problem blocked by China and likely by the new government in South Korea.47 U.S. threats of sanctioning China over North Korea will increase market uncertainty, as will South Korea's political turmoil and (likely) souring relations with the U.S. Taiwan: Taiwan's ruling party has very few domestic political constraints and therefore could make a mistake, especially when emboldened by an audacious U.S. leadership.48 The same combination could convince China that it has to abandon the post-2000 policy of playing "nice" with Taiwan.49 China will employ discrete sanctions against Taiwan. Hong Kong: Mainland forces will bring down the hammer on the pro-independence movement. The election of a new chief executive will appear to reinforce the status quo but in reality Beijing will tighten its legal, political, and security grip. Large protests are likely; political uncertainty will remain high.50 Japan: Japan will effectively receive a waiver from Trump's protectionism and will benefit from U.S. stimulus efforts; it will continue reflating at home in order to generate enough popular support to pass constitutional revisions in 2018; and it will not shy away from regional confrontations, since these will enhance the need for the hawkish defense component of the same revisions. Vietnam: The above issues may provide Vietnam with a chance to improve its strategic position at China's expense, whether by courting U.S. market access or improving its position in the South China Sea. But the absence of an alliance with the U.S. leaves it highly exposed to Chinese reprisals if it pushes too far. Russia: Russia will become more important to the region because its relations with the U.S. are improving and it may forge a peace deal with Japan, giving it more leverage in energy negotiations with China.51 This may also reinforce the view in Beijing that the U.S. is circling the wagons around China. What these dynamics have in common is the emergence of U.S.-China proxy conflicts. China has long suspected that the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" was a Cold War "containment" strategy. The fear is well-grounded but the reality takes time to materialize, which is what we will see playing out in the coming years. The reason we say "proxy wars" is because several American allies are conspicuously warming up to China: Thailand, the Philippines, and soon South Korea. They are not abandoning the U.S. but keeping their options open. The other ASEAN states also stand to benefit as the U.S. seeks economic substitutes for China while the latter courts their allegiance.52 The problem is that as U.S.-China tensions rise, these small states run greater risks in playing both sides. Bottom Line: The overarching investment implications of U.S.-China proxy wars all derive from de-globalization. China was by far the biggest winner of globalization and will suffer accordingly (Chart 51). But it will not be the biggest loser, since it is politically unified, its economy is domestically driven, and it has room to maneuver on policy. Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore are all chiefly at risk from de-globalization over the long run. Chart 51Globalization's Winners Will Be De-Globalization's Losers Japan is best situated to prosper in 2017. We have argued since well before the Bank of Japan's September monetary policy shift that unconventional reflation will continue, with geopolitics as the primary motivation for the country's "pedal to the metal" strategy.53 We will look to re-initiate our long Japanese equities position in early 2017. ASEAN countries offer an opportunity, though country-by-country fundamentals are essential. Brexit: The Three Kingdoms The striking thing about the Brexit vote's aftermath is that no recession followed the spike in uncertainty, no infighting debilitated the Tory party, and no reversal occurred in popular opinion. The authorities stimulated the economy, the people rallied around the flag (and ruling party), and the media's "Bregret" narrative flopped. That said, Brexit also hasn't happened yet.54 Formal negotiations with Europe begin in March, which means uncertainty will persist for much of the year as the U.K. and EU posture around their demands for a post-exit deal. However, improving growth prospects for Britain, Europe, and the U.S. all suggest that the negotiations are less likely to take place in an atmosphere of crisis. That does not mean that EU negotiators will be soft. With each successive electoral victory for the political establishment in 2017, the European negotiating position will harden. This will create a collision of Triumphant Tories and Triumphant Brussels. Still, the tide is not turning much further against the U.K. than was already the case, given how badly the U.K. needs a decent deal. Tightercontrol over the movement of people will be the core demand of Westminster, but it is not necessarily mutually exclusive with access to the common market. The major EU states have an incentive to compromise on immigration with the U.K. because they would benefit from tighter immigration controls that send highly qualified EU nationals away from the U.K. labor market and into their own. But the EU will exact a steep price for granting the U.K. the gist of what it wants on immigration and market access. This could be a hefty fee or - more troublingly for Britain - curbs on British financial-service access to euro markets. Though other EU states are not likely to exit, the European Council will not want to leave any doubt about the pain of doing so. The Tories may have to accept this outcome. Tory strength is now the Brexit voter base. That base is uncompromising on cutting immigration, and it is indifferent, or even hostile, to the City. So it stands to reason that Prime Minister Theresa May will sacrifice the U.K.'s financial sector in the coming negotiations. The bigger question is what happens to the U.K. economy in the medium and long term. First, it is unclear how the U.K. will revive productivity as lower labor-force growth and FDI, and higher inflation, take shape. Government "guidance" of the economy - dirigisme again - is clearly the Tory answer. But it remains to be seen how effectively it will be done. Second, what happens to the United Kingdom as a nation? Another Scottish independence referendum is likely after the contours of the exit deal take shape, especially as oil prices gin up Scottish courage to revisit the issue. The entire question of Scotland and Northern Ireland (both of which voted to stay in the EU) puts deeper constitutional and governmental restructuring on the horizon. Westminster is facing a situation where it drastically loses influence on the global stage as it not only exits the European "superstate" but also struggles to maintain a semblance of order among the "three kingdoms." Bottom Line: The two-year timeframe for exit negotiations ensures that posturing will ratchet up tensions and uncertainty throughout the year - invoking the abyss of a no-deal exit - but our optimistic outlook on the end-game (eventual "soft Brexit") suggests that investors should fade the various crisis points. That said, the pound is no longer a buy as it rises to around 1.30. Investment Views De-globalization, dirigisme, and the ascendancy of charismatic authority will all prove to be inflationary. On the margin, we expect less trade, less free movement of people, and more direct intervention in the economy. Given that these are all marginally more inflationary, it makes sense to expect the "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," as our colleague Peter Berezin argued in July.55 That said, Peter does not expect the bond bull market to end in a crash - and neither do we. There are many macroeconomic factors that will continue to suppress global yields: the savings glut, search for yield, and economic secular stagnation. In addition, we expect peak multipolarity in 2017 and thus a rise in geopolitical conflict. This geopolitical context will keep the U.S. Treasury market well bid. However, clients may want to begin switching their safe-haven exposure to gold. In a recent research report on safe havens, we showed that gold and Treasurys have changed places as safe havens in the past.56 Only after 2000 did Treasurys start providing a good hedge to equity corrections due to geopolitical and financial risks. The contrary is true for gold - it acted as one of the most secure investments during corrections until that time, but has since become correlated with S&P 500 total returns. As deflationary risks abate in the future, we suspect that gold will return to its safe-haven status. In addition to safe havens, U.S. and global defense stocks will be well bid due to global multipolarity. We recommend that clients go long S&P 500 aerospace and defense relative to global equities on a strategic basis. We are also sticking with our tactical trade of long U.S. defense / short U.S. aerospace. On the equity front, we have closed our post-election bullish trade of long S&P 500 / short gold position for an 11.53% gain in just 22 days of trading. We are also closing our long S&P 600 / short S&P 100 position - a play on de-globalization - for an 8.4% gain. Instead, we are initiating a strategic long U.S. small caps / short U.S. large caps, recommended jointly with our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou of the BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy. We are keeping our EuroStoxx VIX term-structure hedge due to mounting political risk in Europe. However, we are looking for an opening into European stocks in early 2017. For now, we are maintaining our long USD/EUR - return 4.2% since July - and long USD/SEK - return 2.25% since November. The first is a strategic play on our view that the ECB has to remain accommodative due to political risks in the European periphery. The latter is a way to articulate de-globalization via currencies, given that Sweden is one of the most open economies in the world. We are converting it from a tactical to a strategic recommendation. Finally, we are keeping our RMB short in place - via 12-month NDF. We do not think that Beijing will "blink" and defend its currency more aggressively just because Donald Trump is in charge of America. China is a much more powerful country than in the past, and cannot allow RMB appreciation at America's bidding. Our trade has returned 7.14% since December 2015. With the dollar bull market expected to continue and RMB depreciating, the biggest loser will be emerging markets. We are therefore keeping our strategic long DM / short EM recommendation, which has returned 56.5% since November 2012. We are particularly fond of shorting Brazilian and Turkish equities and are keeping both trades in place. However, we are initiating a long Russian equities / short EM equities. As an oil producer, Russia will benefit from the OPEC deal and the ongoing risks to Iraqi stability. In addition, we expect that removing sanctions against Russia will be on table for 2017. Europe will likely extend the sanctions for another six months, but beyond that the unity of the European position will be in question. And the United States is looking at a different approach. We wish our clients all the best in health, family, and investing in 2017. Thank you for your confidence in BCA's Geopolitical Strategy. Marko Papic Senior Vice President Matt Gertken Associate Editor Jesse Anak Kurri Research Analyst 1 In Michel Foucault's famous The Order of Things (1966), he argues that each period of human history has its own "episteme," or set of ordering conditions that define that epoch's "truth" and discourse. The premise is comparable to Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigms," which we have referenced in previous Strategic Outlooks. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2012," dated January 27, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Underestimating Sino-American Tensions," dated November 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, and "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2014 - Stay The Course: EM Risk - DM Reward," dated January 23, 2014, and Special Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 A military-security strategy necessary for British self-defense that also preserved peace on the European continent by undermining potential aggressors. 11 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trump And Trade," dated December 8, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see Max Weber, "The Three Types Of Legitimate Rule," Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4 (1): 1-11 (1958). Translated by Hans Gerth. Originally published in German in the journal Preussische Jahrbücher 182, 1-2 (1922). 16 We do not concern ourselves with traditional authority here, but the obvious examples are Persian Gulf monarchies. 17 Please see Francis Fukuyama, Political Order And Political Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). See also our review of this book, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Transformative Vs. Transactional Leadership," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see Irving Fisher, "The Debt-deflation Theory of Great Depressions," Econometrica 1(4) (1933): 337-357, available at fraser.stlouisfed.org. 20 Please see Milanovic, Branko, "Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: in History and Now," dated November 2012, Policy Research Working Paper 6250, World Bank, available at worldbank.org. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 In some way, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy was designed precisely to fill this role. It is difficult to see what would be the point of this service if our clients could get unbiased, investment-relevant, prescient, high-quality geopolitical news and analysis from the press. 24 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Roller Coaster," dated March 31, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 25 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Europe's Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration," dated November 2011, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 26 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 27 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 28 Despite winning an extraordinary six of the 13 continental regions in France in the first round, FN ended up winning zero in the second round. This even though the election occurred after the November 13 terrorist attack that ought to have buoyed the anti-migration, law and order, anti-establishment FN. The regional election is an instructive case of how the French two-round electoral system enables the establishment to remain in power. 29 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy: Asking The Wrong Question," dated December 1, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 30 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 31 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Cold War Redux?" dated March 12, 2014, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia: To Buy Or Not To Buy?" dated March 20, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 32 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia-West Showdown: The West, Not Putin, Is The 'Wild Card,'" dated July 31, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 33 Please see BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Russia's Trilemma And The Coming Power Paralysis," dated February 21, 2012, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 34 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Middle East: Saudi-Iranian Tensions Have Peaked," in Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 35 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 36 President Erdogan, speaking at the first Inter-Parliamentary Jerusalem Platform Symposium in Istanbul in November 2016, said that Turkey "entered [Syria] to end the rule of the tyrant al-Assad who terrorizes with state terror... We do not have an eye on Syrian soil. The issue is to provide lands to their real owners. That is to say we are there for the establishment of justice." 37 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," dated December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 38 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 39 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 40 In recent years, however, China's "official" defense budget statistics have understated its real spending, possibly by as much as half. 41 Please see "U.S. Election Update: Trump, Presidential Powers, And Investment Implications" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 42 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 43 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 44 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "China: Two Factions, One Party - Part II," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 45 The National Financial Work Conference will be one key event to watch for an updated reform agenda. 46 Please see "East Asia: Tensions Simmer ... Will They Boil?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 47 Please see "North Korea: A Red Herring No More?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 48 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, and "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 49 The Trump administration has signaled a policy shift through Trump's phone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. The "One China policy" is the foundation of China-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations depend on Washington's acceptance of it. The risk, then, is not so much an overt change to One China, a sure path to conflict, but the dynamic described above. 50 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Hong Kong: From Politics To Political Economy," dated September 8, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 51 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Can Russia Import Productivity From China?" dated June 29, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 52 Please see "Thailand: Upgrade Stocks To Overweight And Go Long THB Versus KRW" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 53 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, and "Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics," dated September 26, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 54 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "BREXIT Update: Brexit Means Brexit, Until Brexit," dated September 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 55 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 56 Please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 15, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Investors' justification for owning stocks has shifted from TINA - There Is No Alternative, to LISA - Let's Invest Somewhere, Anywhere. Long-term earnings expectations have broken out, suggesting that investors have greatly improved confidence about the health and longevity of the business cycle. Economic conditions are improving, but equity prices have overshot. The recent tightening in monetary conditions means that a payback period is ahead. OPEC has put a floor under oil prices; we expect WTI oil prices to average $55/bbl in 2017. Feature Equity market behavior since early November has been both incredible and incredulous. Instead of dropping spectacularly, as most pundits forecast ahead of a Trump win, the S&P 500 has gained 5.2% since November 8. The rally has occurred on the back of a modest improvement in recent economic data, and a lot on the back of hope. As we outlined in our November 21 report,1 there are as many market-negative proposals in Trump's plans as there are equity market-friendly ones. Indeed, it is incredulous that prices have rallied on so little good news. Not only have prices rallied, but there appears to be a fundamental shift in investors' expectations about long-term earnings prospects. Chart 1 shows five-year earnings for S&P 500 companies. Expectations have broken out of the low range that has reigned since the beginning of the Great Recession. It appears that investors' justification for owning stocks has shifted from TINA (There Is No Alternative) to LISA (Let's Invest Somewhere, Anywhere). Chart 1Sudden Optimism In The Long-Term Outlook! From 2010 until last year when the Fed started raising interest rates, "There Is No Alternative," or TINA, was the adage that best described the behavior of investors in a ZIRP/QE world, where cash earned nothing and there was a shortage of risk-free bonds. As central banks across the globe initiated quantitative easing by buying the safest assets and compressing their yields, investors were forced further out on the risk spectrum. This portfolio balance effect from QE first bid up non-Treasury fixed income products and then spilled over to fixed income equity proxies, such as REITs and higher dividend stocks. For instance, the S&P Dividend Aristocrats index, an aggregate of stable dividend-growing stocks, historically only ever outperformed the S&P 500 in recessions, when investors prefer to hide in relatively high-quality companies that consistently grow their dividends (Chart 2). But during this cycle, Dividend Aristocrats have handily outperformed the S&P 500 each year since 2009, as the index was an important TINA beneficiary. Now that the Fed is finally finding its groove in a new rate cycle (please see the section on page 5), cash is no longer earning zero (albeit it is still not particularly appealing), and Treasury yields are finally comfortably off their multi-decade lows. In other words, investors are beginning to once again have alternatives. Does this mean that investors are giving up on TINA? We think so, but what comes next is difficult to gauge. We have long argued that ending the dance with TINA would require one of two scenarios: 1) A drastic economic shock such as a recession that sends investors into cash and other safe havens, or 2) A significant change in the price of bonds that makes dividend yielding equities less attractive. The former is very unlikely given that a non-inflationary backdrop means that the Fed will not need to raise interest rates at a pace that will meaningfully impact growth. The second scenario is now underway, although the sustainability and magnitude of this trend is unclear. As we highlighted last week, bond yields have shot to undervalued territory, based on our indicators and assumptions about growth over the next year. True, it is encouraging that economic indicators have perked up in recent weeks. In particular, it is positive that there has been a noticeable uptick in consumer confidence over the past couple of months, particularly as job security is improving. Chart 3 summarizes a wide range of economic indicators that are showing recent strength: Global LEI, core PCE inflation, and the Global Manufacturing PMI are among those that have increased. Still, as the chart highlights, these improvements remain subdued and in some cases, recent data points have been too choppy to give a reliable signal. The ISM manufacturing survey is a case in point. Meanwhile, the ISM non-manufacturing survey headline index has jumped higher, as did the employment index. However, the forward-looking component, new orders, dropped. Chart 2TINA Pushed Investors##br## Into Yield Chart 3Momentum Strong Enough ##br##To Bid Up Equity Prices? This economic performance is at odds with the investor optimism captured in Chart 1: there is considerable discrepancy between market expectations and economic data. Granted, financial markets tend to be forward-looking, but the current message is that investors have drastically changed their view about the trajectory of growth and earnings. We do expect economic growth to improve in 2017, as consumers begin to spend more of their wage gains than over the past five years. But the headwinds to profit growth, notably a weak pricing backdrop, and a strong currency are still in place. We believe that market moves and investor sentiment has moved too far, too fast. This swing to optimism appears to be ushered in by LISA, Let's Invest Somewhere, Anywhere. With LISA, investors have traded in their forced justifications (i.e. the lack of alternatives) for unfounded ones (drastically improved long-term earnings outlook). In this environment, the likelihood of profit disappointments runs high. For now, LISA's disregard for fundamentals can prop up equity prices, but with monetary conditions tightening via a simultaneous rise in the dollar and bond yields, investor optimism is likely to be curtailed. Indeed, if bond investors begin to forecast the same rosy growth scenario as equity investors, then there is a danger that an overly aggressive re-pricing of the Fed rate path transpires (Chart 4). This after years of bond market expectations remaining lower than the Fed's dot-plot projections. Chart 4Bond Market Risk: From Underpricing To Overpricing The Fed? Fed Preview Bond market expectations for a rate hike on Wednesday are nearing 100%, which is consistent with our expectations. The Fed will raise interest rates and the only uncertainty is the extent of hawkishness in the accompanying FOMC statement and post-meeting press conference. Chart 5Inflation And Stimulus: Canadian Case Study At this point in the economic cycle, the pace of future rate hikes will depend much more on the Fed's outlook for inflation than for the labor market. As we wrote in a Special Report on November 28,2 the labor market is likely now nearing full employment, i.e. is tight enough to create modest upward pressure on wages. In other words, the Fed's objective of full employment has been - or is at least very close to - being met. Nonetheless, we are not worried about an imminent aggressive turn higher in inflation. True, if our economic forecast for next year pans out, then growth will run somewhat hotter than underlying trend growth (estimated by the Fed to be at 1.8%). That said, there are several headwinds that will keep inflation contained: The U.S. continues to import deflation from overseas. About one-third of the core PCE basket is core goods and prices continue to deflate. Recall that in the early 2000s business cycle recovery, even with a falling U.S. dollar, goods prices could not escape deflation. Retail prices, which represent about 30% of the total core PCE index, continue to deflate at a faster rate than at any point in the past fifteen years. Bond market inflation expectations have surged on the expected inflationary impact of Trump's political agenda. We concede that aggressive fiscal spending and larger budget deficits have the potential to spur inflation, but this is not yet a foregone conclusion. Investors looking for a roadmap for the impact of fiscal spending may turn to Canada. The Trudeau government was elected in October 2015 on a platform of fiscal spending and middle-income family tax cuts. According to the Bank of Canada this week, "the effects of federal infrastructure spending are not yet evident in the GDP data... business investment and non-energy goods exports continue to disappoint". Fourteen months after the election, inflation is still at 2% (Chart 5). A final point is that multiple statistical models refute the notion that a sustainable breach of the 2% inflation target is imminent. Last month, the Cleveland Fed published a report that showed that 5 out of 6 of the top Fed inflation models assign a less than 50% probability to inflation's being 2% or higher over the next three years!3 Our takeaway from their research is a reminder that even once the output gap closes, it can take a long time for inflation pressures to build and for inflation expectations to move higher. The bottom line is that it is too early to expect a shift in the message from the Fed. After the December rate hike, the Fed will maintain its policy of responding to incoming data. We expect minimal revisions to the Fed's economic and inflation forecasts and therefore to their expected rate path. An Update On Oil Two weeks ago, OPEC members agreed to cut 1.2 million barrels of its daily oil output, starting in January. After the initial knee-jerk reaction to a potentially tighter oil market next year (oil prices jumped 10%), prices have started to reverse. Doubts about OPEC's ability to stick to the quota are beginning to set in. According to a Reuters poll,4 most analysts expect cheating, and have doubts about whether quota cuts will be enough to rebalance markets. Our commodity strategists believe that OPEC will by and large respect the new quotas, primarily because both Russia and Saudi Arabia need higher prices. Both countries have consumed considerable foreign reserves to fund government expenditures following the price collapse. BCA estimates that Saudi Arabia will have burned through $220 billion in reserves between July 2014, just prior to its decision to launch OPEC's market-share war, and December 2016, equivalent to 30% of foreign reserves. Russia will have drawn down its official reserves by $77 billion over the same period, or 16% of its total holdings. Our commodity team expects to see evidence of the cuts begin to show up in February-March, in the form of falling commercial inventory levels. Even if actual cuts only amount to 60-70% of the volumes agreed at OPEC's November 30 meeting, OECD storage levels - combined commercial inventories of both crude oil and refined products - could fall by 10%, i.e. to about 2.75 billion barrels by the end of 2017Q3. This would put stocks roughly at their five-year average levels, the stated goal of OPEC, and its reason for negotiating the production cut (Chart 6). Chart 6Oil Inventories Normalizing Chart 7OPEC Putting A Floor At /bbl For WTI In sum, we believe that the OPEC agreement will at the very least put a floor under oil prices at around $45/bbl for WTI (Chart 7). We expect prices to average at $55/bbl in 2017. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com David Boucher, Editor/Strategist U.S. Investment Strategy davidb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Q&A: The Top Ten," dated November 21, 2016, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "U.S. Wage Growth: Paid In Full?," dated November 28, 2016, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 "The Likelihood of 2 Percent Inflation in the Next Three Years," Federal Reserve Bank Of Cleveland, November 29, 2016. 4 Please see "OPEC expected to deliver only half of target production cut: Kemp," published online by reuters.com on December 6, 2016. OPEC has invited Russia, Colombia, Congo, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Brunei to meet in Vienna Dec. 10, according to Reuters.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy If the Fed is about to begin interest rate re-normalization in earnest, then investors should heed the message from historic sector performance during tightening cycles. The tech sector remains vulnerable to tighter monetary conditions. Downshift communications equipment to neutral and stay clear of software. The OPEC supply agreement reinforces our current energy sector bias, overweight oil services and underweight refiners. Recent Changes S&P Communications Equipment - Reduce to neutral. Table 1 Feature Chart 1Why Is Equity Vol So Low? The equity market has been in a remarkably low volatility uptrend in recent weeks, powered by hopes that political regime shifts will invigorate growth. Signs of economic life have also played a role. The risk is that investors have pulled forward profit growth expectations on the basis of anticipated fiscal stimulus that may disappoint. In the meantime, the tighter domestic monetary conditions get, the less likely equity resilience can persist, especially in the face of rising instability in other financial markets. Volatility has jumped across asset classes, with the bond market leading the charge. The MOVE index of Treasury bond volatility has spiked. Typically, the MOVE leads the VIX index of implied equity market volatility (Chart 1, second panel). Currency and commodity price volatility has also picked up. It would be dangerous to assume that the equity market can remain so sedate. If the economy is about to grow in line with analysts double-digit profit growth expectations and/or what the surge in some cyclical sectors would suggest, then a re-pricing of Fed interest rate hike expectations is likely to persist. Against this backdrop, it is instructive to revisit historic sector performance during past Fed tightening cycles. If one views the next interest rate hike as the start of a sustained trend based on the steep trajectory of expected profit growth embedded in valuations and forecasts, then it is useful to use that as a starting point rather than last year's token 'one and done' interest rate hike. Charts 2 and 3 show the one-year and two-year average sector relative returns after Fed tightening cycles have commenced. A clear pattern is evident: defensive sectors have been the best performers by a wide margin, followed by financials, while cyclical sectors have underperformed over both time horizons. To be sure, every cycle is different, but this is a useful frame of reference for investors that have ramped up growth and cyclical sector earnings expectations in recent months. There has already been considerable tightening based on the Shadow Fed Funds Rate, a bond market-derived fed funds rate not bound by zero percent (Chart 4, shown inverted, top panel). The latter foreshadows a much tougher slog for the broad market. The point is that tighter monetary conditions can overwhelm valuation multiples and growth expectations. Chart 212-Month Performance After Fed Hikes Chart 324-Month Performance After Fed Hikes Chart 4A Blow-Off Top? The violent sub-surface equity rotation has presented a number of rebalancing opportunities. The defensive health care and consumer staples sectors have been shunned in recent weeks, with capital rotating into financials and industrials. As discussed previously, the industrials and materials sectors cannot rise in tandem for long with the U.S. dollar. These sectors should be used as a source of funds to take advantage of value creation in consumer discretionary, staples and health care where value has reappeared. Chart 5It's Not A ''Growth'' Trade Indeed, the abrupt jump in the cyclical vs. defensive share price ratio appears to have been driven solely by external forces, i.e. the sell-off in the bond market, rather than a shift in underlying operating profit drivers. For instance, emerging market (EM) equities and the cyclical vs. defensive share price ratio have tended to move hand-in-hand (Chart 5). The former are pro-cyclical, and outperform when economic growth prospects are perceived to be improving. Recent sharp EM underperformance has created a large negative divergence with the U.S. cyclical vs. defensive share price ratio. The surging U.S. dollar is a growth impediment for many developing countries with large foreign debt liabilities, and the lack of EM equity participation reinforces that the recent rise in industrials is not a one way bet. As a result, our preferred cyclical sector exposure lies in the consumer discretionary sector, and not in capital spending-geared deep cyclical sectors. A market weight in financials, utilities and energy is warranted, as discussed below, while the tech sector is vulnerable. A Roundtrip For The Tech Sector? After a semiconductor M&A-driven spurt of strength, the S&P technology sector has stumbled. As a long duration sector, technology has borne a disproportionate share of the backlash from a higher discount rate, similar to the taper-tantrum period in 2013. Then, bond yields soared as the Fed floated trial balloons about tapering QE. Tech stocks did not trough until yields peaked (Chart 6). In addition, a recovery in tech new orders confirmed that the sales outlook had brightened. Now, the capital spending outlook remains shaky, and tech new order growth is nil (Chart 6). Meanwhile, tech pricing power has nosedived (Chart 6). Domestic deflationary pressures are likely to intensify as the U.S. dollar appreciates, particularly against the manufacturing and tech-sensitive emerging Asian currencies. Tech sales growth is already sliding rapidly toward negative territory (Chart 7), with no reprieve in sight based on the contraction in emerging market exports, as well as U.S. consumer and capital goods import prices. Chart 6Tech Doesn't Like Rising Bond Yields Chart 7No Sales Growth True, tech stocks have a solid relative performance track record when the U.S. dollar initially embarks on a long-term bull market (Chart 8). Why? Because tech business models incorporate deflationary conditions, investors have been comfortable bidding up valuations in excess of the negative sales impact from a stronger U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, history shows that this relationship becomes untenable the longer currency appreciation persists. Chart 8 shows that in the final phase of the past two U.S. dollar bull markets, tech stocks have abruptly reversed course, rapidly ceding the previously accrued gains. Apart from a loss of competitiveness from currency strength, the new anti-globalization trend is bad for tech as it has the highest foreign sales exposure. The bottom line is that there is no rush to lift underweight tech sector allocations. In fact, we are further tweaking weightings to reduce exposure. For instance, software companies are worth another look through a bearish lens. Software sales growth is at risk from pricing power slippage amidst cooling final demand (Chart 9). Chart 8Beware Phase II Of Dollar Bull Markets Chart 9Sell Software... The financial sector is an influential technology sector end market. On the margin, financial companies are likely to reduce capital spending on the back of deteriorating credit quality. Chart 9 demonstrates that when financial sector corporate bond ratings start to trend negatively, it is a sign that software investment will stumble. A similar message is emanating from the decline in overall CEO confidence (Chart 10), which mirrors the relentless narrowing in the gap between the return on and cost of capital (Chart 8, bottom panel). Even C&I bank loans, previously an economic bright spot, are signaling that corporate sector demand for external funds and working capital are softening, consistent with slower capital spending. Against a backdrop of fading software M&A activity, we are skeptical that the S&P software index can maintain its premium valuation (Chart 11). Chart 10... Before Sales Erode Chart 11Not Worth A Premium Elsewhere, the communications equipment industry will have trouble sustaining this summer's outperformance. Communications equipment stocks broke out of a long-term downward sloping trend-line on the back of productivity improvement. Chart 12 shows that after a period of intense cost cutting, wage inflation was negative. Our productivity proxy, defined as sales/employment, is growing rapidly. These trends are supportive of profit margins, and at least a modest valuation re-rating from washed out levels. Nevertheless, our confidence that a major bullish trend change has occurred after years of underperformance has been shaken. The budding reacceleration in top-line growth has hit a snag. New orders for communications equipment have rolled over relative to inventories. Investment in communications equipment has dipped (Chart 13). The telecom services sector has scaled back capital spending (Chart 13, third panel), suggesting that final demand will continue to soften. It will be difficult for companies to maintain high productivity if revenue growth stagnates. Chart 12Productivity Strength... Chart 13... May Be Pressured Consequently, the most likely scenario is that relative performance is entering a base-building phase rather than a new bull market, warranting benchmark weightings. Bottom Line: Reduce the S&P communications equipment index (BLBG: S5COMM - CSCO, MSI, HRS, JNPR, FFIV) to neutral, in a move to further reduce underweight tech sector exposure. Stay underweight software (BLBG: S5SOFT - MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, INTU, ATVI, EA, ADSK, SYMC, RHT, CTXS, CA). Energy Strategy Post-OPEC Production Cut Chart 14Energy Stocks Need Rising Oil Prices The energy sector continues to mark time relative to the broad market, but that has masked furious sub-surface movement. We have maintained a benchmark exposure to the broad sector since the spring, but shifted our sub-industry exposure in October to favor oil field services over producers, while underemphasizing refiners. OPEC's recent agreement to trim flatters this positioning. Whether OPEC's announcement actually feeds through into meaningfully lower production next year and higher oil prices remains to be seen, but at a minimum, supply discipline should put a floor under prices. Rather than expecting the overall energy sector to break out of its lateral move relative to the broad market, we continue to recommend a targeted approach. The energy sector requires sustained higher commodity prices to outperform, and our concern is that a trading range is more likely (Chart 14). OPEC producers suffered considerable pain over the last two years as they overproduced in order to starve marginal producers of the capital needed for reinvestment. U.S. shale producers slashed capital expenditures by 65% from 2014 to 2016, and the International Oil Companies (IOCs) cut capital expenditures by 40% over the same period. Chart 15 shows that only OPEC has been expanding production. That has set the stage for limited global production growth, allowing for demand growth to eat into overstocked crude inventories in the coming years. OPEC's decision to trim output should mitigate downside commodity price risks, providing debt and equity markets with confidence to increase capital availability to the sector. With a lower cost and easier access to capital, producers, especially shale, will be able to accelerate drilling programs. The rig count has already troughed. The growth in OECD oil inventories has crested, which is consistent with a gradual rise in the number of active drilling rigs. As oversupply is absorbed, investment in oil field services will accelerate, unlocking relative value in the energy services space (Chart 16). Chart 15OPEC Cuts Would Help... Chart 16... Erode Excess Oil Supply This overweight position is still high risk, because it will take time to absorb the excesses from the previous drilling cycle. There is still considerable overcapacity in the oil field services industry, as measured by our idle rig proxy. Pricing power does not typically return until the latter rises above 1 (Chart 17). Companies will be eager to put crews to work and better cover overhead, and may accept suboptimal pricing, at least initially. Meanwhile, if EM currencies continue to weaken, confidence in EM oil demand growth may be shaken, eroding valuations. Still, we are willing to accept these risks, but will keep this overweight position on a tight leash and will take profits if OPEC does not follow through with plans to limit production. On the flipside, refiners will not receive any relief in feedstock prices, which should ensure that the gap between Brent and WTI prices remains non-existent (Chart 18). That is a strain on refining margins. Our model warns that there is little profit upside ahead. That is confirmed by both domestic and global trends. Chart 17Risks To A Sustained Rally Chart 18Sell Refiners Chart 19Global Capacity Growth Refiners have continued to produce flat out, even as domestic crude production has dropped (Chart 18). As a result, inventories of gasoline and distillates have surged, despite solid consumption growth. In fact, refined product output is about to eclipse the rate of consumption growth, which implies persistently swelling inventories. There is no export outlet to relieve excess supply. U.S. exports are becoming much less competitive on the back of U.S. dollar strength and the elimination of the gap between WTI and Brent input costs (Chart 19). Moreover, rising capacity abroad has trigged an acceleration of refined product exports in a number of low cost producer countries, including India, China and Saudi Arabia (Chart 19). Increased global refining capacity is a structural trend, and will keep valuation multiples lower than otherwise would be the case. The relative price/sales ratio is testing cyclical peaks, warning that downside risks remain acute. Bottom Line: Maintain a neutral overall sector weighting, with outsized exposure to the oil & gas field services industry (BLBG: S5ENRE - SLB, HAL, BHI, NOV, HP, FTI, RIG), and undersized allocations to the refining group (BLBG: S5OILR - PSX, VLO, MPC, TSO). Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and growth over value.

Highlights Dear Client, This week's BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy contains our 2017 Outlook for Energy markets. After surprising the markets with a production cut last week, OPEC and Russia likely will do so again with a successful implementation of their agreement next year. Even if they only get buy-in on 60% to 70% of the 1.8 mm b/d in cuts they believe they've secured, production cuts and natural declines in production that are not reversed via enhanced oil recovery (EOR) will accelerate the drawdown in global crude oil and refined products inventories, which is the stated goal of the agreement. We expect the U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl next year, up $5 from our previous forecast, on the back of last week's announced cut. We are moving the bottom of the range in which we expect WTI prices to trade most of the time next year to $45/bbl and keeping the upside at $65/bbl. For 2018 and beyond, our conviction is lower: The massive capex cuts seen in the industry will place an enormous burden on shale producers and conventional oil producers - chiefly Gulf Arab producers and Russia - to offset natural decline-curve losses and meet increasing demand. Any sign either or both will not be able to move quickly enough to meet growing demand and replace natural declines could spike prices further out the curve. For the international benchmark, Brent crude oil, things get a bit complicated next year: As the spread between Brent and WTI prices widens - the Feb17 spread was pricing at ~ $2.10/bbl earlier this week (Brent over) - we expect U.S. WTI exports to increase from current levels averaging ~ 500k b/d, which should keep the price differential in check next year. For the near term, we are using a +$1.50/bbl differential (Brent over) for our 2017 central tendency, although this could narrow and invert as U.S. exports grow. We closed out our long Feb/17 Brent $50/$55 call spread last week - recommended November 3, 2016, expecting OPEC and Russia to agree a production cut - with a 156% indicated profit. We are taking profits of 80.6% on our long Aug/17 WTI vs. short Nov/17 WTI, basis Tuesday's close, and replacing it with a long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI spread at today's closing levels, expecting backwardation to widen next year. We remain bullish U.S. natural gas near term, given reduced year-on-year production growth going into year-end. A normal-to-colder winter will be especially bullish. We remain long 2017Q1 natural gas, which is up 21.1% since we recommended the position on November 2, 2016. Longer term, we are neutral natgas, expecting production growth to resume in 2017. Kindest regards, Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Feature KSA, Russia Deal Drives Oil Prices In 2017 The evolution of oil prices next year will be dominated by the agreement between OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC, with Russia in the lead, to cut production by up to 1.8 mm b/d. The stated volumes to be cut are comprised of 1.2 mm from OPEC, 300k b/d from Russia, and another 300 from other non-OPEC producers. Later this week, other non-OPEC producers are scheduled to arrive in Vienna to discuss cuts they will pledge to make starting in January. Non-OPEC production is down ~ 900k b/d this year, according to the IEA's November Oil Market Report, so it is difficult to see where these cuts will come from. Outside Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman, anything coming out of the meetings with non-OPEC producers in Vienna this week will be decline-curve losses disguised as production cuts. Still, it means they're not funding EOR programs to replace lost production (e.g., China's 10% yoy losses). Even if actual cuts only amount to 60 - 70% of the volumes agreed at OPEC's November 30 meeting in Vienna, we expect OECD storage levels - combined commercial inventories of both crude oil and refined products - to fall some 10%, or 300 million bbls, to ~ 2.75 billion bbls by the end of 2017Q3. This would put stocks roughly at their five-year average levels, the stated goal of OPEC, and its reason for negotiating the production cut (Chart of the Week). In addition, this will flatten the forward Brent and WTI curves, and deepen an already-developing backwardation in WTI beginning with contracts delivering in December 2017 (Chart 2). This will reverse the contango structure in place since mid-2014, which allowed commercial OECD oil inventories to swell by 400 mm bbls, and non-OECD inventories to increase by 240 mm bbls, according to OPEC estimates. Chart of the WeekOPEC's, Russia's Goal: Normalize Storage##br## To Five-year Average Level Chart 2Backwardation Expected ##br##In WTI And Brent Analysts Expect Cheating On The Deal Most analysts expect cheating on this deal: OPEC's production is expected to fall to 33mm b/d following production cuts, from a record high in November of 34.2mm b/d, according to a Reuters poll.1 At 33mm b/d, OPEC's output would be 500k b/d above the targeted production level of 32.5mm b/d agreed at OPEC's November 30 meeting in Vienna with Russia (Table 1). In other words, most analysts think OPEC will only deliver 700k b/d of the 1.2 mm b/d it pledged to cut under this deal. We disagree. Table 1Allocation of OPEC Cuts This Deal's Going To Work: KSA And Russia Want And Need It OPEC's goal is to get inventories back to 5-year average levels. The Cartel's latest Monthly Oil Market Report puts the global stock overhang at 304mm over the 5-year average, just slightly over our calculated value to end October (Chart of the Week).2 To get stocks to the 5-year average level by the end of June 2017 - when the Vienna agreement runs out - would require an average weekly draw of ~ 11.7mm bbl in OECD oil and products stocks, or roughly 1.7mm b/d. Between normal decline-curve losses and the production cuts, if KSA and Russia got full compliance on this deal, it stands a good chance of meeting OPEC's goal by the end of June. Even if they don't and get, say, a total of 1.1 to 1.2mm b/d in cuts from OPEC and non-OPEC producers, the Agreement's storage goal will be achieved by the end of 2017Q3 or the beginning of Q4. Chart 3KSA And Russia Need To Back Off ##br##After Near-Vertical Output Increases Unlike past production-cut deals, we think there is a good chance KSA and Russia will get fairly high compliance on this agreement. Given the results of the Reuters survey on expected compliance, our out-of-consensus call is predicated on our belief this round of cuts is fundamentally different from what we've seen before. KSA and Russia - and their allies - want and need this deal. KSA and Russia have made their point by massively increasing production in a down market, but both now need to - and want to - back off of flogging their fields and driving prices lower (Chart 3). Given the extremely high dependence both have on oil revenues, they need higher prices.3 For starters, Russia was an active participant in this deal: its energy minister, Alexander Novak, told KSA's oil minister, Khalid Al-Falih, Russia would cut - not freeze - production in the lead-up to the November 30 meeting, and would contribute half the cut OPEC wanted from producers outside the Cartel. In addition, Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, was "directly involved" in the deal, mediating between KSA and its arch rival Iran, according to various press reports.4 Politically, after having invested so much capital, we do not think Russia will backslide on this agreement. There may be some fudging on what actually constitutes a "cut" - e.g., 2017Q1 maintenance that removes 200k b/d or so from production may be called a "cut" - but by Q2 we expect to see the full 300k b/d cut taken. By the same token, we do not think KSA will backslide on its commitment. Saudi's new oil minister Al-Falih invested considerable political capital in getting a deal done, as well, over the course of meetings in Algiers, Istanbul and finally around the November 30 Vienna meeting. Practically, both KSA and Russia have burned through considerable foreign reserves to fund government expenditures following the price collapse (Chart 4). By our estimates, KSA will have burned through $220 billion in reserves between July 2014, just prior to its decision to launch OPEC's market-share war, and December 2016, equivalent to 30% of foreign reserves. Russia will have drawn down its official reserves by $77 billion over the same period, or 16% of its total holdings. Chart 4Lower Oil Prices Forced KSA And Russia ##br##To Burn Through Reserves In addition, both want to tap foreign direct investment (FDI) for cash, investments and technology, and will find it difficult to do so if oil markets remain chronically oversupplied and subject to large downdrafts as producers relentlessly increase production, as we noted in recent research.5 Both KSA and Russia are working on larger agendas next year and 2018. And both require higher prices. They cannot afford to run down reserves any further. Russia is looking to sell 19.5% of Rosneft, after the state pushed through a $5.2 billion merger with Bashneft in October. KSA is looking to issue additional debt, having raised $17.5 billion in October, and will look to IPO 5% of state-owned Aramco next year or in 2018. Both must convince FDI that money invested in their economies will not be wasted because oil production cannot be reined in. And, they both must attend to increasingly restive populations. As a result of the production cuts, KSA's and Russia's export revenues will increase: KSA's 2017 oil export revenues will increase by close to $17.5 billion, and Russia's will increase by ~ $9 billion, following the ~ $10/bbl lift in oil prices the agreement has provided. Both will be able to lever their production to support more debt issuance. KSA will need that leverage to pull off the diversification it is attempting under its Vision 2030 initiative. Russia needs higher prices for its secondary offering of Rosneft, and to get some much-needed breathing room for its budget after years of sanctions, recession and lower government revenues. We would not be surprised if Russia sees additional production cuts next year, which will goose prices a little and put a firmer support under the ~ $50/bbl floor (basis Brent crude oil prices). Given the dire straits in which Russia finds itself, the government likely will increase taxes in 2017, which will result in lower production at the margin. We expect, however, that this will be spun in such a way as to show that when Putin gets involved, positive results occur.6 KSA's Allies Will Cut; Iran And Iraq Are Maxed Out For Now We believe this is a deal that will hold up, which, net, will generate something along the lines of 1.1 to 1.2mm b/d in production cuts in 2017H1. UAE and Kuwait can be counted on to support KSA, as they always have, and cut. And Oman - now at 1mm b/d - will step up for a small slug of the cuts too, and have said they'll match OPEC up to a 10% cut. Iran and Iraq have taken production as far as it can go over the next six months to a year, and do not represent a threat to the KSA-Russia deal (Chart 5). Iran's maxed out - they're not capable of adding all that much to their current 3.7mm b/d output. Iraq could cheat, but we don't think they can go much above 4.5mm b/d, despite their assertion they're at 4.7 mm b/d. Besides, producing at 4.4mm b/d, per the agreement, will produce more revenue for them at higher prices than producing 4.7 mm b/d at lower prices (if they actually could get to that level), and they realize that. According to press reports, Iraq only signed on to the deal in Vienna after they saw the rally in prices following leaks a deal had been reached. Maybe at this time next year, they will have mobilized some FDI to get production ramping, but even that's doubtful. With the exception of Libya and Nigeria - both of which are exempt under this deal - everyone in OPEC outside Iraq, KSA and the GCC OPEC members is producing at max (Chart 6). Libya and Nigeria are equally likely to raise output as prices increase as they are to lose output. The higher prices go the more likely these states are to see increased violence, as warring factions within their borders vie for control of rising oil revenues. Internal conflicts have not been resolved: Any increase in prices accompanied by increased production gives the warring factions more to fight over. The expected value of their increased production next year is therefore zero. Chart 5KSA's Allies Will Support It;##br## Iran, Iraq Maxed Out Chart 6Most Of OPEC Ex Gulf States ##br##Also Are Producing At Max Levels U.S. Shale Production Will Rise We expect to see evidence of the cuts contained in the KSA-Russia deal to begin showing up in the February - March period, in the form of falling commercial inventory levels. The only thing that can destabilize the six-month KSA-Russia deal is U.S. shale-oil production coming back faster and stronger than expected (Chart 7). Pre-cut, we (and the U.S. EIA) estimated U.S. shale production would bottom in late 2017Q1, and then start re-expansion as rig counts rose to sufficient levels. However, overall 2017 production would be 200 - 300 kb/d lower than 2016 production. Chart 7If U.S. Shale Ramps Too Quickly ##br##KSA-Russia Deal Could Unravel If, as we expect, the higher oil price caused by the KSA-Russia deal results in an increase of only ~ 200 kb/d above this estimate, with the production response substantially occurring in the second half of 2017, there's a good chance this deal can hold together and get global commercial oil stocks down to average levels by September 2017. As we've argued, KSA and Russia already have to have factored that in. The apparent average breakeven for the U.S. producers (including a return on capital) appears to be ~ $55/bbl, which could pop above $60 from time to time next year as the long process of restoring U.S. production plays out.7 Having the international oil market pricing at the marginal cost of U.S. shale producers is a lot better for KSA, Russia and the rest of the distressed, low-cost sovereign producers than the low-$40s that cleared the market a few weeks ago. As long as the global market is pricing to shale economics at the margin, these states earn economic rent. Too fast a move to or through the $65 - $75/bbl range would no doubt produce a short-term revenue jump for cash-strapped producers - particularly those OPEC members outside the GCC. But it also would make most of the U.S. shales economic to develop, and incentivize the development of other "lumpy," expensive production that does not turn off quickly once it is brought on line (e.g., oil sands and deepwater). This ultimately would crash prices over the longer term, making it difficult for the industry to attract capital. This is not an ideal outcome for KSA's planned IPO of Aramco, or Russia's sale of 19.5% of Rosneft, or their investors. Even so, reinvestment has to be stimulated with higher oil prices in the not-too-distant future, most likely in 2018. Oil production so far has barely started to show the negative production ramifications of the $1+ trillion cuts to capex that will occur between 2015 and 2020, resulting in some 7mm b/d of oil-equivalent production not being available to the market. We expect the effects of this foregone production to show up over the next four years, and believe there is not much producers, particularly International Oil Companies (IOCs), can do to stop it, since their mega-project investments generally require 3-5 years from the time spending decisions are made until first oil is produced. Chart 8Accelerating Decline Rates And##br## Steady Demand Will Stress Shale Producers With such huge cuts to future expenditures, and enormous amounts of debt incurred by the IOCs to pay for the completion of legacy mega-projects that will need to be repaid ($130B in debt added in the past two years), OPEC could see a looming shortage of oil developing later this decade if IOC-sponsored offshore production falls into steep declines, as we think is likely. With U.S. shales accounting for a larger share of global production, the global decline curve will accelerate from our estimated current level of 8 - 10% p.a. This will be happening as oil demand continues to grow 1.2 - 1.5mm b/d over the 2017 - 2020 interval (Chart 8). These massive capex cuts seen in the industry since OPEC's market-share war was launched in November 2014 will place an enormous burden on shale producers and conventional oil producers - chiefly Gulf Arab producers and Russia - to offset natural decline-curve losses and meet increasing demand. Any sign either or both will not be able to move quickly enough to meet growing demand could spike prices further out the curve, as we've noted in previously. Investment Implications Of BCA's Oil View The KSA-Russia deal is short term - it expires in June, but is "extendable for another six months to take into account prevailing market conditions and prospects," according to terms of the Agreement contained in the OPEC press release of November 30. This forces investors to take relatively tactical positions in the oil markets, with some optionality for longer-dated exposure. We closed out our long Feb/16 Brent $50/$55 call spread last week - recommended November 3, 2016, expecting OPEC and Russia to agree a production cut - with a 156% indicated profit (using closing prices). We are taking profits of 80.6% on our long Aug/17 WTI vs. short Nov/17 WTI, basis Tuesday's close, and replacing it with a long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI spread at today's closing levels, expecting backwardation to widen next year. This is a strategic recommendation, which also will give us exposure to higher prices by the end of 2017. We will look for overshoots on the downside to get long options exposures again, and longer dated exposures as well. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "OPEC expected to deliver only half of target production cut: Kemp," published online by reuters.com on December 6, 2016. OPEC has invited Russia, Colombia, Congo, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Brunei to meet in Vienna Dec. 10, according to Reuters. 2 Please see the feature article in last month's OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published November 11, 2016, "Developments in global oil inventories," beginning on p. 3. 3 Please see "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash," in the September 8, 2016, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Exclusive: How Putin, Khamenei and Saudi prince got OPEC Deal Done," published by reuters.com on December 1, 2016, and "OPEC Deal Hinged on 2 a.m. Phone Call and It Nearly Failed," published on line by bloomberg.com on December 1, 2016. See also Russia Today's online article "Putin 'directly involved' in OPEC reaching production cut deal," published December 2, 2016, on rt.com, which also details Putin's meetings months prior with KSA Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the G20 meeting in China. 5 Please see issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "The OPEC Debate", dated November 24, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Lukoil officials are talking up production cuts and possible tax hikes in Iranian and Arab media: Here is an Iranian outlet (https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/54595/lukoil-sees-60-oil-in-2017), and an Arab outlet with a longer version of the same TASS story (http://www.tradearabia.com/news/OGN_317517.html). Concerns re possible tax increases next year, which will force production lower, appear in the second-to-last paragraph. 7 Please see pp. 22 - 23 of "From Boom to Gloom: Energy States After the Oil Bust," presented by Mine Yucel, Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, July 12, 2016, for a discussion of shale breakevens. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades

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Highlights The brief history of our model portfolios is a tale of two regions: our global portfolios are beating their benchmarks by an aggregate 350 basis points ("bps"), while our U.S. portfolios lag by 55 bps. Defensive sector tilts weighed on all four portfolios, but market-cap tilts gave the U.S. portfolios a big boost, and currency-hedged country and fixed-income positions turbocharged global portfolio performance. We expect to see bond yields, the dollar and DM equity prices higher at year-end 2017 and our portfolio positioning will continue to reflect these broad themes. True inflection points are few and far between, but the U.S. will at least experience a sugar rush, and we are adding some credit risk while walking back some of our defensive equity positioning to prepare for it. Table 1Summary Portfolio Performance Feature This report presents the first review of our model portfolios, which have now been live for seven weeks. Going forward, we will review them in our first publication of every month. The reviews will have two components: an ex-post examination of portfolio performance and an ex-ante discussion of our outlook. Both components are meant to foster transparency, with the ex-post component opening a window on our ongoing efforts to improve our process, and the ex-ante component shining a light on how our views are evolving in real time. Results To Date Our model portfolios have outperformed, on balance, over their first two months, but the aggregate results cover over a fault line between U.S. and global portfolio performance. The U.S. Long-Only portfolio is just even with its benchmark and the Long/Short lags by 55 bps, (Table 1). The disparity highlights the way dollar moves can create international opportunities. Being on the right side of the greenback helped us generate alpha despite dreadful sector positioning. Portfolio Performance Attribution We track portfolio attribution on up to six applicable dimensions. For all the portfolios, we consider Asset Allocation, Equity Sector Allocation and Fixed Income Category Allocation. If the Equity portion of the portfolios has any mid- or small-cap exposures, we track Market Cap Allocation; if it has multi-country exposures, we track Country Allocation; and if it has short positions, we track Long/Short Allocation based on the contribution from its long/short pairs. Since all of the portfolios were initially set to match our benchmark asset allocations (60% Equity/37.5% Fixed Income/2.5% Cash), we have no Asset Allocation attribution to report in this update (Table 2). Table 2Applicable Attribution Sources U.S. Long-Only Our U.S. Long-Only portfolio (Table 3) outperformed its benchmark by 1 basis point through November 30.1 Market cap allocation paved the way to the outperformance, as small- and mid-cap stocks zoomed higher following the election (Table 4). Our fixed-income category allocations helped, as well, with the outperformance of our income hybrids bucket and our sizable underweight in lagging investment-grade corporates more than making up for our zero weight in outperforming high yield (Table 5, bottom panel). The gains were consumed by equity sector underperformance, which labored mightily under an inopportune defensive bias (Table 5, top panel). Table 3U.S. Long-Only Model Portfolio: Absolute Performance By Position Table 4U.S. Relative Performance Contribution From Market-Cap PositioningTable 5U.S. Relative Performance Contribution From Sector Positioning U.S. Long/Short Our U.S. Long/Short portfolio (Table 6) underperformed its benchmark by 55 basis points through November 30.2 Larger defensive sector tilts weighed on the long/short portfolio relative to its long-only counterpart, compounded by short positions in cyclical sectors (Table 7, bottom panel). Our fixed-income pairs fared better: while the HYG short/LQD long detracted from performance, the IEF short/TIP long was able to offset it (Table 7, top panel). The former, an anti-credit risk (and duration-extending) play, was poorly positioned on both counts, but the latter was well positioned to reap the benefit of the pickup in inflation expectations. Table 6U.S. Long/Short Model Portfolio: Absolute Performance By Position Table 7U.S. Relative Performance Contribution From Long/Short Pairs Global Long-Only Our Global Long-Only portfolio (Table 8) outperformed its benchmark by 188 basis points through November 30.3 Successful country positioning contributed to the sizable outperformance, as the (currency-hedged) Japan overweight was a rousing success (Table 9). Fixed-income category allocations were also big winners, driven by the currency-hedged non-U.S. aggregate exposure (BNDX) and the U.S. aggregate (AGG) and corporate holdings (LQD), which more than offset the drag from the unhedged international sovereign exposure (BWX) (Table 10, bottom panel). Only equity sector allocations weighed on the portfolio, as both Staples and Health Care were drubbed by the benchmark index (Table 10, top panel). Table 8Global Long-Only Model Portfolio: Absolute Performance By Position Table 9Global Relative Performance Contribution From Country PositioningTable 10Global Relative Performance Contribution From Sector Positioning Global Long/Short Our Global Long/Short portfolio (Table 11) outperformed its benchmark by 166 basis points through November 30.4 Just like its U.S. counterpart, the global Long/Short portfolio was weighed down by its wrong-footed long defensives/short cyclicals pairs (Table 12). Country long/short pairs paid off nicely, however, especially in November, as emerging markets with sizable current account deficits, like Turkey and Brazil, underperformed their less dollar-vulnerable peers. Our fixed-income long/short pairs also outperformed, albeit by a smaller margin. Table 11Global Long/Short Model Portfolio: Absolute Performance By Position Table 12Global Relative Performance Contribution From Long/Short Pairs How Our Views Fared Rates, Inflation And Credit Markets rewarded two of the four components of our fixed-income view. U.S. inflation expectations surged (Chart 1) and developed-world sovereigns proved to be an especially poor value, as the aggregate G7 economies' 10-year bond yield spiked faster than at any point since the taper tantrum in 2013 (Chart 2). These views, expressed as portfolio tilts - underweight fixed income, own TIPS and hold duration at or below benchmark duration - worked well when translated to portfolio positions, as noted above. Chart 1Inflation Expectations Spiked... Chart 2...And So Did Nominal Yields The bear-flattening call turned out to be a dud, as the Treasury yield curve steepened despite the looming Fed tightening cycle. Overwhelmed by our anti-duration call, though, it had no meaningful portfolio impact. Our credit-bearish call was a central fixed-income pillar in all four of our portfolios, and it did constrain performance as high yield outperformed at home and abroad. Yields may well be due to pull back following their November surge, but we see them ending 2017 higher, making credit's positive carry an attractive buffer against rising rates. Economic Growth And Corporate Earnings Our concerns that the equity rally has become uncomfortably stretched, and that U.S. corporate margins face downward pressure, did not amount to anything over the last two months. Since we maintained benchmark equity weightings across all of our portfolios, however, our too-early views did not affect performance. We expressed our defensives-over-cyclicals view in every portfolio's sector allocations to the detriment of performance across the board. Thanks to currency-hedged Japanese equities' surge, the global portfolios benefitted slightly from our view that European and Japanese multinationals would find the going easier than their U.S. counterparts, and we remain optimistic about the potential for a relative European profit inflection. New And Revised Views Rates, Inflation And Credit There are still too many unknowns about the details of policy proposals to assess whether or not the U.S. is on the cusp of sustained growth acceleration, but the incoming administration, supported by a compliant Congress, can unquestionably bestow a sugar rush. The credit upshot is that it will be harder to default if both growth and inflation get a fillip in 2017. The curve is likely to steepen on the grounds that our bond strategists expect the Fed to allow inflation expectations to gather momentum before it signals an increased pace of hikes and a higher terminal rate. The bond vigilantes could add to the upward pressure on long rates if they ever stir from their long hibernation. It would be entirely reasonable for yields to retrace at least a portion of their sudden and sizable move, and our U.S. Bond Strategy service has moved to benchmark duration to position for near-term consolidation. It still sees long rates higher a year from now, though, and we are not going to wait to add some carry to the portfolio. We are replacing our U.S. REIT exposure with business development company exposure via the BIZD ETF, which will add some beta along with credit exposure. We are going to add bank loans in the form of the BKLN ETF, providing some rate protection (bank loans carry floating rates) and allowing us to dip our toe into the most senior tranche of the high-yield space. BKLN will push our Treasuries exposure to below benchmark,5 but we will maintain Treasury duration near benchmark in line with our bond strategists' tactical guidance. We will look to exit our TLT position on a 10-year rally back to the 2-2.2% range. Chart 3Pigs Get Slaughtered Cyclicals Versus Defensives The uncertainty around the impact of the incoming administration's proposed policies keeps us from fully reversing course on our cyclicals/defensives positioning. But our conviction about higher rates increases our remorse at overstaying our welcome in Staples and Telcos (Chart 3). As an analogue to positioning for near-term economic acceleration by taking on some credit risk, we're shifting capital away from rate-driven Staples and Telecom to Discretionaries and Energy. Our exit from Swiss equities in the global portfolios furthers our move to more neutral intra-equity settings. We are adding Energy exposure to all of the portfolios to reflect our strategists' bullish take on crude oil. The recently agreed OPEC-Russia production cuts will fuel inventory drawdowns that will keep crude prices from falling below $50. Our Energy Sector Strategy service argues that U.S. shale producers will reap the greatest benefits, as $50+ crude will allow them to accelerate oilfield reinvestment and grow production in 2017. We are therefore adding FRAK, an ETF dominated by U.S. shale oil and natural gas producers, to our U.S. portfolios.6 Other Portfolio Changes Aside from dialing back our defensive equity positioning and embracing some credit risk, our biggest change has been to pull in our horns on the sector tilts across all of our portfolios. We are chastened by being off-sides with our sector calls and are pulling back until we have a better sense of direction. We are waiting in all portfolios for an opportune time to shorten duration. We expect to maintain our sizable income hybrids sleeve as the nascent bond bear market grinds along. Table 13 shows our revised U.S. Long-Only portfolio. As mentioned above, it no longer shuns cyclical sector or credit exposures and will continue to evolve with the anticipated direction of the economy. We have chosen not to rebalance our mid- and small-cap exposures and we would be happy to increase them if they retrace some of their relative gains in the near term. The U.S. Long/Short portfolio (Table 14) is effectively an amplified version of the Long-Only portfolio but its sector tilts are being trimmed considerably as well. Table 13Revised U.S. Long-Only Model Portfolio Table 14Revised U.S. Long/Short Model Portfolio The changes to our Global Long-Only portfolio mute its defensive bias and attempt to simplify it by removing standalone currency-hedging positions (Table 15). We substitute HEWU, the currency-hedged version of EWU, for our existing EWU/FXB pair, giving up some liquidity to save on ETF and borrow fees. We clean up the other currency short by exiting our Swiss equity position, which is no longer needed now that we are dialing back the portfolio's defensive cast. We exit BWX and reallocate its proceeds to BNDX and AGG to simplify the portfolio and remove incremental sovereign and currency exposure. We replace LQD with JNK to introduce a modest high-yield exposure to the portfolio. Table 15Revised Global Long-Only Model Portfolio Like its U.S. counterpart, our Global Long/Short portfolio is significantly dialing back its sector tilts (Table 16). The Staples, Telco and Utilities overweights are being eliminated, along with the Financials short. The Health Care overweight and the corresponding Industrials and Tech shorts have been reduced. As in the Long-Only portfolio, we are exiting Switzerland and redeploying the proceeds in Energy, Discretionaries and a slightly reduced U.S. underweight. We are replacing the incremental exposure to U.S. Investment Grade (LQD) with High Yield (JNK), reflecting our U.S. rates and credit view. With the addition of JNK, we are taking the opportunity to do a little housecleaning by replacing the U.S. leg of our EM junk spread-widening pair, formerly HYG, with JNK, which better aligns with our portfolio benchmark and is 10 bps cheaper per annum. Table 16Revised Global Long/Short Model Portfolio Doug Peta, Vice President Global ETF Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Through December 5th, the U.S. Long-Only portfolio is in line with its benchmark. 2 Through December 5th, the U.S. Long/Short portfolio has underperformed by 65 basis points. 3 Through December 5th, the Global Long-Only portfolio has outperformed by 184 basis points. 4 Through December 5th, the Global Long/Short portfolio has outperformed by 160 basis points. 5 In our October 12th Special Report introducing the model portfolios, we referred to outdated Aggregate/High Yield proportions in our U.S. and global fixed income benchmarks. Based on the outstanding value of the bonds in the indexes, the correct U.S. breakdown is 90/10 AGG/HY and the correct global breakdown is 93/7 AGG/HY, not 95/5 as originally stated. Our performance attribution calculations reflect the correct benchmarks. 6 For more information on the shale producers and the effects of the OPEC cuts, please see the following Energy Sector Strategy reports, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com: Constructive On U.S. Shale Producers And Select Service Companies, published July 6, 2016; The OPEC Debate, published November 23, 2016; and Recommendation Additions & Changes Following OPEC's Cut, published December 7, 2016.

特別レポート

President-elect Trump and the specter of his spendthrift policy proposals have generated significant client interest/inquiries on equities and inflation - not asset prices, but of the more traditional kind: consumer price inflation. Chart 1 shows that a little bit of inflation would be positive for the broad equity market, further fueling the high-risk, liquidity-driven blow off phase. However, when inflation has reached 3.7%-4% in the past, the broad equity market has stumbled (Chart 2). Sizeable tax cuts, increased infrastructure and defense spending (i.e. loose fiscal policy), protectionism and a tougher stance on immigration are inherently inflationary policies (and bond price negative) ceteris paribus. Chart 1A Whiff Of Inflation##br## Is Good For Stocks... Chart 2...But Too Much ##br##Is Restrictive However, our working assumption is that in the next 9-12 months, CPI headline inflation will only renormalize, rather than surge. Importantly, the magnitude and timing of the implementation of Trump's policy pledges is unknown. Moreover, the Fed's reaction function is also uncertain, and the resulting economic growth and U.S. dollar impact will be critical in determining whether any lasting inflation acceleration occurs. Table 1 For global inflation to take root beyond the short term, Europe and Japan would also have to follow Canada's and America's fiscal largesse to swing the global deflation/inflation pendulum toward sustained inflation. The Fed's Reaction Function Our sense is that a Yellen-led Fed will allow for some inflation overshoot to materialize. This view was originally posited in her 2012 "optimal control"1 speech and more recently reiterated with her mid-October speech emphasizing "temporarily running a "high-pressure economy," with robust aggregate demand and a tight labor market."2 The Fed has credible tools to deal with inflation. If economic growth does not soar, but rather sustains its post-GFC steady 2-2.5% real GDP growth profile as we expect, then taking some inflation risk is a high-probability. The implication is that the Fed will likely not rush to abruptly tighten monetary policy, a view confirmed by the bond market , which is penciling in only 40bps for 2017 (Chart 3). A sustainable breakout in bond yields would require inflation (and to a lesser extent real GDP growth) to significantly surprise to the upside and thus compel the Fed to aggressively raise the fed funds rate. Is that on the horizon? While wage inflation has perked up, unit labor cost inflation has a spotty track record in terms of leading core consumer goods prices. Why? About 20% of the CPI and PCE inflation baskets are produced abroad, underscoring that domestic costs are not a factor in setting prices. There is a tighter correlation between unit labor costs and service sector inflation, but even here there is not a consistent relationship (Chart 4). Consequently, there is minimal pressure on the Fed to get aggressive, suggesting that most of the cyclical back up in long-term yields may have already occurred. Chart 3Fed Will Be Late, As Always Chart 4Wage And CPI Inflation Often Diverge The 1960s Analogy The 1960s period provides an instructive guide for today. Then, an extremely tight labor market and a positive output gap was initially ignored by the Fed, i.e. the economy was allowed to overheat (Chart 5). This ultimately led to the surge of inflation in the 1970s, especially given the then highly unionized labor market (see appendix Chart A1). While there are similarities between the current backdrop and the 1960s, namely an extended business cycle, full employment, narrowing output gap, easy monetary and a path to easing fiscal policies, and rising money multiplier, there are also striking differences. At the current juncture, wage inflation is half of what it was in the mid-1960s. Even unit labor costs heated up to over 8% back then, nearly four times the current level. Chart 5The 1960's... Chart 6... And Today Full employment has only been recently attained (Chart 6) and in order to pose a long-term inflation worry, it would have to stay near 5% for another three years. True, the output gap is almost closed, and is forecast to turn marginally positive in 2017/2018, but much will depend on the timing of fiscal stimulus. Industrial production has diverged negatively from the output gap of late, suggesting that excess capacity still lingers in some parts of the economy (Chart 7). The upshot is that inflationary pressures may stay contained for some time, especially if the U.S. dollar continues to firm. The global environment remains marked by deficient demand, not scarce resources. Chart 8 shows that the NFIB survey of the small business sector has a good track record in leading core inflation. The survey shows that businesses are still finding it difficult to lift selling prices. That is confirmed by deflation in the retail price deflator. Chart 7Divergent Economic Slack Messages Chart 8Pricing Power Trouble Finally, while the money multiplier has troughed, it would have to jump to a level of 4.9 to parallel the 1960s (Chart 9). This is a tall order and it would really require the Fed to very aggressively wind down its balance sheet. Chart 9Monitoring The Money Multiplier Therefore, a 1960s repeat would be a tail risk, and not our base case forecast. What About The Greenback? Chart 10 shows that inflation decelerates during U.S. dollar bull markets. Our Foreign Exchange Strategy service believes that the currency has more cyclical upside3, given that it has not yet overshot on a valuation basis and interest rate differentials will favor the U.S. for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, it may be difficult for inflation to rise on a sustained basis. Chart 10Appreciating Dollar Is##br## Always Disinflationary So What? Accelerating inflation is a modest risk, but not our base case forecast. Nevertheless, for investors that are more worried about the prospect of higher inflation, the purpose of this Special Report is to serve as an equity sector positioning roadmap if inflationary pressures become more acute sooner than we anticipate. Historically, inflation has been synonymous with an aggressive Fed and hard asset outperformance, suggesting that deep cyclical sectors would be primary beneficiaries. Table 1 on Page 2 shows that over the last six major inflationary cycles, energy, materials, real estate and health care have been consistent outperformers. Utilities, tech and telecom have been clear underperformers. The remaining sectors have been a mixed bag. However, this cycle, potential growth is much lower than in the past, underscoring that the hit to overall profits from tighter monetary policy could be pronounced, potentially undermining equity market risk premiums. If inflation rises too quickly and the Fed hits the economic brakes, then it is hard to envision cyclical sectors putting in a strong market performance, especially given their high debt loads and shaky balance sheets, i.e. they are at the epicenter of corporate sector vulnerability if interest rates rise too quickly. Owning shaky balance sheets in a sluggish global economy is a strategy fraught with risk. On the flipside, the recent knee jerk sell off in more defensive sectors represents a reversal of external capital flows, and is not representative of an underlying vulnerability in their earnings prospects. As a result of this shift, valuations now favor more defensive sectors by a wide margin. Ultimately, we expect relative profit trends to dictate relative performance on a cyclical investment horizon, and are not rushing to position our portfolio for accelerating inflation. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20120411a.htm 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20161014a.htm 3 https://fes.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/20812 Health Care (Overweight) Health care stocks have consistently outperformed during the six inflationary periods we studied. Over the long haul it has paid to overweight this sector given the structural uptrend in relative share prices. Spending on health care services is non-cyclical and demand for such services is also on a secular rise around the globe: in the developed markets driven largely by the aging population and in the emerging markets by the adoption of health care safety nets (Chart 11). Health care pricing power is expanding at a healthy clip, outshining overall CPI. Importantly, recent geopolitical uncertainty had cast a shadow on the sector's pricing power prospects that suffered from a constant derating. Now that political and pricing power uncertainty is lifting, a rerating looms. Finally, the health care sector's dividend yield allure is the lowest among defensive sectors and remains 44bps below the broad market, somewhat insulating the sector from the inflation driven selloff in the bond market (Chart 12). Chart 11Health Care Chart 12Health Care Consumer Staples (Overweight) Similar to the health care sector, consumer staples stocks have been stellar outperformers over the past 55 years. The sector's track record during the six inflationary periods we studied is split down the middle. Most consumer staples companies are global conglomerates and their efforts have been focused on building global consumer brands, allowing them to implement a stickier pricing strategy. As a result, overall inflation/deflation pressures are more benign (Chart 13). Relative consumer staples pricing power is expanding and has been in an uptrend for the past five years. As the U.S. dollar has been in a bull market since 2011, short-circuiting the commodity super cycle, consumer staples manufacturers have been beneficiaries of falling commodity input costs. The implication is that profit margins have been expanding due to both rising pricing power and lower input costs (Chart 14). Chart 13Consumer Staples Chart 14Consumer Staples Telecom Services (Overweight - High Conviction) Relative telecom services performance and inflation appear broadly inversely correlated since the early 1970s, underperforming 60% of the time when core PCE prices accelerate. Importantly, in two of the periods we studied (during the late-70s and the TMT bubble) the drawdowns were massive, skewing the mean results portrayed in Table 1 on page 2. This fixed income proxy sector tends to suffer in times of inflation as competing assets dilute its yield appeal and vice versa (Chart 15). Telecom services pricing power has been declining over time as the government deregulated this once monopolistic industry. As more entrants forayed into the sector boosting competition, pricing power erosion accelerated. While relative sector pricing power has been mostly mired in deflation with a few rare expansionary spurts, there is an offset as the industry has entered a less volatile selling price backdrop: communications equipment costs are also constantly sinking (they represent a major input cost), counterbalancing the industry's profit margin outlook (Chart 16). Chart 15Telecom Services Chart 16Telecom Services Consumer Discretionary (Overweight) While the overall trend in consumer discretionary stocks has been higher since the mid-1970s, relative performance mostly declines during inflationary times. Consumer spending takes the backseat as a performance driver when interest rates rise on the back of higher inflation. In addition, previous inflationary periods have also coincided with surging energy prices, representing another source of diminishing consumer discretionary purchasing power (Chart 17). Consumer discretionary selling prices are expanding relative to overall wholesale price inflation, but they have been losing some steam of late. Were energy prices to sustain their recent cyclical advance, as BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects, that would represent a minor headwind to discretionary outlays. True, the tightening in monetary conditions could also be a risk, but we doubt the Yellen-led Fed would slam on the brakes at a time when the greenback is close to 15 year highs. The latter continues to suppress import prices and act as a tailwind to consumer spending and more than offsetting the energy and interest rate headwinds (Chart 18). Chart 17Consumer Discretionary Chart 18Consumer Discretionary Real Estate (Overweight) REITs have been outperforming the overall market during the five inflationary periods we analyzed, exemplifying their hard asset profile. While the 1976-81 iteration skewed the mean results, REITs still come out with the third best showing among the top eleven sectors even on median return basis (see Table 1 on page 2). Real estate prices tend to appreciate when inflation is accelerating, because landlords have consistently raised rents at least on a par with inflation (Chart 19). REITs pricing power has outpaced overall CPI. Apartment REITs rental inflation has been on a tear since the GFC, and the multi-family construction boom will eventually act as a restraint. The selloff in the bond market represents another risk to REITs relative returns as this index falls under the fixed income proxied equity basket, but the sector is now attractively valued (Chart 20). Chart 19Real Estate Chart 20Real Estate Energy (Neutral) The energy sector comes out on top of the median relative return results in times of inflation, and second best in average terms (Table 1 on page 2). Oil price surges are typically synonymous with other forms of inflation. During the six inflationary periods we analyzed, all but one period were associated with relative share price outperformance. Oil producers in particular benefit from the increase in the underlying commodity almost immediately (assuming little to no hedging), which also serves as an excellent inflation hedge (Chart 21). While relative energy pricing power had stabilized following the tumultuous GFC, Saudi Arabia's decision in late 2014 to refrain from balancing the oil market triggered a plunge in oil prices, similar to the mid-1980s collapse. The OPEC deal reached last week to curtail oil production should rebalance the market more quickly, assuming OPEC cheating will be limited, removing downside price risks. Nevertheless, any oil price acceleration to the $60/bbl level will likely prove self-limiting, as supply will come to the market and producers would rush to lock in prices by hedging forward (Chart 22). Chart 21Energy Chart 22Energy Financials (Neutral) Financials relative returns are neither hot nor cold when inflation rears its ugly head. In fact they sit in the middle of the pack in terms of relative median and mean returns. This lack of consistency reflects different factors that exerted significant influence in some of these inflationary periods. Moreover, Chart 23 shows that relative share prices have been mean reverting since the 1960s, likely blurring the inflation influence. Ultimately, the yield curve, credit growth and credit quality determine the path of least resistance for the relative share price ratio of this early cyclical sector. Financials sector pricing power has jumped by about 400bps over the past 18 months. Given the recent steepening of the yield curve, the odds are high that sector pricing power will remain firm via rising net interest margins. Any easing in the regulatory backdrop could also provide a fillip to margins (Chart 24). Chart 23Financials Chart 24Financials Utilities (Neutral) Utilities relative returns during inflationary bouts are the second worst among the top eleven sectors on an average basis and dead last on a median return basis. In five out of the six inflationary phases we examined, utilities stocks suffered a setback. The industry's lack of economic leverage and fixed income attributes anchor the relative share price ratio during inflationary times (Chart 25). Our utilities sector pricing power proxy has sprung to life recently moderately outpacing overall inflation. Natural gas prices, the industry's marginal price setter, have experienced a V-shaped recovery since the March trough, as excess inventories have been whittled down, signaling that recent pricing power gains have more upside. Nevertheless, the recent inflation driven jack up in interest rates has dealt a blow to this high dividend yielding defensive sector. Barring a sustained selloff in the bond market at least a technical rebound in relative share prices is looming (Chart 26). Chart 25Utilities Chart 26Utilities Tech (Underweight) Technology stocks have underperformed every time inflation has accelerated with two exceptions, in the mid-to-late 1960s and mid-to-late 1970s. Creative destruction forces in the tech industry are inherently deflationary. As a result, tech business models have evolved to thrive during disinflationary periods. Moreover, tech stocks have become more mature than typically perceived, having more stable cash flows and paying dividends. The implication is that the negative correlation with inflation will likely remain in place (Chart 27). Tech companies are constantly mired in deflation. While relative pricing power has been in an uptrend since 2011, it has recently relapsed into the deflationary zone. Worrisomely, deflation pressures are likely to intensify as the U.S. dollar appreciates, eating into the sector's earnings growth prospects. Finally, as a reminder, among the top eleven sectors tech stocks have the highest international sales exposure (Chart 28). Chart 27Tech Chart 28Tech Industrials (Underweight - High Conviction) The industrials sector tends to outperform during inflationary periods. In fact, relative share prices have risen 50% of the time since the mid-1960s when inflation was accelerating. The two oil shocks in the 1970s raised the profile of all commodity-related sectors as investors were scrambling to find reliable inflation hedges (Chart 29). Industrials pricing power is sinking steadily, weighed down by the multi-year commodity plunge on the back of China's economic growth deceleration, rising U.S. dollar and increasing supplies. While infrastructure spending is slated to increase at some point in late-2017 or early-2018, we doubt a lot of shovel ready projects will get off the ground quickly enough to satisfy the recent spike in expectations. We are in a wait and see period and remain skeptical that all this fiscal spending enthusiasm will translate into a sustainable earnings driven outperformance phase (Chart 30). Chart 29Industrials Chart 30Industrials Materials (Underweight) Materials equities have a tight positive correlation with accelerating inflation. Resource-related stocks are the closest representation of hard assets, given their ability to store value among the eleven GICS1 sectors. As inflation takes root and commodity prices rise, materials sales and EPS growth get a boost with relative share prices following right behind (Chart 31). From peak-to-trough relative materials prices collapsed by over 35 percentage points and only recently have managed to stage a modest comeback. Our relative pricing power gauge is flirting with the zero line, but may not move much higher. Deleveraging has not even commenced in the emerging markets, and the soaring U.S. dollar is highly deflationary. It will be extremely difficult for materials prices to advance sustainably if EM financial stress intensifies, given the inevitable backlash onto regional economic growth (Chart 32). Chart 31Materials Chart 32Materials Appendix Chart A1 Chart A2 Chart A3 Chart A4 Chart A5 Chart A6

Whether OPEC's announcement of its intention to curtail production actually feeds through into meaningfully lower output next year remains to be seen, but at a minimum, supply discipline should put a floor under prices. Rather than expect the overall energy sector to break out of its lateral move relative to the broad market, we continue to recommend a targeted approach. On the downside, refiners will not receive any relief in feedstock prices, which should ensure that the gap between Brent and WTI prices remains non-existent. That is a strain on refining margins. Our model warns that there is little profit upside ahead. Instead, our preference is to maintain outsized exposure to the oil field services group. Increased E&P confidence that underlying commodity prices could drift toward the top end of their trading should boost drilling activity. The rig count has already troughed. The growth in OECD oil inventories has crested, which is consistent with a gradual rise in the former. We are underweight refiners, overweight oil field services, and neutral on the broad sector.

Highlights Commodity prices and the dollar can occasionally rise together. The 1999-2001 and the 2005 experiences suggest a supply shock is required. If commodities were to rally alongside a strengthening dollar in 2017, this would be an oil-led move. Metals have very little potential upside as improving DM growth drains liquidity from EM economies. Favor petro currencies (CAD and NOK) relative to the antipodeans (AUD and NZD). Stay short AUD/CAD. USD/JPY is in a major bull market. However, near-term risks are to the downside. Feature It has become axiomatic among investors to assume that a dollar bull market is synonymous with a commodity bear market. While the relationships usually holds, there have been episodes where the narrow trade-weighted dollar and natural resource prices moved in tandem, not in opposite directions: 1982 to 1984, 1999 to 2001, and in 2005. The recent surge in base metals raises that possibility, but as DM economies suck in global liquidity away from EM ones, the prospect for a positive correlation between most commodities and the dollar is still remote. When Do Commodities And The Dollar Walk Together? Commodities and the dollar usually move in opposite direction. Since 1980, there has only been three episodes of consistent commodity strength despite dollar appreciation: 1982 to 1984, 1999 to 2001, and in 2005 (Chart I-1). What defines each of these episodes? In the early 1980s, the rally in commodities was concentrated outside of the energy complex. The U.S. economy was rebounding from the 1980s double-dip recession, and Japan was in the middle of its economic miracle. Their vigorous growth resulted in a large positive demand shock, boosting Japan and the U.S.'s share of global copper consumption from 34% to 37%. This undermined any harmful effect on metal prices from a rising dollar (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Commodities Can Rise ##br##Alongside The Dollar Chart I-2Early 1980s: U.S. Growth Was ##br##Able To Boost Metal Prices From 1999 to 2000, the rally in commodity was not broad based. In fact, it was concentrated in the energy sector (Chart I-3). It reflected three factors: After being decimated in 1997 and 1998, EM stock prices managed to stage a temporary rebound; one that mostly reflected bombed out equity and currency valuations. However, the muted response of non-oil commodities suggests that this rebound had little economic impact. Energy was buoyed by the vigorous growth in DM, with OECD oil consumption growing 1% annually between 1998 and 2001. Finally, as oil prices fell below US$10/bbl in late 1998 global oil production contracted sharply, plummeting by more than 4 million barrels, or 5% of total production. Not only could Saudi Arabia and Russia not withstand the pain of lower oil prices, but the latter was in the midst of a massive economic crisis that disrupted the local oil industry's ability to finance its operations. While most commodities in the 2005 episode experienced subtle upward drift, once again, energy was the true winner (Chart I-4). Supply disruptions in the Gulf of Mexico following the record-breaking 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons contributed to removing slightly more than one million barrels from the market. Additionally, oil had captured investors' imagination, with the peak-oil theory being all the rage. This combination explains why oil was the primary beneficiary of Chinese and EM economic strength while base metals could not overcome the dollar's hurdle. Chart I-31999-2001: Commodity##br## Rally Was An Oil Rally Chart I-42005: Commodity##br## Rally Was An Oil Rally Bringing it all together, the dollar and commodities where able to rise as one in the 1980s because they responded to the same positive U.S. growth shock. However, during the 1999-2001 and 2005 commodity rallies in the face of strong dollar, the supply/demand imbalance in oil was paramount. Bottom Line: The dollar and commodity prices can occasionally move together. This happens when a supply shock affects a natural resource as important as oil, lifting its price despite the greenback hurdle. Outside of energy, in general prices still displayed little upside through these episodes. Giant Sucking Sound Our bullishness on the dollar is built on our positive outlook for U.S. growth and rates, a view only reinforced by Trump's electoral victory.1 This does not mean we expect the same boost to metal consumption that we saw in the early 1980s. Today, combined Japanese and U.S. copper consumption only accounts for 11% of global consumption. For iron ore, the U.S. represents only 4% of global consumption. Even if the U.S. were to spend $1trillion over five years on infrastructure (an extremely optimistic assumption), it will not constitute the same relative boost to global demand as the U.S. expansion during the 1980s did (Chart I-5). Additionally, metals will remain slightly oversupplied. In fact, inventories have been rising and more supply of iron ore is coming upstream in 2017, as additional Pilbara iron ore deposits are being unleashed on the markets. In the case of copper, our commodity specialists expect supply to continue to grow in the years ahead. But still, could EM lift the demand for metals enough to play the same role as the U.S. did in the early 1980s? We doubt it. When it comes to China, the current growth improvement is likely as good as it gets. The Keqiang index - a measure of industrial activity in the Middle Kingdom - is approaching post-2011 highs, but the demand for loans remains very depressed (Chart I-6). Moreover, the Chinese fiscal impulse - which has buoyed the country's economy for much of 2016 - has rolled over and is now in negative territory, suggesting that the Keqiang index will weaken in 2017. This will weigh on Chinese imports of machinery and raw materials, representing a deflationary shock for other EM. Chart I-5Metals Are About China, Not The U.S. Chart I-6China: The Best Is Behind Us At the current juncture, additional deflationary forces on EM would be an unwelcomed development. The structural headwinds plaguing EM economies are still in place. EM remain burdened by too much capacity, too much debt, and too little productivity (Chart I-7). More worryingly, strong DM growth will do very little to lift EM economies and assets out of their structural funk. Instead, DM strength is likely to hurt EM. As Chart I-8 shows, since 2009 improvements in DM leading economic indicators (LEIs) have led to falling EM LEIs. Chart I-7EM Structural Headwinds Chart I-8DM Hurting EM EM nations are not very dependent on DM as a source of growth. Intra EM trade has been responsible for most of the growth in EM exports as shipments to the DM economies and the U.S. now account for only 28% and 15% of EM total exports, respectively. While this explains why DM growth cannot lift EM growth, it still does not explain why DM growth leads to deteriorating EM activity. The glue binding this paradox is global liquidity. In a nutshell, when DM growth improves, DM economies suck in global liquidity, which results in a tightening of EM monetary and financial conditions. This combined constriction acts as a large brake on EM growth. Underpinning the relationship between liquidity and growth are a few relationships: First, DM real rates are a relatively clean measure of growth expectations. As Chart I-9 shows, U.S. real yields and the growth expectations embedded in U.S. stocks prices correlate closely with each other. Second, when DM real yields rise, EM reserve accumulation - a measure of high-powered liquidity - moves into reverse (Chart I-10). This suggests that rising DM real yields prompt investors to abandon EM markets, attracted by improving risk-adjusted returns in DM. Chart I-9Real Interest Rates: ##br##A Read On Expected Growth Chart I-10The Liquidity ##br##Channel Third, rising DM rates puts downward pressure on EM FX (Chart 10, bottom panel). Being associated with a reversal of carry trades this is another indication that capital is leaving EM economies. Additionally, falling EM exchange rates tighten EM financial conditions by hampering the financial viability of EM borrowers with foreign currency debt. Fourth, given that the exogenously-driven fall in liquidity already hurts EM growth, rising EM borrowing costs in response to increasing DM real rates amplify the economic drag. By causing the return on EM bonds to fall (Chart I-11), this generates further outflows from EM, and also tightens EM financial conditions. Finally, rising DM yields have been associated with underperforming EM equities relative to DM equities (Chart I-12), giving investors another reason to pull money out of EM. These dynamics have implications for commodity currencies. BCA's view is that DM real yields have upside from here, and therefore EM liquidity and financial conditions are set to tighten. Not only will this hurt EM assets, but a flattening BRICs yield curve should also lead to falling commodity currencies (Chart I-13). Chart I-11The Financial ##br##Channel Chart I-12EM/DM Stocks: A Function ##br##Of DM Real Rates Chart I-13Tightening EM Liquidity Conditions##br## Hurt Commodity Currencies However, differentiation is needed. Tightening EM liquidity and financial conditions are likely to hurt the metal market where there is no broad-based supply deficit. However, like in the late 1990s, oil could actually do well under a strong dollar scenario. For one, the OECD and the U.S. represent much larger shares of oil demand than they do for industrial metals (Chart I-14). In the context of robust U.S. economic growth and consumer spending, we could see continued upward momentum in global oil demand. This is crucial as the oil market is already in a deficit following the collapse in oil capex in 2015 and 2016 (Chart I-15). Additionally, our Commodity and Energy Strategy team argues that OPEC and Russia are very likely to cut production next week. Economic strains and the desire for asset sales in Saudi Arabia and Russia are creating the needed incentives.2 In this environment, oil currencies (CAD and NOK) should outperform antipodeans (AUD and NZD). The outlook for the AUD is the poorest. It is the currency most exposed to metals, the segment of the commodity market most aligned with EM growth. NZD could be at risk too. While it is not exposed to metals like the AUD, the kiwi is very exposed to EM spreads, a variable that is likely to suffer if DM yields continue to rise.3 Buying a basket of CAD and NOK relative to AUD and NZD makes sense here. In terms of our trades, we shorted AUD/CAD too early. However, the economic backdrop described above suggests that the economic rationale for this trade is growing ever more potent. In fact, from late December 1998 to January 2000, CAD rallied against the USD, while the AUD was flat. Additionally, technicals and positioning point to a favorable entry point at the current juncture (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Oil Is Still About The U.S. Chart I-15Favorable Supply/Demand Backdrop For Oil Chart I-16A Good Entry Point For Shorting AUD/CAD Bottom Line: In 2017, the relationship between commodity prices and the dollar is likely to resemble the 1999-2001 outcome. While tightening EM liquidity conditions could weigh on metals, supply concerns and a strong U.S. economy could lift oil prices. This environment would favor the CAD and the NOK relative to the AUD and the NZD. A Countertrend Bounce In The Yen? As we discussed last week, the move in USD/JPY makes sense based on the BoJ policy dynamics we analyzed in our September 23 report titled "How Do You Say "Whatever It Takes" In Japanese?". However, despite our bearish disposition toward the yen, we worry that a countertrend correction in USD/JPY is in the offing. USD/JPY is approaching a formidable resistance. The tell-tale sign of a USD/JPY bull market has been when the pair moves above its 100-week moving average (Chart I-17). We do expect such a move to ultimately materialize. However, with the 100-week MA currently at 114.8, this key indicator is a stone throw away from the present exchange rate of 113.39 and might prove to be a temporary resistance. Additionally, a congestion zone exists between 113 and 114.5, reinforcing this risk. Increasing the danger at the 114 level is the recent high degree of groupthink behavior displayed by this pair. As was the case for the U.S. bonds, the fractal dimension measure for USD/JPY is now below 1.25, highlighting the risk of a countertrend move (Chart I-18). Chart I-17USD/JPY: Key Resistance In Sight Chart I-18A Countertrend Move In USD/JPY Moreover, we agree with our U.S. Bond Strategy service and expect a pause in the U.S. bond sell-off.4 With the tight relationship between USD/JPY and 10-year Treasury yields fully alive, any rebound in bond prices would imply a rebound in the yen. Finally, our intermediate-term timing indicator shows that USD/JPY is 5% overvalued on a tactical time frame, a level where the likelihood of a temporary reversal is heightened. Based on the above observations, today we are opening a tactical short USD/JPY position at 113.39, with a target of 107 and a stop at 115.2. We are also closing our long NOK/JPY trade at a profit of 5.3%. Bottom Line: While the cyclical outlook for USD/JPY continues to point upward, tactically, USD/JPY is facing some downside risk. We are implementing a tactical short USD/JPY trade with a target at 107 and closing our long NOK/JPY trade. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar: The Great Redistributor", dated October 7, 2016, and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Reaganomics 2.0?", dated November 11, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "The OPEC Debate", dated November 24, 2016, available atces.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market", dated September 16, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Toward A Cyclical Sweet Spot?", dated November 22, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The dollar has crossed a crucial resistance level, and the DXY is now trading close to 102. Positive data this month have contributed to this rally. Durable goods orders came in at 4.8% for October, up from 0.4% in September. This has lifted manufacturing PMI for November to 53.9, showing strength in the supply side of the U.S. economy. Minutes from the November 1-2 FOMC meeting indicate a clear hawkish consensus for December's meeting. A probability of a hike is now fully priced in and is reflected in the almost 14-year high reached by the DXY following the release of the minutes. We should see some stability in the DXY coming up to the December meeting. Otherwise, the U.S. economy seems strong. Upcoming data should ultimately buoy the strength in the dollar, but short-term movements will be limited. Report Links: One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Reaganomics 2.0? - November 11, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Draghi remains resolute in his commitment to reach the inflation target. Easy monetary policy has helped support recent growth in the euro area. Low policy rates have increased credit supply, leading to higher lending volumes to households, NFCs and SMEs. Key indicators, such as this month's composite PMI which went up to 53.7, from 53.3, highlight continued decent growth in Europe. Nevertheless, core inflation remains weak at 0.75%, which entails a high likelihood for easy policy going forward. Persistently low rates and structural weaknesses will continue to weigh on bank profitability. Banks may eventually respond by limiting credit growth in the future and hampering overall activity. The short-run outlook for the Euro still remains solid against crosses. EUR/USD has hit a support level, but momentum indicates strong downward pressure against the dollar, so attention to this resistance level is warranted. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 USD/JPY has appreciated by more than 7% since the day Donald Trump was elected president. From 1990 up until the day Trump got elected, the yen depreciated at such a high rate in such a short time frame in only 4 occasions. We are taking a tactical short position in USD/JPY, because although we continue to be yen bears on a cyclical basis, the current sell-off seems overdone. USD/JPY has reached highly overbought technical levels and it is near its 100-week moving average of 114.8, which should act as a temporary resistance. More importantly, the sell-off in U.S. bond yields, a major driver of the recent plunge in the yen is likely to pause for the time being. USD/JPY will once again become an attractive buy at around 107. Report Links: One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 On Wednesday the Treasury released its Autumn Statement, outlining fiscal policy for the coming year. Philip Hammond, Chancellor of the Exchequer, offered no surprises as he vouched to continue to rebalance the budget, albeit at a slower pace. The fiscal impulse looks to increase slightly, yet stay negative for the next 4 years. Such a hawkish fiscal stance should be a drag on growth in an economy that cannot afford any setbacks as it prepares to exit the European Union. However, despite this grim outlook we are still monitoring the pound as an attractive buy, given that it is very cheap. In fact GBP/USD had very little movement after the announcement, which suggests that much of the risks for the U.K's economic outlook are already priced into the cable. Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The Australian economy continues to encounter structural weaknesses from a deteriorating mining sector, for which the outlook remains pessimistic. An interesting observation is that the mining investment-cut is considerably mature, as RBA Assistant Governor Christopher Kent states "about 80% of the adjustment" is done. However, weak Asian EM fundamentals and a questionable outlook for China imply impending demand-side problems, which will weigh, not only on Australian terms of trade, but also the Australian economy, as emerging Asia represents 66% of Australia's total exports. An additional hurdle for the terms of trade is a rising USD, which could drag down commodity prices and the AUD. In the short run, the MACD line for AUD/USD also points to downside in the near future, as the currency approaches a possible resistance level at 0.72. Report Links: One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 We continue to hold a bearish stance towards NZD/USD, as the dollar bull market and weakness in Asian currencies will ultimately weigh on the kiwi. However, the outlook for the NZD against other commodity producers is not as clear. Prices for dairy products, which constitute over 30% of New Zealand exports, have skyrocketed and are now growing at 46% YoY. This trend is set to continue in the short term, as Chinese dairy imports continue to rebound, recording a 9.7% growth rate compared to last year. Furthermore, real GDP is growing at a 3.5% pace, the highest in the G10. That being said, we are reticent to be too bullish on this currency, as inflation remains very low and increasing migration is putting a lid on wages. However if inflation picks up, the NZD could become attractive relative to its commodity peers. Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data has come out below expectations: Core CPI came in at 1.7%. Wholesale sales are contracting at -1.2%. Retail sales excluding autos are at 0%. These figures support the view that there is an underlying weakness in the Canadian economy which will keep the BoC from reaching its inflation target. However, as the U.S. continues to be the largest consumer of oil in the world, with around 20% of global consumption, stronger U.S. growth will support oil demand, which in conjunction with tighter supply, will support oil prices. This will support the CAD against other commodity producing currencies. Structural weaknesses and an upward trend in USD/CAD since May suggest that the CAD could experience more downside momentum against USD. Nevertheless, it is important to monitor next week's OPEC meeting, the outcome of which will dictate the CAD. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 The decline in EUR/CHF appears to have subsided for the time being. Last week we mentioned that the SNB would not tolerate much more downside on this cross, and would not be shy to intervene if necessary. This view has shown to be valid, as EUR/CHF has found support around 1.07. This floor imposed by the SNB means that the performance of the franc against the dollar should mirror EUR/USD for the time being. This implies that USD/CHF should have limited upside in the short term, as EUR/USD has hit a major support level around 1.05 that has been in place for the last 2 years. On a cyclical basis, monetary divergences should continue to weigh against the euro, which makes us bullish on USD/CHF on this time frame. Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The U.S. continues to be world's largest consumer of crude oil, with 20% of total consumption, while China leads in both the copper and nickel markets, accounting for nearly half of global consumption and consuming over 5 times as much as the U.S. in both markets. This divergence implies that if U.S. outperforms the rest of the world, and if the rising dollar continues to weigh on EM economies, oil should outperform base metals in the commodity space and consequently petro currencies like the NOK should outperform other commodity currencies. Additionally the NOK is supported by a current account surplus of 6%, and high inflation is prompting Norges Bank to back off from its dovish stance. While we like the NOK on its crosses, we are more bearish on the NOK versus the USD, as USD/NOK remains very sensitive to the dollar. Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The Swedish economy continues to show signs of strength. Recent data supports this view: Consumer confidence for November is at 105.8, compared to 104.8 for October. Producer Price Index came in at 2.2% annually for October. A strong consumer sector has lifted inflation expectations in Sweden. Strong PPI numbers validate this, as they foretell a potential rise in CPI as producers pass on their costs to consumers. Despite this strength, SEK may see limited upside. As mentioned last week, most of the movement in the SEK can be attributed to the USD. Rate hike expectations have now been fully priced in for the Fed, so it is likely that movements in the USD will be muted, and hence the SEK could find some support, at least for now. Report Links: One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Feature Happy Thanksgiving to all our U.S. clients. We wish you the best the holiday has to offer, as you share blessings with friends and family. In this holiday-shortened week, we are publishing a joint report with our colleagues at BCA's Energy Sector Strategy (NRG) service. We succinctly examine the pros and cons of the debate over whether OPEC will or will not agree to and uphold a *real* production cut, as it has promised, at its much-anticipated meeting on November 30. Disagreement on the likely outcome of the meeting runs high. In late September, OPEC announced an agreement in principle to cut oil production at the formal November meeting to a level of 32.5-33.0 MMb/d. This would represent a 500,000-750,000 b/d reduction from August production levels, and an 830,000-1,330,000 b/d reduction from the IEA's latest OPEC production estimate for October of 33.83 MMb/d. In addition, non-OPEC behemoth Russia has signaled a potential willingness to contribute its own production freeze or cut to the agreement in an effort to support higher oil prices. Chart 1With A 1 MMb/d Cut, ##br##Draws Would Be Greater There are compelling arguments to be made both supporting the likelihood of a production cut as well as for being skeptical that such an agreement will be reached and adhered to. Even within BCA, there is disagreement. This service, the Commodity & Energy Strategy (CES), which sets the BCA house view on oil prices, pegs the odds at greater than 50% that there will be a meaningful cut of 1 MMb/d+, anchored by large cut pledges from OPEC's leader, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Russia. The NRG team, dissents; they think it is more likely that no deal is reached, and if a deal is announced, it will not be adhered to. Regardless of whether there is an announced agreement to cut production or not, both CES and NRG expect KSA's production to decline by 400,000-500,000 b/d between August and December according to KSA's normal seasonal management of production levels; we would not include this expected seasonal reduction in the calculation of a *real* cut. In our analysis on Chart 1, we include a *real* cut of 1MMB/d below the normal seasonality of KSA's production, which lasts for six months. In H2 2017, we assume the cut is dissolved and the market also receives an extra 200,000 b/d of price-incentivized production from the U.S. shales. How To Bet On A Cut, The Out-Of-Consensus Call Chart 2Without A Cut,##br## Inventories Still Will Be Drawn In 2017 CES's view for a cut (established November 3) was significantly out-of-consensus until recent chatter from OPEC increased the perception that an agreement could be reached. Still, there remains significant doubt a freeze or cut can be accomplished. Without a cut, NRG and CES share a constructive outlook for oil markets heading towards steepening deficits during 2017 (Chart 2). Note: BCA's estimates show a tighter oil market than the EIA's estimates: Our Q3 2016 production estimates are lower than the EIA's by ~300,000 b/d due to differences in our assessments in Brazilian, Russian and Chinese production; our Q3 2016 consumption estimate is higher than the EIA due to our higher assessment of U.S. summer-time demand (the EIA has consistently underestimated U.S. demand over the past few years). A production cut coupled with a natural tightening in the market brought about by the price-induced supply destruction over the past 18 months would make 2017 inventory draws even greater, lifting oil prices higher, and providing even greater upward support to our favorite investment recommendations (Chart 1). Below we outline the investment recommendations that would benefit from an OPEC cut, spanning individual equities, ETFs, and commodity calls: Direct Commodity Investment: CES recommends two pair trades on oil contracts and call options. Long February 2017 $50/bbl Brent Calls vs. short February 2017 $55/bbl Brent Calls to play the spike in oil prices that would come from a successful OPEC cut, which was recommended November 3 and was up 50.41% as of Tuesday's close. Long August 2017 WTI contract vs. short November 2017 WTI contract to play an expected flattening of the forward curve, which also was recommended November 3 and it up 48.61% as of Tuesday's close. Oil Producers: NRG recommends overweight-rated Permian oil producers EOG, PXD, FANG and PE, which will be leaders in expanding production into an improving oil price market. Service Companies: NRG recommends overweight-rated completion-oriented services companies HAL, SLB and SLCA, which will benefit most from increased U.S. shale spending. Equity-Backed ETFs: NRG recommends overweight-rated ETFs XLE, FRAK, and OIH as vehicles that provide more diversified investment exposure to higher oil prices and oilfield service activity than individual equities. Oil-Backed ETF. Tactically buying the U.S. Oil Fund ETF (USO) would provide good direct exposure to a quick oil price surge. However, USO should not be held as a longer-term investment because the inherent cost of continually rolling contracts consistently erodes USO's value versus the equity-backed ETFs XLE and OIH. This longer-term underperformance informs NRG's underweight rating on USO. Risks To Our Views: Oil and natural gas prices that differ materially from our forecasts, possibly due to slower-than-expected global economic growth and/or greater than expected supply growth. Poor operational execution and/or changes to regulatory restrictions could negatively impact the financial and stock performance of our recommendations. A week ahead of the OPEC meeting, in the wake of recently recovering production in Libya and Nigeria, and amid campaigning by Iran and Iraq to be excluded from participation in the cuts, it is impossible to know for certain how the complicated politics of OPEC and Russia will play out. Below we outline the competing objectives and risks that will be in play. Case Against A Cut Undeniably, a cut in production, particularly a coordinated cut where several countries share the burden of restricting production, would raise oil prices and enhance 2017 oil export revenues for all OPEC producers. However, that near-term benefit for pricing and revenue has been obvious for the past two years, and yet neither KSA nor Russia has been willing to cut production, feeling the potential to lose longer-term market share outweighed the immediate revenue benefits of a cut. The hazard of a price-increasing production cut, is that the higher oil price would essentially subsidize non-OPEC competitors with higher cash flows, and would simultaneously bolster the confidence of capital markets that OPEC will support prices at a floor of $50, reducing the risk of future investments. These two effects would jointly encourage increased capital investment into establishing new production, especially by the fast-acting U.S. shale producers, whose rampant investment and production growth from 2010-2015 was, by far, the leading contributor to the 2015-2016 oversupply of oil. Encouraging a resurgence of drilling and production would certainly lead to faster production growth from the U.S. shales in 2017-2018, allowing those producers to grow market share under the umbrella of OPEC's production sacrifices that created the higher prices. OPEC has just endured a lot of economic pain through the oil price decline. The economic purpose of this pain was to starve global producers of operational cash flow and dissuade the inflow of new capital, thus choking off the reinvestment required to continue to grow oil production. By and large, this goal has been achieved, with U.S. shale producers slashing capital expenditures by 65% from 2014 to 2016, and the International Oil Companies (IOCs) cutting capital expenditures by 40% over the same period. As a result, after the substantial surge in global oil production in 2014-2015 that created the current over-supply, the capital starvation caused by low oil prices will result in essentially no global production growth in either 2017 or 2018, allowing for demand growth to erode the oversupply of production during 2016, and to eat into the overstocked inventories of crude during 2017-2018. KSA has created fear and uncertainty throughout global producers and capital markets by steadfastly refusing to use its production-management powers to support a floor under oil prices. We are skeptical that KSA will ultimately agree to reverse this strategy, by now establishing a price floor. Such a reversal would undermine the profound market-share message KSA has delivered to competitors (at the cost of great financial pain), and weaken its perceived resolve to allow oil prices to be set by the market. As such, the NRG team believes KSA will not agree to cut production beyond the already-expected seasonal reduction in production, and that this position will scuttle September's tacit agreement to cut production at the official meeting next week. Such a scenario would be fairly similar to how KSA undermined the production-freeze discussions in Doha in April, by insisting other OPEC members - Iran, in particular - share in the production limitations in order to engender KSA's support; a condition that other members were unwilling to accept. The Case For A Cut The case to expect a cut agreement acknowledges that such a cut would subsidize competitors and diminish the impression of KSA's resolve and/or ability to out-last competitors through an oil price down-cycle. The case for a cut concludes that the benefits of higher 2017 oil prices simply outweigh these market share and reputational costs. The benefits that OPEC and Russia would receive are: Critical Need For Higher Revenue. If KSA and Russia each cut 2017 production by 500,000 below current expectations, and oil prices jumped $10/bbl as a result, KSA's 2017 oil export revenues would increase by close to $17.5 billion, and Russia's would increase by almost $8.25 billion. If the financial pain endured by these countries is substantially greater than NRG has estimated, this near-term revenue lift could be more critical than we appreciate, overwhelming the reputational and longer-term market-share losses resulting from the reversal of policy. Borrowing capacity for each country also would increase, as a result of higher revenues. With both states seeking to tap international debt and equity markets, this increased revenue would increase their borrowing capacity. Higher Value For Asset Sales. KSA is preparing to IPO Saudi Aramco. Bolstering the spirits of capital markets with higher oil prices would be expected to increase the proceeds received from this equity sale, increase the market value of the company, reduce debt-service costs, and improve access to debt markets, which KSA and Saudi Aramco are both likely to tap more frequently in the future as the country tries to diversify the economy away from oil. Similarly, two weeks ago, Russia signed a decree to sell a 19.5% stake in Rosneft by the end of 2016. An immediate oil price strengthening and messaging that KSA and Russia would support a pricing floor would inflate the value of this sale, given the high correlation between Brent crude oil prices and Rosneft's equity price. Production Stability Not As Strong As It Seems. Russia's production levels in 2016 have been surprisingly strong, exceeding our expectations. The collapse of the Russian Ruble has allowed for continued internal investment despite the substantial reduction to dollar-denominated oil revenues. Still, it is likely that Russian producers are pulling very hard on their fields, over-producing the optimal level in an effort to scratch out higher revenues. Such over-production is not sustainable ad infinitum, and Russia may know that its fields need a rest in 2017 anyhow, so a 4-5% production cut is ultimately not much of a sacrifice. Make Room For Libya & Nigeria. Both Libya and Nigeria are trying to overcome substantial civil obstacles to allow production to increase back towards oilfield capabilities. If these problems were solved, we estimate Libya could increase production by 400,000-600,000 b/d while Nigeria could add 200,000-300,000 b/d. If KSA, OPEC, and Russia believe these countries will be able to re-establish shut-in production, they may conclude a production cut is necessary to make room for the growth, and to keep prices from collapsing. Entrenching U.S. Shale As The Marginal Barrel: If KSA and Russia can agree to a 1 MMb/d cut, U.S. shale-oil producers would be the first to take advantage of expected higher prices, given the fast-response nature of this production. This actually would work to the advantage of KSA and Russia and other low-cost producers in and outside OPEC, by firmly entrenching U.S. shale oil as the marginal barrel for the world market. On the global cost curve, shale sits in the middle some $30 to $40/bbl above KSA and Russia, which means that, as long as the global market is pricing to shale economics at the margin, these mega-producers earn economic rents on their production. In order to retain those rents, KSA and Russia will have to find a way to keep shale on the margin - i.e., regulate their production so that prices do not rise too quickly and encourage more expensive output to come on line. For KSA and Russia, it is better to climb the shale cost curve than to encourage the next tranche of production - such as Canadian oil sands - to come on to the market too quickly, or to further incentivize electric vehicles and conservation with run-away price increases, with too-sharp a production cut. Allowing prices to trade through a $65 - $75/bbl range or higher would no doubt produce a short-term revenue jump for cash-strapped producers - particularly those OPEC members outside the GCC. But it also would make most of the U.S. shales economic to develop, and incentivize other "lumpy," expensive production that does not turn off quickly once it is developed (e.g., oil sands and deepwater). This ultimately would crash prices over the longer term, making it difficult for the industry to attract capital. This is not an ideal outcome for KSA's planned IPO of Aramco, or Russia's sale of 19.5% of Rosneft, or their investors. Global Reinvestment Needs To Be Re-Stimulated. Stimulating non-OPEC reinvestment with higher oil prices and increased price-floor confidence may actually be needed in the not-too-distant future. IOCs have barely started to show the negative production ramifications of their 40% cuts to capex; cuts which will grow deeper in 2018. We expect these production declines to show up increasingly over the next four years, and there is not much the IOCs can do to stop it, since their mega-project investments generally require 3-5 years from the time that spending decisions are made until first oil is produced. With such huge cuts to future expenditures, and enormous amounts of debt incurred by the IOCs to pay for the completion of legacy mega-projects that will need to be repaid ($130B in debt added in the past two years), OPEC could see a looming shortage of oil developing later this decade if IOC-sponsored offshore production falls into steep declines, as we think is likely. To orchestrate a softer landing, to prevent oil prices from spiking too high due to a shortage of production, to head-off an acceleration in the pursuit of alternative fuels and/or the recessionary impact of an oil price spike, KSA may actually want to accelerate the re-start of global investment. Bottom Line: There are strongly credible and well-reasoned arguments that support the expectations for a successful establishment of a production cut from OPEC and Russia, as well as to doubt that such an agreement will be achieved (and adhered to) amid the political and economic competition between OPEC members and against non-OPEC producers. A successful agreement to cut production in excess of 1 MMb/d, as CES believes is likely, would be the more out-of-consensus call, with substantially bullish implications for oil prices and for our oil-levered investment strategy and stock recommendations. Even without a production cut, the NRG service remains strongly constructive on the investment strengths of high-quality Permian oil producers and the completion-oriented service companies that will benefit from increased U.S. shale spending. If a production cut is achieved, our investment cases become even stronger, as the U.S. shale producers and service companies would be the greatest beneficiaries of an upward step-change in oil prices. Matt Conlan, Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com SOFTS Dairy: Moderate Upside In 2017H1 Dairy prices may have another 5%-10% upside over next three to six months, based on tightening supply in the global dairy market. China will become more important in the global dairy market. The country's dairy imports will continue heading north. Downside risks include elevated global dairy product inventory, a supply boost from major exporters, and a continuing strengthening dollar. We have been cautiously bullish on global dairy market since last October.1 Since then, the Global Dairy Trade (GDT) All-Products Price Index, which is widely used as a benchmark price for the market, has rallied over 50% in the past seven months off its November - March lows (Chart 3, panel 1). Chart 3Dairy: Tactically Bullish Now the question is: will the rally continue? A review of what had happened in 2015 and so far this year may be a good start of our analysis. A Terrible 2015 The GDT index tumbled to the lowest level on record in early August 2015. A sharply drop in Chinese dairy imports; the Russian import ban on dairy products; robust supply growth across major dairy producing countries; and the EU's decision to scrap its production quotas created a perfect storm for the global dairy market last year - resulting in an extremely oversupplied market, stock builds and depressed dairy prices (Chart 3, panels 2, 3 and 4). An Improving 2016 Fundamentals have improved since April, as major dairy exporting countries responded to low dairy prices, while Chinese dairy imports revived. Fonterra, the world's biggest dairy exporter, and Murray Goulburn, Australian's biggest dairy company, both announced retrospective price cuts in April to dairy farmers in New Zealand and Australia, which hit both countries' dairy industries hard. Many farmers exited the dairy business, given their production costs were well above farm-gate milk prices. As a result, dairy farmers In New Zealand have cut the national dairy cow herd size by 3.3% yoy in 2015 and then a further 1.5% in 2016, based on USDA data. In Australia, dairy farmers have sent more cows into slaughterhouse as well. According to Dairy Australia, in the past 12 months to August 2016, 109,102 head were sold, an increase of 33% on the previous year. New Zealand and Australia are the world's largest and the fourth largest dairy exporters, respectively. In June, one month before the start of the new season (July 2016 to June 2017), farm-gate milk prices set by major dairy processors in Australia were still much lower than most dairy farmers' production costs, further damaging the country's dairy production outlook for the 2016/17 season. In July, August and September, Australian milk production fell sharply for three consecutive months, with a yoy contraction of 10.3%, 9.3%, and 10.2%, respectively. In July, the European Commission funded a €150 million program to pay farmers to cut their milk production. At the same time, the region also intervened with a stock purchase program and a private-storage aid scheme to help remove excess supply from the market. The EU region is the world's second biggest exporter. Its production increase due to the removal of its quota system was one main reason for last year's price drop. The recent supportive policy has worked well - the region's milk volumes decreased in September for the third consecutive month. In the meantime, Chinese dairy imports have rebounded 9.7% yoy for the first nine months of this year, a significant improvement from last year's 44.4% contraction over the same period. China is the world biggest dairy importer, accounting for 51% of global fluid milk imports, and 40% of dry, whole-milk powder imports (Chart 4, panel 1). Chart 4China Needs More Dairy Imports In comparison, the number of Chinese cow herds only accounts for 6% of global total cows for milk production, which is clearly far from meeting its domestic demand (Chart 4, panel 2). Early this year the country loosened up the "one-child" policy, and now allows "two-kids" in a family, starting this year. This will increase the country's baby formula's demand. The country's dairy product intake per capita is still far below Asian peers like Japan and Korea. Growing family wealth and increasing demand for healthy dairy food will continue boosting the dairy consumption in China. Due to the limited pasture land in the country for raising cows, we expect China's dairy imports will continue heading north. What about the price outlook in the remainder of 2016 and 2017? Most of the positive factors aforementioned are still in place. In the near term, we do not see significant supply increase. Despite the 61% price rally in the GDT price index over the past seven months, most of the price increase still has not passed to farm-gate milk prices in major producing countries (except New Zealand). Hence, for the remainder of 2016 and 2017H1, we expect prices will be prone to the upside. Pullbacks are always possible. But overall we still expect another 5% to 10% upside over next three to six months for the GDT price index. Beyond 2017H1, the price outlook is less clear. If prices either go sideways or up, milk production in major producing countries should eventually recover. For now, we hold a neutral view for dairy prices in 2017H2. Downside Risks Chart 5Downside Risks First, global dairy stockpiles are much higher than previous years (Chart 5, panel 1). According to the European Commission, at the end of September, around 428 thousand metric tons (kt) of skimmed-milk powder (SMP) was in public intervention stocks, while another 73 kt SMP was in private storage. In addition, there also is about 90 kt butter and 19 kt cheese stored privately. As the EU still is aiming to cut milk production to boost dairy prices, we believe the odds of an unexpected release from storage in a fast and massive manner is low. The release will likely be gradual. Second, much of New Zealand's milk production is dependent on weather conditions, which have improved from mid-August. Moreover, Fonterra increased its farm-gate milk price to $6 per kgMS (kilogram milk solid) from $5.25 per kgMS last week, which was the third increase over the past four months. Since August, farm-gate milk price in New Zealand has already been up 41% and well above the country's production cost. A combination of both factors may boost the country's milk production more than the market expected. In this case, prices could decline in 2017H1. Third, if the U.S. dollar continues strengthening versus the RMB and other major exporters' currencies, this will tend to discourage purchases from China and encourage sales from New Zealand, the EU and Australia, which will be negative to dairy prices (Chart 5, panel 2). We will monitor these risks closely. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report for softs section "Oil Markets Pricing In $20/Bbl Downside," dated October 1, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Investment Views And Themes Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices And Plays Reference Table Closed Trades

Highlights Tighter global oil markets resulting from the production cut we expect to be announced November 30 at OPEC's Vienna meeting, along with fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration in the U.S., will continue to stoke inflation expectations. We believe gold is well suited for hedging investors' medium-term inflation exposure, given its sensitivity to 5-year/5-year CPI swaps in the U.S. and eurozone. If the Fed decides to get out ahead of this expected pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations by raising rates aggressively next year, we would expect any increase in gold prices - and oil prices, for that matter - to be challenged. For OPEC and non-OPEC producers, a larger production cut may be required to offset a stronger USD next year. Near term, we still like upside oil exposure, given our expectation that production will be cut. Energy: Overweight. We remain long Brent call spreads expiring at year-end, and long WTI front-to-back spreads in 2017H2, in anticipation of an oil-production cut. Base Metals: Neutral. We expect nickel to outperform zinc in 2017. Precious Metals: Neutral. We are long gold at $1,227/oz after our buy-stop was elected on November 11. We are including a 5% stop-loss for this position. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Our long Mar/17 wheat vs. beans order was filled on November 14. We still look to go long corn vs. sugar. Feature Chart of the WeekBrent, WTI Curves Will Flatten, ##br##Then Backwardate Following Oil-Production Cut Continuing production increases from sundry sources outside OPEC, which the International Energy Agency estimates will lift output almost 500k b/d in 2017, are turning the heat up on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to agree a production cut at the Cartel's meeting in Vienna later this month. It's either that or risk another downdraft that takes prices closer to the bottom of our long-standing $40-to-$65/bbl price range that defines U.S. shale-oil economics. The unexpected strength in production growth outside OPEC likely will require KSA and Russia to come up with a production cut that exceeds the 1mm b/d we projected earlier this month would be required to lift prices into the mid-$50s/bbl range. On the back of the expected cuts, we recommended getting long a February 2017 Brent call spread - long the $50/bbl strike vs. short the $55/bbl strike at $1.21/bbl. As of Tuesday's close, when we mark our positions to market every week, the position was up 9.09%. Reduced output from KSA and Russia - and, most likely, Gulf allies of KSA - will force refiners globally to draw down crude in storage, and for refined product inventories to draw as well. This will lift the forward curves for Brent and WTI futures (Chart of the Week). We expect oil prices will increase by approximately $10/bbl, following the joint cuts of 500k b/d each we expect KSA and Russia, which will be announced November 30. This also will lift 3-year forward WTI futures prices, which, as we showed in previous research, share a common trend with 5y5y CPI swaps. As stocks continue to draw next year, we expect the forward Brent and WTI curves to flatten, and, in 2017H2, to backwardate - that is to say, prompt-delivery prices will trade above the price of oil delivered in the future. For this reason, we are long August 2017 WTI futures vs. short November 2017 WTI futures, expecting the price difference between the two, which favors the deferred contract at present (i.e., a contango curve), to flip in favor of the Aug/17 contract. Chart 2Longer-dated WTI Futures, ##br##Inflation Expectations Rising Fiscal Stimulus Expected in the U.S. The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the U.S. likely will usher in significant fiscal stimulus beginning next year, particularly as Republicans now control the Presidency and Congress for the first time since 2005 - 06, when George W. Bush was president. Trump campaigned on a promise of significant fiscal stimulus, which likely will, among other things, stoke inflation expectations as money starts to flow to infrastructure projects and tax cuts toward the end of next year. Even before Trump's election 5-year/5-year (5y5y) CPI swaps were ticking higher, as oil markets rebalanced and started to discount the drawdown in global inventories this year and next (Chart 2). As the outlines of the Trump administration's fiscal policy take shape and money starts to flow to infrastructure projects, we expect inflation expectations to continue to rise. In previous research, we showed 5y5y CPI swaps and 3-year forward WTI futures are cointegrated, meaning they follow the same long-term trend. Indeed, we can specify 5y5y CPI swaps in the U.S. and eurozone directly as a function of 3-year forward WTI futures.1 Gold Will Lift With Rising Inflation Expectations... In the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) markets, gold prices have shared a common trend with U.S. CPI 5y5y swaps and real interest rates, which we show in a new model (Chart 3A, top panel).2 Using this specification, we find a 1% increase in the U.S. 5y5y CPI swaps increases gold prices by slightly more than 9%. Similarly, we find a 1% increase in EMU 5y5y CPI swaps increases gold prices by slightly more than 10% (Chart 3B, top panel).3 Of course, investors always can go straight to Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) for inflation protection, given the evolution of the respective CPIs in the U.S. and eurozone drives returns for these securities (Chart 4). However, we believe gold gives investors higher leverage to actual inflation and expected inflation. Chart 3AGold Prices Ticking Higher With ##br##U.S. CPI Inflation Expectations Chart 3BEMU Inflation Expectations ##br##Vs. 3-year Forward WTI Chart 4Inflation Expectations And TIPS ##br##Are Highly Correlated, As Well ...But The USD's Evolution Matters, Too The combination of tighter oil markets and fiscal stimulus in the U.S. will continue to push inflation and inflation expectations higher. The Fed will not sit idly by and just watch inflation expectations move higher next year. Indeed, prior to the election, we expected two rate hikes next year, following a likely rate increase at the FOMC's meeting next month. With expectations of a tightening oil market, and a fresh round of fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration, the odds of an even stronger USD increase. We had been expecting the USD will appreciate 10% over the next year or so, as a result of the upcoming December rate hike and two additional hikes next year. This could change, since, as, our Foreign Exchange Strategy service noted, "Trump's electoral victory only re-enforces our bullish stance on the dollar."4 A stronger USD, all else equal, is bearish for commodities generally, since it raises the cost of dollar-denominated commodities ex-U.S., and lowers the costs of commodity producers in local-currency terms. The former effect depresses demand at the margin, while the latter raises supply at the margin. Both effects would combine to reduce oil prices at the margin (Chart 5). This would, in turn, lower inflation expectations, which would feed into lower gold prices (Chart 6). Chart 5A Stronger USD Would Be Bearish For Oil Chart 6And Gold Prices As It Would Lower Inflation Expectations Our FX view, is complicated by the possibility the Fed might want to run a "high-pressure economy" next year, and the potential for additional Chinese fiscal stimulus going into the 19th Communist Party Congress next fall. If both the U.S. and China deploy significant fiscal stimulus next year, the growth in these economies could overwhelm the negative effects of a stronger USD, and industrial commodities - chiefly base metals, iron ore and steel - could rally as demand picks up. Oil demand also would be expected to pick up as a result of the combined fiscal stimulus coming out of the U.S. and China, both from infrastructure build-outs and income growth. KSA - Russia Oil-Production Cut Gets Complicated These considerations will complicate the calculus of KSA and Russia and their respective oil-producing allies as the November 30 OPEC meeting in Vienna draws near. If the Fed moves to get out ahead of increasing inflation expectations by adding another rate hike or two next year, oil prices will encounter a significant headwind. OPEC and non-OPEC producers could very well find themselves back at the bargaining table negotiating additional cuts, as prices come under pressure next year from higher U.S. interest rates. It is too early to act on any speculation regarding fiscal policy in the U.S. or China next year. However, given our expectation for an oil-production cut announcement later this month at OPEC's Vienna meeting, we are confident staying long the Brent $50/$55 call spread, and the long Jul/17 vs. short Nov/17 WTI spread position we recommended earlier this month. As greater clarity emerges on U.S. and Chinese fiscal policy going into next year, we will update our assessments. Bottom Line: We expect global oil markets to tighten as KSA and Russia engineer a production cut, which will be announced at OPEC's Vienna meeting later this month. Fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration in the U.S., and possible fiscal stimulus in China next year could put a bid under commodities. However, if the Fed gets out ahead of the expected pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations by raising rates aggressively next year, any increase in commodity prices - oil and gold, in particular - will be challenged. KSA and Russia could find themselves back at the bargaining table, negotiating yet another production cut to offset a stronger USD. That said, we are retaining our upside oil exposure via a Brent $50/$55 call spread expiring at the end of this year, and our long Jul/17 WTI vs. short Nov/17 WTI futures, which will go into the money as the forward curve flattens and then goes into a backwardation. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com BASE METALS China Commodity Focus: Base Metals Nickel: A Good Buy, Especially Versus Zinc Chart 7Nickel: More Upside Ahead We are bullish on nickel prices, both tactically and strategically. Its supply deficit is likely to widen on rising stainless steel demand and falling nickel ore supply in 2017. China will continue to increase its refined nickel imports to meet strong domestic stainless steel production growth. We remain strategically bearish zinc even though our short Dec/17 LME zinc position got stopped out at $2500/MT with a 4% loss. We expect nickel to outperform zinc considerably in 2017. We recommend buying Dec/17 LME nickel contract versus Dec/17 LME zinc contract at 4.3 (current level: 4.38). If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss level for the ratio at 4.15. Nickel prices have gone up over 50% since bottoming in February (Chart 7, panel 1). The global nickel supply deficit reached a record high of 75 thousand metric tons (kt) for the first eight months of this year, based on the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) data (Chart 7, panel 2). More upside for nickel in 2017 On the supply side, the outlook is not promising in 2017. Global nickel ore and refined nickel production fell 5.2% and 1.1% yoy for the first eight months of this year, respectively, according to the WBMS data (Chart 7, panel 3). The newly elected Philippine government is clearly aiming for "responsible mining," and has been highly restrictive on domestic nickel mining activities, actions that likely will reduce the country's nickel ore production in 2017. The Philippines became the world's biggest nickel ore producer and exporter after Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in January 2014. The Philippines has implemented a national audit on domestic mines from July to September and has halted 10 mines for their environmental violations since July. Eight of them are nickel producers, which account for about 10% of the country's total nickel output. In late September, the government further declared that 12 more mines (mostly nickel) were recommended for suspension, and 18 firms are also subject to a further review. Stringent policy oversight will be the on-going theme for Philippine mines. We expect more suspensions in the country next year. There is no sign the export ban will be removed by the Indonesian government. Since Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in January 2014, the country's nickel ore output has declined 84% from 2013 to 2015. This occurred even though smelters were built locally, which will allow more nickel ore output in Indonesia. However, the incremental Indonesian output is unlikely to make up for the global nickel ore shortage next year. Global nickel demand is on the rise again (Chart 7, panel 4). According to the International Stainless Steel Forum (ISSF), global stainless steel production grew by 11.5% in 2016Q2 from only 3.7% yoy in 2016Q1. Comparatively, in 2015, the growth was a negative 0.3%. Due to fiscal and monetary stimulus in China this year, we expect continued growth in global stainless steel production in 2017. Why China Is Important To Global Nickel Markets China is the world's biggest nickel producer, consumer and importer. Its primary effect on nickel prices is through refined nickel imports. It also influences global stainless steel prices through stainless steel exports. In comparison to the global supply deficit of 75 kt, the deficit in China widened to 346 kt for the first eight months of this year - the highest physical shortage ever (Chart 8, panel 1). China has driven the global growth of both refined nickel production and nickel consumption since 2010 (Chart 8, panels 2 and 3). During the first eight months of this year, Chinese nickel production dropped sharply to 40.5 kt, nearly three times the global nickel output loss of 13.6 kt. For the same period, China's nickel demand growth accounted for 67% of global growth. In addition, the country produces about 53% of global stainless steel and exports about 10% of domestic-made stainless steel products to the rest of world (Chart 8, panel 4). Clearly, China is extremely important to both the global stainless steel and nickel markets. China Needs To Import More Nickel in 2017 Looking forward, China is likely to continue increasing its nickel imports to meet a growing domestic supply deficit (Chart 9, panel 1). The country's ore imports have been declining because of Indonesia's ban since 2014, and further dropped this year on the Philippine's suspensions (Chart 9, panel 2). Scarcer ore supply drove down Chinese refined nickel and nickel pig iron (NPI) output every year for the past three consecutive years (including this year). Chart 8China: A Key Factor For Nickel Market Chart 9Chinese Nickel Imports Are Set To Rise Prior to 2014, China imported nickel ores from Indonesia to produce NPI, which is used in its domestic stainless steel production. In 2013, only 20% of domestic nickel demand was met by unwrought nickel imports. After 2014, China's higher nickel ore imports from the Philippines were not able to make up the import losses from Indonesia (Chart 9, panel 3). As a result, in 2015, the percentage of domestic nickel demand met by unwrought nickel imports jumped to 47%. Furthermore, for the first eight months of this year, imports accounted for 57% of Chinese demand. Before the Indonesian ban in 2014, Chinese stainless steel producers and NPI producers built up mammoth nickel ore inventories for their stainless steel ore NPI production (Chart 9, panel 4). Now, Chinese laterite ore inventories are much lower than three years ago. Plus, most of the inventories likely are low nickel-content Philippines ore. Besides the tight ore inventory, China's stainless-steel output is accelerating. According to Beijing Antaike Information Development Co., a state-backed research firm, for the first nine months of 2016, Chinese nickel-based stainless steel output grew 11.3% yoy, a much stronger growth rate than the 4% seen during the same period last year. Given falling domestic nickel output and increasing nickel demand from the stainless steel sector, China seems to have no other choice but to import more refined nickel or NPI from overseas. Downside Risks Nickel prices could fall sharply in the near term if massive LME inventories are released to the global market. After all, global nickel inventories currently are at a high level of more than 350 kt, which is more than enough to meet the supply deficit of 75 kt (Chart 10, panel 1). However, as prices are still at the very low end of the range over the past 13 years, we believe that the odds of a massive, sudden inventory release is small. Inventory holders will be hesitant to sell their precious inventory too quickly, therefore the inventory release will likely be gradual, especially given the continuing export ban in Indonesia and a likely increase in the suspension of mines in the Philippines. In the longer term, if Indonesian refined nickel output continues growing at the pace registered in the past two years, the global nickel supply deficit may be much less than the market expects (Chart 10, panel 2). In that scenario, nickel prices will also fall. Due to power supply shortages, poor infrastructure and funding problems, many of the smelters and stainless steel plants' development have got delayed, so we believe these problems will continue to be headwinds for Indonesian nickel output growth. A five-million capacity stainless steel project, funded by three Chinese companies, potentially making Indonesia the world's second biggest stainless steel producer, will only be in production by 2018. Therefore, we believe next year is still a good window for a further rally in nickel prices. In addition, global stainless steel output may weaken again after this year's stimulus from China runs out of steam, which will also weigh on nickel prices (Chart 10, panel 3). We will monitor these risks closely. Investment strategy We expect nickel to outperform zinc considerably in 2017. Nickel has underperformed zinc massively since 2010 with the nickel/zinc price ratio tumbling to a 17-year low (Chart 11, panel 1). Chart 10Downside Risks To Watch Chart 11Nickel Likely To Outperform Zinc In 2017 Even though our short Dec/17 LME zinc position was stopped out at $2500/MT with a 4% loss due to the short-term turbulence, we remain strategically bearish zinc, as we expect supply to rise in 2017 (Chart 11, panel 2).5 Given our assessments of the nickel and zinc markets, we recommend buying Dec/17 LME nickel contract versus Dec/17 LME zinc contract at 4.3 (current level: 4.38) (Chart 11, panel 3). If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss level for the ratio at 4.15. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 Our updated estimates of the cointegrating regressions for U.S. and eurozone 5y5y CPI swaps indicate 3-year forward WTI futures explain close to 87% of the U.S. swap levels and 82% of the eurozone swaps, in the post-GFC period (January 2010 to present). Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Inflation Expectations Will Lift As Oil Rebalances," dated March 31, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 We also found that, over a longer period encompassing pre-GFC markets, gold prices shared a common trend with U.S. 5y5y CPI swaps, as well. Indeed, the evolution of 5y5y CPI swaps explained 84% of gold's price from 2004, when the 5y5y CPI swap time series begins, to present. 3 Previously, we estimated a gold model using the Fed's core PCE and the St. Louis Fed's 5y5y U.S. TIPS inflation index and found a 1% increase in the core PCE translates to a 4% increase in gold prices. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "A 'High-Pressure Economy' Would Be Bullish For Gold," dated October 20, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report "Reaganomics 2.0?," dated November 11, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report for zinc section "The Lithium Battery Supply Chain: Efficient Exposure To Electric-Vehicle Market," dated October 27, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades