BCA Indicators/Model
Highlights U.S. equities 'melted up' in January as tax cuts made the robust growth/low inflation sweet spot even sweeter. Ominously, recent market action is beginning to resemble a classic late cycle blow-off phase. The fundamentals supporting the market will persist through most of the year, before an economic downturn in the U.S. takes hold in 2019. The repatriation of overseas corporate cash will also flatter EPS growth this year via buyback and M&A activity. The S&P 500 could return 14% or more this year. Unfortunately, the consensus now shares our upbeat view for 2018. Valuation is stretched and many indicators suggest that investors have become downright giddy. This month we compare valuation across the major asset classes. U.S. equities are the most overvalued, followed by gold, raw industrials and EM assets. Oil is still close to fair value. Long-term investors should already be scaling back on risk assets. Investors with a 6-12 month horizon should stay overweight equities versus bonds for now, but a risk management approach means that they should not try to squeeze out the last few percentage points of return. In terms of the sequencing of the exit from risk, the most consistent lead/lag relationship relative to previous tops in the equity market is provided by U.S. corporate bonds. For this reason, we are likely to take profits on corporates before equities. EM assets are already at underweight. We still see a window for the U.S. dollar to appreciate, although by only about 5%. A lot of good news is discounted in the euro, peripheral core inflation is slowing and ECB policymakers are getting nervous. Monetary policy remains the main risk to a pro-cyclical investment stance, although not because of the coming change in the makeup of the FOMC. The economy and inflation should justify four Fed rate hikes in 2018 no matter the makeup. The bond bear phase will continue. Feature Chart I-1Investors Are Giddy U.S. equities 'melted up' in January as tax cuts made the robust growth/low inflation sweet spot even sweeter. Ominously, though, recent market action is beginning to resemble the classic late cycle blow-off phase. Such blow-offs can be highly profitable, but also make it more difficult to properly time the market top. Our base case is that the fundamentals supporting the market will persist through most of the year, before an economic downturn in the U.S. takes hold in 2019. Unfortunately, the consensus now shares our upbeat view for 2018 and many indicators suggest that investors have become downright giddy (Chart I-1). These indicators include investor sentiment, our speculation index, and the bull-to-bear ratio. Net S&P earnings revisions and the U.S. economic surprise index are also extremely elevated, while equity and bond implied volatility are near all-time lows. From a contrarian perspective, these observations suggest that a lot of good news is discounted and that the market is vulnerable to even slight disappointments. It is also a bad sign that our Revealed Preference Indicator moved off of its bullish equity signal in January (see Section III for more details). Meanwhile, central banks are beginning to take away the punchbowl as global economic slack dissipates. This is all late-cycle stuff. Equity valuation does not help investors time the peak in markets, but it does tell us something about downside risk and medium-term expected returns. The Shiller P/E ratio has surged above 30 (Chart I-2). Chart I-3 highlights that, historically, average total returns were negligible over the subsequent 10-year period when the Shiller P/E was in the 30-40 range. Granted, the Shiller P/E will likely fall mechanically later this year as the collapse of earnings in 2008 begins to drop out of the 10-year EPS calculation. Nonetheless, even the BCA Composite Valuation indicator, which includes some metrics that account for extremely low bond yields, surpassed +1 standard deviations in January (our threshold for overvaluation; Chart I-2, bottom panel). An overvaluation signal means that investors should be biased to take profits early. Chart I-2BCA Valuation Indicator Surpasses One Sigma Chart I-3Expected Returns Given Starting Point Shiller P/E As we highlighted in our 2018 Outlook Report, long-term investors should already be scaling back on risk assets. We recommend that investors with a 6-12 month horizon should stay overweight equities versus bonds for now, but we need to be vigilant in terms of scouring for signals to take profits. A risk management approach means that investors should not try to get the last few percentage points of return before the peak. U.S. Earnings And Repatriation Before we turn to the timing and sequence of our exit from risk assets, we will first update our thoughts on the earnings cycle. Fourth quarter U.S. earnings season is still in its early innings, but the banking sector has set an upbeat tone. S&P 500 profits are slated to register a 12% growth rate for both Q4/2017 and calendar 2017. Current year EPS growth estimates have been aggressively ratcheted higher (from 12% growth to 16%) in a mere three weeks on the back of Congress' cut to the corporate tax rate.1 U.S. margins fell slightly in the fourth quarter, but remain at a high level on the back of decent corporate pricing power. A pick-up in productivity growth into year-end helped as well. Our short-term profit model remains extremely upbeat (Chart I-4). The positive profit outlook for the first half of the year is broadly based across sectors as well, according to the recently updated EPS forecast models from BCA's U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service.2 The repatriation of overseas corporate cash will also flatter EPS growth this year via buyback and M&A activity. Studies of the 2004 repatriation legislation show that most of the funds "brought home" were paid out to shareholders, mostly in the form of buybacks. A NBER report estimated that for every dollar repatriated, 92 cents was subsequently paid out to shareholders in one form or another. The surge in buybacks occurred in 2005, according to the U.S. Flow of Funds accounts and a proxy using EPS growth less total dollar earnings growth for the S&P 500 (Chart I-5). The contribution to EPS growth from buybacks rose to more than 3 percentage points at the peak in 2005. Chart I-4Profit Growth Still Accelerating Chart I-5U.S. Buybacks To Lift EPS We expect that most of the repatriated funds will again flow through to shareholders, rather than be used to pay down debt or spent on capital goods. Cash has not been a constraint to capital spending in recent years outside of perhaps the small business sector, which has much less to gain from the tax holiday. A revival in animal spirits and capital spending is underway, but this has more to do with the overall tax package and global growth than the ability of U.S. companies to repatriate overseas earnings. Estimates of how much the repatriation could boost EPS vary widely. Most of it will occur in the Tech and Health Care sectors. Buybacks appear to have lifted EPS growth by roughly one percentage point over the past year. We would not be surprised to see this accelerate by 1-2 percentage points, although the timing could be delayed by a year if the 2004 tax holiday provides the correct timeline. This is certainly positive for the equity market, but much of the impact could already be discounted in prices. Organic earnings growth, and the economic and policy outlook will be the main drivers of equity market returns over the next year. We expect some profit margin contraction later this year, but our 5% EPS growth forecast is beginning to look too conservative. This is especially the case because it does not include the corporate tax cuts. The amount by which the tax cuts will boost earnings on an after-tax basis is difficult to estimate, but we are using 5% as a conservative estimate. Adding 2% for buybacks and 2% for dividends, the S&P 500 could provide an attractive 14% total return this year (assuming no multiple expansion). Timing The Exit Chart I-6Timing The Exit (I) That said, we noted in last month's Report and in BCA's 2018 Outlook that this will be a transition year. We expect a recession in the U.S. sometime in 2019 as the Fed lifts rates into restrictive territory. Equities and other risk assets will sniff out the recession about six months in advance, which means that investors should be preparing to take profits sometime during the next 12 months. Last month we discussed some of the indicators we will watch to help us time the exit. The 2/10 Treasury yield curve has been a reliable recession indicator in the past. However, the lead time on the peak in stocks was quite extended at times (Chart I-6). A shift in the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate above 2.4% would be consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the PCE measure of inflation. This would be a signal that the FOMC will have to step-up the pace of rate hikes and aggressively slow economic growth. We expect the Fed to tighten four times in 2018. We are likely to take some money off the table if core inflation is rising, even if it is still below 2%, at the time that the TIPS breakeven reaches 2.4%. We will also be watching seven indicators that we have found to be useful in heralding market tops, which are summarized in our Scorecard Indicator (Chart I-7). At the moment, four out of the seven indicators are positive (Chart I-8): State of the Business Cycle: As early signals that the economy is softening, watch for the ISM new orders minus inventories indicator to slip below zero, or the 3-month growth rate of unemployment claims to rise above zero. Monetary and Financial Conditions: Using interest rates to judge the stance of monetary policy has been complicated by central banks' use of their balance sheet as a policy tool. Thus, it is better to use two of our proprietary indicators: the BCA Monetary Indicator (MI) and the Financial Conditions Indictor. The S&P 500 index has historically rallied strongly when the MI is above its long-term average. Similarly, equities tend to perform well when the FCI is above its 250-day moving average. The MI is sending a negative signal because interest rates have increased and credit growth has slowed. However, the broader FCI remains well in 'bullish' territory. Price Momentum: We simply use the S&P 500 relative to its 200-day moving average to measure momentum. Currently, the index is well above that level, providing a bullish signal for the Scorecard. Sentiment: Our research shows that stock returns have tended to be highest following periods when sentiment is bearish but improving. In contrast, returns have tended to be lowest following periods when sentiment is bullish but deteriorating. The Scorecard includes the BCA Speculation Indicator to capture sentiment, but virtually all measures of sentiment are very high. The next major move has to be down by definition. Thus, sentiment is assigned a negative value in the Scorecard. Value: As discussed above, value is poor based on the Shiller P/E and the BCA Composite Valuation indicator. Valuation may not help with timing, but we include it in our Scorecard because an overvalued signal means investors should err on the side of getting out early. Chart I-7Equity ScoreCard: Watch For A Dip Below 3 Chart I-8Timing The Exit (II) We demonstrated in previous research that a Scorecard reading of three or above was historically associated with positive equity total returns in subsequent months. A drop below three this year would signal the time to de-risk. Table I-1Exit Checklist To our Checklist we add the U.S. Leading Economic index, which has a good track record of calling recessions. However, we will use the LEI excluding the equity market, since we are using it as an indicator for the stock market. It is bullish at the moment. Our Global LEI is also flashing green. Table I-1 provides a summary checklist for trimming equity exposure. At the moment, 2 out of 9 indicators are bearish. Cross Asset Valuation Comparison Clients have asked our view on the appropriate order in which to scale out of risk assets. One way to approach the question is to compare valuation across asset classes. Presumably, the ones that are most overvalued are at greatest risk, and thus profits should be taken the earliest. It is difficult to compare valuation across asset classes. Should one use fitted values from models or simple deviations from moving averages? Over what time period? Since there is no widely accepted approach, we include multiple measures. More than one time period was used in some cases to capture regime changes. Table I-2 provides out 'best guestimate' for nine asset classes. The approaches range from sophisticated methods developed over many years (i.e. our equity valuation indicators), to regression analysis on the fundamentals (oil), to simple deviations from a time trend (real raw industrial commodity prices and gold). Table I-2Valuation Levels For Major Asset Classes We averaged the valuation readings in cases where there are multiple estimates for a single asset class. The results are shown in Chart I-9. Chart I-9Valuation Levels For Major Asset Classes U.S. equities stand out as the most expensive by far, at 1.8 standard deviations above fair value. Gold, raw industrials and EM equities are next at one standard deviation overvalued. EM sovereign bond spreads come next at 0.7, followed closely by U.S. Treasurys (real yield levels) and investment-grade corporate (IG) bonds (expressed as a spread). High-yield (HY) is only about 0.3 sigma expensive, based on default-adjusted spreads over the Treasury curve. That said, both IG and HY are quite expensive in absolute terms based on the fact that government bonds are expensive. Oil is sitting very close to fair value, despite the rapid price run up over the past couple of months. This makes oil exposure doubly attractive at the moment because the fundamentals point to higher prices at a time when the underlying asset is not expensive. Sequencing Around Past S&P 500 Peaks Historical analysis around equity market peaks provides an alternative approach to the sequencing question. Table I-3 presents the number of days that various asset classes peaked before or after the past major five tops in the S&P 500. A negative number indicates that the asset class peaked before U.S. equities, and a positive number means that it peaked after. Table I-3Asset Class Leads & Lags Vs. Peak In S&P 500 Unfortunately, there is no consistent pattern observed for EM equities, raw industrials, U.S. cyclical stocks, Tech stocks, or small-cap versus large-cap relative returns. Sometimes they peaked before the S&P 500, and sometime after. The EM sovereign bond excess return index peaked about 130 days in advance of the 1998 and 2007 U.S. equity market tops, although we only have three episodes to analyse due to data limitations. Oil is a mixed bag. A peak in the price of gold led the equity market in four out of five episodes, but the lead time is long and variable. The most consistent lead/lag relationship is given by the U.S. corporate bond market. Both investment- and speculative-grade excess returns relative to government bonds peaked in advance of U.S. stocks in four of the five episodes. High-yield excess returns provided the most lead time, peaking on average 154 days in advance. Excess returns to high-yield were a better signal than total returns. This leading relationship is one reason why we plan to trim exposure to corporate bonds within our bond portfolio in advance of scaling back on equities. But the 'return of vol' that we expect to occur later this year will take a toll on carry trades more generally. We are already underweight EM equities and bonds. This EM recommendation has not gone in our favor, but it would make little sense to upgrade them now given our positive views on volatility and the dollar. An unwinding of carry trades will also hit the high-yielding currencies outside of the EM space, such as the Kiwi and Aussie dollar. Base metal prices will be hit particularly hard if the 2019 U.S. recession spills over to the EM economies as we expect. We may downgrade base metals from neutral to underweight around the time that we downgrade equities, but much depends on the evolution of the Chinese economy in the coming months. Oil is a different story. OPEC 2.0 is likely to cut back on supply in the face of an economic downturn, helping to keep prices elevated. We therefore may not trim energy exposure this year. As for equity sectors, our recommended portfolio is still overweight cyclicals for now. Our synchronized global capex boom, rising bond yield, and firm oil price themes keep us overweight the Industrials, Energy and Financial sectors. Utilities and Homebuilders are underweight. Tech is part of the cyclical sector, but poor valuation keeps us underweight. That said, our sector specialists are already beginning a gradual shift away from cyclicals toward defensives for risk management purposes. This transition will continue in the coming months as we de-risk. We are also shifting small caps to neutral on earnings disappointments and elevated debt levels. The Dollar Pain Trade Market shifts since our last publication have largely gone in our favor; stocks have surged, corporate bonds spreads have tightened, oil prices have spiked, bonds have sold off and cyclical stocks have outperformed defensives. One area that has gone against us is the U.S. dollar. Relative interest rate expectations have moved in favor of the dollar as we expected at both the short- and long-ends of the curve. Nonetheless, the dollar has not tracked its historical relationship versus both the yen and euro. The Greenback did not even get a short-term boost from the passage of the tax plan and holiday on overseas earnings. Perhaps this is because the lion's share of "overseas" earnings are already held in U.S. dollars. Reportedly, a large fraction is even held in U.S. banks on U.S. territory. Currency conversion is thus not a major bullish factor for the U.S. dollar. The recent bout of dollar weakness began around the time of the release of the ECB Minutes in January which were interpreted as hawkish because they appeared to be preparing markets for changes in monetary policy. The European debt crisis and economic recession were the reasons for the ECB's asset purchases and negative interest rate policy. Neither of these conditions are in place now. The ECB is meeting as we go to press, and we expect some small adjustments in the Statement that remove references to the need for "crisis" level accommodations. Subsequent steps will be to prepare markets for a complete end to QE, perhaps in September, and then for rates hikes likely in 2019. The key point is that European monetary policy has moved beyond 'peak stimulus' and the normalization process will continue. Perhaps this is partly to blame for euro strength although, as mentioned above, interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar. Does this mean that the dollar has peaked and has entered a cyclical bear phase that will persist over the next 6-12 months? The answer is 'no', although we are less bullish than in the past. We believe there is still a window for the dollar to appreciate against the euro and in broader trade-weighted terms by about 5%. First, a lot of euro-bullish news has been discounted (Chart I-10). Positive economic surprises heavily outstripped that in the U.S. last year, but that phase is now over. The euro appears expensive based on interest rate differentials, and euro sentiment is close to a bullish extreme. This all suggests that market positioning has become a negative factor for the currency. Chart I-10Euro: A Lot Of Bullish News Is Discounted Second, the chorus of complaints against the euro's strength is growing among European central bankers, including Ewald Nowotny, the rather hawkish Austrian central banker. Policymakers' concerns may partly reflect the fact that peripheral inflation excluding food and energy has already weakened to 0.6% from a high of 1.3% in April last year (Chart I-10, fourth panel). Third, U.S. consumer price and wage inflation have yet to pick up meaningfully. The dollar should receive a lift if core U.S. inflation clearly moves toward the Fed's 2% target, as we expect. The FOMC would suddenly appear to have fallen behind the curve and U.S. rate expectations would ratchet higher. Chart I-10, bottom panel, highlights that the euro will weaken if U.S. core inflation rises versus that in the Eurozone. The implication is that the Euro's appreciation has progressed too far and is due for a pullback. As for the yen, the currency surged in January when the Bank of Japan (BoJ) announced a reduction in long-dated JGB purchases. This simply acknowledged what has already occurred. It was always going to be impossible to target both the quantity of bond purchases and the level of 10-year yield simultaneously. Keeping yields near the target required less purchases than they thought. The market interpreted the BoJ's move as a possible prelude to lifting the 10-year yield target. It is perhaps not surprising that the market took the news this way. The economy is performing extremely well; our model that incorporates high-frequency economic data suggests that real GDP growth will move above 3% in the coming quarters. The Japanese economy is benefiting from the end of a fiscal drag and from a rebound in EM growth. Nonetheless, following January's BoJ policy meeting, Kuroda poured cold water on speculation that the BoJ may soon end or adjust the YCC. Recent speeches by BoJ officials reinforce the view that the MPC wants to see an overshoot of actual inflation that will lower real interest rates and thereby reinforce the strong economic activity that is driving higher inflation. Only then will officials be convinced that their job is done. Given that inflation excluding food and energy only stands at 0.3%, the BoJ is still a long way from the overshoot it desires. On the positive side, Japan's large current account surplus and yen undervaluation provide underlying support for the currency. Balancing the offsetting positive and negative forces, our foreign exchange strategists have shifted to neutral on the yen. The Euro remains underweight while the dollar is overweight. Similar to our dollar view, we still see a window for U.S. Treasurys to underperform the global hedged fixed-income benchmark as world bond yields shift higher this year. European government bonds will also sell off, but should outperform Treasurys. JGBs will provide the best refuge for bondholders during the global bond bear phase, since the BoJ will prevent a rise in yields inside of the 10-year maturity. Our global bond strategists upgraded U.K. gilts to overweight in January. Momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. FOMC Transition Monetary policy remains the main risk to a pro-cyclical investment stance, although not because of the coming change in the makeup of the FOMC. An abrupt shift in policy is unlikely. There was some support at the December 2017 FOMC meeting to study the use of nominal GDP or price level targeting as a policy framework, but this has been an ongoing debate that will likely continue for years to come. The Fed will remain committed to its current monetary policy framework once Powell takes over. Table I-4 provides a summary of who will be on the FOMC next year, including their policy bias. Chart I-11 compares the recent FOMC makeup with the coming Powell FOMC (voting members only). The hawk/dove ratio will not change much under Powell, unless Trump stacks the vacant spots with hawks. Table I-4Composition Of The FOMC Chart I-11Composition Of Voting FOMC Members 2017 Vs. 2018 In any event, history shows that the FOMC strives to avoid major shifts in policy around changeovers in the Fed Chair. In previous transitions, the previous path for rates was maintained by an average of 13 months. Moreover, Powell has shown that he is not one to rock the boat during his time on the FOMC. It will be the evolution of the economy and inflation, not the composition of the FOMC, that will have the biggest impact on markets at the end of the day. Recent speeches reveal that policymakers across the hawk/dove spectrum are moving modesty toward the hawkish side because growth has accelerated at a time when unemployment is already considered to be below full-employment by many policymakers. The melt-up in equity indexes in January did little to calm worries about financial excesses either. The Fed is struggling to understand the strength of the structural factors that could be holding down inflation. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 21, focusses on the impact of robot automation. While advances on this front are impressive, we conclude that it is difficult to find evidence that robots are more deflationary than previous technological breakthroughs. Thus, increased robot usage should not prevent inflation from rising as the labor market continues to tighten. The macro backdrop will likely justify the FOMC hiking at least as fast as the dots currently forecast. The risks are skewed to the upside. The median Fed dot calls for an unemployment rate of 3.9% by end-2018, only marginally lower than today's rate of 4.1%. This is inconsistent with real GDP growth well in excess of its supply-side potential. The unemployment rate is more likely to reach a 49-year low of 3.5% by the end of this year. As highlighted in last month's Report, a key risk to the bull market in risk assets is the end of the 'low vol/low rate' world. The selloff in the bond market in January may mark the start of this process. Conclusions We covered a lot of ground in this month's Overview of the markets, so we will keep the conclusions brief and focused on the risks. Our key point is that the fundamentals remain positive for risk assets, but that a lot of good news is discounted and it appears that we have entered a classic blow-off phase. This will be a transition year to a recession in the U.S. in 2019. Given that valuation for most risk assets is quite stretched, and given that the monetary taps are starting to close, investors must plan for the exit and keep an eye on our timing checklist. The main risk to our pro-cyclical portfolio is a rise in U.S. inflation and the Fed's response, which we believe will end the sweet spot for risk assets. Apart from this, our geopolitical strategists point to several other items that could upset the applecart this year:3 1. Trade China has cooperated with the U.S. in trying to tame North Korea. Nonetheless, President Trump is committed to an "America First" trade policy and he may need to show some muscle against China ahead of the midterm elections in November in order to rally his base. It is politically embarrassing to the Administration that China racked up its largest trade surplus ever with the U.S. in Trump's first year in office. A key question is whether the President goes after China via a series of administrative rulings - such as the recently announced tariffs on solar panels and white goods - or whether he applies an across-the-board tariff and/or fine. The latter would have larger negative macroeconomic implications. 2. Iran On January 12, President Trump threatened not to waive sanctions against Iran the next time they come due (May 12), unless some new demands are met. Pressure from the U.S. President comes at a delicate time for Iran. Domestic unrest has been ongoing since December 28. Although protests have largely fizzled out, they have reopened the rift between the clerical regime, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Iranian hardliners, who control part of the armed forces, could lash out in the Persian Gulf, either by threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz or by boarding foreign vessels in international waters. The domestic political calculus in both Iran and the U.S. make further Tehran-Washington tensions likely. For the time being, however, we expect only a minor geopolitical risk premium to seep into the energy markets, supporting our bullish House View on oil prices. 3. China Last month's Special Report highlighted that significant structural reforms are on the way in China, now that President Xi has amassed significant political support for his reform agenda. The reforms should be growth-positive in the long term, but could be a net negative for growth in the near term depending on how deftly the authorities handle the monetary and fiscal policy dials. The risk is that the authorities make a policy mistake by staying too tight, as occurred in 2015. We are monitoring a number of indicators that should warn if a policy mistake is unfolding. On this front, January brought some worrying economic data. The latest figures for both nominal imports and money growth slowed. Given that M2 and M3 are components of BCA's Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, and that nominal imports directly impact China's contribution to global growth, this raises the question of whether December's economic data suggest that China is slowing at a more aggressive pace than we expect. For now, our answer is no. First, China's trade numbers are highly volatile; nominal import growth remains elevated after smoothing the data. Second, China's export growth remains buoyant, consistent with a solid December PMI reading. The bottom line is that we are sticking with our view that China will experience a benign deceleration in terms of its impact on DM risk assets, but we will continue to monitor the situation closely. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 25, 2018 Next Report: February 22, 2018 1 According to Thomson Reuters/IBES. 2 Please see U.S. Equity Sector Strategy Special Report "White Paper: Introducing Our U.S. Equity Sector Earnings Models," dated January 16, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 For more information, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Also see "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018. II. The Impact Of Robots On Inflation Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. Technological advance in the past has not prevented improving living standards or led to ever rising joblessness over the decades, but pessimists argue that recent advances are different. The issue is important for financial markets. If structural factors such as automation are holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. We see no compelling evidence that the displacement effect of emerging technologies is any stronger than in the past. Robot usage has had a modest positive impact on overall productivity. Despite this contribution, overall productivity growth has been dismal over the past decade. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale as some claim, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Periods of strong growth in automation have historically been associated with robust, not lackluster, wage gains, contrary to the consensus view. The Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. This and other evidence suggest that it is difficult to make the case that robots will make it tougher for central banks to reach their inflation goals than did previous technological breakthroughs. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. Recent breakthroughs in technology are awe-inspiring and unsettling. These advances are viewed with great trepidation by many because of the potential to replace humans in the production process. Hype over robots is particularly shrill. Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. In the first in our series of Special Reports focusing on the structural factors that might be preventing central banks from reaching their inflation targets, we demonstrated that the impact of Amazon is overstated in the press. We estimated that E-commerce is depressing inflation in the U.S. by a mere 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. This Special Report tackles the impact of automation. We are optimistic that robot technology and artificial intelligence will significantly boost future productivity, and thus reduce costs. But, is there any evidence at the macro level that robot usage has been more deflationary than technological breakthroughs in the past and is, thus, a major driver of the low inflation rates we observe today across the major countries? The question matters, especially for the outlook for central bank policy and the bond market. If structural factors are indeed holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. However, if low inflation simply reflects long lags between wages and the tightening labor market, then inflation may suddenly lurch to life as it has at the end of past cycles. The bond market is not priced for that scenario. Are Robots Different? A Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service suggested that the "robot revolution" could be as transformative as previous General Purpose Technologies (GPT), including the steam engine, electricity and the microchip.1 GPTs are technologies that radically alter the economy's production process and make a major contribution to living standards over time. The term "robot" can have different meanings. The most basic definition is "a device that automatically performs complicated and often repetitive tasks," and this encompasses a broad range of machines: From the Jacquard Loom, which was invented over 200 years ago, on to Numerically Controlled (NC) mills and lathes, pick and place machines used in the manufacture of electronics, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), and even homicidal robots from the future such as the Terminator. Our Technology Sector report made the case that there is nothing particularly sinister about robots. They are just another chapter in a long history of automation. Nor is the displacement of workers unprecedented. The industrial revolution was about replacing human craft labor with capital (machines), which did high-volume work with better quality and productivity. This freed humans for work which had not yet been automated, along with designing, producing and maintaining the machinery. Agriculture offers a good example. This sector involved over 50% of the U.S. labor force until the late 1800s. Steam and then internal combustion-powered tractors, which can be viewed as "robotic horses," contributed to a massive rise in output-per-man hour. The number of hours worked to produce a bushel of wheat fell by almost 98% from the mid-1800s to 1955. This put a lot of farm hands out of work, but these laborers were absorbed over time in other growing areas of the economy. It is the same story for all other historical technological breakthroughs. Change is stressful for those directly affected, but rising productivity ultimately lifts average living standards. Robots will be no different. As we discuss below, however, the increasing use of robots and AI may have a deeper and longer-lasting impact on inequality. Strong Tailwinds Chart II-1Robots Are Getting Cheaper Factory robots have improved immensely due to cheaper and more capable control and vision systems. As these systems evolve, the abilities of robots to move around their environment while avoiding obstacles will improve, as will their ability to perform increasingly complex tasks. Most importantly, robots are already able to do more than just routine tasks, thus enabling them to replace or aid humans in higher-skilled processes. Robot prices are also falling fast, especially after quality-adjusting the data (Chart II-1). Units are becoming easier to install, program and operate. These trends will help to reduce the barriers-to-entry for the large, untapped, market of small and medium sized enterprises. Robots also offer the ability to do low-volume "customized" production and still keep unit costs low. In the future, self-learning robots will be able to optimize their own performance by analyzing the production of other robots around the world. Robot usage is growing quickly according to data collected by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) that covers 23 countries. Industrial robot sales worldwide increased to almost 300,000 units in 2016, up 16% from the year before (Chart II-2). The stock of industrial robots globally has grown at an annual average pace of 10% since 2010, reaching slightly more than 1.8 million units in 2016.2 Robot usage is far from evenly distributed across industries. The automotive industry is the major consumer of industrial robots, holding 45% of the total stock in 2016 (Chart II-3). The computer & electronics industry is a distant second at 17%. Metals, chemicals and electrical/electronic appliances comprise the bulk of the remaining stock. Chart II-2Global Robot Usage Chart II-3Global Robot Usage By Industry (2016) As far as countries go, Japan has traditionally been the largest market for robots in the world. However, sales have been in a long-term downtrend and the stock of robots has recently been surpassed by China, which has ramped up robot purchases in recent years (Chart II-4). Robot density, which is the stock of robots per 10 thousand employed in manufacturing, makes it easier to compare robot usage across countries (Chart II-5, panel 2). By this measure, China is not a heavy user of robots compared to other countries. South Korea stands at the top, well above the second-place finishers (Germany and Japan). Large automobile sectors in these three countries explain their high relative robot densities. Chart II-4Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Chart II-5Stock Of Robots By Country (II) (2016) While the growth rate of robot usage is impressive, it is from a very low base (outside of the automotive industry). The average number of robots per 10,000 employees is only 74 for the 23 countries in the IFR database. Robot use is tiny compared to total man hours worked. Chart II-6U.S. Investment In Robots In the U.S., spending on robots is only about 5% of total business spending on equipment and software (Chart II-6). To put this into perspective, U.S. spending on information, communication and technology (ICT) equipment represented 35-40% of total capital equipment spending during the tech boom in the 1990s and early 2000s.3 The bottom line is that there is a lot of hype in the press, but robots are not yet widely used across countries or industries. It will be many years before business spending on robots approaches the scale of the 1990s/2000s IT boom. A Deflationary Impact? As noted above, we view robotics as another chapter in a long history of technological advancements. Pessimists suggest that the latest advances are different because they are inherently more threatening to the overall job market and wage share of total income. If the pessimists are right, what are the theoretical channels though which this would have a greater disinflationary effect relative to previous GPT technologies? Faster Productivity Gains: Enhanced productivity drives down unit labor costs, which may be passed along to other industries (as cheaper inputs) and to the end consumer. More Human Displacement: The jobs created in other areas may be insufficient to replace the jobs displaced by robots, leading to lower aggregate income and spending. The loss of income for labor will simply go to the owners of capital, but the point is that the labor share of income might decline. Deflationary pressures could build as aggregate demand falls short of supply. Even in industries that are slow to automate, just the threat of being replaced by robots may curtail wage demands. Inequality: Some have argued that rising inequality is partly because the spoils of new technologies over the past 20 years have largely gone to the owners of capital. This shift may have undermined aggregate demand because upper income households tend to have a high saving rate, thereby depressing overall aggregate demand and inflationary pressures. The human displacement effect, described above, would exacerbate the inequality effect by transferring income from labor to the owners of capital. 1. Productivity It is difficult to see the benefits of robots on productivity at the economy-wide level. Productivity growth has been abysmal across the major developed countries since the Great Recession, but the productivity slowdown was evident long before Lehman collapsed (Chart II-7). The productivity slowdown continued even as automation using robots accelerated after 2010. Chart II-7Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Some analysts argue that lackluster productivity is simply a statistical mirage because of the difficulties in measuring output in today's economy. We will not get into the details of the mismeasurement debate here. We encourage interested clients to read a Special Report by the BCA Global Investment Strategy service entitled "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians." 4 Our colleague Peter Berezin makes the case that the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, radio, indoor plumbing and air conditioning. He argues that the real reason that productivity growth has slowed is that educational attainment has decelerated and businesses have plucked many of the low-hanging fruit made possible by the IT revolution. Cyclical factors stemming from the Great Recession and financial crisis are also to blame, as capital spending has been slow to recover in most of the advanced economies. Some other factors that help to explain the decline in aggregate productivity are provided in Appendix II-1. Nonetheless, the poor aggregate productivity performance does not mean that there are no benefits to using robots. The benefits are evident at the industrial level, where measurement issues are presumably less vexing for statisticians (i.e., it is easier to measure the output of the auto industry, for example, than for the economy as a whole). Chart II-8 plots the level of robot density in 2016 with average annual productivity growth since 2004 for 10 U.S. manufacturing industries (robot density is presented in deciles). A loose positive relationship is apparent. Chart II-8U.S.: Productivity Vs. Robot Density Academic studies estimate that robots have contributed importantly to economy-wide productivity growth. The Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) estimated that labor productivity growth rises by 0.07 to 0.08 percentage points for every 1% rise in the rate of robot density.5 This implies that robots accounted for roughly 10% of the productivity growth experienced since the early 1990s in the major economies. Another study of 14 industries across 17 countries by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) found that robots boosted annual productivity growth by 0.36 percentage points over the 1993-2007 period.6 This is impressive because, if this estimate holds true for the U.S., robots' contribution to the 2½% average annual U.S. total productivity growth over the period was 14%. To put the importance of robotics into historical context, its contribution to productivity so far is roughly on par with that of the steam engine (Chart II-9). It falls well short of the 0.6 percentage point annual productivity contribution from the IT revolution. The implication is that, while the overall productivity performance has been dismal since 2007, it would have been even worse in the absence of robots. What does this mean for inflation? According to the "cost push" model of the inflation process, an increase in productivity of 0.36% that is not accompanied by associated wage gains would reduce unit labor costs (ULC) by the same amount. This should trim inflation if the cost savings are passed on to the end consumer, although by less than 0.36% because robots can only depress variable costs, not fixed costs. There indeed appears to be a slight negative relationship between robot density and unit labor costs at the industrial level in the U.S., although the relationship is loose at best (Chart II-10). Chart II-9GPT Contribution To Productivity Chart II-10U.S.: Unit Labor Costs Vs. Robot Density In theory, divergences in productivity across industries should only generate shifts in relative prices, and "cost push" inflation dynamics should only operate in the short term. Most economists believe that inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon in the long run, which means that central banks should be able to offset positive productivity shocks by lowering interest rates enough that aggregate demand keeps up with supply. Indeed, the Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. Also, note that inflation is currently low across the major advanced economies, irrespective of the level of robot intensity (Chart II-11). From this perspective, it is hard to see that robots should take much of the credit for today's low inflation backdrop. Chart II-11Inflation Vs. Robot Density 2. Human Displacement A key question is whether robots and humans are perfect substitutes. If new technologies introduced in the past were perfect substitutes, then it would have led to massive underemployment and all of the income in the economy would eventually have migrated to the owners of capital. The fact that average real household incomes have risen over time, and that there has been no secular upward trend in unemployment rates over the centuries, means that new technologies were at least partly complementary with labor (i.e., the jobs lost as a direct result of productivity gains were more than replaced in other areas of the economy over time). Rather than replacing workers, in many cases tech made humans more productive in their jobs. Rising productivity lifted income and thereby led to the creation of new jobs in other areas. The capital that workers bring to the production process - the skills, know-how and special talents - became more valuable as interaction with technology increased. Like today, there were concerns in the 1950s and 1960s that computerization would displace many types of jobs and lead to widespread idleness and falling household income. With hindsight, there was little to worry about. Some argue that this time is different. Futurists frequently assert that the pace of innovation is not just accelerating, it is accelerating 'exponentially'. Robots can now, or will soon be able to, replace humans in tasks that require cognitive skills. This means that they will be far less complementary to humans than in the past. The displacement effect could thus be much larger, especially given the impressive advances in artificial intelligence. However, Box II-1 discusses why the threat to workers posed by AI is also heavily overblown in the media. The CEP multi-country study cited above did not find a large displacement effect; robot usage did not affect the overall number of hours worked in the 23 countries studied (although it found distributional effects - see below). In other words, rather than suppressing overall labor input, robot usage has led to more output, higher productivity, more jobs and stronger wage and income growth. A report by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI)7 takes a broader look at automation, using productivity growth and capital spending as proxies. Automation is what occurs as the implementation of new technologies is incorporated along with new capital equipment or software to replace human labor in the workplace. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending, and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Indeed, the report demonstrates that occupational employment shifts were far slower in the 2000-2015 period than in any decade in the 1900s (Chart II-12). Box II-1 The Threat From AI Is Overblown Media coverage of AI/Deep Learning has established a consensus view that we believe is well off the mark. A recent Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service dispels the myths surrounding AI.8 We believe the consensus, in conjunction with warnings from a variety of sources, is leading to predictions, policy discussions, and even career choices based on a flawed premise. It is worth noting that the most vocal proponents of AI as a threat to jobs and even humanity are not AI experts. At the root of this consensus is the false view that emerging AI technology is anything like true intelligence. Modern AI is not remotely comparable in function to a biological brain. Scientists have a limited understanding of how brains work, and it is unlikely that a poorly understood system can be modeled on a computer. The misconception of intelligence is amplified by headlines claiming an AI "taught itself" a particular task. No AI has ever "taught itself" anything: All AI results have come about after careful programming by often PhD-level experts, who then supplied the system with vast amounts of high quality data to train it. Often these systems have been iterated a number of times and we only hear of successes, not the failures. The need for careful preparation of the AI system and the requirement for high quality data limits the applicability of AI to specific classes of problems where the application justifies the investment in development and where sufficient high-quality data exists. There may be numerous such applications but doubtless many more where AI would not be suitable. Similarly, an AI system is highly adapted to a single problem, or type of problem, and becomes less useful when its application set is expanded. In other words, unlike a human whose abilities improve as they learn more things, an AI's performance on a particular task declines as it does more things. There is a popular misconception that increased computing power will somehow lead to ever improving AI. It is the algorithm which determines the outcome, not the computer performance: Increased computing power leads to faster results, not different results. Advanced computers might lead to more advanced algorithms, but it is pointless to speculate where that may lead: A spreadsheet from 2001 may work faster today but it still gives the same answer. In any event, it is worth noting that a tool ceases to be a tool when it starts having an opinion: there is little reason to develop a machine capable of cognition even if that were possible. Chart II-12U.S. Job Rotation Has Slowed The EPI report also notes that these indicators of automation increased rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period that saw solid wage growth for American workers. These indicators weakened in the two periods of stagnant wage growth: from 1973 to 1995 and from 2002 to the present. Thus, there is no historical correlation between increases in automation and wage stagnation. Rather than automation, the report argues that it was China's entry into the global trading system that was largely responsible for the hollowing out of the U.S. manufacturing sector. We have also made this argument in previous research. The fact that the major advanced economies are all at, or close to, full employment supports the view that automation has not been an overwhelming headwind for job creation. Chart II-13 demonstrates that there has been no relationship between the change in robot density and the loss of manufacturing jobs since 1993. Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. Interestingly, despite a worsening labor shortage, robot density among Japanese firms is falling. Moreover, the Japanese data show that the industries that have a high robot usage tend to be more, not less, generous with wages than the robot laggard industries. Please see Appendix II-2 for more details. Chart II-13Global Manufacturing Jobs Vs. Robot Density The bottom line is that it does not appear that labor displacement related to automation has been responsible in any meaningful way for the lackluster average real income growth in the advanced economies since 2007. 3. Inequality That said, there is evidence suggesting that robots are having important distributional effects. The CEP study found that robot use has reduced hours for low-skilled and (to a lesser extent) middle-skilled workers relative to the highly skilled. This finding makes sense conceptually. Technological change can exacerbate inequality by either increasing the relative demand for skilled over unskilled workers (so-called "skill-biased" technological change), or by inducing companies to substitute machinery and other forms of physical capital for workers (so-called "capital-biased" technological change). The former affects the distribution of labor income, while the latter affects the share of income in GDP that labor receives. A Special Report appearing in this publication in 2014 focused on the relationship between technology and inequality.9 The report highlighted that much of the recent technological change has been skill-biased, which heavily favors workers with the talent and education to perform cognitively-demanding tasks, even as it reduces demand for workers with only rudimentary skills. Moreover, technological innovations and globalization increasingly allow the most talented individuals to market their skills to a much larger audience, thus bidding up their wages. The evidence suggests that faster productivity growth leads to higher average real wages and improved living standards, at least over reasonably long horizons. Nonetheless, technological change can, and in the future almost certainly will, increase income inequality. The poor will gain, but not as much as the rich. The fact that higher-income households tend to maintain a higher savings rate than low-income households means that the shift in the distribution of income toward the higher-income households will continue to modestly weigh on aggregate demand. Can the distribution effect be large enough to have a meaningful depressing impact on inflation? We believe that it has played some role in the lackluster recovery since the Great Recession, with the result that an extended period of underemployment has delivered a persistent deflationary impulse in the major developed economies. However, as discussed above, stimulative monetary policy has managed to overcome the impact of inequality and other headwinds on aggregate demand, and has returned the major countries roughly to full employment. Indeed, this year will be the first since 2007 that the G20 economies as a group will be operating slightly above a full employment level. Inflation should respond to excess demand conditions, irrespective of any ongoing demand headwind stemming from inequality. Conclusions Technological change has led to rising living standards over the decades. It did not lead to widespread joblessness and did not prevent central banks from meeting their inflation targets over time. The pessimists argue that this time is different because robots/AI have a much larger displacement effect. Perhaps it will be 20 years before we will know the answer. But our main point is that we have found no evidence that recent advances in robotics and AI, while very impressive, will be any different in their macro impact. There is little evidence that the modern economy is less capable in replacing the jobs lost to automation, although the nature of new technologies may be affecting the distribution of income more than in the past. Real incomes for the middle- and lower-income classes have been stagnant for some time, but this is partly due to productivity growth that is too low, not too high. Moreover, it is not at all clear that positive productivity shocks are disinflationary beyond the near term. The link between robot usage and unit labor costs over the past couple of decades is loose at best at the industry level, and is non-existent when looking across the major countries. The Fed was able to roughly meet its 2% inflation target in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, despite IT's impressive contribution to productivity growth during that period. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. The global output gap will shift into positive territory this year for the first time since the Great Recession. Any resulting rise in inflation will come as a shock since the bond market has discounted continued low inflation for as far as the eye can see. We expect bond yields and implied volatility to rise this year, which may undermine risk assets in the second half. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Brian Piccioni Vice President Technology Sector Strategy Appendix II-1 Why Is Productivity So Low? A recent study by the OECD10 reveals that, while frontier firms are charging ahead, there is a widening gap between these firms and the laggards. The study analyzed firm-level data on labor productivity and total factor productivity for 24 countries. "Frontier" firms are defined to be those with productivity in the top 5%. These firms are 3-4 times as productive as the remaining 95%. The authors argue that the underlying cause of this yawning gap is that the diffusion rate of new technologies from the frontier firms to the laggards has slowed within industries. This could be due to rising barriers to entry, which has reduced contestability in markets. Curtailing the creative-destruction process means that there is less pressure to innovate. Barriers to entry may have increased because "...the importance of tacit knowledge as a source of competitive advantage for frontier firms may have risen if increasingly complex technologies were to increase the amount and sophistication of complementary investments required for technological adoption." 11 The bottom line is that aggregate productivity is low because the robust productivity gains for the tech-savvy frontier companies are offset by the long tail of firms that have been slow to adopt the latest technology. Indeed, business spending has been especially weak in this expansion. Chart II-14 highlights that the slowdown in U.S. productivity growth has mirrored that of the capital stock. Chart II-14U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity Appendix II-2 Japan - The Leading Edge Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. The popular press is full of stories of how robots are taking over. If the stories are to be believed, robots are the answer to the country's shrinking workforce. Robots now serve as helpers for the elderly, priests for weddings and funerals, concierges for hotels and even sexual partners (don't ask). Prime Minister Abe's government has launched a 5-year push to deepen the use of intelligent machines in manufacturing, supply chains, construction and health care. Indeed, Japan was the leader in robotics use for decades. Nonetheless, despite all the hype, Japan's stock of industrial robots has actually been eroding since the late 1990s (Chart II-4). Numerous surveys show that firms plan to use robots more in the future because of the difficulty in hiring humans. And there is huge potential: 90% of Japanese firms are small- and medium-sized (SME) and most are not currently using robots. Yet, there has been no wave of robot purchases as of 2016. One problem is the cost; most sophisticated robots are simply too expensive for SMEs to consider. This suggests that one cannot blame robots for Japan's lack of wage growth. The labor shortage has become so acute that there are examples of companies that have turned down sales due to insufficient manpower. Possible reasons why these companies do not offer higher wages to entice workers are beyond the scope of this report. But the fact that the stock of robots has been in decline since the late 1990s does not support the view that Japanese firms are using automation on a broad scale to avoid handing out pay hikes. Indeed, Chart II-15 highlights that wage deflation has been the greatest in industries that use almost no robots. Highly automated industries, such as Transportation Equipment and Electronics, have been among the most generous. This supports the view that the productivity afforded by increased robot usage encourages firms to pay their workers more. Looking ahead, it seems implausible that robots can replace all the retiring Japanese workers in the years to come. The workforce will shrink at an annual average pace of 0.33% between 2020 and 2030, according to the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training. Productivity growth would have to rise by the same amount to fully offset the dwindling number of workers. But that would require a surge in robot density of 4.1, assuming that each rise in robot density of one adds 0.08% to the level of productivity (Chart II-16). The level of robot sales would have to jump by a whopping 2½ times in the first year and continue to rise at the same pace each year thereafter to make this happen. Of course, the productivity afforded by new robots may accelerate in the coming years, but the point is that robot usage would likely have to rise astronomically to offset the impact of the shrinking population. Chart II-15Japan: Earnings Vs. Robot Density Chart II-16Japan: Where Is The Flood Of Robots? The implication is that, as long as the Japanese economy continues to grow above roughly 1%, the labor market will continue to tighten and wage rates will eventually begin to rise. 1 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "The Coming Robotics Revolution," dated May 16, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that this includes only robots used in manufacturing industry, and thus excludes robots used in the service sector and households. However, robot usage in services is quite limited and those used in households do not add to GDP. 3 Note that ICT investment and capital stock data includes robots. 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Centre for Economic and Business Research (January 2017): "The Impact of Automation." A Report for Redwood. In this report, robot density is defined to be the number of robots per million hours worked. 6 Graetz, G., and Michaels, G. (2015): "Robots At Work." CEP Discussion Paper No 1335. 7 Mishel, L., and Bivens, J. (2017): "The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On," Economic Policy Institute. 8 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "Bad Information - Why Misreporting Deep Learning Advances Is A Problem," dated January 9, 2018, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Rage Against The Machines: Is Technology Exacerbating Inequality?" dated June 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 10 OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 05 (2016): "The Best Versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence Across Firms and the Role of Public Policy." 11 Please refer to page 27. III. Indicators And Reference Charts As we highlight in the Overview section, the earnings backdrop for the U.S. equity market remains very upbeat, as highlighted by the rise in the net earnings revisions and net earnings surprises indexes. Bottom-up analysts will likely continue to boost after-tax earnings estimates for the year as they adjust to the U.S. tax cut news. Our main concern is that a lot of good news is now discounted. Our Technical Indicator remains bullish, but our composite valuation indicator surpassed one sigma in January, which is our threshold of overvaluation. From these levels of overvaluation, the medium-term outlook for equity total returns is negligible. Our speculation index is at all-time highs and implied volatility is low, underscoring that investors are extremely bullish. From a contrary perspective, this is a warning sign for the equity market. Our Monetary Indicator has also moved further into 'bearish' territory for equities, although overall financial conditions remain positive for growth. It is also disconcerting that our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) shifted to a 'sell' signal for stocks, following five straight months on a 'buy' signal. This occurred because investors may be buying based on speculation rather than on a firm belief in the staying power of the underlying fundamentals. For now, though, our Willingness-to-Pay indicator for the U.S. rose sharply in January, highlighting that investor equity inflows are very strong and are favoring U.S. equities relative to Japan and the Eurozone. This is perhaps not surprising given the U.S. tax cuts just passed by Congress. The RPI indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Our U.S. bond technical indicator shows that Treasurys are close to oversold territory, suggesting that we may be in store for a consolidation period following January's surge in yields. Treasurys are slightly cheap on our valuation metric, although not by enough to justify closing short duration positions. The U.S. dollar is oversold and due for a bounce. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst
Highlights U.S. Treasuries: U.S. Treasury yields are too low relative to the strength of global economic growth and the rising trend in U.S. inflation expectations. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure in the U.S., stay underweight Treasuries versus global bond benchmarks, and continue to favor TIPS over nominals. Canada: The Canadian economic data is moving from strength to strength, and now price and wage inflation data is moving higher. The Bank of Canada will hike rates next week with additional increases likely in 2018. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds and stay long inflation protection (both through linkers and CPI swaps). 2017 Model Portfolio Performance Wrap-Up: We closed the books on the first full calendar year of our model bond portfolio with a total return of 3.75%. This was a small -13bps of underperformance versus our custom benchmark, coming entirely from underweight positions on longer-dated developed market government bonds that offset the asset allocation gains from overweights to corporate debt. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Bond Yields Are Too Low 2018 has started much as 2017 ended, with growth-sensitive assets rallying alongside robust economic data. Most major global equity markets are already up 2-3% after the first week of the year, with the U.S. NASDAQ, Japanese Nikkei and Italian MIB indices advancing over 4%. Global credit markets are also off to a strong start, with spreads for U.S. High-Yield corporate debt and EM hard currency corporate debt tighter by -17bps and -8bps, respectively. Even commodity markets have joined the party, with the benchmark Brent oil price hitting the highest level in nearly three years. The pro-growth, pro-risk backdrop is keeping upward pressure on global government bond yields. This is occurring primarily through the inflation expectations component of yields, which are rising in all developed economies (even Japan). Real yields, which are not rising despite the strength of the broad-based global growth upturn (Chart of the Week), have been drifting lower, providing some offset to rising inflation expectations. The primary trend for global yields remains upward, however - especially if growth remains solid and inflation expectations continue to push higher, giving central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve the confidence to continue hiking interest rates. We continue to favor below-benchmark duration exposure, and overweight corporate bond allocations versus government debt, for global fixed income investors over the next 6-9 months. U.S. Treasuries: Still More Reasons To Sell Than Buy U.S. Treasury market participants have a lot to things to be nervous about at the moment. Likely future Fed rate hikes, the weakening U.S. dollar, rising oil prices, ongoing U.S. labor market strength, persistently booming economic growth, the never-ending equity bull market, the potential impact of the Trump fiscal stimulus, the Fed starting its balance sheet runoff - all factors that should force bond investors to expect yields to rise. Yet longer-dated Treasury yields continue to trade too low relative to the bond-bearish fundamentals. The current benchmark 10-year Treasury yield at 2.48% remains well below the fair value from our 2-factor regression model, which is now up to 2.94% (Chart 2). That valuation gap of 46bps is close to the widest levels seen in July 2016 and September 2017, which were both episodes that proved to be excellent entry points for bearish Treasury positions. The two inputs into our Treasury yield model are the global manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment towards the U.S. dollar (USD). The PMI is included as an indicator of global growth and currently sits at 54.5 - the highest level in nearly seven years - led by strong readings in almost every major economy (Chart 3). This has been the primary driver of the fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield since global growth bottomed out and began to accelerate in mid-2016. Chart 210-Year Treasuries Are##BR##Overvalued On Our Model Chart 3Global Growth##BR##Is Booming Sentiment towards the USD is the second input to our Treasury model. It is included as a weakening greenback represents an easing of monetary conditions that could trigger a need for more Fed rate hikes that can push the Treasury curve higher from the short-end (and vice versa for a rallying USD). At the same time, a depreciating USD can drive U.S. inflation higher through higher costs of imported goods & services, which can raise bond yields through higher inflation expectations or greater Fed tightening expectations (again, the opposite holds true for a strengthening USD). Right now, both the strong PMI and weak sentiment towards the dollar are boosting the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield. The fall in value of the greenback is particularly unusual, as it is flying in the face of widening interest rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world (Chart 4, top panel). This is clearly a function of the fact that global growth is rapidly improving - especially in Europe - but very few central banks have yet to respond to that growth with interest rate hikes that match what the Fed has been delivering. So while actual interest rate differentials remain USD-supportive, expectations of some eventual tighter monetary policy outside the U.S. that could narrow those interest rate gaps are triggering speculative inflows into non-USD currencies. With the trade-weighted USD now 5% below levels of a year ago, this should lead to higher headline inflation in the U.S. in the next few months (middle panel). Combined with the continued strength in global oil prices, that means that the two biggest factors that weighed on realized U.S. inflation- the USD rally and oil price collapse of 2014/15 - are now both acting to boost inflation expectations (bottom panel). Throw in the growing body of evidence that a tight U.S. labor market that is putting gentle upward pressure on wage growth, and U.S. inflation expectations - which still remain 40-50bps below levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target - should continue to move higher in the next six months. Rising longer-term inflation expectations would typically result in bear-steepening pressures on the Treasury yield curve. That is not happening at the moment, however, with the 2-year/10-year Treasury curve still at a relatively flat 53bps at the time this report went to press. The flatness of the Treasury curve has worried investors, and even some Fed officials, given the well-known leading relationship between the yield curve and U.S. economic growth. It is too early to draw any conclusions between the shape of the curve and future U.S. economic growth, however, for several reasons: As mentioned above, inflation expectations are still well below levels consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target on the PCE deflator (which translates to 2.5% on the CPI index used to price TIPS and CPI swaps). Both the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) are still buying bonds through their asset purchase programs, although at a slower pace than previous years. This continues to depress local bond yields in Europe and Japan with spillover effects into the U.S. Treasury market - even as the Fed begins the slow runoff of Treasuries from its massive balance sheet. Data on mutual fund and ETF flows shows that there has been significant and sustained buying of bond funds by U.S. retail investors over the past couple of months. There has also been net selling of equity funds, however, suggesting that U.S. retail investors are rebalancing as the equity markets surge higher. Investor positioning in the U.S. Treasury market is very short at the moment, with the J.P. Morgan survey of "active" bond manager duration exposure at an all-time low and the net positioning on Treasury futures now slightly favoring shorts (Chart 5). It makes little sense to interpret a flattening Treasury curve as a signal that the bond market believes that the Fed was making a policy mistake if professional bond investors were running massive duration underweight positions that would benefit if bond yields rise. Chart 4Upside Pressure On U.S. Inflation##BR##From Oil & The USD Chart 5Big Duration Underweight##BR##Among U.S. Bond Managers All these factors muddy the economic signal provided by the Treasury curve at the moment. Nonetheless, we remain of the view that the Fed would not continue on its rate hiking path without U.S. inflation expectations moving sustainably back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target. In other words, the Treasury curve must bearishly steepen first through rising inflation expectations before bearishly flattening later through actual Fed rate hikes. The latter will dampen future U.S. growth expectations and eventually result in a cyclical peak in longer-dated Treasury yields, but from levels closer to 3% on the 10-year after inflation expectations "fully" normalize. Bottom Line: U.S. Treasury yields are too low relative to the strength of global economic growth and the rising trend in inflation expectations. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure in the U.S., stay underweight Treasuries versus global bond benchmarks, and continue to favor TIPS over nominals. The Bank Of Canada Keeps On Playing Catch-Up The Canadian economic story continues to be the best within the developed world. The year-over-year growth rate for real GDP accelerated to over 3% late last year, primarily on the back of robust consumer spending (Chart 6). Even the lagging parts of the economy, like business investment and government spending, began to perk up last year. The momentum remained powerful at the end of 2017, with the unemployment rate in December hitting a 40-year low. The economic boom forced the Bank of Canada (BoC) to begin lifting interest rates last year, with two 25bp hikes occurring in July and September that unwound the easing from 2015. The rapid pace of growth has absorbed spare capacity much faster than the BoC originally projected. More hikes will be required if the current pace of growth is maintained, particularly with the BoC estimating that the neutral policy rate is around 3% and the current Overnight Rate is only at 1%. The Canadian consumer has been enjoying a powerful shopping spree. Real consumer spending growth is at 4% on a year-over-year basis - the highest level since early 2008 (Chart 7). This is led by a powerful surge in spending on consumer durables, where annual growth has surged to 10% (middle panel). Consumer confidence is booming and Canadian workers are enjoying the fastest pace of income growth since 2014 (bottom panel). Chart 6Robust Canadian Growth,##BR##Led By The Consumer Chart 7Canadian Consumers Are##BR##Confidently Spending Surprisingly, the powerful surge in consumer spending has occurred alongside some cooling of the overheated Canadian housing market. The growth rates of existing home sales and prices have both decelerated massively from the pace of the boom years in 2012-16 (Chart 8). The performance of house prices in the three biggest Canadian cities is now a mixed bag, with Vancouver prices reaccelerating, prices in Toronto decelerating and prices in Montreal growing only modestly (middle panel). Regulatory actions to limit the speculative buying of Canadian real estate by foreigners has helped dampen the surge in house prices in some markets. Although the bigger macro-prudential measures designed to tighten mortgage finance rules and reduce the amount of leverage in Canadian housing transactions has likely had a bigger effect. Canadian banks must now conduct stress tests to check if borrowers are able to pay off their mortgages if Canadian interest rates continue to rise. This represents a reduction in the marginal supply of riskier mortgage lending that will help restrain house price inflation in Canada's major cities. In addition, the supply of Canadian homes is growing with new home-building activity, both for single and multiple units, having picked up and overall residential investment growth now up nearly 5% on a year-over-year basis (bottom panel). With signs that the Canadian housing market has stopped rapidly inflating, the BoC can focus its interest rate policy on domestic growth and inflation considerations without worrying about pricking the housing bubble. On that front, the latest edition of the BoC's Business Outlook Survey, released yesterday, provided plenty of reasons to tighten monetary policy further. The overall survey indicator surged back to the peak seen last summer just before the BoC delivered its first rate hike (Chart 9). Capital spending intentions also rebounded back to the 2017 peaks, which bodes well for future gains in investment spending (second panel). Chart 8Canadian Housing Looking##BR##A Bit Less Frothy Chart 9BoC Business Outlook Survey Signaling##BR##Tightening Capacity Constraints The most interesting parts of the Business Outlook Survey were the capacity utilization measures. A greater share of companies were reporting labor shortages (third panel), with the highest percentage of firms reported difficulties in meeting unexpected increases in demand since 2007 (bottom panel). This suggests that the recent surge in employment, wage growth and price inflation are all sustainable. Headline and core CPI inflation are up to 2.1% and 1.8%, respectively, as of November. This is around the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target range (Chart 10). The Bank of Canada forecasts that CPI inflation will continue to rise and remain near 2% target in 2018, but all the risks are to the upside. The unemployment rate is now down to 5.7%, the lowest level since 1976 and well below the OECD's estimate of the NAIRU level at 6.5%. Average hourly earnings growth has surged in response, rising to just under 3% on a year-over-year basis since the trough in early 2017. The Phillips Curve appears to be alive and well in Canada. Canadian interest rate markets have already responded aggressively to the stronger growth and inflation data. Our interest rate discounters now show that the money markets are now expecting 61bps of BoC rate hikes over the next six months and 91bps over the next twelve months (Chart 11). With a 25bp hike at next week's BoC meeting now priced with almost full certainty, the current market pricing suggests at least one more hike will happen by June and nearly three more hikes by year-end. That would be even more hikes than we expect from the Fed in 2018, which is important for the Canadian dollar (CAD). The CAD has appreciated 16% since it bottomed out in early 2016, occurring alongside the rise in global oil prices over the same period (second panel). The price of Canada's Western Select grade of crude oil has lagged the move in other oil benchmarks massively over the past several months, due to a lack of pipeline capacity getting oil out of Alberta that has created a supply glut. This may limit the degree to which additional gains in global energy prices benefit the Canadian dollar from a terms-of-trade perspective. This will not prevent the BoC from delivering additional rate hikes, however - especially if that merely matches the 75bps of Fed rate hikes that the FOMC is projecting, and which we expect, over the rest of the year. In terms of investment strategy, the combination of robust Canadian economic growth and rising inflation pressures leads us to continue recommending an underweight stance on Canadian government bonds, as we have maintained since July 11, 2017. This week, we are introducing two new tactical trades that should benefit as Canadian inflation moves higher and the BoC tightens more aggressively in response (Chart 12): Chart 10The Canadian Phillips Curve Is Not Dead Chart 11The Market Now Expects A Lot From The BoC Chart 12Two New Tactical Trades In Canada Short the June 2018 Canada Bankers' Acceptance futures contact vs. the December 2018 contract (middle panel). The market is now discounting the likely maximum amount of tightening that the BoC can deliver by year-end, while there are only little more than two hikes priced by June. Assuming that the BoC hikes next week, that means that there is only one more hike expected by June. With three more BoC meetings scheduled between next week and June, that provides plenty of opportunities for hawkish surprises from the BoC before then. In other words, this trade is a way to play for the BoC being forced to front-load more rate hikes into the first half of 2018 versus the latter half. Long 10yr inflation expectations through linkers versus nominal government bonds, or using CPI swaps (bottom panel). Given the pickup in domestic inflation pressures currently underway, plus the rise in global inflation coming from the surge in commodity prices, there is room for Canadian market-based inflation expectations to rise from the current level of 1.7%. Bottom Line: The Canadian economic data is moving from strength to strength, and now price and wage inflation data is moving higher. The Bank of Canada will likely hike rates next week with additional increases likely in 2018. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds. 2017 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance: A Brief Review The turn of the year marked the end of the first full calendar year for the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. This now allows us to report the performance of the portfolio on the same basis as our clients. In the future, we will publish quarterly reviews of the portfolio returns after the end of each quarter in a calendar year (in April, July, October and January). The GFIS model portfolio returned 3.45% in 2017. This underperformed our custom performance benchmark (a blend of the Barclays Global Aggregate Index with global high-yield corporate debt) by -13bps (Chart 13). That underperformance can be entirely attributed to our government bond duration allocations, which lagged the benchmark by -46bps. Our recommended credit positions were a positive contributor, generating 33bps of outperformance primarily through overweights to U.S. Investment Grade and High-Yield corporate bonds. The detailed breakdown of the 2017 returns is presented in Table 1. In terms of the government bond portion of the portfolio, the underperformance can be isolated completely to the longest maturity bucket (10+ years). The combined performance of that bucket for all countries lagged that of the benchmark by -52bps. Given our expectation that global yield curves would bear-steepen in the latter half of 2017, it is no surprise that the bulk of our underperformance came by having too little exposure at the long-end. Also, having too much exposure in Japanese government bonds offering no yield also represented a major drag on the income component of the model portfolio's returns (Chart 14). Chart 13GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##2017 Return Breakdown Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##2017 Return Breakdown In terms of our credit allocations, favoring U.S. corporate exposure vs. non-U.S. corporates was the right call, generally speaking (Chart 15). However, we did not have enough portfolio weight in that trade to offset the drag on the overall yield from the Japan government bond overweight. Chart 14GFIS Model Portfolio Government Bond Performance Attribution By Country Chart 15GFIS Model Portfolio Spread Product Performance Attribution Looking ahead, the new model bond portfolio allocation for 2018 that we discussed in our final report of 2017 should offer a better chance of outperforming the benchmark.1 Specifically, we dialed down the Japan overweight, increased the U.S. Investment Grade corporate bond overweight, and reduced the curve steepening exposure in Euro Area governments. This not only boosted the overall yield of the portfolio, but also moderated the overall portfolio duration underweight. This portfolio will do well in the first half of 2018 if our base case of an inflation-driven rise in global government bond yields, led primarily by the U.S. where corporate debt is also expected to outperform Treasuries, comes to fruition. Bottom Line: We closed the books on the first full calendar year of our model bond portfolio with a total return of 3.75%. This was a small -13bps underperformance of versus our custom benchmark, coming entirely from underweight positions on longer-dated developed market government bonds that offset the asset allocation gains from overweights to corporate debt. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Our Model Bond Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves", dated December 19th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of December 31, 2017. The model's allocation to Australia has proven to be quite volatile as evidenced by the large increase to Australia this month to 7% from 1.7% in last month. As a result, the other commodity country, Canada, is now back to underweight from neutral last month. There are no significant large adjustments in other countries, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 80 bps in December as the model was underweight the U.K. versus EMU, yet the U.K. was the best performer in the month while EMU underperformed. Since going live in January 2016, the overall model has outperformed the benchmark by 47 bps, largely from the allocation among the 11 non-U.S. countries, which has outperformed its benchmark by 265 bps. The Level 1 model outperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 19 bps. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of January 2, 2018. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The model has turned more bullish on global growth as seen by a 2% increase in aggregate cyclical overweight. However, the model continues to reduce its overweight in the resources-based sectors, and has upgraded financials to overweight on the back of improving momentum. Finally, both utilities and telecom stocks have been moved further into underweight territory. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights 2018 Model Bond Portfolio Positioning: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. Country Allocations: Divergences in likely central bank policy moves in 2018 will lead to more cross-country bond market investment opportunities. In our model portfolio, we are maintaining underweight positions in the U.S., Canada and the Euro Area, keeping a moderate overweight in low-beta Japan, and adding small overweights in the U.K. and Australia (where rate hikes are unlikely). Spread Product: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Feature Two weeks ago, we published our "Key Views" report, outlining the main fixed income investment implications deriving from the 2018 BCA Outlook.1 In this, our final report of 2017, we translate those Key Views into direct allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. As we always remind our clients, our model portfolio is intended as a vehicle to communicate our opinions on the relative attractiveness and trade-offs between fixed income countries and sectors. That is to say, the portfolio not only includes our traditional individual country and sector recommendations, but attaches actual weightings to those views within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. The main takeaway from our Key Views is that bond market performance, and ideal asset allocation, is likely to look very different as the year progresses (Table 1). The first half of the year will see continued strong global growth and slowly rising inflation, but with central banks only slowing shifting to a less accommodative policy stance. This will create an environment where global bond yields will rise but with credit markets outperforming government bonds. The story will play out differently in the latter half, however, as worries over global growth expectations for 2018 will create more market volatility - albeit with lower cross-asset correlations as central banks act in a less-coordinated fashion than in recent years. Table 1A Pro-Risk Recommended Portfolio In H1/2018, Looking To Get Defensive Later In The Year Top-Down Bond Portfolio Implications Of Our Key Views The main predictions for 2018 in our Key Views report from December 5th were the following: A more bearish backdrop for bonds, led by the U.S.: Faster global growth, with rebounding inflation expectations, will trigger tighter overall global monetary policy. This will be led by Fed rate hikes and, later in 2018, ECB tapering. Global bond yields will rise in response, primarily due to higher inflation expectations. Growth & policy divergences will create cross-market bond investment opportunities: Global growth in 2018 will become less synchronized compared to 2016 & 2017, as will individual country monetary policies. Government bonds in the U.S. and Canada, where rate hikes will happen, will underperform, while bonds in the U.K. and Australia, where rates will likely be held steady, will outperform. The most dovish central banks will be forced to turn less dovish: The ECB and BoJ will both slow the pace of their asset purchases in 2018, in response to strong domestic economies and rising inflation. This will lead to bear-steepening of yield curves in Europe, mostly in the latter half of 2018. The BoJ could raise its target on JGB yields, but only modestly, in response to an overall higher level of global bond yields. The low market volatility backdrop will end through higher bond volatility: Incremental tightening by central banks, in response to faster inflation, will raise the volatility of global interest rates. This will eventually weigh on global growth expectations over the course of 2018, and create a more volatile backdrop for risk assets in the latter half of the year. The first step in translating these themes into allocations into our model bond portfolio is to determining the ideal top-down asset allocation parameters for the start of the 2018: Maintain a moderate overall level of portfolio risk. Both bond yields (Chart 1) and credit spreads (Chart 2) are at the low end of their historical ranges since 2000. This suggests that bond market returns will be much lower than in recent years, simply because initial valuations are not cheap. Coming at a time when bond volatility is also at historically depressed levels, and with central banks starting to slowly take away the monetary punch bowl, keeping overall portfolio risk at modest levels is prudent. Within the GFIS model bond portfolio, that means keeping our tracking error versus our custom benchmark performance index well below our maximum target level of 100bps (Chart 3). Chart 1Historical Range Of Bond Yields For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 Chart 2Historical Range Of Global Credit Spreads, 2000-2017 Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration. The combination of solid global growth, rising inflation and a slower pace of bond buying by the major central banks all suggest that bond yields will move higher in 2018. We will continue to target a recommended portfolio duration that is one year short versus our benchmark index (Chart 4). Chart 3Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Chart 4Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Maintain an overweight stance on corporate credit over government bonds, focusing on the U.S. Although spreads are tight in so many asset classes, the global growth and monetary backdrop remains supportive for the outperformance of credit over government bonds. We recommended focusing on U.S. corporate credit, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY), where growth momentum remains solid and Fed policy is not yet restrictive. After setting those broad portfolio parameters, our recommendations get more interesting in terms of country allocations. Bond yields within the developed markets have become highly correlated to inflation expectations in the past few years (Chart 5). This is no surprise given how strongly central banks have tied their monetary policy decisions to their own inflation forecasts, and to market-based and survey-based inflation expectations. Inflation is likely to move higher next year alongside tight global labor markets and higher oil prices. If the bullish views on oil from BCA's commodity strategists comes to fruition, this implies that both market-based inflation expectations can rise and yield curves can bear-steepen. The key to the latter will be how fast central banks respond to faster rates of inflation. Yield curve steepness remains highly correlated to the level of REAL interest rates. Curves steepen when real interest rates decline and vice versa. Lower real rates can happen in two ways - bullishly, if central banks cut policy rates faster than inflation is falling; or bearishly, if central banks do not hike rates as fast as inflation is rising. We see the latter as being the likely story in 2018, which will lead to steeper government bond yield curves but through higher yields and rising inflation expectations. In Chart 6, where we plot the level of real central bank policy rates (deflated by 10-year CPI swaps as a measure of inflation expectations) vs. the 2-year/10-year bond yield curves. If global inflation expectations merely follow the path implied by our bullish oil forecast (Brent crude average $65/bbl in 2018), and central banks did not respond with rate hikes, then this would generate lower real interest rates (the "x" in each panel of the chart) and steepening pressure on yield curves. Chart 5Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More##BR##By Inflation Expectations Chart 6Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves##BR##From Inflation In 2018 We don't see all central banks responding the same way to an oil-driven move higher in inflation. Lower unemployment rates, and other measures of diminished economic slack, will be needed to give policymakers confidence that their economies can tolerate higher interest rates. Judging central banks along these lines will create more interesting country bond allocation decisions in 2018 (Chart 7). Specifically, we see a greater likelihood that the Fed and Bank of Canada (BoC) can actually raise interest rates next year. It will be much harder for the Bank of England (BoE) to raise rates given sluggish domestic economic growth, lingering Brexit uncertainty and the fact that market-based inflation expectations have already peaked. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will also be unable to hike rates next year given the lack of core inflation pressures and with an unemployment rate that is still much higher than previous cyclical troughs. This leads us to add moderate portfolio overweights in the U.K. and Australia to the government bond portion of our model bond portfolio, while maintaining our current underweight stances for the U.S. and Canada (Chart 8). The ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) will be nowhere near a point where interest rate hikes would be considered, although the decisions those banks make with their asset purchase programs will be a bigger issue for their bond markets in 2018. Chart 7Tight Labor Markets Will##BR##Influence Bond Returns Chart 8Monetary Policy Divergences##BR##Will Drive Country Allocation Bottom Line: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. The Asset Allocation Implications Of Slower Central Bank Asset Purchases The big risk factor for global bonds in 2018 will be how markets respond to less buying from the Fed, ECB and BoJ. As the growth rate of the expansion of the major balance sheets slows, bond yields have the potential to rise through two channels: higher term premia on longer maturity bonds and the market pulling forward the expected future path of interest rates. This will become a major issue for Euro Area bond markets in the 2nd half of 2018, as the ECB will be forced by strong domestic growth and rising inflation pressures to announce a full taper of its asset purchase program by the end of 2018. This will come on top of a slower pace of buying by the BoJ (who is now targeting a price target on bond yields rather than a quantity target), and the Fed allowing some run off of its massive balance sheet. The result is that the growth rate of the major developed market central bank balance sheets is likely to slow to a low single-digit pace in 2018 (Chart 9), creating upside potential for global yields. The case for significant underweights in Euro Area fixed income will be much stronger later next year when the ECB will be forced to prepare the market for a taper. But in the first half of 2018, the impact of the ECB's purchases will continue to dampen Euro Area bond yields. At the same time, Japanese yields will remain pegged near 0% by BoJ buying. In terms of our model bond portfolio, we are maintaining an overweight stance on low-beta Japan given our views on rising global bond yields, while keeping aggregate Euro Area bond weightings close to neutral (and looking to go more aggressively underweight later in the year as the ECB taper talk ramps up). Bond markets that are less propped up by ultra-accommodative central banks will create a more volatile market backdrop for global fixed income as the year progresses. That is hardly a provocative statement, of course, given the starting point of utterly low realized bond market volatility (Chart 10). As discussed earlier, our views for 2018 lead us to recommend a more moderate portfolio risk level in 2018. The potential for higher central-bank driven market volatility fits with that expectation. Chart 9Global Yields Will Rise As##BR##Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Chart 10The Low Bond Vol Regime##BR##Looks Stretched A slower pace of central bank bond buying also has another implication for portfolio construction. With the wave of central bank liquidity becoming a less dominant factor, cross-asset correlations should diminish. We can see that by looking at the average correlation between sectors within our model bond portfolio benchmark index (Chart 11). We have found that the correlation is itself highly correlated to the breadth of global economic growth, as measured by our leading economic indicator diffusion index (top panel). But the average correlation is also linked to the growth rate of central bank balance sheets (bottom panel), which is a by-product of massive asset purchases reducing global macroeconomic risks and forcing investors to plow into similar asset classes to chase acceptable returns. Slightly less coordinated global growth, and less active central banks, should result in lower market correlations in 2018. At the same time, as central banks shift to a less accommodative stance - especially in the U.S. - the uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart 12). This will likely lead us to cut our recommended overweight allocations to U.S. IG and HY corporate debt in our model portfolio later in 2018. To begin the year, however, we are keeping an overweight stance until the Fed is forced to signal a shift to a more hawkish stance because of rising U.S. inflation. Chart 11Expect Lower Global Bond##BR##Correlations In 2018 Chart 12The Link Between U.S. Growth,##BR##Bond Vol & Credit Spreads Bottom Line: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Summing It All Up Chart 13Aiming For Moderate Carry##BR##In Our Model Portfolio On Page 12, we show our model bond portfolio allocations after making some changes to reflect our key views for 2018. We are doing some tweaks to our existing recommendations: modestly increasing our overweight U.S. IG corporates allocation at the expense of U.S. Treasuries; reducing our underweight in the Euro Area by reducing the large Italy underweight; adding exposure to the U.K. and Australia; while cutting our large overweight in Japan. The latter was there as a desire to get more defensive on the portfolio's duration stance, but having such a large allocation has left our portfolio with no yield advantage versus the custom benchmark index (Chart 13). With the changes we are making this week, the model bond portfolio will have a yield that is 12bps over that of our custom index. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 Key Views: BCA's Outlook & What It Means For Global Fixed Income Markets", dated December 5th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights The November jobs report keeps the Fed on track. Despite rising government debt levels, crowding out is not a significant threat. Capex as a share of GDP rises the year before a tax cut and falls in the year after. Holiday spending on track, boosted by tax bill. Feature Last week, investors assessed the ramifications of the OPEC meeting and the Senate's passage of the tax plan. The dollar was noticeably higher, and oil moved lower during the week, but other financial markets ended little changed. Chart 1 shows that the Trump trades are making a comeback, providing ample opportunity for investors who may have missed the trade the first time around. In this week's report, we examine the impact of the tax bill on the debt, deficit, and capital spending and more importantly on corporate balance sheets and financial markets. BCA's view is that the risk that rising government debt levels will crowd out private borrowing is low and that the tax cut will provide a tiny boost to an already robust capital spending environment. We also examine what signal the equity markets are sending about household spending in the holiday season. Chart 1Markets Responding To GOP Tax Plan Living In Paradise The November employment report, released last Friday, paints a Goldilocks-type macro environment for U.S. assets. Strong economic growth, muted inflation, and a go-slow Fed should prolong the bull market in U.S. equities. The economy added 228K in net new jobs, and the unemployment rate held steady at 4.1% in November. With the average work week rising by 0.1 hours, aggregate hours worked rose by a solid 0.5% m/m. Even if hours worked hold flat in December, the average for Q4 will be up 2.6% at an annualized rate from Q3. The November payroll data are easily consistent with about 3.5% GDP growth in Q4. BCA expects above-potential real GDP growth to persist well into 2018. Despite the strong growth and tight labor market, wage pressures remain contained. Average hourly earnings rose just 0.2% m/m in November, which followed a downwardly revised 0.1% m/m decline last month. Annual wage inflation is running at 2.5% (Chart 2). Last week's report will not dissuade the Fed from raising rates again next week. As long as GDP growth remains above trend and the labor market is tightening, the Fed will remain somewhat confident that wages will accelerate and inflation will gradually return to the target level. However, there is no reason yet for the Fed to turn more aggressive for fear of falling behind the curve. Chart 2November Jobs Report Keeps Fed On Track It's Getting Mighty Crowded The recently passed U.S. Senate tax reform bill has to be reconciled with the House bill, but it appears that the Republicans may meet their Christmas deadline after all. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has consistently expected a tax package to pass by the end of Q1 2018 at the latest.1 Although some technical differences between the two versions remain, the two bills are close enough that compromise should not be difficult. The Republicans are under pressure to deliver a "win" ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections. Most of the tax adjustments will occur early next year, except for a reduction in the corporate tax rate that may be delayed until 2019. The Senate version, if passed, would decrease individual taxes by about $680 billion over 10 years, trim small business taxes by just under $400 billion, and reduce corporate taxes by roughly the same amount (including the offsetting tax on currently untaxed foreign profits). The direct effect of all the tax cuts will probably boost real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. However, much depends on the ability of the tax changes and immediate capital expensing to lift animal spirits in the business sector and bring forward investment spending. The total impact - at this stage - is difficult to estimate. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), by the end of 2027 the legislation will add $1 trillion to the debt, including the effects of dynamic scoring. Without the boost from faster economic activity due to the tax changes, the deficit is expected to be $1.4 trillion higher than the CBO's baseline projection for 2027. While nominal economic growth would increase under the plan, the debt-to-GDP ratio would climb to 95% of GDP by 2027, up from 91% under current law (Chart 3). Chart 3Federal Debt As A Share Of GDP Set To Rise Sharply In Coming Decades So far, the Treasury market has shown little reaction to the passage of the Senate bill. Fixed-income investors do not appear to be overly concerned about the implications of the size of the public debt and do not believe that the tax changes alter the Fed's calculations. BCA is also not concerned about the size of public debt in the near term but thinks the tax changes will alter the Fed's forecasts. Nonetheless, more government red ink is likely to raise equilibrium bond yields in the long term. The Fed estimates that the equilibrium 10-year bond yield would rise on a structural basis by 3-4 basis points for each percentage point increase in the Federal government's debt-to-GDP ratio, and by 25 basis points for every percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio.2 The implication is that if the GOP plan becomes law, then the 10-year yield will be 12-16 bps higher than under current legislation. Nonetheless, there is only a modest risk that mounting U.S. government debt will crowd out private borrowing and choke off investment on a 12-month horizon. Crowding out occurs when soaring government debt sparks competition between the public and private sectors for available savings. Increased demand for private credit, a narrowing output gap, and elevated interest payments as a percentage of GDP, are all preconditions for crowding out. While the output gap has closed, demand for private credit is mixed, at best, and federal interest payments will remain in check. Private credit demand has rebounded from the recession, but it is still tepid. At 2% of corporate sales, nonfinancial corporate borrowing is at the lower end of its post-crisis range and has downshifted since 2015 (Chart 4). Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there was a tight relationship between corporate demand for funds and Treasury yields. Since 2009, the link has weakened; credit demand snapped back, but Treasury yields stayed low. Soft C&I loan demand also indicates less of a risk for crowding out (panel 3). Interest payments on the Federal debt are expected to climb, but remain well below all-time highs set in the early 1990s (Chart 5). The CBO's baseline projects that interest payments on the debt as a share of nominal GDP will more than double from 1.4% in 2017 to 2.9% in 2027. These payments will triple in absolute terms from $300 billion in 2017 to more than $800 billion in 2027. The GOP tax plan will boost the 2027 projection, but the CBO has not yet released a new estimate. In a study prepared prior to the passage of the tax bill, the OECD forecast that the federal government's interest payments would climb to 2.9% by 2019. Chart 4Private Credit Demand Has Rebounded,##BR##But Remains Tepid Chart 5Gradual Rise in Net Interest Payments##BR##Not A Crowding Out Threat Moreover, the Tax Policy Center, a center-left think tank, also concluded that interest costs will move up under the new tax law.3 On balance, interest payments on federal debt obligations as a share of the economy are expected to escalate in the next 10 years to 2.5-3%. This reading is in line with the average in the past 20 years, but is still below the 4-4.5% average reached in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the 3.5-4% range observed from 1970-2000. If nothing else changes, higher federal interest payments would absorb funds that could instead be used for areas that add to the productive capacity of the economy, such as education, training and technical innovation. That said, the impact on long-term growth from "crowding out" may only represent a partial offset to the supply-side benefits of the fiscal package to the extent that the business sector lifts capex spending as a result of a lower corporate tax rate and immediate expensing (see below). Bottom Line: Tax cuts are bond bearish but support our overweight stance on equities on the surface. The effective corporate tax rate could decline by about two percentage points, which would boost after-tax cash flows by roughly 2½%. While this is not trivial, much of the good news already appears to be discounted in the S&P 500. Moreover, to the extent that faster growth in 2018 may bring forward hikes in the Fed funds rate, the equity market will have to contend with rising bond yields next year. Investors are also wondering about the tax plan's potential impact on capital spending and corporate balance sheets. Tiny Steps As discussed above, the fiscal package has the potential to generate significant supply side benefits, to the extent that the business sector turns on the capex taps. The JCT estimates that the tax bill will boost U.S. capital stock by 1.1% in 2027, an increase of about 0.1% a year. However, it is uncertain if corporations will permanently boost capex due to increased allowances for capital spending or if the tax shift will merely bring forward future spending. BCA's view is closer to the latter. We expect higher budget and trade deficits in the coming decade as a result of the Senate plan. These deficits will limit the ability of domestic saving to fund needed capital spending projects. Foreign saving will fill the gap. U.S. domestic saving is below the low end its 1960-2008 range (Chart 6). Chart 7 shows that since 1960, there have been four distinct periods of expanding net saving by foreigners. Nominal 10-year Treasury yields rose in three of the four intervals. However, real yields declined in the 1960s, rose in the mid-1970s and early 1980s as foreign saving increased, and then fell in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, a rise in the share of foreign saving led to higher capex in the mid-1960s and 1980s, but lower business expenditures in the 1990s (Chart 8). Chart 6Foreigners Will Finance Capex As##BR##Domestic Saving Declines Chart 7Interest Rates As##BR##Foreign Saving Rises Setting aside who will finance the spending, history suggests that business capital spending tends to climb faster in the 12 months prior to a period of rising fiscal thrust than it does in the 12 months following (Chart 9 and Tables 1 and 2). Note that our analysis shows that recessions occurred in five of the seven episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Chart 8Capex And Rising Foreign Saving Chart 9Capex During Periods Of Fiscal Stimulus In addition, as fiscal thrust escalates, stocks in the industrial and technology sectors underperform the broad market. Small caps generally beat large caps. Since 2000, the fed funds rate fell during periods of fiscal stimulus. Prior to that, the Fed both eased and tightened policy during these episodes (not shown). Table 1Business Spending 12 Months Before Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy Table 2Capex In The Year After Stimulative Fiscal Policy Is Enacted BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) has a tendency to improve during phases of increased fiscal thrust; Chart 10 shows that the CHM improved in five of the seven periods. Free cash flow and return on capital are the best performers during these intervals. In contrast, corporate leverage is apt to shoot up as fiscal policy takes hold. Chart 10Stimulative Fiscal Policy And The Corporate Health Monitor Our fiscal thrust measure includes both personal and corporate tax cuts, and along with increases in government spending. We use fiscal thrust as a proxy because there are a very limited number (just 3 since 1970) of corporate tax cuts to analyze. The paragraphs below covers the impact of corporate tax cuts on capital spending, capital spending-related financial metrics and corporate balance sheets. Capital spending is inclined to rise faster in the 12 months before a corporate tax cut than in the year afterward. The caveat is that there have been only 3 corporate tax cuts in the past 50 years. Charts 11 and 12 and Tables 3 and 4 examine the impact of previous corporate tax reductions on nonresidential fixed investment (and its components) as a share of GDP and on several capex-related metrics in the financial market. Chart 11Corporate Tax Cuts And Capital Spending Chart 12Corporate Tax Cuts And Financial Markets Moreover, industrial stocks underperform the broad market after a tax cut, while tech stocks outperform (Chart 12 again). Small-cap performance is mixed. Both the Fed funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield rise after corporate tax decreases take effect. Table 3Capex The Year Before A Corporate Tax Cut Table 4Capex In The Year After A Corporate Tax Cut Corporate health weakens in the year before a business tax cut is enacted, but then it improves modestly in the ensuing year. Chart 13 and Tables 5 and 6 examine the significance of previous corporate tax cuts on BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) and several of its components. The interest coverage ratio deteriorates, on average, both before and after a corporate tax reduction, but leverage increases substantially in the 12 months following a corporate tax cut. Free cash flow deteriorates in the year prior to a drop in the business tax rate, but is little changed in the subsequent year. Chart 12Corporate Tax Cuts And Financial Markets Chart 13Corporate Tax Cuts And The Corporate Health Monitor Bottom Line: Business capital spending was already on the upswing and the output gap was already closed before the tax cut was passed. Accelerated depreciation allowance may pull capex ahead, but not materially change its trajectory over the long term. Corporate tax cuts and fiscal stimulus, in general, boost capex and corporate health, and support BCA's view that credit will outperform Treasuries in 2018. Table 5BCA's Corporate Health Monitor A Year Before A Corporate Tax Cut... Table 6...And In The 12 Months After Boxing Day The critical holiday spending season is in full bloom. Holiday retail sales make up the bulk of total consumer spending, representing about 20% to 30% of total annual retail sales (and about 40% of total personal consumption expenditures). Moreover, according to the National Retail Federation (NRF), although 54% of consumers surveyed expect to spend the same amount in this year's holiday season as in 2016, 24% are prepared to spend more. The NRF forecasts that holiday sales will increase between 3.6% and 4.0%, exceeding last year's 3.6% rate and the 5-year average forecast of 3.5%. Holiday retail sales have faded in nominal and real terms from an average of 4.9% in the 1993-1999 period to 3.7% pre-2008 (2000-2007) and to an average of 3.3% post-2008 GFC (2009-2016). However, the baseline trend, based on average annual growth rates, remains stable at 3%, with upside potential of as much as 6% during robust economic growth phases(mid 2000s) and downside risk to as low as -4% in recessions (2008) (Chart 14). Chart 14Holiday Sales: Strong Tailwinds Intact Holiday sales this season may just get an unexpected boost from stout consumer finances. The implication is that U.S. economic growth should remain above potential well into 2018. Solid consumer balance sheets remain a tailwind even at this late stage of the business cycle. Household balance sheets have been repaired in an optimal way and household net worth continues to soar to new highs. The implication is that households are much less likely to forego holiday spending this season than in periods where household net worth is under downward pressure. Furthermore, stock market returns for the U.S. consumer discretionary sector, measured between the mid-September to mid-December period, are well correlated with holiday spending trends (Chart 15). The 8.6% rise in the consumer discretionary sector since mid-September heralds another healthy holiday spending season. However, global consumer discretionary retailers are a better predictor of holiday sales than domestic consumer discretionary retailers. Prices here are up 6.6% since mid-September. Chart 15Trends Of Holiday Sales And Equity Returns Furthermore, expectations of tax reform legislation becoming law by the end of the year will incentivize low income households to spend more this holiday season. This cohort is apt to pay for holiday purchases with cash. The NRF has likened the benefit of the tax plan to a "free Christmas".4 The NRF suggests that the cumulative savings from the tax package for an average household will offset the $967.13 projected to be spent this year by the average household in the holiday season. Moreover, a 2016 Fed study finds that the financing for holiday spending varies by income. Low income households have a tendency to source holiday spending from savings/income rather than borrowing, and if access to credit is not readily available, they simply will not spend on holiday shopping.5 To ensure that a majority of U.S. households contribute towards a robust holiday spending season, strong employment growth alongside stable wage growth (and higher real income expectations) and sturdy consumer confidence is required. With an already tight labor market and the underemployment rate (U-6) close to pre-recession lows, solid consumer fundamentals remain intact. Bottom Line: A robust holiday shopping season is likely in 2017, supported by stout consumer balance sheets, the new tax bill, and rising wages and incomes. The 8.6% run up in consumer discretionary stocks also suggests that a happy holiday for retailers is in prospect. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service has a neutral rating on the Consumer Discretionary sector, but recommends an overweight the advertising, home improvement retail and leisure products industry groups. Additionally, BCA maintains an overweight to the holiday-sensitive Air Freight and logistics industry within the Industrial sector.6 Strong personal spending will support above potential GDP growth in Q4 and into 2018, eliminate the output gap, push the unemployment rate further below NAIRU and push up inflation and ultimately bond yields. Stay short duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," October 25, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 "New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt", Thomas Laubach, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 2003. https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200312/200312pap.pdf 3 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/148841/2001606-macroeconomic-analysis-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-as-passed-by-the-house-of-representatives_1.pdf 4 https://nrf.com/media/press-releases/retailers-say-senate-passage-of-tax-reform-could-give-shoppers-free-christmas 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2016/holiday-spending-and-financing-decisions-in-2015-survey-of-household-economics-and-decisionmaking-20161201.html 6 https://uses.bcaresearch.com/trades/recommendations
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update One thing worth noting is that the model now is neutral on Canada, after a long-standing underweight. Canada's valuation ranking had been improving, but the signal was only confirmed this month by the technical ranking. There are no significant changes among other countries, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 68 bps in November as the model was underweight both the U.S. and Japan, which were the only two countries to outperform the MSCI World benchmark in November! The underweight in the U.K. and Australia worked well, but not enough to offset the loss from the overweight of the euro area. Since going live in January 2016, the overall model has outperformed the benchmark by 157 bps, largely from the allocation among the 11 non-U.S. countries, which has outperformed its benchmark by 489 bps. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of November 30, 2017. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The model has turned more bullish on global growth and consequently increased the aggregate cyclical overweight. However, within the cyclical basket there has be re-shuffle from resources-based sectors to consumer discretionary and technology stocks. This was driven by improving momentum in these two sectors. Finally, utilities stocks have been downgraded to underweight on the back of the bullish growth outlook. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com