Alternative Investments
Highlights China's high-profile jawboning draws attention to tightness in metals markets, and raises the odds the State Reserve Board (SRB) will release some of its massive copper and aluminum stockpiles in the near future. Over the medium- to long-term, the lack of major new greenfield capex raises red flags for the IEA's ambitious low-carbon pathway released last week, which foresees the need for a dramatic increase in renewable energy output and a halt in future oil and gas investment to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Copper demand is expected to exceed mined supply by 2028, according to an analysis by S&P, which, in line with our view, also sees refined-copper consumption exceeding production this year (Chart of the Week). A constitution re-write in Chile and elections in Peru threaten to usher in higher taxes and royalties on mining in these metals producers, placing future capex at risk. Chile's state-owned Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world, fears a bill to limit mining near glaciers could put as much as 40% of its copper production at risk. We remain bullish copper and look to get long on politically induced sell-offs as the USD weakens. Feature Politicians are inserting themselves in the metals markets' supply-demand evolutions to a greater degree than in the past, which is complicating the short- and medium-term analysis of prices. This adds to an already-difficult process of assessing markets, given the opacity of metals fundamentals â particularly inventories, which are notoriously difficult to assess. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) jawboning of market participants in iron ore, steel, copper and aluminum markets over the past two weeks has weakened prices, but, with the exception of steel rebar futures in Shanghai â down ~ 17% from recent highs, and now trading at ~ 4911 RMB/MT â the other markets remain close to records. Benchmark 62% Fe iron ore at the port of Tianjin was trading ~ 4% lower at $211/MT, while copper and aluminum were trading ~ 5.5% and 6.5% off their recent records at $4.535/lb and $2,350/MT, respectively. In addition to copper, aluminum markets are particularly tight (Chart 2). Jawboning aside, if fundamentals continue to keep prices elevated â or if we see a new leg up â China's high-profile jawboning could presage a release by the State Reserve Board (SRB) of some of its massive copper and aluminum stockpiles in the near term. In the case of copper, market guesses on the size of this stockpile are ~ 2mm to 2.7mm MT. On the aluminum side, Bloomberg reported CCP officials were considering the release of 500k MT to quell the market's demand for the metal. Chart of the WeekContinue Tightening In Copper Expected Chart 2Aluminum Remains Tight Brownfield Development Not Sufficient Our balances assessments continue to indicate key base metals markets are tight and will remain so over the short term (2-3 years). Economies ex-China are entering their post-COVID-19 recovery phase. This will be followed by higher demand from renewable generation and grid build-outs that will put them in direct competition with China for scarce metals supplies for decades to come. Markets will continue to tighten. In the bellwether copper market, we expect this tightness to remain a persistent feature of the market over the medium term â 3 to 5 years out â given the dearth of new supply coming to market. Copper prices are highly correlated with the other base metals (Chart 3) â the coefficient of correlation with the other base metals making up the LME's metals index is ~ 0.86 post-GFC â and provide a useful indicator of systematic trends in these markets. Chart 3Copper Correlation With LME Index Ex-Copper Copper ore quality has been falling for years, as miners focused on brownfield development to extend the life of mines (Chart 4). In Chart 5, we show the ratio of capex (in billion USD) to ore quality increases when capex growth is expanding faster than ore quality, and decreases when capex weakens and/or ore quality degradation is increasing. Chart 4Copper Capex, Ore Quality Declines Chart 5Capex-to-Ore-Quality Decline Set Market Up For Higher Prices Falling prices over the 2012-19 interval coincide with copper ore quality remaining on a downward trend, likely the result of previous higher prices that set off the capex boom pre-GFC. The lower prices favored brownfield over greenfield development. Goehring and Rozencwajg found in their analysis of 24 mines, about 80% of gross new reserves booked between 2001-2014 were due not to new mine discoveries but to companies reclassifying what was once considered to be waste-rock into minable reserves, lowering the cut-off grade for development.1 This is consistent with the most recent datapoints in Chart 5, due to falling ore grade values, as companies inject less capex into their operations and use it to expand on brownfield projects. Higher prices will be needed to incentivize more greenfield projects. A new report from S&P Global Market Intelligence shows copper reserves in the ground are falling along with new discoveries.2 According to the S&P analysts, copper demand is expected to exceed mined supply by 2028, which, in line with our view, sees refined-copper consumption exceeding production this year. Renewables Push At Risk Just last week, the IEA produced an ambitious and narrow path for governments to collectively reach a net-zero emissions (NZE) goal by 2050.3 Among its many recommendations, the IEA singled out the overhaul of the global electric grid, which will be required to accommodate the massive renewable-generation buildout the agency forecasts will be needed to achieve its NZE goals. The IEA forecasts annual investment in transmission and distribution grids will need to increase from $260 billion to $820 billion p.a. by 2030. This is easier said than done. Consider the build-out of China's grid, which is the largest grid in the world. To become carbon neutral by 2060, per its stated goals, investment in Chinaâs grid and associated infrastructure is expected to approach ~ $900 billion, maybe more, over the next 5 years.4 The worldâs largest fossil-fuel importer is looking to pivot away from coal and plans to more than double solar and wind power capacity to 1200 GW by 2030. Weening China off coal and rebuilding its grid to achieve these goals will be a herculean lift. It comes as no surprise that IEA member states have pushed back on the agency's NZE-by-2050 plan. This primarily is because of its requirement to completely halt fossil-fuel exploration and spending on new projects. Japan and Australia have pushed back against this plan, citing energy security concerns. Officials from both countries have stated that they will continue developing fossil fuel projects, as a back-up to renewables. Japan has been falling behind on renewable electricity generation (Chart 6). Expensive renewables and the unpopularity of nuclear fuel could make it harder for the worldâs fifth largest fossil fuels consumer to move away from fossil fuels. Around the same time the IEA released its report, Australia committed $464 million to build a new gas-fired power station as a backup to renewables. Chart 6Japan Will Continue Building Fossil-Fuel Back-Up Generation Just days after the IEA report was published, the G7 nations agreed to stop overseas coal financing. This could have devastating effects for emerging and developing nationsâ electricity grids which are highly dependent on coal. In 2020 70% and 60% of India and Chinaâs electricity respectively were produced by coal (Chart 7).5 Chart 7EM Economies Remain Reliant On Coal-Fired Generation Near-Term Copper Supply Risks Rise Even though inventories appear to be rebuilding, mounting political risks keep us bullish copper (Chart 8). Lawmakers in Chile and Peru are in the process of re-writing their constitutions to, among other things, raise royalties and taxes on mining activities in their respective countries. This could usher in higher taxes and royalties on mining for these metals producers, placing future capex at risk. In addition, Chile's state-owned Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world, fears a bill to limit mining near glaciers could put as much as 40% of its copper production at risk.6 None of these events is certain to occur. Peruvian elections, for one thing, are too close to call at this point, and Chile has a history of pro-business government. However, these are non-trivial odds â i.e., greater than Russian roulette odds of 1:6 â and if any or all of these outcomes are realized, higher costs in copper and lithium prices would result, and miners would have to pass those costs on to buyers. Bottom Line: We remain bullish base metals, especially copper. Another leg up in copper would pull base metals higher with it. We would look to get long on politically induced sell-offs, particularly with the USD weakening, as expected Chart 8Global Copper Inventories Rebuilding But Still Down Y/Y Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Next Tuesday's OPEC 2.0 meeting appears to be a fairly staid affair, with little of the drama attending previous gatherings. Russian minister Novak observed the coalition would be jointly "calculating the balances" when it meets, taking into account the likely official return of Iran as an exporter, according to reuters.com. We expect a mid-year deal on allowing Iran to return to resume exports under the nuclear deal abrogated by the Trump administration in 2019, and reckon Iran has ~ 1.5mm b/d of production it can bring back on line, which likely would return its crude oil production to something above 3.8mm b/d by year-end. We are maintaining our forecast for Brent to average $64.45/bbl in 2H21; $75 and $78/bbl, in 2022 and 2023, respectively. By end 2023, prices trade to $80/bbl. Our forecast is premised on a wider global recovery going into 2H21, and continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 (Chart 9). Base Metals: Bullish Our stop-losses was elected on our long Dec21 copper position on May 21, which means we closed the position with 48.2% return. The stop loss on our long 2022 vs short 2023 COMEX copper futures backwardation recommendation also was elected on May 20, leaving us with a return of 305%. We will be looking for an opportunity to re-establish these positions. Precious Metals: Bullish We expect the collapse in bitcoin prices, the US Fedâs decision to not raise interest rates, and a weakening US dollar to keep gold prices well bid (Chart 10). Chinaâs ban on cryptocurrency services and Muskâs acknowledgment of the energy intensity of Bitcoin mining sent Bitcoin prices crashing. The Fedâs decision to keep interest rates constant, despite rising inflation and inflation expectations will reduce the opportunity cost of holding gold. According to our colleagues at USBS, the Fed will make its first interest rate hike only after the US economy has reached "maximum employment". The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey reported that job openings rose nearly 8% in March to 8.1 million jobs, however, overall hiring was little changed, rising by less than 4% to 6 million. As prices in the US rise and the dollar depreciates, gold will be favored as a store of value. On the back of these factors, we expect gold to hit $2,000/oz. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn futures were trading close to 20% below recent highs earlier in the week at ~ $6.27/bu, on the back of much faster-than-expected plantings. Chart 9 Chart 10 Footnotes 1 Please refer to Goehring & Rozencwajgâs Q1 2021 market commentary. 2 Please see Copper cupboard remains bare as discoveries dwindle â S&P study published by mining.com 20 May 2021. 3 Please see Net Zero by 2050 â A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, published by the IEA. 4 Please see Chinaâs climate goal: Overhauling its electricity grid, published by Aljazeera. 5 We discuss this in detail in Surging Metals Prices And The Case For Carbon-Capture published 13 May 2021, and Renewables ESG Risks Grow With Demand, which was published 29 April 2021. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see A game of chicken is clouding tax debate in top copper nation, Fujimori looks to speed up projects to tap copper riches in Peru and Codelco says 40% of its copper output at risk if glacier bill passes published by mining.com 24, 23 and 20 May 2021, respectively. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades
Highlights Global oil markets will remain balanced this year with OPEC 2.0's production-management strategy geared toward maintaining the level of supply just below demand. This will keep inventories on a downward trajectory, despite short-term upticks due to COVID-19-induced demand hits in EM economies and marginal supply additions from Iran and Libya over the near term. Our 2021 oil demand growth is lower â ~ 5.3mm b/d y/y, down ~ 800k from last month's estimate â given persistent weakness in realized consumption. We have lifted our demand expectation for 2022 and 2023, however, expecting wider global vaccine distribution and increased travel toward year-end. The next few months are critical for OPEC 2.0: The trajectory for EM demand recovery will remain uncertain until vaccines are more widely distributed, and supply from Iran and Libya likely will increase this year. This will lead to a slight bump in inventories this year, incentivizing KSA and Russia to maintain the status quo on the supply side. We are raising our 2021 Brent forecast back to $63/bbl from $60/bbl, and lifting our 2022 and 2023 forecasts to $75 and $78/bbl, respectively, given our expectation for a wider global recovery (Chart of the Week). Feature A number of evolving fundamental factors on both sides of the oil market â i.e., lingering uncertainty over the return of Iranian and Libyan exports and the strength of the global demand recovery â will test what we believe to be OPEC 2.0's production-management strategy in the next few months. Briefly, our maintained hypothesis views OPEC 2.0 as the dominant supplier in the global oil market. This is due to the low-cost production of its core members (i.e., those states able to attract capital and grow production), and its overwhelming advantage in spare capacity, which we reckon will average in excess of 7mm b/d this year, owing to the massive production cuts undertaken to drain inventories during the COVID-19 pandemic. Formidable storage assets globally â positioned in or near refining centers â and well-developed transportation infrastructures also support this position. We estimate core OPEC 2.0 production will average 26.58mm b/d this year and 29.43mm b/d in 2022 (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekBrent Prices Likely Correct Then Move Higher in 2022-23 Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Will Maintain Status Quo The putative leaders of the OPEC 2.0 coalition â the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia â have distinctly different goals. KSA's preference is for higher prices â ~ $70-$75/bbl (basis Brent) to the end of 2022. Higher prices are needed to fund the Kingdom's diversification away from oil. Russia's goal is to keep prices closer to the marginal cost of the US shale-oil producers, who we characterize as the exemplar of the price-taking cohort outside OPEC 2.0, which produces whatever the market allows. This range is ~ $50-$55/bbl. The sweet spot that accommodates these divergent goals is on either side of $65/bbl for this year. OPEC 2.0 June 1 Meeting Will Maintain Status Quo With Brent trading close to $70/bbl, discussions in the run-up to OPEC 2.0's June 1 meeting likely are focused on the necessity to increase the 2.1mm b/d being returned to the market over the May-July period. At present, we do not believe this will be necessary: Iran likely will be returning to the market beginning in 3Q21, and will top up its production from ~ 2.4mm b/d in April to ~ 3.85mm b/d by year-end, in our estimation. Any volumes returned to the market by core OPEC 2.0 in excess of what's already been agreed going into the June 1 meeting likely will come out of storage on an as-needed basis. Libya will likely lift its current production of ~ 1.3mm b/d close to 1.5mm b/d by year end as well. We are expecting the price-taking cohort ex-OPEC 2.0 to increase production from 53.78mm b/d in April to 53.86mm b/d in December, led by a 860k b/d increase in US output, which will take average Lower 48 output in the US (ex-GOM) to 9.15mm b/d by the end of this year (Chart 3). When we model shale output, our expectation is driven by the level of prompt WTI prices and the shape of the forward curve. The backwardation in the WTI forward curve will limit hedged revenues at the margin, which will limit the volume growth of the marginal producer. We expect global production to slowly increase next year, and the year after that, with supply averaging 101.07mm b/d in 2022 and 103mm b/d in 2023. Chart 3US Crude Output Recovers, Then Tapers in 2023 Demand Should Lift, But Uncertainties Persist We expect the slowdown in realized DM demand to reverse in 2H21, and for oil demand to continue to recover in 2H21 as the US and EU re-open and travel picks up. This can be seen in our expectation for DM demand, which we proxy with OECD oil consumption (Chart 4). EM demand â proxied by non-OECD oil consumption â is expected to revive over 2022-23 as vaccine distribution globally picks up. As a result, demand growth shifts to EM, while DM levels off. China's refinery throughput in April came within 100k b/d of the record 14.2mm b/d posted in November 2020 (Chart 5). The marginal draw in April stockpiles could also signify that as crude prices have risen higher, the worldâs largest oil importer may have hit the brakes on bringing oil in. In the chart, oil stored or drawn is calculated as the difference between what is imported and produced with what is processed in refineries. With refinery maintenance in high gear until the end of this month, we expect product-stock draws to remain strong on the back of domestic and export demand. This will draw inventories while maintenance continues. Chart 4EM Demand Will Recovery Accelerates in 2022-23 Chart 8China Refinery Runs Remain Strong COVID-19-induced demand destruction remains a persistent risk, particularly in India, Brazil and Japan. This is visible in the continued shortfall in realized demand vs our expectation so far this year. We lowered our 2021 oil demand growth estimate to ~ 5.3mm b/d y/y, which is down ~ 800k from last month's estimate, given persistent weakness in realized consumption. Our demand forecast for 2022 and 2023 is higher, however, based on our expectation for stronger GDP growth in EM economies, following the DM's outperformance this year, on the back of wider global vaccine distribution year-end (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Our supply-demand estimates continue to point to a balanced market this year and into 2022-23 (Chart 6). Given our expectation OPEC 2.0's production-management strategy will remain effective, we expect inventories to continue to draw (Chart 7). Chart 6Markets Remained Balanced Chart 7Inventories Continue To Draw CAPEX Cuts Bite In 2023 In 2023, we are expecting Brent to end the year closer to $80/bbl than not, which will put prices outside the current range we believe OPEC 2.0 is managing its production around (Chart 8). We have noted in the past continued weakness in capex over the 2015-2022 period threatens to leave the global market exposed to higher prices (Chart 9). Over time, a reluctance to invest in oil and gas exploration and production prices in 2024 and beyond could begin to take off as demand â which does not have to grow more than 1% p.a. â continues to expand and supply remains flat or declines. Chart 8By 2023 Brent Trades to /bbl Chart 9Low Capex Likely Results In Higher Prices After 2023 Bottom Line: We are raising our 2021 forecast back to an average of $63/bbl, and our forecasts for 2022 and 2023 to $75 and $78/bbl. We expect DM demand to lead the recovery this year, and for EM to take over next year, and resume its role as the growth engine for oil demand. Longer term, parsimonious capex allocations likely result in tighter supply meeting slowly growing demand. At present, markets appear to be placing a large bet on the buildout of renewable electricity generation and electric vehicles (EVs). If this does not occur along the trajectory of rapid expansion apparently being priced by markets â i.e., the demand for oil continues to expand, however slowly â oil prices likely would push through $80/bbl in 2024 and beyond. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The Colonial Pipeline outage pushed average retail gasoline prices in the US to $3.03/gal earlier this week, according to the EIA. This was the highest level for regular-grade gasoline in the US since 27 October 2014. According to reuters.com, the cyberattack that shut down the 5,500-mile pipeline was the most disruptive on record, shutting down thousands of retail service stations in the US southeast. Millions of barrels of refined products â gasoline, diesel and jet fuel â were unable to flow between the US Gulf and the NY Harbor because of the attack, which was launched 7 May 2021 (Chart 10). While most of the system is up and running, problems with the pipeline's scheduling system earlier this week prevented a return to full operation. Base Metals: Bullish Spot copper prices remained on either side of $4.55/lb (~ $10,000/MT) by mid-week following a dip from the $4.80/lb level (Chart 11). We remain bullish copper, particularly as political risk in Chile rises going into a constitutional convention. According to press reports, the country's constitution will be re-written, a process that likely will pave the way for higher taxes and royalties on copper producers.1 In addition, unions in BHP mines rejected a proposed labor agreement, with close to 100% of members voting to strike. In Peru, a socialist presidential candidate is campaigning on a platform to raise taxes and royalties. Precious Metals: Bullish According to the World Platinum Investment Council, platinum is expected to run a deficit for the third consecutive year in 2021, which will amount to 158k oz, on the back of strong demand. Refined production is projected to increase this year, with South Africa driving this growth as mines return to full operational capacity after COVID-19 related shutdowns. Automotive demand is leading the charge in higher metal consumption, as car makers switch out more expensive palladium for platinum to make autocatalysts in internal-combustion vehicles. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn prices continued to be better-offered following last week's WASDE report, which contained the department's first look at the 2021-22 crop year. Corn production is expected to be up close to 6% over the 2020-21 crop year, at just under 15 billion bushels. On the week, corn prices are down ~ 15.3%. Chart 10 Chart 11 Footnotes 1 Please see Copper price rises as Chile fuels long-term supply concerns published 18 May 2021 by mining.com. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades
ãã€ã©ã€ã
ç¶ç¶äžãã€äºæ³ããã財æ¿ã»éèåºæ¿çãšCOVID-19察çã®é²å±ãåããäžçæé·ã®åŒ·ãŸãã¯ãäž»èŠããŒã¿æäŸè
ã«ããä»å¹Žã®ç³æ²¹éèŠåæãæŒãäžããŠããŸãã
åœç€Ÿã¯æ¬æã®é絊ãã©ã³ã¹ã§2021幎ã®äžçéèŠèŠç©ãã64äžb/dåŒãäžããŠ98.25mm b/dãšããOPEC 2.0ãè匱ãªå埩ãä¹±ããªãããã«ãã¬ã³ãäŸ¡æ Œã$60/bblä»è¿ã«ä¿ã€ããã®å¿
èŠãªèª¿æŽãè¡ããšæ³å®ããŠããŸãã
åœç€Ÿã®2022幎ããã³2023幎ã®ãã¬ã³ãäºæž¬ã¯ãããã$65/bblã$75/bblã§ç¶æããŸãã
ã³ã¢ãã£ãã£åžå Žã¯ãç±³åœããã·ã¢ãäžåœããã³ãããã®é¢ä¿åœã»åçåœãå·»ã蟌ãæŠåè¡çªã®é«ãŸã確çãç¡èŠããŠããŸãããã·ã¢ã¯ãŠã¯ã©ã€ãåœå¢ã«è»ãéçµãããç±³åœã«å¹²æžãããªãšèŠåããŸãããäžåœã¯ãã£ãªãã³æ²ã«æŠèŠãéçµãããå°æ¹Ÿã®é²ç©ºèå¥åãžã®äŸµå
¥ãç¶ããŠãããç±³è»ãç·åŒµãããŠããŸããæå³çãããã¯å¶çºçãªäº€æŠãçºçããã°ç³æ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã¯æ¥éš°ããŸãã
äŸ¡æ Œã¯äžäžåæ¹ã«ãªã¹ã¯ãããµããŠããŸããæŠåè¡çªã®ãªã¹ã¯ã«å ããã¯ã¯ãã³é
åžã®å éã¯å埩ãååãããåœç€Ÿäºæž¬ãè¶
ããäŸ¡æ Œäžæãããããå¯èœæ§ããããŸããäžæ¹ã§ããã©ãžã«ãã€ã³ãã欧å·ã§ã®æ»äº¡è
æ°ããã³å
¥é¢è
æ°ã®äžæã瀺ãããã«ãCOVID-19ã«ããããã¯ããŠã³åçºã®äžæ¯ããªã¹ã¯ã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠååšããŸãïŒä»é±ã®ãã£ãŒãïŒã
ç¹é
ç³æ²¹éèŠæšèšâåœç€Ÿã®æšèšãå«ãâã¯ãäž»èŠçµæžã«ãããCOVID-19ã®æå¶ã«åãã枬å®å¯èœãªé²å±ãšãç¹ã«ç±³åœçºã®æœ€æ²¢ãªè²¡æ¿ã»éèåºæ¿çãåããŠå埩ããŠããŸãã1
IMFã®GDPäžæ¹ä¿®æ£ãåããæ¬æã®é絊ãã©ã³ã¹ã§åœç€Ÿã¯2021幎ã®äžçéèŠèŠç©ãã64äžb/dåŒãäžããŠ98.25mm b/dãšããŸãããåœç€Ÿã®ã¢ããªã³ã°ã§ã¯ãè匱ãªå埩ãæãªããªãããã«ãã¬ã³ãäŸ¡æ Œã$60/bblä»è¿ã«ä¿ã€ããã«ããµãŠãžã¢ã©ãã¢çåœïŒKSAïŒãšãã·ã¢ãäž»å°ããçç£è
é£åã§ããOPEC 2.0ãå¿
èŠãªèª¿æŽãè¡ããšæ³å®ããŠããŸãã
éåžžãšã¯ç°ãªããç³æ²¹éèŠå埩ã®åæ段éã¯å
é²åœåžå ŽïŒDMïŒãããåŒãããšèŠãŠããŸããå
é²åœã®ä»£çãšããŠOECDã®ç³æ²¹æ¶è²»ãçšããŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã2ïŒããã®åŸãæ¥å¹Žä»¥éã¯æ°èåžå ŽïŒEMïŒçµæžãåã³æé·ãäž»å°ãã2023幎ã«ãããŠç¶ããŸãã
ä»é±ã®ãã£ãŒã
COVID-19ã®æ»è
æ°ã»å
¥é¢è
æ°ãäžççå埩ãè
ãã
åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®äžæ¯ããªã¹ã¯ãé«ãŸã£ãŠãã
åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®äžæ¯ããªã¹ã¯ãé«ãŸã£ãŠãã
ãã£ãŒã2
å
é²åœïŒDMïŒã®éèŠãä»å¹Žæ¥å¢
DMã®éèŠãä»å¹Žæ¥å¢
DMã®éèŠãä»å¹Žæ¥å¢
OPEC 2.0ã®äœå°çç£èœåã®åžå
åœç€Ÿã¯ãµãŠãžã¢ã©ãã¢çåœïŒKSAïŒãšãã·ã¢ãäž»å°ããçç£è
é£åã§ããOPEC 2.0ãåžå Žã§æ¯é
çãªçç£è
ãšããŠã¢ããªã³ã°ãç¶ããŠããŸããä»å¹Žäºæ³ããæé·ã¯OPEC 2.0ã®äœå°çç£èœåã®ããªãã®éšåãåžåããèŠèŸŒã¿ã§ããããã®å€§åâçŽ8mm b/dã®ãã¡çŽ6mm b/dâãKSAã«ãããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã3ïŒã
äž»èŠçç£åœã®äœå°çç£èœåã¯ãç±³åœã®ã·ã§ãŒã«çç£è
ããªã°ãšäººå¡ãåå¡ããŠæ°èŠçç£ãéç©ã©ã€ã³ãäž»èŠãã€ãã©ã€ã³ã«å°å
¥ãããããéããå埩ããéèŠã«å¯Ÿå¿ããããšãå¯èœã«ããŸãã
åœç€Ÿã¯ç±³åœã®ã·ã§ãŒã«çç£è
ãåžå ŽäŸ¡æ Œãåãå
¥ããã³ããŒãïŒäŸ¡æ Œå容矀ïŒãšããŠã¢ãã«åããŠãããåžå Žãèš±ãéãçç£ãããšæ³å®ããŠããŸãã2020幎ã«9.22mm b/dãŸã§èœã¡èŸŒãã ç±³åœçç£ã¯ãä»å¹Ž9.56mm b/dã2022幎ã«10.65mm b/dã2023幎ã«11.18mm b/dãŸã§å埩ãããšèŠãŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã4ïŒãç±³åœå
ã³ã³ããã³ã¿ã«ç£ïŒLower 48ïŒã®çç£æé·ã¯ã·ã§ãŒã«ãäž»å°ããå幎ãšãç±³åœç·çç£ã®çŽ80%ãå ããèŠèŸŒã¿ã§ãã
ãã£ãŒã3
ã³ã¢OPEC 2.0ã®äœå°çç£èœåããŸãéèŠå¢ã«åå¿ãã
OPEC 2.0ã®ã³ã¢äºåçç£èœåã¯éèŠã®å¢å ã«æåã«åå¿ãã
OPEC 2.0ã®ã³ã¢äºåçç£èœåã¯éèŠã®å¢å ã«æåã«åå¿ãã
ãã£ãŒã4
ã·ã§ãŒã«ã¯äŸ¡æ Œå容矀ã«ãããéçäŸçµŠæº
ã·ã§ãŒã«ã¯äŸ¡æ Œå容矀ã«ãããéçãã¬ã«ã§ãã
ã·ã§ãŒã«ã¯äŸ¡æ Œå容矀ã«ãããéçãã¬ã«ã§ãã
äŸçµŠé¢ã§ã®OPEC 2.0ã®æ¯é
çå°äœã¯ãäœå°çç£èœåãæ¯æžãããŸã§ã¯éé£åçç£è
ã«çµæžçå°ä»£ã奪ãããããšãèš±ãããéé£åçç£è
ã«ãšã£ãŠã¯æå¶èŠå ãšãªããŸãããã®åŸãäŸ¡æ Œå容矀ã¯è³æ¬ãåŒã³èŸŒãèœåãéãããŠãããããå
éšçä¿ããå€ãã®æ¢æ»ã»çç£ïŒE+PïŒæŽ»åãè³ãå¯èœæ§ãé«ããšèããããŸããæ ªäž»ã¯é
åœã®ç¶æã»æé·ããããã¯æ ªåŒè²·æ»ãã«ããè³æ¬éå
ãèŠæ±ãç¶ããã§ãããããããåçæ§ã®ããäŒæ¥ã«çç£æé·ãéå®ããèŠå ã«ãªããŸãã
åœç€Ÿã¯OPEC 2.0é£åã®çç£èŠåŸãäŸçµŠãéèŠã®ãããäžã«ãšã©ããåšåº«ãæžå°ãç¶ããããã«ããã ãããšèŠãŠããŸããããã¯COVID-19ãã³ãããã¯ã§éèŠãç Žå£ãããã«ããããããå®éã«èµ·ããããšã§ãïŒãã£ãŒã5ïŒããããã®ã¢ããªã³ã°åæãããåœç€Ÿã¯äŸçµŠãšéèŠã2023幎ã«ãããŠåè¡¡ãžåãã£ãŠåãç¶ãããšäºæ³ããŠããŸãïŒè¡š1ïŒã
ãã£ãŒã5
2021幎ã®é絊ãã©ã³ã¹
2021幎ã®é絊ãã©ã³ã¹
2021幎ã®é絊ãã©ã³ã¹
è¡š1
BCA äžçåæ²¹ é絊ãã©ã³ã¹ïŒMMb/dãããŒã¹ã±ãŒã¹ïŒ
åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®äžæ¹ãªã¹ã¯ãé«ãŸã£ãŠãã
åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®äžæ¹ãªã¹ã¯ãé«ãŸã£ãŠãã
åœç€Ÿã¯ãã®é絊åè¡¡åãæåžžçãªç©ççäžè¶³ãèªçºããåšåº«ã¯2023幎ã«ãããŠæžå°ãç¶ãããšäºæ³ããŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã6ïŒãåšåº«ãåã厩ãããã«ã€ããŠãOPEC 2.0ã®æ¯é
çãªçç£è
å°äœã¯ãã¬ã³ãããã³WTIã®ãã©ã¯ãŒãã«ãŒããããã¯ã¯ãŒããŒã·ã§ã³ã«ä¿ã€ããšãå¯èœã«ããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã7ïŒã2 åœç€Ÿã¯2022幎ããã³2023幎ã®ãã¬ã³ãäºæž¬ããããã$65/bblã$75/bblã§ç¶æããŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã8ïŒã
ãã£ãŒã6
OPEC 2.0ã®æ¿çã¯äŸçµŠãéèŠã®äžã«çœ®ãç¶ãã...
OPEC 2.0æ¿çã¯äŸçµŠãéèŠããäžåãæ°Žæºã«ä¿ã¡ç¶ããŠããâŠ
OPEC 2.0æ¿çã¯äŸçµŠãéèŠããäžåãæ°Žæºã«ä¿ã¡ç¶ããŠããâŠ
ãã£ãŒã7
OECDåšåº«ã¯2023幎ãŸã§ã«æžå°
OECD Inventories Fall to 2023
OECD Inventories Fall to 2023
ãã£ãŒã8
äžççµæžå埩ã«äŒŽããã¬ã³ãäºæž¬ã¯äžæ
äžççµæžã®å埩ã«äŒŽãããã¬ã³ãã¯äžæãäºæ³ããã
äžççµæžã®å埩ã«äŒŽãããã¬ã³ãã¯äžæãäºæ³ããã
äŸ¡æ Œã®äž¡æ¹åãªã¹ã¯ãå
æº
åœç€ŸèŠè§£ã«ã¯äžæ¯ãããã³äžæ¯ãã®ãªã¹ã¯ãæ°å€ããããŸãã
äžæ¯ãã®äŸãšããŠãè±åœãšç±³åœã®ã¯ã¯ãã³é
åžã®ç«ã¡äžãæ¹ã瀺åã«å¯ã¿ãŸãã
äž¡åœãšãåœåã¯ã€ãŸã¥ããŸãããç¹ã«ç±³åœã¯1ææç¹ã§ãæŠç¥ãæŽã£ãŠããªãããã«èŠããŸãããç±³åœã調éãšé
åžãæ¬æ Œåããããšæ¥çš®çã¯æ¥äžæããçŸåšã§ã¯ç±³åœå
ã§ãéåžžã®ãç¬ç«èšå¿µæ¥ïŒFourth of JulyïŒãè¿ããèŠéãã«ããããã§ããè±åœã¯ä»é±åéãéå§ããŸãããäž¡åœã¯2021幎第3ååæã«éå£å
ç«ãéæãããšäºæ³ãããŠããŸãã3 調éãšé
åžã誀ã£ãEUã¯ãè±åœãšç±³åœã®æèšããå©çãåŸãŠ2021幎第4ååæã«éå£å
ç«ãéæãããšãããã³ãŒãŒã®èª¿æ»ã¯ç€ºããŠããŸãããã®ã¹ã±ãžã¥ãŒã«ã®ååãã¯ããã匷ãæé·ãšåœç€Ÿäºæž¬ãäžåãç³æ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã«ã€ãªããã§ãããã
次ã®å€§ããªèª²é¡ã¯ããã³ãããã¯ãå éãå€ç°æ ªã®çºçã»æ¡æ£ã«çæ³çãªç°å¢ãæäŸããŠããæ°èçµæžå°åïŒç¹ã«ãã®ãããªå°åïŒã«ã¯ã¯ãã³ãäŸçµŠããããšã§ãããã©ãžã«ãã€ã³ãã欧å·ã§ã®æ»äº¡è
æ°ã»å
¥é¢è
æ°ã®äžæã瀺ãããã«ã倧èŠæš¡ãªCOVID-19ã«ããããã¯ããŠã³ã®åçºãªã¹ã¯ã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠæ®ããŸãã
æŠã®çŒç
ïŒCry HavocïŒ
åœç€ŸãèŠãããäžã€ã®å€§ããªäžæ¯ããªã¹ã¯ã¯ãç±³åœããã·ã¢ãäžåœããã³ãããã®é¢ä¿åœã»åçåœãå·»ã蟌ãæŠåè¡çªã§ãã
çŸæç¹ã§ã³ã¢ãã£ãã£åžå Žã¯ãããã®ãªã¹ã¯ãç¡èŠããŠããŸããæŠäºã®ã¬ãã«ã«ã¯éããŠããªãã«ãããæ©åçãªäº€æŠâèªç©ºæ©ãæå¢ããããåã·ãæµ·ã§èŠè¹ã亀æŠãããããªäºæ
âã®ç¢ºçã¯æ¥ã
é«ãŸã£ãŠããŸãã
ããã¯é©ãã¹ãããšã§ã¯ãªããåœç€Ÿã®ååã§ããBCAãªãµãŒãã®å°æ¿åŠã¹ãã©ããžãŒïŒGeopolitical StrategyïŒãæè¿ææããéãã§ãã4 å®éããããã»ã¬ãŒãã±ã³ïŒMatt GertkenïŒãçããåœè©²ãµãŒãã¹ã¯ããã€ãã³æ¿æš©ã就任çŽåŸãããã·ã¢ãšäžåœã«ãã£ãŠãã®çš®ã®è©Šç·Žã«ãããããã ãããšèŠåããŠããŸããã
ãã·ã¢ã¯ãŠã¯ã©ã€ãåœå¢ã«è»ãéçµãããç±³åœã«å¹²æžãããªãšèŠåããŠããŸããäžåœã¯ãã£ãªãã³æ²¿å²žã«è»èŠãéçµãããå°æ¹Ÿã®é²ç©ºèå¥åãžã®äŸµå
¥ãç¶ããŠãããç±³è»ãç·åŒµãããŠããŸããç±³é²ãç±³äžéã®æ¿æ²»å¯Ÿè©±ã¯ãŸããŸãæ¿ãããªã£ãŠãããè¿ãå°æ¥ã«åããå
ãã¯èŠããŸãããæå³çã§ããå¶çºçã§ãã亀æŠãçºçããã°æŠäºã®éèµ°ãèš±ããç³æ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã¯äžæçã«æ¥éš°ããå¯èœæ§ããããŸãã
æåŸã«ãåœç€Ÿãæ³å®ããããã«ã€ã©ã³ãæ žåæïŒããªãã¡å
±åå
æ¬çè¡åèšç»ïŒJCPOAïŒã西åŽè«žåœãšåç· çµã§ããã°ãã€ã©ã³ã¯ãæ£åŒãªãç³æ²¹èŒžåºåœãšããŠã®åŸ©åž°ãäœåãªããããOPEC 2.0ã¯ãããåãå
¥ããããåŸãªããªããŸããJCPOAã¯2018幎ã«åœæã®ãã©ã³ã倧統é ã«ãã£ãŠç Žæ£ãããŸããã
ããã¯å°é£ã䌎ãå¯èœæ§ããããŸããåœç€Ÿã¯2014â16幎ã®ç³æ²¹äŸ¡æ ŒåŽ©å£ãããµãŠãžãåžå Žã·ã§ã¢æŠäºãä»æããŠäŸ¡æ ŒãæŽèœããã2010幎æ«ãã2014幎åã°ã«ãããŠç¶ãã1ãã¬ã«åœãã$100è¶
ã®äŸ¡æ Œãã€ã©ã³ã«èš±ããªãããã®è¡åã ã£ããšèããŠããŸããOPEC 2.0ãç¹ã«KSAã¯ç±³åœâã€ã©ã³äº€æžã«å
¬ã«ã¯é¢äžããŠããŸãããããã2014幎ã«éå§ãããå£æ»
çãªåžå Žã·ã§ã¢æŠäºã®åŸãKSAããã³OPEC 2.0ã¯JCPOAåŸã«ã€ã©ã³ã®åžå ŽåŸ©åž°ãåãå
¥ããããšãæ³èµ·ãã䟡å€ããããŸãã
ãããŒãã»Pã»ã©ã€ã¢ã³ ããŒã ã³ã¢ãã£ãã£ïŒãšãã«ã®ãŒã»ã¹ãã©ããžã¹ã rryan@bcaresearch.com
ã¢ã·ã¥ãŠã£ã³ã»ã·ã£ã€ã¢ã ãªãµãŒãã¢ãœã·ãšã€ã ã³ã¢ãã£ãã£ïŒãšãã«ã®ãŒæŠç¥ ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com
ã³ã¢ãã£ãã£æŠæ³
ãšãã«ã®ãŒïŒ 匷æ°
ãã¬ã³ããšWTIäŸ¡æ Œã¯ãEIAã®é±éç³æ²¹åšåº«å ±åã2021幎4æ9é±çµããã§ç±³åœã®åæ²¹ã»è£œååšåº«ã910äžãã¬ã«æžå°ããããšã瀺ããåŸã«æ¥éš°ããŸãããããã¯åæ¥çšåæ²¹ãšèžçæ²¹åšåº«ã®å€§å¹
ãªåã厩ãïŒãããã590äžãã¬ã«ã210äžãã¬ã«ïŒãäž»å°ããŸããããããã®åã厩ãã¯éå»äžé±éã«äž»èŠããŒã¿æ©é¢ïŒEIAãIEAãOPECïŒã«ããäžçéèŠã®æŠã匷æ°ãªäžæ¹ä¿®æ£ãèæ¯ãšããŠããŸãããããã®è©äŸ¡ã¯ã粟補補åéèŠãããªãã¡ãproduct suppliedãã4æ9é±çµããã§æ¥é110äžb/dè·³ãäžãã£ããšããEIAããŒã¿ã«è£ä»ããããŠããŸãããžã§ã³ãœã³ïŒãžã§ã³ãœã³ã®æ¥çš®åé¡ãšããæ«æããã£ãã«ããããããã¯ã¯ãã³é
åžãå¢ããå¢ããŠãããåšåº«ã®åã厩ããšéèŠæ¹åãäžæã®è§Šåªãšãªã£ãããã§ããç±³ãã«ã®åŒ±å«ã¿ãç±³åœã®å®è³ªéå©äœäžãè¿œã颚ã«ãªããŸããã
ããŒã¹ã¡ã¿ã«ïŒ 匷æ°
ä»é±åãããã±ã«äŸ¡æ Œã¯äžèœããŸãããäžåœã®åœå¶æ°è¯ç€Ÿéä¿¡ãäžåœã®æå
匷éŠçžãäžæããã³ã¢ãã£ãã£äŸ¡æ Œã®äžã§åææåžå Žã®èŠå¶åŒ·åã®å¿
èŠæ§ã匷調ãããšå ±ããäŒæ¥ã®æ¥çžŸã«å§åãããã£ãŠãããšã®ããšã§ããïŒãã£ãŒã9ïŒããã®çºèšã¯äžåœã®ãããçµæžé¡§åã§ããå鶎ãå
é±ã³ã¢ãã£ãã£äŸ¡æ Œã®è¿œè·¡ãåœå±ã«æ±ããåŸã«åºããã®ã§ããããã±ã«äŸ¡æ Œã¯ãã®å ±ãåããŠä»é±åãã«ãã³åœããçŽ$500äžèœãããã³ãã³éå±ååŒæã®ååŒã§ç«ææ¥çµå€æç¹ã§$16,114.5/MTã§ååŒãããŠããŸãããä»ã®ããŒã¹ã¡ã¿ã«ã¯ãã®ãã¥ãŒã¹ã®åœ±é¿ãåããŸããã§ããã
貎éå±ïŒ 匷æ°
ä»é±åãã«çºè¡šããã3æã®ç±³åœã€ã³ãã¬ããŒã¿ãåããŠç±³ãã«ãš10幎ç©ç±³åœåµå©åãã¯äœäžããŸãããç±³åœã®æ¶è²»è
ç©äŸ¡ã¯çŽ9幎ã¶ãã®å€§å¹
äžæãèšé²ããŸãããã€ã³ãã¬ãããžéèŠãšç±³ãã«ã»åµå©åãã®äœäžãéã®è³Œå
¥ã«ãããæ©äŒè²»çšãäžããããšãéäŸ¡æ ŒãæŒãäžããŸããïŒãã£ãŒã10ïŒããã®äžç¢ºå®æ§ãšç±³åœã®è²¡æ¿åºæ¿çã«ããã€ã³ãã¬å§åã®é«ãŸããééèŠãå¢å ãããŸããã¹ãããã®COMEXéã¯ç«ææ¥çµå€ã§$1,746.20/ozã§ååŒãããŠããŸããã
ç©ç©ã»ãœããã³ã¢ãã£ãã£ïŒ äžç«
USDAã®å ±åã«ãããšãç±³åœã®ããŠã¢ãã³ã·ææ«åšåº«ã¯13.5åããã·ã§ã«ã§ãåžå Žäºæ³ã®13.9åããã·ã§ã«ãå
æã®çã®1.50åããã·ã§ã«æšå®ãäžåã£ãŠããŸãïŒagriculture.comã®éèšïŒãäžçã®ããŠã¢ãã³ã·åšåº«ã¯2.839åãã³ã§ãåžå Žäºæ³ã®2.845åãã³ããã³çã®æšå®2.876åãã³ãäžåããŸããã
ãã£ãŒã9
ããŒã¹ã¡ã¿ã«ã¯åŒ·æ°ã«åã
ããŒã¹ã¡ã¿ã«ã¯åŒ·æ°ã«ãªã£ãŠãã
ããŒã¹ã¡ã¿ã«ã¯åŒ·æ°ã«ãªã£ãŠãã
ãã£ãŒã10
éäŸ¡æ Œã®äžæ
éäŸ¡æ Œãäžæãž
éäŸ¡æ Œãäžæãž
è泚
1 åœç€Ÿã2021幎4æ8æ¥ã«çºè¡šããUS-Russia Pipeline Standoff Could Push LNG Prices Higherãã芧ãã ãããç°¡åã«èšãã°ãIMFã¯ä»å¹Žããã³æ¥å¹Žã®æé·çèŠéãããããã6%ãš4.4%ã«åŒãäžãã2021幎1æã®æŽæ°æç¹ãšæ¯ã¹ãŠã»ãŒ1ãã€ã³ãã®äžæ¹ä¿®æ£ãè¡ããŸããã
2 ããã¯ã¯ãŒããŒã·ã§ã³ã®ãã©ã¯ãŒãã«ãŒãâå
ç©ã®æè¿äŸ¡æ Œãæå
äŸ¡æ Œãäžåãç¶æ
âã¯é絊ã¿ã€ããã瀺ãåžå Žã®ã·ã°ãã«ã§ãã粟補æ¥è
ãå°æ¥ãããä»ã®åæ²¹ã®å
¥æãé«ãè©äŸ¡ããŠããããšãæå³ããŸããããã¯ã¡ããã©æè³å®¶ãææ¥åŒãæž¡ããã1ãã«æã«å¯ŸããŠ1ãã«ãæ¯æãããšã奜ã¿ã1幎åŸã«åŒãæž¡ãããåã1ãã«æã«ã¯ä»æ¥98ã»ã³ãããæããªããããããªãã®ãšåããã€ããã¯ã¹ã§ãã
3 ãããã³ãŒãŒã»ã¢ã³ãã»ã«ã³ãããŒã2021幎3æ26æ¥ã«çºè¡šããWhen will the COVID-19 pandemic end?ããåç
§ãã ããã
4 BCAã®å°æ¿åŠã¹ãã©ããžãŒã2021幎4æ2æ¥ã«çºè¡šããå
èŠçãªåæThe Arsenal Of Democracyãã芧ãã ãããåã¬ããŒãã¯ããã€ãã³æ¿æš©ã¯äžåœ/å°æ¹Ÿããã·ã¢ãã€ã©ã³ãããã«ã¯åæé®®ã«é¢ããåæã®ã¹ãã¬ã¹ã»ãã¹ãã«çŽé¢ããŠãããšææããŠããŸããã²ãŒã çè«ã¯éèåžå Žãå°æ¹Ÿæµ·å³¡ã§ã®å±æ©ã®60%ã®ç¢ºçãç¡èŠã§ããªãçç±ã説æããã®ã«åœ¹ç«ã¡ãŸããå
šé¢æŠäºã®ç¢ºçã¯äŸç¶äœããã®ã®ãå°æ¹Ÿã¯äžçã§æãéèŠãªå°æ¿åŠçãªã¹ã¯ã§ããç¶ããŸãã
æè³èŠè§£ãšããŒã
æšå¥šäºé
æŠç¥çæšå¥š
ã¿ã¯ãã£ã«ã«ãã¬ãŒã
ã³ã¢ãã£ãã£äŸ¡æ Œãšãã¬ã€åèè¡š
2021幎ã«ã¯ããŒãºãããã¬ãŒã
ã¯ããŒãºãããã¬ãŒãã®æŠèŠ
ããé«ãã€ã³ãã¬ãå°æ¥
ããé«ãã€ã³ãã¬ãå°æ¥
Highlights Continued upgrades to global economic growth â most recently by the IMF this week âwill support higher natgas prices. In our estimation, gas for delivery at Henry Hub, LA, in the coming withdrawal season (November â March) is undervalued at current levels at ~ $2.90/MMBtu. Inventory demand will remain strong during the current April-October injection season, following the blast of colder-than-normal weather in 1Q21 that pulled inventories lower in the US, Europe and Northeast Asia. The odds the US will succeed in halting completion of the final leg of the Russian Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline into Germany are higher than the consensus expectation. Our odds the pipeline will not be completed this year stand at 50%, which translates into higher upside risk for natural gas prices. We are getting long 1Q22 calls on CME/NYMEX Henry Hub-delivered natgas futures struck at $3.50/MMBtu vs. short 1Q22 $3.75/MMBtu calls at tonight's close. The probability of Nord Stream 2 cancellation is underpriced, which means European TTF and Asian JKM prices will have to move higher to attract LNG cargoes next winter from the US, if the pipeline is cancelled (Chart of the Week). Feature As major forecasting agencies continue to upgrade global growth prospects, expectations for industrial-commodity demand â energy, bulks, and base metals â also are moving higher. This week, the IMF raised its growth expectations for this year and next to 6% and 4.4%, respectively, nearly a full percentage-point increase versus its January forecast update for 2021.1 This upgrade follows a similar move by the OECD last month.2 In the US, the EIA is expecting industrial demand for natural gas to rise 1.35 Bcf/d this year to 23.9 Bcf/d; versus 2019 levels, industrial demand will be 0.84 Bcf/d higher in 2021. For 2022, industrial demand is expected to be 24.2 Bcf/d. US industrial demand likely will recover faster than the EU's, given the expectation of a stronger recovery on the back of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus. Overall natgas demand in the US likely will move lower this year, given higher natgas prices expected this year and next will incentivize electricity generators to switch to coal at the margin, according to the EIA. Total demand is expected to be 82.9 Bcf/d in the US this year vs. 83.3 Bcf/d last year, owing to lower generator demand. Pipeline-quality gas output in the US â known as dry gas, since its liquids have been removed for other uses â is expected to average 91.4 Bcf/d this year, essentially unchanged. Lower consumption by the generators and flat production will allow US gas inventories to return to their five-year average levels of 3.7 Tcf by the end of October, in the EIA's estimation (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekUS-Russia Geopolitical Risk Underpriced Chart 2US Natgas Inventories Return To Five-Year Average US Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) exports are likely to expand, as Asian and European demand grows (Chart 3). Prior to the boost in US LNG demand from colder weather, exports set monthly records of 9.4 Bcf/d and 9.8 Bcf/d in November and December of last year, respectively, with Asia accounting for the largest share of exports (Chart 4). This also marked the first time LNG exports exceeded US pipeline exports to Mexico and Canada. The EIA is forecasting US LNG exports will be 8.5 bcf/d and 9.2 Bcf/d this year and next, versus pipeline exports of 8.8 Bcf/d and 8.9 Bcf/d in 2021 and 2022, respectively. Chart 3US LNG Exports Continue Growing Chart 4US LNG Exports Set Records In November And December 2020 US LNG exports â and export potential given the size of the resource base at just over 500 Tcf â now are of a sufficient magnitude to be a formidable force in global markets, particularly in Europe. This puts it in direct conflict with Russia, which has targeted Europe as a key market for its pipeline natural gas exports. US-Russia Standoff Looming Over Nord Stream 2 Given the size and distribution of global oil and gas production and consumption, it comes as no surprise national interests can, at times, become as important to pricing these commodities as supply-demand fundamentals. This is particularly true in oil, and increasingly is becoming the case in natural gas. That the same dramatis personae â the US and Russia â should feature in geopolitical contests in oil and gas markets also should not come as a surprise. In an attempt to circumvent transporting its natural gas through Ukraine, Russia is building a 1,230 km underwater pipeline from Narva Bay in the Kingisepp district of the Leningrad region of Russia to Lubmin, near Greifswald, in Germany (Map 1). The Biden administration, like the Trump administration and US Congress, is officially attempting to halt the final leg of the pipeline from being built, although Biden has not yet put Americaâs full weight into stopping it. Biden claims it will be up to the Europeans to decide what to do. At the same time, any major Russian or Russian-backed military operation in Ukraine could trigger an American action to halt the pipeline in retaliation. Map 1Nord Stream 2 Route In our estimation, there is a 50% chance that the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline will not be completed this year or go into operation as planned given substantial geopolitical risks. The $11 billion pipeline would connect Russia directly to Germany with a capacity of about 55 billion cubic meters, which, combined with the existing Nord Stream One pipeline, would equal 110 BCM in offshore capacity, or 55% of Russia's natural gas exports to Europe in 2019. The pipelineâs construction is 94% complete, with the Russian ship Akademik Cherskiy entering Danish waters in late March to begin laying pipes to finish the final 138-kilometer stretch, according to Reuters. The pipeline could be finished in early August at the pace of 1 kilometer per day.3 The Russian and German governments are speeding up the project to finish it before US-Russia tensions, or the German elections in September, interrupt the construction process again. It is not too late for the US to try to halt the pipeline through sanctions. But for the Americans to succeed, the Biden administration would have to make an aggressive effort. Notably the Biden administration took office with a desire to sharpen US policy toward Russia.4 While Biden seeks Russian engagement on arms reduction treaties and the Iranian nuclear negotiations, he mainly aims to counter Russia, expand sanctions, provide weapons to Ukraine, and promote democracy in Russiaâs sphere of influence. The result will almost inevitably be a new US-Russia confrontation, which is already taking shape over Russiaâs buildup of troops on the border with Ukraine, where US and Russian meddling could cause civil war to reignite (Map 2). Map 2Russiaâs Military Tensions With The West Escalate In Wake Of Bidenâs Election And Ukraineâs Renewed Bid To Join NATO Tensions in Ukraine are directly tied to US military cooperation with Ukraine and any possibility that Ukraine will join the NATO military alliance, a red line for Putin. Nord Stream 2 is Russiaâs way of bypassing Ukraine but a new US-Russia conflict, especially a Russian attack on Ukraine, would halt the pipeline. The pipelineâs completion would improve Russo-German strategic relations, undercut US liquefied natural gas exports to Germany and the EU, and reduce the USâs and eastern Europeâs leverage over Russia (and Germany). Biden says his administration is planning to impose new sanctions on firms that oversee, construct, or insure the pipeline, and such sanctions are required under American law.5 Yet Biden also wants a strong alliance with Germany, which favors the pipeline and does not want to escalate the conflict with Russia. The American laws against Nord Stream have big loopholes and give the president discretion regarding the use of sanctions, which means Biden would have to make a deliberate decision to override Germany and impose maximum sanctions if he truly wanted to halt construction.6 This would most likely occur if Russia committed a major new act of aggression in Ukraine or against other European democracies. The German policy, under the current ruling coalition led by Chancellor Angela Merkelâs Christian Democratic Union, is to finish the pipeline despite Russiaâs conflicts with the West and political repression at home. Russia provides more than a third of Germanyâs natural gas imports and this pipeline would bypass eastern Europeâs pipeline network and thus secure Germanyâs (and Austriaâs and the EUâs) natural gas supply whenever Russia cuts off the flow to Ukraine (through which roughly 40% of Russian natural gas still must pass to reach Europe). Germany's Election And Natgas Politics Germany wants to use natural gas as a bridge while it phases out nuclear energy and coal. Natural gas has grown 2.2 percentage points as a share of Germanyâs total energy mix since the Fukushima disaster of 2011, and renewable energy has grown 7.7ppt, while coal has fallen 7.3ppt and nuclear has fallen 2.5ppt (Chart 5). The German federal election on September 26 complicates matters because Merkel and the Christian Democrats are likely to underperform their opinion polls and could even fall from power. They do not want to suffer a major foreign policy humiliation at the hands of the Americans or a strategic crisis with Russia right before the election. They will insist that Biden leave the pipeline alone and will offer other forms of cooperation against Russia in compensation. Therefore, the current German government could push through the pipeline and complete the project even in the face of US objections. But this outcome is not guaranteed. The German Greens are likely to gain influence in the Bundestag after the elections and could even lead the German government for the first time â and they are opposed to a new fossil fuel pipeline that increases Russiaâs influence. Chart 5Germany Sees Nord Stream 2 Gas As Bridge To Low-Carbon Economy Hence there is a fair chance that the pipeline does not become operational: either Americans halt it out of strategic interest, or the German Greens halt it out of environmental and strategic interest, or both. True, there is a roughly equal chance that Merkelâs policy status quo survives in Germany, which would result in an operational pipeline. The best case for Germany might be that the current government completes the pipeline physically but the next government has optionality on whether to make it operational. But 50/50 odds of cancellation is a much higher risk than the consensus holds. The Russian policy is to finish Nord Stream 2 while also making an aggressive military stance against the Westâs and NATOâs influence in Ukraine. This would expand Russian commodity and energy exports and undercut Ukraineâs natgas transit income. It would also increase Russian leverage over Germany â and it would divide Germany from the eastern Europeans and Americans. A preemptive American intervention would elicit Russian retaliation. The Russians could respond in the strategic sphere or the economic sphere. Economically they could react by cutting off natural gas to Europe, but that would undermine their diplomatic goals, so they would more likely respond by increasing production of natural gas or crude oil to steal American market share. In any scenario Russian retaliation would likely cause global price volatility in one or more energy markets, in addition to whatever volatility is induced by the cancellation of Nord Stream 2 itself. US-Russia tensions are likely to escalate but only Ukraine and Nord Stream 2, or the separate Iranian negotiations, have a direct impact on global energy supply. If Germany goes forward with the pipeline, then Russia would need to be countered by other means. The Americans, not the Germans, would provide these âother means,â such as military support to ensure the integrity of Ukraine and other nationsâ borders. The Russians may gain a victory for their energy export strategy but they will never compromise on Ukraine and they will still need to focus on the broader global shift to renewable energy, which threatens their economic model and hence ultimately their regime stability. So, the risk of a market-moving US-Russia conflict can be delayed but probably not prevented (Chart 6). Chart 6US-Russia Conflit Likely Bottom Line: The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is not guaranteed to be completed this year as planned. The US is more likely to force a halt to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline than the consensus holds, especially if Russia attacks Ukraine. If the US fails to do so, then the German election will become the next signpost for whether the pipeline will become operational. If the Americans halt the pipeline, then US-Russian conflict either already erupted or will occur sooner rather than later and will likely impact global oil or natural gas prices. Investment Implications Our subjective assessment of 50% odds the US will succeed in halting completion of the final leg of Nord Stream 2 are higher than the consensus expectation. This translates directly into higher upside risk for natural gas prices in the US and Europe later this year and next. Given our view, we are getting long 1Q22 calls on CME/NYMEX Henry Hub-delivered natgas futures struck at $3.50/MMBtu vs. short 1Q22 $3.75/MMBtu calls at tonight's close. The probability of Nord Stream 2 cancellation is underpriced, which means the odds of higher prices in the LNG market are underpriced (Chart 7). The immediate implication of our view is European TTF prices will have to move higher to attract LNG cargoes next winter from the US, if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline's final leg is cancelled. This also would tighten the Asian markets, causing the JKM to move higher as well (Chart 8). Any indication of colder-than-normal weather in the US, Europe or Asian markets would mean a sharper move higher. Chart 7Natgas Tails Are Too Narrow For Next Winter Chart 8Nord Stream 2 Cancellation Would Boost JKM Prices Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The US and Iran began indirect talks earlier this week in Vienna aimed at restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the "Iranâ¯nuclear deal." All of the other parties of the deal â Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia â are in favor of restoring the deal. BCA Research believes this is most likely to occur prior to the inauguration of a new president who is expected to be a hardliner willing to escalate Iranâs demands. US President Biden can unilaterally ease sanctions and bring the US into compliance with the deal, and Iran could then reciprocate. If a deal is not reached by August it could take years to resolve US-Iran tensions. China could offer to cooperate on sanctions and help to broker negotiations following the signing of its 25-year trade deal with Iran last week. Russia likely would demand the US not pressure its allies to cancel the Nord Stream 2 deal, in return for its assistance in brokering a deal. Base Metals: Bullish Iron ore prices continue to be supported by record steel prices in China, trading at more than $173/MT earlier this week. Even though steel production reportedly is falling in the top steel-producer in China, Tangshan, as a result of anti-pollution measures, for iron ore remains stout. As we have previously noted, we use steel prices as a leading indicator for copper prices. We remain long Dec21 copper and will be looking for a sell-off to get long Sep21 copper vs. short Sep21 copper if the market trades below $4/lb on the CME/COMEX futures market (Chart 9). Precious Metals: Bullish Gold held support ~ $1,680/oz at the end of March, following an earlier test in the month. We remain long the yellow metal, despite coming close to being stopped out last week (Chart 10). The earlier sell-off appeared to be caused by a need to raise liquidity to us. We continue to expect the Fed to hold firm to its stated intent to wait for actual inflation to become manifest before raising rates, and, therefore, continue to expect real rates to weaken. This will be supportive of gold and commodities generally (Chart 10). Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn continues to be well supported above $5.50/bu, following last week's USDA report showing farmers intend to increase acreage planted to just over 91mm acres, which is less than 1% above last year's level. Chart 9 Chart 10 Footnotes 1 Please see the Fund's April 2021 forecast Managing Divergent Recoveries. 2 We noted last week these higher growth expectations generally are bullish for industrial commodities â energy, metals, and bulks. Please see Fundamentals Support Oil, Bulks, And Metals, which we published 1 April 2021. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 For the rate of construction see Margarita Assenova, âClouds Darkening Over Nord Stream Two Pipeline,â Eurasia Daily Monitor 18: 17 (February 1, 2021), Jamestown Foundation, jamestown.org. For the current status, see Robin Emmott, âAt NATO, Blinken warns Germany over Nord Stream 2 pipeline,â Reuters, March 23, 2021, reuters.com. 4 The Democratic Party blames Russia for what it sees as a campaign to undermine the democratic West and recreate the Soviet sphere of influence. See for example the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the failure of the Obama administrationâs 2009-11 diplomatic âreset,â the Edward Snowden affair, the seizure of Crimea and civil war in Ukraine, the survival of Syriaâs dictator, and Russian interference in US elections in 2016 and 2020. 5 The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, and the Protecting Europeâs Energy Security Act of 2019/2020, contain provisions requiring sanctions on firms that have contributed in any way a minimum of $1 million to the project, or provide pipe-laying services or insurance. There are exceptions for services provided by the governments of the EU member states, Norway, Switzerland, or the UK. The president has discretion over the implementation of sanctions as usual. 6 The German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is creating a shell foundation to enable the completion of the pipeline. It can shield companies from American sanctions aimed at private companies, not sovereigns. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades
Highlights Recommended Allocation The coronavirus pandemic is not over. Enormous fiscal and monetary stimulus will soften the blow to the global economy, but there remain significant risks to growth over the next 12 months. The P/E ratio for global equities is near a record high. This suggests that the market is pricing in a V-shaped recovery, and ignoring the risks. We can, therefore, recommend no more than a neutral position on global equities. But government bonds are even more expensive, with yields having largely hit their lower bound. Stay underweight government bonds, and hedge downside risk via cash. The US dollar is likely to depreciate further: It is expensive, US liquidity has risen faster than elsewhere, interest-rate differentials no longer favor it, and momentum has swung against it. A weakening dollar â plus accelerating Chinese credit growth â should help commodities. We raise the Materials equity sector to neutral, and put Emerging Market equities on watch to upgrade from neutral. Corporate credit selectively remains attractive where central banks are providing a backstop. We prefer A-, Baa-, and Ba-rated credits, especially in the Financials and Energy sectors. Defensive illiquid alternative assets, such as macro hedge funds, have done well this year. But investors should start to think about rotating into private equity and distressed debt, where allocations are best made mid-recession. Overview Cash Injections Vs. COVID Infections The key to where markets will move over the next six-to-nine months is (1) whether there will be a second wave of COVID-19 cases and how serious it will be, and (2) how much appetite there is among central banks and fiscal authorities to ramp up stimulus to offset the damage the global economy will suffer even without a new spike in cases. A new wave of COVID-19 in the northern hemisphere this fall and winter is probable. It is not surprising, after such a sudden stop in global activity between February and May, that economic data is beginning to return to some sort of normality. PMIs have generally recovered to around 50, and in some cases moved above it (Chart 1). Economic data has surprised enormously to the upside in the US, although it is lagging in the euro zone and Japan (Chart 2). Chart 1Data Is Rebounding Sharply Chart 2US Data Well Above Expectations New COVID-19 cases continue to rise alarmingly in some emerging economies and in parts of the US, but in Europe and Asia the pandemic is largely over (for now) and lockdown regulations are being eased, allowing economic activity to resume (Chart 3). Nonetheless, consumers remain cautious. Even where economies have reopened, people remain reluctant to eat in restaurants, to go on vacation, or to visit shopping malls (Chart 4). While shopping and entertainment activities are now no longer 70-80% below their pre-pandemic levels, as they were in April and May, they remain down 20% or more (Chart 5). Chart 3Few COVID-19 Cases Now In Europe And Asia Chart 4Consumers Still Reluctant To Go Out Chart 5Spending Well Below Pre-Pandemic Levels So how big is the risk of further spikes in COVID-19 cases? Speaking on a recent BCA Research webcast, the conclusion of Professor Peter Doherty, a Nobel prize-winning immunologist connected to the University of Melbourne, was that, âItâs not unlikely weâll see a second wave.â1 But experts canât be sure. It seems that the virus spreads most easily when people group together indoors. That is why US states where it is hot at this time of the year, such as Arizona, have seen rising infections. This suggests that a new wave in the northern hemisphere this fall and winter is probable. Offsetting the economic damage caused by the coronavirus has been the staggering amount of liquidity injected by central banks, and huge extra fiscal spending. Major central bank balance-sheets have grown by around 5% of global GDP since March, causing a spike in broad money growth everywhere (Chart 6). Fiscal spending programs also add up to around 5% of global GDP (Chart 7), with a further 5% or so in the form of loans and guarantees. Chart 6Remarkable Growth In Money Supply... Chart 7...And Unprecedented Fiscal Spending But is it enough? Considerable damage has been done by the collapse in activity. Bankruptcies are rising (Chart 8) and, with activity still down 20% in consuming-facing sectors, pressure on companiesâ business models will not ease soon â particularly given evidence that banks are tightening lending conditions. Household income has been buoyed by government wage-replacement schemes, handout checks, and more generous unemployment benefits (Chart 9). But, when these run out, households will struggle if the programs are not topped up. Central banks are clearly willing to inject more liquidity if need be. But the US Congress is prevaricating on a second fiscal program, and the Merkel/Macron proposed EUR750 billion spending package in the EU is making little progress. It will probably take a wake-up call from a sinking stock market to push both to take action. Chart 8Companies Feeling The Pressure Considerable damage has been done by the collapse in activity. We lowered our recommendation for global equities to neutral from overweight in May. We are still comfortable with that position. Given the high degree of uncertainty, this is not a market in which to take bold positioning in a portfolio. When you have a high conviction, position your portfolio accordingly; but when you are unsure, stay close to benchmark. With stocks up by 36% since their bottom on March 23rd, the market is pricing in a V-shaped recovery and not, in our view, sufficiently taking into account the potential downside risks. P/E ratios for global stocks are at very stretched levels (Chart 10). Chart 9Households Dependent On Handouts Chart 10Global Equities Are Expensive... Nonetheless, we would not bet against equities. Simply, there is no alternative. Most government bond yields are close to their effective lower bound. Gold looks overbought (in the absence of a significant spike in inflation which, while possible, is unlikely for at least 12 months). No sensible investor in, say, Germany would want to hold 10-year government bonds yielding -50 basis points. Assuming 1.5% average annual inflation over the next decade, that guarantees an 18% real loss over 10 years. The only investors who hold such positions have them because their regulators force them to. Chart 11...But They Are Cheap Against Bonds The Sharpe ratio on 10-year US Treasurys, which currently yield 70 BPs, will be 0.16 (assuming volatility of 4.5%) over the next 10 years. A simple calculation of the likely Sharpe ratio for US equities (earnings yield of 4.5% and volatility of 16%) comes to 0.28. One would need to assume a disastrous outlook for the global economy to believe that stocks will underperform bonds in the long run. Though equities are expensive, bonds are even more so. The equity risk premium in most markets is close to a record high (Chart 11). With such mathematics, it is hard for a long-term oriented investor to be underweight equities. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 12Premature Opening Of The Economy Is Risky COVID-19: How Risky Is Reopening? Countries around the world are rushing to reopen their economies, claiming victory over the pandemic. It is hard to be sure whether a second wave of COVID-19 will hit. What is certain, however, is that a premature relaxation of measures is as risky as a tardy initial response. That was the lesson from our Special Report analyzing the Spanish Flu of 1918. The risk is certainly still there: Herd immunity will require around 70% of the population to get sick, and a drug or vaccine will (even in an optimistic scenario) not be available until early next year. China and South Korea, for example, after reporting only a handful of daily new cases in early May, were forced to impose new restrictions over the past few weeks as COVID-19 cases spiked again (Chart 12, panel 1). We await to see if other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and France will be forced to follow. Some argue that even if a second wave hits, policy makers â to avoid a further hit to economic output â will favor the âSwedish modelâ: Relying on peopleâs awareness to limit the spread of the virus, without imposing additional lockdowns and restrictions. This logic, however, is risky since Sweden suffered a much higher number of infections and deaths than its neighboring countries (panel 2). The US faces a similar fate. States such as Florida, Arizona, and Texas are recording a sharp rise in new infections as lockdowns are eased. In panel 3, we show the daily number of new infections during the stay-at-home orders (the solid lines) and after they were lifted (dashed lines). To an extent, increases in infections are a function of mass testing. However, what is obvious is that the percentage of positive cases per tests conducted has started trending upwards as lockdown measures were eased (panel 4). Our base case remains that new clusters of infections will emerge. Eager citizens and rushed policy decisions will fuel further contagion. If the Swedish model is implemented, lives lost are likely to be larger than during the first wave. Chart 13W Or U, Says The OECD What Shape Will The Recovery Be: U, V, W, Or Swoosh? The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee has already declared that the US recession began in March. The economistsâ consensus is that Q2 US GDP shrank by 35% QoQ annualized. But, after such a momentous collapse and with a moderate move back towards normalcy, it is almost mathematically certain that Q3 GDP will show positive quarter-on-quarter growth. So does this mean that the recession lasted only one quarter, i.e. a sharp V-shape? And does this matter for risk assets? The latest OECD Economic Outlook has sensible forecasts, using two âequally probableâ scenarios: One in which a second wave of coronavirus infections hits before year-end, requiring new lockdowns, and one in which another major outbreak is avoided.2 The second-wave scenario would trigger a renewed decline in activity around the turn of 2020-21: a W-shape. The second scenario looks more like a U-shape or swoosh, with an initial rebound but then only a slow drawn-out recovery, with OECD GDP not returning to its Q4 2019 level before the end of 2021 (Chart 13). Chart 14Unemployment Will Take A Long Time To Come Down Why is it likely that, in even the absence of a renewed outbreak of the pandemic, recovery would be faltering? After an initial period in which many furloughed workers return to their jobs, and pent-up demand is fulfilled, the damage from the sudden stop to the global economy would kick in. Typically, unemployment rises rapidly in a recession, but recovers only over many years back to its previous low (Chart 14). This time, many firms, especially in hospitality and travel, will have gone bust. Capex plans are also likely to be delayed. Chart 15Sub-Potential Output Can Be Good For Risk Assets However, a slow recovery is not necessarily bad for risk assets. Periods when the economy is recovering but remains well below potential (such as 2009-2015) are typically non-inflationary, which allows central banks to continue accommodation (Chart 15). Is This Sharp Equity Rebound A Retail Investor Frenzy? The answer to this question is both Yes and No. From a macro fundamental perspective, the answer is No, because coordinated global reflationary policies and medical developments to fight the coronavirus have been the key drivers underpinning this equity rebound. âCOVID-onâ and âCOVID-offâ have been the main determinants for equity rotations. Chart 16Active Retail Participation Lately But at the individual stock level, the answer is Yes. Some of the unusual action in beaten-down stocks over the past few weeks may have its origin in an upsurge of active retail participation (Chart 16). Retail investors on their own are not large enough to influence the market direction. Many online brokerages do not charge any commission for trades, but make money by selling order flows to hedge funds. As such, the momentum set in motion by retail investors may have been amplified by fast-money pools of capital. Retail participation in some beaten-down stocks has also provided an opportunity for institutions to exit. BCAâs US Investment Strategy examined the change in institutional ownership of 12 stocks in three stressed groups between February 23 and June 14, as shown in Table 1. In the case of these stocks, retail investors have served as liquidity providers to institutional sellers seeking to exit their holdings. The redeployment of capital by institutions into large-cap and quality names may have pushed up the overall equity index level. Table 1Individuals Have Replaced Institutions How Will Inflation Behave After COVID? Some clients have asked us about the behavior of inflation following the COVID epidemic. Over the very short term, inflation could have more downside. However, this trend is likely to reverse rapidly. Headline inflation is mainly driven by changes in the oil price and not by its level. Thus, even if oil prices were to stay at current low levels, the violent recovery of crude from its April lows could bring headline inflation near pre-COVID levels by the beginning of 2021 (Chart 17, top panel). This effect could become even larger if our Commodity strategist price target of 65$/barrel on average in 2021 comes to fruition. Chart 17Rising Oil Prices And Fiscal Stimulus Will Boost Inflation But will this change in inflation be transitory or will it prove to be sustainable? We believe it will be the latter. The COVID crisis may have dramatically accelerated the shift to the left in US fiscal policy. Specifically, programs such as universal basic income may now be within the Overton window3 of acceptable fiscal policy, thanks to the success of the CARES Act in propping up incomes amid Depression-like levels of unemployment (middle panel). Meanwhile there is evidence that this stimulus is helping demand to recover rapidly: Data on credit and debit card trends show that consumer spending in the US has staged a furious rally, particularly among low-income groups, where spending has almost completely recovered (bottom panel). With entire industries like travel, restaurants and lodging destroyed for the foreseeable future, the political will to unwind these programs completely is likely to be very low, given that most policymakers will be queasy about an economic relapse, even after the worst of the crisis has passed. Such aggressive fiscal stimulus, coupled with extremely easy monetary policy will likely keep inflation robust on a cyclical basis. Global Economy Overview: March-May 2020 will probably prove to be the worst period for the global economy since the 1930s, as a result of the sudden stop caused by the coronavirus pandemic and government-imposed restrictions on movement. As the world slowly emerges from the pandemic, data has started to improve. But there remain many risks, and global activity is unlikely to return to its end-2019 level for at least another two years. That means that further fiscal and monetary stimulus will be required. The speed of the recovery will be partly determined by how much more aggressively central banks can act, and by how much appetite there is among fiscal authorities to continue to bail out households and companies which have suffered a catastrophic loss of income. US: The economy has shown signs of a strong rebound from the coronavirus slump in March and April. Q2 GDP probably fell around 35% quarter-on-quarter annualized, but Q3 will almost certainly show positive growth. The Economic Surprise Index (Chart 18, panel 1) has bounced to a record high, after stronger-than expected May data, for example the 16% month-on-month growth in durable goods orders, and 18% in retail sales. But the next stage of the recovery will be harder: continuing unemployment claims in late June were still 19.5 million. Bankruptcies are rising, and banks are tightening lending conditions. One key will be whether Congress can pass a further fiscal program before the emergency spending runs out in July. Euro Area: Although pandemic lockdowns ended in Europe earlier than in the US, recovery has been somewhat slower. The euro zone PMI rebounded to close to 50 in June but, given that activity had collapsed in February-May, it is surprising (since the PMI measures month-on-month change) that it is not well above 50 (Chart 19, panel 1). Fiscal and monetary stimulus, while large, has not been as aggressive as in the US. The ECB remains circumscribed (as least psychologically) by the German constitutional courtâs questioning the justification for previous QE. Germany and France have agreed a EUR750 billion additional package to help the periphery, but this has still to be finalized, due to the opposition of some smaller northern EU members. Chart 18Economic Data Has Started To Surprise To The Upside... Chart 19...But From Dramatically Low Levels Japan: Although Japan escaped relatively easily from pandemic deaths and lockdowns, its economy remains notably weak. New machinery orders in April were still falling 18% YoY, and exports in May were down 28% YoY. The poor economic performance is due to its dependence on overseas demand, distrust in the government, the lingering effects of the ill-timed consumption tax rise last October, and limited room for manoeuvre by the Bank of Japan. The government has announced fiscal stimulus equal to a barely credible 40% of GDP, but much of this is double-counting, and less than half of the household and small-company income-replacement handouts announced in March have so far been paid out. Emerging Markets: India, Brazil, and other Latin American countries are now bearing the brunt of the coronavirus pandemic. Economies throughout Emerging Markets have weakened dramatically as a result. Two factors may come to their aid, though. China is again ramping up monetary stimulus, with a notable acceleration of credit growth over the past three months. Its economy has stabilized as a result, as PMIs show (panel 3). And the US dollar has begun to depreciate, which will take pressure off EM borrowers in foreign currencies, and boost commodities prices. The biggest risk is that many EM central banks have now resorted to printing money, which could result in currency weakness and inflation at a later stage. Interest Rates: Central banks in advanced economies have lowered policy rates to their effective lower bound. It is unlikely the Fed will cut into negative territory, having seen the nefarious effects of this on the banking systems in Japan and the euro zone, and particularly due to the large money-market fund industry in the US, which is unviable with negative rates. Reported inflation everywhere, both headline and core, has fallen sharply, but this is somewhat misleading since the price of items that households in lockdown have actually been buying has risen sharply. Markets have started to sniff out the possibility of inflation once the pandemic is over, and inflation expectations have begun to rise (panel 4). For now, deflation is likely to be the bigger worry and so we do not expect long-term rates to rise much this year. But a sharp pickup in inflation is a definite risk on the 18-24 month time horizon. Global Equities Chart 20Stretched Valuation Valuation Concern: Global equities staged an impressive rebound of 18% in Q2 after the violent selloff in Q1, thanks to the âwhatever-it-takesâ support from central banks, and massive fiscal stimulus packages around the globe. Within equities, our country allocation worked well, as the US outperformed both the euro Area and Japan. Our sector performance was mixed: The overweight in Info Tech and underweight in Utilities and Real Estate generated good profits, but the overweights in Industrials and Healthcare and the underweight in Materials suffered losses. As shown in Chart 20, even before the pandemic-induced profit contraction, forward earnings were already only flattish in 2019. The sharp selloff in Q1 brought the valuation multiple back down only to the same level as at the end of 2018. Currently, this valuation measure stands at the highest level since the Great Financial Crisis after a 37% increase in Q2 2020 alone. Such a rapid multiple expansion was one of the key reasons why we downgraded equities to Neutral in May at the asset-class level. Going forward, BCAâs house view is that easy monetary policies and stimulative fiscal policies globally will help to revive economic activity, and that a weakening US dollar will give an additional boost to the global economy, especially Emerging Markets. Consequently, we upgrade global Materials to neutral from underweight and put Emerging Market equities (currently neutral) on an upgrade watch (see next page). Warming To Reflation Plays Chart 21EM On Upgrade Watch Taking risk where risks will most likely be rewarded has been GAAâs philosophy in portfolio construction. As equity valuation reaches an extreme level, the natural thing to do is to rotate into less expensive areas within the equity portfolio. As shown in panel 2 of Chart 21, EM equities are trading at a 31% discount to DM equities based on forward P/E, which is 2 standard deviations below the average discount of past three years. Valuation is not a good timing tool in general, but when it reaches an extreme, itâs time to pay attention and check the fundamental and technical indicators. We are putting EM on upgrade watch (from our current neutral stance, and also closing the underweight in Materials given the close correlation of the two (Chart 21, panel 1). Three factors are on our radar screen: First, reflation efforts in China. The change in Chinaâs total social financing as a % of GDP has been on the rise and BCAâs China Investment Strategy Team expects it to increase further. This bodes well for the momentum of the EM/DM performance, which is improving, albeit still in negative territory (panel 3). Second, a weakening USD is another key driver for EM/DM and the Materials sector relative performance as shown in panel 4. According to BCAâs Foreign Exchange Strategy, the US dollar is likely to churn on recent weakness before a cyclical bear market fully unfolds.4 Last but not least, the recent surge in the number of the coronavirus infections in EM economies, especially Brazil and India, has increased the likelihood of a second wave of lockdowns. Government Bonds Chart 22Bottoming Bond Yields Maintain Neutral Duration. Global bond yields barely moved in Q2 as the global economy rebounded from the COVID-induced recession low (Chart 22, panel 1). The upside surprise in economic data releases implies that global bond yields will likely go up in the near term (panel 2). For the next 9-12 months, however, the upside in global bond yields might be limited given the increasing likelihood of a new set of COVID-19 lockdowns due to the recent surge in new infections globally, especially in the US, Brazil, and India. As such, a neutral duration stance is still appropriate (Chart 22). Chart 23Inflation Expectations On The Rise Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. To fight off the risk of an extended recession, policymakers around the world are determined to continue to use aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus to boost the global economy. The combined effect of extremely accommodative policy settings and the rebound in global commodity prices, especially oil prices, will push up inflation expectations (Chart 23). Higher inflation expectations will no doubt push up nominal bond yields somewhat, but according to BCAâs Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS), positioning for wider inflation breakevens remains the âcleanerâ way to profit for the initial impact of policy reflation.5 According to GFIS valuation models, inflation-linked bonds in Canada, Italy, Germany, Australia, France, and Japan should be favored over their respective nominal bonds. Corporate Bonds Chart 24Better Value In A-rated and Baa-rated Credit Investment-grade: Since we moved to overweight on investment-grade credit within the fixed-income category, it has produced 8.8% in excess returns over duration-matched government bonds. We remain overweight, given that the Federal Reserve has guaranteed to rollover debt for investment-grade issuers, essentially eliminating the left tail of returns. Moreover, the Fed has begun buying both ETFs and individual bond issues, in an effort to keep financial stress contained during the pandemic. However, there are some sectors within the investment-grade space that are more attractive than others. Specifically, our Global Fixed Income Strategy team has shown that A-rated and Baa-rated bonds are more attractive than higher-rated credits (Chart 24). Meanwhile, our fixed-income strategist are overweight Energy and Financials at the sector level.6 High-yield: High-yield bonds â where we have a neutral position - have delivered 11.5% of excess return since April. We are maintaining our neutral position. At current levels, spreads no longer offer enough value to justify an overweight position, specially if one considers that defaults in junk credits could be severe, since the Fed doesnât offer the same level of support that it provides for investment-grade issuers. Within the high-yield space, we prefer Ba-rated credit. Fallen angels (i.e. bonds which fell to junk status) are particularly attractive given that most qualify for the Fedâs corporate buying program, since issuers which held at least a Baa3 rating as of March 22 are eligible for the Fedâs lending facilities.7 Commodities Chart 25Commodity Prices Will Rise As Growth Revives Energy (Overweight): A near-complete lack of storage led WTI prices to go into freefall and trade at -$40 in mid-April: The largest drawdown in oil prices over the past 30 years (Chart 25, panel 1). Since then, oil prices have picked up, reaching their pre-âsudden stopâ levels, as the OPEC 2.0 coalition slashed production. Nevertheless, excess supply remains a key issue. Crude inventories have been on the rise as global crude demand weakens. Year-to-date inventories have increased by over 100 million barrels, and current inventories cover over 40 days of supply (panel 2). As long as the OPEC supply cuts hold and demand picks up over the coming quarters, the excess inventories are likely to be worked off. BCAâs oil strategists expect Brent crude to rise back above $60 by year-end. Industrial Metals (Neutral): Last quarter, we flagged that industrial metals face tailwinds as fiscal packages get rolled out globally â particularly in China where infrastructure spending is expected to increase by 10% in the latter half of the year. Major industrial metals have yet to recover to their pre-pandemic levels but, as lockdown measures are lifted and activity is restored, prices are likely to start to rise strongly (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): The merits of holding gold were not obvious during the first phase of the equity sell-off in February and March. Gold prices tumbled as much as 13%, along with the decline in risk assets. Since the beginning of March, however, there have been as many positive return days as there has been negative (panel 4). However, given the uncertainty regarding a second wave of the pandemic, and the rise in geopolitical tensions between the US and China, as well as between India and China, we continue to recommend holding gold as a hedge against tail risks. Currencies Chart 26Momentum For The Dollar Has Turned Negative US Dollar: The DXY has depreciated by almost 3% since the beginning of April. Currently, there are multiple forces pushing the dollar lower: first, interest-rate differentials no longer favor the dollar Second, liquidity conditions have improved substantially thanks to the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus, as well as coordinated swap lines between the Fed and other central banks to keep USD funding costs contained. Third, momentum in the DXY â one of the most reliable indicators for the dollar â has turned negative (Chart 26â top & middle panel). Taking all these factors into account, we are downgrading the USD from neutral to underweight. Euro: The euro should benefit in an environment where the dollar weakens, and global growth starts to rebound. Moreover, outperformance by cyclical sectors as well as concerns about over-valuation in US markets should bring portfolio flows to the Euro area. Therefore, we are upgrading the euro from neutral to overweight. Australian dollar: Last quarter we upgraded the Australian dollar to overweight due to its attractive valuations, as well as the effect of the monetary stimulus coming out of China. This proved to be the correct approach: AUD/USD has appreciated by a staggering 13% since our upgrade â the best performance of any G10 currency versus the dollar this quarter (bottom panel). Overall, while we believe that Chinese stimulus should continue to prop up the Aussie dollar, valuations are no longer attractive with AUD/USD hovering around PPP fair value. This means that the risk-reward profile of this currency no longer warrants an overweight position. Thus, we are downgrading the AUD to neutral. Alternatives Chart 27Opportunities Will Emerge In Private Equity Return Enhancers: Over the past year, we have flagged that hedge funds, particularly macro funds, will outperform other risk assets during recessions and periods of high market stress. This played out as we expected: macro hedge fundsâ drawdown from January to March 2020 was a mere 1.4%, whereas other hedge fundsâ drawdown ranged between 9% and 19% and global equities fell as much as 35% from their February 2020 peak. (Chart 27, panel 1). However, unlike other recessions, the unprecedented sum of stimulus should place a floor under global growth. Given the time it takes to move allocations in the illiquid space, investors should prepare for new opportunities within private equity as global growth bottoms in the latter half of this year. In an earlier Special Report, we stressed that funds raised in late-cycle bull markets tend to underperform given their high entry valuations. If previous recessions are to provide any guidance, funds raised during recession years had a higher median net IRR than those raised in the latter year of the preceding bull market (panel 2). Inflation Hedges: Over the past few quarters, we have been highlighting commodity futures as a better inflation hedge relative to other assets (e.g. real estate). Within the asset class, assuming a moderate rise in inflation over the next 12-18 months as we expect, energy-related commodities should fare best (panel 3). This corroborates with our overweight stance on oil over the next 12 months (see commodities section). Volatility Dampeners: We have been favoring farmland and timberland since Q1 2016. While both have an excel track record of reducing volatility, farmlandâs inelastic demand during slowdowns will be more beneficial. Investors should therefore allocate more to farmland over timberland (panel 4). Risks To Our View The risks are skewed to the downside. After such a big economic shock, damage could appear in unexpected places. Banking systems in Europe, Japan, and the Emerging Markets (but probably not the US) remain fragile. Defaults are growing in sub-investment grade debt; mortgage-backed securities are experiencing rising delinquencies; student debt and auto loans are at risk. Emerging Market borrowers, with $4 trn of foreign-currency debt, are particularly vulnerable. The length and depth of recessions and bear markets are determined by how serious are the second-round effects of a cyclical slowdown. If the current recession really lasted only from March to July, and the bear market from February to March, this will be very unusual by historical standards (Chart 28). Chart 28Can The Recession And Bear Market Really Be All Over Already? Upside surprises are not impossible. A vaccine could be developed earlier than the mid-2021 that most specialists predict. But this is unlikely since the US Food and Drug Administration will not fast-track approval given the need for proper safety testing. If economies continue to improve and newsflow generally remains positive over the coming months, more conservative investors could be sucked into the rally. Evidence suggests that the rebound in stocks since March was propelled largely by hedge funds and individual day-traders. More conservative institutions and most retail investors remain pessimistic and have so far missed the run-up (Chart 29). One key, as so often, is the direction of US dollar. Further weakness in the currency would be a positive indicator for risk assets, particularly Emerging Market equities and commodities. In this Quarterly, we have moved to bearish from neutral on the dollar (see Currency section for details). Momentum has turned negative, and both valuation and relative interest rates suggest further downside. But it should be remembered that the dollar is a safe-haven, counter-cyclical currency (Chart 30). Any rebound in the currency would not only signal that markets are entering a risk-off period, but would cause problems for Emerging Market borrowers that need to service debt in an appreciating currency. Chart 29Many Investors Are Still Pessimistic Chart 30Dollar Direction Is Key Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Webcast, "The Way Ahead For COVID-19: An Expert's Views," available at bcaresearch.com. 2 OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020, available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-outlook/volume-2020/issue-1_0d1d1e2e-en 3 The Overton window, named after Joseph P. Overton, is the range of policies politically acceptable to the mainstream population at a given time. It frames the range of policies that a politician can espouse without appearing extreme. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, âDXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market?â dated June 5, 2020 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, âHow To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectationsâ dated June 23, 2020 available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy, "Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle," dated May 27, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Fallen angels also outperform during economic recoveries. Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Even Fallen Angels Have A Place In Heaven," dated November 15, 2020, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights Recommended Allocation The outlook for markets over the next few months is highly uncertain. On the optimistic side, new COVID-19 cases are probably close to peaking (for now), and so equities could continue to rally. But there are many risks too. Growth numbers will be horrendous for some months. Second-round effects (corporate defaults, problems in EM and with euro zone banks, for example) will emerge. We recommend a balanced portfolio, robust both for risk-on rallies and a further sell-off. We stay overweight equities versus bonds. Government bonds will not provide significantly positive returns even in a severe recession. Thus, over the next 12-months, equities are likely to outperform them. But we leaven the equity overweight with a âminimum volatilityâ strategy, overweight the low-beta US market, and more stable sectors such as Healthcare and Technology. Within bonds, we stay underweight government bonds, and raise Investment Grade credit to overweight, given the Fedâs backstop. Even in a risk-on rally, government yields will not rise quickly so we recommend a neutral stance on duration. The massive stimulus will eventually be inflationary, so we recommend TIPS, which are very cheaply valued. We are overweight cash and gold as hedges against further market turbulence. Among alternatives, macro hedge funds and farmland look attractively defensive now. We would start to look for opportunities in private debt (especially distressed debt) as the recession advances. Commodity futures are attractive as an inflation hedge. Overview Playing The Optionality From the start of the crisis, we argued that markets would bottom around the time when new cases of COVID-19 peaked. At the end of March, there were clear signs that this would happen in April, with Italy and Spain having probably already peaked and the US, if it follows the same trajectory, being only two or three weeks away (Chart 1). Chart 1Close To A Peak In New Cases? But what happens next? A relief rally is likely, as often happens in bear markets â and indeed one probably started with the three-day 18% rise in US equities in the last week of March. Note, for example, the strong rallies in spring 2008 and summer 2000 before the second leg down in those bear markets (Chart 2). Chart 2Mid Bear Market Rallies Are Common However, there is still a lot of potential bad news for markets to digest. Global growth has collapsed, as a result of people in many countries being forced to stay at home. US GDP growth in Q2 could fall by as much as 10% quarter-on-quarter (unannualized). Horrendously bad data will come as a shock to investors over the coming months. Despite the unprecedented stimulus measures from central banks and governments worldwide (Chart 3), nasty second-round effects are inevitable. Given the high level of corporate debt in the US, defaults will rise, to perhaps above the level of 2008-9 (Chart 4). EM borrowers have almost $4 trillion of foreign-currency debt outstanding, and will struggle to service this after the rise in the dollar and wider credit spreads. Euro area banks are poorly capitalized and have high non-performing debt levels left over from the last recession; they will be hit by a new wave of bankruptcies. Undoubtedly, there are some banks and hedge funds sitting on big trading losses after the drastic sell-off and stomach-churning volatility. Mid-East sovereign wealth funds will unload more assets to fill fiscal holes left by the collapsed oil price. Chart 3Massive Stimulus Everywhere Chart 4Possible Second-Round Effects There is also the question of when the pandemic will end. We are not epidemiologists, so find this hard to judge (but please refer to the answers from an authority in our recent Special Report1). The coronavirus will disappear only when either enough people in a community have had the disease to produce âherd immunity,â or there is a vaccine â which is probably 18 months away. Some epidemiologists argue that in the UK and Italy 40%-60% of the population may have already had COVID-19 and are therefore immune.2 But an influential paper from researchers at Imperial College suggested that repeated periods of lockdown will be necessary each time a new wave of cases emerges3 (Chart 5). Chart 5More Waves Of The Pandemic To Come? At the end of March, global equities were only 23% off their mid-February record high â and were down only 34% even at their low point. That doesnât seem like enough to fully discount all the potential pitfalls over coming months. This sort of highly uncertain environment is where portfolio construction comes in. We recommend that clients position their portfolios with optionality to remain robust in any likely outcome. There are likely to be rallies in risk assets over coming months, particularly when the coronavirus shows signs of petering out. There is significant asymmetric career risk for portfolio managers here. No portfolio manager will be fired for missing the pandemic and underperforming year-to-date (though some may because their firms go out of business or retrench). But a PM who misses a V-shaped rebound in risk assets over the rest of the year could lose their job. This will provide a strong incentive to try to pick the bottom. Chart 6Bond Yields Can't Go Much Lower Government bond yields are close to their theoretical lows. The 10-year US Treasury yield is 0.6% and it unlikely to fall below 0% even in a severe recession (since the Fed has stated that it will not cut short-term rates below 0%). In other countries, the low for yields has turned out to be around -0.3% to -0.9% (Chart 6). The total return from risk-free bonds, therefore, will be close to zero even in a dire economic environment (Table 1). This means that the call between bonds and equities comes down to whether equity prices will be higher or lower in 12-months. Quite likely, they will be higher. Given this, and the optionality of participating in rebounds, we maintain our overweight on equities versus bonds. We would, however, be inclined to lower our equity weighting in the event of a big rally in stocks over the next few months. Table 1Not Much Room For Upside From Bonds Table 2Bear Markets Are Often Much Worse But there are also many downside risks. In the past two recessions, global equities fell by 50%-60% (Table 2). Despite the much worse economic environment this time, the peak-to-trough decline is so far much more limited. Moreover, valuations are not particularly compelling yet (Chart 7). To leaven our overall overweight on equities, we recommend a âminimum volatilityâ strategy, with tilts towards the low-beta US market, and some more defensive sectors such as Healthcare and Technology. China and China-related stocks also look somewhat attractive, since that country got over the coronavirus first, and is responding with a big increase in infrastructure spending (Chart 8). To hedge against downside risk, we also leave in place our overweights in cash and gold. Chart 7Equities Are Not Yet Super Cheap Chart 8China Infra Spending To Rise Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking â About The Coronavirus Have We Seen The Bottom In Equity Markets? Chart 9Watch Closely COVID-19 After hitting a low on March 23, global equities have recovered more than one-third of their loss during this particularly rapid bear market, in response to the massive monetary and fiscal stimulus around the globe. Itâs very hard to pinpoint the exact bottom of any equity bear market. The current one is particularly difficult in two ways: First, it was largely due to the exogenous shock from the COVID-19 pandemic. If history is any guide, we will first need to see a peak in infected cases globally before we can call a true bottom in equities (Chart 9). Second, the massive and coordinated response from central banks and governments around the world is unprecedented, as the global âlockdownâ freezes the global economy. Itâs encouraging to see the Chinese PMI bouncing back to 52 in March after a sharp drop to deep contraction level in February. However, the bounce back was mostly from production. Both export orders and imports remain weak. US initial jobless claims have skyrocketed to 3.3 million. If the peak of infection in the US follows similar patterns in China and Italy, then it would be another encouraging sign even if the US economic data continued to get worse. BCA Researchâs base-case is for this recession to have a U-shaped recovery. This means that equity markets are likely to be range bound until we have a better handle on the future course of the pandemic. As such, we suggest investors actively manage risk by adding to positions when the S&P 500 gets close to 2250 and reducing risk when it gets close to 2750 during the bottoming process. What Will Be The Long-Term Consequences? Maybe it seems too early to think about this, but the coronavirus pandemic will change the world at least as profoundly as did the 1970s inflation, 9/11, and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Here are some things that might change: Chart 10Government Debt Will Rise Significantly Government debt levels will rise dramatically, as a result of the huge fiscal packages being (rightly) implemented by many countries. In the US, after the $2 trillion spending increase and a fall in tax revenues, the annual fiscal deficit will rise from 6% of GDP to 15%-20%. Government debt/GDP could exceed the 122% reached at the end of WW2 (Chart 10). Ultimately, central banks will have to monetize this debt, perhaps by capping long-term rates or by buying a substantial part of issuance. This could prove to be inflationary. Households and companies may want to build in greater cushions and no longer live âon the edgeâ. US households have repaired their balance-sheets since 2009, raising the savings rate to 8% (Chart 11). But surveys suggest that almost one-third of US households have less than $1,000 in savings. They may, therefore, now save more. This could depress consumption further in coming years. Companies have maximized profitability over the past decades, under pressure from shareholders, by keeping inventories, spare cash, and excess workers to a minimum. Given the sudden stop caused by the pandemic (and who is to say that there will not be more pandemics in future), companies may want to protect themselves from future shocks. The inventory/sales ratio, which had been falling for decades, has picked up a little since the GFC (Chart 12). Inventory levels are likely to be raised further. Companies may also run less leveraged balance-sheets, rather than hold the maximum amount of debt their targeted credit rating can bear. This is all likely to reduce long-term profit growth. Chart 11Households May Become Even More Cautious Chart 12Companies Will Run With Higher Inventories The pandemic has highlighted the vulnerability of healthcare systems. China still spends only 5% of GDP on health, compared to 9% in Brazil and 8% in South Africa (Chart 13). The lack of intensive care beds and woefully inadequate epidemic plans in the US and other developed countries will also need to be tackled. Healthcare stocks should benefit. Chart 13Healthcare Spending Will Need To Rise How Risky Are Euro Area Banks? Chart 14Euro Area Banks Are Quite Fragile Banks in the euro area have underperformed their developed market peers by over 65% since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Chart 14, panel 1). Their structural issues â many of which we highlighted in a previous Special Report â remain unsolved. Euro area banks remain highly leveraged compared to their US counterparts (panel 2). Their exposure to emerging economies is high (panel 3), and they continue to be a major provider of European corporate funding. US corporates, by contrast, are mainly funded through capital markets. The sector is also highly fragmented with both outward and inward M&A activity declining post the GFC. Profitability continues to be a key long-term concern, despite having recently stabilized (panel 4). The ECBâs ultra-dovish monetary stance and negative policy rates do not help banksâ performance either. Banksâ relative return has been correlated to the ECB policy rate since the GFC (panel 5). Following the coronavirus outbreak, the ECB is likely to remain dovish for a prolonged period. The ECBâs recently announced measures should, however, provide banks with ample liquidity to hold and spur economic activity through increased lending to households and corporates. Absent consolidation in the European banking sector, competition is likely to dampen banksâ profits. Additionally, the severity of the economic downturn caused by the coronavirus outbreak will determine if their significant exposure to emerging economies, the energy sector, and domestic corporates will hurt them further. For now, we would recommend investors underweight euro area banks. Where Can I Get Income In This Low-Yield World? Chart 15The Bear Market Has Unveiled Attractive Income Opportunities For long-term investors who can tolerate price volatility, there is currently an opportunity to invest in high-income securities at relatively cheap prices. Below we list three of our favorite assets to obtain income returns: Dividend Aristocrats: The S&P 500 Dividend Aristocrats Index is composed of S&P 500 companies which have increased dividend payouts for 25 consecutive years or more. In order to provide such a steady stream of income through a such long timeframe, and even provide dividend increases in recessions, the companies in this index need to have a track record of running cashflow-rich businesses. Thus, the risk of dividend cuts is relatively low in these companies. Currently, the Dividend Aristocrat Index has a trailing dividend yield of 3.2% (Chart 15 â top panel). Fallen Angels: As we discussed in our November Special Report, fallen angels have attractive characteristics that separate them from the rest of the junk market. They tend to have longer maturities as well as a higher credit quality than the overall index. Crucially, fallen angels often enter the high-yield index at a discount, since certain institutional investors are forced to sell them when they are no longer IG-rated (middle panel). Thus, selected fallen angels which are not at a substantial risk of default could be a tremendous income opportunity. Currently fallen angels have a yield to worst of 10.65%. Sovereign US dollar EM debt: Our Emerging Markets Strategy service has argued that most EM sovereigns are unlikely to default on their debts, and instead will use their currencies as a release valve to ease financial conditions in their economies. Thus, hard-currency sovereign issues could prove to be attractive income investments if held to maturity. The bottom panel of Chart 15 (panel 3) shows the current yield-to-worst of the EM sovereign hard currency debt that has an overweight rating by our Emerging Markets service. Global Economy Chart 16The Collapse Begins Overview: The global economy in early January looked on the cusp of a strong manufacturing pickup, driven by the natural cycle and by moderate fiscal stimulus out of China. The coronavirus changed all that. We now face a recession of a severity unseen since the 1930s. The fiscal and monetary response has been similarly rapid and radical. This will tackle immediate liquidity and even solvency risks. But, with consumers in many countries confined to their homes, a recovery is entirely dependent on when the number of new cases of COVID-19 peaks. In an optimistic scenario, this might be in late April or May. On a pessimistic one, the pandemic will continue in waves for several quarters. US: It is highly likely that the NBER will eventually declare that the US entered recession in March 2020. With many states in lockdown, consumption (which comprises 70% of GDP) will slump: only half of consumption is non-discretionary (rent, food, utility bills etc.); the other half is likely to shrink significantly while lockdowns continue. Judged by the 3.3 million initial claims in the week of March 16-21, unemployment will jump from its February level of 3.5% very rapidly towards 10%. Fiscal and monetary stimulus measures will cushion the downside (enabling households to pay rent and companies to service debt). But whether the recession is V-shaped or prolonged will be dependent on the length of the pandemic. Euro Area: European manufacturing growth was showing clear signs of picking up before the coronavirus pandemic hit (Chart 16 panel 1). But lockdowns in Italy, Spain and other countries will clearly push growth way into negative territory. The severity is clear from the first datapoints to reflect March activity, such as the ZEW survey. The ECB, after an initially disappointing response, has promised EUR750 billion (and more if needed) in bond purchases. The fiscal response so far has been more lukewarm, although Germany has now scrapped its requirement to run a budget surplus. One key question: will the stronger nothern European economies agree to âeuro bondsâ, joint and severally guaranteed, to finance fiscal spending in the weaker periphery? Chart 17...With Chinese Data Leading The Way Japan: Japanâs economy was performing poorly even before the coronavirus pandemic, mainly because of the side-effects of last Octoberâs consumption tax hike, and the slowdown in China (Chart 17, panel 2). So far, Japan has seen fewer cases of COIVD-19 than other large countries, but this may just reflect a lack of testing. Japan also has less room for policy response. Government debt is already 250% of GDP. The Bank of Japan has moderately increased purchases of equity ETFs and remains committed to maintaining government bonds yields around 0%. But Japan seems culturally and institutionally unable to roll out the sort of ultra-radical measures taken in other developed economies. Emerging Markets: Chinaâs economy was severely disrupted in January and February, as reflected in an unprecedented collapse of the Caixin Services PMI to 26.5 (Chart 17, panel 3). However, big data (such as traffic congestion) suggest that in March people were gradually returning to work and companies restarting manufacturing operations. Q1 GDP growth will clearly be negative, and growth for the year may be barely above 0%. The authorities are ramping up infrastructure spending, which BCA expects to grow by 6-8% this year.4 Interest rates have also fallen below their 2015 levels, but not yet to their 2009 lows. Both fiscal and monetary policy are likely to be eased further. Elsewhere in Emerging Markets, the key question is whether central banks will cut rates to support rapidly weakening economies, or keep rates steady to prop up collapsing currencies. This is not an easy choice. Interest Rates: Central banks in developed markets have cut rates to their lowest possible levels with the Fed, for example, slashing from 1.25%-1.5% to 0%-0.25% within just 10 days in March. The Fed has signalled that it will not go below zero. Short-term policy rates globally, therefore, have essentially hit their lower bounds. Long-term rates have been volatile, with the 10-year US Treasury yield swinging down to 0.6% before jumping to 1.2%. While uncertainty continues, long-term risk-free rates are unlikely to rise substantially and, in the event of a prolonged severe recession, we would see the US 10-year yield falling to zero â but no lower. Global Equities Chart 18Is The V-Shaped Recovery Sustainable? Whatâs Next? Global equities lost 32.8% year-to-date as of March 23, 2020. All countries and sectors in our coverage were in the red. Even the best performing country (Japan) and the best performing global sector (Consumer Staples) lost 26.7% and 23.2% respectively. From March 24 to March 26, however, equities made the best three-day gains since the Great Depression, recouping about one-third of the loss, even though US initial jobless claims came in at 3.3 million and also the US reported a higher number of cumulative infected people than China, with a much higher number of deaths per million people (Chart 18). So have we reached the bottom of the bear market? Is this âV-shapedâ recovery sustainable? How should an investor construct a multi-asset global portfolio thatâs sound for the next 9-12 months given the uncertainty associated with COVID-19 and the massive monetary and fiscal stimulus around the world? Based on our long-held philosophy of taking risks where risks will most likely be rewarded, we are most comfortable taking risk at the asset class level, by overweighting equities versus bonds, together with overweights in cash and gold as hedges. Within the equity portfolio, we are reducing risk by making the following adjustments: Upgrade US to overweight from underweight financed by downgrading the euro zone to underweight from overweight. Upgrade Tech to overweight, while closing two overweight bets on Financials and Energy and one underweight on consumer staples to benchmark weighting. Country Allocation: Becoming More Defensive Chart 19US And Euro Area: Trading Places In December 2019 we added risk by upgrading the euro area to overweight and Emerging Markets to neutral based on our macro view that the global economy was on its way to recovery. Data releases in January did show signs of recovery in the global economy. However, the COVID-19 outbreak has changed the global landscape, and we are clearly in a recession now. When conditions change, we change our recommendations. We must make a judgment call because the economic data will not give us any timely, useful readings for some time to come. Back in December, the key reason to upgrade the euro area was the recovery of China which flows into the exports of the euro area. We think China will continue to stimulate its economy. However, given the global growth collapse, the âflow throughâ effect to the euro area will be delayed for some time. We prefer to play the China effect directly rather than indirectly. Thatâs why we maintain the neutral weighting of EM versus DM, but downgrade the euro area to underweight, and upgrade US to overweight. We also note the two following factors: First, as shown in Chart 19, panel 1, the relative performance between the euro area and the US is highly correlated with the relative performance between global Financials and Technology. This is not surprising given the sector composition of the two regionâs equity indices. As such, this country adjustment is in line with our sector adjustment of upgrading Technology and downgrading Financials. Second, with a lower beta, US equities provide a better defense when economic uncertainty and financial market volatility are high. The risk to this adjustment, however, is valuation. As shown in panel 4, euro area valuation is extremely cheap compared to the US. However, PMI releases as well as forward earnings estimates are likely to get worse again before they get better, given the regionâs reliance on exports to China and the structural issues in its banking system. Global Sector Allocation: Getting Closer To Benchmark Chart 20Reducing Sector Bets We make four changes in the global sector portfolio to reduce sector bets, since we do not have a high conviction given market volatility and our house view that recovery out of this recession will be U-shaped. These are downgrading Financials to neutral, while upgrading Technology to overweight. We also close the overweight in Energy and underweight in Consumer Staples, leaving them both at benchmark weighting. Financials: We upgraded Financials in October last year as an upside hedge. This move did not pan out as bond yields plummeted. BCA Researchâs US Bond Strategy service upgraded duration to neutral from underweight on March 10 as they do not see a high likelihood for yields to move significantly higher over the next 9-12 months. This does not bode well for Financialsâ performance (Chart 20, panel 1). Even though the Fed and other central banks have come in as the lenders of last resort, loan growth could be weak going forward and non-performing loans could increase, especially in the euro area. Valuation, however, is very attractive. Technology: DRAM prices started to improve even before the COVID-19 outbreak. The global lockdown to fight against the pandemic is further spurring demand for both software and hardware, which should support better earnings growth (panel 2). The risk is that relative valuation is still not cheap, even though absolute valuation has come down after the recent selloff. Energy: The outlook for oil prices is too uncertain. The fight between Saudi Arabia and Russia is weighing on the supply side, while the global lockdown is denting demand prospect. The earnings outlook for energy companies is dire, while valuations are very attractive (panel 3). Consumer Staples: This is a classic defensive sector that does well in recessions. In addition, its relative valuation has improved to neutral from very expensive (panel 4). Government Bonds Chart 21Stay Aside On Duration Upgrade Duration To Neutral. Global bond yields had a wild ride in Q1 as equities plummeted into bear market territory. The 10-year US Treasury yield made an historical low of 0.32% overnight on March 9, then quickly reversed back up to 1.27% on March 18, closing the quarter at 0.67%, compared to 1.88% at the beginning of the quarter (Chart 21). We are already in a recession and BCAâs house view is for a U-shaped recovery. This implies that global bond yields will likely follow a bottoming process similar to global equities, as new infections peak and high-frequency economic data start to recover. As such, we upgrade our duration call to neutral, to be in line with the position of BCA Researchâs US Bond Strategy (USBS) service. Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. The combined effect of the plummet in oil prices and the coronavirus outbreak has crushed inflation expectation to an extremely low level. As shown in Chart 22, the 10-year breakeven inflation rate is currently at 0.95%, 88 bps lower than its fair value. The fair value is estimated based on USBSâs Adaptive Expectations Model. Investors with a 12-month investment horizon should continue to favor TIPS over nominal Treasuries, but those with shorter horizons may be advised to stand aside and wait for the daily number of new COVID-19 cases to reach zero before re-initiating the position. Chart 22TIPS Offer A Ton Of Long-Run Value Extremely Cheap Inflation Protection Corporate Bonds Chart 23High Quality Junk It is undeniable that the dearth of cashflow caused by the lockdowns will spur a ferocious wave of defaults, particularly in the high-yield sector. It also is not clear that this risk is adequately compensated for. Currently, our US bond strategist believes that spreads are pricing an 11% default rate â in line with the default rate of the 2000/2001 recession. While it is not our base case, a default cycle like 2008, where 14% of companies in the index defaulted is a very clear possibility, as revenues have ground to a halt. However, several positive factors in the junk space must also be considered. Roughly 1% of the high-yield index matures in less than one year, which means that refinancing risk for junk credits should remain relatively subdued (Chart 23, top panel). Moreover, the quality of junk bonds is relatively high compared to previous periods of stress: when the market peaked in 2000 and 2007, Ba-rated credit (the highest quality of high yield) stood at 30% and 37% of the overall index respectively (middle panel). Today this credit quality stands at 49% of the high yield market, indicating a relatively healthier credit profile for junk. Additionally, the high-risk energy sector, which is likely to experience a substantial amount of defaults given the collapse in oil prices, now represents less than 8% of the market capitalization of the whole index (bottom panel). Taking these positive factors into consideration, we believe that a downgrade to underweight is not warranted, and instead we are downgrading high-yield credit from overweight to neutral. What about the investment-grade space? the massive stimulus package announced by the Fed, which effectively allows IG issuers to roll over their entire stock of debt, should provide a backstop to this market. One valid concern is that credit agencies can still downgrade a large number of issuers, making them ineligible to receive support. However, it seems that the credit agencies are aware of how much hinges on their ratings, and are communicating that they will factor the measures taken by various government programs into their credit analysis.5 Thus, considering that spreads are already extended, the Fed is providing unprecedent support and credit agencies are unlikely to knock out many companies out of investment-grade ratings, we are upgrading investment-grade credit from neutral to overweight. Commodities Chart 24Oil Prices & Politics Do Not Mix Energy (Overweight): Oil markets were driven by supply/demand dynamics until a third factor, politics, shifted the market equilibrium. The recent clash between Saudi Arabia and Russia led to the breakdown of the OPEC 2.0 coalition and to Brent prices tanking by over 60% to $26 in March. The length of this breakdown is unknown. However, we believe the parties are likely to return to the negotiation table within the next months as the damage to countries which are dependent on oil begins to appear. The fiscal budget breakeven point remains much higher than the current oil price â it is around $83 for Saudi Arabia and $47 for Russia. Weakness in global crude demand will continue to put further downward pressure on prices, until economic activity recovers from the COVID-19 slowdown. Our Commodity & Energy Strategists expect the Brent crude oil price to average $36/bbl, with WTI trading some $3-$4 below that, in 2020 (Chart 24, panels 1 & 2). Industrial Metals (Neutral): Industrial metals prices were on track to pick up until the coronavirus hit global activity at the beginning of the year. Prices face further short-term headwinds as global manufacturing remains suppressed. Once the global social distancing ends and activity resumes, industrial metal prices should pick up as fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending, especially in China, is implemented (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): As the coronavirus spread, global risk assets have tumbled. Over the past 12 months, we have recommended investors increase their allocation to gold as both an inflation hedge and a beneficiary of accommodative monetary policy globally. However, we also recently highlighted that gold was reaching overbought territory and that a pullback was possible in the short-term. Nevertheless, investors should continue to maintain gold exposure to hedge against the eventuality that the pandemic is not contained within the coming weeks (panels 4 & 5). Currencies Chart 25Competing Forces Pushing The US Dollar In Different Directions The USD has gone through a rollercoaster during the coronavirus crisis. Initially, the DXY fell by 4.8%, as rate differentials moved violently against the dollar when the Fed cut rates to zero. But this fall didnât last long: as liquidity dried up, the cost for dollar funding surged, causing the dollar to skyrocket by almost 8.3%. Since then, the liquidity measures taken by monetary authorities have made the dollar reverse course once more. At this point there are multiple forces pulling the greenback in opposing directions. On the one hand, the collapse in global growth caused by the shutdowns should push the dollar higher. Moreover, momentum â one of the most reliable directional indicators for the dollar â continues to point to further upside (Chart 25, panels 1 and 2). However, the Fedâs generous USD swap lines with other major central banks as well as the massive pool of liquidity deployed have already stabilized funding costs in European and British currency markets, and look poised to do the same in others (Chart 25, panel 3). Thus, since there is no clarity on which force will prevail in this tug of war, we are remaining neutral on the US dollar. That being said, long-term investors can begin to buy some of the most depressed currencies, such as AUD/USD. This cross is currently trading at a 12% discount to PPP according to the OECD â the steepest discount that this currency has had in 17 years. Additionally, our China Investment Strategy projects that China will accelerate infrastructure investment this year to counteract the negative economic effects of the lockdown. This pick up in investment should increase base-metal demand, proving a boost to the Australian dollar in the process. Alternatives Chart 26Favor Macro Hedge Funds Over Private Equity During Recessions Intro: The coronavirus outbreak caused tremendous market volatility and huge declines in liquid assets. Many clients have asked over the past few weeks which illiquid assets make sense in the current environment. To answer that, we stick to our usual recommendation framework, dividing illiquid assets into three buckets: Return Enhancers: Over the past year, we have been recommending clients to pare back private-equity exposure and increase allocation to hedge funds â particularly macro hedge funds, which often outperform other risky alternative assets during economic slowdowns and recessions (Chart 26, panel 1). Private debt â particularly distressed debt â could become a beneficiary of the current environment. The market turmoil will leave some assets heavily discounted, which can provide an opportunity for nimble funds to make investments at attractive valuations. In a previous Special Report, we highlighted Business Development Companies (BDCs) as a liquid alternative to direct private lending.6 They have taken a hit over the past month, even compared to equities and junk bonds. However, their recovery as markets bottom is usually significant (panels 2 & 3). Inflation Hedges: The coordinated âwhatever-it-takesâ stance implemented by global governments and central banks to mitigate the coronavirus crisis is likely to have inflationary consequences in the long-term. In that environment, investors should favor commodity futures over real estate (panel 4). As global growth reaccelerates in response to stimulus and resumed manufacturing activity over the next 12 months, the USD should weaken, and commodity prices should rise. Volatility Dampeners: Timberland and farmland remain our long-time favorite assets within this bucket. We have previously shown that both assets outperform other traditional and alternative assets during recessions and equity bear markets (panel 5). Farmland particularly should fare well in this environment, being more insulated from the economy, given foodâs inelastic demand Risks To Our View Chart 27Dollar Would Fall In A Strong Recovery Since our recommendations are based on a middle course, hedging both upside and downside risks, we need to consider how extreme these two eventualities could be. On the upside, the most optimistic scenario would be one in which the coronavirus largely disappears after April or May. The massive amount of fiscal and monetary stimulus would produce a jet-fuelled rally in risk assets. The dollar has soared over the past few weeks, as a risk-off currency (Chart 27), and would likely fall sharply. This would be very positive for commodities and Emerging Markets assets. The strong cyclical recovery would also help euro zone and Japanese equities relative to the more defensive US. Value stocks and small caps would outperform. Chart 28Could It Get Worse Than 2008 - Or Even 1932? Downside risks are less easy to forecast. As Warren Buffet wrote in 2002: âyou only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.â The shock to the system caused by the coronavirus is certainly larger than the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-9 and could approach that caused by the Great Depression (Chart 28), though hopefully without the egregious policy errors of the latter. It is hard, therefore, to know where problems will emerge: US corporate debt, EM borrowers, and euro zone banks would be our most likely candidates. But there could be others. The oil price is another key uncertainty. Demand could collapse by at least 10% as a result of the severe recession. The breakdown of the production agreement between Saudi Arabia and Russia could produce a supply increase of 4-5%. Given this, Brent crude would fall to $20 a barrel. That would represent a strong tailwind to global recovery (Chart 29). On the other hand, a rapprochement between Saudi and Russia (and even with regulators in Texas) could push oil prices back up again â a positive for markets such as Canada and Mexico. Chart 29Cheap Oil Boosts Growth Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "Questions On The Coronavirus: An Expert Answers," dated 31 March 2020, available at bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.24.20042291v1 3 https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, âChinese Economic Stimulus: How Much For Infrastructure And The Property Market,â dated 25th March 2020, available at cis.bcaresarch.com 5 A release by Moodyâs on March 25 stated that their actions âwill be more tempered for higher-rated companies that are likely to benefit from policy intervention or extraordinary government support.â 6 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, âPrivate Debt: An Investment Primer,â dated June 6, 2018, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
ãã€ã©ã€ã äžçã®è£œé æ¥ãµã€ã¯ã«ã¯ãŸããªãããã ã«éããå
¬ç®ã倧ãããæ¶è²»ãšãµãŒãã¹ã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠå
調ã§ããä»åŸ12ãæã®æ¯æ°åŸéãªã¹ã¯ã¯äœããããã¯æ ªåŒãåµåžããåŒãç¶ãã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ããããšã瀺åããŠããŸãã ãããããã®æ¥œèŠ³çãªã·ããªãªã«å¯Ÿãããªã¹ã¯ã¯é«ãŸã£ãŠããŸããæ¶è²»è
ä¿¡é Œæã®äœäžãå°æ¿åŠçç·åŒµã®æªåã¯ãªã¹ã¯è³ç£ã«ææãäžããå¯èœæ§ããããŸããæã
ã¯ããããããžããããã«ãã£ãã·ã¥ããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãããŠããŸãã äžåœã¯çŸæç¹ã§ã¯ç©æ¥µçãªéèç·©åã®äœ¿çšã«åã³è
°ã§ããäžåœãåããŸã§ã¯ãæ¯æ°åŸªç°æ§ãäœãç±³åœæ ªåŒåžå Žãã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ããã¯ãã§ãã äžåœãæ¯æ°åºæ¿ãæ¬æ Œåããã補é æ¥ãµã€ã¯ã«ãæ確ã«ããã ãæã£ããšãã«ãæ°èåžå ŽïŒEMïŒããã³æ¬§å·æ ªãžã·ããããå¯èœæ§ããããŸãããã®äžæ¯ããªã¹ã¯ããããžããããã«ãæã
ã¯ãã¡ã€ãã³ã·ã£ã«ãºãæŠè¡çã«ãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããšãããŸãã€ã³ãã¹ããªã¢ã«ãºã®ãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããšãªãŒã¹ãã©ãªã¢ã®ãã¥ãŒãã©ã«ãå確èªããŸãã åµåžå©åãã¯ãªããŠã³ããç¶ç¶ããã¯ãã§ãããã¥ã¬ãŒã·ã§ã³ãã¢ã³ããŒãŠã§ã€ããšããTIPSãåªå
ããŸããã¯ã¬ãžããã¯æ¯æ°åŸªç°ã®èŠç¹ã§ã¯ã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ããã¯ãã§ãããäŒæ¥ã®é«è² åµã¯ãªã¹ã¯ã§ãã®ã§ãã¥ãŒãã©ã«ãæšå¥šããŸãã æšå¥š
ååæããŒããã©ãªãªèŠéãïŒå
šé¢çãªãããž
ååæããŒããã©ãªãªèŠéãïŒå
šé¢çãªãããž
ç¹é æŠèŠ äžå
šã®ãããž äžççµæžã«ãšã£ãŠç¹ã«äžç¢ºå®ãªææã§ãããè³ç£é
åæ
åœè
ã«ãšã£ãŠã¯æ©ãŸããå±é¢ã§ãã補é æ¥ã®æŽ»åã¯ãŸããªãåºæã¡ããã®ãããããšããµãŒãã¹éšéãæ¶è²»ãå·»ã蟌ãã§äžæŒãããã®ããåµåžå©åãã¯åŒ·ããªããŠã³ããç¶ããã®ããç±³é£éŠæºåå¶åºŠçäºäŒïŒFedïŒã¯å©äžããçµäºããã®ããäžåœã¯ä»ãç©æ¥µçã«éèåºæ¿ãæ¡å€§ããã®ããã€ã©ã³ã¯ãµãŠãžã¢ã©ãã¢ãšã®å¯Ÿç«ãæ¿åãããã®ãããã©ã³ã倧統é ã¯æ¬¡ã«äœããã€ãŒãããã®ãã ããããç°å¢ã§ã¯ããŒããã©ãªãªæ§ç¯ã®æè
ãè©ŠãããŸããæã
ã¯ããããã¹ãŠã®åãã«ã€ããŠèŠè§£ãæã£ãŠããŸããã確信床ã¯éåžžããããäœãã§ããæè³å®¶ãåãã¹ã察å¿ã¯ãæãèµ·ãããããªã·ããªãªãã¹ãŠã«ãããŠããŒããã©ãªãªã匷éã§ããããã«è³ç£é
åãèšç»ããããšã§ãã æã
ã¯äžçã®è£œé æ¥ãµã€ã¯ã«ããŸããªãããã ã«éãããšäºæ³ããŠããŸããã°ããŒãã«å
è¡çµæžææšã¯ãã§ã«å埩ããŠãããã°ããŒãã«PMIãåºæã¡ã®å
åã瀺ããŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã 1ïŒãæçæã®å
è¡ææšã§ããã·ãã£ã°ã«ãŒãçµæžãµãã©ã€ãºææ°ã¯ã欧å·ãé€ããã¹ãŠã®å°åã§æè¿æ¥äžæããŸããïŒãã£ãŒã 2ïŒãïŒãµã€ã¯ã«åºã®ãã颚å€ãããªææšã«ã€ããŠã¯ã7ããŒãžã®ã¯ã©ã€ã¢ã³ããå°ããŠããããšãåç
§ããŠãã ãããïŒåºæã¡ã®èŠå ã¯ããã®9ãæéã®éèç°å¢ã®ç·©åã äžåœæé·ã®å®å®åããããŠåçŽã«æéã®çµéã§ãã補é æ¥ãµã€ã¯ã«ã®äžèœå±é¢ã¯å
žåçã«18ãæç¶ãããã®ãµã€ã¯ã«ã¯2018幎äžåæã«ããŒã¯ãã€ããŸããã ãã£ãŒã 1åºæã¡ã®æåã®å
å
åºæã¡ã®æåã®å
ã
åºæã¡ã®æåã®å
ã
ãã£ãŒã 2äºæ³å€ã«åŒ·ããµãã©ã€ãº
é©ãã»ã©åŒ·ããµãã©ã€ãº
é©ãã»ã©åŒ·ããµãã©ã€ãº
åæã«ãåœåµå©åãã¯ããã«äžæäœå°ãããã¯ãã§ããFedã¯ããšäžåºŠå©äžãããå¯èœæ§ããããŸãããç±³åœçµæžã®å
調ããèžãŸãããšãã以äžã«ã¯ãªããªãã§ããããããã¯ãã§ããã¡ã³ãå
ç©ãç¹ã蟌ãã§ããä»åŸ12ãæã®59ããŒã·ã¹ãã€ã³ãã®å©äžããããå°ããå¹
ã§ããæè¿ã®çµæžãµãã©ã€ãºã®æã¡çŽãã¯ãç±³10幎åœåµå©åããå°ãªããšã6ãæåã®æ°Žæºã§ãã2.3ïœ2.4ïŒ
ã«æ»ãããšã瀺åããŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã 3ïŒããã ããäŸãã°ç±³äžè²¿æåè°ã®ç Žç¶»ã®ãããªæ¿æ²»çç·åŒµã®é«ãŸãããããšããã®åãã¯é
ããå¯èœæ§ããããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã 4ïŒã ãã£ãŒã 3é·æéå©ã¯ããã«ãªããŠã³ããž...
é·æéå©ãããã«åçºãž...
é·æéå©ãããã«åçºãž...
ãã£ãŒã 4...ãããå°æ¿åŠçç·åŒµã¯äŸç¶ãªã¹ã¯
...ãããå°æ¿åŠçç·åŒµã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠãªã¹ã¯ã§ãã
...ãããå°æ¿åŠçç·åŒµã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠãªã¹ã¯ã§ãã
ããã¯ãä»åŸæ°ååæã«ãããæ ªåŒãåµåžãã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ãç¶ããå¯èœæ§ãé«ãããšãæå³ããæã
ã¯12ãæã®æè³æéã§ã°ããŒãã«æ ªåŒããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããã°ããŒãã«åµåžãã¢ã³ããŒãŠã§ã€ãã®ç«å Žãç¶æããŠããŸãããã ãããã®æããã·ããªãªã«å¯Ÿãããªã¹ã¯ã¯å¢ããŠããŸããæã
ã¯ç¬¬äºæ¬¡äžç倧æŠä»¥éãã»ãŒ18ãæåã«ã»ãŒãã¹ãŠã®æ¯æ°åŸéãçäžãããŠããã€ãŒã«ãã«ãŒãã®éã€ãŒã«ãåãäŸç¶ãšããŠæžå¿µããŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã 5ïŒã3ãæ/10幎ã®ã«ãŒãã¯ä»å¹Žäžé ã«éã€ãŒã«ãåããŸããããŸãã補é æ¥éšéã®åŒ±ããæ¶è²»è
ä¿¡é Œæãæãªãããšãæžå¿µããŠããŸããããã¯æ¬§å·ãšæ¥æ¬ã«ããã€ãã®å
åããããŸãããç±³åœã§ã¯ãŸã é¡èã§ã¯ãããŸããïŒãã£ãŒã 6ïŒããããã£ãŠå
æãæ¯æ°åŸéã«å¯ŸãããããžãšããŠæã
ã¯ãã£ãã·ã¥ããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãããŸããããªã¹ã¯ïŒãªã¯ãŒãã®èŠ³ç¹ãããåµåžããããã£ãã·ã¥ãããé
åçãªãããžãšã¿ãªããŠããŸãã ãã£ãŒã 5ã€ãŒã«ãã«ãŒãã®ã¡ãã»ãŒãžãç¡èŠã§ããŸããïŒ
ã€ãŒã«ãã»ã«ãŒãããã®ã¡ãã»ãŒãžãç¡èŠã§ããŸããïŒ
ã€ãŒã«ãã»ã«ãŒãããã®ã¡ãã»ãŒãžãç¡èŠã§ããŸããïŒ
ãã£ãŒã 6æ¶è²»è
ä¿¡é Œæã®åŒ±ãã®ããã€ãã®å
å
æ¶è²»è
ä¿¡é Œæã®åŒ±ãŸãã瀺ãããã€ãã®å
å
æ¶è²»è
ä¿¡é Œæã®åŒ±ãŸãã瀺ãããã€ãã®å
å
æã
ã¯ãŸããããŒã¿ãäœãä»å°åã®æ ªåŒã»ã©æ§é çé颚ãå°ãªãç±³åœæ ªåŒãåŒãç¶ããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãããŸãããã ããäžåœã®ãã倧èãªåºæ¿çã®æ©æµãåããã§ããããããæ¯æ°åŸªç°æ§ã®é«ãæ ªåŒåžå Žãžã®åå
¥ãã€ã³ããåŒãç¶ãæ¢ããŠããŸããäžåœã®éèç·©åã¯ãããŸã§ã®æ¯æ°åºæ¿å±é¢ã«æ¯ã¹ãŠãªãæ
éã§ããåœå
掻åãå®å®åãããã«ã¯ããããååã§ããïŒãã£ãŒã 7ïŒãã2016幎ã®ããã«å·¥æ¥çšã³ã¢ãã£ãã£äŸ¡æ Œãæ°èåžå Žè³ç£ããŠãŒãåæ ªåŒã®ã©ãªãŒãåŒãèµ·ããã»ã©ã§ã¯ãããŸãããã°ããŒãã«PMIã®äžæãšäžåœã®ä¿¡çšæé·ã®åŒ·ãŸãã®å
åã¯ãæããã«æ°èåžå Žãšæ¬§å·ãå©ããã§ãããïŒãã£ãŒã 8ïŒããæã
ãå®éã«ããããèµ·ããŠãããšããé«ã確信ãæã€ãŸã§ã¯ãã®åããåãããšã¯ããŸããããã®éã欧å·æ ªãã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ãå§ããå Žåã«æå©ã«ãªãã¯ãã®ãããæã
ã¯äžæ¯ããªã¹ã¯ããããžããç®çã§ã°ããŒãã«ã®éèã»ã¯ã¿ãŒãæŠè¡çã«ãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãã«åŒãäžããŠããŸããä»å¹Žåãã«ã¯ãããç©æ¥µçãªäžåœåºæ¿ã«ããäžæ¯ããªã¹ã¯ããããžããããã«ã€ã³ãã¹ããªã¢ã«ãºããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãããªãŒã¹ãã©ãªã¢æ ªåŒããã¥ãŒãã©ã«ã«åŒãäžããŸããã ãã£ãŒã 7äžåœã®åºæ¿ã¯æé·ãåã«å®å®åãããã ã
äžåœã®æ¯æ°åºæ¿çã¯æé·ãåã«å®å®ãããã ãã«éããªã
äžåœã®æ¯æ°åºæ¿çã¯æé·ãåã«å®å®ãããã ãã«éããªã
ãã£ãŒã 8欧å·ãšæ°èåžå Žã¯æãæ¯æ°åŸªç°çãªåžå Ž
欧å·ãšæ°èåžå Žã¯æãæ¯æ°åŸªç°æ§ã®é«ãåžå Žã
欧å·ãšæ°èåžå Žã¯æãæ¯æ°åŸªç°æ§ã®é«ãåžå Žã
ãã£ãŒã 9åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®æ¥éš°ã¯ãã°ãã°æ¯æ°åŸéã«å
è¡ãã
åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®æ¥éš°ã¯æ¯æ°åŸéã«å
è¡ããããšãå€ãã
åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®æ¥éš°ã¯æ¯æ°åŸéã«å
è¡ããããšãå€ãã
æã
ã®æ¥œèŠ³çãªã·ããªãªã«å¯Ÿããæ倧ã®å°æ¿åŠçãªã¹ã¯ã¯ããµãŠãžã®ç³æ²¹ç²Ÿè£œæœèšãžã®æ»æåŸã®äžæ±æ
å¢ã§ããéå»50幎ã®ãã¹ãŠã®æ¯æ°åŸéã¯ãåæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®å幎åææ¯100ïŒ
ã®æ¥éš°ã«å
è¡ãããŠããŸããïŒãã ãããã®äºæ
ãçŸå®ãšãªãã«ã¯ãã¬ã³ãã幎æ«ãŸã§ã«çŸåšã®61ãã«ãã100ãã«è¶
ãžäžæããå¿
èŠããããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã 9 ãã£ãŒã 10åæ²¹ã®ãªã¹ã¯ãã¬ãã¢ã ã¯äœãããã®ãïŒ
ååæããŒããã©ãªãªèŠéãïŒå
šæ¹äœã®ãããž
ååæããŒããã©ãªãªèŠéãïŒå
šæ¹äœã®ãããž
ã®ã£ãªãŒã»ãšãŽã¡ã³ã¹ãã·ãã¢ã»ãã€ã¹ã»ãã¬ãžãã³ã ããŒãã»ã°ããŒãã«ã»ã¢ã»ããã»ã¢ãã±ãŒã·ã§ã³ã»ã¹ãã©ããžã¹ã garry@bcaresearch.com ã¯ã©ã€ã¢ã³ããå°ããŠããããš äžçæé·ã®åçºã®ã¿ã€ãã³ã°ãå³ãããã«æè³å®¶ã¯ã©ã®å
è¡ææšã泚èŠãã¹ããïŒ ãã£ãŒã 11äžçæé·ã«é¢ããããžãã£ããªã·ã°ãã«
ãŠãŒãåã®è£œé æ¥ã¯åºæã¡ã«è¿ããïŒ äžççµæžã®æé·ã«å¯Ÿããããžãã£ããªã·ã°ãã«
ãŠãŒãåã®è£œé æ¥ã¯åºæã¡ã«è¿ããïŒ äžççµæžã®æé·ã«å¯Ÿããããžãã£ããªã·ã°ãã«
2019幎ã®äžççãªæé·éåã¯ãåµåžã©ãªãŒãšãã£ãã§ã³ã·ãè³ç£ã®ã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ã®äž»èŠå ã§ããããããã£ãŠããã®äžèœããã€å転ãããã®ã¿ã€ãã³ã°ãèŠæ¥µããããšã¯æ¥µããŠéèŠã§ããå転ã¯ãã£ãã§ã³ã·ãããæ¯æ°åŸªç°æ§ã®è³ç£ãžã®ãªãŒããŒã·ããã®äº€ä»£ãããããããã§ããã§ã¯ãã©ã®ããã«ããŠãããè¡ããã以äžã«ãéå»ã«äžççµæžã«é¢ããä¿¡é Œã§ããå
è¡ã·ã°ãã«ãæäŸããŠããæã
ã®ãæ°ã«å
¥ãã®ææšãäžã€æããŸãã ãã£ãªãŒãã¬ãŒãã®ããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ïŒéåžžã«é«ããã£ãªãŒãæã€æ°èåœé貚ã®å¯Ÿåã§ã®ããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ã¯ãäžçæé·ã®å
è¡ææšãšãªãåŸåããããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã 11, ããã«1ïŒãäžè¬ã«ããã£ãªãŒãã¬ãŒãã¯è³éãè±å¯ã ãå©åããäœãåœïŒæ¥æ¬ã®ãããªïŒããã貯èäžè¶³ã§ãªã¹ã¯ã¯é«ããèŠèŸŒã¿åçãé«ãåœãžæµåæ§ãåé
ããŸãããããã®é貚ã®ããžãã£ããªããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ã¯ãäžççãªæµåæ§ã®æ¹åã瀺ãåŸåããããéåžžã¯äžçæé·ãåŸæŒãããŸãã ã¹ãŠã§ãŒãã³ã®åšåº«ãµã€ã¯ã«ïŒã¹ãŠã§ãŒãã³ã®å泚åšåº«æ¯çã¯äžçã®è£œé æ¥ãµã€ã¯ã«ã®å
è¡ææšã§ãïŒããã«2ïŒããªãããã¹ãŠã§ãŒãã³ã¯å°ããªéæŸçµæžã§ãããäžçæé·ã®ãã€ããã¯ã¹ã«éåžžã«ææã§ããããã«ãã¹ãŠã§ãŒãã³ã®èŒžåºã¯äžé財ã«éå¿ã眮ãããŠãããããã¯ã°ããŒãã«ãªãµãã©ã€ãã§ãŒã³ã®æ©ã段éã«äœçœ®ããŸããããã«ããã¹ãŠã§ãŒãã³ã®åšåº«ãµã€ã¯ã«ã¯äžçã®è£œé æ¥ãµã€ã¯ã«ã®è¯ãæ©æã®ããã¡ãŒã¿ãŒãšãªããŸãã G3ã®ããã¿ãªãŒãã¬ã³ãïŒG3ã®å®è³ªçãªãããŒãµãã©ã€è¶
éïŒãããŒãµãã©ã€æé·çãšè²žåºæé·çã®å·®ãšããŠæž¬å®ïŒã¯ãäžçã®å·¥æ¥çç£ã®å
è¡ææšã§ãïŒããã«3ïŒãããŒã¹ãããŒãšé éãæ¢åã®è²žåºããŒã«ã«å¯ŸããŠéè¡ã·ã¹ãã å
ã§ããè±å¯ã«ãªããšãåæ¥éè¡ã®æµåæ§ããžã·ã§ã³ã¯æ¹åããŸããããã«ããéè¡ã¯ããå€ãã®è²žåºæé·ãçã¿åºãçæãåŸãããæçµçã«çµæžæŽ»åã«è¿œã颚ãæäŸããŸãã éèŠãªã®ã¯ãããããã¹ãŠã®å
è¡ææšãäžççµæžã«å¯ŸããŠããžãã£ããªã·ã°ãã«ãéã£ãŠããããšã§ããããã¯ãäžçæé·ã匷ãŸãã«ã€ããŠéå©ã¯äžæãã¹ãã ãšããæã
ã®èŠè§£ãè£ä»ããŸãããããã£ãŠãæè³å®¶ã¯ããŒããã©ãªãªã§æ ªåŒããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããåµåžãã¢ã³ããŒãŠã§ã€ãã®ãŸãŸã«ããŠããã¹ãã§ãã ãŠãŒãåã®éè¡ãè²·ãææãïŒ 2018幎12æã®ãŠãŒãåã®éè¡ã«é¢ããã¹ãã·ã£ã«ã¬ããŒãã§ã¯ããæŽå²çã«ãçžå¯ŸP/Bãã£ã¹ã«ãŠã³ããäžéãã³ãã«éããçžå¯Ÿé
åœå©åããäžéãã³ãã«éãããšããçžå¯Ÿãªã¿ãŒã³ã®åçºãæåŸ
ã§ããããšææããŸããã1 åœæã®æã
ã®æšå¥šã¯ãé·ææè³å®¶ã¯ãã®å°åã®éè¡ãé¿ããã¹ãã ããããæŠè¡çãªæš©éãæã¡ãæ©åçãªã¹ã¿ã€ã«ã®æè³å®¶ã¯è©äŸ¡ææšãå©çšããŠéè¡ãžã®åºå
¥ããçæãã¬ãŒããšããŠãã¿ã€ãã³ã°ãã§ããããšãããã®ã§ããã ãã以éãéè¡ã¯åžå Žå
šäœã10ïŒ
以äžã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ã§ããã«åŒãç¶ãã¢ã³ããŒããã©ãŒã ããçžå¯Ÿçãªè©äŸ¡ææšãããã«æŒãäžããŸãããçŸåšãçžå¯ŸP/Bãšçžå¯Ÿé
åœå©åãã¯ãšãã«ãæŽå²çã«å°ãªããšãçæçãªåçºãäºåããŠãã極端ãªæ°Žæºã«ãããŸãã ãŠãŒãåã®PMIã¯ãŸã 50ãäžåã£ãŠããŸããããŠãŒãåçµæžãä»å¹ŽåŸåã«æã¡çŽãå
åããããããã¯éè¡ã®çžå¯Ÿçãªåçã«ãšã£ãŠããžãã£ãã«ãªãã¯ãã§ãããã§ã«ããã©ã¯ãŒãã®1æ ªåœããå©çïŒEPSïŒæé·ã¯å¹
åºãåžå Žã«å¯ŸããŠå®å®åããŠããŸãïŒãã£ãŒã 12ãããã«4ïŒã ããã«ã2018幎12æåœæã®äž»èŠãªæžå¿µææã®äºã€ã¯ã€ã¿ãªã¢æ¿åºåµåãšéçç·©åïŒQEïŒã®å·»ãæ»ãã§ãããçŸåšãã€ã¿ãªã¢åµåã¯ãã¯ãå±æ©çãªç¶æ³ã«ã¯ãªããECBã¯QEãåéããŠããŸãã ãããã£ãŠãæŠè¡çãªæš©éãæã¡æ©åçã«éçšã§ããæè³å®¶ã¯ãŠãŒãåã®éè¡ãè²·ãïŒãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãïŒã¹ãã§ããé·ææè³å®¶ã¯æ§é çãªåé¡ãæ®ã£ãŠãããããäŸç¶ãšããŠãã®ãããªçæãã¬ãŒãã¯é¿ããã¹ãã§ãã ãã£ãŒã 12æŠè¡çã«ãŠãŒãåã®éè¡ãã¢ããã°ã¬ãŒã
æŠè¡çã«ãŠãŒãåã®éè¡ãæ Œäžã
æŠè¡çã«ãŠãŒãåã®éè¡ãæ Œäžã
éçžå Žã®äžæã¯çµãã£ãã®ãïŒ ã¹ãããéäŸ¡æ Œã¯å¹Žåæ¥ã§17%äžæããŠããããã®èæ¯ã«ã¯äžççãªæé·éåããã掟ã«åŸããäžå€®éè¡ããããŠé«ãŸãæ¿æ²»çç·åŒµããããæè³å®¶ã¯ä»ãéã®ãšã¯ã¹ããŒãžã£ãŒãåæžãã¹ãã ããããåžžèçã«ã¯ãããã¹ãã ãããããããä»åã¯éåžžã®ææã§ã¯ãªãã çæçã«ã¯ããã¯ãã«ã«é¢ã§ã®è²·ããéããšè¡ãéããããžãã£ããªã»ã³ãã¡ã³ãã®ããã«äžéšå©ç確å®ãå
¥ããéäŸ¡æ Œã¯äžæŒããåããå¯èœæ§ãããïŒãã£ãŒã13ãããã«1ïŒãããã«ãä»å¹Žã®éäŸ¡æ Œã®åãã¯äžå€®éè¡ã®ç·©åæåŸ
ã®é«ãŸãã«ãããšããã倧ããïŒããã«2ïŒãä»åŸãåžå Žã¯å©äžããéå®çã«ãšã©ãŸãããšã«å€±æããå¯èœæ§ãããããããéã®äžèœå§åãšãªãåŸããšäºæ³ããã ä»æ¹ã§ãçŸåšäžçã®åµåã®çŽ27%ãããªãã¡14.9å
ãã«ããã€ãã¹å©åãã§ãããããæè³å®¶ã¯æ¬¡åã®è³ç£ã§ããå©åããŒãã®éãžåŒãç¶ãã·ããããŠããã ããïŒããã«3ïŒãäžå€®éè¡ãšæè³å®¶ã®åæ¹ã«ããããæ°å¹Žã®éä¿æå¢å ïŒããã«4ã»5ïŒããããããæããã§ãããæè³å®¶ããã€ãã¹å©åããåé¿ãè³æ¬ä¿å
šã«éç¹ã眮ãåããç¶ãéãããã®åŸåã¯æç¶ãããšèŠãŠããã 幎å以æ¥ãå°æ¿åŠçç·åŒµã¯åŒ·ãŸã£ãŠããïŒç±³äžéã®ç¶ç¶ããã決å®çã§ãªã貿æ亀æžããããªãé¢çšã®å®æœããã¬ã°ãžããã®äžç¢ºå®æ§ããããŠäžæ±ã§ã®æè¿ã®è»äºæ»æïŒããã«6ïŒããã®ãããªç°å¢ã¯éäŸ¡æ ŒãæŒãäžãç¶ããã¯ãã ã æã
ã¯åŒãç¶ããä»åŸ12ãæã§å éãããšèŠãŠããã€ã³ãã¬ã«å¯ŸãããããžãšããŠããŸãäžçæé·ãå°æ¿åŠçç¶æ³ã®ãããªãæªåã«å¯ŸãããããžãšããŠéãæšå¥šããã Chart 13Gold: Sell Or Hold?
ãŽãŒã«ãïŒå£²åŽãä¿æãïŒ
ãŽãŒã«ãïŒå£²åŽãä¿æãïŒ
楜芳çã·ããªãªãžã®ãªã¹ã¯ã¯é«ãŸã£ãŠãããæã
ã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠéã€ãŒã«ãæ²ç·ãæžå¿µããŠãããéã€ãŒã«ãæ²ç·ã¯ç¬¬äºæ¬¡äžç倧æŠä»¥éã®ãã¹ãŠã®æ¯æ°åŸéãæ£ç¢ºã«äºæž¬ããŠããã éå©ã¯ã©ããŸã§äžããåŸããïŒ ãŒãäžéã¯éå»ã®ãã®ã ãå
æããã³ããŒã¯äžå€®éè¡ã¯éå©ã-0.75%ã«åŒãäžããã¹ã€ã¹ã®10幎åœåµã¯äž»èŠåœãšããŠæŽå²çæäœæ°Žæºã®-1.12%ã«éããã次ã®æ¯æ°åŸéã«ãããŠãçè«äžéå©ã¯ããã«ã©ããŸã§äžèœãåŸãã ãããïŒ å人ã«ãšã£ãŠãçŽå¹£ã®ä¿ç®¡ã³ã¹ããçŸééå©ã®äžéãå¶çŽããå¯èœæ§ããããçŽå¹£èªäœã¯å©åããŒãã ããã ïŒæ¿åºãçŸéãçŠæ¢ããæ¹æ³ã幎äŒè²»ã課ãæ¹æ³ãèŠåºããªãéãïŒãéè¡ã®è²žé庫ã¯å¹ŽéçŽ300ãã«ããŸã100äžãã«ãä¿ç®¡ããã®ã«ååãªããçšé庫ïŒ100ãã«æã®å±±ã§31 x 55 cmãéãçŽ10kgïŒã¯èšçœ®è²»ãå«ãçŽ2,000ãã«ã§ãããåŸè
ã10幎ã§ååŽããã°ã100äžãã«ã®ä¿ç®¡ã³ã¹ãã¯å¹ŽççŽ0.2%ã0.3%ã«ãªããã¹ã€ã¹ãã©ã³çŽå¹£ïŒæé«é¡é¢CHF1,000ïŒã¯ä¿ç®¡ã³ã¹ããããäœããªãã ãããããããçŸç©éã®ä¿ç®¡ã³ã¹ãã¯å¹ŽççŽ2%ã§ããã éå©ããããäžåã£ãŠããå Žåãä»ã®å¶çŽãååšããã¯ãã ãå人ãçŸéãä¿ç®¡ããããšã¯å±éºã§ããã確å®ã«éåžžã«äžäŸ¿ã§ããïŒçšéã®æ¯æãã®ããã«çŸéãéè¡ã«éã°ãªããã°ãªããªãããšãæ³åããŠã¿ãŠã»ããïŒããŸããäŸãã°10åãã«ïŒéã10ãã³ïŒãä¿ç®¡ããå人ãäŒæ¥ã®ã³ã¹ãã¯ã¯ããã«é«ããªãã ãããäœéå©åœã®æŽå²ãèžãŸãããšïŒãã£ãŒã14ãããã«1ïŒãçŸéä¿æè
ãæ¿åºçæåµã®éè¡é éã®ä»£æ¿ã暡玢ãå§ããæ°Žæºã¯æŠã-1%ååŸã ãšæã
ã¯èããŠããã Chart 14How Low Can They Go?
ã©ããŸã§äžããã®ãïŒ
ã©ããŸã§äžããã®ãïŒ
Chart 15Yield Curves When Rates Are At Zero Or Below
éå©ããŒã以äžã®ãšãã®ã€ãŒã«ãã«ãŒã
éå©ããŒã以äžã®ãšãã®ã€ãŒã«ãã«ãŒã
é·æåŽã§ã¯ãçæéå©ããŒããŸãã¯ãã€ãã¹ã®ãšãã«ã€ãŒã«ãã«ãŒãã倧ããé転ããããšã¯éåžžãªãïŒãã£ãŒã15ïŒãä»å¹Žåãã«ã¹ã€ã¹ã§èŠ³æž¬ããã3ãæ/10幎ã®æ倧éã€ãŒã«ãã¯-0.05%ã ã£ãã ãããã£ãŠãã©ãã§ãã10幎åµã®çµ¶å¯Ÿçãªæäœæ°Žæºã¯ãããšãå³ããæ¯æ°åŸéã®åªäžã§ãã£ãŠãæŠã-1.1%ä»è¿ã§ããããšãã瀺åã«ãªãã ããã¯è³ç£é
åæ
åœè
ã«ãšã£ãŠã®æžå¿µææã ãçŸåšã®æ°ŽæºïŒã¹ã€ã¹-0.8%ïŒããã¹ã€ã¹åœåµãåãåŸãæ°åŠçæ倧äžæå¹
ã¯3%ã§ããããã€ãåœåµïŒçŸ-0.5%ïŒã§ã¯5%ã§ãããããã¯ããŸãæå¹ãªãããžãšã¯èšããªããç±³åœã ããçžå¯Ÿçã«æå©ã«èŠããïŒ10幎ç©ç±³åœåµå©åãã0%ã«äœäžããå ŽåãããŒã¿ã«ãªã¿ãŒã³ã¯18%ã«ãªãã äžççµæž Chart 16U.S. Growth Remains Solid
ç±³åœã®æé·ã¯å
調ãç¶æ
ç±³åœã®æé·ã¯å
調ãç¶æ
æŠèŠ³ïŒäžççã«ç£æ¥éšéã®æé·ã¯åŒ±ããå€ãã®åœã§è£œé æ¥PMIã50ãäžåã£ãŠãããããããæ¶è²»ãšãµãŒãã¹ã¯ã»ãŒãã¹ãŠã®å°åã§æã¡å ªããŠããã補é æ¥æ¯éã®é«ããŠãŒãåã§ãäŸå€ã§ã¯ãªãã補é æ¥ã®åºæã¡ã®å
ããæç¶çã«èŠãããããæ¬æ Œçãªå埩ã¯äžåœã«ããããããªãéèç·©åã®èŠæš¡ã«äŸåããã ãããäžåœåœå±ã¯2016幎ã«è¡ã£ãã»ã©ã®å€§èŠæš¡ãªç·©åãå±éããããšã«ã¯æ
éãªå§¿å¢ã厩ããŠããªãããã ã ç±³åœïŒç±³åœã®è£œé æ¥ã¯æ¢ã«äžçã®ä»å°åã«ç¶ããŠåçž®å±é¢ã«å
¥ã£ãŠãããISM補é æ¥æ¯æ³ææ°ã¯8æã«50ãäžåã£ãïŒãã£ãŒã16ãããã«2ïŒãããããæ¶è²»ãšãµãŒãã¹ã¯æŠã奜調ãç¶æããŠãããéçšã¯æ¡å€§ãç¶ããŠããïŒãã ãæšå¹ŽããããéãããŒã¹ã§ãæ±è·è
äžè¶³ãäžå ãããããªãïŒã解éã®å¢å ã¯èŠããããæ¶è²»è
ä¿¡é Œæã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠæŽå²çé«æ°Žæºã«è¿ãïŒ9æã«ãããã«äœäžããïŒãäœå®
ã¯æšå¹Žã®æžéåŸã«å埩ããŠãããæè¿ã®è°äŒã§ã®äºç®åæã«ããä»åŸ12ãæã¯è²¡æ¿æ¿çãããæ¡åŒµçã«ãªãèŠèŸŒã¿ã ãèšåæè³ïŒããã«5ïŒã®ã¿ãã貿ææŠäºãå·¡ãäžç¢ºå®æ§ã®ããã«äŒæ¥ãæè³å€æãå
éãããŠãã圱é¿ã§éåããŠãããã³ã³ã»ã³ãµã¹ã¯ä»å¹Žã®ç±³åœå®è³ªGDPæé·çã2.2%ãšèŠèŸŒãã§ãããå€ãã®æœåšæé·çã®æšå®ãäžåã£ãŠããã ãŠãŒãåïŒè£œé æ¥ã®æ¯éãé«ãããã欧å·ã®æé·ã¯ç±³åœãã匱ãã補é æ¥PMIã¯2æ以æ¥50ãäžåãã8æã«ã¯ããã«45.6ã«äœäžãããé±å·¥æ¥çç£ã¯å幎æ¯ã§2%çž®å°ããŠãããã€ã¿ãªã¢ã¯2ååæã®ãã€ãã¹æé·ãçµéšããŠããããã€ãã第3ååæã«ãã¯ãã«ã«ãªã»ãã·ã§ã³ã«å
¥ãå¯èœæ§ãããïŒç¬¬2ååæã¯GDPã0.1%çž®å°ããïŒããããã補é æ¥ã®åºæã¡ã®å
åã¯æç¶çã«èŠãããïŒäŸãã°9æã®ZEW調æ»ã¯äžæ¯ãã®ãµãã©ã€ãºãšãªã£ãããŸããç±³åœåæ§ã«æ¶è²»ã¯åŒ·ãã補é æ¥æ¯éã®é«ããã€ãã§ãéçšã¯å¢å ãç¶ãã7æã®å°å£²å£²äžé«ã¯å幎åææ¯ã§4.4%å¢ã ã£ããäžæ¹ãè±åœã§ã¯ãã¬ã°ãžãããå·¡ãäžç¢ºå®æ§ãäŒæ¥ã®æè³ãæãªã£ãŠããããéçšã¯å
調ã§ããã2 Chart 17First Signs Of A Rebound In The Rest Of The World?
äžçã®ãã®ä»å°åã§åçºã®å
åãèŠãå§ãããïŒ
äžçã®ãã®ä»å°åã§åçºã®å
åãèŠãå§ãããïŒ
æ¥æ¬ïŒæ¶è²»ã¯æ¢ã«äœäžããŠããã10æã«äºå®ãããæ¶è²»çšçã®åŒãäžãåã§ããèœã¡èŸŒãã§ããã7æã®å°å£²å£²äžé«ã¯å幎æ¯ã§2%æžå°ããè³éã®ãã€ãã¹æé·ãšæ¶è²»è
ã»ã³ãã¡ã³ãã®5幎ã¶ãã®äœæ°Žæºãžã®äœäžãåå ã§ããã補é æ¥ã¯äžåœã®æžéãšåŒ·ãåïŒéå»12ãæã§6%äžæïŒã®åœ±é¿ãåãç¶ããŠããã茞åºã¯6%æžãé±å·¥æ¥çç£ã¯éå»3ãæã§å幎æ¯2%æžå°ããŠãããæ¶è²»çšçåŒäžãã®åœ±é¿ã¯èªåè»çšã®è»œæžãé«æ ¡æè²ã®ç¡ååãšãã£ãæ¿åºã®æªçœ®ã«ããç·©åãããå¯èœæ§ãããããäžåœæé·ã®å埩ã茞åºãæŒãäžããã ããããããã掻åã®åºæã¡ã®å
åã¯ãŸã ä¹ããã æ°èåžå ŽïŒäžåœã®æé·ã¯å®å®åããŠããããã«èŠãã補é æ¥ã»é補é æ¥ã®äž¡PMIã50ãäžåã£ãŠããïŒãã£ãŒã17ãããã«3ïŒãããããæ¯æ³æã¯è匱ã§ãå°å£²å£²äžé«ã®äŒžã³ã¯20幎ã¶ãã®äœæ°Žæºã«éåããèªåè»è²©å£²ã¯8æã«7%æžå°ãããããã¯æ°æåºåºæºé©åè»ã®å°å
¥ã«ããããããã§ãããåœå±ã¯è¿œå ã®ç·©åçïŒ9æã®é éæºåçã®è¿œå åŒãäžããå«ãïŒã§å¯Ÿå¿ãããã2016幎ã®ãããªæ¬æ Œçãªéèåºæ¿ãå床å®æœããããšã«ã¯æ¶æ¥µçãªããã ãä»ã®æ°èåœã§ã¯ãæ§é çãªåé¡ãæ±ããåœã§æé·ãéåããŠããïŒã¢ã«ãŒã³ãã³ã®ææ°ã®å幎æ¯å®è³ªGDPæé·çã¯-5.7%ããã«ã³ã¯-1.5%ãã¡ãã·ã³ã¯-0.8%ïŒããä»æ¹ã§æ¯èŒçå
調ãªã®ã¯ã€ã³ã5%ãã€ã³ããã·ã¢5%ãããŒã©ã³ã4.2%ãã³ãã³ãã¢3.4%ã§ããã éå©ïŒã»ãŒãã¹ãŠã®äžå€®éè¡ããã掟ã«è»¢ããŠãããFRBã¯2åç®ã®å©äžããè¡ããECBã¯è³ç£è²·å
¥ããåéããæ¥éã¯10æã«ç·©åã瀺åããããããããããªãéèç·©åã¯åžå Žã®æåŸ
ãããå°å¹
ã«ãšã©ãŸãå¯èœæ§ãé«ããFRBã¯ä»åã®å©äžããäžéçãªä¿®æ£ã«éããªããšç€ºããè¿œå ç·©åã¯èãã«ãããšç€ºåãããECBãšæ¥éã«ã¯å©çšå¯èœãªæ段ãã»ãšãã©æ®ã£ãŠããªããæé·ã®åºæã¡ã®å
ããšãäžå€®éè¡ã®ãã掟転æãçµç€ã«å·®ãæãã£ãŠãããšããåžå Žã®ç解ãèžãŸããæ¢ã«ç±³åœã§1.45%ãã9æã«1.72%ãžãšäžæããŠããé·æéå©ã¯ããã«äžæããå¯èœæ§ãé«ããæè³å®¶ã¯ãŸããç±³åœã®ã€ã³ãã¬ã«æ³šææ·±ã泚èŠãã¹ãã§ãããåºèª¿ã®åŒ·ãã瀺ãå
åããããã³ã¢CPIã¯8æã«å幎æ¯2.4%äžæããŠããïŒéå»3ãæã®å¹Žçæç®ã§ã¯æ倧3.4%ã«éããïŒã äžçæ ªåŒ Chart 18Has Earnings Growth Bottomed?
å©çã®äŒžã³ã¯åºãæã£ããïŒ
å©çã®äŒžã³ã¯åºãæã£ããïŒ
äŸç¶ãšããŠæ
éã ããäžæ¹ãªã¹ã¯ã«å¯Ÿãããããžãè¿œå ïŒå°æ¿åŠçãªã¹ã¯ã匱ãŸãçµæžææšãšãã£ããããã©ã€ã³ãªã¹ã¯ã«ãããããããã°ããŒãã«æ ªåŒã¯ç¬¬3ååæã«8ããŒã·ã¹ãã€ã³ãã®å°å¹
ãªæ倱ã«ãšã©ãŸã£ãïŒãã£ãŒã18ïŒãç·ããŠãæã
ã®ãã£ãã§ã³ã·ããªåœå¥é
åã¯ç¬¬3ååæã«ããæ©èœãããå
é²åœïŒDMïŒæ ªåŒã¯æ°èåœïŒEMïŒã4.5%äžåããç±³åœã¯ãŠãŒãåã2.8%äžåã£ãã ãã ãã»ã¯ã¿ãŒé
åã¯æåŸ
éãã«ã¯ãããªãã£ãããŠãŒãã£ãªãã£ãŒãšç掻å¿
éåã®ã¢ã³ããŒãŠã§ã€ããããã³è³æ¬è²¡ããšãã«ã®ãŒããã«ã¹ã±ã¢ã®ãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãããã¹ãŠéæ¹åã«åããããã§ããããšã¯ãããããªã¢ã«ã®ã¢ã³ããŒãŠã§ã€ããæ倱ã®äžéšãçžæ®ºããã®ã«å¯äžããã ååæã®éãåµåžå©åãã®å€§ããªå€åã«åãããŠãã°ããŒãã«æ ªåŒã®äžçã§ã¯ã»ã¯ã¿ãŒããã³åœå¥ã®ããŒããŒã·ã§ã³ãæ確ã«èŠãããã9æã«ã¯å
é²åœïŒæ°èåœãç±³åœïŒãŠãŒãåãæ¯æ°åŸªç°æ ªïŒãã£ãã§ã³ã·ãæ ªã§äžéšã®å転ã確èªãããã ä»åŸã«ã€ããŠãBCAã®ããŠã¹ãã¥ãŒã¯äžççµæžæé·ãããæ°ãæã®ãã¡ã«å埩ãå§ãããšããèŠæ¹ãç¶æããŠãããã以åã«äºæ³ããããããé
ãããšäºæ³ããŠããããããã£ãŠãæã
ã®ãã£ãã§ã³ã·ããªåœå¥é
åã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠé©åã ã4æã«ãŠãŒãåãšæ°èåœæ ªãã¢ããã°ã¬ãŒãç£èŠãªã¹ãã«å
¥ããããäžççãªå埩ã®é
ãã¯ãŸã ãã®å€æãçºåããæã§ã¯ãªãããšã瀺ããŠããã3 æã
ã¯åµåžå©åããåºãæã£ããšã®èŠæ¹ãæã£ãŠãããã4ãã°ããŒãã«ã®ã»ã¯ã¿ãŒé
åã§1ã€èª¿æŽãè¡ããéèã»ã¯ã¿ãŒããã¥ãŒãã©ã«ãããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããžæ Œäžããããè³éã¯ãã«ã¹ã±ã¢ã®ããã«ãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããååã«ããŠãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãã«åæžããããšã§è³ãïŒè©³çŽ°ã¯æ¬¡ããŒãžåç
§ïŒããã®èª¿æŽã¯ã1) ãŠãŒãåãç±³åœãã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ããå Žåã2) ä»åŸã®ç±³åœå€§çµ±é éžã§ãšãªã¶ãã¹ã»ãŠã©ãŒã¬ã³ãåå©ããå Žåããšããäºã€ã®å¯èœæ§ã«å¯Ÿãããããžã«ããªãã5 ã°ããŒãã«éèæ ªããã¥ãŒãã©ã«ãããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããžæ Œäžã Chart 19Upgrade Global Financials
ã°ããŒãã«ã»ãã¡ã€ãã³ã·ã£ã«ãºãã¢ããã°ã¬ãŒã
ã°ããŒãã«ã»ãã¡ã€ãã³ã·ã£ã«ãºãã¢ããã°ã¬ãŒã
ã°ããŒãã«ã®éèæ ªã®ç·æ ªåŒåžå Žã«å¯Ÿããçžå¯Ÿããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ã¯ãã°ããŒãã«åµåžå©åãã®åãã«å€§ãã圱é¿ãåããŠããïŒChart 19ãããã«1ïŒã9æã«åµåžå©åããæ¥å転ããã®ã«äŒŽããéèæ ªã®çžå¯Ÿããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ãå転ããããã ããè¿å¹Žã«ãããéèæ ªãå¹
åºãåžå Žã«å¯ŸããŠå€§ããã¢ã³ããŒããã©ãŒã ããŠããããšããããã£ãŒãäžã§ã¯ã»ãšãã©èŠããªãã åµåžå©åãã®æ¥å転ãã©ã®çšåºŠæç¶ãããã¯æ確ã§ã¯ãªãããBCAã®ããŠã¹ãã¥ãŒã§ã¯ä»åŸ9ïœ12ãæã§åµåžå©åãã¯äžæãããšèŠãŠããããããã£ãŠã以äžã®è¿œå çãªçç±ã«ããéèæ ªããã¥ãŒãã©ã«ãããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ããžæ Œäžãããã ããªã¥ãšãŒã·ã§ã³ã¯ããã«2ã«ç€ºãããŠããããã«éåžžã«é
åçã§ãããããã«éèŠãªã®ã¯ãçžå¯Ÿããªã¥ãšãŒã·ã§ã³ãçŸåšãæŽå²çã«éèæ ªã®çžå¯Ÿããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ã®åçºãäºåããŠãã極端ãªæ°Žæºã«ããããšã§ããã ããŒã³ã®è³ªãæ¹åããŠãããç±³åœã®äžè¯åµæš©ïŒNPLïŒæ¯çã¯äžçéèå±æ©ïŒGFCïŒåã«éããåºã«è¿ã¥ããŠãããã¹ãã€ã³ãã€ã¿ãªã¢ã«ãããŠãNPLæ¯çã¯å€§å¹
ã«äœäžããŠããããGFCåã®æ°Žæºããã¯äŸç¶é«ããŸãŸã§ããïŒããã«3ïŒã ç±³åœã®æ¶è²»ã¯å
調ã§ãäœå®
ã¯å埩ããããŒã³éèŠã¯åŒ·ãŸã£ãŠããïŒããã«4ïŒãã·ãã£ã»ãšã³ãããã¯ã»ãµãã©ã€ãºã»ã€ã³ããã¯ã¹ãªã©ã®ããŒã¿ãšäžèŽããŠãããçµæžææšãåºå
¥ãããå¯èœæ§ã瀺åããŠããã ãã®æ Œäžããè³éç¹°ãããããããã«ã¹ã±ã¢ã®ããã«ã»ãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãã«åŒãäžãããããã¯ãæ¥å¹Žã®ç±³å€§çµ±é éžã§ãšãªã¶ãã¹ã»ãŠã©ãŒã¬ã³ãåå©ãå»è¬åäŸ¡æ ŒèŠå¶ãå³æ Œåãããªã¹ã¯ãžã®ãããžã§ããã åœåµ ãã¥ã¬ãŒã·ã§ã³ã¯ããã¢ã³ããŒãŠã§ã€ããç¶æã 第3ååæã®æåã®2ãæéãæã
ã®ãã³ãããŒã¯æ¯ãã¥ã¬ãŒã·ã§ã³çž®å°ã®å€æã¯ã°ããŒãã«åµåžåžå Žã«ãã£ãŠå€§ããè©Šããããç±³åœã®10幎ç©åœåµå©åãã¯9æ3æ¥ã«1.43%ãä»ããããããã¯ç±³åœã®ISM補é æ¥ææ°ãäºæ³ãäžåã£ãããšãåãããã®ã§ãåååææ«ã®æ°Žæºãã57ããŒã·ã¹ãã€ã³ãäœãã2016幎7æ6æ¥ã«èšé²ããæŽå²çäœæ°Žæº1.32%ããããã«äžåãæ°Žæºã ã£ãããã ãã9æ5æ¥ä»¥éã®åµåžå©åãã®åçºã¯ãç±³äžè²¿ææ¿çã®èµ·äŒã ãã§ãªããChart 20ã«ç€ºãããéãçµæžææšã®ãµãã©ã€ãºãããžãã£ãã ã£ãããšã«ãçœåŒãããŠããã BCAã®ã°ããŒãã«ã»ãã¥ã¬ãŒã·ã§ã³ã»ã€ã³ãžã±ãŒã¿ãŒã¯ãåœç€Ÿã®ã°ããŒãã«ã»ãã£ã¯ã¹ãã»ã€ã³ã«ã ã»ã¹ãã©ããžãŒããŒã ãè€æ°ã®å
è¡çµæžææšãçšããŠæ§ç¯ãããã®ã§ãä»åŸäžççã«å©åãäžæã瀺åããŠãããæè³å®¶ã¯ä»åŸ9ïœ12ãæéããã¥ã¬ãŒã·ã§ã³ãããã¢ã³ããŒãŠã§ã€ãã§ç¶æãã¹ãã§ããã åç®åµããã€ã³ãã¬é£ååµãåªå
ã ã°ããŒãã«ã®ã€ã³ãã¬æåŸ
ããååæã®æåã®2ãæéã«ç¶ããäžéãã¬ã³ãã®åŸã«åçºããŠãããããã¯äž»ã«8æã«ã³ã¢CPIãã³ã¢PCEãå¹³åæ絊ãšãã£ãå®çŸã€ã³ãã¬ææšãå éããããšãåæ ããŠãããå ããŠãæŽå²çã«åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã®å€åã¯ã€ã³ãã¬æåŸ
ãšè¯å¥œãªçžé¢ãæã€åŸåãããããµãŠãžã¢ã©ãã¢ã®ç³æ²¹çç£æœèšãžã®æ»æãåããŠåæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã¯äžæ20%æ¥éš°ãããäžæ±ã®å°æ¿åŠçç·åŒµãã©ã®ããã«é²å±ãããã¯äžéæã ãããµãŠãžåŽã䞻匵ããããã«å€±ãããçç£ã®70%ã埩æ§ã§ãããšä»®å®ãããšãOPECã®äœå°çç£èœåïŒæ¥éçŽ180äžãã¬ã«ïŒãåžå Žã®åè¡¡ãä¿ã¡ãæ®ã倱ãããçç£ãã«ããŒã§ããã¯ãã§ããã幎æ«ãŸã§åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã暪ã°ãã§æšç§»ãããšããä¿å®çãªåæã§ããã€ã³ãã¬æåŸ
ã¯ã¯ããã«é«ãŸãæ¹åã«ããããããåç®åµããã€ã³ãã¬é£ååµãæ¯æããæ ¹æ ãšãªããæ¥æ¬ããã³ãªãŒã¹ãã©ãªã¢ã«ãããŠããããããã®åç®åµããã€ã³ãã¬é£ååµã奜ãïŒChart 21ïŒã Chart 20Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom
åµåžå©åãã¯åºãæã£ã
åµåžå©åãã¯åºãæã£ã
Chart 21Favor Inflation Linkers
ãªã³ã¯åµãéžå¥œ
ãªã³ã¯åµãéžå¥œ
ãã倧èãªäžåœã®æ¯æ°åºæ¿ãå®çŸããå Žåã«æ©æµãåãããæ¯æ°åŸªç°æ§ã®é«ãåžå Žãžã®åå
¥æ©äŒãåŒãç¶ãæ¢ããŠããã ç€Ÿåµ æã
ããã£ã¯ã¹ãã»ã€ã³ã«ã ã»ããŒããã©ãªãªå
ã§æ¯æ°åŸªç°çã«ã¯ã¬ãžããããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãã«è»¢ããŠä»¥æ¥ãæè³é©æ Œç€Ÿåµãšãã€ã€ãŒã«ãåµã¯ããããããã¥ã¬ãŒã·ã§ã³ãåãããåœåµã«å¯ŸããŠ220ããã³73ããŒã·ã¹ãã€ã³ãã®è¶
éãªã¿ãŒã³ãçã¿åºããŠããã æã
ã¯ä»åŸ12ãæã®ã¯ã¬ãžããèŠéãã«å¯ŸããŠåŒãç¶ã匷æ°ã§ããã幎æ«ãŸã§ã«ã°ããŒãã«æé·ãå éãããšäºæ³ããŠããããã§ãããæŽå²çã«èŠããšãã°ããŒãã«æé·ã®æ¹åã¯ã¯ã¬ãžãããåœåµã«å¯ŸããŠæç¶çã«ã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ããããšããããããŠãããããã«ã貞åºåºæºãç·©åãç¶ããŠããããšãèžãŸããã°ãããã©ã«ãçã¯ä»åŸ1幎ã«ãããæå¶ããããšèŠãããïŒChart 22ãããã«1ïŒã ã©ã®ãããã®æéã¯ã¬ãžããããªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãã«ããã®ããç±³åœäŒæ¥åµåžå Žã«ãããé«ãã¬ãã¬ããžæ°Žæºãå©æ¯æ¯æèœåïŒinterest coverage ratioïŒã®äœäžãããã³Baaæ Œä»ãåµã®æ¯çã®é«ãã¯ãæ§é çã«ã¯ã¬ãžããããªã¹ã¯ã®é«ãéžæè¢ã«ããŠãããããããã€ã³ãã¬æåŸ
ãäŸç¶ãšããŠéåžžã«äœããããFRBã¯éèæ¿çãç·©åçã«ä¿ã€ã€ã³ã»ã³ãã£ãã匷ãããã®ãã掟çãªéèæ¿çã¯éå©ã³ã¹ããæããã¯ã¬ãžãããä»åŸ1幎ã§ã¢ãŠãããã©ãŒã ããã®ãå©ããã ããã ãšã¯ãããé
åçãªã¯ã¬ãžããã®ã«ããŽãªãŒã«ã¯å·®ããããšæã
ã¯èããŠãããå
·äœçã«ã¯ãBaaæ Œä»ããšãã€ã€ãŒã«ã蚌åžãåªå
ããããšãæšå¥šããããããã®ã¯ã¬ãžããã»ãã±ããã«ã¯ãããªãã¹ãã¬ããå§çž®ã®äœå°ãæ®ãããŠããããã§ããïŒããã«2ããã³ããã«3ïŒãäžæ¹ã§ãæäžäœã®ä¿¡çšã«ããŽãªãŒã¯ãã¯ãããªã¥ãŒãæäŸããŠããªãããé¿ããã¹ãã§ããïŒããã«4ïŒã Chart 22Baa-rated And High-Yield Credit Offer The Most Value
Baaæ Œä»ãããã³ãã€ã€ãŒã«ãã»ã¯ã¬ãžããã¯æãé«ã䟡å€ãæäŸãã
Baaæ Œä»ãããã³ãã€ã€ãŒã«ãã»ã¯ã¬ãžããã¯æãé«ã䟡å€ãæäŸãã
ã³ã¢ãã£ã㣠Chart 23No Supply Shock In The Oil Market
ååæããŒããã©ãªãªèŠéãïŒå
šæ¹äœã§ã®ãããž
ååæããŒããã©ãªãªèŠéãïŒå
šæ¹äœã§ã®ãããž
ãšãã«ã®ãŒïŒãªãŒããŒãŠã§ã€ãïŒïŒ9æã®ãããŒã³æ»æã¯ãµãŠãžã®åæ²¹æœèšã«å¯ŸããäŸçµŠæžå¿µãåŒãèµ·ãããæ»æçŽåŸã®æ°æ¥éã§åæ²¹äŸ¡æ Œã¯æ倧ã§çŽ20%äžæãããããã®åŸæ»æåã®æ°ŽæºãŸã§äžèœãããåæã®æšèšã§ã¯äŸçµŠé害ã¯æ¥éçŽ570äžãã¬ã«ãã€ãŸãäžçäŸçµŠéã®çŽ5.5%ã«çžåœããå²äžæ倧ã®åæ²¹äŸçµŠåæ¢ãšãªã£ãããã ãããµãŠãžã䞻匵ããããã«å€±ãããçç£ã®70%ã埩æ§ã§ãããšä»®å®ããã°ãOPECã®äºåèœåã§ããæ¥éçŽ180äžãã¬ã«ãåžå Žãåè¡¡ãããæ®ã倱ãããçç£ãã«ããŒã§ããã¯ãã§ãããããé·æçã«ã¯ãçµæžæé·ã®å埩ã«äŒŽãäžççãªåæ²¹éèŠã®äŒžã³ãšäŸçµŠã®ç·åŒµãåæ²¹äŸ¡æ ŒãæŒãäžããèŠèŸŒã¿ã§ããã¬ã³ãã¯ä»å¹Ž70ãã«ã«éãã2020幎ã¯å¹³å74ãã«ã«ãªããšäºæ³ãããïŒChart 23ãããã«1ããã³ããã«2ïŒã å·¥æ¥çšéå±ïŒãã¥ãŒãã©ã«ïŒïŒå¹Žåæ¥ã®äžåœåœå±ã«ããæ¶æ¥µçãªåºæ¿çãš2019幎第2ååæã»ç¬¬3ååæã®ç±³ãã«é«ãå·¥æ¥çšéå±ã®ã¹ãããäŸ¡æ ŒãæŒãäžããŠãããããããäžåœæ¿åºã¯9æã«è¿œå ã®åºæ¿çãçºè¡šããã€ã³ãã©äºæ¥ã®è³é調éã®ããã®ãããªãåµåžçºè¡ãéèç·©åãè¡ããšè¡šæããïŒããã«3ïŒãããã«ãããä»åŸ6ïœ12ãæã§å·¥æ¥çšéå±äŸ¡æ Œã«äžæ¯ãäœå°ãåºãã¯ãã§ããã 貎éå±ïŒãã¥ãŒãã©ã«ïŒïŒå¹Žåæ¥ã®å匷ãããã©ãŒãã³ã¹ãèžãŸãã€ã€ããæã
ã¯éã«å¯ŸããŠäŸç¶ãšããŠããžãã£ãã§ãããéã¯æ¯æ°åŸéãã€ã³ãã¬ãå°æ¿åŠãªã¹ã¯ã«å¯ŸããåªãããããžãšèŠãªããããã§ãããéã«ã€ããŠã¯ç¬¬9ããŒãžã®ã¯ã©ã€ã¢ã³ãããã®è³ªåã»ã¯ã·ã§ã³ã§è©³è¿°ããŠãããéãçæçã«ã¯é
åçã«èŠãããéå»20幎ã§éã®å©çšçšéã®æ§è³ªã¯å€åããäž»ã«å·¥æ¥çšçŽ æãšããŠã®åŽé¢ãããå®å
šè³ç£ãšããŠã®è²Žéå±çåŽé¢ã匷ãŸã£ãŠãããéãšéã®äŸ¡æ Œã®çžé¢ã¯äžçéèå±æ©åã®å¹³å0.5ããå±æ©åŸã¯0.8ãžãšäžæããŠããïŒããã«4ããã³ããã«5ïŒãã°ããŒãã«æé·ãšæ¿æ²»çäžç¢ºå®æ§ãä»åŸæ°ãæã§éäŸ¡æ Œãæ¯ããã ããã é貚 ç±³ãã«ïŒ4æã«ãã¥ãŒãã©ã«ã«è»¢ããŠä»¥æ¥ã貿æå éãã«ã¯2.5%äžæããŠãããå©åãã®æ¥èœã¯éèæ¡ä»¶ãç·©åãã幎æ«ã®ç¬¬4ååæã«äžçæé·ãäžæ¯ãããå
¬ç®ã倧ãããç±³ãã«ã¯éæ¯æ°åŸªç°çãªé貚ã§ãããããäžççãªæé·ã®å埩å±é¢ã¯æŽå²çã«ãã«ã«ãšã£ãŠãã¬ãã£ãã§ãã£ãã ãŠãŒãïŒ4æã«åŒ·æ°ã«è»¢ããŠä»¥æ¥ãEUR/USDã¯2.7%ã®äžèœãšãªã£ãŠãããå
šäœãšããŠãæã
ã¯æ¯æ°åŸªç°çãªæé軞ã«ãããŠEUR/USDã«å¯ŸããŠåŒãç¶ãããžãã£ãã§ãããECBãéå©ã10ããŒã·ã¹ãã€ã³ãåŒãäžããè¿œå ã®éçç·©åãçºè¡šããåŸããŠãŒãåãç±³åœã«å¯ŸããŠããã«ç·©åãç¶ããäœå°ã¯ããŸãæ®ã£ãŠããªãïŒChart 24ãããã«1ïŒãå ããŠããŠãŒãåã®å©çæé·èŠéããç±³åœã«æ¯ã¹ãŠæ¹åããããšãæåŸ
ãããã°ãè³éãããŒã¯æ¬§å·ãžåããããããEUR/USDãæŒãäžããã ããïŒããã«2ïŒã æ°èåœé貚ïŒåœé¢ã®éãæ°èåœé貚ã«å¯ŸããŠã¯åŒ±æ°ã®èŠæ¹ãç¶æããããã ãã幎æ«ã«åããŠã¯æ Œäžãç£èŠäžã§ãããäžçæé·ãå転ãã€ã€ããå
åãè€æ°ã¿ãããããã¯æŽå²çã«èšé²çã«äœãåµåžå©åããããããç·©åçãªéèç°å¢ã®çµæã§ãããããã«ãæ°èåœæé·ã®äž»èŠãšã³ãžã³ã§ããäžåœã«ãããéççãªæ¶è²»åŸåïŒM1æé·çãšM2æé·çã®å·®ã§ä»£çãããïŒã¯ãæ°èåœé貚ã®ãããªãäžæã瀺åãç¶ããŠããïŒããã«3ïŒã Chart 24Interest Rate And Profit Expectation Differentials Favor The Euro
ãŠãŒãã¯ãŸããªãæ¥éš°ãããããããªããéå©ãšå©çæåŸ
ã®å·®ããŠãŒãã«æå©ã ã
ãŠãŒãã¯ãŸããªãæ¥éš°ãããããããªããéå©ãšå©çæåŸ
ã®å·®ããŠãŒãã«æå©ã ã
ãªã«ã¿ããã£ã Chart 25Favor Hedge Funds Untill Global Growth Bottoms
ã°ããŒãã«æé·ãåºæã¡ãããŸã§ãããžãã¡ã³ããæšå¥š
ã°ããŒãã«æé·ãåºæã¡ãããŸã§ãããžãã¡ã³ããæšå¥š
ãªã¿ãŒã³å¢åŒ·çïŒéå»12ãæã«ããããæã
ã¯æè³å®¶ã«å¯ŸããŠãã©ã€ããŒãã»ãšã¯ã€ãã£ã®é
åãæžããããããžãã¡ã³ããç¹ã«ãã¯ãã»ãããžãã¡ã³ããžã®é
åãå¢ããããšãæšå¥šããŠãããããã¯ãæã
ã®å€æãšããŠæ¯æ°ãµã€ã¯ã«ãåŸæã«ããããã§ãããæé·ãä»åŸæ°ãæã§å埩ãããšæåŸ
ããŠããããçŸæç¹ã®ããŒã¿ã§ã¯ãŸã æ確ã§ã¯ãªãïŒChart 25ãããã«1ïŒããã®äžç¢ºå®ãªãã¯ãç°å¢ã¯ãç¹ã«ãã«ããã«ã®äžæãšè²·å競äºã®æ¿åãšããç°å¢äžã§ãã©ã€ããŒãã»ãšã¯ã€ãã£ã«ãšã£ãŠå³ãããã®ãšãªãã ãããã°ããŒãã«ã»ãã¯ãã»ãããžãã¡ã³ãã¯æ¬¡ã®æ¯æ°åŸéã«å
ç«ã€æè¯ã®ãããžã§ãããšåŒãç¶ãèŠãŠãããéæµåæ§è³ç£ãžã®é
åãå€æŽããã«ã¯æéãããããããæè³å®¶ã«ã¯ä»ã®ãã¡ã«è³éãé
åããããšãå§ããã ã€ã³ãã¬ã»ãããžïŒçŸç¶ã§ã¯ãTIPSã¯éæµåæ§ã®ãªã«ã¿ããã£ãè³ç£ãããåªããã€ã³ãã¬ã»ãããžã§ããå¯èœæ§ãé«ãã2019幎5æã®ã¹ãã·ã£ã«ã¬ããŒã8ã¯ãã€ã³ãã¬ãäžæããŠãããäŸç¶ãšããŠæ¯èŒçäœãïŒ2.3%æªæºïŒå±é¢ã§ã¯ãTIPSãç¹ã«é
åçãªãªã¹ã¯èª¿æŽåŸãªã¿ãŒã³ãçã¿åºãããšã瀺ããŠããããããã£ãŠãFRBããã掟ãç¶æããéå©ãããäžåºŠåŒãäžãããããããªãäžæ¹ã§ã€ã³ãã¬ã®äžçšåºŠã®å éã容èªãããšããæã
ã®èŠéãã®äžã§ã¯ãTIPSã¯ä»åŸæ°ãæã®ç°å¢ã§è¯å¥œã«æšç§»ããã¯ãã§ããïŒããã«2ïŒã ãã©ãã£ãªãã£æå¶çïŒã¹ãã©ã¯ãã£ãŒãã»ãããã¯ããäž»ã«ã¢ãŒã²ãŒãžæ
ä¿èšŒåžïŒMBSïŒã¯ãããŒããã©ãªãªã®ãã©ãã£ãªãã£ãäœæžããç¹ã§åªããå®çžŸãæã£ãŠããïŒããã«3ïŒãããã«ãããããããçŸåšã®è©äŸ¡ã¯å¿
ãããé
åçã§ã¯ãªããããMBSãžã®é
åã¯ãã¥ãŒãã©ã«ãè¶
ããŠæšå¥šããªããä»ã·ãŒãºã³ã¯é·æéå©ã100ããŒã·ã¹ãã€ã³ã以äžäœäžããåãæã掻åã掻çºåããŠããã«ãããããããåç®ããŒã¹ã®MBSã¹ãã¬ããã¯å²äžæäœæ°Žæºä»è¿ã«ãšã©ãŸã£ãŠããããã ããåœåµå©åããåºæã¡ããã«ã€ããŠåãæãã¯æžéããã¹ãã¬ããã«äžæŒãå§åãããããšäºæ³ããŠãããåœç€ŸèŠè§£ã«å¯Ÿãããªã¹ã¯ æãèµ·ããåŸãäžæ¹ãªã¹ã¯ã¯ãFRBïŒç±³é£éŠæºåå¶åºŠçäºäŒïŒãé床ã«ãã掟ã«ãªãã察å¿ãé
ããããšã§ãããç±³åœã®åºèª¿çãªã€ã³ãã¬å§åã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠåŒ·ãïŒã³ã¢æ¶è²»è
ç©äŸ¡ææ°ã¯éå»3ãæã§å¹Žçæç®3.4ïŒ
äžæïŒã2åã®å©äžãåŸããã§ãã©ã«ãã¡ã³ãéå©ã¯çŸåšäžç«éå©ã倧ããäžåã£ãŠããïŒå®è³ªã§0.1ïŒ
ãLaubachâWilliamsã®r*ã¯0.8ïŒ
ã«å¯ŸããŠã§ããïŒãã£ãŒã26ïŒããããŒã»ããŒã±ããã®ã¿ã€ããããFRBã¯åã³ãã©ã³ã¹ã·ãŒãã®æ¡å€§ãéå§ããŠãããæ¥å¹Žã«è£œé æ¥ã®æé·ãå éããè³éãšå©çãäžæãå§ããã°ã1999幎ã®ãããªæ ªåŒåžå Žã®ã¡ã«ãã¢ãããèµ·ããåŸãããããæçµçã«ã¯ãã€ã³ãã¬ãæããããã«FRBã¯å©äžãïŒå Žåã«ãã£ãŠã¯æ¥æ¿ãªå©äžãïŒãè¡ãå¿
èŠããããããã次ã®æ¯æ°åŸéãæãå¯èœæ§ãããã äžæ¹ãªã¹ã¯ã®ç¯å²ã¯ããåºãã æ¬ååæå ±åå
šäœã§è«ããéããæ¯æ°åŸéã®åŒãéã«ãªãåŸãèŠå ã¯æ§ã
ããïŒç¹ã«äžåœãæ¯æ°åºæ¿ã«å€±æããããšããæ¶è²»è
ã®ä¿¡é Œã®åªå€±ãªã©ã§ãããäžéšã®æ¯æ°åŸéã¢ãã«ã¯ä»åŸ12ãæã®ãªã¹ã¯ãæ倧30ïŒ
ãšèŠç©ãã£ãŠããïŒãã£ãŒã27ïŒãæ§é çã«èŠãŠãæ倧ã®ãªã¹ã¯ã¯ããããç±³åœã«ãããäŒæ¥åµåã®é«æ°Žæºã§ããïŒãã£ãŒã28ïŒãæšå¹Ž12æã«çæé芳枬ããããããªãžã£ã³ã¯åµåžå Žã®åŽ©å£ã¯ãä»åŸ18ãæã§æºæãè¿ãã倧éã®åµåãäŒæ¥ãåãæãã§ããªããªãäºæ
ãæãå¯èœæ§ãããã å°æ¿åŠçãªã¹ã¯ãäŸç¶ãšããŠé«æ¢ãŸãããŠããããã®æ§è³ªäžäºæž¬ãå°é£ã§ããããã¬ã°ãžããã®åž°çµã¯äŸç¶ãšããŠéåžžã«äžç¢ºå®ã§ããããåæãªãé¢è±ã®ãªã¹ã¯ã¯äœããšèŠãŠãããç±³äžã®è²¿æåè°ã¯å
æ¬çãªåæãªãé·æåãããšäºæ³ããŠãããæ確ãªæ±ºè£ã¯ãã¬ãã£ãã§ããããã©ã³ã倧統é ã®åŒŸåŸã¯ããããåžå Žã«ãšã£ãŠé倧ãªåºæ¥äºã§ã¯ãªãããåžå Žå¿çãäžæçã«æªåãããå¯èœæ§ãããïŒç¹ã«ããããšãªã¶ãã¹ã»ãŠã©ãŒã¬ã³ã®åœéžå¯èœæ§ãé«ããå ŽåïŒãã€ã©ã³ãšãµãŠãžéã®çŽäºããšã¹ã«ã¬ãŒãããå¯èœæ§ãããããããã®è
åšãç¹ã蟌ãããã«ãªã¹ã¯ãã¬ãã¢ã ã¯äžæããå¿
èŠããããããããªãã ãã£ãŒã26FRBã¯é床ã«ãã掟ã«ãªã£ãŠããã®ãïŒ
ç±³FRBã¯ãã掟ã«åŸããããŠããã®ãïŒ
ç±³FRBã¯ãã掟ã«åŸããããŠããã®ãïŒ
ãã£ãŒã27æ¯æ°åŸéã®ãªã¹ã¯ã¯ã©ã®çšåºŠãïŒ
æ¯æ°åŸéã®ãªã¹ã¯ã¯ïŒ
æ¯æ°åŸéã®ãªã¹ã¯ã¯ïŒ
ãã£ãŒã28äŒæ¥åµåãæ倧ã®ãªã¹ã¯ãïŒ
äŒæ¥åµåã¯æ倧ã®ãªã¹ã¯ãïŒ
äŒæ¥åµåã¯æ倧ã®ãªã¹ã¯ãïŒ
è泚 1詳现ã¯ã°ããŒãã«ã»ã¢ã»ããã»ã¢ãã±ãŒã·ã§ã³ã»ã¹ãã·ã£ã«ã»ã¬ããŒããããŠãŒãåã®éè¡ïŒããªã¥ãŒã»ãã¬ã€ãããªã¥ãŒã»ãã©ãããïŒã2018幎12æ14æ¥ä»ãgaa.bcaresearch.comã§å
¥æå¯èœã 2詳现ã¯ãã©ãŒãªã³ã»ãšã¯ã¹ãã§ã³ãžã»ã¹ãã©ããžãŒã»ã¹ãã·ã£ã«ã»ã¬ããŒãããè±åœïŒåŸªç°çæžéãæ§é çåæ»ãïŒã2019幎9æ20æ¥ä»ãfes.bcaresearch.comã§å
¥æå¯èœã 3詳现ã¯ã°ããŒãã«ã»ã¢ã»ããã»ã¢ãã±ãŒã·ã§ã³ã»ã¯ã©ãŒã¿ãªãŒããã¯ã©ãŒã¿ãªãŒ - 2019幎4æã2019幎4æ1æ¥ä»ãgaa.bcaresearch.comã§å
¥æå¯èœã 4詳现ã¯ã°ããŒãã«ã»ã€ã³ãã¹ãã¡ã³ãã»ã¹ãã©ããžãŒã»ãŠã£ãŒã¯ãªãŒã»ã¬ããŒãããåµåžå©åãã¯åºãæã£ã,ã2019幎9æ6æ¥ä»ãgis.bcaresearch.comã§å
¥æå¯èœã 5詳现ã¯ã°ããŒãã«ã»ã€ã³ãã¹ãã¡ã³ãã»ã¹ãã©ããžãŒã»ãŠã£ãŒã¯ãªãŒã»ã¬ããŒããããšãªã¶ãã¹ã»ãŠã©ãŒã¬ã³ãšåžå Ž,ã2019幎9æ13æ¥ä»ãgis.bcaresearch.comã§å
¥æå¯èœã 6Dmitry Zhdannikov and Alex Lawler âç¬å ïŒãµãŠãžã®ç³æ²¹çç£ãåœåäºæ³ããéãå埩ãžïŒé¢ä¿ç,â ãã€ã¿ãŒã2019幎9æ17æ¥ä»ã 7詳现ã¯ãžãªããªãã£ã«ã«ã»ã¹ãã©ããžãŒã»ã¹ãã·ã£ã«ã»ã¢ã©ãŒããããµãŠãžã®éèŠã€ã³ãã©ãžã®æ»æã¯ç±³åœã®å¯Ÿå¿ã«çåãæããããã2019幎9æ16æ¥ä»ãgps.bcaresearch.comã§å
¥æå¯èœã 8詳现ã¯ã°ããŒãã«ã»ã¢ã»ããã»ã¢ãã±ãŒã·ã§ã³ã»ã¹ãã·ã£ã«ã»ã¬ããŒãããã€ã³ãã¬ã»ãããžã®ããã®æè³å®¶ã¬ã€ãïŒã€ã³ãã¬äžææã®æè³æ¹æ³ã2019幎5æ22æ¥ä»ãgaa.bcaresearch.comã§å
¥æå¯èœã GAA ã¢ã»ããã»ã¢ãã±ãŒã·ã§ã³