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The DXY index has dropped from a high of 108.54 in July to 106.47 today and is churning around its 50-day moving average. As both bulls and bears battle the next move in the dollar, one currency that is likely to lag its G10 peers is the kiwi, according to…
The prices of many cryptocurrencies have staged a powerful rebound from their summer lows. Bitcoin bottomed at $19,239.47 on July 1st and has since been establishing a classic bull pattern of higher lows and higher highs. If resistance at the 100-day moving…
Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Chart 1The Dollar Has Broken Below The First Line Of Support The softer CPI print in the US boosted growth plays and pushed the DXY index below its 50-day moving average (Feature Chart). This suggests CPI numbers will remain the most important print for currency markets in the coming weeks and months. If US inflation has peaked, then the market will price a less aggressive path for Fed interest rates, which will loosen support for the dollar. At the same time, other G10 central banks are still seeing accelerating inflation. This will keep them on a tightening path. This puts the DXY in a tug of war. On the downside, the Fed could turn less hawkish. On the other hand, currencies such as the EUR, GBP and even SEK face high inflation but deteriorating growth. This will depress real rates. Within this context, the most attractive currencies are those with relatively higher real rates, and a real prospect of a turnaround in growth. NOK and AUD stand out as potential candidates. Our short EUR/JPY trade has been performing well in this context. Stick with it.  RECOMMENDATIONS INCEPTION LEVEL inception date RETURN Short EUR/JPY 141.20 2022-07-21 3.29 Bottom Line: Our recommended strategy is a neutral dollar view over the next three months, until it becomes clear inflation has peaked and global growth has bottomed. Feature The DXY index peaked at 108.64 on July 14 and has dropped to 105.1 as we go to press. There have been two critical drivers of this move. First, the 10-year US Treasury yield has fallen from 3.5% to 2.8%. With this week’s all important CPI release, which showed a sharp deceleration in the headline measure, bond yields may well stabilize at current levels for a while. Second, the drop in energy prices has boosted the JPY, SEK and EUR, which are heavily dependent on imported energy. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyA Montreal Conversation On FX Markets Another development has been happening in parallel – as US inflation upside surprises have crested, so has the US price impulse relative to its G10 counterparts (Chart 1). To the extent that this eases market pricing of a hawkish Fed (relative to other G10 central banks), it will continue to diminish upward pressure on the dollar. Much will depend on the incoming inflation prints both in the US, and abroad. With the DXY having broken below its 50-day moving average, the next support level is at 103.6. This is where the 100-day moving average lies, which the dollar tested twice this year before eventually bouncing higher (Chart 2). The next few sections cover the important data releases over the last month in our universe of G10 countries, and implications for currency strategy. What is clear is that most foreign central banks are committed to their tightening campaign, which argues for a neutral stance towards the DXY for now. Chart 1US Inflation Momentum Has Rolled Over Chart 2The Dollar Has Broken Below The First Line Of Support US Dollar: Consolidation Chart 3The Conditions For A Fed Hike Remain In Place The dollar DXY index is up 10% year to date. Over the last month, the DXY index is down 2.1% (panel 1). Incoming data continues to make the case for a strong dollar. Job gains are robust. In June, the US added 372K jobs. The July release was even stronger at 528K jobs. This pushed the unemployment rate to a low of 3.5% (panel 2). Wages continue to soar. Average hourly earnings came in at 5.2% year-on-year in July. The Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker continues to edge higher across all income cohorts (panel 3). The June CPI print was above expectations at 9.1% for headline, with core at 5.9%. The July print for headline that came out this week was 8.5%, below expectations of 8.7%. At 5.9%, the core measure is still well above the Fed’s target (panel 4). June retail sales remained firm, but consumer sentiment continues to weaken. While the University of Michigan current conditions index increase from 53.8 to 58.1 in June, this is well below the January 2020 level of 115. Correspondingly, the Conference Board consumer confidence index fell from 98.7 to 95.7 in July. On June 17, the Fed increased interest rates by 75bps, as expected. The US entered a second consecutive quarter of GDP growth contraction in Q2, falling by an annualized 0.9%. The ISM manufacturing index was flat in July suggesting Q3 GDP is not starting on a particularly strong foot. The Atlanta Fed Q3 GDP growth tracker is, however, printing 2.5%. Unit labor costs are soaring, rising 10.8% in Q2. This is sapping productivity growth, which fell 4.6% in Q2.  The key for the dollar’s outlook is the evolution of US inflation and the labor market. For now, inflation remains sticky, and wages are rising. Meanwhile, labor market conditions remain robust. This will keep the Fed on a tightening path in the near term. We initially went short the DXY index but were stopped out. We remain neutral in the short term, though valuation keeps us bearish over a long-term horizon. The Euro: A European Hard Landing Chart 4The Euro Is At Recession Lows The euro is down 9.2% year to date. Over the last month, the euro is up 2.7%, having faced support a nudge below parity. Incoming data continues to suggest weak economic conditions, with a stagflationary undertone: The ZEW Expectations Survey for July was at -51.1, the lowest reading since 2011 (panel 1). The current account remains in a deficit, at -€4.5bn in May. Consumer confidence continues to plunge. The July reading of -27 is the worst since the 2020 Covid-19 crisis (panel 2). Despite the above data releases, the ECB surprised markets by raising rates 50bps. CPI continues to surprise to the upside. The preliminary CPI print for July came in at 8.9%, well above the previous 8.6% print. PPI in the euro area was at 35.8% in June, a slight decline from the May reading (panel 3). The German Ifo business expectations index fell to 80.3 in July. Historically, that has been consistent with a manufacturing PMI reading of 45 (panel 4). The Sentix confidence index stabilized in August but remains very weak at -25.2. This series tends to be trending, having peaked in July last year. We will see if the next few months continue to show stabilization. The ECB mandate dictates that it will continue to fight soaring inflation. As such, it may have no choice but to generate a Eurozone-wide recession. This is the key risk for the euro since it could push EUR/USD below parity again. We continue to sell the EUR/JPY cross. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY will collapse. In a risk-on environment, like this week, the yen can still benefit since it is oversold. Meanwhile, investors remain overwhelmingly bearish (panel 5). The Japanese Yen: Quite A Hefty Rally Chart 5Some Green Shoots In Japan The Japanese yen is down 13.4% year-to-date, the worst performing G10 currency (panel 1). Over the last month, the yen is up 3.3%. Incoming data in Japan has been worsening as the rising number of Covid-19 cases is hitting mobility and economic data. According to the Eco Watcher’s survey, sentiment among small and medium-sized Japanese firms deteriorated in July. Current conditions fell from 52.9 to 43.8. The outlook component also declined from 47.6 to 42.8. Machine tool order momentum, one of our favorite measures of external demand, continues to slow. Peak growth was at 141.9% year-on-year in May last year. The preliminary reading from July was at 5.5% (panel 2). Labor cash earnings came in at 2.2% year-on-year, a positive sign. Household spending also rose 3.5%. Rising wages could keep inflation momentum rising in Japan (panel 3). On that note, the Tokyo CPI report for July was also encouraging, with an increase in the core-core measure from 1% to 1.2%. The Tokyo CPI tends to lead nationwide measures. The labor market remains robust. Labor demand exceeds supply by 27%. The Bank of Japan kept monetary policy on hold on July 20th, a policy move that makes sense given incoming data. The BoJ still views a large chunk of inflation in Japan as transitory. For inflation to pick up, wages need to rise. While they are rising, inflation expectations remain well anchored, suggesting little rationale for the BoJ to shift (panel 4). That said, the yen is extremely cheap after being the best short this year (panel 5).  British Pound: Coiled Spring Below 1.20? Chart 6Cable Is Vulnerable The pound is down 9.8% year to date. Over the last month, the pound is up by 2.5%. Sterling broke below a soft floor of 1.20, but quickly bounced back and is now sitting at 1.22, as sentiment picked up (panel 1). We find the UK to have an even bigger stagflation problem than the eurozone. CPI came in at 9.4% in June. The RPI came in at 11.8%. PPI was at 24%. All showed an acceleration from the month of May (panel 2). Nationwide house price inflation has barely rolled over unlike other markets, increasing from 10.7% in June to 11% in July. The Rightmove national asking price was 9.3% higher year-on-year in July, compared to 9.7% in June (panel 3). Meanwhile, mortgage approvals have been in steady decline over the last two years, which points toward stagflation. Retail sales excluding auto and fuel fell 5.9% year-on-year in June, the weakest reading since the Covid-19 crisis. Consumer confidence is lower than in 2020 (panel 4). Trade data continues to be weak, which has dipped the current account towards decade lows (panel 5). The external balance is the biggest driver of the pound, given the huge deficit. The above environment has put the BoE in a stagflationary quagmire. Last week, they raised rates by 50 bps suggesting inflation is a much more important battle than growth. Politically, the resignation of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and broader difficulties for the Conservative Party, is fueling sterling volatility. We are maintaining our long EUR/GBP trade as a bet that at 1.03, the euro has priced in a recession (well below the 2020 lows), but sterling has not. On cable, 1.20 will prove to be a long-term floor but it will be volatile in the short term.  Australian Dollar: A Contrarian Play Chart 7Relatively Solid Domestic Conditions In Australia The AUD is down 2.3% year-to-date. Over the last month, the AUD is up 5.3%. AUD is fast approaching its 200-day moving average. If that is breached, it could signal that the highs of this year, above 76 cents, are within striking distance (panel 1). Inflation is accelerating in Australia. In Q2, the inflation reading was 6.1%, while the trimmed-mean and weighted-median measures were above the central bank’s 1-3% band (panel 2). As a result, the RBA stated the benchmark rate was “well below” the neutral rate. It increased rates by an additional 50bps in August, lifting the official cash rate to 1.85%. Further rate increases are likely. There are a few reasons for this. First, labor market conditions are the most favorable in decades. In June, unemployment reached 3.5%, its lowest level in 50 years, against a consensus of 3.8% (panel 3). The participation rate also increased to 66.8% in June from 66.7%, which has pushed the underutilization rate to multi-decade lows (panel 4). Despite this, consumer confidence continued its decline in August, dropping to 81.2 from 83.8. A pickup in Covid-19 cases and high consumer prices are the usual suspects. Beyond the labor market, monetary policy seems to be having the desired effect. Demand appears to be slowing as retail sales grew 0.2% month-on-month in June from 0.9%. Home loan issuance declined by 4.4% in June, driven by a 6.3% decline in investment lending. House price growth continued to decline in July, particularly in densely populated regions like Sydney and Melbourne. The manufacturing sector remains strong, with July PMI coming in at 55.7, suggesting the RBA might just be achieving a soft landing in Australia.  The external environment was largely favorable for the AUD in June, as the trade balance increased substantially by A$17.7bn with commodities rallying early in the month. However, commodity prices are rolling over. The price of iron for example, is down 24% from its peak in June. This will likely weigh on the trade balance going forward (panel 5). A weakening external environment are near-term headwinds for the AUD, but we will be buyers on weakness (panel 6).  New Zealand Dollar: Least Preferred G10 Currency Chart 8Near-Term Risks To NZD The NZD is down 6.1% this year. Over the last month, it is up 5% (panel 1). The Reserve Bank of New Zealand raised its official cash rate (OCR) in July by 50bps to 2.5%, in line with market expectations. Policymakers maintained their hawkish stance and guided towards increased tightening until monetary conditions can bring inflation within its target range of 1-3%. Inflation rose in Q2 to 7.3% from a 7.1% forecast, largely driven by rising construction and energy prices (panel 2). As of the latest data, monetary policy appears to be continuing to have the desired effect on interest rate sensitive parts of the economy. REINZ home sales declined 38.1% year-on-year in June. Home price growth continues to roll over (panel 3). The external sector continues to slow. Dairy prices, circa 20% of exports, saw a 12% drop in early August after remaining flat in July. The 12-month trailing trade balance remains in deficit. This is most likely due to a substantial slowdown in Chinese economic activity, given that China is an important trade partner with New Zealand. What is important is that the RBNZ’s “least regrets” approach seems to be working. Despite a cooling economy, sentiment seems to be stabilizing. ANZ consumer confidence improved to 81.9 in July from 80.5. Business confidence also improved to -56.7 from -62.6 (panel 4). Ultimately, the NZD is driven by terms of trade, as well as domestic conditions (panels 1 and 5). Thus, short-term headwinds from a deteriorating external sector do not make us buyers of the currency for now, though a rollover in the dollar will help the kiwi.  Canadian Dollar: Lower Oil, Hawkish BoC Chart 9The BoC Will Stay On A Hawkish Path The CAD is down 1.2% year to date. Over the last month, it is up 1.8%. The Canadian dollar did not fully catch up to oil prices on the upside. Now that crude is rolling over, CAD remains vulnerable, unless the dollar continues to stage a meaningful decline (panel 1). Canadian data has been rather mixed over the last month. For example: There have been two consecutive months of job losses. This is after a string of positive job reports. In July, Canada lost 31K jobs. In June, it lost 43K. The reasons have been mixed, from women dropping out of the labor force, to lower youth participation (the participation rate fell), but this is a trend worth monitoring (panel 2). CPI growth remains elevated and is accelerating both on headline and core measures(panel 3). Building permits and housing starts have started to roll over, as house price inflation continues to lose momentum. June housing starts were at 274K from 287.3K. June building permits also fell 1.5% month-on-month though annual inflation is still outpacing house price growth (panel 4). The Canadian trade balance is improving, hitting a multi-year high of C$5.05 bn in June. This has eased the need for foreign capital inflows. The BoC raised rates 100bps in July, the biggest interest rate increase in one meeting among the G10. Unless the labor market continues to soften, the BoC will continue to focus on inflation, which means more rate hikes are forthcoming. The OIS curve is pricing a peak BoC rate of 3.6% in 9 months (panel 5). Two-year real rates are still higher in the US compared to Canada. And the loonie has lost the tailwind from strong WCS oil prices. As such, unless the dollar softens further, the loonie will remain in a choppy trading pattern like most of this year.  Swiss Franc: A Safe Haven Chart 10The Franc Will Remain Strong Against The Euro For Now CHF is down 3.2% year-to-date and up 4.3% in the past month. The Swiss franc has been particular strong against the euro, with EUR/CHF breaching parity (panel 1). Switzerland remains an island of relative economic stability in the G10. Although slowing, the manufacturing PMI was a healthy 58 in July. The trade surplus was up to CHF 2.6bn in June, despite a strong franc. While most European countries are preparing for a tough winter with energy rationing, prospects for Switzerland, which derives only 13% of its electricity from natural gas, look more favorable.  Still, as a small open economy, Switzerland is feeling the impact of global growth uncertainty. The KOF leading indicator dropped to 90.1 in August with a sharp decline in the manufacturing component. This broader measure suggests the relative resilience of the manufacturing sector might not last long (panel 2). Consumer confidence also fell to the lowest level since the onset of the pandemic. Swiss headline inflation stabilized at 3.4% in July. The core measure rose slightly to the SNB’s 2% target (panel 3). The UBS real estate bubble index rose sharply in Q2, suggesting inflation is not only an imported problem. Labor market conditions also remain tight, with the unemployment rate at 2%, a two-decade low. The SNB will continue to embrace currency strength while inflation risks persist (panel 4), as can be seen by the decline in sight deposits and FX reserves (panel 5). The market is still pricing in another 50 bps hike in September although August inflation data that comes out before the meeting will likely be critical for that decision. CHF is one of the most attractive currencies in our ranking. Despite the recent outperformance, CHF is still down year-to-date against the dollar. A rise in safe-haven demand, and a possible energy crunch in winter will be supportive, especially against the euro.  Norwegian Krone: Oil Fields Are A Jewel Chart 11NOK Will Reap Dividends From Energy Exports NOK is down 7.4% year-to-date and up 7.1% over the last month. It is also up 4.2% versus the euro, despite softer oil prices (panel 1). Inflation in Norway continues to accelerate. In July, CPI grew 6.8% year-on-year, above the market consensus and the Norges Bank’s forecast. Underlying inflation jumped sharply to an all-time high of 4.5%, compared to the Bank’s 3.2% forecast made just over a month ago (panel 2). These figures are adding pressure on the central bank to increase the pace of interest rate hikes, with 50bps looking increasingly likely at the meetings in August and September. NOK jumped on the inflation news. The housing market is starting to show signs of slowing with prices down 0.2% on the month in July, the first decrease since December. This, together with household indebtedness (panel 3), makes the task of policy calibration challenging. Our bias is that a persistently tight labor market and strong wage growth (panel 4) will allow the bank to focus on inflation. Economic activity remains robust in Norway but is softening. The manufacturing PMI fell to 54.6 in July, while industrial production was down 1.7% month-over-month in June. Consumer demand remains frail with retail sales and household consumption flat in June from the previous month. On a more positive note, trade surplus remains near record levels and is likely to stay elevated as high European demand for Norwegian energy is likely to last at least through the winter (panel 5). As global risk sentiment picked up, the krone became the best performing G10 currency over the past month. If the risk appetite reverses, the currency is likely to feel some turbulence. Swedish Krona: Cheap, But No Catalysts Yet Chart 12SEK = EUR On Steroids SEK is down 10% year-to-date and up 5.6% over the past month. The vigorous rebound highlights just how oversold the Swedish krona is (panel 1). The Swedish economy grew 1.4% in Q2 from the previous three months, rebounding from a 0.8% contraction in the first quarter. This is impressive, given high energy prices and a slowdown in global economic activity. Going forward, growth is likely to slow. In July, the services and manufacturing PMIs declined, and consumer confidence fell sharply to the lowest reading in almost 30 years. Retail sales were down 1.2% month-on-month in June. The housing market is also feeling the pain of rising borrowing costs (panel 2). The Riksbank’s latest estimate sees a 16% decline in prices by the end of next year.  For now, inflation is still accelerating in Sweden. CPIF, the Riksbank’s preferred measure, increased from 7.2% to 8.5% in June. Headline inflation rose from 7.3% to 8.7% (panel 3). Headline inflation is likely to decline in July, given the drop in the price component of the PMIs, but inflation will remain well above target. This will keep real rates weak (panel 4). This suggests that the Riksbank is facing the same conundrum as the ECB: accelerate policy tightening and tip the economy towards recession or remain accommodative and risk inflation becoming more entrenched. Our bias is that the Riksbank is likely to frontload rate hikes as currently priced in the OIS curve, with a 50 bps hike in September, ahead of major labor union wage negotiations (panel 5). Much like the NOK, the Swedish krona rebounded strongly in the past month on global risk-on sentiment. Fundamentally, the krona remains more vulnerable to external shocks due to higher energy dependency and a strong dollar. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Artem Sakhbiev Research Associate artem.sakhbiev@bcaresearch.com Thierry Matin Research Associate thierry.matin@bcaresearch.com   Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
特別レポート エグゼクティブ・サマリー 第4次台湾海峡危機が現実化していることを受けて、世界の大国間での大規模な戦争の確率は上昇しました。 当社のディシジョンツリーは確率を約20%と示唆しており、これはロシアのウクライナ戦争だけを起点に想定した水準の2倍に相当します。世界は五発リボルバーで「ロシアンルーレット」をしている状態です。 今後の基本見解としては、米中の国内政治イベントが今秋に一段落した後、台湾緊張は横ばい(悪化はしないが改善もしない)になると見ています。 しかし、もし中国が第20回党大会後に緊張をエスカレートさせれば、侵攻の確率は大幅に上昇します。 台湾で紛争が発生した場合、ロシアが欧州でさらに攻勢的になる確率が高まります。 イランは核兵器の追求を強く進める可能性が高いです。   2022年下半期にポジティブな触媒は多くない 五連発拳銃によるルーレット 五連発拳銃によるルーレット タクティカル推奨開始日リターン 米国10年国債ロング2022-04-141.3% グローバルのディフェンシブ/サイクリック株式ロング2022-01-2013.8% 結論:投資家は少なくとも中国の党大会と米国の中間選挙が今秋に終わるまでは防御的なポジションを維持すべきです。来年の地政学的リスクは中国の台湾海峡での行動次第です。 特集   チャート 1 第三次世界大戦をめぐる臆測が高まる 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 世界の出来事に注意を払う悲観論者たちは、近年第三次世界大戦が勃発するリスクを懸念するようになりました。用語の検索は2019年以降増えていますが、懸念の理由は特定の危機事象というよりもむしろグローバルな多極化という基調にあります(チャート 1)。1 米中、あるいは米露間での大規模な戦争の確率はどのくらいでしょうか。どのように算出できるでしょうか。本レポートでは一連の「ディシジョンツリー」を提示し、各シナリオと確率を形式化して示します。 もしWWIIIを米国がロシアあるいは中国、または両方と直接交戦する戦争と定義するなら、今後数年以内にWWIIIが勃発する確率は20%に達すると計算されます! これは非常に高い確率ですが、歴史はこうした確率が非現実的でないことを示しており、投資家は油断してはなりません。政治学者グレアム・アリソンは長期的に見た米中戦争の確率は約75%であると歴史的類推に基づいて示しています。 要点は、各国がこのWWIIIリスクを直視し、拒否しない限り世界の政治環境は改善しないということです。最もあり得るのは、WWIIIおよびそれがもたらす核戦争のリスクが最終的な制約となり、各国がそれを認識して行動を改めるケースですが、現在の大国の振る舞いはまだ制約を認識しておらず、短期的には瀬戸際政策を続ける意向が窺えます。 中国による台湾侵攻の確率 まず問いは、中国が台湾に侵攻するかどうかです。2021年4月に当社は第4次台湾海峡危機が12~24か月以内に発生すると予測しましたが、全面戦争には発展しないと見ていました。この見方が今試されています。 図表 1では、中国の台湾に対する政策選択肢をマッピングし、それぞれに確率を割り当てるディシジョンツリーを示します。 図表 1 第4次台湾海峡危機に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五連発の拳銃によるルーレット 五連発の拳銃によるルーレット   中国は台湾を侵攻する能力を獲得しましたが、特に核三本柱(トライアド)のさらなる進展がない限り、失敗の確率は依然として高いです。したがって、即時に侵攻のために動員をかける確率は20%と見積もります。 明らかに、中国が侵攻を計画しているという具体的な兆候があれば真剣に受け止めるべきです。 2021年にウクライナ周辺でのロシアの軍事増強を投資家やメディアが軽視したことは損失を招きました。 同時に、米中は台湾海峡の現状を試しているだけであり、現状は今回のエピソード後に強化される可能性が高いという見方もあります。結局のところ、今回の危機は第4次台湾海峡危機であり、過去の危機はいずれも戦争には至りませんでした。 バイデン大統領と習近平が、今秋に予定される重要な国内政治イベントを前にそれぞれの力を誇示しているだけなら、両者は既に目的を達成しています。少なくとも今後数年間にわたっては、これ以上の軍事的見せつけは不要です。 我々は、過去一週間の緊張が残るが現状が強化されるシナリオに40%の確率を割り当てます。 その場合、台湾海峡の構造的問題は2024年の米国と台湾の大統領選挙の後、つまりこの図表の時間枠の外で再燃するでしょう。 残念ながら我々は長期的には悲観的であり、台湾での戦争の確率は高いと考えています。 そのため、我々は今後2年間で状況が悪化するシナリオにも同じく40%の確率を割り当てます。 もし中国が党大会後に演習や制裁を拡大するなら、習指導部が単なる国内向けパフォーマンスではないことが明らかになります。 同様に、もしバイデン政権が中間選挙後も対中ハイテク輸出管理の強化を推し進め、同盟国やパートナーにも同様の対応を求め続けるなら、米国は中国が何らかの攻勢作戦を準備していると暗に判断していることになります。その場合、侵攻の危険性は20%から40%に上昇します。 それでも、米中の危機外交が2023-24年に全面戦争を防ぐという見方は依然として妥当ですが、誤算のリスクは非常に高まります。 このディシジョンツリーの最後の要素は、中国が第二次世界大戦で見られたような従来型の上陸侵攻ではなく、「グレーゾーン戦術」やハイブリッド戦を好むという前提です。理由は複数あります。 第一に、上陸侵攻は最も困難な軍事作戦です。第二に、中国軍は未熟である一方、米国と同盟国は守備を固めています。第三に、ハイブリッド戦は米国の同盟国間に対応の分裂を生みます。第四に、ここ14年でロシアはハイブリッド戦が機能することを何度も示してきました。それは戦略的便益を最大化し、コストを最小化する手段です。 西側が小規模な侵攻にどう反応するかは世界が知っている:経済制裁だ。しかし大規模な侵攻にどう反応するかはまだ分かりません。したがって中国は小さく噛み切るインセンティブを持ちます。 とはいえ台湾の場合、こうした戦術が持続可能でない可能性もあります。当社の台湾に関するディシジョンツリーは、ハイブリッド戦や「代理戦争」が大規模戦争に進展する可能性を完全には織り込んでいません。しかしその可能性は実際には高いのです。したがって我々は米中の大規模戦争のリスクを過小評価しているわけではありません。 結論: 今後2年間で、台湾を巡る米中の代理戦争の主観的確率は約32%、直接的な米中戦争の確率は約4%です。 真の試練は習近平が今秋の党大会で権力を固めた後に訪れます。 我々は習氏が経済の再起動に注力すると予想します したがって我々は中国と台湾を除く新興アジアの市場を引き続き推奨します。 ロシアとNATOの戦争の確率 第二の問いは、ウクライナの戦争が西側とのより広範な戦争に変貌するかどうかです。ウクライナでは既に戦争が継続しているため、ロシアと西側の大規模戦争の確率は中国の場合よりも高くなります。一方、台湾海峡の緊張は現時点ではまだ虚勢の段階にすぎません。 投資家のベースケースとしては、ウクライナ戦争はウクライナ内に限定されると考えるべきです。欧州諸国はドンバスのためだけにロシアと壊滅的な戦いを望んでいません。しかし戦時には物事がしばしば誤ることがあります。 重要な問いは、ロシアがNATO加盟国を攻撃するかどうかです。そうなれば同盟条約の第5条が発動され、「欧州または北米における一つ以上の(同盟)加盟国に対する武力攻撃は、すべての加盟国に対する攻撃と見なされる」ことになり、必要に応じて安全回復のために武力行使が正当化されます。 ロシアのウクライナ侵攻以降、バイデン大統領は繰り返し米国は「NATO領土の一インチたりとも防衛する」と述べており、これは政策の変更ではなく米国のレッドラインであり極めて高い可能性で防衛されるでしょう。したがってこれはロシアにとって重大な制約です。 図表 2ではロシアの選択肢をマッピングし、確率を割り当てます。 図表 2 ロシア・ウクライナ戦争に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット   我々はロシアがドンバス地域とクリミアへの陸路を確保し、勝利を宣言する確率を55%と見ています。ロシアは征服地を何らかの外交合意、つまり停戦という形で正当化しようと動き始めるでしょう。これが我々の2023年のベースケースです。 ロシアが既に外交に向けた動きを始めている証拠があります。2 理由はロシア経済が打撃を受け、世界のコモディティ価格が下落し、人的・物的資源が消耗しているからです。プーチン大統領はドニエプル川河口など、侵攻した地域を支配している限り、ウクライナを弱体化させるという目的は大部分達成したと見なすでしょう。 プーチンは征服地を固め、経済と社会を立て直す必要があります。早ければ早いほどロシアにとって有利であり、欧州がコンセンサスを形成して将来的に天然ガスの全面禁輸を実施するのを防げます。 しかしプーチンの野心が彼を破滅に導くリスクもあります。 我々は侵攻が南西ウクライナ(戦略的港湾都市オデッサを含む)やモルドバ東部に拡大する確率を35%と見積もります。モルドバでは親ロシア派が分離統治するトランスニストリア地域にロシア軍が駐留しています。 この新たなキャンペーンはウクライナを完全に内陸化し、モルドバを無力化し、ロシアにより大きな海上アクセスを与えるでしょう。しかしそれはEUを結束させ、天然ガス禁輸を誘発し、ロシアを弱体化させて絶望的な状況に追い込む可能性もあります。報復に出れば、広範な戦争につながることも考えられます。 フィンランドやスウェーデンがNATO加盟を試みたことでプーチンが攻撃する確率は7%にすぎないと見ます。スターリンはフィンランドに失敗し、プーチンの軍はキエフすら征服できませんでした。英国はこれらの国の支援を約束しており、攻撃はNATOとの戦争を引き起こす公算が大きいでしょう。フィンランド攻撃の決断はロシアがNATOがそこに基地を置く計画を立てていると本当に信じた場合にのみ生じるでしょう。つまりそれがロシアの宣言したレッドラインです。 バルト三国に対するロシアの攻撃は、それらが既にNATOに加盟しているため可能性は低いです。ただしプーチンが絶望的になれば起こり得るというリスクはあります。 我々はバルト侵攻のリスクを3%と見積もります。 要するに、ロシアが欧州に対するエネルギーの締め付けを停戦交渉で有利な合意を引き出すためではなく侵攻の拡大に使うなら、より広範な戦争の確率は上昇します。 結論: 結果として、今後24か月での鎮静化の確率は55%、小規模なエスカレーション(例:オデッサ、モルドバ)は35%、NATO加盟国を巻き込みNATOとロシアの戦争に発展する大規模なエスカレーションは10%です。 戦術的には、もし世界経済が回復しロシアが軍事作戦を中止して停戦交渉に舵を切る明確な転換を示すなら、先進国の欧州通貨および資産を買うべきです。景気循環的には、欧州資産で持続的な強気市場が実現するには米露間のより深い理解が必要です。 米国・イスラエルによるイラン攻撃の確率 今年起きている第三の地政学的危機は、バイデン大統領とアリー・ハメネイ師が2015年の米国・イラン核合意に再加盟することで当面先送りになる可能性があります。しかし我々は懐疑的です。 バイデン政権は2015年の核合意に再加盟して、イランの原油を日量約100万バレル市場に戻し、中間選挙前にガソリン価格を下げたいと考えています。米国のグランドストラテジーはまたイランと関与して中東を安定化させ、米国がアジアへ軸足を移せるようにしたいと考えています。 EUはイラン資源への需要がより大きく、イランの核獶取得を防ぎたいので合意を提案しています。ロシアと中国も対米制裁解除とイランとの貿易を望むため支持的ですし、必ずしもイランに核が持たれることを望んでいるわけではありません。 ただし一つ問題があります:イランは体制の長期的生存を確保するために核兵器を必要としている。 問題はハメネイが再び米国との合意を承認するかどうかです。最初の合意は彼の体制に大きな代償をもたらして裏切られました。近い将来ハメネイに代わって権力を握ることを望むエブラヒム・ライシ大統領は、自らのキャリアと個人の安全を2024年の大統領選の共和党勝利に賭けることには強く反対するでしょう。 イランは既に核ブレイクアウト能力を達成しています—核装置を構築できるだけの60%濃縮ウランを保有している—そして最終的に核抑止力を獲得しようとしない理由が不明です。特に将来的に米国やその同盟国からの軍事攻撃から体制を守る必要が生じる可能性があるためです。 ただし当社の確信度は中程度です。バイデン大統領は制裁解除を望んでおり一方的にそれを行うことができるからです。バイデン政権はいまだ合意を成立させるための予備的措置を講じていませんが、それは変わる可能性があります。3 短期的なつなぎ合意には好循環的な理屈があります。 BCAのコモディティ&エネルギー・ストラテジスト、ボブ・ライアンによれば、サウジアラビアとUAEの間の予備生産余力は合わせて約150万バレルに過ぎません。EUの石油禁輸と西側諸国の対ロシア制裁は約200万バレル/日を市場から押し出すため、OPECの余力の大部分を吸収します。したがってバイデン政権はイランが市場にもたらし得る100万バレルを必要としています。 我々はイランが制裁解除を認める合意に署名し、バイデンに制裁解除を可能にする可能性を否定できません。それは彼らの経済に利益をもたらします。彼らは核査察を許容しつつ、密かに弾頭や弾道ミサイル開発に注力を移すかもしれません。イランは不可逆的に核計画を放棄するわけではなく、時間稼ぎに長けています。 それでもイランの国内政治は合意を支持しておらず、米国が提供できる信頼できる安全保障の保証がなければ、イランのグランドストラテジーは合意を支持しません。米国はその外交政策の一貫性の欠如からそのような保証を提供できないのです。米国のグランドストラテジーは合意が検証可能であれば支持しますが、イランが合意を口実に爆弾を追求するようなケースは容認しません。 イランは3年間の最大制裁、パンデミック、世界的混乱を経ても屈服していません。そしてロシアと中国が西側に攻勢をかけるようになったことで、戦略的利益を引き出す見通しがより大きくなったとイランは見ています。 モスクワと北京は対ワシントンの共通の不満のため戦略的パートナーになり得ます。一方で米国はルーハニ政権を裏切ったのと同じようにライシ政権を裏切ることも容易であり、その結果として経済は再び翻弄され、最高指導者と政治体制は国民から二重に愚か者と見なされるでしょう。 図表 3はイランの選択肢を整理しています。 図表 3 イラン核危機に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五連発拳銃でのルーレット 五連発拳銃でのルーレット   交渉が決裂した場合(50%)、イランは米国とイスラエルが攻撃する前に核兵器確保へ向けて突進するでしょう。 米国とイランが合意に達した場合(40%)、イランは2024年の米国選挙まで合意の条件に従う可能性があり、当面は投資家の懸念材料が除かれます。しかし長期的に核抑止力を得ようとする利害は変わらず、2024年以降に紛争が再燃するでしょう。 協議が決着せず継続する場合(10%)、イランは合意の制約なしに核計画を漸進的に進めるでしょう(ただし突発的な突進を必ずしも必要としないかもしれません)。 要するに、ロシアと中国はイランが核計画を凍結してもイランを必要としますが、米国とイスラエルはイランを抑止するために勢力均衡のアブラハム同盟を形成するでしょう—たとえイランが核計画を凍結してもです。 結論: 投資家は短期的なつなぎの米国・イラン核合意に40%の確率を割り当てるべきです。原油価格の下落は一時的なものにとどまるでしょう。長期的な供給拡大は、米国がイランに不可逆的に核計画を停止させるのに十分な安全保障保証を提供できないため期待できません。 第三次世界大戦の確率 ここからが難しい部分で、これら3つの地政学的危機を合わせて考えます。以下では単純化しすぎていますが、異なるプレーヤーとその選択肢について我々の考えを形式化するのが目的です。 図表 4は中国/台湾紛争に関する結論から出発し、その結果としてロシアのより広範な戦争の確率を調整し、イランが核兵器追求に極めて積極的であるという見方を加えたものです。時間枠は再び2年です。 図表 4 第三次世界大戦に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五発の銃を使ったルーレット 五発の銃を使ったルーレット   WWIIIとは異なる紛争シナリオとしては「限定戦争」があり—これは米国が関与しない、あるいは間接的にしか関与しないハイブリッド戦や代理戦争を指す危険な概念です。あるいはロシアと中国を巻き込まないイランとの紛争である可能性もあります。 我々は中国から議論を始めます。なぜなら中国は現代で最も有能で野心的なグローバルパワーだからです。中国の戦略的台頭は世界秩序を揺るがし米国に挑戦しています。また今年のいくつかの証拠から、ロシアは戦争をウクライナ外に拡大する意図を持っていない可能性が示唆されていることも理由です。 中国が台湾に対してさらなる攻撃的行動を取れば、ロシアがより大きなリスクを取るユニークな機会が生まれます。そうでない場合、WWIIIの確率は2年間で急落します。これが我々のベースケースです。 しかし中国が台湾を攻撃し米国が台湾を防衛する場合、我々はロシアがバルト三国に侵攻する確率が高まると見ています。もし中国がハイブリッド攻撃を行い米国が台湾を間接的にしか支援しないなら、ロシアの攻勢の確率はわずかにしか上がりません。 結果として、WWIII(米国がロシアまたは中国、あるいは両者と直接戦う戦争)の確率は20%になります。こうした戦争が限定的に留まるかどうかは議論の余地があります。1945年以降の戦争ゲームは、主要核保有国間の戦争はエスカレートしやすいことを示しています。しかし核兵器は相互確証破壊という究極の制約をもたらします。核エスカレーションのリスクがあるため、我々はディシジョンツリーにおけるWWIIIの確率を下方に丸めています。 より確からしい59%の「限定戦争」シナリオは一見ポジティブな結果のように見えるかもしれませんが、そこには今日の水準からの地政学的緊張の大幅な上昇、例えば中国の台湾に対するハイブリッド戦などが含まれます。 結論: この試算ではWWIIIの確率は最大20%に達し得ます。これは我々のロシアに関するディシジョンツリーの水準の倍であり、当社の台湾危機の予測が現実化したことを考慮すると妥当です。 重要な要因は、今秋の党大会後に北京が台湾への圧力をさらにエスカレートさせるかどうかです。それが危険な連鎖反応を引き起こす可能性があります。 世界経済と金融市場は地政学的リスクからの下振れリスクを依然として抱えていますが、ロシアが停戦に向かい、中国が台湾への行動を遅らせて経済再起動に集中する場合、2023年には改善が見られる可能性があります。 投資の示唆 今年初めにロシアがウクライナに侵攻した際、当社の同僚であるチーフ・グローバル・ストラテジストのピーター・ベレジンは核による破滅の確率を10%と主張しました。 少なくともこれはロシアとNATOが衝突する確率として合理的な数値です。 今や予想された台湾危機が現実になりました。我々は主要な戦争の確率が20%へと倍増したと推定します。 逆に言えばより良い結果が起こる確率は80%です。分析的には、我々は依然としてロシアが限定的な目的—ウクライナを繁栄や軍事的に強大にさせないよう弱体化する—を追求していると見ており、中国も限定的な目的—台湾を国家たる存在としてではなく従属へと向かわせることで威嚇する—を追求していると見ています。 これらの目的が変わらない限り、我々はまだ第三次世界大戦からは遠いと考えます。 世界は不活化されたウクライナと従属した台湾と共存できます。 しかし否定できないのは、2008年のグローバル金融危機以降の世界情勢の軌跡が第二次世界大戦前の道筋と不快なほど似ているということです:金融危機、経済後退、デフレ、国内不安、通貨切り下げ、貿易保護主義、債務の貨幣化、軍備増強、インフレ、そして侵略戦争。ルーレットがゲームなら、世界戦争の確率は6分の1、すなわち17%であり、我々のディシジョンツリーの20%という結果に近い数値です。 我々が仮に大げさであるとしても、WWIIIの確率が20%に達すると論理的に主張できること自体が、投資家が現在のウクライナと台湾をめぐる緊張が低下するまで大きなリスクを取るのを待つべきであることを示唆しています。 簡単なチェックリストを見ると、グローバルマクロと地政学の文脈は陰鬱です(表 1)。チェックリストの改善が見られるまでより楽観的になるのは控えるべきです。 表 1 2022年下半期にポジティブな触媒は多くない 五発の拳銃を使ったルーレット 五発の拳銃を使ったルーレット     チャート 2 2022年下半期は防御的ポジションを維持 2022年下半期は防御的なポジションを維持する 2022年下半期は防御的なポジションを維持する 具体的には、投資家はロシアがNATOに拡大しないこと、そして中国が当面台湾を侵攻しないことに合理的な安心感を持つ必要があります。 これはワシントンとモスクワ、ワシントンと北京の間で紛争を回避する新たな外交的理解を要求します。 そのような理解は危機の中でしか築かれません。関連する危機は進行中ですがまだ完了していません。 通常の解決策である外交を通じて戦争リスクが払拭されるまで、グローバル株式にはさらに下振れリスクがある可能性が高いです。 世界システムの具体的かつ信頼できる改善が見られるまで、リスク資産に対して一般的なオーバーウェイト姿勢を取るのは控えましょう。株より政府債券を重視し、グローバル株より米国株、景気敏感セクターよりディフェンシブ・セクターを好み、中国・台湾の通貨と資産は評価を下げることを推奨します(チャート 2)。     マット・ガートケン チーフ・ジオポリティカル・ストラテジストmattg@bcaresearch.com  脚注 1      記:Graham Allison、Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?(New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017)。 2     例えば、オデッサからの穀物輸送に関するトルコ仲介の合意、2015年イラン核合意への再加盟を支持する外交的動き、ヘルソンのような征服地での住民投票、軍縮交渉での影響力強化の試みなどです。欧州のエネルギーを断つことは最終的に欧州を停戦に有利な条件で妥協させるための圧力手段です。 3     イランは依然として余計な要求を出しています—最近ではIAEAがイランの未公表の核施設で発見された特定の人工ウラン粒子の出所を調査している件を取り下げるよう要求しました。IAEAはこの調査を取り下げておらず、取り下げればIAEAの信頼性が損なわれます。一方でバイデンは制裁を強化しており、制裁解除はイランの主要な要求です。バイデンはイラン革命防衛隊やイQods部隊をテロ指定から外していません。これらのハードルは決定的ではありませんが、我々の見方を変える前に何らかの進展を見るべきだと考えます。 戦略テーマ オープン・タクティカル・ポジション(0~6か月) オープン・サイクリック推奨(6~18か月) 地域別地政学リスクマトリックス 「打率」:地政学ストラテジーの成果()
Executive Summary Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation Inflation is not about oil, food or used car prices. Looking at prices of individual components of a consumer basket is akin to missing the forest for the trees. Despite the latest drop in US headline inflation, various core CPI measures continue trending up and registered considerable month-on-month rises in July. Wages and, more specifically, unit labor costs are the true measure of genuine and persistent inflation. US wage growth is very elevated, and the pace of unit labor cost gains has surged to a 40-year high. The conditions for sustainable and persistent disinflation in the US are not yet present. US inflation will prove to be much stickier and more entrenched than many market participants presently believe. The recovery in China will be U- rather than V-shaped, with risks tilted to the downside. The mainland’s property market breakdown is structural, not cyclical. Excesses are very large, and problems are snowballing, rendering the enacted policy stimulus insufficient. Bottom Line: US core inflation lingering above 4% and easing financial conditions will compel the Fed to continue hiking rates. This will cap global risk asset prices and put a floor under the US dollar.  We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Consistently, we are also reluctant to chase EM currencies higher. Feature The bullish macro narrative circulating in the investment community is that conditions for a cyclical rally in global risk assets have fallen into place. Specifically: US inflation will drop sharply as US growth has crested and commodity prices have plunged; The Fed is nearing the end of a tightening cycle; China has stimulated sufficiently, and its economy is about to recover, which will boost economic conditions among its trading partners in general and EM in particular. These assumptions along with the fact that the S&P 500 index has found support at a 3-year moving average – a proven line of defense – suggest that US share prices have likely bottomed (Chart 1). Are we witnessing déjà vu of the 2011, 2016, 2018 and 2020 market bottoms? Chart 1Déjà Vu? Is 2022 Like The 2011, 2016 And 2018 Bottoms In The S&P 500? We have reservations about all of the above fundamental conjectures. We elaborate on these reservations in this report. On the whole, we contend that the current environment is different, and the roadmaps of all post-2009 equity market bottoms are not necessarily currently applicable. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team believes that (1) US consumer price inflation is much more entrenched and will prove stickier than is commonly believed; and (2) the Chinese property market’s breakdown is structural, not cyclical; hence, the recovery will not gain traction easily.  Is This The End Of The US Inflation Problem? Not Quite This week’s US inflation data confirmed that headline CPI inflation has probably peaked: prices in several categories plunged. However, inflation is not about oil, food or used car prices. Chart 2 reveals that historically there have been several episodes whereby core inflation remains elevated despite plunging oil prices. Chart 2US Core Inflation Does Not Always Follow Oil Prices Looking at price dynamics among the individual components of the CPI basket is akin to missing the forest for the trees. Inflation is a very inert and persistent phenomenon. Underlying inflation does not change its direction often and/or quickly. That is why we believe that it is premature to celebrate the end of the US inflation problem. A few observations on this matter: Despite the drop in US headline inflation, various core CPI measures − like trimmed-mean CPI, median CPI and core sticky CPI − all continue trending up and registered substantial month-on-month rises in July (Chart 3). The range of core inflation based on these annual and month-month annualized rates is between 4-7%. In brief, the rate of genuine/sticky inflation is well above the Fed’s 2% target. Given its unconditional commitment to bringing inflation down to 2%, the Fed will continue hiking interest rates ceteris paribus. Chart 3US Core CPI Measures Are Still Very High Chart 4US Wages Growth Has Been Surging   We continue to emphasize that wages and, more specifically, unit labor costs are the true measures of persistent and genuine inflation. We have written at length about why wages and unit labor costs are more important to inflation than oil or food prices. US wage growth is very elevated and is accelerating (Chart 4). Unit labor costs, calculated as hourly wages divided by productivity, have also been surging to a 40-year high (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 5Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation The reason for this very strong wage growth and swelling unit labor costs is the very tight labor market. The bottom panel of Chart 5 demonstrates that labor demand is still outpacing labor supply by a wide margin. Hence, wage inflation will not subside until the unemployment rate rises meaningfully. Bottom Line: Conditions for sustainable and persistent disinflation in the US are not yet present.  Inflation will prove to be much stickier and more entrenched than many market participants presently believe. Core inflation lingering above 4% and easing financial conditions will compel the Fed to continue hiking rates. This will cap risk asset prices and put a floor under the US dollar.   China: Is This Time Different? If one believes that China’s current business cycle is similar to all previous ones seen since 2009, odds are that a buying opportunity in China-related financial markets is at hand. Chart 6 illustrates that the credit and fiscal spending impulse leads the business cycle by about nine months. Given that this impulse bottomed late last year, a trough in the Chinese business cycle is due. Chart 6Is A Recovery In China's Business Cycle Imminent? It is always risky to suggest that this time is different. Nevertheless, at the risk of being wrong, we contend that a combination of (1) property markets woes, (2) an impending export contraction, and (3) the dynamic zero-COVID policy will reduce the multiplier effect of current stimulus measures. Hence, a meaningful recovery in economic activity will likely fail to materialize in the coming months. The challenges facing the mainland property market are now well known. Yet, excesses are very large, and problems are snowballing, making policy stimulus insufficient. In particular: Authorities are contemplating bailout funds for property developers in the range of RMB 300-400 billion to enable them to complete housing that has been pre-sold. This is not sufficient financing for overall property construction. Table 1How Large Are Property Developers Bailout Funds? Table 1 illustrates that these amounts are equal to just 3-4% of annual fixed-asset investment in real estate excluding land purchases, 1.5-2% of total financing of developers, and 3-4% of the advance payments that property developers received for pre-sold housing in 2021. Property developers will not be receiving any cash upon the completion and delivery of presold housing units because they were paid in advance. Hence, without liquidating their other assets, homebuilders cannot repay the bailout financing. Consequently, only state financing can work here because, from the viewpoint of providers of this financing, this scheme de-facto means throwing good money after bad. The property industry in China is extremely fragmented. This makes bailouts difficult to organize and execute. There are officially about 100,000 property developers in China. The overwhelming majority of them are not state-owned companies. Plus, the two largest property developers, Evergrande (before defaulting) and Country Garden, had only 3.8% and 3.3% of market share respectively in 2020. The failure of homebuilders to complete and deliver pre-sold housing units could unleash a death spiral for them. In recent years, 90% of housing units have been pre-sold, i.e., buyers made advance payments/prepayments, often taking out mortgages (Chart 7, top panel). Witnessing the inability of developers to deliver on presold units, a rising number of people may decide to wait to buy. The largest source of developers’ financing – advance payments for pre-sold housing units – might very well dry up. This source has accounted for 50% of real estate developers’ total financing in recent years (Chart 7, bottom panel). In brief, a vicious cycle is possible. The lack of financing for homebuilders bodes ill for construction activity (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Housing Presales And Pre-Payments Are Critical To Developers Chart 8Lack Of Homebuilder Financing = Shrinking Construction Activity Chart 9Chinese Property Developers Are Extremely Leveraged Besides, property developers are very leveraged with an assets-to-equity ratio close to nine (Chart 9). They have grown accustomed to borrowing heavily to accumulate real estate assets. They have been starting but not completing construction (Chart 10, top panel). We have been referring to this phenomenon as the biggest carry trade in the world. The bottom panel of Chart 10 shows two different measures of residential floor space inventories held by property developers. One measure subtracts completed floor space from started floor space, and another one deducts sold floor space from started floor space. On both measures, residential inventories are enormous. In theory, they could raise funds by selling their real estate assets. However, if they all try to sell simultaneously, there will not be enough buyers, and asset prices will plunge, which could lead to a full-blown debt deflation spiral. The last time the real estate market was similarly distressed in 2014-15, the central bank launched the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) facility. This was effectively a QE program to monetize housing. This was the reason why housing recovered strongly in 2016-2017. There is currently no such program up for discussion. On the whole, odds are that the current property market breakdown is structural, not cyclical. Financial markets – the prices of stocks and USD bonds of property developers – convey a similar message and continue to plunge (Chart 11). Chart 10Excessive Property Inventories Chart 11No Green Light From Property Stocks And Corporate Bond Prices Chart 12There Has Been No Recovery In China Without A Revival in Real Estate Without an improvement in the housing market, a meaningful business cycle recovery is unlikely in China. Chart 12 illustrates that all recoveries in the Chinese broader economy since 2009 occurred alongside a revival in property sales. The importance of the property market goes beyond its size. Rising property prices lift household and business confidence, boosting aggregate spending and investment. The sluggish housing market and falling house prices will impair consumer and business confidence. This, along with uncertainty related to the dynamic zero-COVID policy, will dent consumer spending and private investments. Finally, the upcoming contraction in Chinese exports will dampen national income growth. Taken together, the multiplier effect of stimulus in the upcoming months will be lower than it has been in previous periods of stimulus. There are two areas that will see meaningful improvement in the coming months: infrastructure spending and autos. BCA’s China Investment Strategy service discussed the outlook for auto sales in a recent report. Chart 13Green Shoots In China's Infrastructure Investment On the infrastructure front, there has been mixed evidence of an improvement in activity. The top and middle panels of Chart 13 demonstrate that Komatsu machinery’s operational hours and the number of approved infrastructure projects might be bottoming. However, the installation of high-power electricity lines has fallen to a 15-year low (Chart 13, bottom panel).   As we elaborated in last month’s report, the new financing/stimulus for infrastructure development will not result in new investments. Rather, it will by and large offset the drop in local government (LG) revenues from land sales this year. In short, there is little new stimulus for infrastructure beyond what was approved in the budget plan earlier this year. Bottom Line: The recovery in China will be U- rather than V-shaped, with risks tilted to the downside. Investment Recommendations Our bias is that the rebound in global risk assets could last for a few more weeks. The basis is that investor positioning in risk assets was very light when this rebound began. Plus, falling oil prices could reinforce the idea among investors that US inflation is no longer a problem. Looking beyond the next several weeks, the outlook for global and EM risk assets is dismal. Markets will realize that the Fed cannot halt its tightening with core inflation well above 4-5%. Hawkish Fed policy and contracting global trade will boost the US dollar and weigh on cyclical assets. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Consistently, we are also reluctant to chase EM currencies higher. EM local bonds offer value, as we have argued over the past couple of months, but for now we prefer to focus on yield curve flattening trades. We continue betting on yield curve flattening/inversion in Mexico and Colombia and are long Brazilian 10-year domestic bonds while hedging the currency risk. In addition, we recommend investors continue receiving 10-year swap rates in China and Malaysia.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)
BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategy service is neutral on the dollar over the next three-to-six months. The drivers of dollar downside have been clear. First, long-term interest rates in the US have fallen substantially. The US 10-year Treasury yield…
Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary The Euro And The Chinese Credit Impulse The US dollar has bounced off its 50-day moving average. In the recent past, that had led to a period of cyclical strength. The yen rally can be explained by the decline in Treasury yields and the fall in energy prices. Where next for the yen will depend on the time horizon. For investors trying to time the bottom, the euro is not yet a buy, but the common currency is incredibly cheap. Much depends on global/Chinese growth (Feature Chart). One of the key drivers of the dollar is volatility, and the correlation with the MOVE index. Less uncertainty will ease safe-haven demand. Stay short EUR/JPY and CHF/JPY. Remain long EUR/GBP. Maintain a limit sell on CHF/SEK at 10.76. RECOMMENDATIONS inception date RETURN Short EUR/JPY 2022-07-21 3.68 Bottom Line: We are tactically neutral the dollar but will be sellers on strength. Questions And Answers Chart 1Currencies And Yield Differentials It is rare that we receive clients in our Montreal office. This has obviously been doubly the case due to the pandemic and the general hassle of travel nowadays. But when we do, it is a delight. In this week’s report, we got asked a few difficult questions on a tea date. The most important was not surprisingly the dollar view, but also our highest conviction trades in FX markets. We enjoyed the conversation and the intellectual debate, so we thought we would share this with our clients. Hopefully, this answers some of the most pressing questions. We have sliced this into as brief and concise a conversation as we could. Question: It is hard not to notice the steep decline in the dollar over the last few weeks. Should we fade this decline or lean into it? That is a tough question, but our educated guess is to fade it for now. That said, longer-term asset allocators should really be looking at buying extremely cheap G10 currencies on any declines. The drivers of dollar downside have been clear. First, long-term interest rates in the US have fallen substantially. The US 10-year Treasury yield has fallen from 3.5% to 2.7%. In real terms, they have also declined. The 10-year TIPS yield has fallen from 0.85% to 0.23%. On a relative basis, the market is also pricing in that the Fed will cut interest rates next year much faster than other central banks. More simply put, 2-year real bond yields in the US are rolling over, relative to the euro area and Japan, the biggest components of the DXY index (Chart 1). Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyHow Deep A Recession Is The Dollar Pricing In? Specific to Japan and the euro area, there has also been another critical factor – the decline in energy import costs. Germany’s trade balance improved markedly in June (Chart 2). This has been the first genuine improvement in a year. There is also discussion to extend the life of existing nuclear power plants, which will help assuage energy import costs. In Japan, trade balance data comes out on Monday next week, so we will see what it reveals. But what has been clear is a political drive to restart nuclear power and wean the Japanese economy off its dependence on oil and gas (Chart 3). Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida has been very vocal about this in recent speeches. Chart 2Euro Area And Japanese Trade Balances Are Improving Chart 3A Nuclear Renaissance In Japan? Turning to the more important part of your question, should we fade the decline or lean into it? We are of two minds on this to be honest, and here is why. The DXY has bounced off its 50-day moving average, which has been a sign in the past that the rally is not over (Chart 4). Our Geopolitical and Commodity & Energy colleagues are telling us not to trust the decline in oil prices. Our bond strategists think US yields are heading higher, with a whisper floor of 2.5%. Chart 4The DXY Has Support At The 50-Day Moving Average Given these crosscurrents, there are many better opportunities that exist in FX at the crosses, rather than playing the dollar outright. But of course, the dollar call is critical. We would be neutral over the next three-to-six months but be incremental sellers of the dollar on strength. Question: Okay, neutral dollar for now, but bearish long term. We tend to consider longer-term investments as well, and we are confused about the euro, but even more so about the yen. Would you buy the yen today? If so, why? Our starting point for many currencies is valuation. On this basis, the yen is incredibly cheap. So, if you have a five-to-ten-year horizon, you can unlock incredible value in Japan, simply on a buy-and-hold basis. Our in-house curated model shows that the yen is at a multi-general low in value terms (Chart 5). Currencies mean-revert. Consider this for a minute – we are not equity experts, but Toyota trades at a P/E of 10.75, while Tesla trades at a P/E of 109.15. And yes, Toyota has electric cars. Chart 5The Japense Yen Is Incredibly Cheap Chart 6The Yen Is A Favorite Short It is true that a winner-takes-all mantra can be attributed to Tesla’s valuation over Toyota, but our colleagues in the Global Investment Strategy are telling us this era is over. As such, at a 40% discount, the yen is a long-term buy in our books. Interestingly, nobody likes the yen, at least by our preferred measure – net speculative positions. It is one of the most shorted G10 currencies (Chart 6). A cheap currency that is the most shorted ranks quite well in our evaluation of bargains in currency markets. Given my discussion above about the dollar, we have played the yen at the crosses. We are short EUR/JPY and CHF/JPY. On the euro, Japanese car manufacturers are simply becoming more competitive than their eurozone or US counterparts. This is not only related to the car industry, but according to the OECD, EUR/JPY is expensive on a purchasing power parity basis (Chart 7). Meanwhile, a short EUR/JPY trade is a perfect hedge for a pro-cyclical portfolio. The DXY index has historically traded in perfect inverse correlation to the euro-yen exchange rate (Chart 8). This suggests the collapse in the yen, relative to the euro, is very much overdone. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY will sell off. Meanwhile, there are also fundamental reasons to suggest that the yen should trade higher vis-à-vis the euro. Chart 7Remain Short ##br##EUR/JPY Chart 8The DXY And EUR/JPY Usually Track Each Other Question: Okay, let’s switch to the euro. I know you are short EUR/JPY, which has been working out well in the last few days. But the euro touched parity and I get a sense that it has bottomed. You have often mentioned that the euro has priced in one of the deepest recessions in the eurozone. I am surprised you are not trumpeting this currency and a once-in-a-lifetime buying opportunity. We agree somewhat with your conclusion but not the premise. Let’s consider the narrative over the last few months in the media. The first was that eurozone inflation will never catch up to the US, because the economy was structurally weak. Well, it did, albeit due to an exogenous shock.  So, among a ranking of stagflationary candidates, the euro area is a top contender. If you believe in the idea that currencies are driven by real interest rates, rising inflation, and falling growth are an anathema for the exchange rate. When we typically have doubts about the euro area economy, and the outlook for its financial markets, we consult with our European Investment Strategy colleagues. We did just that and Mathieu Savary, who heads the service, mentioned two things: one – Chinese import volumes are imploding. For net creditor nations, this is a negative as their source of income is waning. The euro area falls into that category. The second thing to consider is that the dollar is a momentum currency. So is the euro. We mentioned earlier that the dollar bounced off its 50-day moving average, which explains euro weakness in recent trading days. In the end, Mathieu and the FX team did not really disagree, but I highlighted two charts to track. The euro tracks the Chinese credit impulse due to the importance of Chinese import demand for the euro area. It looks like our measure of that impulse has bottomed (Chart 9). If it has, you buy the euro on a long-term view. Relatedly, financial conditions are easing in China. As the Chinese bond market becomes more open and liberalized, bond yields become a financial conditions valve. That has been the case and has perfectly tracked the propensity for imports in the last few years (Chart 10). Chart 9The Euro And The Chinese Credit Impulse Chart 10Financial Conditions Are Easing In China In short, we will buy the euro if it touches parity, and even more so below parity with a 5–10-year view, but we think EUR/USD could touch 0.95 in the near term. I guess what we are saying is that a 5%-7% move is big in FX markets, but a 26% move (the undervaluation of the euro) is a whale. We do not see the catalyst for a whale in our current compass. Question: We have talked about the yen and the euro. I do not want to get into the pound, Australian dollar, and other currencies as you have told me your team has upcoming reports on those. But the Chinese yuan is very important in my investment portfolio. Any ideas on its next move? USD/CNY topped out near 6.8 in May. Since then, it has been in a trading range despite the DXY breaking to multi-decade highs (Chart 11). When a pattern like this emerges, it is always useful to revisit fundamentals. Those fundamentals are real interest rate differentials. We care about the yuan because China is a big trading partner of the US. As such, it is also a huge weight in the broad trade-weighted dollar index. China has huge problems, especially related to the property market, which need to be resolved. Bond yields have also collapsed. But the real interest rate in China is very attractive (Chart 12). It is also important to consider that if the dollar is the global safe haven, that means that the yuan could be becoming the haven in Asia. So, yuan downside is not a big risk for our long-term dollar bearish call. That said, we will be short CNY versus the yen, but not the dollar. Chart 11The RMB Has Been Relatively Resilient Chart 12The RMB Has Undershot Real Rate Differentials Question: I think I could sit with you all morning to discuss other aspects of FX,  but I respect you have a tight stop due to the BLU meeting. Any concluding thoughts? I have one. Very often, we debate with our colleagues about capital flows. The dollar rises (in general), as capital inflows accelerate into the US and vice versa. It is often said that getting the dollar call right gets everything else right. So, if you can predict the path of the dollar, the performance of, say, US versus non-US equities becomes easy. Chart 13The Dollar And Earnings Revisions We agree that the dollar is a real-time indicator of relative fundamentals. But here is one important observation: relative earnings revisions are deteriorating in the US vis-à-vis other countries (Chart 13). That has historically had an impact on exchange rates, as it affects equity capital flows. If the Federal Reserve also cut rates next year as the market is predicting, that will also be a negative for bond inflows. We think the global economy will avoid a deep recession, and that will allow growth to pick up outside the US. When the euro area and China bottom, then the dollar will truly peak, as capital flows to these economies will accelerate. So we are watching relative earnings and bond yield differentials closely.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
Counterpoint’s August schedule: Next week, I am travelling to see clients in Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, so we will send you a report on China’s 20th National Party Congress written by our Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Matt Gertken. Given that the outlook for the $100 trillion Chinese real estate market is crucial for the global economy and markets, Matt’s insights will be very interesting. Then on August 18, I will host the monthly Counterpoint webcast, which I hope you can join. We will then take a week’s summer holiday and return with a report on September 1. Executive Summary In the topsy-turvy recession of 2022, real wages have collapsed. This means profits have stayed resilient and firms have not laid off workers. Making this recession a ‘cost of living crisis’ rather than a ‘jobs crisis’. If inflation comes down slowly, then the ‘cost of living crisis’ will persist. But if inflation comes down quickly while wage inflation remains sticky, firms will lay off workers to protect their profits, turning the ‘cost of living crisis’ into a ‘jobs crisis’. Either way, this will keep a choke on consumer spending, and particularly the spending on goods, which is likely to remain in recession. Meanwhile, until mortgage rates move meaningfully lower, housing investment will also remain in recession.  The double choke on growth means that the bear market in the 30-year T-bond is likely over. This suggests that the bear market in stock market valuations is also over, but that ‘cyclical value’ is now vulnerable to profit downgrades. Hence, equity investors should stick with ‘defensive growth’, specifically healthcare and biotech. Fractal trading watchlist: GBP/USD and Hungarian versus Polish bonds. In The 2008 Recession, Real Wage Rates ##br##Went Up So Employment Went Down… …But In The 2022 Recession, Real Wage Rates##br##Went Down So Employment Went Up! Bottom Line: The bear market in the 30-year T-bond and stock market valuations is likely over, but equity investors should stick with ‘defensive growth’, specifically healthcare and biotech. Feature The US economy has just contracted for two consecutive quarters, meeting the rule-of-thumb definition of a recession. Other major economies are likely to follow. Yet many economists and strategists are in denial. This cannot be a ‘proper’ recession, they say, because the economy remains at full employment. But the recession-deniers are wrong. It is a recession, albeit it is a ‘topsy-turvy’ recession in which employment remains high (so far) because real wage rates have collapsed, circumventing the need for lay-offs. This contrasts with a typical recession when real wage rates remain high, forcing the need for lay-offs.1 The Topsy-Turvy Recession Of 2022 When do firms lay off workers? The answer is, when they need to protect their profits. Profits are nothing more than revenues minus costs, and in a typical recession revenues slow much faster than the firms’ biggest cost, the wage bill. In this event, the only way that firms can protect their profits is to lay off workers. Chart I-1 confirms that every time that nominal sales have shrunk relative to wage rates, the unemployment rate has gone up. Without exception. Chart I-1Unemployment Goes Up Whenever Firms' Wage Rates Rise Faster Than Their Revenues... But what happens during a recession in which nominal sales do not shrink relative to wage rates? In this event, profits stay resilient, so firms do not need to lay off workers. Welcome to the topsy-turvy recession of 2022! In the topsy-turvy recession of 2022, there has been much greater inflation in consumer prices and nominal sales than in nominal wage rates (Chart I-2). The result is that real wage rates have collapsed, profits have stayed resilient, and firms have not needed to lay off workers… so far. Chart I-2...But In The 2022 Recession, Wage Rates Have Risen Slower Than Revenues, So Unemployment Hasn't Gone Up In a typical recession, the pain falls on the minority of workers who lose their jobs, as well as on profits. Paradoxically, for the majority that keep their jobs, real wages go up. This is because sticky wage inflation tends to hold up more than collapsing price inflation. For example, in the 2008 recession, the real wage rate surged by 4 percent (Chart I-3), and in the 2020 recession it rose by 2 percent. Chart I-3In The 2008 Recession, Real Wage Rates Went Up So Employment Went Down... Yet in the 2022 recession, the real wage rate has shrunk by 4 percent, meaning that the pain of the recession has fallen on all of us (Chart I-4). In one sense therefore, this recession is ‘fairer’ because ‘we’re all in it together’. This is confirmed by the current malaise being characterised not as a ‘jobs crisis’, but as a ‘cost of living crisis’. In another sense though, the recession is unfair because the pain has not been shared by corporate profits, which have remained resilient… so far. Chart I-4...But In The 2022 Recession, Real Wage Rates Went Down So Employment Went Up! The crucial question is, what happens next? Using the US as our template, wage rates are growing at 5-6 percent, and this growth rate is typically stickier than sales growth. Assuming inflation drifts lower, nominal sales growth will also drift lower from its current 7 percent clip, meaning that it could soon dip below sticky wage growth. Once the growth in firms’ revenues has dipped below that in nominal wage rates, profits will finally keel over. To repeat, profits are nothing more than revenues minus costs, where the biggest cost is the wage bill (Chart I-5).2 Chart I-5Profits Are Nothing More Than Revenues Minus Costs At this point, the downturn will become more conventional. To protect profits, firms will be forced to lay off workers who will bear the pain of the downturn alongside falling profits. Meanwhile, with inflation easing, real wage growth for the majority that keep their jobs will turn positive. But to repeat, this is the typical pattern in a recession. Accelerating real wage rates are entirely consistent with a contracting economy as we witnessed in both 2008 and 2020.  As Two Huge Imbalances Correct, Demand Will Be Pegged Back All of this assumes that real demand will remain under pressure, so the question is what is pegging back real demand? The answer is: corrections in two huge imbalances in the global economy. A breakdown of the -1.3 percent contraction in the US economy reveals these two corrections:3   Spending on goods, which contributed -1.2 percent Housing investment, which contributed -0.7 percent. These corrections are not over. As we presciently explained back in February in A Massive Economic Imbalance, Staring Us In The Face: “The pandemic overspend on goods constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. An overspend on goods is corrected by a subsequent underspend; but an underspend on services is not corrected by a subsequent overspend. The pandemic overspend on goods constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. This unfortunate asymmetry means that the recent overspend on goods at the expense of services makes the economy vulnerable to a recession. And the risk is exacerbated by central banks’ intentions to hike rates in response to inflation” (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Pandemic Overspend On Goods Constitutes One Of The Greatest Imbalances In Economic History Then, in The Global Housing Boom Is Over, As Buying Becomes More Expensive Than Renting, we identified a second major imbalance that is starting to correct. Specifically, the global housing boom of the past decade, which has doubled the worth of global real estate to $370 trillion, was predicated on ultra-low mortgage rates that made buying a home more attractive than renting. But in many parts of the world now, buying a home has become more expensive than renting (Chart I-7). Disappearing US and European homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers will weigh on home prices and housing investment – at least until policymakers are forced to bring down mortgage rates (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-7Buying A Home Has Become More Expensive Than Renting! Chart I-8Homebuyers Have Disappeared... Chart I-9...While Home-Sellers Are Flooding The Market Meanwhile, as Chinese policymakers try and gently let the air out of the $100 trillion Chinese real estate market, a collapse in Chinese property development and construction activity will have negative long-term implications for commodities, emerging Asia, and developing countries that produce raw materials. More Investment Conclusions In addition to the long-term investment conclusions just described, we can draw some shorter-term conclusions: If inflation comes down slowly, then the current ‘cost of living crisis’, which is pummelling everyone’s real incomes, will persist. But if inflation comes down quickly while wage inflation remains sticky, firms will be forced to lay off workers to protect their profits, turning the ‘cost of living crisis’ into a ‘jobs crisis’. Either way, this will keep a choke on consumer spending, and particularly the spending on goods, which is likely to remain in recession. Meanwhile, until mortgage rates move meaningfully lower, housing investment will also remain in recession.  Equityinvestors should stick with ‘defensive growth’, specifically healthcare and biotech. This double choke on growth is likely to keep a lid on ultra-long bond yields, even if central banks need to hike short-term rates more than expected to slay inflation. Our proprietary fractal analysis confirms that the sell-off in the 30-year T-bond is likely over (Chart I-10). Chart I-10The Bear Market In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Likely Over For the stock market, this suggests that the valuation bear market is now over, but that ‘cyclical value’ sectors are now vulnerable to profit downgrades. Hence, equity investors should stick with ‘defensive growth’, specifically healthcare and biotech. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week we noticed that the sudden 20 percent collapse of Hungarian versus Polish 10-year bonds, has reached the point of short-term fractal fragility that suggests an imminent rebound. Hence, we are adding this to our watchlist. Go long GBP/USD. But our trade is GBP/USD. UK political risk is diminishing, the BoE is likely to be as, or more, hawkish than the Fed, and the 260-day fractal structure of GBP/USD is at the point of fragility that has signalled major turning points in 2014, 15, 16, 18 and 21 (Chart I-11). Accordingly the recommendation is long GBP/USD, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent.   Chart I-11Go Long GBP/USD Expect Hungarian Bonds To Rebound Chart 1CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point   Chart 2Expect Hungarian Bonds To Rebound Chart 3Copper's Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Chart 4US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 5CAD/SEK Is Reversing Chart 6Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Chart 7The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended Chart 8The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended Chart 9FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 10Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Ended Chart 11The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility Chart 12The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 13Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Chart 14German Telecom Outperformance Has Started To Reverse Chart 15Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 16ETH Is Approaching A Possible Capitulation Chart 17The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended Chart 18The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Has Ended Chart 19A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 20Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 21Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Chart 22Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Chart 23Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Is Exhausted Chart 24USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 25The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended Chart 26A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 27US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 28The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The best measure of wage rates is the employment cost index (ECI) because it includes all forms of compensation including benefits and bonuses. 2  In fact, stock market profits are even more cyclical because, as well as wages, there are other sticky deductions from revenues such as interest and taxes. 3 All expressed as annualised rates. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-12 Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
The Citigroup economic surprise indices for the US and the Euro Area are both deep in negative territory. Although the US index was first to cross below 0 in mid-May, the Eurozone measure turned negative towards the end of June and has recently been…
Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Following last week’s sharp post-FOMC rally, we shifted our 12-month equity recommendation from overweight to neutral. We expect stock prices to rise further during the remainder of the year as US recession risks abate, but then to give up most of their gains early next year as it becomes clear that the Fed has no intention of cutting rates and may even need to raise rates. We have more conviction that US growth will hold up over the next 12 months than we do that inflation will fall as fast as the Fed expects or the breakevens imply. These varying degrees of conviction stem from the same reason: The neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than widely believed. A high neutral rate implies that it may take significant monetary tightening to slow the economy. That reduces the risk of a recession in the near term, but it raises the risk that inflation will remain elevated. A recession is now our base case for the euro area. However, we expect the European economy to bounce back early next year, as gas supplies increase and fiscal policy turns more stimulative. The euro has significant upside over the long haul. Bottom Line: Stocks will continue to recover over the coming months before facing renewed pressure early next year. We are retaining our tactical (3-month) overweight on global equities but are shifting our 12-month recommendation to neutral. Taking Some Chips Off the Table Following last week’s sharp post-FOMC rally, we shifted our cyclical 12-month equity recommendation from overweight to neutral. This note lays out the key considerations in a Q&A format.   Q: Have any of your underlying views about the economy changed recently or has the market simply moved towards pricing in your benign outlook? A: Mainly the latter. While we continue to see a higher-than-normal risk of a US recession over the next 12 months, our baseline (60% odds) remains no recession.   Q: Many would say that we are in a recession already. A: While two consecutive quarters of negative growth does not officially constitute a recession, it is correct to say that every time real GDP has contracted for two quarters in a row, the NBER has ultimately deemed that episode a recession (Chart 1). Chart 1In The Past, Two Consecutive Quarters Of Negative Growth Have Always Coincided With A Recession That said, one should keep two things in mind. First, preliminary GDP estimates are subject to significant revisions. According to our calculations, there is a 35% chance that real GDP growth in Q2 will ultimately be revised into positive territory (Chart 2). Even Q1 may eventually show positive growth. Real Gross Domestic Income (GDI), which conceptually should equal GDP, rose by 1.8% in Q1. Chart 2After Further Revisions, It Is Possible That GDP Growth Ends Up Being Positive In Q2 2022 Second, every single US recession has seen an increase in the unemployment rate (Chart 3). So far, that has not happened, and there is good reason to think it will not happen for some time: There are 1.8 job openings per unemployed worker (Chart 4). For the foreseeable future, most people who lose their jobs will be able to walk across the street to find a new one. Chart 3Recessions And Spikes In The Unemployment Rate Go Hand-In-Hand Chart 4A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market   Chart 5Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Q: Aren’t other measures of economic activity such as the ISM, consumer confidence, and homebuilder sentiment all signaling that a major slowdown is in progress? A: They are but we should take them with a grain of salt. The composition of consumer spending is shifting from goods to services. This is weighing on manufacturing output. As Chart 5 shows, goods spending has already retraced two-thirds of its pandemic surge, with no ill effects on the labor market. Consumer confidence tends to closely track real wages (Chart 6). Despite an extraordinarily tight labor market, real wages have been shrinking all year. As supply-chain bottlenecks abate, inflation will fall, allowing real wages to rise. This will bolster consumer confidence and spending. Falling gasoline prices will also boost disposable incomes. Prices at the pump have fallen for seven straight weeks and the futures market is pointing to further declines in the months ahead (Chart 7). Chart 6Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence Chart 7The Futures Market Points To Further Declines In Gasoline Prices It is also critical to remember that the Fed is trying to slow the economy by tightening monetary policy. At the start of the year, investors expected the Fed funds rate to be 0.9% in early 2023. Today, they expect it to be 3.4% (Chart 8). Chart 8Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Chart 9Housing Activity Should Recover Now That Mortgage Rates Have Stabilized   Rising rate expectations curb aggregate demand. This temporarily leads to lower growth. However, once rate expectations stabilize – and demand resets to a lower level – growth will tend to return to trend. The 6-month mortgage yield impulse has already turned up. This suggests that housing and other interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy will begin to recover by the end of the year (Chart 9). Admittedly, if the unemployment rate rises in response to lower aggregate demand, this could set off a vicious circle where higher unemployment leads to less spending, leading to even higher unemployment. However, as noted above, given that the current starting point is one where labor demand already exceeds labor supply by a wide margin, the odds of a such a labor market doom loop are much lower than during past downturns.   Q: Does the question of whether we officially enter a recession or not really matter that much? A: It is a matter of degree. As Chart 10 shows, macroeconomic factors are by far the most important determinant of equity returns over medium-term horizons of about 12 months. As a rule of thumb, bear markets almost always coincide with recessions (Chart 11). Chart 10Macro Forces Are An Important Driver Of Equity Returns On Cyclical Horizons Chart 11Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand-In-Hand   Chart 12Soaring Energy Prices Have Boosted Earnings Estimates This Year Q: Are you surprised that earnings estimates have not come down faster this year as economic risks have intensified? A: Most analysts have not baked in a recession in their forecasts, so from that perspective, if our baseline scenario of no recession does not pan out, earnings estimates will almost certainly come down (Chart 12). That said, the bar for major downward earnings revisions is quite high. This is partly because we think that if a recession does occur, it is likely to be a mild one. It is also because earnings are reported in nominal terms. In contrast to real GDP, nominal GDP grew by 6.6% in Q1 and 7.8% in Q2.   Q: Let’s turn to interest rates. Why do you think the Fed will not cut rates next year as markets are discounting? A: It all boils down to the neutral rate of interest. In past reports, we made the case that the neutral rate in the US is higher than widely believed. The fact that job vacancies are so plentiful provides strong evidence in favor of our thesis. If the neutral rate were low, the labor market would not have overheated. But it did, implying that monetary policy must have been exceptionally accommodative. The good news for investors is that a high neutral rate implies that the Fed is unlikely to induce a recession by raising rates in accordance with its dot plot. That reduces the risk of a recession in the near term. The bad news is that a high neutral rate will essentially preclude the Fed from cutting rates next year. The economy will simply be too strong for that. Worse still, if the Fed is too slow in bringing rates to neutral, inflation – which is likely to fall over the coming months as supply-chain pressures ease – could reaccelerate at some point next year. That could force the Fed to start hiking rates again.   Chart 13Real Yields Have Scope To Rise Further Q: What is your estimate for the neutral rate in the US? A: In the past, we have written that the neutral rate in the US is around 3.5%-to-4%. However, I must admit, I’m not a big fan of this formulation. Real rates matter more for economic growth than nominal rates, and long-term rates matter more than short-term rates. Thus, a better question is what level of real long-term bond yields is consistent with stable inflation and full employment. Based on research we have published in the past, my best bet is that the neutral long-term real bond yield is between 1.5%-and-2%. That is substantially above the 10-year TIPS yield (0.27%) and the 30-year TIPS yield (0.79%) (Chart 13). Given that the yield curve is inverted, the Fed may have to raise policy rates well above 4% in order to drag up the long end of the curve. It is a bit like how oil traders say you need to lift spot crude prices in order to push up long-term futures prices when the oil curve is backwardated.   Chart 14Investors Expect Inflation To Fall Rapidly Over The Next Few Years Q: So presumably then, you would favor a short duration position in fixed-income portfolios? A: Yes, if the whole yield curve shifts higher, you will lose a lot less money in short-term bonds than in long-term bonds. Relatedly, we would overweight TIPS versus nominal bonds. The TIPS market is pricing in a very rapid decline in inflation over the next few years (Chart 14). The widely followed 5-year, 5-year forward TIPS inflation breakeven rate is trading at 2.28%, toward the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone of 2.3%-to-2.5%.1   Q: What about credit? A: US high-yield bonds are pricing in a default rate of 6.1% over the next 12 months. This is up from an expected default rate of 3.8% at the start of the year and is significantly higher than the trailing 12-month default rate of 1.4%. In a typical recession, high-yield default rates rise above 8% (Chart 15). Thus, spreads would probably increase if the US entered a recession. That said, it is important to keep in mind that many corporate borrowers took advantage of very low long-term yields over the past few years to extend the maturity of their debt. Only 7% of US high-yield debt, and less than 1% of investment-grade debt, held in corporate credit ETFs matures in less than two years. This suggests that the default cycle, if it were to occur, would be less intense and more elongated than previous ones. Chart 15High-Yield Bonds Are Pricing In Higher Default Rates On balance, we recommend a modest overweight to high-yield bonds within fixed-income portfolios.   Chart 16High Energy Prices Are Weighing On The European Economy Q: Let’s turn to non-US markets. The dollar has strengthened a lot against the euro this year as the economic climate in Europe has soured. Can Europe avoid a recession? A: Probably not. European natural gas prices are back near record highs and business surveys increasingly point to recession (Chart 16). That said, the nature of Europe’s recession could turn out to be quite different from what many expect. There are a few useful parallels between the predicament Europe finds itself in now and what the global economy experienced early on during the pandemic. Just like the Novel coronavirus, as it was called back then, represented an external shock to the global economy, the partial cut-off in Russian energy flows represents an external shock to the European economy. Policymakers in advanced economies responded to the pandemic by showering their economies with various income-support measures. European governments will react similarly to the energy crunch. In fact, the political incentive to respond generously is even greater this time around because the last thing European leaders want is for Putin to succeed in his efforts to destabilize the region. For its part, the ECB will set an extremely low bar for buying Italian bonds and the debt of other vulnerable economies. Just like the world eventually deployed vaccines, Europe is taking steps to inoculate itself from its dangerous addiction to Russian energy. The official REPowerEU plan seeks to displace two-thirds of Russian natural gas imports by the end of the year. While some aspects of the plan are probably too optimistic, others may not be optimistic enough. For example, the plan does not envision increased energy production from coal-fired plants, which is something that even the German Green Party has now signed on to. The euro is trading near parity to the dollar because investors expect growth in the common-currency bloc to remain depressed for an extended period of time. If investors start to price in a more forceful recovery, the euro will rally.   Q: China’s economy remains in the doldrums. Could that undermine your sanguine view on the global economy? A: China’s PMI data disappointed in July, as anxiety over the zero-Covid policy and a sagging property market continued to weigh on activity (Chart 17). We do not expect any change to the zero-Covid policy until the conclusion of the Twentieth Party Congress later this year. After that, the government is likely to ease restrictions, which will help to reignite growth. Chart 17The Zero-Covid Policy And Slumping Property Market Are Weighing On Chinese Economic Activity Chart 18China Faces A Structural Decline In The Demand For Housing The property market has probably entered a secular downturn (Chart 18). If a weakening property market were to cause a banking crisis, similar to what happened in the US and parts of Europe in 2008, this would destabilize the global economy. However, we doubt that this will happen given the control the government has over the banking system. In contrast, a soft landing for the Chinese real estate market might turn out to be a welcome development for the global economy, as less Chinese property investment would keep a lid on commodity prices, thus helping to ease inflationary pressures. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on           LinkedIn & Twitter   Footnotes 1     The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of 2.3%-to-2.5%. View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores