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For starters, over the past five years or so, whenever this cross has broken below the 1.04 support level, going long proved to be a profitable strategy over the ensuing 6-to-12 months. Meanwhile, over the last 35 years, the cross has spent more than 95% of

Our Foreign Exchange Strategy team’s simple observation is that while the pound is sitting exactly where it was after the 2016 referendum results, the odds of a hard Brexit have significantly fallen since then. We are opening a buy-stop on GBP/USD at 1.30

Highlights Most currency pairs continue to trade toward the apex of tight wedge formations. History suggests major breakouts could be imminent. While the trade-weighted dollar has historically tended to be the best performing currency over a six-month period following a U.S. yield curve inversion, this window is rapidly closing. As the tug of war between data disappointments and easier financial conditions plays out, we intend to selectively add to more USD short positions. The pound is sitting exactly where it was after the 2016 U.K. referendum results, but the odds of a hard Brexit have significantly fallen since then. Place a limit buy on GBP/USD at 1.30. The RBA’s dovish shift was widely expected, while the RBNZ’s was not. Meanwhile, the Aussie dollar is sitting close to the epicenter of any Chinese stimulus. Buy AUD/NZD for a trade. Feature Markets have taken a risk-on tone this week. On the data front, there was strong improvement in the Chinese composite PMI, as well as broad increases in the services component of the PMIs across Europe and the U.S. Retail sales data out of Europe and Asia were above expectations and U.S. housing data is beginning to benefit from the fall in interest rates. Case in point, mortgage applications jumped almost 20% week-on-week, nudging the mortgage purchase index towards new highs. On the political front, China and the U.S. appear to be approaching a trade deal, and the U.K. has reached across the aisle to forge a Brexit deal that will potentially include stronger support from the Labor party. Despite these positives, there remain some dislocations in financial markets as investors digest whether financial conditions have eased enough globally to lift us out of the growth slowdown. Since 2015, both the Japanese Nikkei 225 index and the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield have moved in lockstep (Chart I-1). Right now, these two global growth barometers are sending opposing signals. The Nikkei index bottomed in December 2018 and is 13% off its lows, while at 2.5%, U.S. bond yields are not far off the trough made last week. Back in 2016, both indicators bottomed together in a unified response to the Federal Reserve’s dovish shift as well as Chinese stimulus. Every time the U.S. 10-year versus three-month spread has inverted, pro-cyclical currencies have gotten clobbered.  The important message is that monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, and over the last year, more central banks have tightened policy than at any time since 2011 (Chart I-2). Our central bank monitors are still falling, suggesting easy monetary policy is still required. It wasn’t so long ago that dismal manufacturing PMI readings from Europe and Japan sent equity markets into a tailspin, with the U.S. 10-year versus three-month spread inverting. At a minimum, this warns against betting the farm too early on pro-cyclical currencies. Chart I-1Who Is Right? Chart I-2Monetary Policy Still relatively Tight       Bottom Line: Every time the U.S. 10-year versus three-month spread has inverted, the U.S. trade-weighted dollar has tended to be the best performing currency over the next six months, while other pro-cyclical currencies have gotten clobbered. This occurred whether or not the inversion was a head-fake (Chart I-3). Our bias is that this time is different, but we will await further confirmation from higher-frequency indicators before building aggressive USD short positions. Chart I-3ABeware Of Curve Inversions (1) Chart I-3BBeware Of Curve Inversions (2) What To Watch In our March 8th bulletin,1 we detailed the case for fading U.S. dollar tailwinds and what to watch for in order to adopt a more pro-cyclical stance. These included PMI differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world, copper- and oil-to-gold ratios, Chinese M2 relative-to-GDP, emerging market currencies, and China-sensitive industrial commodities. The message from these indicators remains broadly consistent with what was observed a month ago, so we will not reprint them here. That said, there are a few additional indicators to consider. AUD/JPY: This cross has broadly tracked swings in the global manufacturing pulse, given the Australian dollar benefits from improving global growth, while the yen benefits from flights to safety and deteriorating liquidity (Chart I-4). The cross has been dead flat around 79 for three months, suggesting these two forces are largely in a stalemate. A break higher in the cross towards the 82-83 zone would be encouraging. EUR/USD: For the U.S. dollar to weaken significantly, the euro will have to strengthen meaningfully, given the large share of euros in global reserves. Following dismal manufacturing PMI numbers out of Europe, the more domestic service-oriented PMIs have proven more resilient. Yet they still point to GDP growth between 1%-1.5% (Chart I-5). The external sector will have to participate to finally put a floor under the euro. It is encouraging that the euro has weakened significantly relative to the Chinese RMB, which should help European exports to China. Chart I-4Bottoming Processes Could Last A While Chart I-5Dollar Weakness Needs A Strong Euro     Chinese Bond Yields: A larger share of financial intermediation is now being done through the Chinese bond market, meaning it has the power to ease financial conditions. There is significant debate as to whether Chinese credit stimulus has been sufficient, but bond yields suggest this has been the case (Chart I-6). We will be watching the Chinese aggregate money data for further confirmation that it is time to put on reflation trades.   Chart I-6All Confirmatory Signs From China Count Bottom Line: We noted last week that exports to China from Singapore jumped by 34% year-on-year and those to emerging markets by 22% year-on-year. Recent data from Taiwan corroborate the improvement in the Chinese manufacturing PMI for the month of March. With many currency pairs trading toward the apex of tight wedge formations, history suggests breakouts are imminent. Given that currency crosses can themselves be indicators, we will wait for confirmation of a breakout before putting on fresh pro-cyclical positions. Westminster Unifies It has been almost three years since the British voted to leave the European Union (EU). The original deadline of March 29th has been extended to April 12th. As the new deadline approaches, the odds are that a new one will be negotiated, probably by the May 23rd EU elections or even later. The imbroglio has been highly complex, even for the most astute of political analysts. However, our simple observation is that while the pound is sitting exactly where it was after the 2016 referendum results, the odds of a hard Brexit have significantly fallen since then. We are opening a buy-stop on GBP/USD at 1.30 today for a trade (Chart I-7). A very detailed scenario analysis for Brexit was discussed in this month’s Bank Credit Analyst publication.2 The historical context is that while complete sovereignty of a nation is and always has been a desirable fundamental right, a hard Brexit will do little to alleviate the British voters’ angst. Globalization, decades of supply-side reforms and competition from emerging markets have lifted income inequality in the U.K. to the detriment of the average U.K. voter. However, this is hardly due to European integration, given that this same sentiment afflicts many other independent nations. Economic surprises in the U.K. relative to both the U.S. and euro area are soaring.  Back when the referendum was held in June 2016, even the pro-Brexit Tories, a minority in the party, promised continued access to the Common Market. Fast forward to today and there are simply not enough committed Brexiters in Westminster to deliver a hard Brexit. Meanwhile, there is scant evidence the general populace wanted a hard Brexit, given the very slim margin of victory for the Leave vote. It is also possible that absent the prominence of migration issues and terrorist attacks that were afflicting Europe at the time, we would not be having this debate today. Chart I-7Changing Landscape For The Pound Chart I-8What Brexit?     As we publish this week, British Prime Minister Theresa May has kicked off negotiations with opposition party leader Jeremy Corbyn in a plan to muster a deal before the April 12th deadline. This falls into the first camp of our three scenarios, which are: 1) a softer Brexit deal; 2) a general election to break the impasse; or 3) another referendum. In the case of a general election, unless a hard Tory replaces Ms. May, chances are a softer Brexit will prevail. Meanwhile, our geopolitical strategists have ventured to say that Brexit is unsustainable over the secular horizon, and that the U.K. will remain in the EU. Bottom Line: While the political battle unfolds in the U.K., the reality is that the pound and U.K. gilt yields should be much higher solely on the basis of hard incoming data. Employment growth has been holding up very well, wages are inflecting higher, and the average U.K. consumer appears in decent shape (Chart I-8). Economic surprises in the U.K. relative to both the U.S. and euro area are soaring. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible cable made its lows in mid-2016-early 2017 as it became clearer that the probability of a hard Brexit was waning. We are placing a limit buy on the pound today at 1.30, with a wide stop at 1.22. Buy AUD/NZD Chart I-9AUD Is On Sale There are few times in markets and trading when you get a semblance of a free lunch. But one such opportunity may be on the table for the Aussie versus the Kiwi. For starters, over the past five years or so, whenever this cross has broken below the 1.04 support level, going long proved to be a profitable strategy over the ensuing 6-to-12 months. Meanwhile, over the last 35 years, the cross has spent more than 95% of the time over 1.06, with the low in 2015 close to parity. Finally, the cross is very cheap on a real effective exchange rate basis, which means that relative prices in Australia are at a discount to those in New Zealand (Chart I-9).  The confluence of monetary policy shifts over the last few months may be blurring the direction of relative interest rate trends, but on the simple basis of real three-month interest rate differentials, the Aussie should be 15% higher relative to the Kiwi (Chart I-10). Ever since 2015, the market has been significantly more dovish on Australia relative to New Zealand, in part due to a more accelerated downturn in house prices and a significant slowdown in China. The reality is that the downturn in Australia has allowed some cleansing of sorts, and brought it far along the adjustment path relative to New Zealand. We may now be entering a window where economic data in New Zealand converges to the downside relative to Australia, the catalyst being a foreign ban on domestic house purchases (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Divergences Are Very Rare Chart I-11Australia Is Well Along The Adjustment Path Chart I-12Domestic Demand Pressures In New Zealand A study by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand shows that on average, the elasticity of consumption growth to house price changes is 0.22%.3 However, the housing wealth effect is asymmetric with negative housing shocks, hurting consumption by more than the boost received from positive shocks. According to their calculations, the housing wealth elasticity for consumption is 0.23 for negative shocks, as compared to 0.13 for positive changes in housing wealth. This asymmetry may be due to the fact that, at very elevated debt levels, leveraged gains are used to pay down debt aggressively, whereas leveraged losses hit bottom lines directly. The study proves timely, since the RBNZ began a new mandate on April 1st to now include full employment in addition to inflation targeting. But given that the RBNZ has been unable to fulfill its price stability mandate over the last several years, it is hard to argue it will find a dual mandate any easier. Falling consumption will depress aggregate demand which, in turn, will depress consumption further. Falling inbound migration levels at a time of rapidly dwindling labor supply everywhere means the goldilocks scenario of non-inflationary growth may be behind us (Chart I-12). And for an economy driven by agricultural exports, productivity gains will be hard to come by. The final catalyst for the AUD/NZD cross will be a terms-of-trade shock, and evidence is rising that this is turning in favor of the Aussie (Chart I-13). China’s clear environmental push has lifted the share of liquefied natural gas in Australia’s export mix (Chart I-14). Given that eliminating pollution is a strategic goal in China, this will be a multi-year tailwind. Australia overtook Qatar last year as the world’s biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas. As the market becomes more liberalized and long-term contracts are revised to reflect surging spot prices, the Aussie dollar will get a boost. Chart I-13A Positive Shift Chart I-14A Shifting Export Landscape   Bottom Line: Go long AUD/NZD as a strategic position. Place stops at parity.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Into A Transition Phase,”dated March 8, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, titled “The State Of Brexit,” dated March 28, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Mairead de Roiste, Apostolos Fasianos, Robert Kirkby, and Fang Yao, “Household Leverage and Asymmetric Housing Wealth Effects - Evidence from New Zealand,” Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Discussion Paper Series, (April 2019). Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been weak compared to the rest of the world: Retail sales in February contracted by 0.2% month-on-month, shy of consensus of 0.3%. The March Markit manufacturing PMI fell  to 52.4 while ISM manufacturing PMI rose to 55.3. However, the ISM non-manufacturing PMI also decreased to 56.1. The February durable goods orders contracted by 1.6% while still better than expected. Initial jobless claims fell to 202k this week. DXY index initially fell by 0.3% before rebounding to end the week flat. The upbeat Chinese data earlier this week was the strongest in the manufacturing sector for the past 8 months. Easing financial conditions worldwide and progress on trade talks have brought back investors’ risk appetite, which is a headwind for the counter-cyclical dollar. Report Links: Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have shown tentative signs of a recovery: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 47.5 in March, the weakest number since 2013. However, the Markit composite PMI and services PMI increased to 51.6 and 53.3 respectively, both higher than expected. The unemployment rate stayed unchanged at 7.8% in February. Consumer price inflation in March fell slightly to 1.4%. Retail sales grew at 2.8% year-on-year in February, outperforming expectations of 2.3% growth. In Germany, retail sales surged by 4.7% year-on-year. EUR/USD depreciated by 0.2% this week. While the manufacturing data remains weak, the services PMI and retail sales in the euro area all show signs of an imminent pickup. During a speech last Wednesday, Mario Draghi highlighted that policy will continue to remain accommodative which should help financial conditions. Moreover, good news from U.K. and China could improve the trade outlook in the euro area. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 A Contrarian Bet On The Euro - March 1, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Housing starts in February grew by 4.2% year-on-year. Nikkei manufacturing PMI in March came in at 49.2, surprising to the upside, while the services PMI fell slightly to 52. Foreign investment in Japanese stocks increased to 438.7 billion yen. USD/JPY appreciated by 0.5% this week. The Tankan survey for Q1 was a bit disappointing, but nascent green shoots in the global economic recovery are providing support for Japanese shares. On the flip side, the higher risk appetite will likely decrease the demand for the safe-haven Japanese yen. Report Links: Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been mostly positive: The Q4 GDP surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.4% year-on-year. The Markit manufacturing PMI jumped to 55.1 in March, the strongest within the past year. The Markit construction PMI came in slightly below expectation at 49.7, while still above the last reading of 49.5. The services PMI fell to 48.9.  GBP/USD appreciated by 0.7% this week. GBP/USD has been very volatile over the past weeks amid ongoing Brexit uncertainties. Despite this, the U.K. economy has been very healthy and cable is still trading at a discount to its fair value. Report Links: A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been improving: The NAB business confidence fell to 0 in March, but the business conditions component increased to 7. The February HIA new home sales increased by 1% month-on-month. Building permits in February increased by 19.1% month-on-month. Retail sales increased by 0.8% month-on-month in February. Trade balance came in at 4.8 million AUD in February. Legacy LNG projects almost guarantee trade surpluses for years to come. AUD/USD has been flat this week. On Tuesday, the RBA kept the interest rate unchanged at 1.5%, as was widely expected. AUD/USD is likely to form a floor if Chinese economic activity continues to improve and global industrial production picks up. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: The global dairy trade price index increased by 0.8% in April.  ANZ commodity prices increased by 1.4% in March. NZD/USD fell by 1% this week. Despite positive terms of trade, NZD/USD is still trading at a 10%-15% premium above its fair value. New Zealand will be held hostage to the downturn in the Aussie economy. Meanwhile, a new dual mandate for the RBNZ makes it difficult to gauge whether its recent dovish shift is a one-off or more perpetual. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly positive: GDP grew by 0.3% month-on-month in January, surprising to the upside. However, the Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 50.5 in March, from a previous reading of 52.8. USD/CAD rebounded after the plunge on positive Canadian GDP data, returning flat this week. On Monday, Governor Poloz gave a speech in Nunavut, highlighting slowing trade growth and the downside risks from trade wars. He stated that the economic outlook continues to warrant a policy rate that is well below the neutral range, and trade among provinces and territories should be promoted. Report Links: A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been strong: The KOF leading indicator increased to 97.4 in March. The February retail sales growth came in at -0.2% year-on-year, above the estimated -0.8%. Consumer price index came in higher than expected at 0.7% year-on-year. USD/CHF increased by 0.47% this week. While the inflation rate took a step closer towards the target rate, the uptick in investment sentiment and rising appetite for risk assets could be a headwind for the safe-haven franc. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been improving: Retail sales contracted by 1.3% month-on-month in February. However, the registered unemployment fell to 78.32k in March. The unemployment rate decreased to 2.4% accordingly. House prices increased by 3.2% year-on-year in March. The manufacturing PMI rose from 56.3 to 56.8 in March. USD/NOK fell by 0.3% this week. The Norwegian krone has been one of our favorite currencies, as it remains most responsive to crude oil prices. Our BCA house view is in favor of rising oil prices amid Iran and Venezuela sanctions and production cuts. Report Links: A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been better than expected: The manufacturing PMI came in at 52.8 in March, slightly higher than 52.7 in February. USD/SEK has been flat this week. The Swedish krona is still trading below its one sigma band of fair value. A brighter picture for the euro area could improve trade conditions for Sweden. Our short USD/SEK position is now 1.84% in the money since initiated. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The meaningful improvement in the March manufacturing PMIs (both Caixin and official) all but confirms that a rebound in Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. The odds that investors will look through any near-term economic and/or earnings weakness are directly related to the likely magnitude of the expansion in credit over the coming year, and our research points to the need for the recent pace of credit growth to be sustained in order to stabilize the outlook for earnings. Barring a substantial breakdown in trade talks between China and the U.S., a strong March total social financing release would likely tip the scales in favor of a recommendation to increase Chinese investable stock exposure within a global equity portfolio to overweight. Feature Tables 1 and 2 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, coincident economic activity has sharply converged with our leading indicator for China’s economy, which we highlighted was likely to occur. Looking forward, while we await the March total social financing release later this month for a better sense of the likely magnitude in credit growth over the coming year, the meaningful improvement in the March manufacturing PMIs (both Caixin and official) all but confirms that a rebound in Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary​​​​​​​ The likely magnitude of the uptrend in credit is important from an investment strategy perspective, as we have highlighted that weak coincident activity raises the risk of a lagged but meaningful further decline in Chinese earnings per share over the coming few months. The odds that investors will look through any near-term economic and/or earnings weakness are directly related to the ultimate size of the expansion in credit, and our research points to the need for the recent pace of credit growth to be sustained in order to stabilize the outlook for earnings. But the bottom line for investors is that we recently placed Chinese investable stocks (i.e. the MSCI China Index) on upgrade watch, and the March PMI is a step in the direction of a recommendation to increase equity allocation to overweight within a global stock portfolio. Investors should closely watch the March total social financing data (due to be released in mid-April); a strong release, barring a substantial breakdown in trade talks between China and the U.S., would likely tip the scales in favor of a move to overweight. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data below: Chart 1 shows that coincident economic activity sharply converged in January and February with our leading indicator for China’s economy, as we had argued many times over the past several months was likely to occur. In our view, most if not all of the previously beneficial tariff front-running effect has probably washed out of the data, implying that future changes in activity measures are now more likely to reflect actual changes in underlying economic circumstances. Chart 1A Convergence That We Predicted The components of our LKI leading indicator continue to point to divergent outcomes for the Chinese economy (Chart 2). Monetary conditions have weakened somewhat over the past few months, but remain quite easy relative to history. The credit components bounced in January but are still weak relative to their history, whereas money growth is extremely weak and has shown no sign of improvement. Barring a major rise in the RMB, a continuation in the recent pace of credit growth would likely be enough to cause our leading indicator to trend higher, particularly if money growth begins to pick up. Chart 2An Uptrend In Credit Growth Will Push Our Leading Indicator Higher We noted in our March 13 Weekly Report that growth in residential floor space started was unsustainably strong,1 and the January/February data update confirmed this view. Growth in starts has decelerated by 10 percentage points from December to February, highlighting that housing construction cannot permanently decouple from sales volume and that a further deceleration is possible unless sales growth (which is currently negative) begins to pick up. The PMI rebound in March registers as one of the most important macro developments since the release of the January total social financing data. Both the Caixin and official manufacturing PMI data came in solidly positive for March, rising relative to their February values and surprising consensus expectations to the upside. Chart 3 highlights that the March Caixin data has pushed the series above its post-2010 median, whereas the official PMI has risen to its 40th percentile from essentially its lowest point in the past decade. In our view, the PMI rebound registers as one of the most important macro developments since the release of the January total social financing data, in that it all but confirms that a rebound in (still depressed) Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. Chart 3A Very Sharp Rebound In Both Manufacturing PMIs Despite having rallied significantly from their low, Chinese stocks (both investable and domestic) remain approximately 20% below their early-2018 high in US$ terms. This is in contrast to global stocks, which are only 7% shy of their 2018 high. If Chinese equities can avoid a major earnings recession, this discrepancy underscores that there is further upside for stock prices in relative terms over the coming 6-12 months. For the A-share market, however, Chart 4 highlights a potential near-term roadblock for continued outperformance versus global stocks. The chart highlights that the relative performance trend is now bumping up against the upper end of a declining trend channel that has been in place for almost 4 years, a bearish pattern that is in stark contrast to that of the investable market. Conversely, a break outside of this channel would warrant attention, as it could signal a secular change in trend for the domestic equity market. Chart 4Is The Four Year Downtrend In A-Share Relative Performance Over? Chart 5 highlights that the strange combination of consumer staples and real estate stocks have been the clear sector winners over the past month, both in the investable and domestic markets. Signs of stabilization in consumer spending explains staples outperformance, but the rally in real estate stocks is more difficult to explain given the weakness in housing fundamentals referenced above. For now, our bias is to believe that real estate stocks are benefitting as a value play, given their deep discount relative to both their respective broad markets and their global peers. Chart 5A Sharp Rebound In Staples And Real Estate Stocks China’s 7-day interbank repo rate has increased somewhat over the past month, raising speculation that the PBOC may soon proceed with a generalized cut to the reserve requirement ratio. In our view, the trend in the 3-month interbank repo rate has been more important over the past few years, as it has closely correlated since late-2016 with average interest rates in the economy and sharp declines in the rate last year preceded the pickup in credit growth observed in January. Still, additional easing from the PBOC could be significant for market participants, as it would likely be greeted positively by investors and could further stoke the belief that Chinese credit growth may overshoot to the upside over the coming 6-12 months. A stronger RMB versus the euro will be welcome news for European exporters. In contrast to a significant improvement in domestic equity prices and investor sentiment, Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads have actually inched higher over the past month. While the rise has been comparatively small (8 basis points), spreads now stand at roughly a third of their 12-month range. A rising trend in onshore corporate bond spreads is not consistent with a slower pace of defaults over the coming 6-12 months, suggesting that at least some headwinds facing the Chinese economy will remain over the coming year if the recent trend in spreads continues. While CNY-USD has been largely flat over the past month, CNY-EUR has continued to rise and is now within striking distance of its 2018 high (Chart 6). This is not likely welcome news for Chinese exporters with close ties to Europe, but it may help provide a much-needed trade boost to the European economy over the coming year, whose manufacturing PMI has recently fallen to a six-year low. Chart 6A Stronger CNY-EUR Cross Will Help Boost Chinese Imports From Europe   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China Macro And Market Review”, dated March 13, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that the global allocation of foreign exchange reserves towards the U.S. dollar peaked at about 72% in the early 2000s and has been in a downtrend since. Meanwhile, allocation to other currencies, notably

Highlights U.S. growth remains robust, despite some temporary softness in recent months. Ex U.S., growth continues to fall but, with China probably now ramping up monetary stimulus, should bottom in the second half. Central banks everywhere have turned more dovish, partly in an attempt to push up inflation expectations. The combination of resilient growth and easier monetary policy should be good for global equities. We remain overweight equities versus bonds. Bond yields have fallen sharply everywhere. However, with U.S. inflation still trending up, and central banks unlikely to turn any more dovish this year, yields are unlikely to fall much further in 2019. We recommend a slight underweight on duration. We remain overweight U.S. equities, but are on watch to upgrade the euro zone and Emerging Markets when we have stronger conviction about China’s stimulus. Given structural headwinds in both Europe and EM, this would probably be only a tactical upgrade. We have been tilting our equity sector recommendations in a more cyclical direction, last month raising Industrials and Energy to overweight. We also prefer credit over government bonds within the fixed-income category, though we warn that spreads will not fall much further given weak corporate fundamentals. Feature Recommended Allocation Overview Don’t Fight The Doves The performance of risk assets essentially comes down to a battle between growth and monetary policy/interest rates. Last September, despite the fact that global economic growth was clearly slowing, the Fed sounded hawkish; this triggered an 18% drop in global equities in Q4. But, since late last year, all major developed central banks have turned more dovish, culminating in March’s decision of the ECB to push back its guidance for its first rate hike, and the FOMC’s wiping out its two planned hikes for 2019. But, at the same time, U.S. economic growth is showing resilience, and we see the first “green shoots” of a cyclical pickup in growth outside the U.S. This is an environment in which risk assets should continue to perform well. Why did the Fed back off? The most likely explanation is that it wants to give itself more room to act come the next recession. Inflation expectations have become unanchored, with 10-year breakevens over the past decade steadily below a level that would be consistent with the Fed achieving its 2% core PCE inflation target in the long run. In the period since the Fed formally introduced this (supposedly “symmetrical”) target in 2012, it has exceeded it in only four months (Chart 1). Around recessions over the past 50 years, the Fed has on average cut rates by 655 basis points (Table 1). It sees little risk, therefore, in letting the economy “run a little hot” and allowing inflation to rise somewhat above 2%. This would reanchor expectations, and eventually get nominal short- and long-term rates higher before the next recession. Chart 1Market Doesn’t Believe The Fed’s Target Table 1Fed Won’t Be Able To Cut This Much Next Time   Chart 2Financial Conditions Now Much Easier Chart 3Housing Market Bottoming Out Meanwhile, U.S. growth seems to be stabilizing at a decent level after signs of weakness late last year caused by tighter financial conditions, a slowdown elsewhere in the world, and the six-week government shutdown. An easing of financial conditions since the beginning of the year should help to keep U.S. GDP growth above trend at around 2.0-2.5% this year (Chart 2). Most notably, interest-rate sensitive areas of the economy that were under pressure last year, especially housing, are showing signs of bottoming (Chart 3). Consumption also should be robust, given strong wage growth, consumer confidence close to historic record high levels, and amid no signs of a deterioration in the labor market (Chart 4). Chart 4No Signs Of Weaker Labor Market Chart 5Some 'Green Shoots' For Global Growth   A key question for us over the next few months will be when to shift allocations to more cyclical, higher-beta equity markets such as the euro area and Emerging Markets. These have underperformed year-to-date despite the strong risk-on market. China’s nascent reflationary stimulus will decide the timing and level of conviction of this shift. As we explain in detail on page 6, we think the jury is still out on whether China is injecting liquidity on anything like the same scale as it did in 2016. Even if it is, historically it has taken six to 12 months before the effect showed through via a rebound in global trade, commodity prices, and other China-related indicators. The first early signs of a bottoming are emerging: Chinese fixed-asset investment and the Caixin Manufacturing PMI beat expectations last month, the German ZEW Expectations indicator has started to recover, and the diffusion index of the Global Leading Economic Indicator (which often leads the LEI itself by a few months) has picked up (Chart 5). We are on watch to shift our allocation1 but, given the long-term structural headwinds against both Europe and EM, we need to be more convinced about the strength of Chinese stimulus before doing so. The seeds of recession are sown in expansions. Eventually, we see the newly dovish Fed falling behind the curve. The Fed Funds Rate is still below the range of estimates of the neutral rate – hard though this is to estimate in real time (Chart 6). If the economy remains as strong as we expect, sometime next year inflation could begin rising to uncomfortable levels (and asset bubbles start to be of concern), which would push the Fed back into hiking mode. Given that the market is pricing in Fed rate cuts, not hikes, and that the Fed can hardly sound any more dovish than it does now without moving to an outright easing path, it seems to us that long-term rates are very unlikely to fall from here (Chart 7). Chart 6Fed Still Below Neutral Chart 7Can The Fed Get Any More Dovish Than This? In this environment, therefore, we continue to expect global equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. However, a recession is possible in 2021 triggered by the Fed late next year needing to put its foot abruptly on the brake.   What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 8Ex-U.S. Equities Driven By China Stimulus When Is The Time To Switch Allocations To Europe And EM? It is slightly surprising that the 12% rally in global equities this year has been led by the low-beta U.S., up 13%, rather than Europe (up 9%) or emerging markets (up 9% - and much less if the strong Chinese market is excluded). Is it time to switch to these underperforming, more cyclical markets? Our answer is, not yet. Global growth ex-U.S. continues to weaken. It is likely to bottom sometime in the second half, as a result of Chinese growth stabilizing. However, the jury is still out on whether the increase in Chinese credit creation in January was a one-off, or major policy reversal. Even if it is the latter, a revival in global growth (and cyclical markets) has typically lagged Chinese stimulus by 6-12 months (Chart 8, panel 1). There are also significant structural headwinds for both the euro zone and Emerging Markets which make us reluctant to overweight them unless there are clear cyclical reasons to do so. Both have lagged global equities fairly consistently since the Global Financial Crisis, with only brief outperformance during periods of economic acceleration, such as in 2016 and 2012 (panel 2). The euro zone remains challenged by its banking system. Loan growth has been stagnant for years, and banks remain undercapitalized relative to their U.S. peers, and highly fragmented (panels 3 and 4). Emerging markets are hampered by their high level of foreign-currency debt (which makes them highly sensitive to U.S. financial conditions), dependence on China, and lack of structural reform. We could see ourselves shifting our recommendation from the U.S. to the euro area and EM, and becoming outright bearish on the U.S. dollar (a counter-cyclical currency), over the coming months if we find confirmation of a bottoming of global cyclical growth and become more confident in the size of China’s stimulus. But given the structural headwinds, and the steady underperformance of these markets, we need stronger evidence first.   Chart 9Oil, Positioning, And Housing Why Is The 10-Year Bond Yield So Depressed? Despite U.S. equities rallying back to within 4% of a record high, the U.S. Treasury bond yield has fallen further this year (Chart 9, panel 1). Moreover, the 3-month/10-year yield curve has briefly inverted. Besides the Fed’s recent more dovish turn, what has depressed bond yields? We would pin the cause on the following factors: Dampened inflation expectations: Over the past few years the 10-year yield has been closely correlated with the oil price via inflation expectations. A temporary supply shock in Q4 caused oil prices to decline sharply. But tighter supply this year should allow the oil price to recover further. This should cause a rise in inflation expectation (panel 2). Trade positioning: Late last year,  speculative short positions in government bonds were at their highest levels since 2015. However, the Q4 equity selloff pushed investors to cover their positions; these are now close to neutral (panel 3). Home Sales: Housing data has been weak over the past few quarters, with both existing and new home sales declining. But there are now signs of recovery: mortgage applications have started to pick up, which should in turn push home sales higher (panel 4). This should also allow for a rise in bond yields. Our key take-away from March’s FOMC meeting, when the tone turned decidedly dovish, is that the Fed is focusing on re-anchoring inflation expectations, which should push nominal yields higher. We think the market is very pessimistic by pricing in 42 and 56 bps of rate cuts over the next 12 and 24 months respectively. It would take a significant further weakening of economic data to make the Fed’s stance turn even more dovish and for nominal yields to fall even further.   How Will U.S. Corporate Bonds Perform In The Next Recession? Historically high levels of U.S. corporate debt, as well as declining credit quality in the investment-grade space, have started to worry investors (Chart 10). Specifically, investors are worried that, when the next default cycle comes, a large portion of investment-grade debt will be downgraded to junk, forcing fund managers who are constrained to hold certain credit qualities to sell. These worries seem to be justified. Investment-grade bonds of lower credit quality tend to experience large increases in migration to junk status during credit recessions (Chart 11). Given the current composition of the U.S. investment-grade corporate bond universe, a credit recession would imply a downgrade to junk status of 4.6% of the index if we assume similar behavior to previous recessions. Depending on the speed of the selloff, such a downgrade could also have grave consequence for liquidity. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), average daily turnover in the U.S. corporate bond market was 0.34% in 2018. Thus, it is not hard to envision a situation where forced selling could surpass normal levels of liquidity. However, it is hard to tell what would be the effect of such a fire-sale on credit spreads, given that they tend to widen in recessions regardless. While this asset class could perform poorly in the next recession, we don’t expect that its weakness will translate to the real economy. Leveraged institutions such as banks hold just 18% of corporate credit. Furthermore, despite being at all-time highs, U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt to GDP is still at a much healthier level than in other countries (Chart 12). Chart 10Declining Quality In Investment Grade Chart 12U.S. Corporate Debt Levels Are Healthy Relative To The Rest Of The World   Chart 13A Value Rebound?   Is It Time To Favor Value Over Growth Again? Since it peaked in May 2007, the ratio of global value to growth has attempted to rebound several times amid a sustained downtrend (Chart 13). Due to the cyclical nature and the neutral relative valuation of the value/growth indexes, we have preferred to use sector positioning (cyclicals vs. defensives) to implement a value/growth style tilt in our global portfolio since March 20162 (Chart 13, panel 1). Lately, we have received many requests on the topic of the value-versus-growth-ratio. After reaching a historical low in August 2018, the  value/growth ratio slightly rebounded in Q4 2018 before reversing some of its gains so far this year. Additionally, the value/growth valuation gap as measured by both price-to-book and forward P/E has reached a historically low level (Chart 13, panel 4). As we have often noted, the sector composition of both the value and growth indexes changes over time.2 Chart 14 shows the current sector weights of S&P Pure Value and Pure Growth Indexes.3 It’s clear that now a bet on Pure Value versus Pure Growth is essentially a bet on Financials (which account for 35% of the Pure Value index) versus Tech and Healthcare (which together account for 38% of the Pure Growth index) - see also Chart 13, panel 2. Given the cyclical nature of the value/growth ratio and also the sector concentration, it’s not surprising that the value/growth play is also a play on euro area versus U.S. equities (Chart 13, panel 3). Currently, we are neutral on Financials and Tech, while overweight Healthcare in our global sector portfolio, and we are putting the euro area on an upgrade watch (see page 14). Therefore, maintaining a neutral stance between value and growth is in line with our sector and country views. However, a close watch for a possible upgrade of value is also warranted given the extreme valuation measures.   Global Economy Overview: U.S. growth has slowed recently, though it remains more robust than in the more cyclical economies in Europe and emerging markets. Central banks almost everywhere have recently turned dovish. However, China’s increased monetary stimulus should help global growth bottom out in H2. This could lead the Fed and central banks in other healthy economies to return to a rate-hiking path. U.S.: The U.S. economy has been weak in recent months. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 15, panel 1) has collapsed, and the Fed NowCasts point to only 1.3-1.7% QoQ annualized GDP growth in Q1 (compared to 2.2% in Q4). But the slowdown is mostly due to the six-week government shutdown (which probably took 1% off growth), some seasonal adjustment oddities (which leave Q1 as the weakest quarter almost every year), and tighter financial conditions in H2 2018 which have now largely reversed. The manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs in February were  still healthy at 54.2 and 59.7 respectively. Consumption (propelled by strong employment growth and accelerating wages) and capex remain strong (panel 3). BCA expects GDP growth in 2019 to be around 2.0-2.5%, still above trend. Euro Area: The European economy continues to slow, driven by weak exports to emerging markets, troubles in the banking sector, and political uncertainty. Q4 GDP growth was only 0.8% QoQ annualized, and the manufacturing PMI has fallen to 47.6 (with Germany as low as 44.7). But there are some early signs of an improvement. The ZEW Expectations index for Germany has bottomed (Chart 16, panel 1), fiscal policy should boost euro area growth this year by around 0.5 percentage points, and wage growth has begun to accelerate. The key remains Chinese stimulus, whose positive effects should help European exports recover sometime in H2. Chart 15U.S. Growth Slowing But Still Robust Chart 16Signs Of Bottoming In Global Ex-U.S.? Japan: Japan also remains highly dependent on a Chinese stimulus. Machine tool orders (the best indicator of capex demand from China) fell by 29% YoY in February. Despite stronger wage growth, now 1.2% YoY, inflation shows no signs of moving up towards the Bank of Japan’s target of 2%: ex energy and food CPI inflation is still only 0.4%. The biggest risk in 2019 is October’s planned consumption tax hike from 8% to 10%. Prime Minister Abe has said that he will cancel this only in the event of a shock on the scale of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The government has put in place measures to soften the impact (most notably a 5% rebate on purchases at small retailers after October 1 paid for electronically), but consumption is still likely to fall significantly. Emerging Markets: China seems to have ramped up its monetary stimulus, with total social financing in January and February combined up 12% over the same months last year. Recent data have shown signs of a stabilization of growth: the manufacturing PMI rebounded to 49.9 in February from 48.3, and fixed-asset investment beat expectations at 6.1% YoY in January and February combined. Nonetheless, the size of liquidity injection is likely to be smaller than in previous episodes such as 2016, since Premier Li Keqiang and the PBOC have warned of the risk of excessive speculation. Elsewhere, some emerging economies (notably Brazil and Mexico) have showed signs of recovery after last year’s deterioration, whereas others (such as South Africa, Indonesia, and Poland) continue to suffer. Interest rates: Central banks worldwide have generally turned more dovish in recent months, with the Fed and ECB both moving to signal no rate hikes this year. This has pushed down long-term rates globally, with 10-year bond yields falling below 0% again in Germany and Japan. However, with global growth likely to bottom over the next few months, rates may not stay at current depressed levels. U.S. inflation, in particular, continues to trend up, and the Fed’s target PCE inflation measure is likely to exceed 2% over coming months. We see the Fed turning more hawkish by year-end, and long rates globally more likely to rise than fall from current levels.   Global Equities Chart 17Watch Earnings Remain Cautiously Optimistic: We added risk in our January Portfolio Update4 by putting cash back to work in global equities, and then in the March Portfolio Update5 we reduced the underweight in EM equities and increased the tilt to cyclicals at the expense of defensives, to hedge against a continuing acceleration in Chinese credit growth. All these came after our risk reduction in July 2018.6 GAA’s portfolio approach has always been to take risks where they are most likely to be rewarded. BCA’s macro view is that global economic growth data is likely to be on the weak side in the coming months, but will pick up in the second half. This implies that equities are likely to rally again after a period of congestion within a trading range, supporting a cautiously optimistic portfolio allocation for the next 9-12 months. At the asset-class level, our positioning of overweight equities versus bonds while neutral on cash, reflects the “optimistic” side of our allocation. However, the rebound in global equities since the December sell-off has been driven completely by a valuation re-rating, while earnings growth has been revised down sharply. (Chart 17). As such, within global equities, our preference for low-beta countries (favoring DM versus EM, and favoring the U.S over the rest of DM) reflects the “cautious” aspect of our allocation. Our macro view hinges largely on what happens to China. There are signs that China may have abandoned its focus on deleveraging, yet it is too early to tell if it has switched back to a reflationary path. Therefore, our global equity sector overlay has a slight cyclical tilt by overweighting Industrials and Energy, which are among the main beneficiaries of Chinese reflationary policies or a positive resolution to U.S.-China trade negotiations. Chart 18Warming Up To The Euro Area Euro Area Equities: On Upgrade Watch We have favored U.S. equities relative to the euro area since July 2018.7 Since then, the U.S. has outperformed the euro area by 11% in USD terms and by 8% in local currency terms, with the difference being attributed to the weakness of the euro versus the U.S. dollar. Given BCA’s view on the global economy and the U.S. dollar, however, we are watching closely to switch our recommendation between the U.S. and euro area equities, for the following reasons: First, as shown in Chart 18, panel 1, the relative performance between the euro area and the U.S. is highly correlated with the EUR/USD exchange rate. BCA believes that the U.S. dollar is set for a period of weakness starting in the second half of the year,8 which bodes well for the outperformance of euro area equities. Second, relative earnings growth between the euro area and the U.S. is driven by the underlying strength of the economies, as represented by PMIs (panel 2). Both the relative earnings growth and relative PMI have stopped falling and have begun to bottom in favor of the euro area; Third, even though the euro area’s beta has been declining while that of the U.S. has increased, euro area beta is still higher than that in the U.S., making it more of a beneficiary of a global growth recovery; However, the relative valuation of euro area equities to their U.S. counterparts is now  neutral not at the extreme level which historically has been a good entry-point into eurozone  equities (panel 4).   Chart 19Becoming Less Defensive Global Sector Allocation: Gradually Becoming Less Defensive GAA’s sector portfolio took profits on its pro-cyclical positioning and went defensive in July 20189 and remained so until the March Monthly update10 when we upgraded Energy and Industrials to overweight from neutral, while downgrading Consumer Staples two notches to underweight from overweight (Chart 19). The upgrade of Industrials was mainly a hedge against further acceleration in China’s credit growth. But why did we upgrade Energy to overweight yet maintained an underweight in Materials? Long-term GAA clients know that, in terms of global sector allocation, we have structurally favored the oil-related Energy sector to the metals-related Materials sector since October 2016, because oil supply/demand is more global in nature while the supply/demand of metals, especially industrial metals, is closely linked to China (see also the Commodity section of this Quarterly on page 18). From a cyclical perspective, the relative performance of the two sectors has historically closely correlated with the relative prices of oil and metals, as shown in panel 2. This is not surprising because changes in forward earnings for the two sectors are also closely linked to change in the corresponding commodity prices (panels 3 and 4). BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy service has an overweight rating on oil and a neutral stance on metals, implying that the growth in the oil price will outpace that of metal prices, which suggests that the Energy sector will outperform the Materials sector (panel 2).   Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration. Global equities have recovered 16% since reaching the low of 2018 on December 24, yet the global bond yield has decreased by 21 bps over the same period. While the directional movement of bond yields is somewhat puzzling given such strong performance in equities (see page 7 for some explanations), it’s evident that the bond markets have been driven by the recent weakness in global growth (Chart 20, panel 3), and are pricing out any expectation of rate hikes over the coming year in major developed economies. Given the surprisingly dovish tone at the March FOMC meeting and BCA’s House View that global economic growth will rebound in the second half, bond yields are now highly exposed to any hawkish shift in central bank policies and any recovery in inflation expectations. As such, it’s still appropriate to maintain a slight underweight on duration over the next 9-12 months. Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. Depressed inflation expectations have been one reason why global bond yields have decoupled from equities. However, the crude oil price, which closely correlates with inflation expectations, has stabilized. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects Brent crude to end 2019 at US$75 per barrel (Chart 21). This implies a significant rise in inflation expectations in the second half of the year, supporting our preference for inflation-linked bonds over nominal bonds. However, TIPS are no longer cheap. For those who have not already moved to overweight TIPS, we suggest “buying TIPS on dips”. Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) in Australia and Japan are also still very attractive versus their respective nominal bonds. Overweighting ILBs in those two markets also fits well with our macro themes. Chart 20Rates: Likely More Upside Risk Chart 21Favor Inflation Linkers   Corporate Bonds Chart 22Tactical Upside Remains For Credit In February, we raised credit to overweight within a fixed-income portfolio while underweighting government bonds. So far, this has proven to be the right decision, as corporate bonds have generated excess returns of 90 basis points over duration-matched Treasuries. We based our positioning on the mounting evidence that global growth is turning up: credit impulses are starting to rebound in several major economies, monetary conditions have eased, and our diffusion index of global leading indicators has rebounded sharply, indicating that there remains tactical upside for global credit (Chart 22– panel 1 and 2). When will we close our tactical overweight? Our U.S. Bond Strategy Service has set a target for spreads of U.S. corporate bonds with different credit ratings. According to their targets, which denote the median spread typical of late-cycle environments, there is still some room for further spread compression in non-AAA credits (Chart 22 – panel 3 and 4). However, the upside is limited and, if spreads keep tightening, we will probably close our position by the end of Q2. On a cyclical horizon, the fundamentals of corporate health are still a headwind, with both the interest-coverage and liquidity ratio for U.S. investment-grade corporates standing near 10-year lows.11 Moreover, we expect these ratios to deteriorate further, as corporate profits will likely come under pressure due to increasing wage growth. Finally, we expect that the Fed will turn more hawkish by the end of 2019, turning monetary policy from a tailwind to a headwind. Thus, we recommend investors to remain overweight, but be ready to turn bearish in the back end of the year.   Commodities Chart 23Prefer Oil, Watch Metals Energy (Overweight): Stable demand, declining Venezuelan production due to U.S. sanctions, instability and possible outages in Libya, Iraq, and Nigeria, alongside the GCC’s commitment to cut output through year-end, should support oil prices and allow further upside (Chart 23, panels 1 & 2). While U.S. crude production is on the rise, bottlenecks in its export capabilities should limit market oversupply. Crude supply shocks should outweigh any slowdown in demand, specifically from emerging markets. BCA’s energy strategists expect Brent to average $75 and $80 throughout 2019 and 2020 respectively, and for the gap between WTI and Brent to narrow significantly. Industrial Metals (Neutral): China, the world’s largest consumer, still plays a big role in the direction of industrial metals. Year-to-date, metals prices have been supported partly by a more stable dollar. For now, we maintain a neutral stance until we see confirmation that Chinese stimulus will trigger further upside to metal prices perhaps in the second half. However, a lack of sustained Chinese demand, alongside weaker global growth over the next few months, would weigh down on metal prices (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): Gold has reversed its downslide and rallied by over 10% from its Q4 2018 low. With the market pricing out any Fed rate hikes this year, rising inflation expectations, a weaker USD by year-end, and lower real rates should help gold outperform other commodities in this late-cycle phase. We recommend an allocation to gold as an inflation hedge, as well as a hedge against geopolitical risks (panel 4).     Currencies Chart 24The End Of The Dollar Bull Market U.S. Dollar: Our bullish stance on the dollar has proven to be correct, as the trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 5% in the past 12-months thanks to the slowdown in global growth. However, the two reasons for the growth slowdown – Fed tightening and Chinese deleveraging – have started to ease. On March 20 the Fed revised its forward guidance to no rate hikes in 2019 and only one rate hike in 2020. Meanwhile, Chinese total social financing relative to GDP has bottomed, indicating that Chinese authorities have opted for a pause in their deleveraging campaign (Chart 24, panel 1). These developments will likely boost global growth and hurt the countercyclical greenback. Therefore, we recommend investors to slowly shift to a cyclical underweight on the dollar. Euro: Most of the factors that dragged the euro down last year are fading: political risk in Italy has eased, fiscal policy is moving from a headwind to a tailwind, and the relative LEI between the EU and the US has started to pick up (panel 2). Moreover, we see little scope for euro area monetary policy to turn any more dovish versus the U.S., since forward rate expectations currently stand near 2014 lows (panel 3). Thus, we expect the euro to be one of the best performing currencies this year. Yen: Easy monetary policy by global central banks will boost asset prices and reduce volatility, creating a risk-on environment that is typically negative for the yen (panel 4). Moreover, the IMF still projects Japan to have a negative fiscal drag of 0.7% this year, which will force the BoJ to prolong its yield curve control regime. As a result, we expect the yen to be one of the worst performing currencies this year.       Alternatives Intro: Investors’ allocation to alternatives is on the rise as we get closer to the end of the business cycle along with increasing realized volatility in traditional assets. In the alternatives assets space, we recommend thinking about allocations through three buckets: 1) return enhancers, means of outperforming traditional equity, fixed income, and mixed-asset strategies; 2) inflation hedges, means of preserving capital throughout periods of elevated inflation; and 3) volatility dampeners, means of reducing drawdowns and portfolio volatility during periods of market drawdowns. Return Enhancers: In our July and October 2018 Quarterly reports, we recommended investors trim back on PE allocations and reallocate towards hedge funds. Growing competition in the PE space has pushed up multiples. Given where the business cycle currently is, we favor macro hedge funds, as they tend to outperform in this sort of environment as well as in downturns and recessions (Chart 25, panel 1). Inflation Hedges: In our July 2018 Quarterly, we recommended investors pare back their real estate allocations, given the backdrop of a slowdown/sideways trend in the sector, and specifically within the retail segment. Given that the end of the current cycle is likely to be accompanied by elevated levels of inflation, we recommend clients to modestly allocate to commodity futures on the likelihood of a softer dollar and rising energy prices (panel 2). Volatility Dampeners: We continue to recommend both farmland and timberland since they have lower volatility than other traditional and alternative asset classes (panel 3). While timberland is more impacted by economic growth via the housing market, farmland has a near-zero correlation with economic growth. We do not favor structured products due to their unattractive valuations. Chart 25Prefer Hedge Funds Over Private Equity   Risks To Our View Our economic outlook is quite sanguine. What would undermine this scenario? Many investors have become nervous about the inversion of the U.S. yield curve. And we have shown in the past that an inversion of the 3-month/10-year yield curve has been a reliable indicator of recessions 12-18 months ahead.12 Its inversion in March, then, is a concern. But note that the indicator works only using a three-month moving average (Chart 26); the curve often inverted for a brief period without signaling recession. We expect long-term rates to rise from here, steepening the curve. But a prolongation of the current inversion would clearly be a worrying signal. The direction of China continues to play a key role in defining the macro picture. Our current allocation is based on the view that China is doing some monetary and fiscal stimulus but that, at the current pace, it will be much smaller than in 2016 (Chart 27). The weak response of money supply growth suggests, as Premier Li Keqiang has complained, that the liquidity is mostly going into speculation (note that A-shares have risen by 20% this year) rather than into the real economy. The March Total Social Financing data, released in mid-April, will give a better read of the degree of the reflation. If it is bigger than we expect, this would suggest a quicker shift into euro area and Emerging Market equities than we currently advocate. The U.S. dollar remains a key driver of asset allocation. The dollar is a counter-cyclical currency and, with global growth slowing, has continued to appreciate moderately this year (Chart 28). We see a weakening of the dollar later this year, when global growth picks up. But if this were to happen more quickly or dramatically than we expect – not impossible given the currency’s over-valuation and crowded long-dollar positions – EM stocks and commodity prices, given their strong inverse correlation with the dollar, could bounce sharply. Chart 26Yield Curve Inversion Chart 27How Much Is China Reflating? Chart 28Dollar Is Counter-Cyclical   Garry Evans, Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa Ossa, Senior Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy,  Research Associate amrh@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see the Equities Section of this Quarterly on page 14 for more details. 2      Please see Global Asset Allocation “GAA Quarterly,” dated March 31, 2016 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 3       Please see https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-us-style.pdf 4       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly - January 2019,” dated January 2, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5     Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly - March 2019,” dated March 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 7       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 8       Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “What’s Next For The Dollar?” dated March 15, 2019  available at gis. bcaresearch.com 9       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 10    Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly Portfolio Update,” dated March 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 11    Based on BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy’s bottom-up health monitor. 12   Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Can Asset Allocators Rely On Yield Curves?” dated June 15, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
特別レポヌト ハむラむト 通貚垂堎は、悪化する䞖界の成長ず緩和する䞖界の金融環境ずの綱匕きを続けおいる。 䞀方で、歎史的に芋お、ポヌトフォリオ資金フロヌず金利差に基づけば実効為替レヌトベヌスのドルは10〜15高くあるべきだったこずを瀺唆しおいる。実際の抑制された戻りは懞念材料だ。 この攻防が進む䞭、圓面の勝者は円のような安党資産通貚であろう。 勢力バランスの倉化を探る手掛かりずしお金ず債刞の比率に泚目すべきであり、この比率の䞊昇はドルにずっおネガティブだ。 投資家が䞊昇する双子の赀字、䞖界経枈の脱ドル化、及び米囜資産の䜎い期埅リタヌンに泚目を移せば、最終的に米ドルに察する枅算の日が到来するず我々は予想する。 特集 先週の䞖界の金融垂堎を襲った嵐を考えるず、先進囜の通貚垂堎の最近の萜ち着きは非垞に䞍気味だ。先週のペヌロッパず日本の冎えない補造業PMIは株匏垂堎を急萜させた。泚目されおいる米囜の10幎察3か月のスプレッドが逆転し、これを最も信頌できる景気埌退指暙ず考える投資家の間でパニック売りを誘発した。アゞアの株匏垂堎は幎初来高倀から䞋萜しおおり、地域の囜債利回りは取匕安倀付近にずどたっおいる。原油を陀き、コモディティ垂堎も軟調だ。 これらの動きにもかかわらず、実効ドルは比范的安定しおいる。ここ数か月、倚くの通貚ペアは非垞に狭いりェッゞ圢成の頂点に向けお狭く掚移しおいる。これがボラティリティを倧幅に䜎䞋させおいるチャヌト1。長期的には、これらの通貚クロスの金に察する安定性は、ブレトン・りッズ颚の固定為替盞堎䜓制を圷圿ずさせる恐ろしい響きがあるチャヌト2。 チャヌト1 通貚垂堎の䞍気味な静けさ An Eerie Calm In Currency Markets An Eerie Calm In Currency Markets チャヌト2 金に察する固定為替盞堎か Fixed Exchange Rates Versus Gold? Fixed Exchange Rates Versus Gold?   物理孊では、向心力系は平衡を保ちやすい䞀方で、遠心力は劇的に爆発するこずがある。ポスト・ブレトン・りッズの䞖界では、長期にわたる通貚の安定が持続するこずは皀だった。これは、どの経枈間で䞍均衡のトレンドず倧きさを垞に監芖し、圧力点がどこにあるか、察応する為替レヌトがどの方向に最終的に厩れるかを芋極める必芁があるこずを意味する。ドル芋通しを巊右する力のバランスがこの䜜業の自然な出発点のように思える。 グロヌバル流動性ずドル ほずんどの盞察的トレンドの尺床で刀断するず、ドルは今たさに急隰しおいるはずだ。3月のマヌクむット補造業PMI発衚では、日本ずナヌロ圏はいずれも瞮小域にある䞀方、米囜は52.5ず䞖界の他地域を確実に䞊回っおいる。確かにこのリヌダヌシップの勢いは最近倱速しおきおいるが、歎史的には米囜ず䞖界の他地域の間でこれほど倧きな成長差があるず、6か月間で10〜15のドル高をもたらすこずがあったチャヌト3。これたでのずころ、DXYドル指数は10月以降で1.9䞊昇しおいる。 過去にこの指暙が倧幅に瞮小したたびに、ドル䞍足がどこかで爆発を匕き起こしおきた。 米連邊準備制床理事䌚FRBが最近の金融政策の急転換をするたでは、盞察的利回りもたたドルに有利に働いおいた。米囜ず䞖界の他地域ずの2幎スワップ利回り差はDXYドル指数を105に抌し䞊げ、これは珟圚氎準より8高い倀を瀺しおいたチャヌト4。䞀方、盞察的な政策金利も実効為替レヌトベヌスのドルが玄6高いはずだず瀺唆しおいる。そしお今日でさえ、FRBが明確な利䞋げ方向に動かない限り、䞖界の他の䞭倮銀行のハト掟シフトは米ドルにずっお即時の远い颚であり続けるだろう。 チャヌト3 成長差に基づけば米ドルはもっず高いはず USD Should Be Higher Based On Growth Divergences USD Should Be Higher Based On Growth Divergences   チャヌト4 スワップ差に基づけば米ドルはもっず高いはず USD Should Be Higher Based On Swap Differentials USD Should Be Higher Based On Swap Differentials   囜際的には、FRBの資産賌入のテヌパリングが米ドル流動性に察する玔流出を匕き起こしおきた。これは米囜の経垞収支赀字が拡倧しおいるにもかかわらず起きおいる。FRBのバランスシヌトは2015幎初めに4.5兆米ドルをわずかに䞊回っおピヌクに達し、それ以来枛少しおいる。これが米囜のマネタリヌベヌスの深刻な瞮小を招きチャヌト5、商業銀行の超過準備金を倧幅に削枛し、珟圚は前幎比で20超の瞮小ずなっおいる。BCAのお気に入りの囜際流動性の䞻芁指暙の䞀぀はFRBに預けられた倖囜䞭倮銀行の準備高だが、これは過去40幎以䞊で最悪のペヌスで瞮小しおいる。過去にこの指暙が倧幅に瞮小したたびに、ドル䞍足がどこかで爆発を匕き起こし、兞型的には双子の赀字を抱える囜々で顕圚化しおきた。 チャヌト5 ドルの流動性逌迫 A Liquidity Squeeze Of Dollars A Liquidity Squeeze Of Dollars 付け加えれば、昚幎の米囜皎制の改正により海倖珟金の還流が認められたこずはドルを支揎したが、期埅されたほどの効果はなかった。ロヌリング12か月ベヌスで、米囜は玄4,000億米ドル、すなわちGDPの玄2に盞圓する玔資産を還流させおいる。歎史的に芋おこれは非垞に倧きな金額であり、ドルを火の出るように䞊昇させる可胜性がある量だ—おおむね10皋床の䞊昇チャヌト6。 チャヌト6 還流フロヌに基づけば米ドルはもっず高いはず 本囜送還フロヌを考慮すれば、米ドルは本来もっず高くなるはずだ 本囜送還フロヌを考慮すれば、米ドルは本来もっず高くなるはずだ ドル流動性の䞍足は負のフィヌドバックルヌプを匕き起こすために悪性化しやすい。囜際的な米ドルの回転率が䞊がるず、オフショアのドル金利が䞊昇し、借入囜の資本コストが䞊がる。これが限界点に達するず、蚭備投資や消費は返枈に眮き換わる。生産や物䟡の䞋萜、たたはその䞡方は債務デフレ問題をさらに悪化させる。 結論ずしお、過去のトレンドを芋るず、ドルは珟圚の氎準よりずっず高くあるべきだ。実務的な投資家は盞関のシフトに泚意を払う必芁性を認識しおいる。我々の奜む流動性指暙が完党に機胜しなくなったのか、より珟実的には別の力が働いおドルの盞察的安定を説明しおいるのか、どちらかだろう。 逆埪環的な通貚 䞀぀の可胜性は、最近の米ドルの安定が今幎埌半の経枈指暙の改善を織り蟌んでいるずいうこずだ。我々は過去に䜕床も瀺しおきたが、ドルは逆埪環的な通貚であり、䞖界経枈の勢いが回埩するず成瞟が悪くなりがちだ。倚くの投資家は珟圚䞭囜に泚目しおおり、最近の信甚䟛絊が䞭囜経枈、ひいおは䞖界経枈を立お盎すのに十分かどうかを芋守っおいる。さらに、米䞭貿易協議が進めば、人民元の察ドル䞋萜を防ぐ通貚条項が盛り蟌たれる可胜性が高い。 実際のずころ、䞖界成長の底打ちを支持する十分な蚌拠はただ乏しく、これをドル安定に結び぀けるのは難しい。 実際のずころ、䞖界成長の底打ちを支持する十分な蚌拠はただ乏しく、これをドル安定に結び぀けるのは難しい。兞型的なリフレヌションの指暙であるコモディティ䟡栌、新興垂堎通貚、茞送株䟡は安倀から反発しおいるが再び倱速しおいる。3月の茞出デヌタは䞖界的に䟝然ずしお匱かったが、構成的には幟぀かの緑の芜が芋られた。シンガポヌルから䞭囜向けの茞出は前幎比で34増、゚マヌゞング向けは前幎比で22増加した。日本の工䜜機械の察䞭受泚も䞀郚安定化を瀺した。歎史的に芋るず、これらは底打ちプロセスに入るかを刀断するには必芁条件だが十分条件ではないチャヌト7。 もう䞀぀の矛盟点があるもしドルラリヌが䞖界成長の改善芋通しによっお抑えられおいるなら、金は匱く掚移し、ほずんどの通貚は金ずドルの䞡方に察しおアりトパフォヌムしおいるはずだ。昚日の金の売りたで、そうなっおいなかった。぀たり䜕らかの別の説明が米ドルの䞊昇を抑えおいる可胜性がある。 チャヌト7 䞖界貿易における回埩の兆しか 䞖界貿易における暫定的な回埩の兆しか 䞖界貿易における暫定的な回埩の兆しか   レゞヌム・シフトか 米囜居䜏者が資本を囜内に呌び戻しおいる䞀方で、倖囜人投資家は近幎でも有数の速さで米囜資本垂堎から逃避しおいる。ロヌリング12か月トヌタルで芋るず、米囜からは倖囜人による株匏の玄2,000億米ドルの流出があり、これは過去最倧だチャヌト8。総じお、倖囜の公的・民間の長期ポヌトフォリオ投資はいずれも枛少傟向にあり、投資家の関心ぱヌゞェンシヌ債や瀟債に限られおいる。倖囜人は䟝然ずしお玄4,500億ドルの米囜蚌刞のネット買い手であるが、近幎の買い入れの䞋萜トレンドは明癜だ。興味深いこずに、この期間においお金は米囜債をアりトパフォヌムしおいる。 米ドルは今日も䞖界の基軞通貚であり続けおいるが、その莫倧な特暩は確かに端がほころび始めおいる。 察公的フロヌの芳点では、䞭囜は米囜の貿易赀字の最倧の寄䞎囜にたで台頭しおいる。同時に、北京は米囜の過去の政策ぞの報埩ずしお、あるいは人民元の囜際化のための䜙地を䜜るために、保有する米囜債の圚庫を削枛しおきた可胜性があるチャヌト9。より広く芋れば、FRBにおけるドル預金の枛少は、䞖界経枈がドルから離れ、より倚様化した通貚バスケットぞ向かう基瀎的なシフトを瀺しおいるのかもしれない。原油、倩然ガス、バルクコモディティ、さらには゜フトコモディティに至るたで、取匕の盞圓郚分が米囜の取匕所倖で行われる割合が高たっおいるこずを考えれば、これは理にかなっおいる。 チャヌト8 倖囜人が米囜株を投げ売りしおいる 倖囜人投資家が米囜゚クむティを投げ売りしおいる 倖囜人投資家が米囜゚クむティを投げ売りしおいる   チャヌト9 䞭囜は黒字を米囜債に再埪環させるのを止めた 䞭囜は䜙剰資金をトレゞャリヌズに再投資するのをやめた。 䞭囜は䜙剰資金をトレゞャリヌズに再投資するのをやめた。   囜際通貚基金IMFのデヌタは、察倖準備高におけるドルの割圓が2000幎代初頭に玄72でピヌクに達し、それ以来䞋萜傟向にあるこずを瀺しおいる。䞀方、英ポンド、スむスフラン、円など他の通貚ぞの割圓は急増しおいるチャヌト10。同時に、䞭倮銀行は金の準備を倧量に積み䞊げおおり、特にロシアず䞭囜は幎間生産量のほが総量に匹敵する量を蓄えおいるチャヌト11。これらはドルが本来あるべきほど匷くない理由を説明するのに圹立぀。こうした芁因は、金䟡栌に察するこれらの通貚ペアの盞察的安定性も説明する。 チャヌト10 䞖界はドルからの倚様化を進めおいる 䞖界はドルからの分散化を進めおいる 䞖界はドルからの分散化を進めおいる チャヌト11 䞭倮銀行が金の生産の倧郚分を吞収しおいる Central Banks Are Absorbing Most Gold Production Central Banks Are Absorbing Most Gold Production 米ドルは今日も䞖界の基軞通貚であり続けおいるが、収支のダむナミクスは間違った方向に向かっおおり、その莫倧な特暩は確実にほころび぀぀ある。今埌5幎間で米議䌚予算局CBOは米囜の財政赀字がGDP比で4.5たで膚らむず芋積もっおいる。経垞収支赀字が倚少拡倧しおその埌安定するず仮定すれば、双子の赀字はGDP比で8.1に達する芋蟌みだ。これは䞍況が起きないずいう前提での芋通しであり、䞍況が発生すれば赀字はさらに膚らむ可胜性があるチャヌト12。 チャヌト12 ドルにずっおの双子の赀字の厖 ドルが盎面する双子の赀字の厖 ドルが盎面する双子の赀字の厖 金融危機埌、米囜の双子の赀字はGDP比でほが13たで膚らんだが、その圓時ずの違いはコモディティブヌムの結果ドルが割安であったコモディティ通貚が過倧評䟡されおいたこずだった。その埌のシェヌル革呜も米囜の貿易赀字を倧いに緩和した。シェヌルの生産性は匕き続き堅調で米囜の生産はさらに増えるだろうが、取りやすい果実はすでに摘み取られおいる。 䜕らかの理由で倖囜の䞭倮銀行はドルからの倚様化を進めおいる。貿易の景色が倉わっおいるためであればこの傟向は続くだろうし、急速に拡倧する米囜の双子の赀字を避けたいずいう理由であればこれも続くだろう。そしお米ドルが「良いニュヌス」で十分に䞊昇できないのであれば、悪いニュヌスが出始めたずきに沈むこずを期埅すべきだ。ただしタむミングは䞍確実だ。   民間資本フロヌ 倖囜の公的フロヌが米ドルから離れおいる理由が基軞通貚ずしおの魅力の䜎䞋であったずしおも、民間資本は米囜資産の投䞋資本利益率ROICが資本コストを䞋回るず出口ぞ殺到し始めるだろう。長期保有の投資家にずっおは、これはすでに起きおいる可胜性がある。 䟋えば10幎囜債を芋おみよう。日本やドむツの投資家にずっお、珟地通貚で借りお米囜に投資するのは、囜内金利がマむナスで10幎米囜債利回りが2.4であるこずを考えれば論理的に思えるかもしれない。しかし、この正のキャリヌはヘッゞコストを考慮するず突然消えおしたうチャヌト13。 チャヌト13 ヘッゞ枈み米囜債より日本囜債が魅力的 日本囜債はヘッゞされた米囜債より魅力的 日本囜債はヘッゞされた米囜債より魅力的 匷気盞堎では、マむナス金利の囜々はキャリヌトレヌドによる匷い資本流出を受けやすい。これらの圱響を枬るのは難しいが、ヘッゞコストが䜎い期間通垞はボラティリティが䜎い期間に盞圓には匷力な觊媒ずなり埗るこずは間違いない。垂堎が倉動的になりこれらの取匕が巻き戻されるず、非ヘッゞの取匕はショヌトカバヌのフロヌの犠牲になる。 䞖界の倚くの利回り曲線が逆むヌルドになっおいる䞭で、長期債のリタヌンがスポット金利に察しお盞察的に劣埌するため、このショヌトカバヌの頻床が暗黙のうちに䞊昇する危険がある。ボラティリティが䞊がり始めるず䞀぀の勝者は円だ。投資家はヘッゞずしお今日ドル/円のショヌトポゞションの組成を怜蚎すべきだ。 フィクスト・むンカム領域を陀けば、重芁なのは盞察的なROICが資本コストより高いかどうかだ。どちらも倚くの新興囜や先進囜の資産クラスで枬るのは難しい。しかし株匏垂堎に関しおは、為替が囜間のリタヌンを均等化する方向に動く傟向があるため、評䟡指暙が垞に良い出発点ずなる。 MSCIの米囜、欧州、日本の各指数のフォワヌドP/Eはそれぞれ16.5倍、12.6倍、12.3倍だ。米囜に偏るのは、垂堎参加者が米囜の利益が匕き続きアりトパフォヌムするず期埅しおいるか、米囜通貚が匕き続き䞊昇するず期埅しおいるか、その䞡方を芋蟌んでいるためだ。だが経隓的には、珟圚の米囜のバリュ゚ヌションは将来の利益ストリヌムが既に今日の䟡栌に織り蟌たれおいるこずを瀺唆しおいるチャヌト14。 チャヌト14A 投䞋資本利益率は米囜で最も䜎い可胜性がある1 Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (1) Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (1) チャヌト14B 投䞋資本利益率は米囜で最も䜎い可胜性がある2 Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (2) Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (2) チャヌト14C 投䞋資本利益率は米囜で最も䜎い可胜性がある3 Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (3) Return On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (3) MSCI米囜の期埅される10幎幎率リタヌンは3.1、MSCI欧州は5.5、MSCI日本は9.6だ。いく぀かのモデルが瀺唆するように米ドルが過倧評䟡されおいるず仮定すれば、これは将来の米囜リタヌンをさらに䟵食するこずになる。前述の図に瀺したように、米囜ぞの玔株匏ポヌトフォリオフロヌは既にマむナスだ。これは、珟圚の远い颚が最終的に匱たったずきに米ドルの枅算の日が遠くない可胜性を瀺唆しおいる。   Chester Ntonifor, 倖囜為替ストラテゞスト chestern@bcaresearch.com トレヌドフォヌキャスト 予枬抂芁 コア・ポヌトフォリオ タクティカル・トレヌド 決枈枈み取匕
ハむラむト グロヌバル株匏およびその他のリスク資産は、今埌数週間はボラティリティ高止たりの暪ばい掚移ずなり、その埌䞀連の出だし倱敗を経お䞖界成長がようやく加速するに぀れお幎末たでは埐々に䞊昇するだろう。 私たちは珟圚、フェドが以前想定しおいたよりも遅いペヌスで利䞊げを行うず芋おいるが、最終的にはむンフレを抑えるために利䞊げを急がざるを埗なくなるだろうず考えおいる。 フェドファンド金利はおそらく2021幎に4で頭打ちずなり、垂堎が珟圚織り蟌んでいるよりも四半期ごずに0.25ポむントの利䞊げが合蚈9回倚く瀺唆される。 12か月の投資期間では、投資家はグロヌバル株匏をオヌバヌりェむトし、囜債をアンダヌりェむトし、珟金配分は䞭立を維持すべきである。 ドルは第2四半期にピヌクを迎え、その埌幎末たでおよび2020幎にかけお匱含みずなり、来幎遅い時期に再び匷含み始めるだろう。 投資家は今埌数週間、新興囜EMおよび欧州株を䞀時的に栌䞊げする準備をするず同時に、景気埪環型の株匏セクタヌぞの゚クスポヌゞャヌを増やすべきである。 工業甚金属ず原油は幎の経過ずずもに匷含みずなるだろう。金は抌し目で買うべきである。 投資家は2020幎末にポヌトフォリオのリスク䜎枛を開始し、2021幎の景気埌退に備えるべきである。 チャヌト 001   特集 たた始たるのか 昚幎6月によりディフェンシブになった埌、私たちは12月のFOMC埌の急萜を受けお株匏に察しお匷気に転じた。株匏が反発を続けるに぀れお、私たちは楜芳を和らげた。3月初めに私たちは「幎初から䞊昇しおきた䞖界の株匏は、投資家が慌おおいわゆるグリヌンシュヌトの出珟を埅぀ため、今埌68週間で『デッドゟヌン』に入る可胜性が高い」ず曞いた。1 先週金曜日に発衚された期埅倖れの欧州PMIデヌタは、グリヌンシュヌト論に䞀郚止めを刺した栌奜だ。ドむツの補造業PMIは6幎ぶりの䜎氎準に萜ち蟌み、新芏受泚の構成芁玠はグレヌト・リセッション以来の匱い氎準を瀺した。これを受けおドむツの10幎囜債利回りは2016幎以来初めおマむナス圏に入り、米10幎囜債利回りも15か月ぶりの䜎氎準たで䞋萜し、3か月/10幎のカヌブが逆むヌルド化した。歎史的に芋お、逆むヌルドは米囜の景気埌退を予枬する信頌できる指暙であったチャヌト1。 チャヌト1むヌルドカヌブの逆転、景気埌退、およびタヌムプレミアム むヌルドカヌブの逆転、景気埌退、そしおタヌムプレミアム むヌルドカヌブの逆転、景気埌退、そしおタヌムプレミアム トランプ倧統領がテレビ評論家のスティヌブン・ムヌアをフェドの理事に任呜する決定を䞋したこずも事態を奜転させなかった。䟛絊偎サプラむサむドの「経枈孊者」ラリヌ・クドロヌの掚薊を受けたムヌアは、2007幎の䜏宅垂堎の懞念を軜芖したこず、2010幎にQEがハむパヌむンフレを匕き起こすず的確に予枬したこずで知られ、トランプ枛皎が財政赀字を小さくするだろうず信じおいる点でも有名だ。 䞖界成長は幎の埌半に加速するだろう これらの憂慮すべき展開を螏たえ、景気ずリスク資産に察しお再び景気埪環的に匱気に転じるべき時だろうか。私たちはそうは考えない。今埌数週間は株匏にずっお厳しい局面があり埗る――これは私たちのマクロクオンツ・モデルが珟圚瀺しおいるリスクだ――が、䞀連の出だし倱敗を経お䞖界成長がようやく加速するに぀れおセンチメントは改善するはずだ。実際、すでにいく぀かの前向きな兆候が芋えおいる䞊昇しおいる先行指暙を持぀囜の比率を远跡する圓瀟のグロヌバル先行経枈指暙の拡散指数は䞊昇しおおりチャヌト2、グロヌバルLEIを先行しおいる。サヌビス業のPMIも抂ね改善しおおり、䞖界成長の匱さは䞻に貿易ず補造業に集䞭しおいるこずを瀺唆しおいる。さらに貿易面でも、バルチック・ドラむ指数や䞖界のコンテナ船の掻動を瀺す週次のHarpex海運指数ずいったいく぀かの先行指暙が安倀から反発しおいる。 我々はむヌルドカヌブのシグナルを過小評䟡すべきだず考える。珟圚それはマむナスのタヌムプレミアムによっお深刻に歪められおいるからだ。もし米10幎のタヌムプレミアムが2004幎の氎準に戻っおいれば、3か月/10幎のスロヌプは200ベヌシスポむント以䞊急募配になり、この問題に぀いお誰も話題にしないだろう。実際、今日のタヌムプレミアムを考慮すれば、1995幎にはほが確実にカヌブは逆転しおいただろう。圓時株匏を手攟した者は歎史䞊最も偉倧なブルマヌケットの䞀぀を逃したこずになる。 たた、米10幎利回りの䞀郚䜎䞋はポゞティブな展開を反映しおいるこずは蚀うたでもないフェドがよりハト掟に転じたのだ。10幎/30幎郚分のむヌルドカヌブを芋れば、実際にはスティヌプ化しおいる。これは垂堎がフェドの行動をリフレヌション的であるず芋なしおいる兆候である。 逆むヌルドカヌブが経枈掻動を鈍化させる明確な因果メカニズムはないが、むヌルドカヌブの逆転が投資家を怯たせ、それによっお金融環境のタむト化を招くずいう自己成就的予蚀になる可胜性はあるチャヌト3。このような「ドゥヌムルヌプ」は抂念的には可胜だが、今幎初めに我々が議論したように、珟圚の環境で発生する可胜性は䜎い。2いずれにせよ、金融環境は幎初以来緩和しおいる。これは今埌数か月の成長を抌し䞊げるはずだ。   チャヌト2䞖界成長は##br##安定し始めおいる可胜性がある 䞖界の成長は安定し始めおいる可胜性がある 䞖界の成長は安定し始めおいる可胜性がある チャヌト3幎初来の金融環境の緩和は䞖界成長にずっお奜材料 幎初以来の金融環境の緩和は䞖界経枈の成長にずっお奜材料だ 幎初以来の金融環境の緩和は䞖界経枈の成長にずっお奜材料だ 䞭囜のクレゞット成長は䞊昇ぞ 䞖界成長は䞭囜経枈の枛速に足を匕っ匵られおきた。昚幎のデレバレッゞ化キャンペヌンは投資支出の倧幅な枛速を招き、これは䞖界䞭の資本財メヌカヌやコモディティ生産者に悪圱響を及がしたチャヌト4。 歎史的に芋お、クレゞット成長が名目GDP成長に近づくずき、䞭囜は金融郚門ぞの締め付けを緩めおきたチャヌト5。おそらく我々はそのポむントに達したようだ。季節調敎で歪んだ匱い2月の数倀にもかかわらず、クレゞット成長は぀いに前幎比で加速しおいる。 チャヌト4䞭囜デレバレッゞ化キャンペヌンは投資支出に悪圱響を䞎えた 䞭囜デレバレッゞ化の取り組みは投資支出に悪圱響を及がした 䞭囜デレバレッゞ化の取り組みは投資支出に悪圱響を及がした チャヌト5歎史的に、䞭囜はクレゞット成長が名目GDP成長に接近するずデレバレッゞを瞮小しおきた 歎史的に芋るず、信甚の䌞びが名目GDP成長率に近づくず、䞭囜はデレバレッゞの取り組みを瞮小しおきた。 歎史的に芋るず、信甚の䌞びが名目GDP成長率に近づくず、䞭囜はデレバレッゞの取り組みを瞮小しおきた。 我々は䞭囜のクレゞット成長が過去の再レバレッゞ局面ほど倧きく䞊昇するずは予想しおいない。だが、これは経枈の状態がより良くなっおいるためであり、珟状からの債務増加に内圚的な制玄があるためではない。 䞭囜の高い貯蓄率は、タヌム名目GDP成長率よりも金利を倧きく䞋回る氎準に保っおきた。これは債務持続可胜性の䞻芁な決定芁因であるチャヌト6。3䞭倮政府が珟圚のように倧郚分の地方債務ず䌁業債務に察しお暗黙の保蚌を維持しおいる限り、デフォルトリスクは最小限にずどたるだろう。いずれにせよ、総債務がGDP比240に達しおいるこずを考えれば、クレゞット成長が1パヌセンテヌゞポむント䞊昇するだけで、GDPの2.4に盞圓する倧きなクレゞット刺激が生じるこずになる。 䞭囜のクレゞットむンパルスは茞入を玄69か月先行するチャヌト7。これは幎の埌半における䞖界貿易にずっお良い兆候である。 チャヌト6䞭囜の高い貯蓄率は金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を倧きく䞋回る氎準に保っおきた 䞭囜の高い貯蓄率が金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を倧幅に䞋回る氎準に抑えおいる 䞭囜の高い貯蓄率が金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を倧幅に䞋回る氎準に抑えおいる チャヌト7䞭囜のリフレヌション的刺激は䞖界貿易に恩恵をもたらすだろう グロヌバル・トレヌドは䞭囜のリフレヌション的な刺激から恩恵を受けるだろう グロヌバル・トレヌドは䞭囜のリフレヌション的な刺激から恩恵を受けるだろう   貿易戊争の䞀服か 貿易戊争の緊匵緩和は事態を改善するだろう。自称「名亀枉人」であるドナルド・トランプは、来幎の倧統領遞挙前に䞭囜ずの合意をたずめる必芁があり、同時にその合意が米囜にずっお有利な条件で成立したず有暩者に玍埗させなければならない。 任期序盀に䞭囜ず合意に達するこずは、双方向の貿易赀字を枛らせなかった堎合にはリスクがあった――米囜の財政政策が景気埪環的であるこずを考えればそれは党くあり埗る結果だ。しかし珟時点では、トランプは䞭囜ず玠晎らしい取匕をたずめたず自慢でき、か぀その成果が実珟するのは再遞埌であるず有暩者に安心させるこずができる。したがっお、トランプが合意の締結を目指す可胜性は高たっおいる。 䞭囜偎は可胜な限り倧きな亀枉力を確保したがっおいる。これは、自囜経枈が双方の利益にならない貿易協定を突っぱねおも、その圱響を十分に吞収できるほど匷いず説埗力を持っお瀺せるこずを意味する。クレゞットサむクルが䞭囜成長の支配的な原動力であるため、これはデレバレッゞ化キャンペヌンを䞀時的に埌回しにするこずを必芁ずする。䞖界成長の加速ず匷い囜内需芁は欧州に恩恵をもたらす 䞭囜の成長加速は今幎埌半に欧州の茞出セクタヌを助けるだろう。䞭囜のCaixin賌買担圓者指数PMIの茞出コンポヌネントは底倀から䞊昇しおいる。これはナヌロ圏のPMIを玄䞉か月先行しおいる。䞀方で、ナヌロ圏の囜内需芁はより緩和的な財政政策ず䜎䞋する債刞利回りの恩恵を受けるだろう。 むタリアにずっおは債刞利回りの䜎䞋が特に有益だ。昚幎䞉月にポピュリスト政暩が遞出された埌の利回り急隰ず䌁業信頌感の喪倱は景気埌退に突入させたチャヌト 8。珟圚、10幎物BTP利回りが高倀から100ベヌシスポむント以䞊䜎䞋しおいるため、むタリア経枈は回埩し始めるはずだ。 囜内成長が加速しおも欧州䞭倮銀行は今幎利䞊げを行わないだろうが、垂堎はおそらく2020幎以降に数回の利䞊げを織り蟌むだろう。これによりコア欧州債刞垂堎の利回り曲線がわずかに再スティヌプ化し、長らく苊しんでいる銀行の収益にはプラスに働くはずだ。 ブレグゞットは䟝然ずしお懞念材料だ。この継続する物語は滑皜な段階に達しおおり、1) 英囜はEU離脱に投祚したが、2) 議䌚はブリュッセルず満足のいく合意に達しない限りEUに留たるこずに投祚し、しかも3) 提瀺されおいた唯䞀の合意案を拒吊した。倚くの英囜有暩者がもはやブレグゞットを望んでいないこずを考えるずチャヌト 9、我々は政府がいわゆる先送りを続け、二床目の囜民投祚が発衚されるか「゜フト・ブレグゞット」合意が策定されるたでその問題を先送りにするだろうず考えおいる。いずれの結果も垂堎には歓迎されるだろう。 チャヌト 8むタリアの債刞利回りはもはや逆颚ではない むタリア囜債利回りはもはや逆颚ではない むタリア囜債利回りはもはや逆颚ではない チャヌト 9英囜やり盎しずなれば残留偎が勝぀可胜性が高い 英囜やり盎しが行われれば、残留掟が勝぀可胜性が高い 英囜やり盎しが行われれば、残留掟が勝぀可胜性が高い   フェッドはどうするか チャヌト10 昚幎の「クリスマス暎萜」はフェッドの反応関数を明らかによりハト掟の方向ぞず倉えた。今埌数か月でゞェロヌム・パり゚ルが利䞊げを行うずは予想しおいないが、䞖界成長の再加速は12月にフェッドを再び匕き締めに向かわせる可胜性が高い。フェッドは2020幎に四半期に䞀床の利䞊げを継続し、むンフレ䞊昇に察応しお2021幎には匕き締めペヌスを加速させるだろう。 総じお、我々はこのサむクルの終わりたでにフェデラルファンド金利が玄4%に䞊昇するず芋おいる。これは垂堎が珟圚織り蟌んでいる氎準よりも四半期ごずの25ベヌシスポむントの利䞊げが九回倚いこずを意味するチャヌト 10。我々はフェデラルファンド先物のショヌトポゞションで損切りになったが、顧客には2021幎6月限フェデラルファンド先物たたは同等の手段をショヌトするこずを掚奚する。 米囜経枈再び奜調 基本的に米囜経枈は堅固な基盀にあり、より高い金利にも耐えられる。10幎前ずは異なり、䜏宅垂堎は良奜な状態にあるチャヌト 11。持ち家空宀率は蚘録的な䜎氎準近蟺にある。フィコ・スコアを芋る限り、䜏宅ロヌンの貞出の質は䟝然ずしお高い。劎働垂堎も堅調で、求人件数は二月に再び過去最高を蚘録したチャヌト 12。健党な䜏宅垂堎ず劎働垂堎の組み合わせは消費者にずっお䞍可避的に良い。 チャヌト 11米囜の䜏宅の基瀎条件は堅調 米囜の䜏宅ファンダメンタルズは堅調だ 米囜の䜏宅ファンダメンタルズは堅調だ チャヌト 12米囜の劎働垂堎は堅調である 米囜の劎働垂堎は堅調だ 米囜の劎働垂堎は堅調だ チャヌト13 個人貯蓄率は珟圚7.6%にあり、家蚈の玔資産察可凊分所埗比率から期埅される氎準よりもかなり高いチャヌト 13。貯蓄率の䜎䞋は消費支出が所埗よりも速く増加するこずを可胜にするだろう。埌者は賃金䞊昇によっお支えられおいるため、これは消費にずっお匷気材料ずなる。 蚭備投資意向は過去数か月で䜎䞋したが、歎史的基準から芋るず䟝然ずしお高い氎準にあるチャヌト 14。実質非䜏宅資本ストックは回埩開始以来平均でわずか1.7%しか成長しおおらず、リセッション前の期間の3%から䜎䞋しおいるチャヌト 15。生産性成長の景気埪環的な䞊振れ、䞊昇する劎働コスト、䜎い䜙剰生産胜力の氎準は、䌁業が新しい工堎や蚭備に投資する動機付けずなるはずだ。 チャヌト 14蚭備投資意向は軟化したが、䟝然ずしお高氎準にある 蚭備投資の意向は軟化したが、䟝然ずしお高氎準にある 蚭備投資の意向は軟化したが、䟝然ずしお高氎準にある チャヌト 15米囜の蚭備投資䜙地はただある 米囜ぞの資本投資にはさらなる䜙地がある 米囜ぞの資本投資にはさらなる䜙地がある   䌁業債務どれほどのリスクか チャヌト 16米囜の䌁業債務は䞖界基準で極端ではない 米囜の䌁業債務は䞖界基準では極端ではない 米囜の䌁業債務は䞖界基準では極端ではない 近幎、䌁業債務氎準は倧幅に増加し、契玄条項の緩いロヌンの増加に芋られるように匕受基準は悪化した。それでも状況は深刻ずは皋遠い。 他囜ず比べるず、米囜の䌁業債務はかなり䜎いチャヌト 16。フランスの䌁業債務はGDP比で143%に達し、米囜の2倍である。これはフランスの䌁業セクタヌがすべお順調であるこずを瀺すわけではないが、事実ずしおフランスは䌁業債務の危機に芋舞われおいない。これは米囜が差し迫った危機に瀕しおいないこずのシグナルにもなる。 珟金を差し匕くず、米囜の䌁業債務のGDP比は1989幎ず同じ氎準にあり、その幎のフェデラルファンド金利はほが9%であった。法人ネット負債察EBITDの比率は比范的䜎いたたである。利子負担胜力比率は歎史平均を䞊回っおいる。加えお、過去数幎で䌁業資産もかなり速く増加しおおり、䌁業の債務察資産比率は抂ね安定しおいるチャヌト 17。 䌁業郚門の金融収支䌁業の収入ず支出の差は䟝然ずしおGDPの1%でプラス圏にある。過去50幎のすべおの景気埌退は䌁業郚門の金融収支が赀字になったずきに始たっおいるチャヌト 18。 チャヌト 17米囜の䌁業債務どのくらい高いか 米囜の䌁業債務どこたで高くなる 米囜の䌁業債務どこたで高くなる チャヌト 18䌁業郚門の金融収支は䟝然ずしお黒字 䌁業郚門の金融収支は䟝然ずしお黒字 䌁業郚門の金融収支は䟝然ずしお黒字 䜏宅ロヌンのようにレバレッゞドな機関が倚く保有する債務ずは異なり、ほずんどの䌁業債務は幎金基金、保険䌚瀟、ミュヌチュアル・ファンド、むヌティヌ゚フのような非レバレッゞのプレむダヌによっお保有されおいる。銀行貞出は非金融䌁業郚門債務のわずか18%を占め、1980幎の40%から䜎䞋しおいるチャヌト 19。銀行が保有するレバレッゞド・ロヌンのシェアは10幎前の玄25%から珟圚は10%未満に䜎䞋しおいる。さらに、今日の銀行は過去よりもはるかに高品質の自己資本を倚く保有しおいるチャヌト 20。これにより䌁業債務は経枈にずっおシステミックに重芁である床合いが䜎くなっおいる。   チャヌト 19銀行は䌁業セクタヌぞの゚クスポヌゞャヌを削枛した 銀行は䌁業向けの゚クスポヌゞャヌを瞮小した 銀行は䌁業向けの゚クスポヌゞャヌを瞮小した チャヌト 20米囜の銀行は十分な自己資本を保有しおいる 米囜の銀行は健党な資本氎準にある 米囜の銀行は健党な資本氎準にある 我々が12月にリスク資産に察しおより匷気になった理由の䞀぀は、株匏が急萜し䌁業スプレッドが拡倧したにもかかわらず金融ストレス指数に倧きな远随がなかったためである。䟋えば、悪名高いテッド・スプレッドはほずんど動かなかったチャヌト 21。 チャヌト 21テッド・スプレッドは萜ち着いおおり、深刻な金融ストレスの兆候は瀺しおいない TEDスプレッドは良奜に掚移しおおり、金融ストレスの重倧な兆候は芋られない TEDスプレッドは良奜に掚移しおおり、金融ストレスの重倧な兆候は芋られない みんなラリヌに同意しおいる 米囜経枈に倧きな䞍均衡がないこずを螏たえるず、投資家はなぜフェッドが実際にはさらに利䞊げできないず考えおいるのだろうか。フェデラルファンド金利の実質ベヌスはかろうじおれロを䞊回っおいるにすぎないのに。答えは、投資家がラリヌ・サマヌズの䞖俗的停滞セキュラヌ・スタグネヌション論を受け入れおいるように芋えるこずである。これは䞭立金利が過去に比べお今日ははるかに䜎いずいう仮説である。 我々はこの理論にいくぶんの同情を持っおいるが、これは生産性や人口動態ずいった長期的な金利決定芁因に関する理論であるこずを忘れおはならない。この理論は景気埪環的な金利のドラむバヌ、すなわち䜙剰生産胜力の量、財政政策のスタンス、信甚の成長、賃金動向などに぀いおはほずんど䜕も語っおいない。 今十幎初め、我々がただ債刞に非垞に匷気であったずきには、経枈は極めお䜎い金利を必芁ずしおいるずもっずもらしく䞻匵できた産出ギャップは䟝然ずしお倧きく、デレバレッゞのサむクルは始たったばかりであり、䜏宅ず株䟡は䞋抌しされ、賃金䞊昇は乏しく、倧䞍況の間の短い景気刺激のバヌストの埌に財政政策は制玄的になっおいた。䞭立からはほど遠いか 䞊述のすべおの芁因は、過去数幎の間に完党にたたは郚分的に方向を転じおいる。財政政策を䞀䟋ずしお挙げるず、IMFは米囜の構造的財政赀字が2014–15幎にGDPの平均で3.3%だったず掚蚈しおいる。2019–20幎にはIMFは赀字がGDPの平均で5.6%になるず芋蟌んでいる。 より緩和的な財政政策はどの皋床たで米囜の䞭立金利を抌し䞊げたのだろうか。保守的に仮定しお、远加の1ドルの財政刺激が総需芁を1ドル抌し䞊げるずしよう。この堎合、財政政策は過去5幎間で総需芁に察しおGDP比で2.3%を䞊乗せしたこずになる。総需芁が1パヌセンテヌゞポむント増加するず䞭立金利が1%䞊昇するず仮定するずこれはむ゚レン元FRB議長が支持したテむラヌルヌルの仕様ず䞀臎する、財政政策だけで䞭立金利を2パヌセントポむント以䞊抌し䞊げたこずになる。 䞊の議論は、長期的な構造芁因が䞭立金利を䞋抌ししおいるずしおも、景気埪環的な芁因が䞭立金利をかなり抌し䞊げた可胜性があるこずを瀺唆しおいる。FRBは今埌1〜2幎の経枈にずっお適切な氎準を芋据えお金利を蚭定するはずなので、金利が過床に䜎い状態が長く続くこずになりかねない。これにより経枈は過熱し、最終的にはむンフレが急䞊昇するだろう。 むンフレの脅嚁 良いニュヌスは、我々のお気に入りの指暙のいずれも倧芏暡な差し迫ったむンフレ䞊昇を瀺しおいないこずだチャヌト22。関皎が高たっおいるにもかかわらず、消費者向け茞入物䟡のむンフレ率は鈍化しおいる。コア䞭間財の生産者物䟡むンフレ率は枛速しおいる。ISMや地域連銀の調査における支払䟡栌項目は急萜しおいる。むンフレ・サプラむズ指数は反転しお䜎䞋しおいる。調査ベヌスおよび垂堎ベヌスのむンフレ期埅はずもに昚倏より䜎いたたである。これらの動きに沿っお、BCAの独自のパむプラむン・むンフレ指暙は2幎半ぶりの䜎氎準に䞋萜しおいる。 賃金䞊昇は加速しおいるが、生産性の䌞びの方がさらに倧きくなっおいる。その結果、単䜍劎働コストのむンフレ率は昚幎䞭頃から䜎䞋しおいる。単䜍劎働コストはコアCPIの玄12か月先行指暙であるチャヌト23。これは少なくずも来幎䞋半期たでは消費者物䟡のむンフレ率が䞍快なほど高い氎準に達する可胜性は䜎いこずを瀺唆しおいる。 Chart 22米囜における差し迫った倧芏暡むンフレ䞊昇の兆候は芋られない 米囜で差し迫った倧芏暡なむンフレヌションの急隰の兆候は芋られない... 米囜で差し迫った倧芏暡なむンフレヌションの急隰の兆候は芋られない... Chart 23単䜍劎働コストの枛速は圓面むンフレ圧力を和らげる ...そしお、単䜍劎働コストの枛速は圓面の間、むンフレ圧力を和らげるだろう ...そしお、単䜍劎働コストの枛速は圓面の間、むンフレ圧力を和らげるだろう その時点では、むンフレが䞊昇に転じるリスクが高い。これによりFRBは2021幎初めに急激な利䞊げを開始せざるを埗なくなり、ドルが䞊昇し株匏やスプレッド・プロダクトが売られる可胜性がある。結果ずしお金融状況が匕き締たり、2021幎䞭埌半に米囜ず䞖界の景気が埌退に陥る恐れが高い。   圓面はグロヌバル株匏に匷気を維持し、来幎埌半に防埡的姿勢ぞ転換 Chart 24アナリスト予想はかなり控えめである アナリストの予想はかなり控えめだ アナリストの予想はかなり控えめだ 䞊で述べた二段階のFRBによる匕き締めサむクル――12月に始たり2020幎にかけお埐々に利䞊げを行い、その埌むンフレ䞊昇に反応しおより積極的な利䞊げに移行する――が今埌数幎間の投資芋解を圢䜜る。本刊行物の冒頭にある䞻芁金融垂堎予枬チャヌトは、䞻芁資産クラスが向かう先の倧たかなスケッチを瀺しおいる。 株匏や他のリスク資産は、FRBが幎内にさらに利䞊げを瀺唆しお垂堎の準備を始める時期の前埌でボラティリティが高たるものの、最初の段階の利䞊げを織り蟌むこずができるだろうず我々は考えおいる。昚幎9月ずは異なり、利益芋通しはより保守的だ。ボトムアップの掚蚈では、2019幎に米囜で1株圓たり利益EPSが3.9%䞊昇し、䞖界のその他地域で5.4%䞊昇する芋通しであるチャヌト24。成長の加速、金融環境の緩和、継続的な自瀟株買いの組合せは、これらの数倀に䞊振れ䜙地を瀺唆しおいる。 さらに重芁な点は、9月ずは異なり、FRBは経枈が良奜に掚移しおいる堎合にのみ利䞊げを開始するだろうずいうこずである。パり゚ルは米囜経枈が枛速し始めたちょうどその時に「金利は䞭立からは遠い」ず述べおしたい、誀りを犯した。もしその発蚀が米囜の成長がただ加速しおいる時点で出おいたなら、投資家はおそらくそれを無芖しただろう。 ゞェロヌム・パり゚ルは同じ過ちを繰り返さないだろう。代わりに別の誀りを犯す可胜性がある経枈を過熱させ、FRBが明らかに埌手に回り、远い぀くために慌おお利䞊げを行わざるを埗ない状況にしおしたうこずである。その結果生じるスタグフレヌション的な環境――劎働力䞍足により成長が鈍化し぀぀むンフレが䞊向く状況――は株匏や他のリスク資産にずっお有毒ずなるだろう。 タむミングを正確にするのは難しいが、我々は投資家に察しお今埌12〜18か月は控えめにリスク志向を維持するこずを掚奚する。ただし、FRBが利䞊げのペヌスを加速する前の来幎埌半には株匏ずスプレッド・プロダクトぞの゚クスポヌゞャヌを削枛すべきだ。 囜際株匏を䞀時的に栌䞊げする準備をする 米囜株匏垂堎は他の垂堎ず比べお「ロヌ・ベヌタ」になりがちである。もし今幎埌半に䞖界成長が加速するなら、囜際株匏は米囜株匏をアりトパフォヌムするだろう。我々はEEMむヌティヌ゚フのプットを1月3日に売华しお104%の利益を埗おおり、珟圚は新興囜株匏を玔粋にロングするこずを掚奚しおいる。䞖界成長の回埩を瀺すさらなる確蚌が埗られ次第、為替ヘッゞなしの条件で新興囜株匏ず欧州株匏の䞡方をオヌバヌりェむトぞ栌䞊げするこずを数週間以内に怜蚎する予定だ。 日本株に぀いおは刀断が分かれるずころだ。匷い䞖界成長は日本の倚囜籍䌁業に恩恵をもたらすが、囜内垂堎に重心を眮く䌁業は政府が10月に消費皎を匕き䞊げるなら打撃を受ける可胜性がある。圓面は日本株の栌䞊げは芋送る぀もりだ。 グロヌバルなセクタヌレベルでは、我々は今幎初めにディフェンシブ寄りの配分を瞮小した昚倏により慎重になっおいた埌で。投資家にぱネルギヌずむンダストリアル工業をオヌバヌりェむトするこずを掚奚する。金融ずマテリアル玠材にも奜感を抱き始めおいる。前者は今幎埌半のむヌルドカヌブのスティヌプ化やクレゞット成長の加速から恩恵を受けるだろう。埌者はより堅調な䞭囜経枈から利益を埗るだろう。ヘルスケア、情報技術、コミュニケヌション・サヌビスは䞭立配分を維持する。䞍動産ず公益事業は債刞利回りが䞊昇し始めるずどちらも傷を負う。生掻必需品のような叀兞的なディフェンシブ・セクタヌもアンダヌパフォヌムするだろう。  䞖界の債刞利回りは䞊昇しそうだ 䞖界の債刞利回りは、成長が䞊振れサプラむズを起こすに぀れお今埌12〜18か月で䞊昇する可胜性が高い。むンフレが加速するに぀れお利回りは2021幎前半に向けおさらに䞊昇し続けるだろう。 過去のリスクオフ局面ずは異なり、次の景気埌退に向かう過皋で米囜債が倧きなセヌフヘむブンの圹割を果たすずは限らない。䞊述の通り、今日債刞利回りがこれほど䜎い理由の䞀぀はタヌム・プレミアムが非垞に䜎䞋しおいるこずだ。FRBの債刞買入の环積効果がタヌム・プレミアムを抌し䞋げおいる可胜性は高いが、より倧きな圱響は投資家が米囜債をさたざたなマクロリスクに察する保険ずしお芋なしおいるこずに由来しおいる。投資家は、経枈が景気埌退に陥るず株䟡は䞋萜し、䜏宅垂堎は悪化し、賃金䞊昇は鈍化し、雇甚芋通しは悪化するが、少なくずも債刞ポヌトフォリオの䟡倀は䞊がるだろうず考えるこずに慣れおいるのだ。 この考え方の問題は、それが有効なのはFRBが成長の匷たりに察しお利䞊げを行う堎合だけだずいう点だ。もしFRBがむンフレが手に負えなくなっおいるこずに反応しお利䞊げを行うなら、米囜債利回りは䞊昇する䞀方で株匏は䞋萜する可胜性がある。これは実際、1960幎代埌半から2000幎代初頭にかけおは垞態だったチャヌト25。 Chart 25米囜債利回りが䞊昇する䞀方で株匏が䞋萜する可胜性 米囜債利回りは䞊昇する䞀方で、株䟡は䞋萜する可胜性がある 米囜債利回りは䞊昇する䞀方で、株䟡は䞋萜する可胜性がある もし米囜債がセヌフヘむブンの地䜍を倱えば、タヌム・プレミアムは䞊昇するだろう。利回り䞊昇が株匏垂堎を匱め、投資家が株匏ず債刞の䞡方から珟金ぞず䞀斉に逃げるこずで、さらなる利回り䞊昇ず株䟡䞋萜を招くずいう悪埪環が生じる可胜性がある。 投資家は今埌12か月間、米囜債に察しおはやや短めのデュレヌション・スタンスを維持し、その埌むンフレが衚面化し始める2020幎䞭頃にはデュレヌションを最倧限アンダヌりェむトにするべきだ。デュレヌションをロングする長めの債を保有する刀断が合理的になるのは、FRBが金利を制玄的な氎準たで匕き䞊げ、経枈が景気埌退に入った堎合だけである。それが起こるのは2021幎䞋半期たで芋蟌たれない。 地域別には、今埌12か月間で米囜債に察しお欧州、カナダ、オヌストラリア、ニュヌゞヌランド、特に日本の囜債を奜む。米囜経枈が最も過熱するリスクにさらされおいるからだ。通貚ヘッゞありの芳点では、10幎物米囜債利回りは䞖界の䞻芁囜の䞭で䜎い郚類に入る衚1。䟋えば日本の10幎囜債は通貚ヘッゞありの条件で2.72%を提䟛し、ドむツ囜債は2.94%を瀺しおいる。 Table 1先進囜の債刞垂堎 2019幎第2四半期 ストラテゞヌ芋通しデッドゟヌンから゚ンドゟヌンぞ 2019幎第2四半期 ストラテゞヌ芋通しデッドゟヌンから゚ンドゟヌンぞ  ç±³ãƒ‰ãƒ«ïŒšã‚œãƒ•ト・パッチぞ向かう 米ドルの芋通しを枬るのはやや厄介だ。米連邊準備制床理事䌚Fedは今埌12か月間で段階的に利䞊げを行うにせよ、垂堎が織り蟌んでいる氎準よりは高い利䞊げを行う芋蟌みだ。他の倧半の䞭倮銀行がただ様子芋の姿勢を続けおいるため、短期金利差は米ドルに有利に動く可胜性が高い。それでも、日本を陀けば、䞖界的な成長が匷たるず投資家は2020幎以降の他の先進囜での远加利䞊げを織り蟌む可胜性が高い。その結果、長期の利回り差は短期の利回り差ほど拡倧しないかもしれない。 おそらくそれ以䞊に重芁なのは、米ドルはカりンタヌサむクリカル、぀たり䞖界成長の動きず逆方向に動く通貚であるずいう点だChart 26。この逆埪環性は、米囜経枈が䞖界の他地域ず比べお補造業よりもサヌビス業により重点を眮いおいるこずに起因するChart 27。したがっお、䞖界成長が加速するず、資本は米囜から䞖界の他地域ぞ流れる傟向が匷たり、倖貚需芁が増え、ドル需芁は枛少するこずになる。 Chart 26ドルは逆埪環通貚である ドルは景気埪環に逆行する通貚である ドルは景気埪環に逆行する通貚である Chart 27米囜はグロヌバル成長に察する䜎ベヌタの投資察象である 米囜はグロヌバル成長に察する䜎ベヌタの投資先 米囜はグロヌバル成長に察する䜎ベヌタの投資先 もし䞖界成長が今幎埌半に持ち盎すなら、ドルは第2四半期にピヌクを付け、その埌2019幎末から2020幎にかけお匱含む可胜性が高い。ドルの動きは、2017幎の経過ず䌌た経路をたどるかもしれない。2017幎はFedが4回利䞊げした幎だが、貿易加重換算の広矩ドルはそれでも7匱含んだ。 Chart 28円はリスクオフ通貚である 円はリスクオフ通貚だ 円はリスクオフ通貚だ 2017幎ず同様に、ナヌロは今幎埌半に米ドルに察しお䞊昇するだろうし、倚くの新興囜通貚やコモディティ通貚も同様に䞊昇するだろう。ただし、2017幎に倚くの通貚がドルに察しお䞊昇したのに日本円がその動きに参加しなかったのず同じように、円は米ドルに察しおあたり勢いよく䞊昇するのは難しいだろう。 円は“リスクオフ”通貚であり、したがっお䞖界のリスク資産が䞊昇するず円は匱たる傟向があるChart 28。さらに、もし今幎埌半に䞖界の囜債利回りが日本囜債JGB利回りに察しお䞊昇するならば、円は打撃を受けるだろう。特に、財政政策の匕き締たりを受けお日銀がむヌルドカヌブ・コントロヌルの運甚を長匕かせざるを埗ない堎合はその傟向が匷たる。123を䞋回る堎面ではEUR/JPYをロングする぀もりだ。 䞀旊匱含んだ埌、米ドルは来幎末に再び䞊昇する 米囜経枈が2020幎に䟛絊面の制玄にたすたす盎面するに぀れ、成長は鈍化し、むンフレは加速するだろう。Fedはむンフレの䞊昇以䞊の速さで利䞊げを行っお応じる。結果ずしお実質金利が䞊昇し、ドルに䞊方圧力がかかるだろう。 このスタグフレヌション的な環境では、株匏は急萜し、クレゞットスプレッドは拡倧する。米囜の金融環境の匕き締たりは䞖界䞭に波及し、䞖界成長はそれがなかった堎合よりも䞀局枛速するだろう。これがさらにドルを加速させる。米ドルがピヌクを付けるのは、Fedが2021幎末に利䞋げを開始した時点のみである。 コモディティより匷気に 今幎埌半のドルの匱含みず、䞭囜の回埩に牜匕された䞖界成長の匷化はコモディティにずっお远い颚ずなる。BCAのコモディティ・ストラテゞストは、珟行氎準で銅のロングを掚奚する。たた、原油に察する匷気のバむアスも維持しおいる。ブレントは今幎平均75ドル/バレル、2020幎は80ドル/バレルになるず芋蟌んでいる。米囜のシェヌル生産の増加は、深海の茞出斜蚭敎備の遅延によっお盞殺され、䟛絊は比范的タむトに保たれるだろう。 過去のレポヌトでは、むンフレヘッゞずしお金を賌入するこずの有甚性を論じおきた。ただし、我々はドル匷気芋解のためにそれを実行に移すのを控えおきた。今やドルが今埌数か月でピヌクを付けるず芋おいるため、1275ドル/オンスを䞋回る堎面があれば金を買いたい。   Peter Berezin, チヌフ・グロヌバル・ストラテゞスト グロヌバル・むンベストメント・ストラテゞヌ peterb@bcaresearch.com 脚泚 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “グレツキヌのドクトリン,” dated March 1, 2019. 2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “FCIドゥヌム・ルヌプの可胜性は䜎い,” dated January 4, 2019. 3      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “本圓に䞖界には政府債務が倚すぎるのか” dated February 22, 2019. ストラテゞヌ & マヌケット動向 マクロクォント・モデルず珟圚の䞻芳的スコア チャヌト29 タクティカル・トレヌド ストラテゞヌ掚奚 クロヌズド・トレヌド
特別レポヌト Highlights So What? It makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP. However, short-term investors should instead buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones. Why? The U.K. electorate is not staunchly Euroskeptic. In fact, Bregret has already set in. Volatility is the only sure bet over the tactical and strategic time horizons. The most likely scenario is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. Brexit is unsustainable over the secular time horizon. Our low-conviction view is that in the long term, the U.K. will remain inside the European Union. Feature The hour is late in the ongoing Brexit saga. The original deadline, once spoken of with religious reverence, will be tossed aside for one, potentially two, extensions. In this analysis, we attempt to consider the state of Brexit from multiple time horizons. First, we offer our tactical view, what will happen in the next several weeks and months. Second, we offer our strategic view, surveying the Brexit process to the end of the year. Third, we consider the secular view and attempt to answer the question of whether the U.K. will ever fully exit the EU. We then assign investment recommendations across the three time horizons. The Conservative Party has wrapped itself into an intellectual pretzel trying to deliver on a referendum that the pro-Brexit Tories promised would not mean losing access to the Common Market. How Did We Get Here? In March 2016, three months ahead of the fateful June referendum, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy published a joint report on the topic that drew three conclusions: The probability of Brexit was understated by the market. “According to our modeling results, roughly 64% of Tory undecided voters would have to swing to the “Stay” camp in order to ensure that the vote crosses the 50% threshold in favour of continued EU membership 
 Conventional wisdom suggests that the probability of Brexit is around 30%, anchoring to the 1975 referendum results. Our own analysis of current polling data suggests that it is much closer to 50%, as in too close to call.” The biggest loser of Brexit, domestically, would be the Conservative Party. “The risk is that the British populace realizes that leaving the EU was a sub-optimal result and that little sovereignty was recovered. As such, there could be a backlash against the Tories in the next general election. In this scenario, the winner would not necessarily be UKIP, but rather the Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party – as close to the Michael Foot-led opposition in the early 1980s as any Labour Leadership.” The EU would survive, intact, with no further “exits.” “European integration is therefore a gambit for relevance by Europe’s declining powers. Brexit will not create centrifugal forces that tear the EU apart, and could in fact enhance the sinews that bind EU member states in a bid for 21st century geopolitical relevance.” Thus far, all three predictions have proven prescient. Not only was the probability of Brexit understated, but the electorate actually voted to exit the EU.1 The Conservative Party has wrapped itself into an intellectual pretzel trying to deliver on a referendum that the pro-Brexit Tories – a minority in the party – promised would not mean losing access to the Common Market. And the EU has not only seen no other “exits,” but has held firm and united in the negotiations with the U.K. while witnessing an increase in the support for its troubled currency union, both in the Euro Area in aggregate as well as in crisis-ridden Italy (Chart 1). Chart 1The Euro Area Stands Unified The net assessment we conducted in 2016 correctly gauged what the Brexit referendum was about and what it was not about. Our view was that behind the angst lay factors too general to be laid at the feet of European integration. Decades of supply-side reforms combined with competition from emerging economies led to a sharp rise in U.K. income inequality (Chart 2), the erosion of its manufacturing economy (Chart 3), and the ballooning of the country’s financial sector (Chart 4). As a result, the U.K.’s income inequality and social mobility were, in 2016 as today, much closer to those of its Anglo-Saxon peer America than to those of its continental European neighbors (Chart 5). Chart 2Brits Saw Inequality Surge Chart 3Manufacturing Jobs Collapsed Chart 4The Financial Bubble Burst The underlying economic angst has continued to influence British politics since Brexit. Campaigning on an anti-austerity platform in the summer of 2017, the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn nearly won the general election, only underperforming the Conservative vote by 2% (Chart 6). The election was supposed to politically recapitalize Theresa May and allow her to lead the U.K. out of the EU. But the failure to secure a single-party majority created the political math in the House of Commons that is today preventing the prime minister from executing on Brexit. There are simply not enough committed Brexiters in Westminster to deliver on the relatively hard Brexit – no access to the EU Common Market or customs union – that Prime Minister May has put on offer (Chart 7). The decision not to pursue a customs union arrangement with the EU is particularly disastrous. As our colleague Dhaval Joshi – Chief Strategist of BCA’s European Investment Strategy – has pointed out, remaining in the customs union would have protected the cross-border supply chains that are vital to many U.K. businesses and would have avoided a hard customs border on the island of Ireland.2 However, the slim margin of the Tory victory in 2017 has boosted the influence of the 20-to-40 hard-Brexiters in the party. They pushed Theresa May to the extreme, where a customs union arrangement – let alone access to the Common Market – became politically unpalatable. The underlying economic angst has continued to influence British politics since Brexit. Had the British electorate genuinely wanted “Brexit ÃŒber alles,” or the relatively hard Brexit on offer today, the margin of victory for Leave would have been greater. Furthermore, the electorate would not have come so close to giving the far-left Corbyn – who nonetheless supports the softest-of-soft Brexits – a majority in mid-2017. The slim margin of victory effectively tied May’s hands in her subsequent negotiations with both the EU and her own party. But there was more to the 2016 referendum than just general malaise centered on the economy and inequality. There were idiosyncratic events that provided tailwinds for the Leave campaign. Or, as we put it in 2016: Certainly, a number of ills have befallen the continent in quick succession: the euro area sovereign debt crisis, Russian military intervention in Ukraine, rampant migrant inflows from Africa and the Middle East, and terrorist attacks in France. It is no surprise that the U.K. populace wants to think twice about tying itself even more closely to a Europe apparently on the run from the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. The two issues we would particularly focus on were the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks in Europe. Data ahead of the referendum clearly gave credence to the view that the influx of migrants was raising “concerns about immigration and race.” This angst was primarily focused on EU migrants who came to the U.K. legally (Chart 8), but the influx of millions of migrants into the EU in 2015 – peaking at 172,000 in the month of October – certainly bolstered the anxiety in the U.K. (Chart 9).3 Chart 8EU Migrants A Source Of Anxiety In 2016 Chart 9The Refugee Crisis Boosted Brexit Vote Terrorism was another concern. In the 18 months preceding the referendum, continental Europe experienced 13 deadly terror attacks. Two were particularly egregious: the November 2015 Paris terror attack that led to 130 deaths, and the March 2016 Brussels terror attack that led to 32 deaths. The idiosyncratic events that provided tailwinds behind Brexit 
 were the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks in Europe. Both the migration and terror crises, however, were temporary and caused by idiosyncratic variables with short half-lives. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy argued that both would eventually abate. The migration crisis would subside due to firming European attitudes towards asylum seekers and the exhaustion of the supply of migrants as the Syrian Civil War drew to its tragic close. The extremist Islamic terror attacks would dwindle due to the decrease in the marginal utility of terror that has been observed in previous waves of terrorism (Chart 10). Neither forecast was popular with our client base, but both have been spot on. Chart 10Fewer Attacks Due To Declining Marginal Utility Of Terror The point is that the British electorate was never as Euroskeptic as the Euroskeptics cheering on Brexit thought. Support for EU integration has waxed and waned for decades (Chart 11). Instead, a combination of macro-malaise caused by the general plight of the middle class – the same factors that have given tailwinds to populist policymakers across developed markets – and idiosyncratic crises in the middle of this decade created the context in which the public voted to leave the EU. Whatever the vote was for, we can say with a high degree of certainty that it was not in favor of the current deal on offer, a relatively hard Brexit. After all, the pro-Leave Tories almost universally campaigned in favor of remaining in the Common Market post-Brexit.4 Chart 11Data Does Not Support Euroskeptic U.K. Today, Bregret has clearly set in. Not only on the specific issue of whether the U.K. should leave the EU – where the gap between Bremorseful voters and committed Brexiters is now 8% (Chart 12), a 12% swing since just after the referendum – but also on the more existential question of whether U.K. citizens feel European (Chart 13). Chart 12Bregret Has Set In... Chart 13...And Brits Feel More European The political reality of Bregret is the most important variable in predicting Brexit. Not only is it difficult for Prime Minister May to deliver her relatively hard Brexit in Westminster due to the mid-2017 electoral math, but it is especially the case when the electorate does not want it. Yes, the mid-2016 referendum is an expression of a democratic will that must be respected. But no policymaker wants to respect the referendum at the cost of disrespecting the current disposition of the median voter, which is revealed through polls. Doing so will cost them in the next election. The British electorate was never as Euroskeptic as the Euroskeptics cheering on Brexit thought. Reviewing “how we got here” is essential in forecasting the tactical, strategic, and secular time horizons in the ongoing Brexit imbroglio. To this task we now turn. Bottom Line: The U.K. electorate is not staunchly Euroskeptic: data clearly support this fact. The Brexit referendum simply came at the right time for the Leave vote, as the secular forces of middle-class discontent combined with idiosyncratic crises of migration and terror. Three years following the referendum, the discontent remains unaddressed by British policymakers while the idiosyncratic crises have abated. As such, Bregret has set in, creating a new reality that U.K. policymakers must respond to if they want to retain political capital. Where Are We Going? The Tactical And Strategic Time Horizons The EU has offered a two-step delay to the Article 50 deadline of March 29. The first option is a delay until May 22, but only if Theresa May successfully passes her Brexit plan through Westminster. The second option is a delay until April 12. This would come in effect if the House of Commons rejects the deal on offer. The short time frame is supposed to pressure London to come up with the next steps, which the EU has inferred would either be to get out of the bloc without a deal or to plan for a long-term extension. Although there are no official conditions to awarding a long-term extension, it is clear that the EU only envisages three options: Renegotiate the terms of Brexit, to include either a customs union or full Common Market membership (a softer Brexit); Hold a general election to break the impasse; Hold another referendum. The EU is suggesting that it could deny the U.K. an extension if London does not come back with a plan. There are two reasons why we would call the EU’s bluff. First, it is likely an attempt to help May get the deal through the House of Commons by creating a sense of urgency. Second, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in December 2018 that the U.K. could “revoke that notification unilaterally, in an unequivocal and unconditional manner, by a notice addressed to the European Council in writing.”5 The only requirement is that the notification be sent to Brussels prior to March 29 (or, in the case of a mutually agreed upon extension, prior to April 12). It is increasingly likely that, after the deal on offer fails, Theresa May will have to go “hat-in-hand” to the EU to ask for a much longer extension. She will have until April 12 to ask for that extension, but it would require participation in the European Parliamentary (EP) elections on May 23. Prime Minister May has said that the U.K. will not hold those elections. We beg to differ. Not holding the election would allow the EU to end the U.K.’s membership in the bloc, which would by default mean contravening the Parliament’s will to reject a no-deal Brexit (which it did in a rebuke to the government in March). As such, the U.K. will absolutely hold an EP election in May. Yes, it will be a huge embarrassment to the Conservative government. And we would venture that the election would turn out a huge pro-EU majority from the U.K., given that it is the Europhile side of the aisle that is now excited and activated, further embarrassing the ruling government. The most likely scenario is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. The most likely scenario, therefore, is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. As we have been arguing throughout the year, the only way to break the impasse without calling a referendum – is to call a new election. A new election would be contested almost exclusively on the issue of Brexit – unlike the 2017 election, which Jeremy Corbyn managed to be almost exclusively contested on the issue of austerity. As such, the winner would have a clear political mandate to pursue the Brexit of their choice. If it is Jeremy Corbyn, this would mean a second referendum, given his recent conversion to supporting one. If Theresa May remains prime minister, it would be her relatively hard Brexit option; if another Tory replaces her, it would potentially be a softer Brexit. Intriguingly, Theresa May is coming up to the average “expiry date” of a “takeover” prime minister, which is 3.3 years (Chart 14). Why do we think that Theresa May would be replaced with a soft Brexit Tory? Because there are simply not enough members of parliament in the Conservative Party caucus to elect a hard Brexiteer. Furthermore, the current deal on offer, which is a form of hard Brexit, clearly has no chance of passing in the House of Commons. Theresa May herself did not support the Leave campaign, but she converted into a hard Brexiteer due to the pressures in the Conservative Party caucus. If, on the other hand, we are wrong and the Conservative Party elects a hard Brexit Tory as leader, the odds of losing the election to the Labour Party would increase. Furthermore, the impasse in the House of Commons would not be resolved as Theresa May would be replaced by a prime minister with essentially the same approach to Brexit. Confused? You are not alone. Diagram 1 illustrates the complexity of the tactical (0-3 months) and strategic (3-12 months) time horizons. There are so many options over the next six months alone that we ran out of space in our diagram to consider the consequences of the general election. Diagram 1Confused? You Are Not Alone Needless to say, an election would induce volatility in the market as it would put Jeremy Corbyn close to the premiership. While he has now promised a second referendum, his government would also implement policies that could, especially in the short term, agitate the markets. Our forecasts of the currency moves alone suggest that volatility is the only sure bet over tactical and strategic time horizons. We do not have a high-conviction view on a directional call on the pound or U.K. equities. However, global growth concerns, combined with political uncertainty, should create a bond-bullish environment. Bottom Line: Over the course of the year, political uncertainty will remain high in the United Kingdom. A general election is the clearest path to breaking the current deadlock. However, it is not guaranteed, as Labour’s recent decline in the polls appears to be reversing since Jeremy Corbyn finally succumbed to the demands that he support a new referendum (Chart 15). Chart 15Labour Party Revives On Referendum Support The Secular Horizon BCA Geopolitical Strategy believes that the median voter is the price maker in the political market place. Politicians are merely price takers. This is why Theresa May’s notion that the sanctity of the 2016 referendum cannot be abrogated is doubly false. First, she cannot truly claim from the slim 52%-48% result that U.K. voters want her form of Brexit. The referendum therefore may be a sacred expression of the democratic will, but her “no customs union” Brexit option is not holy water: It is an educated guess at best, pandering to hard Brexit Tories (a minority of the electorate) at worst. Given that 48% of the electorate wanted to remain in the EU and that a large portion of Brexit voters wanted a Common Market membership as part of Brexit, it is mathematically obvious that the softest of soft Brexit options was the desire of the median voter in June 2016. An election would induce volatility to the market as it would put Jeremy Corbyn close to the premiership. Furthermore, polling data (presented in Chart 12 and Chart 13) now clearly show that the median voter is migrating away from even the softest of soft Brexit options to the “Stay” camp. Bregret has set in and a strong plurality of voters no longer supports Brexit. The question behind Chart 12 is unambiguous. It clearly asks, “In hindsight, do you think Britain was right or wrong to vote to leave the EU?” What does all of this infer for the long term, or secular, horizon? First, an election this year could usher in a Labour government that delivers a new referendum. At this time, given the polling data and the geopolitical context, sans terror and migration crises, we would expect such a referendum to lead to a win for the Stay camp. Second, an election that produces a soft Brexit prime minister or negotiated outcome would allow the U.K. to leave the EU in an orderly fashion. A new Tory prime minister, pursuing a soft Brexit outcome, could even entice some Labour MPs to cross the aisle and support such an exit from the bloc. However, over a secular time horizon of the next two-to-three years, we doubt that a soft Brexit outcome would be viable. Investors have to realize that the vote on leaving the EU does not conclude the U.K. long-term deal with the bloc. That negotiating phase will last during the transition phase, over the next two-to-three years, and would conclude in yet another Westminster vote – and likely crisis – at the end of the period. If this deal entails membership in the Common Market, our low- conviction view over the long term is that it will ultimately fail. Take the financial community’s preferred soft Brexit option, the so-called super soft “Norway Plus” option. A Norway Plus option would entail the highest loss of sovereignty imaginable, given that the U.K. would essentially pay full EU membership fees with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. There is also a debate as to whether London would be able to constrict immigration from the EU under that option over the long term, a key demand of Brexiters.6 As such, the only viable option would be to switch to a customs union relationship. However, we fear that even this option may no longer be available to U.K. policymakers. Conservative Party leaders have wasted too much time and lost too much of the public’s good will. With only 40% of the electorate now considering Brexit the correct decision, it is possible that even a customs union arrangement will be unacceptable by the end of the transition period. Aside from the electorate’s growing Bregret, there is also the economic logic – or lack thereof – behind a customs union. A customs union would ensure the unfettered transit of goods between the U.K. and the continent, but not of services. This arrangement greatly favors the EU, not the U.K., as the latter has a wide (and growing) deficit in goods and an expanding surplus in services with the bloc (Chart 16). Chart 16Services Are Key For The U.K. The only logic behind selecting a customs union over the Common Market is that a customs union would allow the U.K. to conclude separate trade deals with the rest of the world. While that may be a fantasy of the few remaining laissez-faire free traders in the U.K. Conservative Party, the view hardly represents the desire of the median voter. Other than a potential trade deal with the U.S., it is practically inconceivable to expect the U.K. electorate to support a free trade agreement with China or India, both of which would likely entail an even greater loss of blue-collar jobs. Even a trade deal with the U.S. would likely face political opposition, given that the U.K. is highly unlikely to be given preferential treatment by an economy seven times its size.7 The Conservative Party has wasted its window of opportunity to push a hard, or moderately hard, Brexit through Parliament. The fact of the matter is that the Conservative Party has wasted its window of opportunity to push a hard, or moderately hard (customs union), Brexit through Parliament. Bregret has set in, as the doyens of Brexit increasingly pursued an unpopular strategy. On the other hand, a Brexit that retains the U.K. membership in the Common Market has never had much logic to begin with. Where does this leave the U.K. in the long term? Given the time horizon and the uncertainty on multiple fronts, our low-conviction view is that it leaves the U.K. inside the European Union. Bottom Line: The combination of increasing Bregret, lack of economic logic behind a customs union membership alone, and the lack of a political logic behind a Common Market membership, suggests that Brexit is unsustainable over the secular time horizon. This imperils the ultimate deal between the U.K. and the EU, which we think will not be able to pass the House of Commons in two-to-three years when it comes up for approval. This is a low-conviction view, however, as political realities can change. Support for Brexit could turn due to exogenous factors, such as a global recession that renews the Euro Area economic imbroglio or a major geopolitical crisis. Both are quite likely over the secular time horizon. Investment Implications Today, cable is cheap, trading at an 18% discount to its long-term fair value as implied by purchasing-power parity models (Chart 17). The growing probability that the U.K. may, down the road, remain in the European Union means that, at current levels the pound is indeed attractive, especially against the U.S. dollar. Chart 17Cable Attractive On Higher Odds Of Bremain However, when it comes to short-term dynamics, the picture is much murkier. The low probability of a no-deal Brexit implies limited downside. However, the path to get the U.K. to abandon the current relatively hard Brexit is also one that involves a new election. This implies that before a resolution is reached, multiple scenarios are possible, including one where Corbyn becomes the next prime minister. Jeremy Corbyn could be the most left-of center leader of any G-10 nation since Francois Mitterrand in France in the early 1980s. Mitterrand’s audacious nationalization and left-leaning policies were met with a collapse in the French franc (Chart 18). Chart 18A Left-Wing Leader Bodes Ill For The Currency Global growth also has an impact on cable. Despite all the noise around Brexit, the reality remains that exports constitute 30% of U.K. GDP, a larger contribution to output than in the euro area. This means that if global growth deteriorates, GBP/USD will face another headwind. If, however, global growth improves, then cable would face a new tailwind. Since BCA is of the view that global growth will likely trough by the summer, we are inclined to be positive on the pound. It makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP 
 short-term investors should buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones. Netting out all those factors, it makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP, using the dips along the way to build a larger position in this currency. Even on a six-to-twelve-month basis, the path of least resistance for cable is likely upward. The problem is that risk-adjusted returns are likely to be poor as volatility will remain very elevated. We therefore recommend that short-term investors instead buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones (Chart 19). Chart 19Volatility Will Be A Challenge For Short Term Investors Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 At the time of publication of our March report, we still had a low-conviction view that the vote would swing towards Stay at the last moment. 2 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Important Message From The Currency Markets,” dated March 14, 2019, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Trying to play up the threat of unchecked migration, the U.K. Independence Party ran a famous campaign poster showing hundreds of refugees on a road under the title of “Breaking Point – The EU has failed us all.” Despite the fact that the U.K. accepted only around 10,000 Syrian refugees since the 2015 crisis. Germany has accepted over 700,000 while Canada – which is located across the Atlantic Ocean on a different continent – accepted over 40,000. Even the impoverished Serbia has accepted more Syrian refugees than the U.K. ­4 One of the most prominent Leave supporters, Boris Johnson, famously quipped after the referendum result that “There will continue to be free trade and access to the single market.” 5 Please see The European Court of Justice, “Judgement Of The Court,” In Case C-621/18, dated December 10, 2018, available at curia.europa.eu. 6 Proponents of the Norway Plus option point out that Article 112(1) of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement allows for restriction of movement of people within the area. However, these restrictions are intended to be used in times of “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties.” It certainly appears to be an option for London to restrict EU migration, but it is not clear whether Europe would agree for this to be a permanent solution. Liechtenstein has been using Article 112 to impose quantitative limitations on immigration for decades, but that is because its tiny geographical area is recognized as a “specific situation” that justifies such restrictions. 7 President Donald Trump may want to give the U.K. preferential trade terms on the basis of the filial Anglo-Saxon relationship alone, but it is highly unlikely that the increasingly protectionist Congress would do the same. There is also no guarantee that President Trump will be around to bring such trade negotiations across the finish line.
Following last week’s dovish FOMC meeting, the OIS curve has moved to expect lower interest rates. This has dragged down Treasury rates to below 2.4%, raising the specter of an incoming wave of mortgage refinancing. In order to hedge this prepayment risk,