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S&P 500 Chart 1Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 2Profitability Chart 3Valuations And Technicals Chart 4Uses Of Cash Cyclicals Vs Defensives Chart 5Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 6Profitability Chart 7Valuation And Technicals Chart 8Uses Of Cash Growth Vs Value Chart 9Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 10Profitability Chart 11Valuations And Technicals Chart 12Uses Of Cash Small Vs Large Chart 13Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 14Profitability Chart 15Valuations and Technicals Chart 16Uses Of Cash Table 1Performance Table 2Valuations And Forward Earnings Growth Recommended Allocation
Listen to a short summary of this report. Executive Summary Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap The Chinese economy faces a trifecta of economic woes: 1) The threat of renewed Covid lockdowns; 2) Cooling export demand; 3) A floundering housing market. Trying to reflate the Chinese housing bubble would only damage the long-term prospects of China’s economy. A much better option would be to adopt measures that boost disposable income. Not only would this help offset the drag from slowing export growth and a negative housing wealth effect, but it would also take some of the sting out of China’s zero-Covid policy. With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, the political incentive to shower the economy with cash will only intensify. Chinese equities are trading at only 10-times forward earnings and about 1-times sales. A significant upward rating for equity valuations is likely if the government adopts broad-based income-support measures. Go long the iShares MSCI China ETF ($MCHI) as a tactical trade. Bottom Line: China faces a number of economic woes, but these are fully discounted by the market. What has not been discounted is a broad-based stimulus program focused on income-support measures. Dear Client, I will be visiting clients in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi next week. No doubt, the outlook for oil prices will feature heavily in my discussions. I will brief you on any insights I learn in my report on June 17. In the meantime, I am pleased to announce that Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, will be the guest author of next week’s Global Investment Strategy report. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Triple Threat The Chinese economy faces a trifecta of economic woes: 1) The threat of renewed Covid lockdowns; 2) Cooling export demand; 3) A floundering housing market. Let us discuss each problem in turn. Problem #1: China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Age of Omicron Chart 1China’s Lockdown Index Remains Elevated China was able to successfully suppress the virus in the first two years of the pandemic. However, the emergence of the Omicron strain is challenging the government’s commitment to its zero-Covid policy. The BA.2 subvariant of Omicron is 50% more contagious than the original Omicron strain and about 4-times more contagious than the Delta strain. While 89% of China’s population has been fully vaccinated, the number drops off to 82% for those above the age of 60. And those who are vaccinated have been inoculated with vaccines that appear to be largely ineffective against Omicron. Keeping a virus as contagious as measles at bay in a population with little natural or artificial immunity is exceedingly difficult. While the authorities are starting to relax restrictions in Shanghai, China’s Effective Lockdown Index remains at elevated levels (Chart 1). A number of domestically designed mRNA vaccines are in phase 3 trials. However, it is not clear how effective they will be. Shanghai-based Fosun Pharma has inked a deal to distribute 100 million doses of Pfizer’s vaccine, but so far neither it nor Moderna’s vaccine have been approved for use. Our working assumption is that China will authorize the distribution of western-made mRNA vaccines later this year if its own offerings prove ineffectual. The Chinese government has already signed a deal to manufacture a generic version of Pfizer’s Paxlovid, which has been shown to cut the risk of hospitalization by 90% if taken within five days of the onset of symptoms. In the meantime, the authorities will continue to play whack-a-mole with Covid. Investors should expect more lockdowns during the remainder of the year. Problem #2: Weaker Export Growth China’s export growth slowed sharply in April, with manufacturing production contracting at the fastest rate since data collection began. Activity appears to have rebounded somewhat in May, but the new export orders components of both the official and private-sector manufacturing PMIs still remain below 50 (Chart 2). Part of the export slowdown is attributable to lockdown restrictions. However, weaker external demand is also a culprit, as evidenced by the fact that Korean export growth — a bellwether for global trade — has decelerated (Chart 3). Chart 2China’s Export Growth Has Rolled Over Chart 3Softer Export Growth Is Not A China-Specific Phenomenon Spending in developed economies is shifting from manufactured goods to services. Retail inventories in the US are now well above their pre-pandemic trend, suggesting that the demand for Chinese-made goods will remain subdued over the coming months (Chart 4). The surge in commodity prices is only adding to Chinese manufacturer woes. Input prices rose 10% faster than manufacturing output prices over the past 12 months. This is squeezing profit margins (Chart 5). Chart 4Well-Stocked Shelves In The US Bode Poorly For Chinese Export Demand Chart 5Surging Input Costs Are Weighing On The Profits Of Chinese Commodity Users A modest depreciation in the currency would help the Chinese export sector. However, after weakening from 6.37 in April to 6.79 in mid-May, USD/CNY has moved back to 6.66 on the back of the recent selloff in the US dollar. Chart 6The RMB Tends To Weaken When EUR/USD Is Rising We expect the dollar to weaken further over the next 12 months as the Fed tempers its hawkish rhetoric in response to falling inflation. Chart 6 shows that the trade-weighted RMB typically strengthens when EUR/USD is rising. Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s Chief Currency Strategist, expects EUR/USD to reach 1.16 by the end of the year. Problem #3: Flagging Property Market Chinese housing sales, starts, and completions all contracted in April (Chart 7). New home prices dipped 0.2% on a month-over-month basis, and are up just 0.7% from a year earlier, the smallest gain since 2015. The percentage of households planning to buy a home is near record lows (Chart 8). Chart 7The Chinese Property Market Has Been Cooling Chart 8Intentions To Buy A House Have Declined China’s property developers are in dire straits. Corporate bonds for the sector are, on average, trading at 48 cents on the dollar (Chart 9). Goldman Sachs estimates that the default rate for property developers will reach 32% in 2022, up from their earlier estimate of 19%. The government is trying to prop up housing demand. The PBoC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate by 15 bps on May 20th, the largest such cut since 2019. The authorities have dropped the floor mortgage rate to a 14-year low of 4.25%. They have also taken steps to make it easier for property developers to issue domestic bonds. BCA’s China strategists believe these measures will foster a modest rebound in the property market in the second half of this year. However, they do not anticipate a robust recovery – of the sort experienced following the initial wave of the pandemic – due to the government’s continued adherence to the “three red lines” policy.1 China is building too many homes. While residential investment as a share GDP has been trending lower, it is still very high in relation to other countries. China’s working-age population is now shrinking, which suggests that housing demand will contract over the coming years (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Property Developer Bonds Are Trading At Distressed Levels Chart 10Shrinking Working-Age Population Implies Less Demand For Housing Chinese real estate prices are amongst the highest anywhere. The five biggest cities in the world with the lowest rental yields are all in China (Chart 11). The entire Chinese housing stock is worth nearly $100 trillion, making it the largest asset class in the world. As such, a decline in Chinese home prices would generate a sizable negative wealth effect. Chart 11Chinese Real Estate Is Expensive A Silver Bullet? Trying to reflate the Chinese housing bubble would only damage the long-term prospects of China’s economy. Luckily, one does not need to fill a leaky bucket through the same hole the water escaped. As long as there is enough demand throughout the economy, workers who lose their jobs in declining sectors will eventually find new jobs in other sectors. China needs to reorient its economy away from its historic reliance on investment and exports towards consumption. The easiest way to do that is to adopt measures that boost disposable income, which has slowed of late (Chart 12). Not only would this help offset the drag from slowing export growth and a negative housing wealth effect, but it would also take some of the sting out of China’s zero-Covid policy. The authorities have not talked much about pursuing large-scale income-support measures of the kind adopted by many developed economies during the pandemic. As a result, market participants have largely dismissed this possibility. Yet, with the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, the political incentive to shower the economy with cash will only intensify. Chinese equities are trading at only 10-times forward earnings and about 1-times sales (Chart 13). A significant upward rating for equity valuations is likely if the government adopts broad-based income-support measures. As we saw in the US and elsewhere, stimulus cash has a habit of flowing into the stock market; and with real estate in the doldrums, equities may become the asset class of choice for many Chinese investors. With that in mind, we are going long the iShares MSCI China ETF ($MCHI) as a tactical trade. Chart 12Disposable Income Growth Has Been Trending Lower Chart 13Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap At a global level, a floundering Chinese property market would have been a cause for grave concern in the past, as it would have represented a major deflationary shock. Times have changed, however. The problem now is too much inflation, rather than too little. To the extent that reduced Chinese investment injects more savings into the global economy and knocks down commodity prices, this would be welcomed by most investors. China’s economy may be heading for a “beautiful slowdown.” Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn Twitter Footnotes 1 The People’s Bank of China and the housing ministry issued a deleveraging framework for property developers in August 2020, consisting of a 70% ceiling on liabilities-to-assets, a net debt-to-equity ratio capped at 100%, and a limit on short-term borrowing that cannot exceed cash reserves. Developers breaching these “red lines” run the risk of being cut off from access to new loans from banks, while those who respect them can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most. View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Highlights The economic and financial market developments that have occurred over the past month are consistent with several of the risks that we identified in our recent reports. We warned in our April report that the outlook for equities had deteriorated meaningfully since the beginning of the year and recommended that investors maintain, at most, a very modest overweight toward stocks in a global multi-asset portfolio. We see the performance of the equity market over the past month as reflecting the beginning of the recession scare that we warned was coming. Still, several factors continue to suggest that this is indeed a scare, and not an actual recession. Section 2 of this month’s report reviews the US housing market for signs of an imminent recession. While a slowdown in the housing market is clearly underway, we do not yet see signs that this slowdown is recessionary. It remains an open question how forcefully Russia is willing to weaponize its natural gas exports in response to a seemingly imminent European embargo on Russian oil, and whether Russia will deploy this strategy now or later. For now, our base case view is that the euro area economy will slow and will probably contract in Q2, but it will avoid a debilitating energy-driven recession. China’s zero-tolerance COVID policy has failed to contain the disease, and it is now clear that more and more outbreaks will occur across the country over the coming months. Our base case view is that additional fiscal & monetary support is forthcoming if the spread of the disease progresses as we expect. We are likely to downgrade our outlook for global economic activity as well as our recommended allocation to risky assets if it does not materialize. Our profit margin warning indicators have deteriorated over the past month, and it is now our view that a contraction in S&P 500 margins is likely. Still, a major decline should be avoided, and we expect that S&P 500 earnings will grow at a low, single-digit rate over the coming year. We continue to recommend a marginally overweight stance towards risky assets over the coming 6-12 months, along with a neutral regional equity stance, a modestly overweight stance towards value over growth, an overweight stance towards small caps, a modestly short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio, and short US dollar positions. Not Out Of The Woods Yet Chart I-1In May, Global Stocks Nearly Fell Into Bear Market Territory May was a painful month for the equity market. Globally, stocks fell more than 4% in US$ terms, led by the US. May’s selloff pushed global stocks close to bear market territory relative to their early-January high (Chart I-1), a threshold that was breached in intra-day terms in the US last week. We warned in our April report that the outlook for equities had deteriorated meaningfully since the beginning of the year and recommended that investors maintain, at most, a very modest overweight toward stocks in a global multi-asset portfolio. In our view, the economic and financial market developments that occurred over the past month are consistent with several of the risk we identified in our recent reports. We continue to recommend that investors remain minimally overweight risky assets. Our view that investors should not be underweight risky assets hinges on three expectations: the avoidance of a US recession over the coming year, a continuation of Russian natural gas exports to key gas-reliant European countries, and the announcement from Chinese policymakers of either significant additional stimulus in its traditional form or income-support policies of the type that prevailed in developed economies in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. Confirmation of these expectations is likely to push us to upgrade our recommended stance toward risky assets, especially if equities continue to sell off in response to growth fears. Conversely, we are likely to recommend downgrading risky assets to neutral or underweight if evidence mounts that our expectations are unlikely to materialize. A US Recession Scare Is Underway We noted in last month’s report that the US economy would likely avoid a recession over the coming year, but that a recession scare was quite likely. We emphasized a probable slowdown in the housing market as the locus of investors’ recessionary concern, and the US housing market data is indeed now surprising significantly to the downside (Chart I-2). We see the performance of the equity market over the past month as reflecting the beginning of the recession scare that we warned was coming. Chart I-3 highlights that the composition of the US equity selloff since the beginning of the year has looked quite unlike the growth-driven selloffs that occurred over the past decade, in that real bond yields have been a strong driver of the decline in stocks. By contrast, May’s decline has looked more like a typical growth scare, with real bond yields somewhat cushioning the impact of a significant rise in the equity risk premium. Chart I-2The US Housing Market Is Clearly Slowing Chart I-3May’s Selloff Was Driven By Growth Fears, Not Rising Interest Rates Chart I-4 highlights that it is not just the housing market that is worrying investors. The chart shows that the Conference Board’s US leading economic indicator (LEI) is slowing quite sharply, in line with previous episodes of a major growth scare. And while the weakest components of the LEI modestly improved on average in April, Chart I-5 highlights that the collapse in real wage growth alongside the recently severe underperformance of consumer stocks has fed concerns that high inflation has eroded household purchasing power – and that a contraction in real spending is imminent. Chart I-4A Serious US Growth Scare Is Underway Chart I-5The Decline In Real US Wage Growth Has Caused A Major Selloff In Consumer Stocks In Section 2 of this month’s report we provide further analysis supporting the view that the US housing market will not drive the US economy into recession. But we do continue to believe that a slowdown in housing activity is likely, and that concerns about a housing-driven recession will linger. Still, several factors continue to suggest that the US is experiencing a recession scare, and not an actual recession: The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is currently predicting US real GDP growth that is only modestly below trend in Q2, and the overall estimate continues to be dragged significantly lower by a sizably negative contribution from the change in inventories (Chart I-6). Without this negative inventories effect, the Atlanta Fed’s model would be forecasting real annualized growth of over 3%. After having decelerated significantly in the second half of last year because of a broadening in consumer price inflation, Chart I-7 highlights that real personal consumption expenditures reaccelerated and real personal income ex-transfers stabilized in Q1. Chart I-6No Sign Of A Major Decline In Q2 Consumer Spending Chart I-7Real Income Growth Is Stabilizing, And Real Consumer Spending Is Accelerating US manufacturing industrial production surged in April, led by motor vehicle production (Chart I-8, panel 1). It is true that industrial production is a coincident indicator and thus does not necessarily argue against the idea that a recession is imminent. A pickup in vehicle production is encouraging, however, as it suggests that the 15% surge in the level of new car prices over the past year that contributed to the erosion in household real incomes may be set to reverse (panel 2). Chart I-8A Pickup In Auto Production Should Help Lower Car Prices And Improve Consumer Purchasing Power Services spending is likely to improve, as deliveries of Pfizer’s Paxlovid antiviral drug continue to ramp up and vaccines are eventually approved for children under the age of six. Charts I-9A and I-9B highlight several real services spending categories that remain below their pre-pandemic levels, which in our view have been clearly linked to the pandemic and are not likely to be permanently lower. Americans have not likely stopped going to the gym, amusement parks, movies, live concerts, or the dentist, nor have their stopped needing to put elderly relatives in nursing care homes. They are also highly unlikely to stop traveling. There is some internal debate at BCA about the impact that working-from-home trends will have on the level of services spending, but we would note that essentially all of the spending categories shown in Charts I-9A and I-9B have exhibited uptrends that only appear to have been affected by consumer responses to the Delta and Omicron waves of the pandemic. Widely-available treatment options that reduce the fatality rate of the disease close to that of the flu are likely to be perceived by the public as an effective end of the pandemic, boosting spending on lagging categories of services spending. Chart I-9AAn Eventual End To The Pandemic… Chart I-9B…Will Cause A Further Improvement In Services Spending Based on high-frequency data from OpenTable, the number of seated diners in US restaurants is not exhibiting any major warning signs for US consumer spending (Chart I-10). Real spending in restaurants has been strongly correlated with overall real personal consumption expenditures over the past two decades, and thus Chart I-10 is not suggesting that a collapse in overall spending is imminent. Chart I-10High-Frequency Data Does Not Yet Show A Major Pullback In US Consumer Spending As a final point concerning the risk of recession in the US, investors should note that the recent behavior of inflation expectations is encouraging and points to a potentially imminent peak in Fed hawkishness. Over the past few months, we have expressed our concern about the pace of increase in long-dated household inflation expectations. We highlighted last month that long-term market-based inflation expectations were also exhibiting some potential signs of becoming unanchored. However, Chart I-11 highlights that the momentum of long-dated household inflation expectations is now starting to flag, and that long-term market-based inflation expectations recently decreased in response to escalating growth fears. Chart I-12 clearly shows a slowing pace of core consumer prices, which will act to restrain further significant increases in long-dated inflation expectations. Chart I-11Long-Dated Inflation Expectations Point To A Potentially Imminent Peak In Fed Hawkishness Chart I-12Core Inflation Momentum Is Clearly Slowing Chart I-13 highlights that investors expect the Fed to raise the policy rate by the end of the year to a level even higher than what Jerome Powell implied during the Fed’s May press conference: a target range for the Fed funds rate of 2.5-2.75%, corresponding to two more 50 basis point hikes and three 25 basis point hikes during the FOMC’s September, November, and December meetings. Chart I-13Expectations For Fed Rate Hikes This Year Are Likely To Come Down If Inflation Continues To Moderate It is likely that the market’s expectation for rate hikes this year will fall over the coming few months if the monthly pace of core inflation continues to slow. The Fed itself may soon signal a less intense pace of tightening than Powell recently implied – a perspective that we feel is supported by the minutes of the May FOMC meeting. That would allow the US economy to “digest” the recent adjustment in interest rates with less uncertainty about the economic outlook, which would lower the odds that a “mid-cycle slowdown” morphs into a full-blown recession. A Debilitating Energy-Driven Recession In Europe Is Not In The Cards, For Now The key issue pertaining to the European economic outlook remains the question of whether Europe’s imports of Russian natural gas will be interrupted. A European embargo of Russian oil now seems likely, which would likely cause Russian oil production to decline. Our Commodity & Energy strategy service now expects Brent oil to trade at $120/bbl on average for the remainder of the year, $5/bbl higher than current levels (Chart I-14). We agree with our Commodity & Energy Strategy team’s updated oil price forecast, but we have a different view about the odds that Russia will respond to a European oil embargo by cutting its natural gas exports to the EU. We still think this is a risk, not yet a likely event, although it may still occur later in the year. A full and immediate cutoff of natural gas exports to gas-dependent European countries such as Germany and Italy would not only destabilize the Russian economy by substantially reducing its current account surplus, it would also cause a severe recession in Europe through a combination of gas rationing to industries by government decree and surging energy prices (Chart I-15). Chart I-14A European Embargo Of Russian Oil Will Cause Brent To Rise To $120/bbl Chart I-15A Full Cutoff Of Russian Natural Gas Would Cause A Severe European Recession That could erode European voters’ willingness to provide military support for Ukraine, but it could instead backfire and galvanize European public opinion against Russia – and remove leverage that may be potentially used to secure a ceasefire agreement that will preserve its military gains in eastern Ukraine. Chart I-16Europe Is Replenishing Its Gas Storage, But It Cannot Yet Withstand A Full Cutoff Russia may respond to an oil embargo by throttling the amount of natural gas exported to key European countries in a fashion that raises natural gas prices and prevents European countries from building up sufficient storage for the upcoming winter – a process that is underway but is far from complete (Chart I-16). But it remains an open question how forcefully Russia is willing to weaponize its natural gas exports, and whether it will deploy this strategy now or later. For now, our base case view is that the euro area economy will slow and will probably contract in Q2, but it will avoid a debilitating energy-driven recession. China: The Only Way Out Is Through Among the three pillars of the global economy – the US, China, and Europe – the last is arguably the least important. Today, the US and China are the core drivers of global demand, and we are therefore more concerned about the economic impact of China’s zero-tolerance COVID policy than we are about a slowdown or mild recession in Europe. Given how contagious the Omicron variant of COVID-19 has shown itself to be, and given how widespread recent outbreaks have been, it is now clear that China’s zero-tolerance policy has failed to contain the disease and that more and more outbreaks will occur across the country over the coming months. Despite public statements to the contrary, we suspect that Chinese policymakers are well aware of this situation, but are constrained by the consequences of removing the zero-tolerance policy. Recent studies suggest that China could face intensive care demand that is sixteen times existing capacity and upwards of 1.5 million deaths by removing the policy,1 roughly 1.5 times the cumulative amount of deaths that have occurred in the US during the pandemic. But the economic consequences of maintaining the zero-tolerance policy will also be severe, and therefore also likely represent a constraint on policymakers. Charts I-17 and I-18 show that China’s labor market and industrial sector have already slowed sharply over the past few months, at a pace and magnitude that is unlikely to be politically sustainable for much longer. In addition, Chart I-19 shows that China’s credit impulse fell meaningfully in April. Chart I-17China’s Labor Market Is Cratering… Chart I-18…As Is Its Manufacturing Sector Chart I-19More Fiscal & Monetary Support Will Be Needed In China Soon, If COVID-19 Cases Continue To Spread This would be tolerable if the decline in activity was likely to be short-lived as it was at the very beginning of the pandemic, but we no longer see this as a probable outcome. We acknowledge that reported cases of COVID-19 have steadily declined in cities in the Yangtze River region, and we agree that the Shanghai lockdown may soon end for a time. But we doubt that this will mark the end of outbreaks in the region, or prevent major outbreaks from occurring in other parts of the country. If China cannot relax its zero-tolerance policy or tolerate the degree of economic weakness entailed by its continued application, then additional fiscal and monetary support is likely. While China’s leadership has stepped up its pro-growth policy measures, as evidenced by the recent cut in the 5-year loan prime rate, we strongly suspect that more support will be needed. This support may take the form of traditional stimulus via local government spending, or it may involve the introduction of income-support policies of the kind that prevailed in developed economies in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. Chart I-20The Chinese Housing Market Is Slowing Significantly, Lowering The Risk Of Speculation From Income Support Policies Chinese policymakers who are eager to prevent another significant releveraging of the economy and who want to avoid another major deterioration in housing affordability may perhaps be forgiven for seeing the developed economy experience with these programs as a poor roadmap to follow. House prices have exploded in most advanced economies during the pandemic, which has significantly contributed to a major decline in affordability. However, with the benefit of hindsight, Chinese policymakers would likely be able to recalibrate any income support program to avoid some of the excesses that occurred in DM countries, such as policies that caused aggregate disposable income to increase in the US and Canada during the pandemic. In addition, Chart I-20 highlights that the starting point for the Chinese property market is one in which house prices are seemingly poised to contract at the worst pace since late 2014 / early 2015. The latter suggests that Chinese policymakers have more ability to support household income without causing an explosion in house prices and speculative activity than DM policymakers did in 2020. Regardless of its form, it is the view of the Bank Credit Analyst service that China cannot avoid the provision of significant additional fiscal/monetary support if it maintains its zero-tolerance COVID policy for the remainder of the year given our assumption that potentially major outbreaks will continue. It is our base case view that additional support is forthcoming over the coming weeks and months if the spread of the disease progresses as we expect. We are likely to downgrade our outlook for global economic activity as well as our recommended allocation to risky assets if it does not materialize. US Corporate Profits In A Nonrecessionary Slowdown Scenario Chart I-21US Forward Earnings Very Rarely Fall While The Economy Continues To Expand Chart I-3 highlighted that the US equity market selloff in May shifted from one that was strongly driven by rising real government bond yields to one in which a rising equity risk premium was the dominant driver. And yet, the chart showed that there has been no negative contribution to US stock prices from falling earnings expectations, with expected earnings having continued to rise since the beginning of the year. While it may seem counterintuitive to investors that forward earnings expectations are not falling in the middle of a major growth scare, Chart I-21 highlights that this is not abnormal. The chart highlights that forward earnings expectations rarely decline outside of the context of a recession, because actual earnings typically do not decline when the economy is expanding. This means that the potential for earnings to decline shows up as a rise in the equity risk premium during growth scares, which is what has generally occurred since the beginning of the year (excluding energy, forward EPS estimates have fallen slightly this year). In last month’s Section 2, we noted that nonrecessionary earnings declines almost always occur because of contractions in profit margins. We argued that risks to US equity margins might rise later this year. In fact, since we published our report last month, some of these risks have already materialized: our new profit margin warning indicator has jumped significantly (Chart I-22), and our sector profit margin diffusion index has fallen below the boom/bust line (Chart I-23). As such, it is now our view that a contraction in S&P 500 profit margins is likely over the coming year, which contrasts with analyst EPS growth expectations of 9.5% and sales per share growth expectations of 8% (meaning that analysts are currently forecasting a margin expansion). Chart I-22A Contraction In S&P 500 Profit Margins... Chart I-23...Now Looks Likely Will a likely contraction in profit margins cause an outright decline in earnings over the coming year? Investors should acknowledge that this is a risk, but for now our answer is no. Chart I-24For Now, A Severe Contraction In Margins Does Not Seem Probable Taken at face value, our sector diffusion index shown in Chart I-23 suggests that profit margins are set to decline by 2 percentage points over the coming year, which would indeed imply a 7-8% contraction in earnings per share assuming 8% revenue growth. However, the index is much better at predicting inflection points in profit margins than the magnitude of the change; in several cases over the past three decades the model correctly predicted a decline in profit margins, but implied a much larger change in margins than what actually occurred. In addition, our model shown in Chart I-22 has yet to cross above the 50% mark into probable territory, and Chart I-24 highlights that net earnings revisions and net positive earnings surprises are falling but have not yet reached levels that would be consistent with a major margin decline. In sum, we expect that S&P 500 earnings will grow at a low, single-digit rate over the coming year given our expectation of a nonrecessionary slowdown scenario. This implies that US equity returns will be uninspiring over the coming year, but they will be likely be positive and will likely beat the returns offered from bonds. Investment Strategy Recommendations Considerable uncertainty remains about the global economic and financial market outlook, and there are several identifiable risks that would warrant an underweight stance towards risky assets were they to materialize. We agree that an aggressively overweight stance is not justified. Chart I-25Without A Recession, The US Equity Risk Premium Is Very Likely To Decline However, the fact that corporate profits do not usually fall while the economy is expanding underscores why investors should be reluctant to significantly cut their risky asset exposure unless a recession appears likely. Without a recession, the US equity risk premium is very likely to decline (Chart I-25), meaning that 10-year Treasury yields closer to 4% or a significant contraction in profit margins would be required for US stocks to post negative returns over the coming 6-12 months. We would not rule out either of these outcomes, but we also do not think that they are probable. To conclude, it is fair to say that global investors are not out of the woods yet, but we continue to recommend a marginally overweight stance towards risky assets on the basis that the US will avoid a recession over the coming year, Russia is not yet likely to push Europe into a debilitating recession, and China will further ease fiscal & monetary policy to support growth. In addition to a modest overweight towards stocks in a multi-asset portfolio, we continue to recommend the following: A neutral regional equity stance, with global ex-US equities on upgrade watch in response to an improvement in the European economic outlook and further fiscal & monetary support in China. The recent passive outperformance of global ex-US stocks has occurred mainly because US stocks have fallen more than global stocks, which have “caught up” to mounting US and global growth fears. As such, ex-US stocks have outperformed for the wrong reasons, and investors should wait for durable signs of an improving global growth outlook and a falling US dollar before shifting in favor of a global ex-US equity stance. A modestly overweight stance towards value over growth stocks on the basis of better valuation. However, most of the pandemic-related outperformance of growth stocks has already reversed (Chart I-26), suggesting that the outperformance of value is getting late. An overweight stance toward global small-cap stocks over their large-cap peers, as they are now unequivocally inexpensive and have remained resilient as global growth fears have intensified (Chart I-27). Chart I-26Modestly Favor Value Stocks Due To Better Valuation, But The COVID Effects On Equity Style Have Mostly Reversed Chart I-27Small Cap Stocks Have Recently Proven Resilient, And Are Extremely Cheap A modestly short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio. Short US dollar positions, as the dollar is clearly benefiting from growth fears that will wane. In addition, the US dollar is very expensive, and extremely overbought. Concerning our recommended duration stance, we acknowledge that a slower pace of rate hikes than what investors currently expect and a slowing pace of inflation would normally argue for a long duration stance. But we do not expect the Fed to stop raising interest rates unless a recession seems likely, and a slower but steady path of tightening, in conjunction with easing inflation, makes it more likely that the US economy will be able to “digest” the recent adjustment in rates without tipping into recession. This, in turn, increases the odds that the Fed funds rate will peak at a higher level than investors currently expect, which should ultimately push long-maturity yields higher rather than lower. On balance, this suggests that investors should be modestly short duration, even if long-maturity bond yields move temporarily lower over the coming few months. Long-duration positions are perhaps reasonable on a 0-3 month time horizon, but over a 6-12 month time horizon we continue to recommend a modestly short stance. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 26, 2022 Next Report: June 30, 2022 II. Is The US Housing Market Signaling An Imminent Recession? The Fed’s hawkish shift over the past six months has caused a sharp increase in US interest rates. In this report we examine the US housing market for signs of an imminent recession, given the housing sector’s strong interest rate sensitivity. In addition to a severe contraction in real home improvement spending, there are several other housing-related indicators that are ostensibly pointing in a bearish direction. The growth in total home sales and the MBA mortgage application purchase index are already in negative territory, housing affordability has deteriorated meaningfully, and the National Association of Home Builders’ (NAHB) housing market index is falling sharply. However, the breadth of house prices and building permits, consumer surveys, housing equity sector relative performance, and the fact that mortgage rates have likely peaked for the year point to a more optimistic outlook for housing. At a minimum, they do not yet suggest that the current slowdown in housing-related activity is recessionary. Structural factors are also supportive of the pace of housing construction in the US. While a slowdown in the housing market is clearly underway, it is not occurring after a period of excessive housing construction. The opposite is true: the US and several other developed market economies have underbuilt homes over the past decade. This should limit the drag on economic growth from housing-related activity, and reduces the odds that a housing market slowdown will morph into a housing-driven US recession. Chart II-1The Fed's Hawkish Shift Has Caused An Extremely Sharp Rise In Interest Rates The Fed’s hawkish shift over the past six months has caused US interest rates to rise at an extremely rapid pace. Panel 1 of Chart II-1 highlights that the spread between the US 2-year Treasury yield and the 3-month T-bill yield reached a 20-year high in early April of this year. Panel 2 shows that the two-year change in the 30-year mortgage rate will reach the highest level since the early 1980s by the end of this year if mortgage rates remain at their current level. Over the longer run, it is the level of interest rates that matters more than their change. However, changes in interest rates and other key financial market variables are also important drivers of economic activity, especially when they happen very rapidly. Given the speed of the recent adjustment in US interest rates, and the fact that the Fed funds rate will have likely reached the Fed’s neutral rate forecast by the end of this year, investors have understandably become concerned about the potential for a recession in the US. In this report we examine the US housing market for signs of an imminent recession, given the housing sector’s strong interest rate sensitivity. We conclude that while a slowdown in the housing market is clearly underway, several signs suggest that this slowdown is not recessionary. Investors should remain laser-focused on the pace of housing-related activity over the coming 6-12 months, but for now our assessment of the housing market is consistent with a modest overweight stance towards stocks within a multi-asset portfolio. A Brief Review Of The Housing Sector’s Contribution To Growth Table II-1 highlights the importance of the housing sector as a driver/predictor of US recessions. This table highlights that real residential investment is not a particularly important contributor to real GDP growth during nonrecessionary quarters, but it is the only main expenditure component exhibiting negative growth on average in the year prior to a recession.2 Table II-1Real Residential Investment Tends To Contract In The Year Prior To A Recession When examining the contribution to economic growth from the housing sector, investors and housing market analysts often fully equate real residential investment with housing construction. In fact, while direct construction of housing units accounts for a sizeable portion of the contribution to growth from housing, it is just one of four components. This is an important point, as one of the often-overlooked elements of real residential investment has strongly leading properties and is currently providing a very negative signal about the housing sector. Chart II-2 breaks down what we consider as aggregate real “housing-related activity”, and Chart II-3 presents the contributions to annualized quarterly growth in housing activity from the four components. For the sake of completeness, we include personal consumption expenditures on furnishings and household equipment as part of housing-related activity, alongside the two main components of real residential investment: permanent site construction (including single and multi-family properties), and “other structures.” In reality, “other structures” is not predominantly accounted for by the construction of different types of residential properties; it is almost entirely composed of spending on home improvements and brokerage commissions on the sale of existing residential properties. Chart II-2Housing Construction Is An Important Part Of Residential Investment, But There Are Other Contributing Factors Chart II-3Home Improvement Spending And Brokerage Commissions Also Drive Residential Investment Aside from the link between existing home sales and the general demand for newly-built homes, the prominence of brokerage commissions in other residential structures investment helps explain why existing home sales are strongly correlated with real residential investment (Chart II-4, panel 1). Given that a distributed lag of monthly housing starts maps closely to permanent site construction (panel 2), starts and existing home sales explain a good portion of the contribution to growth from housing-related activity. Of the two remaining components of housing-related activity, Chart II-5 highlights that personal consumption expenditures on furniture and household equipment generally coincide with the pace of housing construction and new home sales. We take this to mean that the consumption component of housing-related activity is typically a derivative of the decision to build a new home or sell an existing one. Chart II-4Existing Home Sales Explain Commissions, And Housing Starts Explain Permanent Site Construction Chart II-5The Pace Of Contraction In Home Improvement Spending Is Worrying What is not coincident with construction and existing home sales is residential home improvement: Panel 2 of Chart II-5 highlights that it has strongly leading properties, and is currently contracting at its worst rate since the 2008 recession. Data on real home improvement spending is only available quarterly from 2002, so the ability to compare the current situation to previous housing market cycles is limited. But the pace of contraction is worrying and underscores that investors should be on the lookout for corroborating signs of a major contraction in the housing market. Is The Housing Data Sending A Recessionary Signal? In addition to the severe contraction in real home improvement spending shown in Chart II-5, there are several other housing-related indicators that are ostensibly pointing in a bearish direction. In particular, Chart II-6 highlights that both the growth in total home sales and the MBA mortgage application purchase index are already in negative territory, that housing affordability has deteriorated meaningfully, and that the National Association of Home Builders’ (NAHB) housing market index is falling sharply. However, there are also several signs pointing to a more optimistic outlook for housing, or at least indicating that the current slowdown in housing-related activity is not recessionary. We review these more optimistic indicators below. The Breadth Of House Prices And Building Permits In sharp contrast to previous periods of serious housing market weakness and/or recessionary periods, there is no sign yet of a major slowdown in US house price appreciation including cities with the weakest gains. In fact, Chart II-7 highlights that house prices have recently been reaccelerating on a very broad basis after having slowed in the second half of last year, which hardly bodes poorly for new home construction. Chart II-6A US Housing Sector Slowdown Is Certainly Underway Chart II-7No Sign Yet Of A Major Deceleration In House Prices It is true that US house price data is somewhat lagging, so it is quite likely that price weakness is forthcoming. However, there has been no sign of a major slowdown in prices through to March 2022, by which point 30-year mortgage rates had already risen 200 basis points from their 2021 low. More importantly, Chart II-8 highlights that a state-by-state diffusion index of authorized housing permits has done a very good job at leading the growth in permits nationwide, and is currently not pointing to a contraction in activity. Chart II-9 presents explanatory models for the growth in US housing starts and total home sales based on our state permits diffusion index, pending home sales, the change in mortgage rates, and housing affordability. The chart underscores that a contraction in housing activity is not what these variables would predict, even though starts and sales should be growing at a much more modest pace than what has prevailed on average over the past two years. Chart II-8Our Building Permits Diffusion Index Leads Housing Construction Activity, And Is Not Pointing To A Major Slowdown Chart II-9Reliably Leading Indicators Of Construction And Home Sales Do Not Point To A Recessionary Outcome Consumer Surveys The University of Michigan consumer survey shows that consumers feel it is the worst time to buy a home since the early-1980s (Chart II-10), which seems like a clearly negative sign for the housing market and an indication of the likely impact of tighter policy on housing-related activity. And yet, panel 2 highlights that this is the result of the fact that house prices in the US have surged during the pandemic, not that mortgage rates have risen too high. It is true that the number of survey respondents citing “interest rates are too high” is rising sharply, but this factor as a share of all “bad time to buy” reasons given is not meaningfully higher than it was in 2018, 2011, or 2006. It is clear that high prices are also the culprit for why consumers report that it is a bad time to buy large household durables and not that large household durables are unaffordable or that interest rates are too high (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Nearly The Worst Time To Buy A Home, Mostly Due To Prices (Not Interest Rates) Chart II-11Same Story For Large Household Durables It may seem counterintuitive for investors to see Charts II-10 and II-11 as in any way positive for the housing market. But, to us, the notion that elevated house prices are the main source of poor affordability supports the idea that a normalization of the housing market will occur through a combination of marginally lower demand, a slower pace of house price appreciation, and a sustained pace of housing market construction. This implies that existing home sales may be weaker than housing construction over the coming year, but the latter will help to support the contribution to overall economic growth from housing-related activity. Housing Sector Relative Performance Despite the significant slowdown in real home improvement spending and the recent decline in the NAHB’s housing market index, Chart II-12 highlights that home improvement retail and homebuilding stocks have not exhibited significantly negative abnormal returns over the past year – as they did in 1994/1995 and in the lead up to the global financial crisis. The chart, which presents a rolling 1-year “Jensen’s alpha” measure for both industries, attempts to capture the risk-adjusted performance of the industry versus the S&P 500. While the chart shows that both industries have generated negative alpha over the past year, the magnitude does not appear to be consistent with a recession. In the case of homebuilder stocks in particular, negative abnormal returns over the past year should have been meaningfully worse given the year-over-year change in mortgage rates. Chart II-13 highlights that homebuilder performance has not been cushioned by a deep valuation discount in advance of the rise in mortgage rates. Chart II-12Housing-Related Equity Sectors Are Not Warning Of A Housing-Driven Recession Chart II-13Homebuilders Were Not Excessively Cheap Before Mortgage Rates Spiked In short, the important takeaway for investors is that the relative performance of housing-related stocks is not yet consistent with a housing-led US recession. Mortgage Rates Are Not Restrictive, And Have Likely Peaked As we highlighted in Chart II-1, the two-year change in the US 30-year conventional mortgage rate will be the largest in history by the end of this year, save the Volcker era, if the mortgage rate remains at its current level. However, it is not just the change in interest rates that matters for economic activity, but rather also the level. Encouragingly, Chart II-14 highlights that the level of mortgage rates has not yet risen into restrictive territory relative to the economy’s underlying potential rate of growth. In addition, it appears that mortgage rates have overreacted to the expected pace of monetary tightening – and thus have likely peaked for this year. Two points support this view: First, panel 2 of Chart II-14 highlights that the 30-year mortgage rate is one standard deviation too high relative to the 10-year Treasury yield, underscoring that the former has overshot. And second, Chart II-15 highlights that the mortgage rate is still too high even after controlling for business cycle expectations, current coupon MBS yields, and bond & equity market volatility. Chart II-14Mortgage Rates Are Not Yet Restrictive, But Have Likely Peaked For The Year Chart II-15No Matter How You Slice It, US Mortgage Rates Are Stretched Structural Factors Supporting Housing Construction Chart II-16The US And Several Other DM Countries Have Underbuilt Homes Since The Global Financial Crisis Our analysis above points to a scenario in which the housing market slows in a nonrecessionary fashion, supported by relatively buoyant construction activity. Structural factors, which are mostly a legacy of the global financial crisis, are also supportive of the pace of housing construction in the US and other developed market economies. We presented Chart II-16 in our June 2021 Special Report, which shows the most standardized measure of cross-country housing supply available for several advanced economies: the trend in real residential investment relative to real GDP over time. These series are all rebased to 100 as of 1997, prior to the 2002-2007 US housing market boom. The chart makes it clear that advanced economies generally fall into two groups based on this metric: those that have seen declines in real residential investment relative to GDP, especially after the global financial crisis (panel 1) and those that have experienced either an uptrend in housing construction relative to output or a flat trend (panel 2). The US, along with the euro area, the UK, and Japan, all belong to the first group, with commodity-producing and Scandinavian countries belonging to the second group. The point of the chart is that the US and most other major DM economies have seemingly experienced a chronic undersupply of homes in the wake of the global financial crisis, which should continue to support housing construction activity even if demand for housing is slowing because of a sharp increase in mortgage rates. Given that the trend in real residential investment to GDP is a somewhat crude metric of housing supply, Chart II-17 presents a more precise measure for the US. It shows the standardized trend in permanent site residential structures investment (both single- and multi-family) relative to both the US population and the number of households. The chart makes it clear that the US vastly overbuilt homes from the late-1990s to 2007, but also vastly underbuilt since 2008. Relative to the number of households, real permanent site residential structures investment is still half of a standard deviation below its long-term average – even after the surge in construction that occurred in 2020. Chart II-18 highlights a similar message: it shows that the US homeowner vacancy rate (the proportion of the housing stock that is vacant and for sale) was at a 66-year low at the end of the first quarter. Chart II-19 shows that the monthly supply of existing one-family homes on the market is also at a multi-decade low, but that the supply of new homes for sale spiked in April. Chart II-17More Precise Home Supply Measures Underscore That The US Needs To Build More Houses Chart II-18The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Extremely Low At first blush, this spike in the monthly supply of new homes relative to sales is quite concerning, as it has risen back to levels that prevailed in 2007. One point to note is that the increase in new home inventory relates to homes still under construction; the inventory of completed homes for sale remains quite low. In addition, from the perspective of a homebuilder, a rise in the monthly supply of new homes relative to home sales is only concerning if it translates into a significant increase in the amount of time to sell a completed home, as has historically been the case (Chart II-20). Chart II-19Existing Home Inventories Remain Low Relative To Sales... Chart II-20...And Higher New Home Inventories Are Not Affecting Time-To-Sale Of Completed Homes Chart II-20 highlights that a fairly significant divergence between these two series has emerged over the past decade. Despite roughly five-six months’ supply of new home inventory on average since 2012, the median number of months required to sell a new home rarely exceeded four. In early-2019 the monthly supply of new homes also spiked, and a relatively modest and nonrecessionary slowdown in housing starts was sufficient to prevent any meaningful rise in the amount of time required to sell a newly completed home. Notably, the models that we presented in Chart II-9 led the slowdown in total home sales and starts in late-2018/early-2019, and they are not pointing to a major contraction today. The key point for investors is that while a slowdown in the housing market is clearly underway, it is not occurring after a period of excessive housing construction. In fact, the opposite is true: despite a surge in construction during the pandemic, it remains below its historical average relative to the population and especially the number of households. This should act to limit the drag on economic growth from housing-related activity, and therefore reduces the odds that a housing market slowdown will morph into a housing-driven US recession. Investment Implications We noted in our May report that the inversion of the 2-10 yield curve has set a recessionary tone to any weakness in US macroeconomic data, and that a recession scare was likely. Recent negative housing market data surprises underscore that a slowdown in the US housing market is clearly underway, and that this will likely feed recessionary concerns for a time. Investors should continue to be highly focused on the evolution of US macro data when making asset allocation decisions over the coming 6-12 months, as the current economic and financial market environment remains highly uncertain. This should include a strong focus on the housing market, as consumer surveys highlight that the overall impact of falling real wages and high house prices could cause a more pronounced slowdown in housing-related activity than we expect – and that the change and level of interest rates would imply. Nevertheless, our analysis of the historical predictors of housing construction and sales points to the conclusion that the ongoing housing market slowdown is not likely to be recessionary in nature. This, in conjunction with the factors that we noted in Section 1 of our report, support maintaining a modest overweight towards stocks within a multi-asset portfolio over the coming 6-12 months. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators generally paint a pessimistic picture for stock prices. Our monetary indicator is at its weakest level in almost three decades, and our valuation indicator highlights that stocks are still expensive. Meanwhile, both our sentiment and technical indicators have broken down, and have not yet reached levels that would indicate an imminent reversal. Investors should be, at most, very modestly overweight stocks versus bonds over the coming year. Equity earnings will likely rise over the coming year if the US economy avoids a recession (as we expect), but analysts are pricing in too much growth over the coming year. A contraction in profit margins is now likely, signaling that earnings will grow at a low single-digit pace. Net earnings revisions are falling, but are not yet signaling a large enough decline in margins that would cause earnings to contract even in the face of positive revenue growth. Within a global equity portfolio, we recommend a neutral regional equity allocation. The recent passive outperformance of global ex-US stocks has occurred mainly because US stocks have fallen more than global stocks, which have “caught up” to mounting US and global growth fears. Investors should wait for durable signs of an improving global growth outlook and a falling US dollar before shifting in favor of a global ex-US equity stance. Within a fixed-income portfolio, long-duration positions are reasonable on a 0-3 month time horizon given that 10-year Treasurys are significantly oversold. But over a 6-12 month time horizon, we continue to recommend a modestly short stance. A slower but steady path of tightening, in conjunction with easing inflation, makes it more likely that the US economy will be able to “digest” the recent adjustment in rates without tipping into recession. This should ultimately push long-maturity yields higher rather than lower. Our composite technical indicator for commodity prices continues to highlight that commodities are overbought. Still, the geopolitical situation continues to favor higher energy prices, as a seemingly imminent European oil embargo against Russia will likely lower Russian oil production. Additional fiscal & monetary support in China is likely to cause a renewed rally in industrial metals, although they may fall in the nearer-term as COVID-19 cases continue to spread across China. We remain structurally bullish on industrial metals prices given that Russia’s aggression has sped up Europe’s decarbonization timeline. US and global LEIs remain in positive territory but have now rolled over significantly from very elevated levels. Our global LEI diffusion index is now rising, which may herald a stabilization in our global LEI. Manufacturing PMIs are falling in the US and globally, but have not yet fallen below the boom/bust line and are far from levels normally consistent with a recession. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4US Stock Market Breadth Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Gabriel Di Lullo Research Associate Footnotes 1 Cai, J. . et al., Modeling Transmission Of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron in China, Nature Medicine. May 10, 2022. 2 This is aside from the contribution to growth from imports, which mechanically subtract from consumption and investment when calculating GDP.
Executive Summary Credit Demand Collapsed Business activity data from April showed a broad-based contraction in China’s economy. Credit growth tumbled as demand collapsed. Bank loan expansion slowed by the most in nearly five years and annual change in new household loans declined to an all-time low. Exports decelerated sharply in April. China’s export sector faces headwinds from Omicron-related supply chain disruptions and weakening global demand for goods. Export growth will rebound following the resumption of business activity in China’s major cities, but is set to decelerate from 2021 as external demand for goods weakens. The PBOC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate (LPR) by 15bps last Friday, following a cut in the floor rate of first-home mortgages to 20bp below the benchmark. These moves will help to arrest the ongoing deep contraction in the property market. However, these policies alone will not generate strong recovery in housing demand, amid near-term Covid-related disruptions and dampened household income growth. Barring major lockdowns, China’s economy will likely bottom around mid-2022. We expect a muted recovery in the second half of the year, despite an acceleration in policy easing. From a cyclical perspective, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to Chinese onshore stocks in a global portfolio. Bottom Line: China’s economy has been hit by a relapse in demand and Covid-induced production disruptions. The economy will likely bottom by mid-year, but the ensuing recovery may be subdued. A Subdued Recovery In 2H 2022 A broad-based contraction in China’s economy in April reflects hit by a combination of slumping domestic demand and Covid-related disruptions. Growth in retail sales and industrial production contracted from a year ago and home sales shrunk further. Economic activity will rebound when the current Covid wave is under control and lockdown restrictions are lifted. However, we expect a much more muted recovery in the second half of this year compared with two years ago when China’s economy staged an impressive V-shaped recovery as it emerged from the first wave of lockdowns in spring 2020. Presently, reported virus cases have steadily declined in cities in the Yangtze River region, including Shanghai which aims to lift its lockdown on June 1st. The number of regions and cities under stringent confinement also fell. However, China firmly maintains its dynamic zero-Covid policy, which means tight mobility restrictions and some forms of lockdowns will occur across the country on a rolling basis going forward. China’s leadership has stepped up its pro-growth policy measures, such as a 15bps cut in the 5-year LPR last week. Given the pace of credit expansion collapsed in April and private-sector sentiment remains in the doldrums, a recovery will not be imminent or strong despite this rate cut (Chart 1). In the near term, the poor economic outlook in China, coupled with jitters in the global equity market, will continue to depress the performance of Chinese stocks in absolute terms (Chart 1, bottom panel). From a cyclical perspective, we maintain our neutral view on China’s onshore stocks and underweight view on China’s investable stocks within a global equity portfolio. China’s economy is set to underwhelm investor expectations and stock prices probably are unlikely to outperform their global counterparts (Chart 2). Chart 1Weak Economic Fundamentals Undermine Stock Performance Chart 2Too Early To Upgrade Chinese Stocks In A Global Portfolio Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Credit Growth Slowed Notably As Loan Demand Slumps Credit expansion in April relapsed, as lockdowns exacerbated the weakness in business activity and further depressed the demand for credit. Bank loan growth plummeted to its worst level in almost five years (Chart 3). Notably, annual change in new household loans origination contracted the most since data collection began because Covid lockdowns and the property market slump sapped consumers’ willingness to borrow (Chart 4). In addition, household propensity to spend declined to an all-time low, highlighting that bleak sentiment will continue to curb demand for loans (Chart 4, bottom panel). Moreover, a rapid deceleration in corporate medium-and long-term loans versus soaring short-term bill financing indicates corporates’ weak demand for credit and investment (Chart 5). The deterioration in corporate sentiment is also reflected in business condition surveys (Chart 6). Chart 3Subdued TSF Growth Due To Collapsed Loan Demand Chart 4Annual Change In New Household Loans Contracted The Most In April Chart 5Corporate Demand For Credit Remains in The Doldrums … Chart 6... And Unlikely To Turn Around Soon Despite Accommodative Monetary Conditions Chart 7Early Signs Of Authorities Loosening Their Grip On Shadow Banking Local government bond issuance unexpectedly moderated in April after most of the front-loaded local government special purpose bonds (SPBs) was issued in Q1. In the January-April period this year, the amount of SPBs issuance was RMB 1.41 trillion. The SPBs quota for 2022 is 3.65 trillion, along with 1.1 trillion of SPB proceeds that can be carried over from last year. Given that most of the planned SPBs will be issued by the end of June, we will likely see a peak in SPB issuance in Q2.This entails about RMB 3 trillion of SPBs will be issued in May-June. The intensified SPB issuance will underpin total social financing (TSF) growth in the next two to three months. However, barring an increase in the SPB quota or an approval to issue Special Treasury bonds as occurred in 2H 2020, the support from government bonds issuance to TSF will likely decline sharply in the second half of this year. Notably, there has been stabilization in shadow bank financing growth, although it remains below zero (Chart 7). It may be an early sign that China’s leadership is allowing some shadow banking activity; a meaningful relaxation of local governments’ shadow banking activity would be positive for infrastructure investment. Exports: Weaker Than Last Year China’s exports growth softened sharply in April, led by an extensive reduction in shipments to major developed markets (Chart 8). In addition, exports by product group also indicate a wide ranging slowdown in both exports of lower-end consumer goods and tech products (Chart 9). The softness in China’s exports reflects Omicron-related supply chain and logistical disruptions along with a weakening external demand for goods. Chart 8China's Exports To Developed Markets Fell Chart 9A Broad-Based Decline Among Categories of Exported Goods Chart 10Weakening Global Demand For Goods South Korean exports, a bellwether for global trade, have also been easing in line with Chinese exports, which indicates dwindling global demand for manufacturing goods (Chart 10). In addition, the sharp underperformance of global cyclical stocks versus defensives heralds a worldwide manufacturing downturn (Chart 11). Falling US demand for consumer goods corroborates diminishing external demand (Chart 12). China’s exports will likely rebound from its April levels when manufacturing production resumes in Shanghai and supply-chain interruptions subside in the Yangtze River Delta region. Nonetheless, we expect a contraction in exports this year, as global consumer demand for goods dwindles. Chart 11Global Manufacturing Sector Is Heading Into A Downturn Chart 12External Demand For Chinese Export Goods Is Dwindling Recovery In China’s Manufacturing Sector Will Be Muted In 2H 2022 Manufacturing production growth contracted in April at the fastest rate since data collection began. The contraction was due to Covid-induced production troubles and weak demand (Chart 13). Chart 13Manufacturing Output Growth Contracted The Most Since Data Reporting Began Chart 14Mounting Product Inventory Chart 15Chinese Manufacturing Output And Capacity Utilization Face Headwinds From Weakening Exports The inventory of finished products soared to the highest point in the past 10 years due to port closures and domestic logistical issues (Chart 14). Even when the impact of the current Covid wave wanes in the second half of this year, destocking pressures will dampen manufacturing production. In addition, Chinese manufacturing output and capacity utilization face headwinds from decelerating exports (Chart 15). While upstream industries, such as the mining, resources and materials sectors, benefit from strong pricing trends, profit margins for middle-to-downstream manufacturers remain very subdued (Chart 16). The large gap between prices for producer goods and consumer goods is a reflection of the inability of manufacturers to pass on higher input costs to consumers (Chart 17). Elevated input cost pressures and, hence, disappointing corporate profits, will continue to curb manufacturing investments and production in 2H 2022. Chart 16Manufacturing Sector's Profit Margins Are Further Squeezed Chart 17Manufacturers Are Under Rising Cost Pressures Housing Market Outlook Remains Gloomy The PBOC lowered the 5-year LPR by 15bps from 4.6% to 4.45% on May 20, the largest LPR rate cut since 2019. The easing measure followed a reduction in first-home mortgages to 20bps below the benchmark announced on May 15. The national-level mortgage rate floor and benchmark rate drops are clear signals that policymakers are ramping up policy easing measures in the property sector, given the failure of previous efforts to revive housing demand. Historically, mortgage rates tend to lead household loans and home sales by two quarters, suggesting that the housing market may see some improvement by year-end (Chart 18). However, as we pointed out in previous reports, without large-scale and direct fiscal transfers to consumers to boost household income, these housing measures will unlikely generate a strong rebound in household sentiment and home purchases (Chart 19). Chart 18Mortgage Rates Tend To Lead Consumer Loans And Home Sales By Two Quarters Chart 19Housing Market Sentiment Shows Little Signs Of Revival Lockdowns in April exacerbated the slump in all housing market indicators, with the exception of a moderate improvement in floor space completed (Chart 20). Home prices, which tend to lead housing starts, decelerated even more in April following seven consecutive month-to-month declines. Moreover, our housing price diffusion index suggests that home prices on a year-on-year basis will contract in the next six to nine months, a further drop from the current 0.7% growth (Chart 21, top panel). Falling home prices will curb housing starts and construction activity (Chart 21, bottom panel). In addition, real estate developers’ financing conditions have not improved because the “three red lines” policy is still in place and home sales have collapsed (Chart 22). Chart 20A Further Deterioration In Housing Market Indicators In April Chart 21Housing Prices Are Set To Contract In 2H 2022 Chart 22Slumping Home Sales Exacerbate Real Estate Developers’ Funding Woes A Collapse In Household Consumption Due To Covid Confinement Measures City lockdowns have taken a heavy toll on China’s household consumption. Both retail sales and service sector business activity experienced their deepest contractions since March 2020 (Chart 23). Notably, the growth of online goods sales slipped under zero in April, below that recorded in early 2000 and the first contraction since data collection began. Furthermore, both core and service consumer prices (CPI) weakened again in April, reflecting lackluster consumer demand (Chart 24). Chart 23Chinese Retail Sales Contracted The Most Since March 2020 Chart 24Weak Core And Service CPIs Also Reflect Lackluster Household Demand Labor market dynamics went downhill rapidly. The nationwide urban unemployment rate rose to its highest level since mid-2020, while the unemployment rate among younger workers climbed to an all-time high (Chart 25). Meanwhile, sharply slowing wage growth since mid-2021 has contributed to a deceleration of household income (Chart 26). The gloomy sentiment on future income also impedes a household’s willingness to consume (Chart 27). Chart 25Labor Market Situation Is Dramatically Worse Chart 26Household Income Growth Has Been Falling All in all, China’s household consumption will be hindered not only by renewed threats from flareups in domestic COVID-19 cases, but also by a worsening labor market situation and depressed household sentiment in the medium term. Chart 27Poor Sentiment On Funture Income Contributes To Consumers' Unwillingness To Spend Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations