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Highlights Controversial gaffes aside, President Trump has started 2018 by moving to the middle; This comes at a time when animal spirits are reawakening thanks to tax cuts; And the path of least resistance for fiscal policy points towards more profligacy; Meanwhile, Chinese growth is imperiled by structural reform efforts; With money growth and import data showing signs of stress; The combination of upside growth risks in the U.S. and downside growth risks in the rest of the world should revive the U.S. dollar and threaten EM performance in 2018. Feature In just the first two weeks of 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump has: Hosted a meeting on immigration policy with Republican and Democratic leaders during which he said that the upcoming legislation should be a "bill of love," while encouraging congressional leaders to think big and pursue comprehensive immigration reform; Claimed that he has a "very good relationship" with Kim Jong-Un, while refusing to deny that he has already spoken privately with the North Korean leader; Supported bringing back "earmarks" in order to grease the wheels of bipartisanship in Congress - i.e., new spending that allocates funds to specific projects; Extended sanction relief to Iran, albeit with the caveat that it would be the last time he does so without demanding modifications to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal); Broken with his former chief political strategist Steve Bannon - dubbing him "Sloppy Steve" in the process - while disparaging Bannon's penchant for scorched-earth tactics.1 On the whole, Trump's actions in January suggest a move towards the political center. Meanwhile, the media and political opponents continue to dwell on Trump's alleged comments where he disparaged immigrants from certain countries, obscuring the subtle shift in political strategy. What would be the reason for a Trump shift to the middle? As we wrote last week, the Pocketbook Voter Theory in political science suggests that Trump's Republican Party should be benefiting from a surge in popular support amid strong economic data and record-setting market performance.2 However, the 2018 generic congressional ballot still points to a very challenging midterm election for the Republican Party (Chart 1). Trump has two choices. First, he can ignore the poor GOP polling, as well as his own (Chart 2) in the face of stellar economic performance, and plow into an electoral disaster. This would make him the earliest "lame duck" president in recent U.S. history. As we wrote in December, this choice is a serious market risk for investors.3 Lame duck presidents have often sought relevancy abroad, given the lack of constitutional constraints to executive action in the foreign policy realm. In the case of Trump, we could think of three avenues by which he might increase geopolitical risk premiums: Protectionist policies towards China, the abrogation of NAFTA, or military tensions with Iran. Chart 1History Favors The Opposition Chart 2Trump Is Extraordinarily Unpopular The second option for President Trump is to move to the middle ahead of the midterms. This would be unexpected in every way other than that Trump is the master of the unexpected. We happen to agree with his supporters that he is a political genius. Unless, that is, he continues to waste an extraordinary bull market, strong economy, and soaring consumer/business confidence by refusing to woo the median voter. What would a shift towards the center mean for the equity market? First, the already low probability that domestic political intrigue will upend the ongoing rally would get even lower in a world where Trump moves to the center. Second, the risk of market-moving geopolitical risks prompted by White House policy would decline as Trump would presumably seek and follow the advice of his establishment advisers. In other words, it would be pure nectar for the already buoyant markets. This is not to say that there would not still be reason for a pullback in U.S. equities. The bull-bear ratio is dangerously high (Chart 3), and consumer confidence is ominously stretched (Chart 4). Chart 3Investor Bullishness Is At Record High... Chart 4...And So Is Consumer Confidence U.S.: Business Owners Are Republican While some of our clients in the financial community may fret about Trump's unorthodoxy, our clients in the corporate world clearly do not. This is not merely an offhand observation, it is an empirical fact (Chart 5). America's business leaders have given President Trump the benefit of the doubt since he was elected. Bill Dunkelberg, the Chief Economist of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), which publishes the Small Business Optimism survey, went on to comment this month: "we've been doing this research for nearly half a century ... and I've never seen anything like 2017 ... The 2016 election was like a dam breaking."4 It is dangerous, therefore, to be overly mathematical about U.S. growth prospects in 2017. While we agree with our colleague Peter Berezin that, on face value, the strict growth impact of the tax cuts may merely add 0.3% of GDP growth in 2018, the qualitative impact of unleashing animal spirits is incalculable.5 The risk to growth in the U.S. is therefore very much tilted to the upside. First, as we discussed in a Special Report published with our U.S. Equity Strategy colleague Chris Bowes, a crucial, yet under-reported change in the corporate tax bill allows the immediate expensing of capital investment.6 Most market observers have overlooked this part of the legislation as it is simply a shift in the "time value of money." The IRS already allows significantly accelerated depreciation of capex; this reform merely brings it forward. Our analysis, however, suggests that the impact of bringing it forward could, at the margin, change spending behavior for firms and drive the next upleg in capex. This comes at a time when the prospects for business investment are already positive (Chart 6).7 Chart 5Business Owners Are Depressed When##br## Democrats Control The White House Chart 6Animal Spirits Will ##br##Spur CAPEX Second, investors are underestimating the probability that the current budget impasse - which could lead to a government shutdown in late January - gets resolved through more, not less, federal spending. Trump surprised legislators during a meeting on immigration when he offered his support for "earmarks" - i.e., legislative tags that direct funding to special interests in representatives' home districts. Earmarks were done away with in 2011 by the GOP following the Tea Party-inspired 2010 midterm victory, but they have crept back into the discussion through different guises (Chart 7). Chart 7Pork-Barrel Prohibition Is Ending The timing of Trump's statement on earmarks is interesting as the House Rules Committee is holding public hearings on the originally GOP-instituted earmark ban. In fact, the 115th Congress (the current one) almost reinstated earmarks at the beginning of 2017, only to be held back by House Speaker Paul Ryan and the newly elected White House. In January 2017, Ryan and the White House agreed that it would be unseemly to approve "pork barreling" so quickly after the election of a man who promised to "drain the swamp." Apparently, a year later, the appropriate amount of time has passed to make the move okay! What about the fears that the budget deficit is unsustainable? Investors may be fretting about a problem that does not exist (at least not yet). Chart 8 shows that budget deficits have decreased in almost every case ahead of a recession by 1.16% on average in the eight quarters before a downturn. This is because revenues are very important in determining deficit dynamics. Only just before the recession hits, as growth slows, does the deficit start to flatline or expand. If the risk to the U.S. economy is to the upside, as we believe it is, then deficits will come down regardless of tax or spending policy. Chart 8The Deficit Is Not A Problem... Yet Fiscal policy rhetoric may alone be far more important to the equity, bond, and currency markets than the market is currently pricing. Talk of draconian spending cuts - remember the May 2017 White House budget? Anyone? - could very quickly be replaced with an appropriation bill in late January that combines higher defense spending with higher discretionary spending. Given the current low levels of discretionary spending (Chart 9), the move towards greater spending could be sizeable and surprising. And if earmarks make a comeback, look out! Chart 9Government Spending Is Bottoming Chart 10Global Economy Is Firing On All Cylinders This fiscal fuel is coming when the fire of the U.S. economy is already well lit. Yes, global growth is strong (Chart 10), but U.S. growth is likely to beat it in 2018 (Chart 11). The global and U.S. economy may diverge just as the BCA's two-factor 10-year Treasury yield model is showing that U.S. long-dated bonds are expensive (Chart 12), while dollar bearishness is overcrowded (Chart 13). Chart 11U.S. May Outperform Global Growth Chart 12More Room For Yields To Rise Chart 13The Dollar Will Be Great Again Bottom Line: Tax cuts will unleash animal spirits in the U.S. in 2018. Meanwhile, the political path of least resistance on fiscal policy is towards profligacy. Fade any talk of austerity or entitlement reform, earmarks are back! A combination of easy fiscal policy and tax cuts should be good for equity markets, bad for Treasuries, and good for the greenback in 2018. Technical indicators flag some near-term risks to the dollar, but over the course of the year, our assessment is that it will hold at current levels or rally. China: Reform Reboot Is Growth-Constraining Unlike the U.S. economy, where risks lie to the upside, China is our top candidate for growth disappointments in 2018. Premier Li Keqiang has announced that China's GDP grew by 6.9% in 2017, slightly above expectations at the beginning of the year. However, growth momentum is already slowing due to cyclical factors, the waning of fiscal and credit stimulus, and the government's financial tightening measures that were implemented over the past year (Chart 14). Chinese imports are what really matter from a global macro perspective, and the latest import data suggest that the domestic economy is slowing more abruptly than expected. Import growth fell sharply to 5% year-on-year in December and 0.46% month-on-month. Import volume growth fell from 27.1% in early 2017 to 9.3% in December (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Economy: Weakness Ahead Chart 15What Happens In China, Does Not Stay In China Policy changes are highly likely to add to this slowdown. There can no longer be much doubt about the reformist turn in government policy that we highlighted last year.8 All of the policy announcements that came out of the nineteenth National Party Congress in October so far have had a reformist bent. The market agrees, as the sectors of the equity market most likely to benefit from reforms - health care, IT, energy and consumer staples - have outperformed the broad market significantly since President Xi's five-year policy speech on October 18, 2017 (Chart 16). Two separate news items that caused market jitters over the past week reflect the reformist turn. First came unconfirmed rumors that China would make its exchange rate more flexible by abandoning a "counter-cyclical factor" in its daily fixing rate; second came a "fake news" report that China planned to diversify its foreign exchange reserves away from U.S. Treasuries (Chart 17). The rumors were not significant in themselves, at least not without more information, but they were significant in suggesting that debates on major macro policies are intensifying.9 The question is how much resolve will China's central government have in executing its renewed reform agenda? President Xi obviously does not want to self-impose a recession, yet meaningful reform will constrain credit, investment, and growth. For instance, the current financial regulatory crackdown has caused a precipitous drop in the growth of wealth management products (WMPs), which are investment products that make up about 60% of the burgeoning non-bank credit flows; non-bank credit, for its part, makes up 28% of total credit (total social financing). And regulators have gone on to tackle entrusted loans, corporate bonds, and other innovative financial products as well (Chart 18). The impact could be material over the course of this year. Chart 16Markets Believe In China Reforms Chart 17Chinese Treasury Reserves Can Be Weaponized Chart 18China's Dodd-Frank Moment We strongly urge clients to fade the narrative that China is already "easing up" on reforms. In the three months since China's party congress we have seen a handful of false media narratives about how the government is backtracking on its policy agenda. For instance, both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times declared that the outcome of the major annual economic policymaking meeting - the Central Economic Work Conference - included a turn away from deleveraging. This was not only a misreading of the high-level policy priorities but also a mistranslation of the Economic Work Conference documents, which argued that deleveraging remains a key policy focus.10 It would be humiliating for President Xi - who, not incidentally, has achieved Mao-like authority within the Communist Party - to backtrack on his second-term economic agenda before he has even officially been elected to his second term. Xi will be re-elected in March and he is looking at 2020-21 deadlines for progress on key reforms according to the thirteenth Five Year Plan (2015-20) and his own three-year plan to fight the "Three Battles" of systemic financial risk, poverty, and pollution. The only way to meet these deadlines while ensuring that the country is strong and stable for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021 is to frontload the reform push in 2018-19.11 In Table 1 we update our "Reform Reboot Checklist" to reflect the reality that the Central Economic Work Conference produced a strikingly reform-oriented outcome. This is significant because it was billed as the first major statement of economic policy under "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era." Table 1How Do We Know China Is Reforming? The money growth (M2) target for 2018, for instance, is rumored to be the lowest in China's history after that meeting (supposedly it will be 9%, down from the low- to mid-teens seen in previous years). Now all we need to confirm that serious reforms are afoot is slower bank loan growth (which will likely be tipped in January numbers due in early February), or substantially tighter interbank rates, plus the announcement of significant reform initiatives at the annual "Two Sessions" in early March. It is very common in China for central government decrees to be too draconian initially and then to be modified after an outcry from industry. This year, however, we would advise clients to avoid confusing the inevitable back-and-forth between the central and local governments for a lack of resolve from the central government.12 China's bark will have bite this time around because the political and macroeconomic constraints to the core leadership are lower than they have been at any point in the past ten years. Table 2 shows the issues that we are watching to gauge the reform process and its impact on growth. In light of the above initiatives, we give a 30% subjective probability that China's policymakers will overtighten this year, which could lead to a global risk-off move in financial assets. Table 2China Is Rebooting Economic Reforms Even in our baseline case - China slows abruptly but remains stable - we believe financial markets have yet to understand the shift in Chinese policymaker thinking, which means that China is the prime candidate for negative surprises in a year in which markets are priced for perfection. Chart 19China's Trade Surplus Is A Geopolitical Risk Finally, China is still a major geopolitical risk this year. It scored the largest trade surplus ever with the U.S. in 2017 (Chart 19) and several key U.S. trade rulings are looming that could trigger a tit-for-tat conflict. This was, of course, the real reason behind the rumors about halting U.S. Treasury purchases. We will discuss the trade and geopolitical tensions in a forthcoming report. Bottom Line: China's reform reboot is gaining steam. It will threaten to constrain growth via the anti-corruption campaign, financial and regulatory tightening, corporate and industrial restructuring, and local government scrutiny. In combination with a stronger U.S. economy, China's downward-sloping business cycle and reform-capable political cycle spell disappointments for global markets this year. Investment Implications A faster growing U.S. economy and a slower growing China is beneficial for DM versus EM, the USD versus the RMB and other EM and commodity-linked currencies, U.S. stocks relative to DM stocks (because China's slower growth will weigh on Japanese and European earnings), and Chinese stocks relative to EM. It is bearish for China/EM corporate bonds. It will have varying impacts on commodity prices, depending on the role of Chinese supply-side reforms, but in the long term - as overcapacity cuts are priced in - it should be marginally bearish base metals as a result of China's desired switch of the growth model to a less investment-intensive model.13 Could stronger U.S. growth compensate for slower Chinese growth? We doubt it very much. China is alone expected to make up a third of all global economic growth in 2018, with China-leveraged EM making up the other 45%, according to the latest IMF World Economic Outlook (Chart 20). It is unfathomable to see how the U.S., which is expected to contribute just 10% of all growth, can compensate for slower growth in developing nations. Even if U.S. growth massively surprised to the upside, the U.S. economy is far too domestically driven to make a genuine difference through higher imports. Chart 20Chinese Growth Outweighs U.S. Globally As for the U.S. economy and markets, a global slowdown may be precisely what the doctor ordered. With stretched valuations, a foreign-induced correction may be healthy from a valuation perspective while having no impact on domestic economic fundamentals. Meanwhile, a dollar rally combined with some market volatility later in the year may be enough to give the Fed just enough pause to slow down the pace of hikes. Technical indicators are flagging some near-term risks to the dollar, but over the course of the year our assessment is that it will hold at current levels or rally. While this is not our base case, it would be the type of event that could prolong the current economic cycle. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jim Mylonas, Vice President Client Advisory & BCA Academy jim@bcaresearch.com 1 In his official statement on the break with Mr. Bannon, President Trump concluded with an important paragraph: "We have many great Republican members of Congress and candidates who are very supportive of the Make America Great Again agenda. Like me, they love the United States of America and are helping to finally take our country back and build it up, rather than simply seeking to burn it all down." The statement was important as it aligned President Trump firmly with Congressional Republicans in their opposition to the Bannon/Breitbart Clique. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The American Pocketbook Voter," dated January 10, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see NFIB, "December 2017 Report: Small Business Optimism Index," dated December 12, 2017, available at www.nfib.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook," dated January 5, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here - Equity Sector Implications," dated December 11, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 The biggest pushback against our view comes from the oft-repeated anecdote of a meeting between Gary Cohn, the Director of the National Economic Council, and American business leaders. Apparently, when Cohn asked the attendees how many would invest if their corporate taxes were cut, only one executive raised their hand. We have now heard this anecdote repeated to us so many times by clients that it has become clear that it is essentially the only evidence that U.S. corporations have no intention of increasing capex. Needless to say, we do not base our analysis on a single anecdote! 8 For this theme, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "China Down, India Up?" dated March 15, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 The change to the RMB fixing method is not confirmed, while the rumor of a change in the forex reserve portfolio management came from an unreliable media report that was denied by China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). China's purchases of U.S. Treasuries peaked in 2011; China would harm itself if it sold its Treasuries rapidly. However, it may want to highlight this threat in response to U.S. President Donald Trump's threats of broad tariffs on Chinese imports. 10 The official communique from the 2017 Central Economic Work Conference did not specifically use the term "deleveraging," as in the 2015 and 2016 statements. This omission triggered U.S. news reports claiming that Beijing was backing off its deleveraging goal. However, the 2017 communique clearly emphasized preventing financial risk, including the first of the administration's "three battles" for the next three years. It also indirectly referred to "deleveraging" by citing the "Three De's, One Lower, and One Make Up," which is shorthand for the policy phrase "De-capacity, de-stocking, deleveraging, lowering costs and making up for weaknesses," which has been a fixture in rhetoric on China's supply-side reforms. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 For instance, the central government is facing pushback on new asset management regulations that are set to be fully in force by June 2019. While there may be some compromise, we do not expect the regulations themselves to be watered down too much. 13 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Environmental Reforms Drive Steel & Iron Ore," dated January 11, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in U.S. bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & U.S. Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Feature Chart of the WeekHigher Yields, Driven By Inflation There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart of the Week). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016, its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal U.S. 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's U.S. CPI report provided further evidence that U.S. core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning##BR##For Oil And Bonds Chart 5Net Speculative Positions &##BR##10-Year Treasury Yield (2010 - Present) Chart 6Net Speculative Positions &##BR##WTI Oil Price (2010 - Present) Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And U.S. Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields. The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection. Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When##BR##Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to ease policy is constrained while its ability to tighten is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation: Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation & Commodities Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year. Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal U.S. bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Too Soon To Expect A Hike Chart 11Australia: A Solid Rebound In Growth... Over the last quarter much of the economic data from Australia have improved. Real GDP growth rebounded sharply to 2.8% YoY in Q3 from 1.9% the previous quarter (Chart 11). Iron ore prices have been rising since mid-October. Employment growth is robust and the unemployment rate is well below its estimated natural level. This begs the question - with so much going right is it time for the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to lift rates? Our answer is an emphatic "no." First, most data improvements have been relatively minor and the overall economic picture remains mixed. As we mentioned in our recent Special Report,2 the RBA is stuck between conflicting forces. Booming house prices and rising household indebtedness on the one hand, and an economy still working off excess capacity on the other. Nevertheless, our expectation is that the RBA will allow the economy to recover further for the following reasons: Consumer health is fragile. Policymakers left cash rates unchanged at the last monetary policy meeting in December, and Governor Philip Lowe expressed concerns about household consumption. Consumption is a significant driver of economic growth and the combination of declining savings, elevated debt levels and weak income growth is worrisome (Chart 12). Since then, real income growth has dipped back into positive territory, but only barely so. Meanwhile, house prices are still surging, despite macro-prudential measures aimed at tightening lending standards, thereby supporting consumer spending through the wealth effect. Given an extreme household debt to income ratio, consumption would be very vulnerable if the RBA were to curb house price gains by raising rates. Labors markets have plenty of slack. The unemployment rate has fallen to a four year low and other labor market statistics show a broad-based improvement over the last quarter. However, the unemployment rate is still significantly higher than it was in the previous cycle and other improvements in the labor market have also occurred from extremely weak levels. In 2017Q1, the underemployment rate and part-time workers as a percentage of total workers both reached all-time highs. Those numbers have dipped slightly in Q3, with underemployment falling to 8.3% and part-time workers as a percentage of total declining to 31.7%, but those elevated levels suggest there still needs to be significant improvement before spare capacity is worked off and real wage growth starts to move higher (Chart 13). Chart 12...But Consumers Can't Afford A Rate Hike Chart 13Still Plenty Of Slack In Australian Labor Markets Inflation is still too low. Headline and core inflation readings came in at 1.8% and 1.9% respectively in Q3 (Chart 14). While headline slowed, core inflation recovered over the last quarter. Tradeable goods inflation collapsed into negative territory at -0.9%, as a result of currency strength and increased competition among retailers. Going forward, we expect consumer price growth to be muted given the lack of inflationary pressures. The output gap is wide, despite rebounding growth, and the IMF forecasts that it will be years before the Australian economy reaches capacity. The trade-weighted Aussie dollar index has risen almost 5% since it bottomed in early December, while the AUD/USD has broken above its 40-week moving average. Continued currency strength would exert even further deflationary pressure. As stated above, the labor market also requires significant improvement to work off excess capacity. All of these factors caused the RBA to dial back its inflation forecast in the November statement. It now expects that inflation will remain quite flat for the next two years, only touching the lower-end of its 2%-3% target range at the end of 2019. Consequently, inflation will not be forcing the RBA's hand in the foreseeable future. One of our key themes for 2018 is that global growth will be less synchronized. Central banks will therefore employ diverging monetary policies, presenting cross-country bond market investment opportunities. As such, we recently shifted to a slight overweight position in Australian debt within our model portfolio, arguing that it would outperform global government bond benchmarks during a year expected to be driven by Fed tightening and ECB/BoJ tapering concerns. Historically, relative yield moves have closely tracked relative shifts in monetary policy (Chart 15). In the U.S., above-trend growth, a tight labor market and the continued recovery in inflation will force the Fed to become more aggressive. If the RBA stays inactive as we expect, then this gap should continue to move in favor of Australian debt. Additionally, there is still a modest yield pickup in Australian debt relative to the global index and as we expect global bond yields to rise, low-beta Australian government bonds should offer considerable protection. Chart 14Australia: Lacking Inflationary Pressures Chart 15Australian Relative Yields Track Relative Policy This also leads us to continue holding our tactical Long Dec 2018 Australian Bank Bill futures trade from last October. We initially entered into this trade as a more focused way of expressing that the RBA will stay on hold. The trade is currently 6 bps in the money and with markets still pricing about 30 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, there is plenty of room for further profit as market expectations are revised down. Bottom Line: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place", dated July 25, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of yields. Fed: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Feature There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart 1). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016 its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). Chart 1Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's CPI report provided further evidence that core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 5Net Speculative Positions & 10-Year Treasury Yield Chart 6Net Speculative Positions & WTI Oil Price Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When ##br##Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to cut rates is constrained by the zero-bound while its ability to lift rates is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation And Commodities Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year (see section titled "The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change" below). Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of bond yields. The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change? As was alluded to in the prior section, the biggest potential change for bond markets in 2018 would be if the Fed changed its monetary policy framework to one that tolerated higher levels of inflation. For example, let's imagine that the Fed suddenly lifted its inflation target from 2% to 3%. This would likewise shift the upper-bound range for long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to approximately 3.4% to 3.5%. It would mean that nominal bond yields have further upside over the course of the cycle, and also that oil and commodity prices would play an important role in bond markets for much longer. It would also lengthen the period where spread product can outperform Treasuries since the Fed would not be so quick to choke off the recovery. We still think it is unlikely that such a change will be implemented this year, but recent weeks have seen a marked increase in the number of Fed policymakers either advocating for a different policy framework or saying that the Fed should start researching alternative frameworks. What's crucial to remember is that the reason policymakers are unsatisfied with the current 2% inflation target is that it brings the zero-lower bound on interest rates into play too often. So any potential change in policy framework would be to one that tolerates higher inflation rates. Bernanke's Idea Chart 11The Implications Of A Price Level Target One potential new policy approach was put forward by ex-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke in a recent blog post.2 Bernanke made the case for "Temporary Price Level Targeting", a policy where the Fed continues to use a 2% inflation target when the fed funds rate is sufficiently far from zero, but then switches to a price-level target when the fed funds rate is close to the zero bound. In his own words, the strategy would be communicated as follows: The Committee therefore agrees that, in future situations in which the funds rate is at or near zero, a necessary condition for raising the funds rate will be that average inflation since the date at which the federal funds rate first hit zero be at least 2 percent. Chart 11 provides an illustration of this example. Under the current framework the Fed targets 2% PCE inflation and forecasts that it will achieve this target sometime in 2019. In Bernanke's proposed framework the Fed would not target 2% inflation, but rather a price level that is consistent with 2% trend growth in prices since the zero-lower bound was hit in December 2008. In order to achieve this goal by the end of 2019 the Fed would need to tolerate a significant overshoot of inflation during the next two years (bottom panel). Who's On Board? The Appendix to this report is a list of all Fed Governors and Regional Fed Presidents. It also shows our own assessment of each committee member's policy bias. We noted from the most recent Summary of Economic Projections that 6 FOMC participants expect three rate hikes in 2018, 6 expect fewer than three rate hikes and 4 expect more than three hikes. From recent speeches we attempted to discern which member owns which forecast and then we attributed a "dovish" policy bias to those with a forecast for fewer than three hikes, a "neutral" bias to those expecting three hikes, and a "hawkish" bias to those expecting more than three hikes. We also show which FOMC participants are voters in 2018, although we do not think that distinction carries much practical importance. The Committee tends to arrive at decisions by consensus anyways, and all participants voice their opinions at every meeting whether or not it is their turn to vote. But it is the "notes" column of the Appendix that is most striking. There we highlighted all the FOMC participants who have recently made comments regarding the exploration of alternative policy frameworks. A general consensus seems to be forming that alternative frameworks should be studied this year, and a few policymakers (San Francisco Fed President John Williams, in particular) have strongly made the case that the Fed should switch to some sort of price level targeting regime. The Appendix also identifies the biggest source of uncertainty for the Fed this year. Namely that there are four vacant Governor positions that need to be filled. The New York Fed will also need a new President when William Dudley retires later this year. Who is nominated to fill those vacant positions will go a long way toward determining how aggressively the Fed pursues alternative policy frameworks. Bottom Line: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/10/12/temporary-price-level-targeting-an-alternative-framework-for-monetary-policy/ Appendix Table 2Composition Of The FOMC Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
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