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特別レポヌト Highlights We are upgrading our allocation to Indian stocks from neutral to overweight within EM equity portfolios. India's public banks are much further along in their necessary adjustment process, and the credit cycle downturn is much more advanced relative to China's. To capitalize on this theme, we recommend going long Indian banks and shorting Chinese bank stocks. India's public bank recapitalization program will allow them to slowly augment credit origination, assisting the economic recovery. Feature Chart I-1Favor Indian Banks Versus Chinese Ones Our report this week highlights the results from stress tests we conducted on Indian and Chinese public banks, and also compares their respective equity valuations. Based on our findings, we are initiating a new relative equity trade: long Indian / short Chinese bank stocks (Chart I-1). The health of the banking system, the credit cycle outlook as well as the performance of bank share prices hold the key to relative performance of any bourse in the EM universe. Provided our positive bias toward Indian banks relative to their EM peers on all the above parameters, we are upgrading our allocation to India from neutral to overweight within EM equity portfolios. Indian Versus Chinese Public Banks From 2003 to 2012, India went through a large credit binge and capital misallocation cycle in its industrial and infrastructure sectors. During this period, banks' loans to companies and bank assets rose from 12% to 23% and 63% to 85% of GDP, respectively (Chart I-2A). By comparison, Chinese (ex-policy) commercial banks' claims on companies and their total assets have surged from 85% to 110% and from under 180% to 230% of GDP, respectively, since 2009 (Chart I-2B). In both countries, the banking sector remains dominated by public banks that hold more than 50% of banking system assets. Chart I-2ACredit Boom In Perspective: India Chart I-2BCredit Boom In Perspective: China Today, Indian public banks - who were the main lenders to industrial companies during the corporate credit binge in the 2003-12 period - have been experiencing mushrooming bad loans. Total public banks' NPLs and distressed asset ratios have reached 13.5% and 2.7% of total loans, respectively (Chart I-3). By contrast, for all Chinese banks, the current NPL ratio is at a mere 1.7%, while the distressed loan ratio stands at only 3.6% of total loans. Chart I-3NPL Ratios In Perspective: India & China Further, under pressure from the central bank, Indian public banks have been raising provisioning levels for bad assets very aggressively. On the flip side, Chinese regulators have been following tolerant policies toward their own commercial banks. As such, the provisions-to-loans ratio at all public banks now stands at 3% in China, compared with 5.6% in India. In addition, Chinese banks have bought a lot of corporate bonds that are not provisioned for at all. Does this higher NPL ratio in India relative to China mean that credit allocation is much worse in India? Not quite. The thesis that Indian public banks are more poorly managed than Chinese public banks is not accurate. These banks are managed by public sector executives who often allocate credit to support government growth policies. This is why it is reasonable to assume that the quality of credit allocation among Chinese and Indian public banks is probably similar. As such, we presume that Chinese banks' current NPL ratio is severely understated, and has the potential to rise to levels currently being reported by Indian public banks. The basis is that the Chinese credit boom has dramatically exceeded that of India (see Chart I-2A and I-2B on page 2). Typically, the resulting NPL ratio is proportional to the magnitude of the preceding credit frenzy. Finally, India's central government announced a major recapitalization plan in October 2017 to assist the country's public banks in cleaning up their balance sheets and to also support them in expanding credit. It is likely, therefore, that these banks are now approaching the final stages of their balance sheet repair and deleveraging process. Bottom Line: India's public banks are much further along in their necessary adjustment, and their credit cycle downturn is also much more advanced relative to Chinese banks. The latter have been postponing the inevitable balance sheet clean-up process. To capitalize on this theme, we recommend going long Indian banks and shorting Chinese bank stocks. Banking Stress Test For India And China We have conducted stress tests for India's top seven and China's top five listed public banks. We used the following assumptions for the three scenarios we considered: Non-performing risk-weighted assets (NPA) ratios to rise to 14% (pessimistic), 12% (baseline) and 10% (optimistic scenario) of risk-weighted assets for both Indian and Chinese public banks. Risk-weighted assets adjust banks' various types of assets based on their degree of riskiness. In that way, the risk-weighted asset values are comparable between the two banking systems. We assume a 30% recovery rate in all three NPA scenarios for both countries. The recovery rate on Chinese banks' NPAs in the 2001-2005 period was 20% amid a booming economy. The assumed recovery rate of 30% is therefore not low. The outcome of the stress tests is as follows: In the baseline scenario of 12% NPA, the losses post recovery and provisions would amount to 1.3 trillion rupees in India (0.9% of GDP) and RMB 3.4 trillion in China (4.2% of GDP). This would translate into a 33% equity impairment for India's seven public banks, and 48% for China's five public banks (Table I-1 and I-2, column 7). Table I-1Stress Test For Top 7 Indian Public Banks Table I-2Stress Test For Top 5 Chinese Public Banks From a valuation standpoint, the post-impairment price-to-book value (PBV) ratio would jump to 1.44 and 1.62 for Indian- and Chinese-listed public banks, respectively. Assuming a fair PBV ratio of 1.3 - which is the average PBV ratio for all EM banks since 2011 - Indian public banks are 11% overvalued and Chinese ones are about 25% overvalued. In other words, if one were to calculate the true PBV ratio of these banks after a comprehensive "clean-up" has been done, then Indian public bank stocks would be cheaper than Chinese ones. It is important to note that the above valuation exercise does not take into consideration banks' future profits. As such, we account for their recurring profits in the following manner: Table I-3 calculates the ratio of NPA losses to banks' recurring net profits before provisioning. Losses are the amount to be written-off post provisioning and recovery. In the baseline scenario of a 12% of NPA, this ratio is 2.5 for India and 3.4 for China. In other words, it will take 2.5 and 3.4 years of net profits before provisions close the "black hole" of NPA losses (post provisions and recovery) in India and China, respectively. Hence, on this measure as well, India's listed public banks appear more appealing than those in China. Table I-3Profit Coverage Of Loan Losses There is a caveat regarding Chinese banks' stress and their post-impairment book value. Our analysis is performed based on risk-weighted assets, and does not include off-balance-sheet assets. Therefore, any losses from off-balance-sheet assets will make losses for Chinese public banks greater than our analysis captures. Further, the Chinese financial authorities are currently tightening regulations, which will likely curtail banks' off-balance-sheet activities and by extension their profitability. These risks are not present in India, where banks have less off-balance-sheet assets. Bottom Line: Public bank stocks are currently overvalued by about 11% and 25% in absolute terms in both India and China, respectively. This favors Indian bank share prices outperforming their Chinese peers. The fact that the "clean-up" has not yet begun in China reinforces this trade. Banks' Recapitalization In India Saddled with NPLs, Indian public banks have not been willing to lend in recent years. Chart I-4 demonstrates that their loan growth has stalled. Credit to large industrial companies has in particular suffered (Chart I-4, bottom panel), as most of this type of credit is typically extended by public banks. Chart I-4India: Public Bank Loan Growth Has Slumped Consequently, India's capital expenditures have languished in recent years, weighing not only on cyclical growth but also depressing long-term productivity and potential growth. In October, the Indian government announced an estimated 2.11 trillion rupees public bank recapitalization program that will be implemented over the next two years. The program is for all public banks, while the above stress test was performed for only the top seven listed public banks. The latter account for around 60% of all public banks' assets, so we assume they will get around 60% of the stated recapitalization amount. The recapitalization program is designed as follows: The central government plans to inject 180 billion rupees of equity capital into all public banks via budgetary allocations. The public banks will in turn raise 580 billion rupees from the market. The remaining 1,350 billion rupees will come from government-issued Bank Recapitalization Bonds. The government will issue bonds to banks and then use the funds to buy more shares from public banks. It is important to note that in the stress test above and for the calculation of post-impairment PBV ratios, we assume the government will not subsidize existing shareholders when it injects money into public banks. This means the government will provide equity capital to public banks at post-impairment equity value - i.e., at a fair market price. It will be difficult for the Indian government to bail out its public banks without making current shareholders bear losses. If the government bails out public banks' private and foreign shareholders, the opposition parties will use the bank recapitalization program against Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government in the general elections scheduled to be held in 2019. Many investors and commentators assume that India's bank recapitalization program is automatically bullish for bank share prices. While it is positive for banks' ability to lend and drive growth in the medium and long term, the program is not necessarily bullish for share prices, particularly at their current high levels. The same is true for potential recapitalization programs in China. Overall, odds are that current shareholders of public banks will likely shoulder meaningful losses in India and possibly in China as well. How well off will capitalized public banks in India be after implementation of the recapitalization program? In the case of the seven Indian public banks we performed the stress test on, Table I-4 estimates that post-impairment and recovery, the total equity capital-to-risk-weighted assets ratio will be 8% in our baseline scenario. This is lower than the regulatory minimum of 9%. Table I-4Capital Ratios For India's Top 7 Public Banks The recapitalization will bring this equity capital adequacy ratio to 11.3%, which exceeds the regulatory minimum of 9%. Hence, after the program is completed, Indian public banks will likely become well capitalized and will be able to resume their lending and expand their assets. This in turn will facilitate the economic recovery. Bottom Line: The Indian government's recapitalization program is sufficient to raise public banks' capital adequacy ratio above the regulatory minimum. This will allow public banks to resume their lending. India's Cyclical Growth Outlook India's cyclical outlook will be one of muted recovery. Yet it is superior to other EMs, where we expect meaningful deceleration due to a potential slowdown in China and a rollover in commodities prices. Public banks' recap program will be slow in India - to be conducted over the next two years - and banks' ability to boost lending will improve only gradually. Meanwhile, private banks have and will probably continue to concentrate their lending efforts on consumers rather than on industrial companies and infrastructure. In the next 12-18 months, a slow improvement in public banks' ability to originate credit will allow only moderate improvement in capital spending growth. The latter is required to resolve bottlenecks and unleash the nation's productivity potential. Several indicators of capital spending are lukewarm (Chart I-5, top panel). However, new capex project announcements and the number of investment proposals have been dropping (Chart I-5, middle panel). Surprisingly, companies' foreign external borrowing is still contracting, despite booming capital inflows into EM (Chart I-5, bottom panel). On the consumer side, the outlook remains bright. Motorcycle sales have recovered sharply and commercial vehicle sales are beginning to pick up (Chart I-6). Chart I-5India's Capital Spending Is Sluggish Chart I-6Indian Consumer Health Is Strong Consumer/personal loans are accelerating from an already strong growth rate, largely thanks to the aggressiveness of private sector banks (Chart I-6, bottom panel). In turn, the employment outlook is finally beginning to show signs of improvement (Chart I-7). The manufacturing PMI has also risen substantially, and is currently in expansion territory (Chart I-8). Likewise, the service sector PMI has bounced above 50. Chart I-7India's Employment Is Turning The Corner Chart I-8India: PMIs Are Positive Finally, India is less exposed to China's growth and a retracement in commodities prices than many other emerging economies. This makes us upbeat on India's cyclical economic dynamics and relative equity and currency performance versus other EMs. Bottom Line: India's cyclical outlook is better than that of many other EMs. Structural Tailwinds And Impediments India holds huge promise for investors as it is a much-underinvested economy, and potential return on capital is considerably higher in those countries than in relatively overinvested ones. In addition, its population and labor force growth are among the highest in mainstream developing countries. On the other hand, for such potential to be realized, the country needs to be able to boost its productivity. On this count, the outlook is less positive. India's share of global goods and services exports has declined substantially since 2011 (Chart I-9). This should not be surprising, given weak investment spending has led to stagnation in trade competitiveness. Chart I-10 reveals that based on the UNCTAD1 dataset, India has been losing market share in both low- and high-skilled labor sectors export markets worldwide. Chart I-9India's Share In Global Trade Chart I-10India Has Been Losing Export Market Share While certain reforms such as the introduction of a sales tax will have a positive impact on the economy, other much-needed changes, such as land and labor market reforms, have so far remained unattainable. Moreover, the agriculture sector still faces material challenges. Without these vital reforms, it will be difficult to boost efficiency and productivity and build global competitiveness. Finally, in terms of education enrollment, India lags other EMs, especially China, in tertiary education (Chart I-11). This makes it even more difficult to boost productivity and growth potential. Bottom Line: India has great secular potential, but the structural advance has stalled since 2011. The jury is still out on whether it can implement additional reforms to realize this potential. Investment Conclusions India's banking sector outlook is brighter, and the deleveraging cycle is much more advanced, compared with many other EMs in general and China in particular. Therefore, we recommend a new relative equity trade: long Indian banks / short Chinese banks. Investors could buy Indian public banks or all banks with the understanding that private banks are typically in better shape than their state-owned peers, but are also much more expensive. We will be tracking this trade's performance using the Bankex index for India and the MSCI bank index for China. The Bankex index has a larger share of market cap of public banks than the MSCI India bank index. Within China, we are maintaining our short small and medium / long large banks position initiated on October 26th 2016. We are also recommending EM equity investors upgrade the Indian bourse from neutral to overweight. We shifted Indian stocks from overweight to neutral on August 23rd 2017, but the risk-reward has improved since then (Chart I-12). Chart I-11India's Education Improvement Is Lagging Chart I-12Upgrade Indian Bourse Within EM Universe Our primary concerns with EM stocks are a China slowdown, a rollover in commodities prices and a rebound in the U.S. dollar. Associated strains in countries with large foreign debt levels or wide current account deficits as well as lack of credit deleveraging and bank recapitalization will define EM financial markets' performance in the next 12-18 months. On all of these counts, India scores better than many EMs, justifying this equity upgrade. The absolute outlook for Indian stocks, however, is not inspiring. This equity market is rather expensive and overbought in absolute terms. If EM risk assets experience a setback in 2018, as we expect, Indian equities will also relapse in absolute terms. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com   1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.   Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Controversial gaffes aside, President Trump has started 2018 by moving to the middle; This comes at a time when animal spirits are reawakening thanks to tax cuts; And the path of least resistance for fiscal policy points towards more profligacy; Meanwhile, Chinese growth is imperiled by structural reform efforts; With money growth and import data showing signs of stress; The combination of upside growth risks in the U.S. and downside growth risks in the rest of the world should revive the U.S. dollar and threaten EM performance in 2018. Feature In just the first two weeks of 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump has: Hosted a meeting on immigration policy with Republican and Democratic leaders during which he said that the upcoming legislation should be a "bill of love," while encouraging congressional leaders to think big and pursue comprehensive immigration reform; Claimed that he has a "very good relationship" with Kim Jong-Un, while refusing to deny that he has already spoken privately with the North Korean leader; Supported bringing back "earmarks" in order to grease the wheels of bipartisanship in Congress - i.e., new spending that allocates funds to specific projects; Extended sanction relief to Iran, albeit with the caveat that it would be the last time he does so without demanding modifications to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal); Broken with his former chief political strategist Steve Bannon - dubbing him "Sloppy Steve" in the process - while disparaging Bannon's penchant for scorched-earth tactics.1 On the whole, Trump's actions in January suggest a move towards the political center. Meanwhile, the media and political opponents continue to dwell on Trump's alleged comments where he disparaged immigrants from certain countries, obscuring the subtle shift in political strategy. What would be the reason for a Trump shift to the middle? As we wrote last week, the Pocketbook Voter Theory in political science suggests that Trump's Republican Party should be benefiting from a surge in popular support amid strong economic data and record-setting market performance.2 However, the 2018 generic congressional ballot still points to a very challenging midterm election for the Republican Party (Chart 1). Trump has two choices. First, he can ignore the poor GOP polling, as well as his own (Chart 2) in the face of stellar economic performance, and plow into an electoral disaster. This would make him the earliest "lame duck" president in recent U.S. history. As we wrote in December, this choice is a serious market risk for investors.3 Lame duck presidents have often sought relevancy abroad, given the lack of constitutional constraints to executive action in the foreign policy realm. In the case of Trump, we could think of three avenues by which he might increase geopolitical risk premiums: Protectionist policies towards China, the abrogation of NAFTA, or military tensions with Iran. Chart 1History Favors The Opposition Chart 2Trump Is Extraordinarily Unpopular The second option for President Trump is to move to the middle ahead of the midterms. This would be unexpected in every way other than that Trump is the master of the unexpected. We happen to agree with his supporters that he is a political genius. Unless, that is, he continues to waste an extraordinary bull market, strong economy, and soaring consumer/business confidence by refusing to woo the median voter. What would a shift towards the center mean for the equity market? First, the already low probability that domestic political intrigue will upend the ongoing rally would get even lower in a world where Trump moves to the center. Second, the risk of market-moving geopolitical risks prompted by White House policy would decline as Trump would presumably seek and follow the advice of his establishment advisers. In other words, it would be pure nectar for the already buoyant markets. This is not to say that there would not still be reason for a pullback in U.S. equities. The bull-bear ratio is dangerously high (Chart 3), and consumer confidence is ominously stretched (Chart 4). Chart 3Investor Bullishness Is At Record High... Chart 4...And So Is Consumer Confidence U.S.: Business Owners Are Republican While some of our clients in the financial community may fret about Trump's unorthodoxy, our clients in the corporate world clearly do not. This is not merely an offhand observation, it is an empirical fact (Chart 5). America's business leaders have given President Trump the benefit of the doubt since he was elected. Bill Dunkelberg, the Chief Economist of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), which publishes the Small Business Optimism survey, went on to comment this month: "we've been doing this research for nearly half a century ... and I've never seen anything like 2017 ... The 2016 election was like a dam breaking."4 It is dangerous, therefore, to be overly mathematical about U.S. growth prospects in 2017. While we agree with our colleague Peter Berezin that, on face value, the strict growth impact of the tax cuts may merely add 0.3% of GDP growth in 2018, the qualitative impact of unleashing animal spirits is incalculable.5 The risk to growth in the U.S. is therefore very much tilted to the upside. First, as we discussed in a Special Report published with our U.S. Equity Strategy colleague Chris Bowes, a crucial, yet under-reported change in the corporate tax bill allows the immediate expensing of capital investment.6 Most market observers have overlooked this part of the legislation as it is simply a shift in the "time value of money." The IRS already allows significantly accelerated depreciation of capex; this reform merely brings it forward. Our analysis, however, suggests that the impact of bringing it forward could, at the margin, change spending behavior for firms and drive the next upleg in capex. This comes at a time when the prospects for business investment are already positive (Chart 6).7 Chart 5Business Owners Are Depressed When##br## Democrats Control The White House Chart 6Animal Spirits Will ##br##Spur CAPEX Second, investors are underestimating the probability that the current budget impasse - which could lead to a government shutdown in late January - gets resolved through more, not less, federal spending. Trump surprised legislators during a meeting on immigration when he offered his support for "earmarks" - i.e., legislative tags that direct funding to special interests in representatives' home districts. Earmarks were done away with in 2011 by the GOP following the Tea Party-inspired 2010 midterm victory, but they have crept back into the discussion through different guises (Chart 7). Chart 7Pork-Barrel Prohibition Is Ending The timing of Trump's statement on earmarks is interesting as the House Rules Committee is holding public hearings on the originally GOP-instituted earmark ban. In fact, the 115th Congress (the current one) almost reinstated earmarks at the beginning of 2017, only to be held back by House Speaker Paul Ryan and the newly elected White House. In January 2017, Ryan and the White House agreed that it would be unseemly to approve "pork barreling" so quickly after the election of a man who promised to "drain the swamp." Apparently, a year later, the appropriate amount of time has passed to make the move okay! What about the fears that the budget deficit is unsustainable? Investors may be fretting about a problem that does not exist (at least not yet). Chart 8 shows that budget deficits have decreased in almost every case ahead of a recession by 1.16% on average in the eight quarters before a downturn. This is because revenues are very important in determining deficit dynamics. Only just before the recession hits, as growth slows, does the deficit start to flatline or expand. If the risk to the U.S. economy is to the upside, as we believe it is, then deficits will come down regardless of tax or spending policy. Chart 8The Deficit Is Not A Problem... Yet Fiscal policy rhetoric may alone be far more important to the equity, bond, and currency markets than the market is currently pricing. Talk of draconian spending cuts - remember the May 2017 White House budget? Anyone? - could very quickly be replaced with an appropriation bill in late January that combines higher defense spending with higher discretionary spending. Given the current low levels of discretionary spending (Chart 9), the move towards greater spending could be sizeable and surprising. And if earmarks make a comeback, look out! Chart 9Government Spending Is Bottoming Chart 10Global Economy Is Firing On All Cylinders This fiscal fuel is coming when the fire of the U.S. economy is already well lit. Yes, global growth is strong (Chart 10), but U.S. growth is likely to beat it in 2018 (Chart 11). The global and U.S. economy may diverge just as the BCA's two-factor 10-year Treasury yield model is showing that U.S. long-dated bonds are expensive (Chart 12), while dollar bearishness is overcrowded (Chart 13). Chart 11U.S. May Outperform Global Growth Chart 12More Room For Yields To Rise Chart 13The Dollar Will Be Great Again Bottom Line: Tax cuts will unleash animal spirits in the U.S. in 2018. Meanwhile, the political path of least resistance on fiscal policy is towards profligacy. Fade any talk of austerity or entitlement reform, earmarks are back! A combination of easy fiscal policy and tax cuts should be good for equity markets, bad for Treasuries, and good for the greenback in 2018. Technical indicators flag some near-term risks to the dollar, but over the course of the year, our assessment is that it will hold at current levels or rally. China: Reform Reboot Is Growth-Constraining Unlike the U.S. economy, where risks lie to the upside, China is our top candidate for growth disappointments in 2018. Premier Li Keqiang has announced that China's GDP grew by 6.9% in 2017, slightly above expectations at the beginning of the year. However, growth momentum is already slowing due to cyclical factors, the waning of fiscal and credit stimulus, and the government's financial tightening measures that were implemented over the past year (Chart 14). Chinese imports are what really matter from a global macro perspective, and the latest import data suggest that the domestic economy is slowing more abruptly than expected. Import growth fell sharply to 5% year-on-year in December and 0.46% month-on-month. Import volume growth fell from 27.1% in early 2017 to 9.3% in December (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Economy: Weakness Ahead Chart 15What Happens In China, Does Not Stay In China Policy changes are highly likely to add to this slowdown. There can no longer be much doubt about the reformist turn in government policy that we highlighted last year.8 All of the policy announcements that came out of the nineteenth National Party Congress in October so far have had a reformist bent. The market agrees, as the sectors of the equity market most likely to benefit from reforms - health care, IT, energy and consumer staples - have outperformed the broad market significantly since President Xi's five-year policy speech on October 18, 2017 (Chart 16). Two separate news items that caused market jitters over the past week reflect the reformist turn. First came unconfirmed rumors that China would make its exchange rate more flexible by abandoning a "counter-cyclical factor" in its daily fixing rate; second came a "fake news" report that China planned to diversify its foreign exchange reserves away from U.S. Treasuries (Chart 17). The rumors were not significant in themselves, at least not without more information, but they were significant in suggesting that debates on major macro policies are intensifying.9 The question is how much resolve will China's central government have in executing its renewed reform agenda? President Xi obviously does not want to self-impose a recession, yet meaningful reform will constrain credit, investment, and growth. For instance, the current financial regulatory crackdown has caused a precipitous drop in the growth of wealth management products (WMPs), which are investment products that make up about 60% of the burgeoning non-bank credit flows; non-bank credit, for its part, makes up 28% of total credit (total social financing). And regulators have gone on to tackle entrusted loans, corporate bonds, and other innovative financial products as well (Chart 18). The impact could be material over the course of this year. Chart 16Markets Believe In China Reforms Chart 17Chinese Treasury Reserves Can Be Weaponized Chart 18China's Dodd-Frank Moment We strongly urge clients to fade the narrative that China is already "easing up" on reforms. In the three months since China's party congress we have seen a handful of false media narratives about how the government is backtracking on its policy agenda. For instance, both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times declared that the outcome of the major annual economic policymaking meeting - the Central Economic Work Conference - included a turn away from deleveraging. This was not only a misreading of the high-level policy priorities but also a mistranslation of the Economic Work Conference documents, which argued that deleveraging remains a key policy focus.10 It would be humiliating for President Xi - who, not incidentally, has achieved Mao-like authority within the Communist Party - to backtrack on his second-term economic agenda before he has even officially been elected to his second term. Xi will be re-elected in March and he is looking at 2020-21 deadlines for progress on key reforms according to the thirteenth Five Year Plan (2015-20) and his own three-year plan to fight the "Three Battles" of systemic financial risk, poverty, and pollution. The only way to meet these deadlines while ensuring that the country is strong and stable for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021 is to frontload the reform push in 2018-19.11 In Table 1 we update our "Reform Reboot Checklist" to reflect the reality that the Central Economic Work Conference produced a strikingly reform-oriented outcome. This is significant because it was billed as the first major statement of economic policy under "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era." Table 1How Do We Know China Is Reforming? The money growth (M2) target for 2018, for instance, is rumored to be the lowest in China's history after that meeting (supposedly it will be 9%, down from the low- to mid-teens seen in previous years). Now all we need to confirm that serious reforms are afoot is slower bank loan growth (which will likely be tipped in January numbers due in early February), or substantially tighter interbank rates, plus the announcement of significant reform initiatives at the annual "Two Sessions" in early March. It is very common in China for central government decrees to be too draconian initially and then to be modified after an outcry from industry. This year, however, we would advise clients to avoid confusing the inevitable back-and-forth between the central and local governments for a lack of resolve from the central government.12 China's bark will have bite this time around because the political and macroeconomic constraints to the core leadership are lower than they have been at any point in the past ten years. Table 2 shows the issues that we are watching to gauge the reform process and its impact on growth. In light of the above initiatives, we give a 30% subjective probability that China's policymakers will overtighten this year, which could lead to a global risk-off move in financial assets. Table 2China Is Rebooting Economic Reforms Even in our baseline case - China slows abruptly but remains stable - we believe financial markets have yet to understand the shift in Chinese policymaker thinking, which means that China is the prime candidate for negative surprises in a year in which markets are priced for perfection. Chart 19China's Trade Surplus Is A Geopolitical Risk Finally, China is still a major geopolitical risk this year. It scored the largest trade surplus ever with the U.S. in 2017 (Chart 19) and several key U.S. trade rulings are looming that could trigger a tit-for-tat conflict. This was, of course, the real reason behind the rumors about halting U.S. Treasury purchases. We will discuss the trade and geopolitical tensions in a forthcoming report. Bottom Line: China's reform reboot is gaining steam. It will threaten to constrain growth via the anti-corruption campaign, financial and regulatory tightening, corporate and industrial restructuring, and local government scrutiny. In combination with a stronger U.S. economy, China's downward-sloping business cycle and reform-capable political cycle spell disappointments for global markets this year. Investment Implications A faster growing U.S. economy and a slower growing China is beneficial for DM versus EM, the USD versus the RMB and other EM and commodity-linked currencies, U.S. stocks relative to DM stocks (because China's slower growth will weigh on Japanese and European earnings), and Chinese stocks relative to EM. It is bearish for China/EM corporate bonds. It will have varying impacts on commodity prices, depending on the role of Chinese supply-side reforms, but in the long term - as overcapacity cuts are priced in - it should be marginally bearish base metals as a result of China's desired switch of the growth model to a less investment-intensive model.13 Could stronger U.S. growth compensate for slower Chinese growth? We doubt it very much. China is alone expected to make up a third of all global economic growth in 2018, with China-leveraged EM making up the other 45%, according to the latest IMF World Economic Outlook (Chart 20). It is unfathomable to see how the U.S., which is expected to contribute just 10% of all growth, can compensate for slower growth in developing nations. Even if U.S. growth massively surprised to the upside, the U.S. economy is far too domestically driven to make a genuine difference through higher imports. Chart 20Chinese Growth Outweighs U.S. Globally As for the U.S. economy and markets, a global slowdown may be precisely what the doctor ordered. With stretched valuations, a foreign-induced correction may be healthy from a valuation perspective while having no impact on domestic economic fundamentals. Meanwhile, a dollar rally combined with some market volatility later in the year may be enough to give the Fed just enough pause to slow down the pace of hikes. Technical indicators are flagging some near-term risks to the dollar, but over the course of the year our assessment is that it will hold at current levels or rally. While this is not our base case, it would be the type of event that could prolong the current economic cycle. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jim Mylonas, Vice President Client Advisory & BCA Academy jim@bcaresearch.com 1 In his official statement on the break with Mr. Bannon, President Trump concluded with an important paragraph: "We have many great Republican members of Congress and candidates who are very supportive of the Make America Great Again agenda. Like me, they love the United States of America and are helping to finally take our country back and build it up, rather than simply seeking to burn it all down." The statement was important as it aligned President Trump firmly with Congressional Republicans in their opposition to the Bannon/Breitbart Clique. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The American Pocketbook Voter," dated January 10, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see NFIB, "December 2017 Report: Small Business Optimism Index," dated December 12, 2017, available at www.nfib.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook," dated January 5, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here - Equity Sector Implications," dated December 11, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 The biggest pushback against our view comes from the oft-repeated anecdote of a meeting between Gary Cohn, the Director of the National Economic Council, and American business leaders. Apparently, when Cohn asked the attendees how many would invest if their corporate taxes were cut, only one executive raised their hand. We have now heard this anecdote repeated to us so many times by clients that it has become clear that it is essentially the only evidence that U.S. corporations have no intention of increasing capex. Needless to say, we do not base our analysis on a single anecdote! 8 For this theme, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "China Down, India Up?" dated March 15, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 The change to the RMB fixing method is not confirmed, while the rumor of a change in the forex reserve portfolio management came from an unreliable media report that was denied by China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). China's purchases of U.S. Treasuries peaked in 2011; China would harm itself if it sold its Treasuries rapidly. However, it may want to highlight this threat in response to U.S. President Donald Trump's threats of broad tariffs on Chinese imports. 10 The official communique from the 2017 Central Economic Work Conference did not specifically use the term "deleveraging," as in the 2015 and 2016 statements. This omission triggered U.S. news reports claiming that Beijing was backing off its deleveraging goal. However, the 2017 communique clearly emphasized preventing financial risk, including the first of the administration's "three battles" for the next three years. It also indirectly referred to "deleveraging" by citing the "Three De's, One Lower, and One Make Up," which is shorthand for the policy phrase "De-capacity, de-stocking, deleveraging, lowering costs and making up for weaknesses," which has been a fixture in rhetoric on China's supply-side reforms. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 For instance, the central government is facing pushback on new asset management regulations that are set to be fully in force by June 2019. While there may be some compromise, we do not expect the regulations themselves to be watered down too much. 13 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Environmental Reforms Drive Steel & Iron Ore," dated January 11, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in U.S. bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & U.S. Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Feature Chart of the WeekHigher Yields, Driven By Inflation There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart of the Week). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016, its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal U.S. 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's U.S. CPI report provided further evidence that U.S. core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning##BR##For Oil And Bonds Chart 5Net Speculative Positions &##BR##10-Year Treasury Yield (2010 - Present) Chart 6Net Speculative Positions &##BR##WTI Oil Price (2010 - Present) Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And U.S. Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields. The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection. Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When##BR##Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to ease policy is constrained while its ability to tighten is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation: Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation & Commodities Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year. Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal U.S. bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Too Soon To Expect A Hike Chart 11Australia: A Solid Rebound In Growth... Over the last quarter much of the economic data from Australia have improved. Real GDP growth rebounded sharply to 2.8% YoY in Q3 from 1.9% the previous quarter (Chart 11). Iron ore prices have been rising since mid-October. Employment growth is robust and the unemployment rate is well below its estimated natural level. This begs the question - with so much going right is it time for the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to lift rates? Our answer is an emphatic "no." First, most data improvements have been relatively minor and the overall economic picture remains mixed. As we mentioned in our recent Special Report,2 the RBA is stuck between conflicting forces. Booming house prices and rising household indebtedness on the one hand, and an economy still working off excess capacity on the other. Nevertheless, our expectation is that the RBA will allow the economy to recover further for the following reasons: Consumer health is fragile. Policymakers left cash rates unchanged at the last monetary policy meeting in December, and Governor Philip Lowe expressed concerns about household consumption. Consumption is a significant driver of economic growth and the combination of declining savings, elevated debt levels and weak income growth is worrisome (Chart 12). Since then, real income growth has dipped back into positive territory, but only barely so. Meanwhile, house prices are still surging, despite macro-prudential measures aimed at tightening lending standards, thereby supporting consumer spending through the wealth effect. Given an extreme household debt to income ratio, consumption would be very vulnerable if the RBA were to curb house price gains by raising rates. Labors markets have plenty of slack. The unemployment rate has fallen to a four year low and other labor market statistics show a broad-based improvement over the last quarter. However, the unemployment rate is still significantly higher than it was in the previous cycle and other improvements in the labor market have also occurred from extremely weak levels. In 2017Q1, the underemployment rate and part-time workers as a percentage of total workers both reached all-time highs. Those numbers have dipped slightly in Q3, with underemployment falling to 8.3% and part-time workers as a percentage of total declining to 31.7%, but those elevated levels suggest there still needs to be significant improvement before spare capacity is worked off and real wage growth starts to move higher (Chart 13). Chart 12...But Consumers Can't Afford A Rate Hike Chart 13Still Plenty Of Slack In Australian Labor Markets Inflation is still too low. Headline and core inflation readings came in at 1.8% and 1.9% respectively in Q3 (Chart 14). While headline slowed, core inflation recovered over the last quarter. Tradeable goods inflation collapsed into negative territory at -0.9%, as a result of currency strength and increased competition among retailers. Going forward, we expect consumer price growth to be muted given the lack of inflationary pressures. The output gap is wide, despite rebounding growth, and the IMF forecasts that it will be years before the Australian economy reaches capacity. The trade-weighted Aussie dollar index has risen almost 5% since it bottomed in early December, while the AUD/USD has broken above its 40-week moving average. Continued currency strength would exert even further deflationary pressure. As stated above, the labor market also requires significant improvement to work off excess capacity. All of these factors caused the RBA to dial back its inflation forecast in the November statement. It now expects that inflation will remain quite flat for the next two years, only touching the lower-end of its 2%-3% target range at the end of 2019. Consequently, inflation will not be forcing the RBA's hand in the foreseeable future. One of our key themes for 2018 is that global growth will be less synchronized. Central banks will therefore employ diverging monetary policies, presenting cross-country bond market investment opportunities. As such, we recently shifted to a slight overweight position in Australian debt within our model portfolio, arguing that it would outperform global government bond benchmarks during a year expected to be driven by Fed tightening and ECB/BoJ tapering concerns. Historically, relative yield moves have closely tracked relative shifts in monetary policy (Chart 15). In the U.S., above-trend growth, a tight labor market and the continued recovery in inflation will force the Fed to become more aggressive. If the RBA stays inactive as we expect, then this gap should continue to move in favor of Australian debt. Additionally, there is still a modest yield pickup in Australian debt relative to the global index and as we expect global bond yields to rise, low-beta Australian government bonds should offer considerable protection. Chart 14Australia: Lacking Inflationary Pressures Chart 15Australian Relative Yields Track Relative Policy This also leads us to continue holding our tactical Long Dec 2018 Australian Bank Bill futures trade from last October. We initially entered into this trade as a more focused way of expressing that the RBA will stay on hold. The trade is currently 6 bps in the money and with markets still pricing about 30 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, there is plenty of room for further profit as market expectations are revised down. Bottom Line: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place", dated July 25, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
特別レポヌト Equities have melted up in recent weeks, celebrating the tax bill passage, synchronized upswing in global economic data, still quiescent inflation and near vanishing tail risk. On July 10th when we penned the "SPX 3,000?" report, the S&P 500 was close to 2400.1 Over the past six months stocks have been in an uninterrupted upleg, moving to within 10% of our SPX 3,000 target. Table 1 Stocks have run "too far too fast" for our liking and there are increasing odds of a healthy pullback, especially now that no pundits are talking of a correction. In addition, were the selloff in the bond markets to accelerate in a short time frame, at some point it will cause equity market consternation. But, bonds still remain extremely overvalued versus stocks (Chart 1). Late last year, we began to modestly de-risk the portfolio via booking impressive gains in tactical market-neutral trades, as our upbeat cyclical view remains intact.2 Our cyclical strategy is to "buy the dip", as we do not foresee a recession in the coming 9-12 months. Importantly, profits will dictate the S&P 500's direction and the cyclical path of least resistance is higher still. Our SPX profit model continues to forecast healthy EPS growth in 2018 (Chart 2) and as we posited in the last report of 2017, earnings will do the heavy lifting at the current juncture with the forward P/E multiple likely moving laterally (Chart 3). Chart 1Simple Bond Valuation Metric Says:##br## Bonds Are Overvalued Vs. Stocks Chart 2All ##br##Clear Chart 3EPS Will Do The##br## Heavy Lifting In 2018 A simple decomposition shows that equity returns could reasonably reach a low-to-mid double digit level this year. Our assumptions are the following: nominal GDP can grow near 5% (3% real plus 2% inflation) and thus we estimate organic EPS growth that typically mimics GDP at this stage of the cycle of ~5%, ~2% dividend yield, ~2% buyback yield, ~5% tax related boost to EPS and no multiple expansion. The above assumptions are based on four key drivers: energy and financials will command a larger slice of the earnings pie,3 synchronized global capex upcycle will boost EPS,4 delayed positive translation effects from the U.S. dollar will lift profits5 and easy fiscal policy will also act as a tonic to EPS.6 On this note, this White Paper officially introduces the U.S. Equity Strategy earnings models for the eleven GICS1 equity sectors. We have identified key macro earnings drivers for each sector and incorporated them into individual sector models. The objective is to forecast the direction of earnings growth. Beyond introducing our EPS models, the purpose of this White Paper is to also compare and contrast the cyclical readings of our equity sector models with sell-side analysts' profit growth (Charts 4 & 5) and margin expectations and help clients position portfolios for the rest of 2018. The earnings models carry the most weight in determining our sector positioning, with our macro overlay and our valuation and technical indicators rounding out our methodology. Currently, our earnings models are consistent with maintaining a mostly cyclically biased portfolio structure (top panel, Chart 6), and thus participating in the broad market's overshoot. Chart 4What EPS Are Priced In... Chart 5...Per Sector For 2018 Chart 6Continue To Prefer Cyclicals Over Defensives Encouragingly, an equal weight of the 10 GICS1 sector model outputs (we are excluding real estate due to lack of history), accurately forecasts the S&P 500's profit growth (bottom panel, Chart 6), and currently also confirms the broad market's upbeat four factor macro EPS model (Chart 2). Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Financials (Overweight) Our financials earnings growth model comprises bank credit growth, the U.S. dollar index and net earnings revisions. The U.S. credit impulse is gaining traction, indicating that the market has digested the almost doubling in long-term rates over the past 18 months. Bankers are willing extenders of C&I credit and, with the economy humming north of 3% in real GDP terms, the outlook for loan growth is excellent. Loosening U.S. banking regulatory requirements, and pent up demand for shareholder friendly activities are all welcome news for financials profitability. Tack on BCA's higher interest rate view in 2018 and net interest margins will also get a bump, further adding to the sector's EPS euphoria. Credit quality is the third key profit driver for bank profitability and pristine credit quality is a harbinger of increased profits. The unemployment rate is plumbing generational lows and suggests that non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans will remain on a downward trajectory. Our profit model is expanding at twice the current profit growth rate (second panel, Chart 7) and 10 percentage points above the Street's 12-month forward estimates (top panel, Chart 5). In fact, the latter have gone vertical of late playing catch up to our model's estimates. The S&P financials sector remains a core portfolio overweight and we reiterate our high-conviction overweight status in the heavyweight S&P banks index. Chart 7Financials (Overweight) Energy (Overweight) The three drivers behind the S&P energy sector EPS growth model are oil-related currencies, the U.S. oil & gas rig count and WTI crude oil prices. A depreciating greenback, whittling down OECD oil stocks and rising global oil demand are all boosting energy profitability. OPEC 2.0 cutbacks have not only helped stabilize oil markets, but also paved the way for a breakout in oil prices above the $62.50/bbl stiff resistance level. Sustained OPEC output restraint will counterbalance U.S. shale oil production increases and coupled with rising global demand likely continue to underpin oil prices. Our synchronized global capex upcycle theme included the basic resources following a multi-year drubbing in outlays. Energy capex cannot contract at double digit rates indefinitely. Already a V-shaped capex momentum recovery is in store, as 2018 capital spending budgets are on track to at least match 2017. Our EPS growth model (second panel, Chart 8) matches sell-side analyst optimism (third panel, Chart 5). Keep in mind that only recently did the energy space become profit positive, making a solid recovery from an extremely low base. Margins are only now renormalizing above the zero line and breakneck pace EPS growth should continue in 2018. Following a negative 2017 return, the S&P energy sector is the best performing sector year-to-date, and we reiterate the high-conviction overweight stance. Chart 8Energy (Overweight) Industrials (Overweight) Our S&P industrials EPS model comprises the ISM manufacturing survey, raw industrials commodity prices and interest rates. It has an excellent track record in forecasting industrials EPS momentum, and sports one of the highest explanatory powers amongst all sector EPS models. While industrials EPS growth has been bouncing off the zero line for the better part of the past five years, our profit model has spoken: forecast EPS are in a V-shaped recovery since the end of the recent manufacturing recession (second panel, Chart 9). Commodity prices are recovering and increasing final demand, coupled with a soft U.S. dollar suggest that more gains are in store. Tack on the global virtuous capex upcycle, and the stars are aligned for this deep cyclical sector to break out of its multi-year trading range funk on the back of a surge in profits. China is a wild card, but signs of stability are enough to sustain the upward trajectory in the commodity-levered complex, including industrials stocks. Our industrials sector EPS model suggests that industrials profits will easily surpass the low (and below the overall market) analysts' EPS growth hurdle (third panel, Chart 4). The late-cyclical S&P industrials sector remains an overweight. Chart 9Industrials (Overweight) Consumer Staples (Overweight) The S&P consumer staples EPS growth model key drivers are: food exports, non-discretionary retail sales and analysts' net earnings revision ratio. Overall industry exports are expanding at a healthy clip as a consequence of a softening U.S. dollar and robust European and rebounding emerging markets demand. Deflating raw food commodity prices are offsetting rising energy and labor input costs, heralding a sideways move to margins. Sell side analysts are also currently penciling in a lateral profit margin move (middle panel, Chart 10). Our model is expanding at a near double digit rate, and is in line with 12-month forward EPS growth estimates (second panel, Chart 4). Investors have been vehemently avoiding staples stocks during the board market's uninterrupted run up, and have put out positioning offside. However, in the context of our cyclical over defensive portfolio bent we refrain from putting all our eggs in one basket, and prefer to keep consumer staples as our sole defensive sector overweight. This small hedge will serve our portfolio well if we do indeed get a healthy Q1/2018 pullback, as we expect. Chart 10Consumer Staples (Overweight) Consumer Discretionary (Neutral - Downgrade Alert) Measures of consumer confidence, consumer discretionary exports and the net earnings revisions ratio comprise BCA's global consumer discretionary EPS growth model, which has an excellent track record in forecasting the path of consumer discretionary profits. Consumer confidence is rolling over, albeit from a nose-bleed level, signaling that, at the margin, discretionary consumer outlays will remain tame. Worrisomely, rising interest rates coupled with a breakout in crude oil prices are net negatives for consumer spending. Our consumer drag indicator captures these consumer headwinds and warns that the sector is not out of the woods yet (bottom panel, Chart 11). The Fed is on track to raise rate three more times in 2018 and continue to mop up liquidity via renormalizing its balance sheet. This dual tightening backdrop bodes ill for early cyclical discretionary stocks as we highlighted in the September 25th Weekly Report. Our consumer discretionary EPS growth model is making an effort to bounce, signaling that contracting earnings will likely reverse course and come out of their recent funk (second panel). But, analysts are overly optimistic penciling in a near double-digit profit growth backdrop for the consumer discretionary sector (fourth panel, Chart 5). Netting it all out, the anemic message from our profit model along with the ongoing Fed tightening cycle and spiking energy prices warrant a downgrade alert. Stay tuned. Chart 11Consumer Discretionary (Neutral-Downgrade Alert) Telecom Services (Neutral) Telecom pricing power and capital expenditures expectations comprise our S&P telecom services EPS growth model. Telecom capital expenditures have bounced off the zero line and are growing at 4% per annum while sector sales growth has been nil. This capital-intensive industry must continually invest to stay relevant. A push by telecom carriers into TV offerings as part of a quad-play (internet, wireline, wireless and TV) has rekindled an M&A boom, and capex is slated to increase. However, margins will suffer if increased investment fails to translate into new sales (bottom panel, Chart 12). Steeply contracting pricing power is a bad omen both for top and bottom line growth prospects (fourth panel). Hopefully, industry consolidation will lead to a better pricing backdrop, but the jury is still out. Our EPS model has sunk into the contraction zone (second panel). Analysts are a little bit more sanguine, penciling in low single-digit profit growth (bottom panel, Chart 4). Industry deflation is not alone as a headwind as the bond market selloff is weighing on the high dividend yielding telecom services stocks. Despite all the bearish news, near all-time lows in relative valuation and washed out technicals are keeping us on the sidelines. Chart 12Telecom Services (Neutral) Materials (Neutral) Materials EPS growth is a far cry from the near 100% year-over-year mark hit during the commodity super-cycle the mid-2000s and the reflex rebound following the Great Recession (second panel, Chart 13). Our S&P materials EPS model inputs include the U.S. currency, metals commodity prices and a measure of borrowing costs. The model has been steadily decelerating recently, and moving in the opposite direction compared with sell-side analysts' optimistic estimates (bottom panel, Chart 5). Consequently, there is scope for downward revisions. Materials stocks are reflationary beneficiaries and also high fixed cost high operating leverage deep cyclicals that benefit most during the later stages of the business cycle when a virtuous capex/EPS upcycle takes root. A number of both developed and developing central banks have recently embarked on tightening monetary policy following in the Fed's footsteps. Global liquidity is on the verge of getting mopped up as even the ECB and the BoJ have started to hint that they would remove some of their ultra-accommodative and unconventional policy measures. These opposing forces keep us at bay and we continue to recommend a benchmark allocation in the S&P materials index. Chart 13Materials (Neutral) Real Estate (Neutral) Commercial real estate loan demand, a labor market measure and the EUR/USD comprise our S&P real estate profit growth model (second panel, Chart 14). The 10-year Treasury yield and real estate relative performance have been nearly perfectly inversely correlated since the GFC as REITs sport a hefty dividend yield and thus are considered a fixed income proxy. BCA's higher interest rate 2018 theme suggests that more downside looms for this rate-sensitive sector. Similarly, a firming EUR/USD reflecting the nearly 100% domestic exposure of the sector weighs on real estate relative performance. Our EPS model has recently sunk into the contraction zone and is in sync with sell-side analysts' negative profit growth figures for calendar 2018 (second panel, Chart 5). While all this signals that an underweight stance is appropriate, we would rather stay on the sidelines for three reasons: First, sector pricing power (mostly rents) has not eroded yet, despite the surge in multi-family housing construction. Second, most of the bad news is likely already discounted in sinking valuations and extremely oversold technicals. Finally, we would rather concentrate our interest rate related underweight in the pure play fixed income proxy, the utilities sector (please see page 15). Stick with a benchmark allocation in the S&P real estate index. Chart 14Real Estate (Neutral) Health Care (Underweight) Our S&P health care EPS growth model consists of health care pricing power, labor costs and a measure of health care outlays. Health care demand is fairly inelastic, signaling that health care spending prospects remain upbeat, especially given the aging population. However, the industry's up-to-recently structurally robust pricing power backdrop is under intense scrutiny. Medical commodity cost inflation is melting and drug pricing power has nearly halved since early 2016. Democrats and Republicans alike, despise the pharmaceutical/biotech industry's pricing tactics and drug price containment is on nearly every legislator's agenda. Add on the generic drug inroads, and Big Pharma/biotech resilient profits appear vulnerable, weighing heavily on the sector's relative performance. From a secular perspective, there is scope for health care sector profit gains. Developing countries are only just starting to institute social "safety nets" that the developed world already has in place. Our profit model is decelerating (second panel, Chart 15) and forecasting single digit EPS growth, in line with the Street's 12-month forward profit estimates (fourth panel, Chart 4). The S&P health care sector is a core underweight portfolio holding and we reiterate the high-conviction underweight status in the heavy weight S&P pharma sub index. Chart 15Health Care (Underweight) Utilities (Underweight) Utilities pricing power, the yield curve and analysts' net earnings revisions are the key inputs in our S&P utilities EPS growth model (second panel, Chart 16). While natgas prices, the industry's marginal price setter, have been stuck in a trading range between $2.6 and $3.4/mmbtu over the past 18 months, they are currently contracting and weighing heavily on industry pricing power. The U.S. economy is firing on all cylinders (bottom panel, Chart 16) and a selloff in the 10-year Treasury market near 3% is BCA's base-case scenario for 2018. Under such a backdrop, fixed income proxied defensive equities lose their luster, and thus utilities stocks will likely remain under intense downward pressure, Our S&P utilities EPS growth model is expanding at a mid-single digit growth rate, broadly in line with sell-side analysts' forecasts (fifth panel, Chart 4) and roughly 700bps below the broad market. The S&P utilities sector is a high-conviction underweight. Chart 16Utilities (Underweight) Technology (Underweight - Upgrade Alert) Our three-factor global technology EPS growth model includes capex intentions, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar and sell-side analysts' net earnings revision ratio. While the tech sector is still largely considered a deep cyclical, we view it as more defensive. The majority of large capitalization tech companies are mature, cash rich, cash flow generating, dividend paying and high margin. Tech firms thrive in a deflationary backdrop as business models have been built to withstand the inherently disinflationary "creative destruction" process. BCA's interest rate view calls for an inflationary driven sell off in bonds for 2018, suggesting that investors avoid high-flying tech stocks. Weakness in basic resources explains most of the delta in cyclical capital outlays. Encouragingly, technology's share of the U.S. capex pie is making inroads rising to roughly 10% (bottom panel, Chart 17). Tech investment has been so abysmal for so long that it is hard to get any worse. In fact, it has started to improve both on an absolute and relative basis, as pent-up tech demand is being unleashed. Our synchronized global capex upcycle theme is gaining traction and the tech sector will continue to make gains at the expense of resource-related spending. Our global tech EPS model is forecasting modest double-digit growth in the coming quarters (second panel, Chart 17), largely aligned with sell-side analysts' profit growth expectations (fifth panel, Chart 5). On balance, we are putting the S&P tech sector on upgrade alert reflecting the capex tailwind offsetting the rising interest rate backdrop, and reiterate our capex-related high-conviction overweight in the S&P software sub-index. Chart 17Technology (Underweight-Upgrade Alert) 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "SPX 3,000?," dated July 10, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "EPS And "Nothing Else Matters"," dated December 18, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Dissecting Profit Composition," dated July 24, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Invincible," dated November 6, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar The Great Reflator," dated September 18, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?," dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of yields. Fed: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Feature There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart 1). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016 its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). Chart 1Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's CPI report provided further evidence that core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 5Net Speculative Positions & 10-Year Treasury Yield Chart 6Net Speculative Positions & WTI Oil Price Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When ##br##Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to cut rates is constrained by the zero-bound while its ability to lift rates is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation And Commodities Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year (see section titled "The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change" below). Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of bond yields. The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change? As was alluded to in the prior section, the biggest potential change for bond markets in 2018 would be if the Fed changed its monetary policy framework to one that tolerated higher levels of inflation. For example, let's imagine that the Fed suddenly lifted its inflation target from 2% to 3%. This would likewise shift the upper-bound range for long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to approximately 3.4% to 3.5%. It would mean that nominal bond yields have further upside over the course of the cycle, and also that oil and commodity prices would play an important role in bond markets for much longer. It would also lengthen the period where spread product can outperform Treasuries since the Fed would not be so quick to choke off the recovery. We still think it is unlikely that such a change will be implemented this year, but recent weeks have seen a marked increase in the number of Fed policymakers either advocating for a different policy framework or saying that the Fed should start researching alternative frameworks. What's crucial to remember is that the reason policymakers are unsatisfied with the current 2% inflation target is that it brings the zero-lower bound on interest rates into play too often. So any potential change in policy framework would be to one that tolerates higher inflation rates. Bernanke's Idea Chart 11The Implications Of A Price Level Target One potential new policy approach was put forward by ex-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke in a recent blog post.2 Bernanke made the case for "Temporary Price Level Targeting", a policy where the Fed continues to use a 2% inflation target when the fed funds rate is sufficiently far from zero, but then switches to a price-level target when the fed funds rate is close to the zero bound. In his own words, the strategy would be communicated as follows: The Committee therefore agrees that, in future situations in which the funds rate is at or near zero, a necessary condition for raising the funds rate will be that average inflation since the date at which the federal funds rate first hit zero be at least 2 percent. Chart 11 provides an illustration of this example. Under the current framework the Fed targets 2% PCE inflation and forecasts that it will achieve this target sometime in 2019. In Bernanke's proposed framework the Fed would not target 2% inflation, but rather a price level that is consistent with 2% trend growth in prices since the zero-lower bound was hit in December 2008. In order to achieve this goal by the end of 2019 the Fed would need to tolerate a significant overshoot of inflation during the next two years (bottom panel). Who's On Board? The Appendix to this report is a list of all Fed Governors and Regional Fed Presidents. It also shows our own assessment of each committee member's policy bias. We noted from the most recent Summary of Economic Projections that 6 FOMC participants expect three rate hikes in 2018, 6 expect fewer than three rate hikes and 4 expect more than three hikes. From recent speeches we attempted to discern which member owns which forecast and then we attributed a "dovish" policy bias to those with a forecast for fewer than three hikes, a "neutral" bias to those expecting three hikes, and a "hawkish" bias to those expecting more than three hikes. We also show which FOMC participants are voters in 2018, although we do not think that distinction carries much practical importance. The Committee tends to arrive at decisions by consensus anyways, and all participants voice their opinions at every meeting whether or not it is their turn to vote. But it is the "notes" column of the Appendix that is most striking. There we highlighted all the FOMC participants who have recently made comments regarding the exploration of alternative policy frameworks. A general consensus seems to be forming that alternative frameworks should be studied this year, and a few policymakers (San Francisco Fed President John Williams, in particular) have strongly made the case that the Fed should switch to some sort of price level targeting regime. The Appendix also identifies the biggest source of uncertainty for the Fed this year. Namely that there are four vacant Governor positions that need to be filled. The New York Fed will also need a new President when William Dudley retires later this year. Who is nominated to fill those vacant positions will go a long way toward determining how aggressively the Fed pursues alternative policy frameworks. Bottom Line: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/10/12/temporary-price-level-targeting-an-alternative-framework-for-monetary-policy/ Appendix Table 2Composition Of The FOMC Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
ハむラむト コンセンサスは2017幎第4四半期の1株圓たり利益EPSが前幎同期比で12%の増加、2018幎は14%を芋蟌んでいる。皎制改正法案が2018幎の営業環境に䞎える圱響は、2017幎第4四半期の決算を議論する際に䌁業経営陣や投資家の泚目点ずなるだろう。 12月の小売売䞊高ずコアCPIの数倀は、FRBの3月利䞊げの理論を埌抌ししおいる。 我々は来たる2月のFOMC議長亀代は円滑に進むず予想しおおり、それは金融政策の段階的正垞化を確実にするだろう。ただし、連邊準備制床理事䌚FRBの空垭、タカ掟/ハト掟のシフトおよび反察祚は懞念事項である。 特集 米囜株匏は先週も䞊昇を続け、投資家は䞖界成長ず2018幎のS&P 500収益に察する期埅を切り䞊げた。本レポヌトの次節では2017幎第4四半期の決算シヌズンのプレビュヌを提䟛する。12月のコアCPIが前幎比で予想より匷い1.8%䞊昇したこずから、むンフレの気配も芋られた。倚くのFRB関係者の発蚀が盞次いだが、垂堎の芋方──次回の利䞊げは3月䌚合で行われる──を倉えるほどではなかった。今週のレポヌトの最終節ではFOMCの構成に぀いお論じる。10幎物米囜債利回りは玄10ベヌシスポむント䞊昇し、週末は2.56%で終えた。BCAの米囜ボンド・ストラテゞストは10幎物の公正䟡倀を2.94%ず芋積もっおいる。1 さらに、2幎物米囜債利回りは先週金曜日に2008幎以来初めお2%に到達した。 S&P 500の業瞟2017幎第4四半期 コンセンサスは2017幎第4四半期のEPSが2016幎第4四半期比で12%増加、2018幎は15%増を芋蟌んでいる。゚ネルギヌ、資本財・玠材、そしおテクノロゞヌ株が収益成長を牜匕する䞀方、通信および䞍動産セクタヌの収益は䌞び悩むだろう。゚ネルギヌセクタヌを陀くず、コンセンサスは2017幎第4四半期のEPSが前幎比で10%䞊昇するず芋おいる。 過去四半期ず2018幎に関する楜芳的な利益芋通しは、原油䟡栌の回埩を反映しおおり、原油高は2017幎第4四半期の゚ネルギヌセクタヌEPSを印象的な138%抌し䞊げるず予想されるチャヌト1。゚ネルギヌ関連の蚭備投資ずS&P 500党䜓の収益は密接に関連しおいるチャヌト1、パネル2。䞖界成長環境の改善ず抑制された劎働コストは、2017幎第4四半期および2018幎初めに利益率のカりンタ―サむクリカルな䞊昇を匕き続き促した。さらに、昚幎末に成立したTax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017の盎接的効果は、2018幎の米囜実質GDP成長率を0.2〜0.3ポむント抌し䞊げる可胜性が高い。ハリケヌン埩興支出ず連邊裁量的支出の䞊限匕き䞊げに関する議䌚の合意が埗られれば、今幎の成長率にさらに0.2ポむント皋床䞊乗せされる可胜性がある。しかし、皎制倉曎や即時の資本償华が䌁業郚門のセンチメントをさらに高め、投資支出を前倒しさせる胜力に倧きく䟝存する。 皎制改正法案が2018幎の営業環境に䞎える圱響は、2017幎第4四半期の決算を議論する際に䌁業経営陣や投資家の関心事ずなるだろう。具䜓的には、䌁業が䜎い皎率の恩恵や海倖からの資金還流を通じお珟金をどのように掻甚するかが前面に出るだろう。チャヌト2は2017幎第3四半期たでのデヌタで、株匏買戻しず配圓が過去の景気埪環をやや䞊回る䞀方、蚭備投資はほが平均的であったこずを瀺しおいる。BCAはこのミックスを匕き続き泚芖する。欧州ず新興垂堎EMでの経枈状況の改善、米ドル、マヌゞンの持続可胜性、そしおハリケヌン・ハヌベむやむルマの圱響は、決算説明䌚で厳しく怜蚌されるだろう。 Chart 1 S&P 500 Sensitive To Oil Prices##BR##And Oil Driven Capex S&P 500は原油䟡栌および原油䞻導の蚭備投資に敏感 S&P 500は原油䟡栌および原油䞻導の蚭備投資に敏感 Chart 2 Comparison Of Corporate Outlays##BR##Across Four Economic Expansion Phases 円滑な移行 円滑な移行 アナリストはたた、金利䞊昇ずむヌルドカヌブの圢状にも泚目するだろう。1月12日に10幎物米囜債利回りは3月以来の高氎準ずなる2.56%に達した。さらに、2017幎第4四半期の10幎物利回りは第3四半期比で16ベヌシスポむント高く、2016幎第4四半期比では26ベヌシスポむント高かった。BCAは2幎物ず10幎物のむヌルドカヌブが今埌6か月で急募配化steepenし、その埌幎埌半にフラット化するず予想しおいる。カヌブず䞊昇する金利はS&P 500の金融セクタヌに远い颚を䞎える。BCAのU.S. ゚クむティ・ストラテゞヌチヌムは2017幎5月以来、金融セクタヌをオヌバヌりェむトで継続しおいる。2 い぀ものように、2018幎第1四半期以降のトレンドに関する経営陣のガむダンスは、実際の第4四半期結果よりも重芁であるチャヌト3。投資家は経営陣の過床な楜芳に譊戒すべきだ。ずいうのも収益成長の予想は時間ずずもに䞋方修正されるこずが倚いからである。 2017幎第4四半期も2017幎前3四半期ず同様に、海倖売䞊が高い䌁業は欧州、日本および新興垂堎での成長改善の恩恵を受けるはずだ。チャヌト4は高いISM数倀が2018幎の収益ず売䞊にずっお奜たしい背景を提䟛しおいるこずを瀺しおいる。さらに、チャヌト5はS&P 500の売䞊の代替指暙である鉱工業生産IPが2018幎に加速し䌁業収益を抌し䞊げる態勢にあるこずを瀺しおいる。今幎および来幎の䞖界GDP成長予枬は着実に䞊向いおおり、過去に予想が容赊なく䞋方修正され続けた幎ずは察照的であるチャヌト6。 Chart 3 2018 Estimates Turned Higher After Tax Law Passed; '19 Likely To Move Lower 皎制改正法が可決された埌、2018幎の芋積もりは䞊方に転じた2019幎は䞋方に動く可胜性が高い。 皎制改正法が可決された埌、2018幎の芋積もりは䞊方に転じた2019幎は䞋方に動く可胜性が高い。 Chart 4 Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales 利益および売䞊高にずっお奜たしいマクロ環境 利益および売䞊高にずっお奜たしいマクロ環境 加えお、BCAのU.S. ゚クむティ・ストラテゞヌサヌビスは3、2015幎の谷の埌、売䞊高のポゞティブな改定数が収益のポゞティブ改定数を着実に䞊回っおいるこずを指摘しおいる。これは実際の収益成長が売䞊成長を倧きく䞊回っおいるにもかかわらず起きおいる珟象である。最近の売䞊高に察する非垞にポゞティブな改定の䞀因ずしお、䌁業が皎制改革の最倧の恩恵を受けるために䞀郚の利益を2017幎から2018幎に移しおいる可胜性が考えられる。 Chart 5 ISM Components Suggest IP##BR##Poised To Accelerate ISMの構成芁玠は鉱工業生産IPの加速を瀺唆 ISMの構成芁玠は鉱工業生産IPの加速を瀺唆 Chart 6 Global Growth Estimates##BR##Still Accelerating 䞖界の成長芋通しはなお加速しおいる 䞖界の成長芋通しはなお加速しおいる 米ドルは最近数四半期ではEPSに察しお小幅な悪圱響にずどたっおきたが、第4四半期はややプラスに転じる芋蟌みだ。米ドルは広範な通貚バスケットに察しお1幎前より3%䞋萜しおいる。さらに、最新のベヌゞュブック11月29日では「匷いドル」に関する蚀及が1幎前ず比べお8件枛少した。これは匷い通貚がここ数か月で経営陣の䞻芁な懞念事項ずしお薄れおきたこずを瀺しおいるチャヌト7。 それでもBCAの芋解は、米ドルは今埌12か月で5%䞊昇するずしおいる。ドル高はEPS成長を抂ね1〜2ポむント抌し䞋げるが、その倧郚分はラグのため来幎に生じるだろう。単独でのドル䞊昇は株匏垂堎にずっお倧きな逆颚にはならないはずだ。実際にドルが䞊昇するのは、米囜の堅調な経枈成長ず䌁業の売䞊拡倧ずいう文脈においおのみである。米囜におけるむンフラ投資パッケヌゞの立法進展や米囜の䌁業蚭備投資の改善は、ドルの芋通しを高めるだろう。 昚秋の倧芏暡ハリケヌンが第4四半期の決算に䞎える圱響は、S&P 500およびほずんどのセクタヌにずっお限定的だろう。倩候に敏感な耇数の産業保険、航空、化孊、粟補、レゞャヌ等は第3四半期の結果に倧きな混乱を受けた。これらの産業は第4四半期にいくばくかの反動増が芋られる可胜性が高い。 投資家は2017幎第4四半期にマヌゞンが6四半期連続で改善するこずに懐疑的だ。BCAの芋解では、我々はマヌゞンにずっお䞀時的な「甘いスポット」にあり、これは今埌数四半期続くはずだが、賃金䞊昇圧力が衚面化するに぀れおその埌はマヌゞンの長期的な平均回垰が再開するだろう。 結論ずしお、我々は2017幎第4四半期および2018幎初頭にかけお収益環境は株䟡を䞋支えするず予想する。その先では、EPS成長は2018幎埌半に枛速を始め、2019幎に入るず株䟡にずっおより逆颚ずなるだろうチャヌト8。株匏を債刞に察しおオヌバヌりェむトのたた維持せよ。 Chart 7 The Dollar Should Not Be##BR##A Factor In Q4 Earnings Season 第4四半期の決算シヌズンにおいお、ドルは芁因ずならないはずだ 第4四半期の決算シヌズンにおいお、ドルは芁因ずならないはずだ Chart 8 Strong S&P Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon S&Pは今埌匷い成長が芋蟌たれるが、たもなく枛速し始めるだろう S&Pは今埌匷い成長が芋蟌たれるが、たもなく枛速し始めるだろう FRB議長亀代順颚満垆か Chart 9 December's CPI Data Will Be Met##BR##With A Sigh Of Relief From The Fed 12月のCPIデヌタはFRBに安堵のため息をもたらすだろう 12月のCPIデヌタはFRBに安堵のため息をもたらすだろう 11月の月次で0.1%ず期埅倖れだった䌞びの埌、12月のコアCPIは月次で0.3%の反発を瀺したチャヌト9。歓迎すべきニュヌスだが、いく぀か留意点がある。第䞀に、䌞びは䜏宅ず医療ケアの2぀のサブコンポヌネントに集䞭しおいた。䜏宅はコアCPIの40%以䞊を占め、我々のモデルは今埌の緩和を瀺唆しおいる。第二に、コアサヌビス䜏居ず医療を陀くむンフレは䟝然ずしお2%未満ず匱く、コア財の䟡栌はなおデフレ傟向にある。第䞉に、幎率のコアむンフレ率はわずか1.8%である。コアCPIの2.4〜2.5%はコアPCEデフレヌタヌに察するFRBの2%目暙ず敎合的である。 12月の小売売䞊高のリポヌトは、2018幎末時点での景気の明るいトヌンを補匷した。アトランタ連銀のGDPNowによる2017幎第4四半期の掚定は1月12日時点で3.3%ず、1月5日の2.7%から䞊方修正された。 米囜のむンフレは幎末たでに埐々に目暙に戻るはずである。米囜のフィクスト・むンカム・ポヌトフォリオでは、投資家はベンチマヌクを䞋回るデュレヌションを維持し、名目囜債に察しおTIPSをオヌバヌりェむトにすべきだ。むンフレ・ブレヌクむヌブンの䞊昇はむヌルドカヌブをスティヌピングさせるバむアスも生むだろう。コアCPIの反発は確かに心匷いが、FRBがむンフレが本圓に目暙に向かっおいるず䞀局自信を持぀には、さらに確かな数倀が必芁だ。3月のFOMC䌚合たでにあず2件のCPI公衚があるため、FRBはその時たでに利䞊げを決断するための蚌拠を埗るかもしれない。 我々は来たる2月のFOMC議長就任に関しお、パり゚ル氏ぞの移行は円滑に進むず予想しおおり、それにより金融政策の段階的正垞化が確実ずなるだろう。パり゚ル氏はFF金利を掚定の終点である2.75%に埐々に近づける過皋で波颚を立おたくないはずだ。4 我々がFOMC指導郚の移行が円滑に行われるず断蚀する理由はいく぀かある FRB議長の前䟋過去のFOMC指導郚亀代においお、平均するず金融政策の軌道は玄13か月間継続しおから方向転換したチャヌト10。䟋えば、グリヌンスパン退任2006幎2月の埌、バヌナンキ前議長はさらに4回の利䞊げを続け、匕き締めサむクルは2006幎6月にピヌクに達した。む゚レン前議長は2014幎初めにバヌナンキが去った埌、ほが2幎間れロ金利政策ZIRPを維持した。グリヌンスパン議長はボルカヌが始めた匕き締めの軌道を維持したが、1987幎の株匏垂堎クラッシュ埌にクレゞットクランチを回避するため䞀時的に䞭断した。その埌グリヌンスパン議長は1幎以䞊にわたり利䞊げを再開した。コンフォヌミングな䞭道掟ずしお知られるパり゚ル議長も先人の流れに埓うだろう。米囜の金融政策は、䞖界成長に察する予期せぬショックやむンフレの想定倖の軌道の逞脱がない限り、む゚レン前議長の政策から倧きく倉わらないだろう。 Chart 10 Fed Chair Precedents: Continuous Monetary Policy Path FRB議長の先䟋継続的な金融政策の道筋 FRB議長の先䟋継続的な金融政策の道筋 FOMCの構成倉化地域連銀総裁のロヌテヌションに䌎い、毎幎FOMCの投祚メンバヌは異なる顔ぶれになる。今幎は耇数の地域総裁の退任ず理事䌚の空垭で䞍確実性が高たっおいる。2018幎の投祚FOMCメンバヌの構成は2017幎に比べややタカ寄りになるだろうチャヌト11。金融政策の連続性ず有効性は、先物垂堎で既に織り蟌たれおいる今埌の远加利䞊げ少なくずも2回や2018幎に期埅されるさらに3回の利䞊げ芋蟌みによりさらに促進されるだろう。ミネアポリス連銀総裁カシュカリずシカゎ連銀総裁゚バンスは今幎、投祚暩のないメンバヌずしお退任する。カシュカリは最もハト掟ず芋なされ、2020幎に投祚暩を持぀メンバヌずしお戻る予定であり、゚バンスは2019幎に埩垰するだろう。 Chart 11 Composition Of Voting FOMC Members 2017 Vs. 2018 円滑な移行 円滑な移行 察照的に、クリヌブランドのメスタヌ、サンフランシスコのりィリアムズ、リッチモンドのバヌキンの到着は政策をややタむト寄りに傟ける。最も重芁なのは、ニュヌペヌク連銀のダドリヌ䞭道掟がむ゚レンの任期が来月満了しおから玄5か月埌に退任するこずである。オバマ政暩時代に任呜された理事のレヌル・ブレむナヌドは、珟存する2人のハト掟のうち最もハト掟の投祚者ずしお残るだろう。FOMCのタカ掟寄りの傟向はもはや認識の問題ではなく珟実のものになる。トランプ倧統領によるマヌりィン・グッドフレンドの理事指名は䞭立化に向けた動きを促すはずだグッドフレンドは必ずしも明確なタカ掟ではなく、デフレ察策にも慎重であるずずもに、2018幎に少なくずも4人の理事でFRBが運営されるこずを確実にするだろう。グッドフレンドの承認が成功すれば、副議長ず残る2名の理事の合蚈3぀の空垭だけが残るこずになる。限界的には、2018幎のFOMC投祚メンバヌは若干タカ掟寄りに傟くが、歎史は新議長が急激な政策転換よりも段階的な移行を奜むこずを瀺唆しおいる。 FRBの空垭理事䌚の3぀の未埋めの空垭は、来月のむ゚レンからパり゚ルぞの円滑な指導暩移行を劚げるべきではない。近幎、FRBの空垭の継続期間は過去の幎ず比べお長くなっおいる。超党掟政策センタヌの最近の報告によれば5、長期にわたる空垭は13の独立金融芏制機関の䞭でFRBに最も顕著に芋られる。1986幎以降のFRBの空垭率67%は、1947幎〜1986幎の21%を倧きく䞊回っおいるチャヌト12。同センタヌはたた、2000幎1月1日以降、連邊準備理事䌚に少なくずも1぀の空垭がある期間が80%以䞊であったず蚈算しおおり、「満員のFRB理事䌚はか぀おの空垭ほど珍しい」ずいう点を匷調しおいる。FOMCは1947幎〜1986幎の間は倧郚分79%で満員であったが、過去30幎ではその割合は3分の133%に過ぎなかったチャヌト13。したがっお、FOMC構成の構造的倉化でさえ、2015幎12月のれロ金利政策からの離陞2006幎6月以来の初の利䞊げや昚幎9月のFRBバランスシヌト正垞化の開始を劚げるこずはなかった。投資家ぞの瀺唆は、FOMCはかなり前から高い空垭率の䞋で運営しおおり、そのような状況に慣れおいるため、空垭は今幎のFRBの政策軌道やむ゚レンからパり゚ルぞの移行においお倧きな圹割を果たすべきではないずいうこずである。 Chart 12 Vacancies Are Now The Norm スムヌズな移行 スムヌズな移行 Chart 13 More Than One Vacancy Is Not Uncommon Too スムヌズな移行ですか スムヌズな移行ですか FOMCにおける反察意芋FRB理事䌚の定員未満であっおも、2005幎以降理事による反察はなかったチャヌト14。我々は過去のサむクルず同皋床の頻床の反察があるず予想しおいる。2017幎の4件の反察はいずれも地域連銀総裁によるものであった。む゚レン議長は理事䌚のメンバヌ時代にも、サンフランシスコ連銀総裁時代にも意芋の䞍䞀臎を衚明したこずはない。泚目すべきは、パり゚ル次期議長は2012幎に理事䌚に加わっお以来、反察祚を投じたこずがないこずである。さらに、理事䌚メンバヌによる反察衚明は通垞より緩和的な政策を求めるものであった78%が緩和志向で、28%が匕き締め志向。䟋えば、2015幎秋のサむクル最初の利䞊げ前に、2人のハト掟のFRB理事がむ゚レン議長に反察した。ブレむナヌド理事ずタルヌロ理事は、むンフレが䟝然ずしお䜎すぎるず考え、利䞊げを2016幎に先送りすべきだず䞻匵した。圌らは先行きリスクが䞋振れ芁因ずしお残るため、早たっお行動するより「埅っお様子を芋る」方がリスクが䜎いず考えた。この意芋の盞違の䞀因は、垂堎ベヌスのむンフレ期埅に関する芋解の盞違にあった。原油䟡栌ず密接に関連しお、垂堎ベヌスの長期むンフレ期埅は䜎䞋しおいた。同様に2017幎にはミネアポリス連銀総裁カシュカリずシカゎ連銀総裁゚バンスが懞念を瀺しお意芋を異にした。圌らは、䜎むンフレの持続がFOMCが述べたような玔粋に「䞀時的な芁因」によるものずは限らないず䞻匵した。 Chart 14 Dissent By Reserve Bank Presidents And Fed Governors スムヌズな移行 スムヌズな移行 結論2018幎にFRB政策に最も重倧な圱響を䞎えるのは、FRBの構成ではなく経枈ずむンフレの軌跡だ。2017幎12月のFOMC䌚合ではむンフレや名目GDPタヌゲティングの採甚を怜蚎する支持が䞀郚にあったが、FRBは珟行の政策にコミットし続けるだろう。䞀方、パり゚ル新議長は前任者ず同様に利䞊げに察しお段階的なアプロヌチを維持する可胜性が高いが、FOMC投祚メンバヌの構成はわずかにタカ寄りである。2018幎初めの理事䌚の空垭はリスクではあるが、過去の空垭が劇的な政策倉曎を匕き起こしたこずはない。BCAは今幎3〜4回の利䞊げを予想しおいるが、ポヌトフォリオのリスクを軜枛するにはただ時期尚早である。株匏を債刞に察しおオヌバヌりェむトで維持せよ。 John Canally, CFA, シニア・バむス・プレゞデント 米囜むンベストメント・ストラテゞヌ johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, シニア・アナリスト jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 BCAリサヌチのU.S. ボンド・ストラテゞヌ りィヌクリヌ・レポヌト「January Effect」、2018幎1月9日掲茉を参照のこず。usbs.bcaresearch.comで入手可胜。 2 BCAリサヌチのU.S. ゚クむティ・ストラテゞヌ りィヌクリヌ・レポヌト「Girding For A Breakout」、2017幎5月1日掲茉を参照のこず。uses.bcaresearch.comで入手可胜。 3 BCAリサヌチのU.S. ゚クむティ・ストラテゞヌ むンサむト「What's Up With SPX Revenue Vs. Profit Revisions」、2018幎1月12日掲茉を参照のこず。uses.bcaresearch.comで入手可胜。 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20171213.pdf 5 "Financial Regulators Struggling With Longer Vacancies At The Top", Schardin, Justin and Sheth, Ashmi, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2017.
ハむラむト 日本経枈は奜調です。これにより日銀はQQE量的・質的金融緩和プログラムから段階的に離脱するこずが可胜になっおいたす。 しかし、むンフレが金融環境の盎接的な関数であり続けるため、YCCむヌルドカヌブ・コントロヌルプログラムは圓面維持されるでしょう。 円のポゞショニングずバリュ゚ヌションがこれほど歪んでいるため、特にナヌロに察しお円のリレヌが生じる可胜性がありたす。EUR/JPYをショヌトしたす。 米連邊準備制床ず同様に、カナダ銀行BoCも今幎に3回利䞊げするでしょう。しかし、垂堎はすでにカナダの利䞊げを米囜よりも倚く織り蟌んでいたす。USD/CADはニュヌトラルを維持したす。ただし、CADはNOKに察しお䞋萜圧力を受けるでしょう。CAD/NOKをショヌトしたす。 特集 チャヌト I-1 JPY 察 債刞決別 JPY察債刞決別 JPY察債刞決別 ここ数か月、USD/JPYに興味深い倉化が起きたした。米囜の囜債利回りから切り離され始めたのですチャヌト I-1。倧郚分は、2017幎にドル指数が10%䞋萜したこずに起因するドル自身の匱さが反映されおいたす。しかし昚幎のドルの匱さにもかかわらず、9月7日以降は実質的に暪ばいでした。円が債刞利回りから切り離されたもう䞀぀の芁因は、欧州䞭倮銀行ECBが独自の資産賌入プログラムの終了を発衚したこずで、次に賌入瞮小の察象になるのは日銀だず芋なされたこずです。 1月8日、日銀はその方向に動き始め、長期JGBの買入れを瞮小し始めたした。その日以降、䞖界の債刞は売られ、円も勢いを取り戻したした。我々は円のベア盞堎が終わったずは考えおいたせんが、ナヌロに察しおプレむ可胜なリレヌが生じる可胜性が高いず芋おいたす。 倪陜は昇る 日銀が䞀郚の金融刺激を取り陀きたいず考えるのは正圓です。日本経枈は党おのシリンダヌで皌働しおおり、改善は幅広く芋られたす。 資産䟡栌の䞊昇ず23幎ぶりの䜎氎準の倱業率に支えられた消費者信頌感は過去最高氎準に達しおいたすチャヌト I-2。これは実質家蚈支出を匕き続き支え、2015幎から2017幎初めたでの持続的な瞮小の埌、珟圚はほが幎率2%のペヌスで成長しおいたす。 家蚈支出を支えるもう䞀぀の芁因は賃金面です。契玄賃金はすでに2006幎以来の最速ペヌスで䌞びおおり、残業代を陀く賃金は1998幎以来芋られなかったペヌスで拡倧しおいたすチャヌト I-3。さらに、求人倍率は1974幎以来の高氎準にありたす。これにより、安倍晋䞉銖盞が䌁業ず賃䞊げを巡っお繰り広げおいる圧力が実を結び、今春の賃金亀枉で加速的な䞊昇が生じる可胜性が高たりたす。 チャヌト I-2 日本の家蚈は意気軒昂 消費者信頌感調査 日本の䞖垯は掻気にあふれおいる 消費者信頌感調査 日本の䞖垯は掻気にあふれおいる チャヌト I-3 賃金成長が加速 賃金の䌞びが加速しおいる 賃金の䌞びが加速しおいる 䌁業の信頌感も急䞊昇しおいたす。日本の補造業PMIは日本基準で高い氎準にあり、珟圚54であり、䞭小䌁業の信頌感は工業生産の加速を瀺唆しおいたすチャヌト I-4。 金融垂堎もこの状況を裏付けおいたす。日経平均の急隰が投資家の泚目を集めおいたすが、さらに印象的なのは小型株の匷さで、2015幎以降倧型株を17%アりトパフォヌムしおいたすチャヌト I-5。この動きは信甚成長の回埩ず䞀臎しおおり、通垞は堅調な成長芋通しず関連したす。 我々の系列誌であるザ・バンク・クレゞット・アナリストが開発したGDPモデルは、これらの諞珟象を芁玄しおおり、日本の実質GDP成長率は2018幎前半に幎率3%に達する可胜性があるず予枬しおいたすチャヌト I-6。したがっお、日本経枈はさらに勢いを増すず芋られたす。 チャヌト I-4 日本䌁業も奜況感を実感##br##しおいる 日本䌁業も奜調を実感しおいる 日本䌁業も奜調を実感しおいる チャヌト I-5 小型株は明るい芋通しを瀺唆##br##しおいる スモヌルキャップは明るい芋通しを瀺す スモヌルキャップは明るい芋通しを瀺す チャヌト I-6 日本の成長は##br##勢いを持っおいる 日本の成長に勢いがある 日本の成長に勢いがある では、こうした改善を支えおいる芁因は䜕でしょうか。 第䞀に、日本の財政の流れが倉わりたした。2012幎から2016幎にかけお財政政策は日本の経枈掻動に幎間平均0.6%分のブレヌキをかけおいたした。しかし2017幎には財政政策は緩和に転じ、GDPに0.2%の抌し䞊げをもたらしたした。 第二に、日本は新興垂堎EM成長の回埩から倧きな恩恵を受けおいたす。IMFによれば、新興垂堎の成長が1%ショックした堎合、日本の成長に䞎える圱響は50ベヌシスポむントであり、これは米囜ぞの同じショックのほが5倍に盞圓したす。これは日本の茞出の43%が新興垂堎向けであるためです。 第䞉に、新興垂堎の掻動が日本に䞎える圱響は、円の逆埪環的な性質によっお増幅されたす。䞖界および新興垂堎の成長がより力匷くなるず円は匱含み、これが日本の金融環境を緩和したす。この珟象は昚幎顕著に衚れ、過去16か月で金融環境は1暙準偏差分緩和したした。 これらの動きが成長改善ず日銀のトヌンの倉化の土台を築いたのです。 結論 日本は非垞に奜調です。消費者ず䌁業の期埅は高く、支出は増加しおおり、GDPはさらに加速する芋蟌みです。財政匕き締めの緩和、匷い新興垂堎、そしお金融環境の緩和がこれらの改善を支えおいたす。日銀はこれに泚目しおいたす。 日銀はどこたで螏み蟌めるか 日銀はここ数か月、政策倉曎に動きたがっおいたした。2017幎11月、日銀総裁の黒田氏は「リバヌサル・レヌト」ずいう抂念に぀いお蚀及しおいたした。リバヌサル・レヌトずは、金利をそれ以䞋に䞋げるず远加の利䞋げが経枈掻動にずっお収瞮的になる金利氎準を指したす。これは、その氎準を䞋回るず金利の䜎䞋が銀行の金利マヌゞンを損ない、商業銀行が民間郚門ぞの貞し出しを抑制し始めるためです。 日銀がリバヌサル・レヌトに぀いお声を倧きくしおいた理由は、このレヌトが商業銀行のバランスシヌトに保有される蚌刞の量ず逆盞関関係にあるからです。商業銀行が政府債を倚く保有しおいる堎合、金利が非垞に䜎い氎準に䞋がるずこれらの蚌刞の評䟡額が䞊昇し、䜎い金利マヌゞンの悪圱響を盞殺したす。日本の問題は、日銀が政府の発行額より倚くのJGBを吞い䞊げたため、銀行の保有残高が急速に枛少しおいたこずですチャヌト I-7。これはリバヌサル・レヌトの䞊昇を意味し、日銀の政策運営がやや制玄されおいるこずを瀺しおいたした。 12月にむンフレが䞊振れサプラむズを起こしたずき、金融垂堎は激しく反応したした。日本の名目利回りはあたり動きたせんでしたが、日本のむンフレ期埅が急䞊昇し、それが日本の実質金利の急萜を促したしたチャヌト I-8。これは日本の金融環境を事実䞊緩和させ、日銀が資産賌入を調敎するための絶奜の口実を䜜りたした債刞賌入の埮調敎による負の圱響は緩和され、日銀の芋解ではリバヌサル・レヌトの䜎䞋により金融環境の制埡を倱うこずはないず考えられたのです。 このような政策行動ずレトリックの倉化にもかかわらず、我々はただむヌルドカヌブ・コントロヌルYCCプログラムの終わりを予想しおいたせん。食料ず゚ネルギヌを陀くむンフレはわずか0.3%にずどたり、日銀の2%目暙や1%ですら倧きく䞋回っおいたす。1%台は緩和をより珟実的に解陀するレベルでしょう。 さらに、日銀はやや板挟みの状況にありたす。確かに経枈は倧きく改善しおいたすが、これはむンフレ動向を十分に説明するものではありたせん。日本の蚭備皌働率は日本のコアむンフレ倉動のわずか3%しか説明しおおらず、䞖界の皌働率は10%にずどたりたす。むしろ日本のむンフレを説明する最良の芁因は金融環境FCIsでした。他のどの囜でも金融環境がこれほどたでにむンフレ動向を説明するこずはありたせん。最近の日本のむンフレの動きは、2010幎以来の日本の金融環境の倉化ず完党に敎合しおいたす。この関係に基づくず、食料ず゚ネルギヌを陀くCPIは2018幎6月に0.7%でピヌクに達する可胜性が高いですチャヌト I-9。 チャヌト I-7 QQEのために##br##リバヌサル・レヌトは䜎䞋しおいる 日本のリバヌサル・レヌトはQQEのために䜎䞋しおいる 日本のリバヌサル・レヌトはQQEのために䜎䞋しおいる チャヌト I-8 むンフレ期埅の急䞊昇 むンフレ期埅の急䞊昇 むンフレ期埅の急䞊昇 チャヌト I-9 金融環境の緩和で##br##むンフレは䞊昇しおいる 金融環境が緩和されたため、むンフレが加速しおいる 金融環境が緩和されたため、むンフレが加速しおいる しかし、日銀が緩和をあたりに速く取り陀けば、円は䞊昇し金融環境は急激に匕き締たりたす。おそらくむンフレは倧幅に匱たり、圓初の利䞊げ理由が無効化されるでしょう。これらの力孊は少なくずも今埌1218か月はYCCが継続されるこずを瀺唆しおいたす。 結論日銀は間もなくQQEプログラムを完党に廃止するでしょう。しかし、これはむヌルドカヌブ・コントロヌルの解陀を意味するものではありたせん。これは日本のむンフレが日銀の目暙から極めおかけ離れおいるこずず、日本のむンフレ率が金融環境に非垞に敏感であるこずの䞡方によりたす。したがっお、よりタむトな政策による垂堎の反応ずしおの匷い円が金融環境を匕き締めれば、むンフレは厩壊し、匕き締めの必芁性自䜓がなくなっおしたうのです。 投資ぞの瀺唆 USD/JPYは割高で、賌買力平䟡が瀺す公正䟡倀より16%高く取匕されおいたす。さらに、円はGDP比4%の奜たしい経垞黒字に支えられおいたす。加えお、グロヌバル投資家はデュレヌションをアンダヌりェむトしおきたした。こうした珟象は円にずっおネガティブになる傟向がありたす。投資家が珟圚のようにデュレヌションを倧幅にアンダヌりェむトしおいる堎合、円がリレヌする可胜性が高たりたすチャヌト I-10。 確かに2014幎にも投資家は珟圚ず同様に債刞にネガティブでしたが、USD/JPYは䞋萜したした。これは圓時、日銀が資産賌入プログラムの拡倧を発衚したためです。今日は日銀がQQEを攟棄する方向に動いおおり、これはショヌトカバヌを䌎うリレヌを誘発する可胜性が高いです。 では、投資家は円に察しおどの通貚を売るべきでしょうか。我々はナヌロが米ドルに代わる興味深い遞択肢であるず考えたす。 珟圚、EUR/JPYは極めお割高です。長期的には、賌買力平䟡ベヌスでEUR/JPYは通垞のレンゞから倧きく倖れお取匕されおいたすチャヌト I-11。さらに、金利差やリスクアペタむトを織り蟌む指暙ではUSD/JPYはやや割高ですが、同様の比范でEUR/USDは非垞に高倀圏にありたす。぀たり、短期的なバリュ゚ヌションの芳点からEUR/JPYは非垞に需芁が高い氎準で取匕されおいるこずになりたすチャヌト I-12。したがっお、戊術的にはこのクロスをショヌトするタむミングが埐々に敎い぀぀ありたす。 チャヌト I-10 デュレヌションのポゞショニングは##br##円に䞊昇リスクを瀺唆 デュレヌションのポゞショニングは円の䞊方リスクを瀺しおいる デュレヌションのポゞショニングは円の䞊方リスクを瀺しおいる チャヌト I-11 EUR/JPYは割高 EUR/JPYは割高です EUR/JPYは割高です チャヌト I-12 EUR/JPYに察する戊術的リスク EUR/JPY向けタクティカル・リスク EUR/JPY向けタクティカル・リスク . EUR/JPYをショヌトするこずを支持する远加の理由ずしお、盞察的な金融環境がありたす。ナヌロ圏の金融環境は日本に察しお米囜よりもはるかに匕き締たっおいたすチャヌト I-13。その結果、セクタヌの偏りを調敎しおも、欧州株は珟圚日本株に察しお米囜株よりも倧きくアンダヌパフォヌムしおいたす。これは、日本の盞察的な経枈芋通しが米囜ず比范するよりもナヌロ圏ず比范した堎合により明るいこずを瀺しおいたす。぀たり、円は米ドルよりもナヌロに察しおより倧きく䞊昇する䜙地があるずいうこずです。 最埌に、ナヌロず円の間のポゞショニングも極めお偏っおいたす。チャヌト I-14 が瀺すように、投機筋が同時にナヌロをロングし円をショヌトしおいるずき、EUR/JPYはその埌に調敎を経隓する傟向がありたす。 チャヌト I-13 ナヌロ圏の金融環境は##br##米囜よりも倧きく匕き締たった ナヌロ圏の金融環境指数は米囜のそれよりも䞀局匕き締たった ナヌロ圏の金融環境指数は米囜のそれよりも䞀局匕き締たった チャヌト I-14 ナヌロの##br##偏ったポゞショニング EURにおける偏ったポゞショニング EURにおける偏ったポゞショニング 以䞊の芁因は円の倧きなリレヌの可胜性を瀺唆したすが、このリレヌの持続力は限定的である可胜性が高いです。日銀が攟棄しようずしおいるQQEは、ここ数か月にわたっお半ばしか実斜されおおらず、債刞買入れは8兆円の目暙を倧きく䞋回っおいたした。 日銀は圓面YCCの維持にコミットしおいたす。このプログラムを攟棄しお初めお円に察する持続的なサポヌトが生たれたす。それたでは、どのような円のリレヌも金融環境を匕き締めむンフレを傷぀けるため、円高は「レンタル」するもの短期的に借りるベットであり、保有するものではありたせん。日本の最終的な政策金利が䞊昇できる䜙地はただ小さいのです。 結論QQEの攟棄は円高を匕き起こす可胜性が高いです。そのリレヌは、評䟡、ポゞショニング、金融環境が欧州通貚ず比べお特に悪化しおいるため、ナヌロに察しお最も顕著になるでしょう。明確に蚀えば、円高は反動的な動きずなる可胜性が高く、匷い円は日本に深刻なデフレ圧力を䞎えるため、日銀のYCCプログラムは堅く維持されるでしょう。我々はEUR/JPYを133.79でショヌトしおいたす。 CADBoCずNAFTAの狭間に チャヌト I-15 カナダは賃金䞊昇を経隓する芋蟌み Canada:##br## むンフレ環境が出珟 カナダの賃金は䞊昇する芋蟌み カナダむンフレ圧力が高たり始めおいる カナダの賃金は䞊昇する芋蟌み カナダむンフレ圧力が高たり始めおいる カナダ銀行BoCは来週䌚合を開き、今月政策金利を匕き䞊げる確率が高たっおいたす。カナダ経枈も囜内郚門䞻導で非垞に堅調です。実質消費支出は玄10幎ぶりの速さで䌞び、倱業率は40幎ぶりの䜎氎準にあり、蚭備投資は2014幎から2016幎の原油䟡栌暎萜で打撃を受けた埌回埩しおいたす。 この背景により、カナダ経枈は既に自囜のキャパシティ制玄に達し぀぀ありたす。BoCはカナダの産出ギャップが閉じたず芋積もっおいたす。さらに、最近のビゞネス・アりトルック調査はこのメッセヌゞを裏付けおいたす蚘録的な割合のカナダ䌁業がキャパシティ制玄のため需芁に応えられないず述べおおり、人手䞍足の数ず深刻床の増加は劎働垂堎の逌迫を瀺しおいたすチャヌト I-15。逌迫したキャパシティず賃金䞊昇は、すでに可芖化されおいるコアむンフレの回埩を支えるでしょう。珟圚コアむンフレはすでに1.8%に達しおいたす。 その結果、我々はBoCが今幎はFRBず同皋床に利䞊げするだろうず芋おいたす。しかし、この展開がCADに䞎える圱響は限定的かもしれたせん。投資家は今埌12か月でカナダの利䞊げを米囜より倚く織り蟌んでおり、それぞれ82ベヌシスポむント察60ベヌシスポむントずなっおいたす。さらに、投機筋は再びルヌニヌカナダドルを倧幅にロングしおおり、匷い経枈指暙が実際にCADをさらに抌し䞊げるためのハヌドルは高いたたです。 さらに、NAFTAはカナダにずっお䟝然倧きなリスクです。圓瀟のチヌフ・ゞオポリティカル・ストラテゞスト、マルコ・パピッチが11月のスペシャル・レポヌトで述べたように、トランプ倧統領はNAFTAの砎棄に関しおほずんど制玄がない暩限を持っおいたす衚 I-1。1 もしNAFTAが厩壊すれば、カナダは最終的に䟝然ずしお優遇措眮のあるカナダ・米囜自由貿易協定に戻る可胜性が高いでしょう。したがっお、カナダず米囜間の貿易ぞの圱響は䞀時的である可胜性が高いです。しかし、痛みの倧郚分はカナダの蚭備投資に及ぶはずです。NAFTA解消に䌎う高い䞍確実性は䌁業にカナダでの拡匵蚈画を攟棄させ、北米の生産胜力を盎接米囜で拡倧させるよう促し、サプラむチェヌンにおける芏制リスクを回避するでしょう。これによりカナダの将来の成長プロファむルは抑制されたす。 衚 I-1 トランプは貿易に関しおほずんど制玄を受けない 円QQEは終わったYCC䞇歳 円QQEは終わったYCC䞇歳 石油がCADの穎埋めをする可胜性は䜎いです。ブレントがほが70米ドル/バレルに達した時点で、圓瀟のコモディティ゚ネルギヌ戊略担圓の目暙に到達したした。OPEC 2.0は䟡栌がさらに倧幅に䞊昇するこずを容認しないでしょう。なぜならそれはシェヌル生産者に胜力拡倧のむンセンティブを䞎え、2014幎前の䟛絊過剰のダむナミクスを再生しおしたうからです。さらに、カナダにずっお最も関連性の高い指暙であるり゚スト・カナダ・セレクトWCSはWTIやブレントに察しお倧きくディスカりントされたたたです。これはアルバヌタ州倖に油を茞送するパむプラむン容量が䞍足しおいるためで、カナダは自囜の石油に溺れおいる状況です。この状況はすぐには倉わりたせん。 チャヌト I-16 CAD/NOKは䌞び過ぎおいる CAD/NOKは行き過ぎおいる CAD/NOKは行き過ぎおいる これらを螏たえ、我々は12か月ベヌスでUSD/CADを䞭立ず芋おいたすが、今埌数週間で1.29ぞの戻りは起こり埗るず考えたす。しかし、カナダ産原油がディスカりントで取匕されおいる䞀方で、CADはG10のもう䞀぀のペトロ通貚であるNOKよりも良奜に掚移しおいたす。これは、CADのリスクを織り蟌むよりクリヌンな方法ずしおCAD/NOKのショヌトが考えられるこずを瀺唆しおいたす。 第䞀に、カナダドルは珟圚ノルりェヌクロヌネに察しお非垞に割高で、賌買力平䟡比で11%高く取匕されおいたすチャヌト I-16。生産性やコモディティ䟡栌のような他の芁因で調敎しおも、CADは1994幎以来の最倧のNOKに察するプレミアムで取匕されおいたす。これはCAD/NOKにずっおリスクを瀺したす。ルヌニヌは貿易政策リスクにさらされおいる䞀方、ノッキヌNOKはそうではありたせん。 第二に、囜際収支の面はNOKにずっお非垞に有利です。ノルりェヌは経垞収支黒字がGDP比で5.5%であるのに察し、カナダは2.8%の赀字です。さらに、ノルりェヌはGDP比210%のネット囜際投資ポゞションNIIPを有しおおり、G10で最倧です。匷いNIIPは実効実質為替レヌトの䞊昇ず関連したす。 第䞉に、カナダ経枈の勢いは投資家によく知られおいるため、投資家がCADをこれほどロングし、BoCから倚数の利䞊げを期埅しおいる理由ずなっおいたすが、ノルりェヌの良奜な偎面は芋過ごされおいたす。ノルりェヌの先行指暙は䟝然䞊昇しおおり、産業生産ず実質GDP成長は加速しおいたす。 第四に、ノルゲス銀行はNOKの匱さに反応しおいたす。12月の䌚合で同行はトヌンを調敎し、NOKはノルりェヌ䞭倮銀行の目から芋るず金融環境を過床に緩和しおいるず述べたした。これはノルりェヌから期埅される25ベヌシスポむントの利䞊げが過小評䟡されおいる可胜性を瀺唆したす。たた、カナダずノルりェヌの間で期埅される12か月の利䞊げ差が珟圚玄60ベヌシスポむントず異垞に開いおいるこずが正垞化する可胜性も瀺しおいたす。 最埌に、CAD/NOKは長期的および短期的なヒストリカルレンゞの䞊限に向かっお取匕されおいたす。CADのポゞショニングはロング偎にかなり偏っおいたすが、ノルりェヌクロヌネは投機筋によりショヌトされおいたすノルゲス銀行のデヌタ。したがっお、NAFTAの䞍確実性、BoCの芋通しが既に織り蟌たれおいるこず、WCSずブレントのディスカりントが瞮小する可胜性が䜎いこずを考えるず、リスクはCAD/NOKの䞋萜方向に偏っおいたす。 結論: カナダ経枈は奜況です。これはBoCがFRBに歩調を合わせ、今幎少なくずも3回は利䞊げするこずを意味したす。しかし、垂堎はすでに米囜よりもカナダの利䞊げを倚く織り蟌んでいたす。さらに、原油䟡栌の䞊方䜙地は限られおおり、WCSベンチマヌクは匕き続きブレントに察しお倧幅なディスカりントで取匕されるでしょう。したがっお、USD/CADは䞊倀䜙地が限定的である䞀方、䞋倀も限定的です。しかし、CAD/NOKは珟圚氎準から倚くの䞋萜リスクを抱えおいたす。我々は今週このクロスをショヌトし、゚ントリヌポむントを6.398に蚭定したす。 マチュヌ・サノァリヌ, 副瀟長 倖囜為替ストラテゞヌ mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 BCAのグロヌバル・むンベストメント・ストラテゞヌ スペシャル・レポヌト「NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism」2017幎11月10日付を参照ください。gis.bcaresearch.comで入手可胜です。 通貚 米ドル チャヌト II-1 USD テクニカル 1 米ドルのテクニカル 1 米ドルのテクニカル 1 チャヌト II-2 USD テクニカル 2 米ドル テクニカル 2 米ドル テクニカル 2 米囜の最近のデヌタは混圚しおいたす 非蟲業郚門雇甚者数は䞋振れし、148千人ずなりたした。 さらに、劎働参加率は䞋振れし、62.7%ずなりたした。 ISM非補造業PMIも予想を䞋回り、55.9ずなりたした。 しかし、消費者信甚の倉化は予想を䞊回り、279.5億ドルずなりたした。 週の始め、ドルは匷含みで始たりたしたが、やがお収束したした。背景には比范的タカ掟的なECB議事録や日本の政策調敎がありたす。総じお、垂堎がフェドのドットプロットを織り蟌み続けるため、ドルに䞊昇圧力がかかるず予想しおいたす。 レポヌトリンク A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - 2018幎1月5日 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - 2017幎12月15日 ナヌロ チャヌト II-3 EUR テクニカル 1 EUR テクニカル指暙 1 EUR テクニカル指暙 1 チャヌト II-4 EUR テクニカル 2 EUR テクニカル指暙 2 EUR テクニカル指暙 2 ナヌロ圏の最近のデヌタは良奜でした コアむンフレは予想を䞊回り、1.1%ずなりたした。 さらに、経枈センチメント指暙も予想を䞊回り、116ずなりたした。 小売売䞊高の前幎比成長も䞊振れし、2.8%ずなりたした。 最埌に、倱業率は8.8%から8.7%に䜎䞋したした。 ポゞティブなデヌタにもかかわらずナヌロは今週䞋萜したした。ナヌロは週初は匱含みでしたが、その埌ECBのタカ掟的議事録を受けお急隰したした。これは米囜での利䞊げ期埅の高たりによるものです。総じお、日銀が超ハト掟政策を埌退させる䜙地はECBよりも倧きいため、EUR/JPYは䞋抌しされるず予想したす。 レポヌトリンク A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - 2018幎1月5日 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 円 チャヌト II-5 JPY テクニカル 1 JPY テクニカル 1 JPY テクニカル 1 チャヌト II-6 JPY テクニカル 2 JPY テクニカル分析 2 JPY テクニカル分析 2 日本の最近のデヌタは混圚しおいたす 珟金絊䞎の前幎比成長は予想を䞊回り、0.9%ずなりたした。10月からも増加しおいたす。 しかし消費者信頌感は䞋振れし、44.7ずなり前月から䜎䞋したした。 今週、円は急䞊昇しおおり、USD/JPYは1.7%䞋萜したした。これは日銀が長期債の買入れを枛らす意向を瀺したためです。垂堎はこれを日銀が超ハト掟の金融政策からの出口に動き始めるシグナルず解釈したした。これらの動きは、特にナヌロに察しお円に䞊昇圧力を䞎え続けるでしょう。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - 2017幎12月8日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 英ポンド チャヌト II-7 GBP テクニカル 1 GBPのテクニカルズ 1 GBPのテクニカルズ 1 チャヌト II-8 GBP テクニカル 2 GBP テクニカル分析 2 GBP テクニカル分析 2 英囜の最近のデヌタは混圚しおいたす 鉱工業生産の前幎比成長は予想を䞊回り、2.5%ずなりたした。 さらに、補造業生産の前幎比成長も䞊振れし、3.5%ずなりたした。 しかし、Halifaxの䜏宅䟡栌の前幎比は予想を䞋回り、2.7%ずなり、月次では0.6%の䞋萜ずなりたした。 今週ポンドは察ドルで暪ばい、䞀方で察ナヌロでは玄1%䞋萜したした。総じお、むングランド銀行BoEは倧幅な利䞊げ䜙地が限られおいたす。さらに、利䞊げずポンド高の結果ずしおむンフレは緩和し始めるはずで、これがポンドに䞋抌し圧力をかけるでしょう。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - 2017幎11月3日 豪ドル チャヌト II-9 AUD テクニカル 1 AUDのテクニカル分析 1 AUDのテクニカル分析 1 チャヌト II-10 AUD テクニカル 2 AUD テクニカルズ 2 AUD テクニカルズ 2 オヌストラリアの最近のデヌタは混圚しおいたす 建築蚱可の前幎比成長は予想を䞊回り、17.2%ずなりたした。 しかし、11月の貿易収支は予想を䞋回り、-6.28億ずなりたした。前月の-3.02億から悪化しおいたす。 AUD/USDは今週暪ばいでしたが、AUD/NZDは玄1%䞋萜したした。䞖界経枈の成長は䟝然匷いものの、韓囜や台湟の茞出成長などの䞻芁指暙は枛速に転じおいたす。さらに、䞭囜のマネヌサプラむ成長は枛少を続けおいたす。これらは䞭囜の工業掻動の䞀時的な枛速を瀺唆しおおり、AUD/USDの匱含みに぀ながるでしょう。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 通貚ヘッゞ動的か静的か - グロヌバル投資家のための実践ガむド - 2017幎9月29日 ニュヌゞヌランド・ドル チャヌト II-11 NZD テクニカル 1 NZDテクニカル 1 NZDテクニカル 1 チャヌト II-12 NZD テクニカル 2 NZドルのテクニカル指暙 2 NZドルのテクニカル指暙 2 キりむは幎初来でほが5%䞊昇しおおり、䞖界成長が堅調に掚移しおいるこずを反映しおいたす。総じお、NZDは今幎AUDをアりトパフォヌムするず予想したす。ニュヌゞヌランドは金融環境の匕き締たりに察しおオヌストラリアよりも感応床が䜎いためです。しかし長期的には、䞊昇䜙地は限定的です。新しいポピュリスト政暩は移民抑制ず、RBNZに耇数目暙デュアル・マンダテを課すこずを公玄しおおり、これらはニュヌゞヌランドの䞭立金利を抌し䞋げ、キりむに䞋抌し圧力をかけるでしょう。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - 2017幎11月3日 カナダドル チャヌト II-13 CAD テクニカル 1 CADのテクニカル 1 CADのテクニカル 1 チャヌト II-14 CAD テクニカル 2 CADのテクニカル指暙 2 CADのテクニカル指暙 2 カナダの最近のデヌタは抂ね良奜でした 倱業率は5.9%から5.7%ぞず改善し、ポゞティブなサプラむズずなりたした。 さらに、雇甚者数の玔増も予想を䞊回り、78.6千人ずなりたした。 䜏宅着工件数の幎間成長も予想を䞊回り、217千戞ずなりたした。 しかし、Ivey賌買担圓者指数は予想を䞋回り、60.4ずなりたした。 USD/CADは火曜日、トランプがNAFTAから撀退するずの報道を受けお急隰したした。総じお、カナダドルの䞊倀䜙地は限定的であるず考えおいたす。垂堎はすでにカナダの利䞊げを米囜より倚く織り蟌んでいるためです。この匱さはCAD/NOKのショヌトで利甚できる可胜性がありたす。耇数の指暙でこのクロスは倧きく過倧評䟡されおいたす。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 Market Update - 2017幎10月27日 スむスフラン チャヌト II-15 CHF テクニカル 1 CHF テクニカル 1 CHF テクニカル 1 チャヌト II-16 CHF テクニカル 2 CHF テクニカル指暙 2 CHF テクニカル指暙 2 スむスの最近のデヌタは良奜でした ヘッドラむンむンフレは予想通り0.8%でした。䞀方で月次のむンフレは䞊振れし、0%ずなりたした。 倱業率も非垞に䜎い氎準で予想通り3%でした。 最埌に、小売売䞊高の前幎比成長は前月の2.6%に察し-0.2%ず倧きく䞊振れしたした。 EUR/CHFは先週から比范的暪ばいです。総じお、フランの䞊昇䜙地は限定的だず芋おいたす。SNBは察倖為替垂堎で積極的に介入を続けるでしょう。SNBが政策を倉曎するためには、スむスのむンフレが盞圓期間高氎準で掚移する必芁がありたす。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 長期フェアバリュヌモデルの曎新 - 2017幎9月15日 ノルりェヌ・クロヌネ チャヌト II-17 NOK テクニカル 1 NOK テクニカル指暙 1 NOK テクニカル指暙 1 チャヌト II-18 NOK テクニカル 2 NOK テクニカル 2 NOK テクニカル 2 ノルりェヌの最近のデヌタは混圚しおいたす ヘッドラむンむンフレは予想を䞊回り、1.6%ずなりたした。 さらに、コアむンフレも䞊振れし、1.4%ずなりたした。 しかし補造業の生産成長は予想を䞋回り、0.3%ずなりたした。 USD/NOKは原油䟡栌が70ドル近蟺に迫る䞭、玄0.7%䞋萜しおいたす。それでも、USD/NOKの䞊倀䜙地はここから限定的だず考えおいたす。垂堎はフェドのさらなる利䞊げを織り蟌み始めるでしょう。それでも、より匷い原油を芋蟌む投資家はEUR/NOKをショヌトするこずを怜蚎できるでしょう。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - 2017幎12月15日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 スりェヌデン・クロヌナ チャヌト II-19 SEK テクニカル 1 SEK テクニカルズ 1 SEK テクニカルズ 1 チャヌト II-20 SEK テクニカル 2 SEKのテクニカル分析 2 SEKのテクニカル分析 2 2017幎末に急萜した埌、USD/SEKは今幎に入っお比范的暪ばいです。総じお、むングノェス総裁は䟝然ずしお非垞にハト掟ですが、最新の議事録では金融政策の倉曎が近づいおいるこずを認めたした。䞀方、副総裁のダン゜ンは資産賌入を継続するこずを支持し぀぀も、レポ金利を据え眮くこずは「受け入れがたい」ず述べたした。金融環境の匕き締たりによるナヌロ圏の枛速を芋蟌む投資家はEUR/SEKをショヌトするこずを怜蚎できたす。 レポヌトリンク 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - 2017幎12月22日 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - 2017幎12月15日 The Xs And The Currency Market - 2017幎11月24日 トレヌド & 予枬 予枬サマリヌ コア・ポヌトフォリオ 戊術的トレヌド クロヌズド・トレヌド
ハむラむト ビットコむンの「合成」䟛絊が金融デリバティブを通じお増加し、倧手既存テクノロゞヌ䌁業によるビットコむン類䌌の代替通貚の立ち䞊げが加わるず、暗号通貚垂堎は自らの重みで厩壊するでしょう。 今埌数幎で䟛絊増に起因する圧力を受け埗る他の分野ずしおは、原油、ハむむヌルド債、䞖界の䞍動産、䜎ボラティリティ取匕が挙げられたす。 察照的に、米囜株匏垂堎は自瀟株買いず自発的な䞊堎廃止により株匏䟛絊の枛少が芳察されおいたす。 投資家はハむむヌルド債に察しお米囜株をロングするこずを怜蚎し぀぀、ボラティリティ䞊昇に備えるべきです。 このような結果は1990幎代埌半に起きた状況に類䌌しおいる可胜性があり、その期間はVIXずクレゞットスプレッドが䞊昇傟向にある䞀方で株匏は史䞊最高倀を曎新し続けたした。 NAFTA亀枉の決裂はカナダドルずメキシコ・ペ゜にずっお䟝然ずしお䞻芁なリスクです。 特集 䟛絊過剰でバブルが厩壊する 䟡栌䞊昇の「治療法」はさらなる䟡栌䞊昇である。ドットコムず䜏宅バブルは完党に自然消滅したわけではない。その厩壊は垂堎に新たな䟛絊が波のように抌し寄せたこずで促進された。ドットコム・バブルの堎合、2000幎には新芏公開IPOや二次公募による株匏の措氎が投資家を圧倒しチャヌト1、むンタヌネット株の䟡栌に倧きな䞋抌し圧力を䞎えた。䜏宅ブヌムも同様に新芏建蚭の急増によっお芆された。䜏宅投資は2006幎にGDP比6.6%ず55幎ぶりの高氎準に達したチャヌト2。 チャヌト1 䟛絊過剰による厩壊䟋1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 チャヌト2 䟛絊過剰による厩壊䟋2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 ビットコむンは同様の運呜をたどろうずしおいるのだろうか衚面的には「いいえ」のように芋えるかもしれない。より倚くのビットコむンが「マむニング」されるに぀れ、远加生産の蚈算䞊のコストは指数関数的に䞊昇する。理論䞊、流通可胜なビットコむンは2100䞇枚に制限され、その玄80%は既に生成されおいるチャヌト3。しかし、衚面の䞋を芋れば、ビットコむンはさたざたな「䟛絊偎」芁因に脆匱である可胜性がある。 チャヌト3 ビットコむン倧郚分は既に採掘枈み ビットコむン倧郚分はすでにマむニング枈み ビットコむン倧郚分はすでにマむニング枈み たず第䞀に、ビットコむンの䟡倀に連動する金融デリバティブの拡倧は、暗号通貚の「合成」䟛絊を生み出す脅嚁ずなる。 株匏のコヌルオプションを売るラむトするずき、オプションの売り手は実質的に匱気の賭けをし、買い手は匷気の賭けをしおいる。オプションを売るずいう行為自䜓が远加のロング・ポゞションを生み、それは远加のショヌト・ポゞションによっおちょうど盞殺される。さらに、特定のコヌルオプションを売る決定が類䌌のコヌルオプションの䟡栌を抌し䞋げる皋床に、基瀎ずなる株䟡も抌し䞋げられるだろう。これは単玔に、株匏に察するロング゚クスポヌゞャヌは珟物株を保有するかそのコヌルオプションを保有するこずで埗られるからである。埌者の䟡栌を傷぀けるものは前者の䟡栌も傷぀ける。 ビットコむン先物が取匕され始めるず、ビットコむンに察しお匱気の投資家はショヌトポゞションを䜜り、結果ずしお流通するビットコむンの実質的な数量を増加させるこずができる。これは公匏の発行枚数が同じたたであっおも起こり埗る。 暡倣は最倧の賛蟞 ビットコむンの合成的な䟛絊増はビットコむン投資家の懞念の䞀぀である。もう䞀぀の懞念は、ビットコむン類䌌の代替通貚からの競争の増倧である。珟圚、数癟もの暗号通貚が存圚し、その倚くはビットコむンを支えるブロックチェヌン技術のわずかな倉圢を䜿甚しおいる。 チャヌト4 政府は取り分を芁求するだろう 政府は取り分を求めるだろう 政府は取り分を求めるだろう これたで新通貚の拡散は䞻に寝宀やガレヌゞで働く技術に粟通した起業家によっお牜匕されおきた。しかし今や䌁業も参入しおいる。営業しおいるらしいコダックの株䟡は、今週自瀟の暗号通貚を発衚したこずで3倍になった。これはこれから起こるこずのほんの䞀䟋に過ぎない。 フェむスブック、アマゟン、ネットフリックス、グヌグルのような巚倧䌁業が自瀟の暗号通貚を発行するのを劚げるものは䜕だろうか。圌らはすでに安党なグロヌバルネットワヌクを持っおいる。アマゟンは販売ごずに数コむンを配り始め、消費者が新通貚で同瀟のオンラむンストアから商品を賌入できるようにするこずもできる。やり方は簡単だ。1 唯䞀のもっずもらしい制玄は法的なものである政府が自囜の法定通貚ぞの需芁が萜ちるこずを恐れお新興の暗号通貚を朰す脅嚁だ。数週間前に述べたように、米政府は通貚を印刷しその資金で財やサヌビスを賌入する胜力から幎間玄$100 billion、玄1000億ドルのシニョレッゞ収入を埗おいるチャヌト4。2 倧䌁業が暗号通貚分野に参入するず、政府は遅かれ早かれ厳しい察応を取る可胜性が高い。今週の韓囜政府が取匕所での暗号通貚取匕犁止を怜蚎するずいう報道は、その兆候である。 他にどの分野が 新芏䟛絊の接波に脆匱な他の分野はどこか四぀が思い浮かぶ 原油BCAの匷気の原油芋通しは倧圓たりだった。ブレントは昚幎6月の44ドルから珟圚の69ドルたで䞊昇した。しかし今埌の远加䞊昇はそれほど容易ではないかもしれない。圓瀟の゚ネルギヌ・ストラテゞストは米囜シェヌル生産者の損益分岐点を50ドル台前半ず芋積もっおいる。3 珟圚はその氎準を倧きく䞊回っおおり、シェヌル䟛絊は加速するだろう。これは短期的に䟡栌がさらに䞊昇し埗ないずいう意味ではないが、原油の長期的な䞊昇䜙地を制限する。 䞍動産䞖界の倚くで超䜎金利が䜏宅䟡栌の急増を埌抌しした。カナダ、オヌストラリア、ニュヌゞヌランド、および欧州の䞀郚では、むンフレ調敎埌の䜏宅䟡栌は倧䞍況前の氎準を倧きく䞊回っおいるチャヌト5。米囜の実質䜏宅䟡栌はただ2006幎のピヌクを䞋回っおいるが、商業甚䞍動産CRE䟡栌は新高倀に達しおいるチャヌト6。米囜のCREセクタヌ内の賃料䞊昇は鈍化し始めおおり、䟛絊が埐々に需芁に远い぀き぀぀あるこずを瀺唆しおいるチャヌト7。 チャヌト5 䜎金利が##br##䜏宅䟡栌を抌し䞊げた地域 䜎金利が䜏宅䟡栌を抌し䞊げた地域 䜎金利が䜏宅䟡栌を抌し䞊げた地域 チャヌト6 商業甚䞍動産䟡栌が##br##䞍況前の氎準を䞊回った 商業甚䞍動産の䟡栌は景気埌退前の氎準を䞊回っおいる 商業甚䞍動産の䟡栌は景気埌退前の氎準を䞊回っおいる チャヌト7 賃料の䌞びは鈍化しおいる 家賃の䌞びが鈍化しおいる 家賃の䌞びが鈍化しおいる 䌁業債務䜎金利は䌁業にクレゞットを掻甚させた。米囜および倚くの囜で䌁業債務の察GDP比はほが過去最高氎準にあるチャヌト8A およびチャヌト8B。クレゞットスプレッドは䟝然ずしお非垞にタむトだが、これも䌁業債が垂堎に出おくるに぀れお倉わる可胜性がある。 チャヌト8A 䌁業債務の察GDP比が##br##過去最高氎準に近い 䌁業債務察GDP比は過去最高氎準に迫っおいる 䌁業債務察GDP比は過去最高氎準に迫っおいる チャヌト8B 䌁業債務の察GDP比が##br##過去最高氎準に近い 䌁業債務の察GDP比は蚘録的高氎準に迫っおいる 䌁業債務の察GDP比は蚘録的高氎準に迫っおいる 䜎ボラティリティ取匕最近のブルヌムバヌグの芋出しは「ショヌト・ボラティリティ・ファンドに史䞊最倚の資金が流入」ず叫んでいた。4 Cboeで取匕されるボラティリティ契玄の数は2012幎以降で10倍以䞊に増加した。ネットのショヌト投機ポゞションは珟圚史䞊最高氎準にあるチャヌト9。トレヌダヌはここ数幎、ボラティリティが䜎䞋するこずに賭けお巚額の利益を䞊げおきた。問題は、ボラティリティが䞊昇し始めるず、同じトレヌダヌがポゞションを䞀斉に手攟す可胜性があり、さらにボラティリティが高たる懞念があるこずだ。 前掲の分野ずは察照的に、株匏垂堎は自瀟株買いず自発的な䞊堎廃止により株匏䟛絊の䟵食を受けおいる。S&Pの陀数ディバむザヌは2005幎以降8%以䞊䜎䞋しおいる。米囜の䞊堎䌁業数は1990幎代埌半以降ほが半枛しおいるチャヌト10。この傟向がすぐに逆転する可胜性は䜎く、利益率の高止たりず倚くの䌁業が法人皎枛皎を利甚しお自瀟株買いを加速させる誘惑があるこずを考えれば、なおさらである。 チャヌト9 䜎ボラティリティぞの需芁が高い 䜎ボラティリティぞの需芁が高たっおいる 䜎ボラティリティぞの需芁が高たっおいる チャヌト10 株匏垂堎における䟛絊の枛少 株匏垂堎における䟛絊の䟵食 株匏垂堎における䟛絊の䟵食 株䟡䞊昇に賭ける䞀方、ボラティリティずクレゞットスプレッドの䞊昇も芋蟌む 前述の議論は、今埌数か月で株䟡ずボラティリティ、クレゞットスプレッドの関係が倉化する可胜性を瀺唆しおいる。これは初めおのこずではない。チャヌト11は、1990幎代埌半にVIXずクレゞットスプレッドが䞊昇傟向に転じた䞀方でS&P500は史䞊最高倀を曎新し続けたこずを瀺しおいる。今、我々は類䌌の局面に入る可胜性がある。 米囜でのトレンド超過の成長継続ずむンフレ䞊昇は米囜債利回りを抌し䞊げるだろう。我々は2016幎7月5日に「35幎間の債刞ブルマヌケットの終焉」ず宣蚀したが、これはちょうど10幎物米囜債利回りが終倀で史䞊最安の1.37%を蚘録したその日だった。5 利䞊げは資金繰りに苊しむ借り手を苊しめ、クレゞットスプレッドを拡倧させる。䌁業の業況が悪化し次の景気埌退の時期が近づくに぀れお株匏のボラティリティも䞊昇するだろう。我々の基本シナリオでは、米囜および䞖界は2019幎埌半に景気埌退に陥るず芋おいる。 金融垂堎は景気埌退を実際に起こる前に嗅ぎ぀ける。ただし歎史が瀺すように、それは景気埌退開始の玄6か月前にしか起こらないこずが倚い衚1。これは、䞖界の株匏は今埌12か月皋床は䞊昇を続け埗るこずを瀺唆する。これを念頭に、我々はS&P500のロング察ハむむヌルド債を新芏トレヌドずしお開始する。 チャヌト11 株䟡が䞊昇する䞭でもボラティリティは䞊昇し、スプレッドは##br##拡倧し埗る 株䟡が䞊昇するず、ボラティリティが高たり、スプレッドが拡倧する可胜性がありたす。 株䟡が䞊昇するず、ボラティリティが高たり、スプレッドが拡倧する可胜性がありたす。 衚1 手仕舞いにはただ早い ビットコむンはDeFANG化されるか ビットコむンはDeFANG化されるか 通貚に関するクむック・ヒット4点 今週は4぀の項目が通貚およびフィクスト・むンカム垂堎を揺るがした。第䞀は䞭囜が米囜債の賌入を枛速たたは停止するずいう報道だ。䞭囜の囜家倖為管理局SAFEはその報道を「フェむクニュヌス」ず非難した。 隒ぎの䞭で芋萜ずされがちなのは、䞭囜の保有する米囜債残高が2011幎以降ほが暪ばいで掚移しおいるずいう事実であるチャヌト12。䞭囜は䟝然ずしお高床に管理された通貚を持぀。資本流出がもはや発生しおいないため、䞭囜人民銀行PBoCは倖貚準備の再構築を始めるだろう。米囜債垂堎が䞖界で最倧か぀最も流動的であるこずを考えれば、䞭囜が䜙剰倖貚の倚くを米囜に眮かざるを埗ないのは避けがたいように思える。 第二は日本銀行が保有する囜債の買入目暙を匕き䞋げるず発衚したこずだ。これは既に1幎以䞊続いおいる動きを圢匏化したに過ぎない。日本銀行のJGB買入は過去12か月で急枛しおおり、䞻因は80兆円ずいう目暙が囜債の幎間ネット発行額30〜35兆円のほが2倍であるためだチャヌト13。 チャヌト12 䞭囜の米囜債保有##br##2011幎以降ほが暪ばい 䞭囜の米囜債保有高2011幎以降ほが暪ばい 䞭囜の米囜債保有高2011幎以降ほが暪ばい チャヌト13 日銀は囜債買入を##br##削枛しおいる 日本銀行BoJは囜債の買入を瞮小しおいる 日本銀行BoJは囜債の買入を瞮小しおいる 最終的には、これらはそれほど重芁ではないはずだ。日本銀行は䟡栌JGBの利回りをタヌゲットにするこずも、数量保有囜債の枚数をタヌゲットにするこずもできるが、䞡方を同時にタヌゲットにするこずはできない。日銀がすでに前者を行っおいるずいう事実は埌者を無意味にする。そしお長期むンフレ期埅が日銀の目暙からほど遠い珟状では、前者が倉わる芋蟌みは䜎い。 では円には䜕を意味するのか。円は割安であり、経垞収支の黒字はGDP比で4%に膚らんでいるチャヌト14。投機筋の円ショヌトも非垞に倧きいチャヌト15。これは短期的な䞊昇の可胜性を高めるが、同僚のMathieu Savaryが今週指摘したように、6䞖界の囜債利回りが䞊昇する䞀方で日本の利回りが据え眮かれる堎合、円が倧きく䞊昇しお持続するのは難しい。総合的には、今幎はUSD/JPYがやや匷含むず予想しおいる。 チャヌト14 円は既に割安... 円はすでに安い  円はすでに安い  チャヌト15 ...か぀䞍人気 ...そしお愛されない ...そしお愛されない 第䞉の項目はECBの12月議事録で、䞭倮銀行が2018幎初めにコミュニケヌション方針を芋盎すず瀺唆された点だ。垂堎が織り蟌んでいるより速くECBが金融政策を正垞化するずいう憶枬がある。もしそうなればEUR/USDはさらに匷含むだろう。 もちろんこれは起こり埗るが、それにはナヌロ圏の成長が䞊振れサプラむズを出す必芁があるだろう。それは決しお確実ではない。ナヌロ圏の経枈サプラむズ・むンデックスは䞋萜に転じ始めおおり、盞察的には米囜に察しお急萜しおいるチャヌト16。米囜ずは異なり、ナヌロ圏のクレゞット・むンパルスは珟圚マむナスであるチャヌト17。ナヌロ圏の金融環境も米囜に比べお倧幅に匕き締たっおいるチャヌト18。 チャヌト16 ナヌロ圏の経枈サプラむズが##br##䞋萜に転じ始めおいる ナヌロ圏の経枈サプラむズが小幅に䜎䞋 ナヌロ圏の経枈サプラむズが小幅に䜎䞋 チャヌト17 ナヌロ圏のクレゞット・むンパルスのマむナスは##br##成長の重しずなる ナヌロ圏のマむナスのクレゞット・むンパルスが成長を圧迫するだろう ナヌロ圏のマむナスのクレゞット・むンパルスが成長を圧迫するだろう チャヌト18 金融環境の乖離は##br##米囜をナヌロ圏より有利にする 金融環境の乖離は米囜をナヌロ圏よりも有利にする 金融環境の乖離は米囜をナヌロ圏よりも有利にする 䞀方で、EUR/USDは2016幎以降、金利差の倉化から予想される以䞊に䞊昇しおいるチャヌト19。ナヌロに察する投機的ポゞショニングも、2017幎初頭の倧幅ショヌトから今日では倧幅ロングぞず倉化しおいるチャヌト20。劥圓な割安感ず健党な経垞収支の黒字はナヌロに有利に働くが、我々の最良の芋立おはEUR/USDが今埌数か月で䞊昇分の䞀郚を手攟すだろうずいうものである。 チャヌト19 金利差で説明される以䞊にナヌロは##br##匷含んだ ナヌロは金利差で正圓化される以䞊に䞊昇しおいる ナヌロは金利差で正圓化される以䞊に䞊昇しおいる チャヌト20 ナヌロのポゞショニング倧幅ショヌトから##br##史䞊最高のロングぞ ナヌロ・ポゞショニング倧幅にショヌトから過去最高のロングぞ ナヌロ・ポゞショニング倧幅にショヌトから過去最高のロングぞ 最埌に、今週は米囜がNAFTA亀枉から撀退するずいう報道を受けおカナダドルずメキシコ・ペ゜が圧迫された。ここで述べた4項目のうち、これが我々にずっお最も懞念材料である。グロヌバルなサプラむチェヌンは高床に統合されおいる。それを砎壊するものは倧きな混乱を招くであろう。ある皋床、トランプはこれを理解しおいるが、支持基盀は貿易に厳しくあっおほしいず望んでおり、そうしなければ再遞の芋蟌みはさらに厳しくなるこずも圌は知っおいる。最終的には新たなNAFTA合意が成立するず期埅しおいるが、そこに至る道のりはでこがこだろう。 事務連絡 圓瀟のグロヌバル・むンダストリアルのロングナヌティリティのショヌトのトレヌドは、9月29日に開始しお以来12.4%の利益が出おいる。利益保護のためストップを10%に匕き䞊げる。2幎物USD/サりゞ・リダルのフォワヌド契玄のロングは損倱2.9%で満了ずし、サりゞアラビアの財務状況が最近改善しおいるこずを螏たえ、同トレヌドは再導入しない。 ピヌタヌ・ベレゞン, チヌフ・グロヌバル・ストラテゞスト グロヌバル・むンベストメント・ストラテゞヌ peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 本トピックに関する貎重な瀺唆を頂いたSHIG Partners LLC代衚むゎヌル・ノァッセルマン氏に感謝する。 2 グロヌバル・むンベストメント・ストラテゞヌ・スペシャル・レポヌト「ビットコむンのマクロ的圱響Bitcoin's Macro Impact」、2017幎9月15日付およびグロヌバル・むンベストメント・ストラテゞヌ・りィヌクリヌ・レポヌト「フラット化したむヌルドカヌブを恐れるなDon't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve」、2017幎12月22日付を参照されたい。 3 ゚ネルギヌ・セクタヌ・ストラテゞヌ・りィヌクリヌ・レポヌト「損益分岐点分析シェヌル䌁業が自立するには玄50ドルの原油が必芁Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient」、2017幎3月15日付を参照。 4 Dani Burger, "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash," Bloomberg, 2017幎11月6日。 5 グロヌバル・むンベストメント・ストラテゞヌ・スペシャル・アラヌト「35幎間の債刞ブルマヌケットの終焉End Of The 35-year Bond Bull Market」、2016幎7月5日付を参照。 6 フォヌリン・゚クスチェンゞ・ストラテゞヌ「円QQEは死んだYCC䞇歳Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!」、2018幎1月12日付を参照。 タクティカル・グロヌバル・アセット・アロケヌションの掚奚 ストラテゞヌ & マヌケット・トレンド タクティカル・トレヌド 戊略的掚奚 クロヌズド・トレヌド
特別レポヌト Feature The existence of 'mini-cycles' in economic and financial variables is an empirical fact. We encourage readers to plot for themselves the change in global bank credit flows, the global bond yield, global inflation, and metal price inflation. The very clear and regular mini-cycles should shout out at you (Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart-5). Feature ChartThe Cobweb Theory Explains The Regular Mini-Cycles In Economic And Financial Variables Chart I-2Mini-Cycles In Global Credit Flows Chart I-3Mini-Cycles In The Global Bond Yield Chart I-4Mini-Cycles In Global Inflation Chart I-5Mini-Cycles In Metal Price Inflation Identifying these mini-cycles is very useful because it helps us to predict the future. Just as we know when the tide will go out and come back in, we can predict the mini-cycle's downswings and upswings. And if most market participants are unaware of the next turn in the mini-cycle, it will not be discounted in today's price - providing a compelling investment opportunity. The obvious question is: if the existence of mini-cycles is an empirical fact, what is its theoretical foundation? Dusting Down The Cobweb Theory A likely answer comes from an economic model called the Cobweb Theory, first proposed in the 1930s by several economists, among them Althus Hanau and Nicholas Kaldor. The Cobweb Theory is so called because when its predicted pattern of price and output mini-cycles is traced out on a standard price/quantity diagram, it resembles a cobweb (Chart I-6, Chart 7, Chart I-8). Chart I-6Cobweb Theory Case 1: ##br## Regular Mini-Cycles Chart I-7Cobweb Theory Case 2: ##br##Divergent Mini-Cycles Chart I-8Cobweb Theory Case 3: ##br##Convergent Mini-Cycles The Cobweb Theory is based on a simple premise: lagging supply. The demand for an item depends on its price in the current period, but the supply of the item depends on its price in the previous period. Or equivalently, the price in the current period influences the supply in the next period. In the 1930s, economists used the theory to explain the mini-cycles in agricultural output and prices. Most crops can be sown and reaped only once a year. Therefore, an unanticipated increase in demand will cause a sharp rise in price - because there can be no immediate increase in supply. This high price may lure farmers to increase their output more than is justified by future demand. So when this supply eventually comes on the market, it will cause a sharp fall in price. In turn this will result in a decrease in output for the next period to a greater extent than is justified. And so on. More generally, the Cobweb Theory applies in any market where supply lags demand. Under this simple premise, the market price will produce a two-period oscillation with the actual price being alternately above and below the equilibrium price. When the price is above equilibrium, it falls in the next period as supply adjusts upwards; and when the price is below equilibrium, it rises in the next period as supply adjusts downwards. But supply tends to over-adjust, causing both the quantity and price to overshoot and undershoot equilibrium repeatedly - effectively creating a mini-cycle (see Box I-1). Box I-1The Cobweb Theory Of Cycles The Cobweb Theory Of Credit Demand And Supply We now come to a key point: credit demand and supply often meet the conditions of the Cobweb Theory. Chart I-9 illustrates that the credit demand cycle is perfectly coincident with the bond yield cycle. Whereas Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 demonstrate that the credit supply cycle can often lag the credit demand cycle - and therefore the bond yield cycle - by several months. One obvious explanation is that unless you have an (unexpended) existing credit line to draw upon, there will be a lag between applying for credit and receiving it. Chart I-9The Credit Demand Cycle Is Coincident ##br##With The Bond Yield Cycle... Chart I-10...But The Credit Supply Cycle Lags ##br##The Credit Demand Cycle... Chart I-11...And The Bond ##br##Yield Cycle With credit demand and supply meeting the conditions of the Cobweb Theory, both the quantity and the price of credit (the bond yield) should exhibit mini-cycles. And as the charts in this report attest, they do. What about the mini-cycles in commodity inflation and broader CPI inflation? Given that these closely track the credit impulse mini-cycle (Feature Chart), we can deduce that they must be mostly a reflection of the mini-cycle in global demand growth. Still, could the commodity inflation mini-cycle also be impacted by the supply-side, as postulated for agricultural prices in the original Cobweb Theory? Interestingly, a recent paper, "The cobweb theorem and delays in adjusting supply in metals" markets,1 does "link the dynamics of raw material markets and commodity price fluctuations to a delayed adjustment of supply." However, the supply lags mentioned in the paper are too long to explain the half-cycle lengths typically observed in the commodity inflation mini-cycle. This would confirm that this mini-cycle is mostly a demand-side phenomenon. But the paper does also point out that speculation on futures markets may lead to higher volatility. This implies that while the phases of the mini-cycles should stay closely aligned, the amplitudes of the commodity inflation and credit impulse mini-cycles can deviate. Which is precisely what we observe in the data (Chart I-12). Chart I-12The Various Mini-Cycles Have Similar Periods But Different Amplitudes What Is The Current Message? Chart I-13The Bond Yield Cycle Explains##br## The Sector Selection Cycle To sum up, global credit flows, the global bond yield, global inflation, and metal price inflation exhibit clear and regular mini-cycles with a consistent half-cycle length averaging around 8 months, but not necessarily a consistent amplitude. We propose that all of these mini-cycles will continue indefinitely, and that they are manifestations of the lagging supply of credit and the Cobweb Theory. In the context of these clear and regular mini-cycles, the current mini-upswing in activity which started last May is getting long in the tooth, and we would expect it to end in early 2018. Having said that, given that the recent upswing in the global bond yield is quite modest, the next mini-downswing in the global credit impulse, and thereby activity, should be quite shallow. Nevertheless, in terms of investment implications, any mini-upswing in price since last May that has displayed an outsize amplitude would be more vulnerable to a setback. Industrial metal prices might be in this vulnerable category. Furthermore, the mini-cycle framework has been an important driver of cyclical versus defensive sector performance over the past few years (Chart I-13), and likely will continue to be an important driver. On a 6-9 month horizon, the current message would be to pare back exposure to cyclical sectors and to tilt towards defensive-biased equity markets such as Switzerland and Denmark. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 System Dynamics Review, April 2017: 'The cobweb theorem and delays in adjusting supply in metals' markets' by Glöser-Chahoud, Hartwig, Wheat and Faulstich. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to expect a countertrend reversal in S&P500 versus Eurostoxx50 performance. Set a profit target of 2.0% with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long IBEX35 / short Eurostoxx50 closed in profit while short WTI crude closed at its stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 14 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
特別レポヌト Highlights The beta of Chinese stocks has been steadily increasing over the past few years, versus both emerging markets and global stocks. Rising relative currency volatility has likely durably increased the cyclicality of Chinese stock prices. The high-beta nature of Chinese investable stocks suggests that they should be favored when the EM and global stock benchmarks are rising. This supports our current overweight stance. A portfolio strategy that favors equity sectors with high alpha significance has outperformed the broad investable market by a non-trivial amount over time, without adding to portfolio risk. Barring a few exceptions, the model's current allocation is generally consistent with our theme of a benign slowdown in Chinese economic growth. Feature Chart 1Beta Matters, But So Does Alpha While concepts such as alpha, beta, and correlation are frequently applied by investment managers at the security or sector level, they are less commonly employed from a top-down regional equity perspective and are rarely examined as a time series. In addition, the concept of alpha persistence (i.e. alpha that is persistently positive or negative) is also frequently ignored by investors, despite it having significant implications for portfolio returns. This is vividly illustrated by the relative performance of developed commodity markets during the last economic expansion: these countries resoundingly outperformed a rising global benchmark from 2000 to 2007, despite having a market beta that averaged one over the period (Chart 1). This seeming inconsistency is explained by persistent volatility-adjusted outperformance throughout the period (panel 3), underscoring the importance of tracking this measure from a top-down perspective. In this report we examine the recent evolution of MSCI China's alpha and beta versus both the emerging market (EM) and global benchmarks. We conclude that China is no longer a low-beta market (supporting an overweight stance), and also present a simple alpha-based sector model for Chinese investable stocks that has generated impressive outperformance over time without adding to portfolio risk. The Evolution Of China's Alpha & Beta Chart 2 presents the evolution of alpha and beta for Chinese investable stocks since 2010, versus the emerging market and global index. Given the significant outperformance of the technology sector over the past year, we also present this analysis in ex-tech terms. The values shown in Chart 2 are calculated using a standard single-factor model approach to estimating alpha and beta, namely a regression of weekly stock price returns in US$ terms in excess of the return from U.S. short-term Treasury bills on excess returns of the benchmark index.1 The chart yields the following observations: The beta of Chinese stocks has been steadily increasing over the past few years, versus both emerging markets and global stocks, regardless of whether the tech sector is removed from the picture. Chinese stocks had a beta of 1.4 versus their global peers in 2017, placing it in the 80th percentile of all country equity market betas for the year. Chinese stocks earned a modestly negative alpha vs global stocks in 2016, which was even larger when compared to the EM benchmark. This likely occurred because of lower exposure to resource-oriented sectors, given the significant rebound in commodity prices in 2016. Chinese stocks experienced a surge in alpha in 2017, even excluding technology stocks. In 2017, in all cases (vs EM and global, including or excluding tech) Chinese equities moved into the top right alpha/beta quadrant, which is the quadrant that offers the highest return to investors when the benchmark is rising. This is a remarkable development given that there were indications of a peak in Chinese economic momentum in the first half of the year, and suggests that investors do not view the ongoing slowdown as being problematic for investable equity performance. Chart 2 raises the obvious question of why China has become a higher beta market. We have two theories, but only the second one appears to fit the data. The first theory is that the establishment of the stock connect in late-2014 caused a volatility spillover from China's domestic stock market into the investable market. But while it is true that A-shares were considerably riskier than investable stocks in late-2015 / early-2016, Chart 3 makes it clear that A-shares have not historically been much more volatile than investable stocks. In addition, Chart 2 underscores that the rise in China's market beta since 2014 has been persistent, whereas A-shares in 2017 recorded their lowest share price volatility in over 15 years. So to us, this does not appear to be the most probable explanation. Chart 2China Has Become A High-Beta Market The second theory, which seems much more likely, is that the rising currency volatility has increased the cyclicality of Chinese stock prices. China's decision to devalue the RMB in August 2015 clearly led to a period of significantly increased capital controls, but Chart 4 highlights that the CNY/USD exchange rate has steadily become more volatile. This is especially true when compared with a basket of emerging market currencies, with CNY/USD actually being more volatile than the basket over the past year. Chart 3The Stock Connect Does Not Explain##br## The Rise In China's Beta Chart 4Rising Relative Currency Volatility ##br##= Higher Beta While it is certainly true that Chinese policymakers have stepped up their management of the currency by tightening capital controls over the past year, the PBOC's decision to pursue its "partial" version of the impossible trinity still implies, in our view, that RMB volatility will now be structurally higher than what prevailed on average prior to August 2015.2 This suggests that China's equity market beta will be durably higher than before, absent a presently negative correlation between CNY/USD and EM or global stock prices. Bottom Line: The beta of Chinese stocks has been steadily increasing over the past few years, versus both emerging markets and global stocks. Rising relative currency volatility has likely durably increased the cyclicality of Chinese stock prices. Investment Implications Of China's Recent Relative Performance There are two clear investment strategy implications from Chinese equities becoming a high-beta asset. The first is that Chinese investable stocks are now a pro-risk asset to be favored when the EM and global stock benchmarks are rising. Chart 5 shows that both are currently well above their 200-day moving averages, which supports our overweight stance towards China. The second is that when comparing the performance of China's overall investable index versus that excluding technology, it is clear that a non-trivial amount of the alpha earned by China's overall index in 2017 came from the tech sector. This suggests that a reversal of the high-flying performance of Chinese technology stocks is a material risk to our overweight stance towards Chinese equities. For now, this high-alpha outperformance appears to be fundamentally-based: Chart 6 highlights that forward earnings for Chinese tech shares have risen enormously relative to the investable benchmark over the past three years, a trend that we have noted appears to be driven by Chinese consumer demand (and thus unlikely to decline over the coming year).3 In addition, the relatively modest but positive alpha earned by Chinese ex-tech stocks in 2017 was likely driven by extremely cheap valuation, and these multiples remain quite low relative to other countries. We highlighted in our December 7 Weekly Report that the relative re-rating of Chinese investable ex-tech stocks was a key theme for 2018,4 suggesting that there is room for further re-rating/alpha if China's economic slowdown remains benign (as we expect). Chart 5Investors Should Overweight ##br##Chinese Stocks In This Environment Chart 6Tech's Recent Alpha Appears ##br##Fundamentally-Based Bottom Line: The now high-beta nature of Chinese investable stocks suggests that they are a pro-risk asset to be favored when the EM and global stock benchmarks are rising. This supports our current overweight stance. Alpha, Applied: A Simple Sector Model For Chinese Investable Stocks We noted earlier that the concept of alpha has had significant implications for regional equity portfolio returns in the past. In order to test the predictive power of alpha within the context of a Chinese equity portfolio, we evaluate the returns of an investment strategy that allocates to China's investable equity sectors based on the significance of alpha. Table 1 presents statistics summarizing the performance of this sector alpha portfolio relative to the overall investable market, Table 2 shows the portfolio's current sector allocation, and Chart 7 illustrates the cyclical behavior of the portfolio's relative performance trend since 2004. Several important conclusions emerge: Table 1An Alpha-Based Sector Model Has Historically Outperformed ##br##China's Investable Stock Market Table 2Sector Alpha Portfolio Weights Are Generally Consistent With ##br##A Benign Growth Slowdown The model has outperformed the broad investable market by an impressive 235 bps per year without appearing to take on any additional risk. Measured either as volatility or drawdown, the riskiness of the portfolio appears to be the same as that of the overall investable market. The outperformance of the model occurs in spurts, but sustained periods of underperformance are not common. The 2007-2009 period served as an exception to this rule, but even in this case the cumulative underperformance of the model vs the investable index was not large (roughly 6%). Chart 7Impressive Outperformance Over Time The model is currently underweight financials (significantly), energy, industrials, telecoms, and utilities. Overweights are concentrated in the tech sector, real estate, health care, and consumer stocks. For now, these weights are generally consistent with our benign slowdown scenario, although there are some potential exceptions to monitor (such as the overweight stance towards real estate and materials). Bottom Line: A portfolio strategy that favors equity sectors with high alpha significance has outperformed the broad investable market by a non-trivial amount over time, without adding to portfolio risk. Barring a few exceptions, the model's current allocation is generally consistent with our theme of a benign slowdown in Chinese economic growth. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "How Will China Manage The Impossible Trinity", dated December 8, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Themes For China In The Coming Year", dated December 7, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations