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Highlights President Biden has called for the US intelligence community to investigate the origins of COVID-19 and one of Biden’s top diplomats has stated the obvious: the era of “engagement” with China is over. This clinches our long-held view that any Democratic president would be a hawk like President Trump. The US-China conflict – and global geopolitical risk – will revive and undermine global risk appetite. China faces a confluence of geopolitical and macroeconomic challenges, suggesting that its equity underperformance will continue. Domestic Chinese investors should stay long government bonds. Foreign investors should sell into the bond rally to reduce exposure to any future sanctions. The impending agreement of a global minimum corporate tax rate has limited concrete implications that are not already known but it symbolizes the return of Big Government in the western world. Our updated GeoRisk Indicators are available in the Appendix, as well as our monthly geopolitical calendar. Feature In our quarterly webcast, “Geopolitics And Bull Markets,” we argued that geopolitical themes matter to investors when they have a demonstrable relationship with the macroeconomic backdrop. When geopolitics and macro are synchronized, a simple yet powerful investment thesis can be discerned. The US war on terror, Russia’s resurgence, the EU debt crisis, and Brexit each provided cases in which a geopolitically informed macro view was both accessible and actionable at an early stage. Investors generally did well if they sold the relevant country’s currency and disfavored its equities on a relative basis. Chart 1China's Decade Of Troubles Of course, the market takeaway is not always so clear. When geopolitics and macroeconomics are desynchronized, the trick is to determine which framework will prevail over the financial markets and for how long. Sometimes the market moves to its own rhythm. The goal is not to trade on geopolitics but rather to invest with geopolitics. One of our key views for this year – headwinds for China – is an example of synchronization. Two weeks ago we discussed China’s macroeconomic challenge. In this report we discuss China’s foreign policy challenge: geopolitical pressure from the US and its allies. In particular we address President Biden’s call for a deeper intelligence dive into the origins of COVID-19. The takeaway is negative for China’s currency and risk assets. The Great Recession dealt a painful blow to the Chinese version of the East Asian economic miracle. By 2015, China’s financial turmoil and currency devaluation should have convinced even bullish investors to keep their distance from Chinese stocks and the renminbi. If investors stuck with this bearish view despite the post-2016 rally, on fear of trade war, they were rewarded in 2018-19. Only with China’s containment of COVID-19 and large economic stimulus in 2020 has CNY-USD threatened to break out (Chart 1). We expect the renminbi to weaken anew, especially once the Fed begins to taper asset purchases. Our cyclical view is still bullish but US-China relations are unstable so we remain tactically defensive. Forget Biden’s China Review, He’s A Hawk Chinese financial markets face a host of challenges this year, despite the positive factors for China’s manufacturing sector amid the global recovery. At home these challenges consist of a structural economic slowdown, a withdrawal of policy stimulus, bearish sentiment among households, and an ongoing government crackdown on systemic risk. Abroad the Democratic Party’s return to power in Washington means that the US will bring more allies to bear in its attempt to curb China’s rise. This combination of factors presents a headwind for Chinese equities and a tailwind for government bonds (Chart 2). This is true at least until the government should hit its pain threshold and re-stimulate. Chart 2Global Investors Still Wary New stimulus may not occur in 2022. The Communist Party’s leadership rotation merely requires economic stability, not rapid growth. While the central government has a record of stimulating when its pain threshold is hit, even under the economically hawkish President Xi Jinping, a financial market riot is usually part of this threshold. This implies near-term downside, particularly for global commodities and metals, which are also facing a Chinese regulatory backlash to deter speculation. In this context, President Biden’s call for a deeper US intelligence investigation into the origin of COVID-19 is an important confirming signal of the US’s hawkish turn toward China. Biden gave 90 days for the intelligence community to report back to him. We will not enter into the debate about COVID-19’s origins. From a geopolitical point of view it is a moot point. The facts of the virus origin may never be established. According to Biden’s statement, at least one US intelligence agency believes the “lab leak theory” is the most likely source of the virus (while two other agencies decided in favor of animal-to-human transmission). Meanwhile Chinese government spokespeople continue to push the theory that the virus originated at the US’s Fort Detrick in Maryland or at a US-affiliated global research center. What is certain is that the first major outbreak of a highly contagious disease occurred in Wuhan. Both sides are demanding greater transparency and will reject each other’s claims based on a lack of transparency. If the US intelligence report concludes that COVID originated from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Chinese government and media will reject the report. If the report exonerates the Wuhan laboratory, at least half of the US public will disbelieve it and it will not deter Biden from drawing a hard line on more macro-relevant policy disputes with China. The US’s hawkish bipartisan consensus on China took shape before COVID. Biden’s decision to order the fresh report introduces skepticism regarding the World Health Organization’s narrative, which was until now the mainstream media’s narrative. Previously this skepticism was ghettoized in US public discourse: indeed, until Biden’s announcement on May 26, the social media company Facebook suppressed claims that the virus came from a lab accident or human failure. Thus Biden’s action will ensure that a large swathe of the American public will always tend to support this theory regardless of the next report’s findings. At the same time Biden discontinued a State Department effort to prove the lab leak theory, which shows that it is not a foregone conclusion what his administration will decide. The good news is that even if the report concluded in favor of the lab leak, the Biden administration would remain highly unlikely to demand that China pay “reparations,” like the Trump administration demanded in 2020. This demand, if actualized, would be explosive. The bad news is that a future nationalist administration could conceivably use the investigation as a basis to demand reparations. Nationalism is a force to be reckoned with in both countries and the dispute over COVID’s origin will exacerbate it. Traditionally the presidents of both countries would tamp down nationalism or attempt to keep it harnessed. But in the post-Xi, post-Trump era it is harder to control. The death toll of COVID-19 will be a permanent source of popular grievance around the world and a wedge between the US and China (Chart 3). China’s international image suffered dramatically in 2020. So far in 2021 China has not regained any diplomatic ground. Chart 3Death Toll Of COVID-19 The US is repairing its image via a return to multilateralism while the Europeans have put their Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China on hold due to a spat over sanctions arising from western accusations of genocide (a subject on which China pointedly answered that it did not need to be lectured by Europeans). Notably Biden’s Department of State also endorsed its predecessor’s accusation of genocide in Xinjiang. Any authoritative US intelligence review that solidifies doubts about the WHO’s initial investigation – even if it should not affirm the lab leak theory – would give Biden more ammunition in global opinion to form a democratic alliance to pressure China (for example, in Europe). An important factor that enables the US to remain hawkish on China is fiscal stimulus. While stimulus helps bring about economic recovery, it also lowers the bar to political confrontation (Chart 4). Countries with supercharged domestic demand do not have as much to fear from punitive trade measures. The Biden administration has not taken new punitive measures against China but it is clearly not worried about Chinese retaliation. Chart 4Large Fiscal Stimulus Lowers The Bar To Geopolitical Conflict China’s stimulus is underrated in this chart (which excludes non-fiscal measures) but it is still true that China’s policy has been somewhat restrained and it will need to stimulate its economy again in response to any new punitive measures or any global loss of confidence. At least China is limited in its ability to tighten policy due to the threat of US pressure and western trade protectionism. Simultaneous with Biden’s announcement on COVID-19, his administration’s coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, proclaimed in a speech that the era of “engagement” with China is officially over and the new paradigm is one of “competition.” By now Campbell is stating the obvious. But this tone is a change both from his tone while serving in President Obama’s Department of State and from his article in Foreign Affairs last year (when he was basically auditioning for his current role in the Biden administration).1 Campbell even said in his latest remarks that the Trump administration was right about the “direction” of China policy (though not the “execution”), which is candid. Campbell was speaking at Stanford University but his comments were obviously aimed for broader consumption. Investors no longer need to wait for the outcome of the Biden administration’s comprehensive review of policy toward China. The answer is known: the Biden administration’s hawkishness is confirmed. The Department of Defense report on China policy, due in June, is very unlikely to strike a more dovish posture than the president’s health policy. Now investors must worry about how rapidly tensions will escalate and put a drag on global sentiment. Bottom Line: US-China relations are unstable and pose an immediate threat to global risk appetite. The fundamental geopolitical assessment of US-China relations has been confirmed yet again. The US is seeking to constrain China’s rise because China is the only country capable of rivaling the US for supremacy in Asia and the world. Meanwhile China is rejecting liberalization in favor of economic self-sufficiency and maintaining an offensive foreign policy as it is wary of US containment and interference. Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping are still capable of stabilizing relations in the medium term but they are unlikely to substantially de-escalate tensions. And at the moment tensions are escalating. China’s Reaction: The Example Of Australia How will China respond to Biden’s new inquiry into COVID’s origins? Obviously Beijing will react negatively but we would not expect anything concrete to occur until the result of the inquiry is released in 90 days. China will be more constrained in its response to the US than it has been with Australia, which called for an international inquiry early last year, as the US is a superior power. Australia was the first to ban Chinese telecom company Huawei from its 5G network (back in 2018) and it was the first to call for a COVID probe. Relations between China and Australia have deteriorated steadily since then, but macro trends have clearly driven the Aussie dollar. The AUD-JPY exchange rate is a good measure for global risk appetite and it is wavering in recent weeks (Chart 5). Chart 5Australian Dollar Follows Macro Trends, Rallies Amid China Trade Spat Tensions have also escalated due to China’s dependency on Australian commodity exports at a time of spiking commodity prices. This is a recurring theme going back to the Stern Hu affair. The COVID spat led China to impose a series of sanctions against Australian beef, barley, wine, and coal. But because China cannot replace Australian resources (at least, not in the short term), its punitive measures are limited. It faces rising producer prices as a result of its trade restrictions (Chart 6). This dependency is a bigger problem for China today than it was in previous cycles so China will try to diversify. Chart 6Constraints On China's Tarrifs On Australia By contrast, China is not likely to impose sanctions on the US in response to Biden’s investigation, unless Biden attacks first. China’s imports from the US are booming and its currency is appreciating sharply. Despite Beijing’s efforts to keep the Phase One trade deal from collapsing, Biden is maintaining Trump’s tariffs and the US-China trade divorce is proceeding (Chart 7). Bilateral tariff rates are still 16-17 percentage points higher than they were in 2018, with US tariffs on China at 19% (versus 3% on the rest of the world) while Chinese tariffs on the US stand at 21% (versus 6% on the rest of the world). The Biden administration timed this week’s hawkish statements to coincide with the first meeting of US trade negotiators with China, which was a more civil affair. Both countries acknowledged that the relationship is important and trade needs to be continued. However, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s comments were not overly optimistic (she told Reuters that the relationship is “very, very challenging”). She has also been explicit about maintaining policy continuity with the Trump administration. We highly doubt that China’s share of US imports will ever surpass its pre-Trump peaks. The Biden administration has also refrained so far from loosening export controls on high-tech trade with China. This has caused a bull market in Taiwan while causing problems for Chinese semiconductor stocks’ relative performance (Chart 8). If Biden’s policy review does not lead to any relaxation of export controls on commercial items then it will mark a further escalation in tensions. Chart 7US Tarrifs Reduce China In Trade Deficit Bottom Line: Until Presidents Biden and Xi stabilize relations at the top, the trade negotiations over implementing the Phase One trade deal – and any new Phase Two talks – cannot bring major positive surprises for financial markets. Chart 8US Export Controls Amid Chip Shortage Congress Is More Hawkish Than Biden Biden’s ability to reduce frictions with China, should he seek to, will also be limited by Congress and public opinion. With the US deeply politically divided, and polarization at historically high levels, China has emerged as one of the few areas of agreement. The hawkish consensus is symbolized by new legislation such as the Strategic Competition Act, which is making its way through the Senate rapidly. Congress is also trying to boost US competitiveness through bills such as the Endless Frontier Act. These bills would subject China to scrutiny and potential punitive measures over a broad range of issues but most of all they would ignite US industrial policy , STEM education, and R&D, and diversify the US’s supply chains. We would highlight three key points with regard to the global impact of this legislation: Global supply chains are shifting regardless: This trend is fairly well established in tech, defense, and pharmaceuticals. It will continue unless we see a major policy reversal from China to try to court western powers and reduce frictions. The EU and India are less enthusiastic than the US and Australia about removing China from supply chains but they are not opposed. The EU Commission has recommended new defensive economic measures that cover supply chains in batteries, cloud services, hydrogen energy, pharmaceuticals, materials, and semiconductors. As mentioned, the EU is also hesitating to ratify the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China. Hence the EU is moving in the US’s direction independently of proposed US laws. After all, China’s rise up the tech value chain (and its decision to stop cutting back the size of its manufacturing sector) ultimately threatens the EU’s comparative advantage. The EU is also aligned with the US on democratic values and network security. India has taken a harder stance on China than usual, which marks an important break with the past. India’s decision to exclude Huawei from its 5G network is not final but it is likely to be at least partially implemented. A working group of democracies is forming regardless. The Strategic Competition Act calls for the creation of a working group of democracies but the truth is that this is already happening through more effective forums like the G7 and bilateral summits. Just as the implementation of the act would will ultimately depend on President Biden, so the willingness of other countries to adopt the recommendations of the working group would depend on their own executives. Allies have leeway as Biden will not use punitive measures against them: Any policy change from the EU, UK, India, and Australia will be independent of the US Congress passing the Strategic Competition Act. These countries will be self-directed. The US would have to devote diplomatic energy to maintaining a sustained effort by these states to counter China in the face of economic costs. This will be limited by the fact that the Biden administration will be very reluctant to impose punitive measures on allies to insist on their cooperation. The allies will set the pace of pressure on China rather than the United States. This gives the EU an important position, particularly Germany. And yet the trends in Germany suggest that the government will be more hawkish on China after the federal elections in September. Bottom Line: The Biden administration is unlikely to use punitive measures against allies so new US laws are less important than overall US diplomacy with each of the allies. Some allies will be less compliant with US policies given their need for trade with China. But so far there appears to be a common position taking shape even with the EU that is prejudicial to China’s involvement in key sectors of emerging technologies. If China does not respond by reducing its foreign policy assertiveness, then China’s economic growth will suffer. That drag would have to be offset by new supply chain construction in Southeast Asia and other countries. Investment Takeaways The foregoing highlights the international risks facing China even at a time when its trend growth is slowing (Chart 9) and its ongoing struggle with domestic financial imbalances is intensifying. China’s debt-service costs have risen sharply and Beijing is putting pressure on corporations and local governments to straighten out their finances (Chart 10), resulting in a wave of defaults. This backdrop is worrisome for investors until policymakers reassure them that government support will continue. Chart 9China's Growth Potential Slowing Chart 10China's Leaders Struggle With Debt China’s domestic stability is a key indicator of whether geopolitical risks could spiral out of control. In particular we think aggressive action in the Taiwan Strait is likely to be delayed as long as the Chinese economy and regime are stable. China has rattled sabers over the strait this year in a warning to the United States not to cross its red line (Chart 11). It is not yet clear how Biden’s policy continuity with the Trump administration will affect cross-strait stability. We see no basis yet for changing our view that there is a 60% chance of a market-negative geopolitical incident in 2021-22 and a 5% chance of full-scale war in the short run. Chart 11China PLA Flights Over Taiwan Strait Putting all of the above together, we see substantial support for two key market-relevant geopolitical risks: Chinese domestic politics (including policy tightening) and persistent US-China tensions (including but not limited to the Taiwan Strait). We remain tactically defensive, a stance supported by several recent turns in global markets: The global stock-to-bond ratio has rolled over. China is a negative factor for global risk appetite (Chart 12). Global cyclical equities are no longer outperforming defensives. There is a stark divergence between Chinese cyclicals and global cyclicals stemming from the painful transition in China’s bloated industrial economy (Chart 13). Global large caps are catching a bid relative to small caps (Chart 14). Chart 12Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio Rolled Over Chart 13Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Pause Chart 14Global Large Caps Catch A Bid Versus Small Caps Cyclically the global economic recovery should continue as the pandemic wanes. China will eventually relax policy to prevent too abrupt of a slowdown. Therefore our strategic portfolio reflects our high-conviction view that the current global economic expansion will continue even as it faces hurdles from the secular rise in geopolitical risk, especially US-China cold war. Measurable geopolitical risk and policy uncertainty are likely to rebound sooner rather than later, with a negative impact on high-beta risk assets. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Coda: Global Minimum Tax Symbolizes Return Of Big Government On Thursday, the US Treasury Department released a proposal to set the global minimum corporate tax rate at 15%. The plan is to stop what Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has referred to as a global “race to the bottom” and create the basis for a rehabilitation of government budgets damaged by pandemic-era stimulus. Although the newly proposed 15% rate is significantly below President Biden’s bid to raise the US Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) rate to 21% from 10.5%, it is the same rate as his proposed minimum tax on corporate book income. Biden is also raising the headline corporate tax rate from 21% to around 25% (or at highest 28%). Negotiators at the OECD were initially discussing a 12.5% global minimum rate. The finance ministers of both France and Germany – where the corporate income tax rates are 32.0% and 29.9%, respectively – both responded positively to the announcement. However, Ireland, which uses low corporate taxes as an economic development strategy, is obviously more comfortable with a minimum closer to its own 12.5% rate. Discussions are likely to occur when G7 finance ministers meet on June 4-5. Countries are hoping to establish a broad outline for the proposal by the G20 meeting in early July. It is highly likely that the OECD will come to an agreement. However, it is not a truly “global” minimum as there will still be tax havens. Compliance and enforcement will vary across countries. A close look at the domestic political capital of the relevant countries shows that while many countries have the raw parliamentary majorities necessary to raise taxes, most countries have substantial conservative contingents capable of preventing stiff corporate tax hikes (Table 1, in the Appendix). Our Geopolitical strategists highlight that the Biden administration’s compromise on the minimum rate reflects its pragmatism as well as emphasis on multilateralism. Any global deal will be non-binding but the two most important low-tax players are already committed to raising corporate rates well above this level: Biden’s plan is noted above, while the UK’s budget for March includes a jump in the business rate to 25% in April 2023 from the current 19%. Ireland and Hungary are the only outliers but they may eventually be forced to yield to such a large coalition of bigger economies (Chart 15). Chart 15Global Minimum Corporate Tax Impact Is Symbolic Rather Than Concrete Thus a nominal minimum corporate tax rate is likely to be forged but it will not be truly global and it will not change the corporate rate for most countries. The reality of what companies pay will also depend on loopholes, tax havens, and the effective tax rate. Bottom Line: On a structural horizon, the global minimum corporate tax is significant for showing a paradigm shift in global macro policy: western governments are starting to raise taxes and revenue after decades of cutting taxes. The experiment with limited government has ended and Big Government is making a comeback. On a cyclical horizon, the US concession on global minimum tax is that the Biden administration aims to be pragmatic and “get things done.” Biden is also working with Republicans to pass bills covering some bipartisan aspects of his domestic agenda, such as trade, manufacturing, and China. The takeaway from a global point of view is that Biden may prove to be a compromiser rather than an ideologue, unlike his predecessors.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Vice President Daily Insights RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, "Competition Without Catastrophe," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019, foreignaffairs.com. Section II: Appendix Table 1OECD: Which Countries Are Willing And Able To Raise Corporate Tax Rates? GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights China's high-profile jawboning draws attention to tightness in metals markets, and raises the odds the State Reserve Board (SRB) will release some of its massive copper and aluminum stockpiles in the near future. Over the medium- to long-term, the lack of major new greenfield capex raises red flags for the IEA's ambitious low-carbon pathway released last week, which foresees the need for a dramatic increase in renewable energy output and a halt in future oil and gas investment to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Copper demand is expected to exceed mined supply by 2028, according to an analysis by S&P, which, in line with our view, also sees refined-copper consumption exceeding production this year (Chart of the Week). A constitution re-write in Chile and elections in Peru threaten to usher in higher taxes and royalties on mining in these metals producers, placing future capex at risk. Chile's state-owned Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world, fears a bill to limit mining near glaciers could put as much as 40% of its copper production at risk. We remain bullish copper and look to get long on politically induced sell-offs as the USD weakens. Feature Politicians are inserting themselves in the metals markets' supply-demand evolutions to a greater degree than in the past, which is complicating the short- and medium-term analysis of prices. This adds to an already-difficult process of assessing markets, given the opacity of metals fundamentals – particularly inventories, which are notoriously difficult to assess. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) jawboning of market participants in iron ore, steel, copper and aluminum markets over the past two weeks has weakened prices, but, with the exception of steel rebar futures in Shanghai – down ~ 17% from recent highs, and now trading at ~ 4911 RMB/MT –  the other markets remain close to records.  Benchmark 62% Fe iron ore at the port of Tianjin was trading ~ 4% lower at $211/MT, while copper and aluminum were trading ~ 5.5% and 6.5% off their recent records at $4.535/lb and $2,350/MT, respectively. In addition to copper, aluminum markets are particularly tight (Chart 2). Jawboning aside, if fundamentals continue to keep prices elevated – or if we see a new leg up – China's high-profile jawboning could presage a release by the State Reserve Board (SRB) of some of its massive copper and aluminum stockpiles in the near term. In the case of copper, market guesses on the size of this stockpile are ~ 2mm to 2.7mm MT. On the aluminum side, Bloomberg reported CCP officials were considering the release of 500k MT to quell the market's demand for the metal. Chart of the WeekContinue Tightening In Copper Expected Chart 2Aluminum Remains Tight Brownfield Development Not Sufficient Our balances assessments continue to indicate key base metals markets are tight and will remain so over the short term (2-3 years). Economies ex-China are entering their post-COVID-19 recovery phase. This will be followed by higher demand from renewable generation and grid build-outs that will put them in direct competition with China for scarce metals supplies for decades to come. Markets will continue to tighten. In the bellwether copper market, we expect this tightness to remain a persistent feature of the market over the medium term – 3 to 5 years out – given the dearth of new supply coming to market. Copper prices are highly correlated with the other base metals (Chart 3) – the coefficient of correlation with the other base metals making up the LME's metals index is ~ 0.86 post-GFC – and provide a useful indicator of systematic trends in these markets. Chart 3Copper Correlation With LME Index Ex-Copper Copper ore quality has been falling for years, as miners focused on brownfield development to extend the life of mines (Chart 4). In Chart 5, we show the ratio of capex (in billion USD) to ore quality increases when capex growth is expanding faster than ore quality, and decreases when capex weakens and/or ore quality degradation is increasing. Chart 4Copper Capex, Ore Quality Declines Chart 5Capex-to-Ore-Quality Decline Set Market Up For Higher Prices Falling prices over the 2012-19 interval coincide with copper ore quality remaining on a downward trend, likely the result of previous higher prices that set off the capex boom pre-GFC. The lower prices favored brownfield over greenfield development. Goehring and Rozencwajg found in their analysis of 24 mines, about 80% of gross new reserves booked between 2001-2014 were due not to new mine discoveries but to companies reclassifying what was once considered to be waste-rock into minable reserves, lowering the cut-off grade for development.1 This is consistent with the most recent datapoints in Chart 5, due to falling ore grade values, as companies inject less capex into their operations and use it to expand on brownfield projects. Higher prices will be needed to incentivize more greenfield projects. A new report from S&P Global Market Intelligence shows copper reserves in the ground are falling along with new discoveries.2 According to the S&P analysts, copper demand is expected to exceed mined supply by 2028, which, in line with our view, sees refined-copper consumption exceeding production this year. Renewables Push At Risk Just last week, the IEA produced an ambitious and narrow path for governments to collectively reach a net-zero emissions (NZE) goal by 2050.3 Among its many recommendations, the IEA singled out the overhaul of the global electric grid, which will be required to accommodate the massive renewable-generation buildout the agency forecasts will be needed to achieve its NZE goals. The IEA forecasts annual investment in transmission and distribution grids will need to increase from $260 billion to $820 billion p.a. by 2030. This is easier said than done. Consider the build-out of China's grid, which is the largest grid in the world. To become carbon neutral by 2060, per its stated goals, investment in China’s grid and associated infrastructure is expected to approach ~ $900 billion, maybe more, over the next 5 years.4 The world’s largest fossil-fuel importer is looking to pivot away from coal and plans to more than double solar and wind power capacity to 1200 GW by 2030. Weening China off coal and rebuilding its grid to achieve these goals will be a herculean lift. It comes as no surprise that IEA member states have pushed back on the agency's NZE-by-2050 plan. This primarily is because of its requirement to completely halt fossil-fuel exploration and spending on new projects. Japan and Australia have pushed back against this plan, citing energy security concerns. Officials from both countries have stated that they will continue developing fossil fuel projects, as a back-up to renewables. Japan has been falling behind on renewable electricity generation (Chart 6). Expensive renewables and the unpopularity of nuclear fuel could make it harder for the world’s fifth largest fossil fuels consumer to move away from fossil fuels. Around the same time the IEA released its report, Australia committed $464 million to build a new gas-fired power station as a backup to renewables. Chart 6Japan Will Continue Building Fossil-Fuel Back-Up Generation Just days after the IEA report was published, the G7 nations agreed to stop overseas coal financing. This could have devastating effects for emerging and developing nations‘ electricity grids which are highly dependent on coal. In 2020 70% and 60% of India and China’s electricity respectively were produced by coal (Chart 7).5 Chart 7EM Economies Remain Reliant On Coal-Fired Generation Near-Term Copper Supply Risks Rise Even though inventories appear to be rebuilding, mounting political risks keep us bullish copper (Chart 8). Lawmakers in Chile and Peru are in the process of re-writing their constitutions to, among other things, raise royalties and taxes on mining activities in their respective countries. This could usher in higher taxes and royalties on mining for these metals producers, placing future capex at risk. In addition, Chile's state-owned Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world, fears a bill to limit mining near glaciers could put as much as 40% of its copper production at risk.6 None of these events is certain to occur. Peruvian elections, for one thing, are too close to call at this point, and Chile has a history of pro-business government. However, these are non-trivial odds – i.e., greater than Russian roulette odds of 1:6 – and if any or all of these outcomes are realized, higher costs in copper and lithium prices would result, and miners would have to pass those costs on to buyers. Bottom Line: We remain bullish base metals, especially copper. Another leg up in copper would pull base metals higher with it. We would look to get long on politically induced sell-offs, particularly with the USD weakening, as expected Chart 8Global Copper Inventories Rebuilding But Still Down Y/Y   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Next Tuesday's OPEC 2.0 meeting appears to be a fairly staid affair, with little of the drama attending previous gatherings. Russian minister Novak observed the coalition would be jointly "calculating the balances" when it meets, taking into account the likely official return of Iran as an exporter, according to reuters.com. We expect a mid-year deal on allowing Iran to return to resume exports under the nuclear deal abrogated by the Trump administration in 2019, and reckon Iran has ~ 1.5mm b/d of production it can bring back on line, which likely would return its crude oil production to something above 3.8mm b/d by year-end. We are maintaining our forecast for Brent to average $64.45/bbl in 2H21; $75 and $78/bbl, in 2022 and 2023, respectively. By end 2023, prices trade to $80/bbl. Our forecast is premised on a wider global recovery going into 2H21, and continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 (Chart 9). Base Metals: Bullish Our stop-losses was elected on our long Dec21 copper position on May 21, which means we closed the position with 48.2% return. The stop loss on our long 2022 vs short 2023 COMEX copper futures backwardation recommendation also was elected on May 20, leaving us with a return of 305%. We will be looking for an opportunity to re-establish these positions. Precious Metals: Bullish We expect the collapse in bitcoin prices, the US Fed’s decision to not raise interest rates, and a weakening US dollar to keep gold prices well bid (Chart 10). China’s ban on cryptocurrency services and Musk’s acknowledgment of the energy intensity of Bitcoin mining sent Bitcoin prices crashing. The Fed’s decision to keep interest rates constant, despite rising inflation and inflation expectations will reduce the opportunity cost of holding gold. According to our colleagues at USBS, the Fed will make its first interest rate hike only after the US economy has reached "maximum employment". The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey reported that job openings rose nearly 8% in March to 8.1 million jobs, however, overall hiring was little changed, rising by less than 4% to 6 million. As prices in the US rise and the dollar depreciates, gold will be favored as a store of value. On the back of these factors, we expect gold to hit $2,000/oz. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn futures were trading close to 20% below recent highs earlier in the week at ~ $6.27/bu, on the back of much faster-than-expected plantings. Chart 9 Chart 10     Footnotes 1     Please refer to Goehring & Rozencwajg’s Q1 2021 market commentary. 2     Please see Copper cupboard remains bare as discoveries dwindle — S&P study published by mining.com 20 May 2021. 3    Please see Net Zero by 2050 – A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, published by the IEA. 4    Please see China’s climate goal: Overhauling its electricity grid, published by Aljazeera.  5    We discuss this in detail in Surging Metals Prices And The Case For Carbon-Capture published 13 May 2021, and Renewables ESG Risks Grow With Demand, which was published 29 April 2021.  Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see A game of chicken is clouding tax debate in top copper nation, Fujimori looks to speed up projects to tap copper riches in Peru and Codelco says 40% of its copper output at risk if glacier bill passes published by mining.com 24, 23 and 20 May 2021, respectively.    Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Domestic and foreign supply-side constraints are now exerting a significant effect on the US economy. Consumer prices may increase at a faster pace than we initially expected over the coming 3-4 months, but supply-side constraints are likely to wane later this year and thus do genuinely appear to be transitory. The idea that even a temporary period of high inflation could persist over the longer term has legitimate grounding in macro theory, and is explicitly recognized in the Fed’s inflation framework. But it would necessitate a very large increase in inflation expectations, which have yet to rise to abnormal levels. The baseline for inflation has shifted back closer to the Fed’s target, but deviations above or below target over the coming 12-18 months are likely to be driven by demand-side rather than supply-side factors. The Fed’s checklist for liftoff now entirely depends on employment, and there are compelling arguments in favor of outsized jobs growth in the second half of the year that would move forward the timing of the first rate hike. But the reality for investors is that there is tremendous uncertainty concerning the magnitude of these job gains, given the likelihood of some lasting changes to consumer behavior following the pandemic. Visibility about the employment consequences of these changes will remain very low until investors receive more information about likely urban office footprint and downtown commuter presence, the speed at which international travel will return, and to what degree any pandemic control measures remain in place in the second half of the year. For now, investors should remain cyclically overweight stocks versus bonds, short duration, and invested in other procyclical positions, with an eye to reassess the monetary policy and growth outlook in the late summer / early fall. Feature Chart I-1Investors Have Focused On The April Jobs And Inflation Data Investors’ attention in May was focused squarely on two, ostensibly contradictory US data surprises: an extremely disappointing April jobs report, and a surge in consumer prices (Chart I-1). Abstracting from the typically lagging nature of consumer prices, a weak labor market is typically disinflationary / deflationary, not inflationary. But this is only to be expected in a typical environment where demand-side factors are predominantly driving the jobs market and the pricing decisions of firms, and the April data has made it clear that domestic and foreign supply-side constraints are now exerting a significant effect on the US economy, more forcefully than we initially thought. This warrants a further analysis of our prior view that supply-side effects would have a moderate effect on activity and prices this year, which we present below. A Deep Dive Into April’s Employment And Inflation Data Chart I-2 shows the difference between the April monthly gain in US jobs by industry compared with those of March. Almost all US industries saw a slower pace of jobs gains in April than March, but the slowdown was particularly acute in the professional & business services, transportation & warehousing, education & health services, construction, and manufacturing industries. By contrast, leisure & hospitality, the industry with the largest employment gap relative to pre-pandemic levels, saw a faster pace of April job gains relative to March. Chart I-2Breaking Down Disappointing April Payroll Gains In our view, several facts from the April jobs report characterize the labor market as being in a transition towards a post-pandemic state, but also legitimately impacted by labor supply constraints at the low-skilled and blue-collar levels: Within professional & business services, almost all of the slowdown in monthly job gains occurred within temporary help services. Temp help services is a cyclical employment category over the longer-term, but over short periods of time it can also be negatively correlated with gains in full-time positions. April saw a large decline in the number of employed persons at work part time, suggesting that the slowdown in temp help may reflect a shift back to full-time work. Within transportation & warehousing, the slowdown in jobs was entirely attributed to the couriers and messengers subsector, which includes delivery services. In combination with the acceleration in jobs in the leisure & hospitality sector, this likely reflects a shift away from home food delivery towards in-person restaurant orders and the use of aggressive hiring tactics by restaurant owners (including advertisements of cash bonuses following 90 days of completed work, paid vacations, health insurance, and other perks). The slowdown in jobs growth in the construction & manufacturing industries is likely due to two, separate supply constraints: the negative impact of higher input costs such as lumber, semiconductors, and other raw materials, as well as the disincentivizing effects of supplementary unemployment benefits that appears to be limiting the willingness of lower-wage workers to return to work. Chart I-3April's Rise In Core CPI Was Extreme, Even After Removing Some Outliers On the inflation front, Chart I-3 highlights that the April surge in core consumer prices did not just occur because of year-over-year base effects, but because of significant month-over-month increases in prices. Outsized gains in used car prices driven by the impact of the semiconductor shortage on new car production, as well as surging airline fares, did significantly contribute to April’s month-over-month gain, but the dotted line in the chart highlights that the monthly change would still have been extreme relative to history even if these components had increased instead at a 2% annual rate. Taken together, the April employment and inflation data, in conjunction with surveys of US firms as well as the trend in commodity prices, suggest that the labor market and consumer prices are being affected by four separate but related factors: An underlying demand effect, driven by extremely stimulative fiscal & monetary policy as well as economic reopening; A domestic labor shortage Coordination failures and bottlenecks impacting the production of key supply chain components and resource inputs Coordination failures and bottlenecks impacting the logistics of international trade Strong domestic aggregate demand is not likely to wane over the coming 6-12 months, which has been the basis for our view that inflation would rise to modestly above-target levels this year. Given this new evidence of their prominence and impact, it does seem likely that the remaining three supply-side factors will persist for a few more months, suggesting that core inflation may remain quite elevated over the near term. But several points underscore why it remains difficult to accept a view that supply-side factors will remain an important driver of employment and consumer price trends on a 1-year time horizon. Chart I-4Home Schooling Is Impacting The Labor Market First, domestic labor shortages are occurring in the context of a gap of 8.2 million jobs relative to pre-pandemic levels, underscoring that substantial barriers to returning to work exist. The three most cited barriers are an unwillingness to return to employment for health reasons, an unwillingness to return to work because of supplementary unemployment insurance benefits that are in excess of regular income, and an inability to return to work due to childcare requirements. For example, Chart I-4 highlights that the labor force participation rate has declined the most for women with young children, whose children in many cases are being schooled online rather that in person. But all three of these factors are clearly linked to the pandemic, and are likely to be greatly reduced (or eliminated) in the fall once schools have reopened and income support has ended. Federal supplementary UI benefits are set to expire by labor day, and several US states have already opted out of the program – with benefits set to end in June or July.1 Second, global producers of important commodity inputs (such as lumber) significantly cut production last year under the expectation that the pandemic would greatly reduce spending, only to be whipsawed by a surge in demand stemming from a combination of working from home effects and a massive policy response. Chart I-5 highlights that US industrial production of wood products fell to -10% on a year-over-year basis last April, but that it has subsequently rebounded to a new high. Unlike other supply chain inputs, global semiconductor sales did not decline last April (in the face of enormous PC, tablet, and server/data center demand), but Chart I-6 highlights that DRAM prices, lumber prices, and prices of raw industrial goods may be peaking or have already peaked. Chart I-5Lumber Prices Are Soaring, In Part, Because Supply Was Cut Last Year Chart I-6Costs of Key Inputs May Be Peaking (Or Have Peaked) Chart I-7Logistical Issues, Which Will Be Resolved, Are Driving Shipping Costs Third, while some market participants have attributed the enormous rise in global shipping costs entirely to the underlying demand effect that we noted above, Chart I-7 highlights that this is clearly not the case. The chart shows that the surge in loaded inbound container trade to the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports, to its strongest level since the inception of the data in the mid 1990s, could potentially explain a 75-100% year-over-year rise in shipping costs – less than half of the 250% surge that has occurred over the past 12 months. This strongly points to logistical issues such as the incorrect positioning of cargo containers amid pandemic-related port congestion (and other disruptions such as the temporary grounding of the Ever Given in the Suez canal) as the dominant driver of global shipping costs, which have likely pushed up US non-oil import prices by more than what would normally be implied by the decline in the US dollar (Chart I-8). Global shipping costs have yet to peak, but we expect that these logistical problems will likely be resolved sometime in Q3, or potentially over the summer. This view is underpinned by the fact that the number of global container ships arriving on time rose in March, the first month-over-month increase since June of last year.2 Chart I-8Rising Transport Costs Have Pushed Up US Import Prices For investors, the key conclusion of this review is that while consumer prices may increase at a faster pace than we initially expected over the coming 3-4 months, supply-side factors are clearly driving outsized gains, and have likely or definite end points before the end of the year. As such, despite the surprising magnitude of these supply-side factors, they do genuinely appear to be transitory. The “Transitory” Debate Most investors would agree that 3-4 months of outsized consumer price increases would not be, in and of themselves, economically significant or investment relevant. But the question of whether even a temporary period of high inflation could persist over a 12-month or multi-year time horizon has become prominent in the marketplace, with some investors believing that it has high odds of fueling an already-established, demand-side narrative supporting higher prices in a way that becomes self-reinforcing among consumers and firms. Indeed, this view has a legitimate grounding in macro theory, and is explicitly recognized in the Fed’s inflation framework – which is called the expectations-augmented or Modern-Day Phillips Curve (“MDPC”). In anticipation of the coming debate about inflation and its causes, we thoroughly reviewed the MDPC in our January report.3 One crucial takeaway from the MDPC framework is that economic activity relative to its potential determines the degree to which inflation deviates from expectations of inflation, not the Fed’s inflation target. If, for example, inflation expectations are meaningfully below target, then the Fed would need to aim for an unemployment rate below its natural rate for some period of time in an attempt to re-anchor expectations closer to its target rate (based on the view that inflation expectations adapt to the actual inflation experience). This is essentially what occurred in the latter half of the last economic expansion, and is what motivated the Fed’s shift to its average inflation targeting regime. The Modern-Day Phillips Curve is “modern” because of the experience of inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s, where ever-rising expectations for inflation (alongside extremely easy monetary policy) became self-reinforcing and caused core PCE inflation to rise to high single-digit territory in the second half of the decade. Thus, the notion that elevated consumer prices over the short-term could increase actual inflation over the longer term via higher expectations – meaning that it would not be transitory – is plausible. Chart I-9The Fed's New Index Of Common Inflation Expectations (CIE) Is it likely? In our view, while the odds have increased somewhat over the past month, the answer is no. Chart I-9 presents the Fed’s quarterly index of common inflation expectations (CIE), alongside a model designed to track movements in the index on a monthly frequency. While the Fed’s index includes over 21 inflation expectation indicators, our condensed model uses just six: the 10-year annualized rate of change in headline inflation, the 10-year annualized rate of change in the headline PCE deflator, 5-year/5-year forward and 10-year/10-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates, the 3-month moving average of long-term surveyed consumer expectations for inflation, and a proprietary measure of inflation expectations based on an adaptive expectations framework. Chart I-10 highlights that among these six series (shown standardized since mid 2004), three of them have risen quite significantly over the past year: long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates (5-5 and 10-10), and long-term consumer expectations for inflation. In our view, the latter series from the University of Michigan is one of the most important for investors to monitor over the coming year, as it is one of the few available measures of “main-street” inflation expectations with a long history. Chart I-10Important Drivers Of The CIE Index Have Risen, But From A Low Base Chart I-11A Deeply Negative Output Gap Last Cycle Made Inflation Expectations Vulnerable To Shocks But while the series in the top panel of Chart I-10 have risen sharply, they are rising from an extremely low base and are currently only fractionally above their average since 2004. As noted in our January report, inflation expectations fell significantly in 2014 first because they were highly vulnerable to shocks following a long period of a deeply negative output gap (Chart I-11), and second because they were catalyzed by a substantial US dollar / oil price shock that occurred in that year. We noted above that the odds of extreme near-term price changes ultimately becoming non-transitory have risen somewhat, and Chart I-12 highlights why. The chart presents the annual change in long-term consumer expectations of inflation alongside the annual change in 2-year government bond yields, and notes that the past three cases of a similar-sized spike in expectations were all ultimately met with either a significant rise in short-term interest rates or a major deflationary shock – neither of which we expect to occur over the coming year. Chart I-12Other Consumer Price Expectation Spikes Have Been Met By Rising Rates Or A Deflationary Shock However, the fact that the rise in expectations clearly has a mean-reversion component to it, and that the supply-side factors driving month-over-month price increases are temporary in nature, argues against the idea that expectations will rise above the average that prevailed from 2002 – 2014. This suggests that while the baseline for inflation has moved back closer to the Fed’s target, deviations above or below target are likely to be driven by demand-side rather than supply-side factors. The Fed’s Checklist: Focus On Employment Table I-1The Fed’s Checklist For Liftoff From an investment perspective, the outlook for inflation is important mostly because of its implications for Fed policy, and thus interest rates and equity valuation multiples. My colleague Ryan Swift, BCA’s US Bond Strategist, has presented the Fed’s checklist for liftoff in Table I-1. The Fed has been explicit that they will not raise interest rates until all three boxes are checked, regardless of what is occurring to inflation expectations or actual inflation. The first box in the list is essentially checked, as tomorrow’s April Personal Income and Outlays report will very likely confirm that the core PCE deflator rose in excess of 2% (the headline PCE deflator was already in excess of this in March). And the third criterion is essentially a derivative of the other two, barring the emergence of a significant deflationary shock at the time that the Fed would otherwise begin to raise rates. This means that investors should be entirely focused on labor market developments, and whether they are consistent with the Fed’s assessment of maximum employment. Table I-2 highlights the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth that will be required for the unemployment rate to reach 3.5-4.5%, the range of the Fed’s NAIRU estimates. The table underscores that large gains will be required for the Fed’s maximum employment criteria to be met by the end of this year or year-end 2022, on the order of 410-830k per month. Table I-2Calculating The Distance To Maximum Employment But the nature of the pandemic and the factors that drove what is still an 8.2 million jobs gap underscore the extreme difficulty in forecasting what monthly job gains are likely to occur on average over the coming 12-18 months. From March to August of last year, monthly changes in nonfarm payrolls exceeded +/-1 million per month, with 20.7 million jobs lost in the month of April 2020 alone. Payroll gains averaged 3.8 million per month in the two months that followed, and if that pace were to be repeated this fall as schools reopen and supplementary unemployment benefits draw to a close in all states it would close 93% of the outstanding jobs gap. This implies that monthly job growth will follow a bimodal distribution over the coming year, with large gains in Q3/Q4 followed by a much more normal pace of jobs growth in Q1/Q2 2022. In our view, the outlook for Fed policy depends significantly on the magnitude of those outsized gains in employment this fall, and there are three main arguments favoring a larger pace of monthly job growth during this period. First, Table I-3 highlights that the jobs gap is most prominent in the leisure & hospitality, government, education & health services, and professional & business services industries, and several observations suggest that Q3/Q4 job gains in these sectors may be sizeable: Table I-3Breaking Down The Pandemic Employment Gap By Industry 70% of the government employment gap shown in Table I-3 can be attributed to education, as government employment also includes education employment at the state and local government level. Many of these jobs, along with those in the education & health services industry, are likely to recover in the fall as schools reopen across the country. As noted in our discussion of the April jobs data, the professional & business services industry includes the “administrative & support services” sector, which accounts for 85% of the overall job gap for the industry. These jobs have likely been impacted heavily by reduced office presence as well as business travel, and may recover further in the fall as many employees shift partially or fully away from working from home. Chart I-13Leisure & Hospitality Employment Is Closely Tracking Hotel Occupancy Chart I-13 highlights that the year-over-year growth rates of leisure & hospitality employment and the US hotel occupancy rate are tracking each other quite closely, and that the latter is in a solid uptrend.4 While international travel is likely to remain muted this summer, the rebound in hotel occupancy suggests that Americans are choosing to travel domestically this year and that further gains in occupancy may occur over the coming months. Chart I-14 highlights the second argument in favor of a larger pace of monthly job growth in the second half of the year. The chart shows the clear relationship between reopening and the employment gap, with states that have fully reopened having substantially smaller gaps than states that have not. It is true that some states that have fully reopened are still experiencing a sizeable gap, but this is at least in part due to leisure & hospitality employment that is dependent on the travel patterns of consumers. For example, Nevada still has a 10% employment gap despite having fully reopened, clearly reflecting the impact of reduced tourism to Las Vegas. Thus, as all states move towards being fully reopened later this year, including large states such as New York and California, Chart I-14 suggests that the US jobs gap is likely to narrow significantly. Chart I-14US States That Have Reopened Have A Smaller Employment Gap Chart I-15Real Output Per Worker Is Not Likely To Rise Further Finally, Chart I-15 highlights that the 2020 recession is the only one in which real output per person rose sharply during the recession. It is true that productivity tends to rise over time and that it usually increases in the early phase of an economic recovery, but the rise in real output per worker last year clearly reflects the massive decline in employment and services spending that resulted from pandemic-related control measures and lockdowns. Our sense is that this sharp rise in real output per worker is not likely to be sustained following full reopening and the elimination of barriers to employment, and if real output per worker were to even modestly converge to its prior trend (the dotted line in Chart I-15) it would more than fully close the jobs gap shown in Table I-3 by the end of the year based on consensus growth forecasts for this year. Investment Conclusions Despite compelling arguments for outsized jobs growth in the second half of the year, the bottom line for investors is that there is tremendous uncertainty concerning its magnitude. It seems likely that there will be some lasting changes to consumer behavior following the pandemic, and visibility about the employment consequences of these changes will remain very low until investors receive more information about the likely urban office footprint and downtown commuter presence, the speed at which international travel will return, and the degree to which any pandemic control measures remain in place in the second half of the year. Given the Fed’s criteria for liftoff, developments that imply a pace of jobs recovery that is in line with or slower than the Fed’s unemployment rate projections will ensure that the monetary policy regime will remain supportive of risky asset prices over the coming year. If the employment gap closes rapidly in Q3/Q4, then investor expectations for the timing of the first rate hike will move sharply closer, which could act as a negative inflection point for stock prices. This is now more probable than it was a month ago, as Chart I-16 highlights that the OIS curve has shifted towards expectations of an initial rate hike at the end of next year or early 2023, from mid 2022 previously. Chart I-16Market Rate Hike Expectations Have Shifted Back To Late 2022 / Early 2023 Still, abstracting from knee-jerk market reactions, it is the pace of hikes and investor expectations for the terminal Fed funds rate that are the more important fundamental drivers of 10-year Treasury yields, and investors would need to see a very large revision to the latter in order for yields to rise to a point that would restrict economic activity or threaten equity market multiples. Such a revision is highly unlikely over the summer unless incoming evidence strongly suggests that the employment gap will be closed by the end of the year. As highlighted above, this may indeed occur later in the year, but probably not over the coming 3 months. For now, investors should remain cyclically overweight stocks versus bonds, short duration, and invested in other procyclical positions, with an eye to reassess the monetary policy and growth outlook in the late summer / early fall. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 27, 2021 Next Report: June 24, 2021 II. Global House Prices: A New Threat For Policymakers House prices are rising rapidly across the developed markets, in response to the extraordinary monetary and fiscal policy stimulus implemented to fight the pandemic. Evidence points to the house price surge being driven by monetary policy that has left real interest rates far below equilibrium levels. Supply factors are a secondary cause of the house price boom. Financial stability risks stemming from rising house prices are less acute than the pre-2008 experience, as overall household leverage has grown more slowly during the pandemic and global banks are better capitalized. Rapidly rising house prices are forcing some central banks to turn less accommodative earlier than expected. The recent hawkish turns by the Bank of Canada and Reserve Bank of New Zealand may be canaries in the coal mine for other central banks – perhaps even the Fed – if house prices and household leverage start rising together. The COVID-19 pandemic led to the sharpest economic recession since World War II, alongside an enormous rise in unemployment. Consensus expectations call for the output gap to be closed (or mostly closed) in most advanced economies by the end of this year, but it remains an open question how quickly these economies will be able to return to full employment amid potentially permanent shifts in demand for office space and goods sold at physical, “brick and mortar” retail locations. Despite this sizeable and swift economic shock, house price appreciation accelerated last year in the developed world. Chart II-1 highlights that US house prices rose at an 18% annualized pace in the second half of 2020, whereas they accelerated at a high-single digit pace in developed markets ex-US (on a GDP-weighted basis). This, in conjunction with a sharp rise in the household sector credit-to-GDP ratio (Chart II-2), has unnerved some investors while raising questions about the implications for monetary policy. Chart II-1House Prices Are Surging Around The World Chart II-2Rising Fears About Deteriorating Household Balance Sheets Before we discuss the investment implications of the global housing boom, however, we must first accurately determine the reasons why it is happening. The Work-From-Home Effect: Less Than Meets The Eye When analyzing the surprising behavior of the housing market last year, the working-from-home effect brought upon by the pandemic emerges as an obvious factor potentially explaining house price gains. Last year, following recommended or mandatory stay-at-home orders from governments, most office-based businesses rapidly shifted to work-from-home arrangements as an emergency response. However, in the month or two following the beginning of stay-at-home orders, several national US surveys found many office workers preferred the flexibility afforded by work-from-home arrangements. Many employers, correspondingly, found that the productivity of their employees did not suffer while working from home, or that it even improved. Several prominent corporations in the US have subsequently made some work-from-home options permanent, or even allowed employees to work from offices in a different city than they did prior to the pandemic. Newfound work-from-home options have undoubtedly created new demand for housing, and thus explained the surge in house prices seen over the past year in the minds of some investors. However, in our view, evidence from the US, the UK, and France suggests that the work-from-home effect better explains differences in price gains across housing types and within large metropolitan areas, rather than aggregate or national-level changes in house prices. Chart II-3 provides some quantification of the impact of work-from-home policies by plotting US resident migration patterns by city. This data has been compiled by CBRE, and the impact of COVID is shown as the change in net move-ins from 2019 to 2020 per 1000 people. This helps control for the underlying migration pattern that existed in US cities prior to the pandemic. Chart II-3Work From Home Policies Have Impacted Migration Trends… The chart highlights that the negative migration impact from COVID has been mostly concentrated in New York City and the three most populous cities on the West Coast (by metro area): Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. And yet, Chart II-4 highlights that house price inflation in these four cities has accelerated to a double-digit pace, only modestly below the national average. Chart II-4...But Cities With Outward Migration Still Have Very Strong House Price Gains The house price indexes shown in Chart II-4 represent aggregate, metro area trends, and clearly some regions within these metro areas have experienced house price deceleration or outright deflation versus gains in areas outside the urban core. But Chart II-5 highlights that house prices have declined in Manhattan basically in line with the change in net move-ins as a share of the population, underscoring that double-digit metro area-wide house price gains appear to be vastly disproportionate to changes in net migration. Similarly, Chart II-6 highlights that rents decelerated in the US over the past year but remained in positive territory and grew at a 3.5% annualized rate from February to April. Chart II-5In Manhattan, House Prices Have Tracked Net Migration Chart II-6Rent Costs Have Decelerated, But Have Not Contracted Evidence from Paris and London also suggests that a work-from-home effect is insufficient to explain broad house price gains. Panel 1 of Chart II-7 highlights that house prices in France have accelerated significantly, but that apartment prices have decelerated only fractionally in lockstep. Panel 2 shows that the acceleration in house prices does reflect a work-from-home effect, as prices have risen faster in inner Parisian suburbs. Panel 3, however, highlights that Parisian apartment prices, the dominant property type in the urban core, have decelerated modestly. Chart II-8 highlights that house price gains have not even decelerated in greater London; they have been merely been modestly outstripped by gains in Outer South East (outside of the Outer Metropolitan Area). Chart II-7In France, Parisian Apartment Prices Are Simply Lagging, Not Falling Chart II-8In The UK, Greater London Property Prices Are Accelerating     The Policy Effect: The Fundamental Driver Of The Housing Market Despite the broader location flexibility that work-from-home policies now provide to potential homeowners, it seems inconceivable that the housing market would have responded in the manner that it has over the past year given the size of the economic shock brought on by the pandemic without significant support from policy. Above-the-line fiscal measures to the pandemic have totaled in the double-digits in advanced economies (Chart II-9), and monetary policy has contributed to easier financial conditions via rate cuts, asset purchases, and sizeable programs to support financial market liquidity. Chart II-9There Has Been A Massive Fiscal Policy Response To The Crisis In fact, Charts II-10-II-13 present compelling evidence that fiscal and monetary policy have been the core drivers of significant house price gains over the past year. Charts II-10 and II-11 plot the above-the-line fiscal response of advanced economies against the year-over-year growth rate in house prices as well as its acceleration (the change in the year-over-year growth rate). The charts show a clearly positive relationship, with a stronger link between the pandemic fiscal response and the acceleration in house prices. Chart II-10Differences In Last Year’s Fiscal Response… Chart II-11…Help Explain Differences In House Price Gains Chart II-12Pre-Pandemic Differences In The Monetary Policy Stance… Chart II-13…Do An Even Better Job Of Explaining 2020 House Price Gains   Charts II-12 and II-13 highlight the even stronger link between house prices and the pre-pandemic monetary policy stance in advanced economies, defined as the difference between each country’s 2-year government bond yield and its Taylor Rule-implied policy interest rate as of Q4 2019. We construct each country’s Taylor Rule using the original specification, with core consumer price inflation, a 2% inflation target, and real potential GDP growth as the definition of the real equilibrium interest rate. The charts make it clear that easy monetary policy strongly explains house price gains in 2020, particularly the year-over-year percent change rather than its acceleration. This makes sense, given that monetary policy was already quite easy in many countries at the onset of the pandemic – meaning that changes were less pronounced than they would have been had interest rates been higher. The explanation that emerges from Charts II-10-II-13 is that historic fiscal easing, combined with an easy starting point for monetary policy – that became even easier last year – enabled demand from work-from-home policies to manifest during an extremely severe recession. We agree that work-from-home policies have shifted the geographic preferences of some home buyers and likely provided a new source of net demand from renters in urban cores purchasing homes in outlying areas. But we strongly doubt that the net effect of work-from-home policies in the midst of an extreme shock to economic activity would have caused the rise in house prices that we have observed, certainly not to this level, without major support from policy. This underscores that policy, and not the work-from-home effect, has and will likely remain the core driver of the global housing market. The Supply Effect: Mostly A Red Herring Chart II-14Countries Fall Into Two Groups In Terms Of The Relative Trend In Real Residential Investment One perennial question that emerges when analyzing the housing market, particularly in markets with outsized house price gains, is the impact of constrained supply. It is frequently argued that constrained supply is squeezing prices higher in many markets, and that the appropriate policy solution to extreme house price gains is to enable widespread housing construction – not to raise interest rates. We do not rule out the potential impact of constrained supply in certain cities or regional housing markets, and we have highlighted in previous research that a positive relationship does exist between population density in urban regions and median house price-to-income ratios.5 But as a broad explanation for supercharged house price gains, the supply argument appears to fall flat. Chart II-14 presents the most standardized measure of cross-country housing supply available for several advanced economies, the trend in real residential investment relative to real GDP over time. These series are all rebased to 100 as of 1997, prior to the 2002-2007 US housing market boom. The chart makes it clear that advanced economies generally fall into two groups based on this metric: those that have seen declines in real residential investment relative to GDP, especially after the global financial crisis (panel 1), and those that have experienced either an uptrend in housing construction relative to output or have seen a flat trend (panel 2). If scarce housing supply was the core driver of outsized house price gains, then we would expect to see stronger gains in the countries shown in panel 1 and smaller gains in the countries shown in panel 2. In fact, mostly the opposite is true: Charts II-15 and II-16 highlight that the relationship between the level of these indexes today relative to their 1997 or 2005 levels is positively related to the magnitude of house price gains last year, suggesting that housing market supply has generally been responding to demand over the past decade. The US and possibly New Zealand stand as possible exceptions to the trend, suggesting that relatively scarce supply may be boosting prices even further in these markets beyond what fiscal and monetary policy would suggest. Chart II-15Countries That Have Seen A Stronger Pace Of Residential Investment… Chart II-16…Have Experienced Stronger House Price Gains   Chart II-17Is This Not Enough Supply, Or Too Much Demand? As a final point about the inclination of investors to gravitate towards supply-side arguments related to the housing market, Chart II-17 presents a simple thought experiment. The chart shows a simple housing supply-demand curve diagram, in a scenario where the demand curve for housing has shifted out more than the supply curve has (thus raising house prices). Is this a scenario in which supply is too tight? Or is it a case in which demand is too strong? In our view, the tight supply answer is reasonable in circumstances where the increase in demand is normal or otherwise sustainable. But Charts II-10-II-13 clearly showed that housing demand is being boosted by easy policy, which in the case of some countries has occurred for years: interest rates have remained well below levels that macroeconomic theory would traditionally consider to be in equilibrium, and this has occurred alongside significant household sector leveraging (Chart II-18). As such, in our view, investors should be more inclined to view the global housing market as generally being driven by demand-side rather than supply-side factors. This Is Not 2007/08 … Yet We highlighted in Chart II-2 above that the household sector debt-to-GDP ratio increased sharply last year, which has raised some questions about debt sustainability among investors. For the most part, the rise in this ratio actually reflects denominator effects (namely a sharp contraction in nominal GDP) rather than a huge surge in household debt. Chart II-19 shows BIS data for the annual growth in total household debt in developed economies was roughly stable last year, at least until Q3 (the most recent datapoint available from the BIS). Chart II-18Low Interest Rates Have Fueled Household Leveraging Chart II-19Total Credit Growth Has Been Stable, But Mortgage Credit Growth Is Accelerating Chart II-20US Mortgage Growth Is Picking Up, As Repayments Slow Consumer Credit Growth But Chart II-19 shows the recent trend in total household debt, which masks diverging mortgage and non-mortgage debt trends. In the US, euro area, Canada, and Sweden, household mortgage debt has accelerated to varying degrees, underscoring that households have likely paid down non-mortgage debt with some of the savings that they have accumulated from a significant reduction in spending on services. Chart II-20 shows this effect directly in the case of the US; mortgage debt growth accelerated by roughly 1.5 percentage points in the second half of the year, whereas consumer credit growth (made up of student loans, auto loans, credit cards, and other revolving credit) decelerated significantly. This aligns with data showing that US households have used some of their savings windfall to pay down their credit card balances. This changing mix within household debt - less higher-interest-rate consumer credit, more lower-interest-rate collateralized mortgage debt – could, on the margin, help mitigate financial stability risks from the housing boom by moderating overall debt service burdens. The starting point for the latter matters, though, in accurately assessing the risks from rising house prices and increased mortgage debt, particularly in countries where household debt levels are already high. According to data from the BIS, the US already has one of the lowest household debt service ratios (7.6%) among the developed economies (Chart II-21).6 This compares favorably to the double-digit debt service ratios in the “higher-risk” countries like Canada (12.6%), Sweden (12.1%) and Norway (16.2%). On top of that, US commercial banks have become far more prudent with mortgage loan underwriting standards since the 2008 financial crisis. The New York Fed’s Household Debt and Credit report shows that an increasing majority of mortgage lending made by US banks since the 2008 crisis has been to those with very high FICO credit scores (Chart II-22). This is in sharp contrast to the steady lending to “subprime” borrowers with poor credit scores that preceded the 2008 financial crisis. The median FICO score for new mortgage originations as of Q1 2021 was 788, compared to 707 in Q4 2006 at the peak of the mid-2000s US housing boom. Chart II-21Diverging Trends In Global Household Debt Servicing Costs Chart II-22US Banks Have Become More Prudent With Mortgage Lending   US bank balance sheets are also now less directly exposed to a fall in housing values. Residential loans now represent only 10% of the assets on US bank balance sheets, compared to 20% at the peak of the last housing bubble (Chart II-23). This puts the US in the “lower-risk” group of countries in Europe, the UK and Japan where mortgages are less than 20% of bank balance sheets. This compares favorably to the “higher risk” group of countries where residential loans are a far larger share of bank assets (Chart II-24), like Canada (32%), New Zealand (49%), Sweden (45%) and Australia (40%). Chart II-23Banks Have Limited Direct Exposure To Housing Here Chart II-24Banks Are Far More Exposed To Housing Here   Like nature, however, the financial ecosystem abhors a vacuum. “Non-bank” mortgage lenders have filled the void from traditional US banks reducing their lending to lower-quality borrowers, and they now represent around two-thirds of all US mortgage origination, a big leap from the 20% origination share in 2007. Non-bank lenders have also taken on growing shares of new mortgage origination in other countries like the UK, Canada and Australia. Chart II-25Global Banks Can Withstand A Housing Shock Non-bank lenders do not take deposits and typically fund themselves via shorter-term borrowings, which raises the potential for future instability if credit markets seize up. These lenders also, on average, service mortgages with a higher probability of default, so they are exposed to greater credit losses when house prices decline. However, the risk of a full-blown 2008-style commercial banking crisis, with individual depositors’ funds at risk from a bank failure, are reduced with a greater share of riskier mortgage lending conducted by non-bank entities. This is especially true with global commercial banks far better capitalized today, with double-digit Tier 1 capital ratios (Chart II-25), thanks to regulatory changes made after the Global Financial Crisis. Net-net, we conclude that the overall financial stability implications of the current surge in house prices in the developed economies are relatively modest on average. The acceleration in mortgage growth has occurred alongside reductions in non-mortgage growth, at a time when banks are better able to withstand a shock from any sustained future downturn in house prices. However, if house prices continue to accelerate and new homebuyers are forced to take on ever increasing amounts of mortgage debt, financial stability issues could intensify in some countries. Services spending will recover in a vaccinated post-COVID world, as economies reopen and consumer confidence improves, which will likely end the trend of falling non-residential consumer debt offsetting rising mortgage debt in countries like the US and Canada. Overall levels of household debt could begin to rise again relative to incomes, building up future financial stability risks when central banks begin to normalize pandemic-related monetary policies – a process that has already started in some countries because of the housing boom. The Monetary Policy Implications Of Surging House Prices Rapidly appreciating house prices are becoming an area of concern for policymakers in countries like Canada and New Zealand, where the affordability of housing is becoming a political, as well as an economic, issue. In the case of New Zealand, the government has actually altered the remit of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to more explicitly factor in the impact of monetary policy on housing costs. The Bank of Canada announced in April that it would taper its pace of government debt purchases and signaled that its decision was based, at least in small part, on signs of speculative behavior in Canada’s housing market. Macroprudential measures like limiting loan-to-value ratios of new mortgage loans are a policy option that governments in those countries have already implemented to try and cool off housing demand. Yet while such measures can help alleviate demand-supply mismatches in certain cities and regions, the efficacy of such measures in sustainably slowing the ascent of house prices on a national scale is unclear. In the April 2021 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, researchers estimated that, for a broad group of countries, the implementation of a new macro-prudential measure designed to cool loan demand reduced national household debt/GDP ratios by a mere one percentage point, on average, over a period encompassing four years.7 If macroprudential measures are that ineffective in sustainably reducing demand for mortgage loans, then the burden of slowing house price appreciation will have to fall on the more blunt instruments of monetary policy. Importantly, surging house price inflation is not likely to give a boost to realized inflation measures – an important issue given the current backdrop of rapidly rising realized inflation rates in many countries. Housing costs do represent a significant portion of consumer price indices in many developed countries, ranging from 19% in New Zealand to 33% in the US (Chart II-26), with the euro area being the outlier with housing having a mere 2% weighting in the headline inflation index. Chart II-26A Limited Impact On Actual Inflation From Housing Yet those so-called “housing” categories overwhelmingly measure only housing rental costs and not actual house prices. This is an important distinction because rents – which are often imputed measures like in the US and not even actual rental costs - are rising at a far slower pace than actual house prices in most countries, so the housing contribution to realized inflation is relatively modest. So the good news is that booming house prices will not worsen the acceleration of realized global inflation that has concerned investors and policymakers in 2021. Yet that does not mean that central bankers will not be forced to tighten policy to cool off red-hot housing demand that is clearly being fueled by persistently negative real interest rates. In Chart II-27 and Chart II-28, we show both nominal and real policy interest rates for the “lower risk” and “higher risk” country groupings that we described earlier. The real policy rates are nominal policy rates versus realized headline CPI inflation. The dotted lines in the charts represent the future path of rates discounted by markets. Specifically, the projection for nominal rates is taken from overnight index swap (OIS) forward curves, while the projection for real rates is calculated by subtracting the discounted path of inflation expectations extracted from CPI swap forwards. Chart II-27Markets Discounting Negative Real Rates For The Next Decade Chart II-28Negative Real Rates Are Unsustainable During A Housing Bubble   There are two key takeaways from these charts: Real policy interest rates are at or very close to the most deeply negative levels seen since the 2008 financial crisis. Markets are discounting that real rates will be at or below 0% for most of the next decade. Admittedly, there is room for debate over what the equilibrium level of real interest rates (a.k.a. “r-star”) should be in the coming years. However, we deem it a major stretch to believe that real rates need to be persistently low or negative for the next ten years to support even trend growth across the developed economies. In our view, the current boom in housing demand and mortgage borrowing provides clear evidence that negative real rates are below equilibrium and, thus, are stimulating credit demand. Thus, the only way for a central bank to cool off housing demand will be to raise both nominal and, more importantly, real interest rates. Canada and New Zealand will be the “canaries in the coal mine” among developed market central banks for such a move. According to the latest Bank of Canada Financial Stability Review, nearly 22% of Canadian mortgages are highly levered, with a loan-to-value ratio greater than 450%, a greater share of such mortgages than during the 2016/17 housing boom (Chart II-29). Canadian house prices have risen to such an extent that home prices in major cities like Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal are among the most expensive in North America.8  Stunningly, a recent Bloomberg Nanos opinion poll revealed that nearly 50% of Canadians would support Bank of Canada rate hikes to cool off the red-hot housing market (Chart II-30). The central bank will be unable to resist the pressure to use monetary policy to slam on the brakes of the housing market – investors should expect more tapering and, eventually, rate hikes from the Bank of Canada over at least the next couple of years. Chart II-29Canadians Are Leveraging Up To Buy Expensive Homes Chart II-3050% Of Canadians Want A Rate Hike To Cool Housing   In New Zealand, worsening housing affordability has reached a point where a 20% down payment on the median national house price is equal to 223% of median disposable income (Chart II-31). This is forcing more first-time home buyers to take on levels of mortgage debt that the RBNZ deems highly risky (top panel). Like the Bank of Canada, the RBNZ will prove to be one of the most hawkish central banks in the developed world over the next couple of years as the central bank follows their newly-revised remit to try and cool off housing demand in New Zealand. Who is next? Housing values, measured by the ratio of median national house prices to median national household incomes, are rising in the US and UK but are still below the peaks of the mid-2000s housing bubble (Chart II-32). Meanwhile, housing is becoming more expensive across the euro area, but not in a consistent manner, with valuations in Germany and Spain having increased far more than in France or Italy. Housing valuations have actually improved in Australia over the past couple of years on a price-to-income basis. The most likely candidates for a housing-related hawkish turn are in Scandinavia, with housing valuations in Sweden and Norway closing in on Canada/New Zealand levels. Chart II-31New Zealand Housing Is Wildly Unaffordable Chart II-32Global House Price/Income Ratios Are Trending Higher   Investment Conclusions The current acceleration in global house prices is an inevitable outcome of the extraordinary monetary and fiscal easing implemented during the pandemic. Higher realized inflation is pushing real rates deeper into negative territory in many countries, fueling the demand for housing. Central banks in countries with more stretched housing valuations will be forced to turn more hawkish sooner than expected, leading to tapering and, eventually, rate hikes to cool housing demand. This has negative implications for government bond markets in countries where housing is more expensive and real yields remain too low, like Canada, New Zealand and Sweden (Chart II-33). Investors should limit exposure to government bonds in those markets over the next 6-12 months. Chart II-33Negative Real Yields & Expensive Housing Valuations – An Unsustainable Mix Bond markets in countries where house prices are not rising rapidly enough to force policymakers to turn more hawkish more quickly – like core Europe, Australia and even Japan - are likely to be relative outperformers. The US and UK are “cuspy” bond markets, as housing valuations are becoming more expensive in those two countries but the Fed and Bank of England are not facing the same domestic political pressure to use monetary policy tools to fight the growing unaffordability of housing. That could change, though, if overall household leverage begins to rise alongside house price inflation as the US and UK economies emerge from the pandemic. Current pricing in OIS curves shows that markets expect the RBNZ and Bank of Canada to begin hiking rates in May 2022 and September 2022, respectively (Table II-1). This is well ahead of expectations for “liftoff” from other developed markets central banks, including the Fed in April 2023. The cumulative amount of rate hikes following liftoff to the end of 2024 is highest in Canada, New Zealand, the US and Australia. Those are also countries with currencies that are trading at or above the purchasing power parity levels derived from our currency strategists’ valuation models. This highlights the difficult choice that central bankers facing housing bubbles must confront, as the rate hikes that will help cool off housing demand will lead to currency appreciation that could impact other parts of their economies like exports and manufacturing. Table II-1Hawkish Central Banks Must Live With Currency Strength Tracking the second-round economic consequences of eventual monetary policy actions to control excessive house price inflation, particularly in “higher risk” countries, is likely to be the subject of future Bank Credit Analyst / Global Fixed Income Strategy reports. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but more modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has aggressively retreated from its high last year, reflecting a meaningful recovery in government bond yields since last August. The indicator remains above the boom/bust line, however, highlighting that monetary policy remains supportive for risky asset prices. Forward equity earnings already price in a complete earnings recovery, but for now there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions remain positive, and positive earnings surprises have risen to their strongest levels on record. Within a global equity portfolio, there has been a modest tick up in global ex-US equity performance, led by European stocks. EM stocks had previously dragged down global ex-US performance, and they continue to languish. Japanese stocks have cratered in relative terms since the beginning of the year, seemingly driven by service sector underperformance resulting from a surge in COVID-19 cases since the beginning of March. While Japanese equity performance may stage a reversal over the coming 3 months as cases counts decline and progress continues on the vaccination front, we expect global ex-US performance to continue to be led by European stocks. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has traded sideways since mid-March, after having risen to levels that were extremely technically stretched. Despite this pause, our valuation index highlights that bonds are still expensive, and that yields could move higher over the cyclical investment horizon if employment growth in Q3/Q4 implies a faster return to maximum employment than currently projected by the Fed. We expect the rise to be more modest than our valuation index would imply, but we would still recommend a short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio. Commodity prices, particularly copper, lumber, and agricultural commodities, have screamed higher over the past several months. This reflects bullish cyclical conditions, but also pandemic-induced supply shortages that are likely to wane later this year. Commodity prices are extremely technically stretched and sentiment is very bullish for most commodities, suggesting that a breather in commodity prices is likely at some point over the coming several months. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend, and global manufacturing PMIs are strong. Our global LEI diffusion index has declined significantly, but this likely reflects the outsized impact of a few emerging market countries (whose vaccination progress is lagging). Strong leading and coincident indicators underscore that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly later this year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 The New York Times “Texas, Indiana and Oklahoma join states cutting off pandemic unemployment benefits,” May 18, 2021. 2 The Wall Street Journal, “Shipments Delayed: Ocean Carrier Shipping Times Surge in Supply-Chain Crunch,” May 18, 2021 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "The Modern-Day Phillips Curve, Future Inflation, And What To Do About It," dated December 18, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4 To eliminate the pandemic base effect for both series, we adjust the year-over-year growth rates in March and April of this year by comparing them to March and April 2019. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy "Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story," dated July 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 6 Importantly, the BIS debt service ratios include the payment of both principal and interest, thus making it a true measure of debt service costs that includes repayment of borrowed funds – a critical issue in countries with high loan-to-value ratios for home mortgages. 7 Please see page 46 of Chapter 2 of the April 2021 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, which can be found here: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2021/04/06/global-finan… 8 “Vancouver, Toronto and Hamilton are the least affordable cities in North America: report”, CBC News, May 20, 2021

ハイライト グローバル通貨は米ドルに対して重要な水準にある。 ポジショニングの観点からは、DXY指数が89〜90を下回ると非常に弱気と判断される一方で、現在水準からの反発は3〜4％程度で抑えられるはずである。 米ドルを押し下げた主な要因は二つある：米国の実質金利の低下と、米国外で回復する経済モメンタムである。 株式市場が5月に乱高下する中で、米ドルに季節的な強さが見られる可能性がある。しかし、これは新たなドル売りポジションの機会を提供するだろう。 連邦準備制度理事会（FRB）は、現時点のインフレの上振れを一時的と見る姿勢を維持しつつ、労働市場に注目し続けるだろう。これにより、米国の実質金利は他国に比べて抑制され続ける。 新規トレード案：通貨ボラティリティ上昇を見越してCHF/NZDのロング。さらにUSD/JPYが110に触れれば売り。 特集 チャート I-1 米ドルは重要な岐路にある ドルは重要な岐路に立っている ドルは重要な岐路に立っている 1月から3月にかけての短期的な上昇の後、米ドルは再びテクニカルな崩壊寸前にある。DXY指数、FRBの実効実勢ドル、そして新興国通貨ベンチマークはいずれも重要な水準に位置している（チャート I-1）。崩壊が確認されれば、2020年3月に始まったドルのベア相場が継続していることになり、ドルからの投機的な資金流出を引き起こすだろう。 我々の12月の為替見通しでは、1循環的な観点（12〜18か月の時間軸）でDXYは80に向かうとの見方だった。しかし同時に、DXY指数が第1四半期に94〜95に達すると予想しており、以降も複数回にわたりその見方を補強してきた。DXY指数は93.5でピークアウトしたため、次の最もありそうな動きを検討することが有益である。これを行うために、12月の記事以降に何が変わったか、何が変わっていないかを再検討する。 投資家ポジショニングの見極め チャート I-2 ドル・ブルは降伏している ドル買いの強気筋が降参している ドル買いの強気筋が降参している 2021年に入るとドル売りはコンセンサスのトレードであり、通貨は大幅に売られ過ぎていた。逆張り派にとっては強気に振る舞うことが功を奏した（チャート I-2）。その後、投資家は米ドルのショートポジションを解消し、JPYやCHFをファンディング通貨とするキャリートレードに注力している。投機筋はユーロのロングを維持しているが、その賭けの規模は未決済建玉のネット30％から現在は約10％に縮小している。GBPやCADのポジショニングは依然として高水準にあり、これら通貨はテクニカルな押し戻しに脆弱であることを示唆している。 興味深いことに、シティグループの米ドルに対するセンチメント指標は1月の底に近い。ここから見ると、直近数週間でドルショートの蓄積があったことが分かる。これが最近のドルの弱さを説明する一助となっている。 今後、ポジショニングはドルの次の動きを指し示すうえであまり有用ではないだろう。なぜならポジショニングは極端な局面でしか有効に機能しないからだ。さらに言えば、それはカウンタートレンドの動きを測るうえでのみ有用である。2000年代初頭の多くの期間、ドルのセンチメントは弱気であったが、反発は4〜6％で抑えられていた。先の十年のドル・ブル相場では、センチメントは概ね強気圏にとどまったが、ドルは脱出速度を達成した（チャート I-3）。 チャート I-3 ドルとレジームシフト ドルとレジーム・シフト ドルとレジーム・シフト 現時点のポジショニングから見ると、DXY指数が89〜90を下回ることは極めて弱気のサインとなる一方、現在水準からの反発は3〜4％程度で抑えられるはずだ。テクニカルな観点からドルは重要な分岐点にいる。 連邦準備制度理事会、インフレ、金利 2021年初め、金利はドルに有利な動きを続けており、これは昨年中盤から続くトレンドだった。米独10年金利差は昨年の約100ベーシスポイントの低水準から3月には200ベーシスポイント超の高水準まで拡大した。最近では金利差はドルに不利に動き始めており、これが3月以降のドル指数全般の反転を説明している。現在の米独10年スプレッドは180ベーシスポイントにある。 為替レートはインフレが通貨の購買力を侵食するため、実質金利差を反映する傾向がある。したがって名目金利に何が起きているかだけでなく、基調としてのインフレ動向を見極めることが重要である。これはインフレがしばしば遅行変数であるため複雑さを増すが、インフレの行方を把握することは通貨ストラテジーにとって非常に有用だ。 出発点として、米国は実質金利の観点で芳しくない。チャート I-4は実質金利とドルの広い相関を示している。スイス、スウェーデン、ユーロ圏のような低金利国では、米国実質金利のピークはこれら通貨の循環的な反発と一致した。円のような通貨でも、実質金利は米国と比べて好ましい。名目10年金利は10bpで、10年物のインフレスワップは23bpである。これにより日本の実質金利はほぼ100bp、米国より上回っている。 チャート I-4A 金利はドルに不利に動いた 金利はドルに対して逆に動いた 金利はドルに対して逆に動いた チャート I-4B 金利はドルに不利に動いた 金利はドルに対して変動した 金利はドルに対して変動した チャート I-4C 金利はドルに不利に動いた 金利は米ドルに対して動いた 金利は米ドルに対して動いた もちろん、米国でインフレが上振れしているため、FRBが市場に伝えているより早くテーパリングを行ったり、想定より速く利上げを行ったりする可能性はある。カナダ銀行やイングランド銀行のような他の中央銀行は既に資産購入の縮小を示唆していることを考えれば驚くことではない。しかし、たとえFRBが資産購入のテーパリングを決めても、その影響が一部の市場参加者が期待するほど単純ではないだろう。 なぜかを理解するために、チャート I-5を考えてほしい。これは他の中央銀行と比較して、FRBのバランスシートのインパルスがGDP比で既に約13％縮小していることを示している。本質的に、FRBは他のG10中央銀行に比べて「ステルス的」に資産購入を縮小してきた。この動きは今年ドルをサポートしてきた。また市場はフェデラルファンド金利の見通しをFOMCの中央値よりもかなり上に織り込ませている（チャート I-6）。したがって、FRBの資産購入テーパリングの見通しは既に資産価格に織り込まれている可能性がある。 チャート I-5 FRBによるステルステーパリング？ 米FRBによるステルス・テーパリングか？ 米FRBによるステルス・テーパリングか？ チャート I-6 市場は既にタカ派なFRBを織り込んでいる 市場は既にタカ派のFRBを織り込んでいる 市場は既にタカ派のFRBを織り込んでいる 今後、我々のグローバル・フィクスト・インカムの同僚は、FRBが次にテーパリングすると期待される順番で既に下位に移動していることを指摘している。2 日銀と欧州中央銀行はほとんど資産購入を縮小していない。彼らが6月10日と6月18日の会合で何か重要な発表をする可能性は低いかもしれないが、市場は言葉の変更に注目し続けるだろう。 チャート I-7 浪費的な米国政府は歴史的にドルにとって弱材料だった 浪費的な米国政府は歴史的にドル安傾向にあった 浪費的な米国政府は歴史的にドル安傾向にあった 投資家がFRBのメッセージを額面どおり受け取り、FOMCがインフレの上振れを見送る姿勢を維持すると判断すれば、米国の実質金利は低迷し続け、ドルは下押しされるだろう。我々は米国のインフレが一時的か恒常的かについて確信は持っていない。しかしながら、米国経済は他の先進国よりも内需を刺激しており、生産ギャップを埋めるために必要以上の財政・金融刺激を行っているため、歴史的にはこれは米ドルにとって弱材料である（チャート I-7）。 触媒としての経済モメンタム 金融政策が国内の経済状況に合わせて調整される程度に、成長モメンタムは明らかに米国から他国へと回転している。これはECBやRBAのような他の中央銀行がBoEやBoCの歩みを追う可能性が徐々に高まっていることを示唆する。世界各地の製造業購買担当者景気指数（PMI）は米国水準を上回っており、サービスPMIが追いつくのは時間の問題である。 チャート I-8はユーロ圏のデータが継続して上振れしていることを示しており、ユーロ圏と米国の経済サプライズ・インデックスは10年ぶりの高水準にある。これは歴史的に米国よりもユーロ圏の債券利回りがやや高くなることと同義であり、通貨を支援してきた。ZEWとSentixの期待コンポーネントは今月さらに強かったことから、欧州およびドイツの成長は夏にかけて健全に推移するはずだ（チャート I-9）。 チャート I-8 欧州債利回りが上昇するための小さな窓 欧州利回り上昇の小さな機会 欧州利回り上昇の小さな機会 チャート I-9 ユーロ圏のデータは強さを保つ ユーロ圏のデータは堅調を維持 ユーロ圏のデータは堅調を維持 中国の刺激策の減速はグローバル成長のリスクであることに同意する（我々の中国ストラテジストが指摘する通り）が、逆方向の要因も二つ働いている： 中国の刺激は長いラグを伴って経済に影響を与える。前回のサイクルでは中国のクレジットのピークは2016年にあったが、世界貿易が鈍化するのは2018年まで待たなければならなかった（チャート I-10）。これが、最大の買い手からのクレジット創出が鈍化しているにもかかわらず、コモディティ価格が後退していない理由の一端を説明する。 経済はクレジット形成だけに依存できない。ある時点で、バトンは投資家の動意（animal spirits）に渡されなければならない。マネーの回転率、つまり貨幣創出1単位あたりに何単位のGDPが生み出されるかはその一つの力である。チャート I-11は、マネーの回転率が米国外で、中国を中心に速く上昇していることを示している。 チャート I-10 中国のクレジット・インパルスは遅れて効く 中国のクレジット・インパルスは遅れて作用する 中国のクレジット・インパルスは遅れて作用する チャート I-11 米国と比較したマネーの回転率 米国とのマネー・ベロシティ比較 米国とのマネー・ベロシティ比較 上記のトレンドにより、我々はドルの強さはカウンタートレンドの動きに過ぎず、FRBが方針転換して示唆より速く金融引き締めに動くまでは、そうした動きは逆張りすべきだと確信している。弱い世界成長の期間は我々の見方に対する別のリスクとなる。 興味深いことに、中国人民元は金利差が縮小しているにもかかわらず新たな循環的安値をつけている。2月のスペシャルレポートでは、USD/CNYは6.2に向かうと示唆したが、これは米中の金利差が縮小しても成り立つ見通しだった。もし中国の経済活動がクレジット形成の鈍化にもかかわらず比較的堅調に推移するなら、USD/CNYはさらに低下するだろう。 チャート I-12 新興市場の成長は依然として弱い 新興市場の成長は依然として弱い 新興市場の成長は依然として弱い USD/CNYの下落は必要条件ではあるが、十分条件ではない。米国に対する相対的な観点で見ると、新興国の成長は昨年のCOVID-19リセッションの最深部よりも悪いままである（チャート I-12）。我々の新興市場ストラテジストは、EM通貨が持続的にアウトパフォームするには経済状況の改善が必要だと見ている。ワクチン接種キャンペーンが新興国に広がることがこの変化の鍵を握る可能性が高い。 ドル・ショートポジションに対する実際のリスク 現在水準でドルをショートするリスクは株式市場から生じる。 先進国通貨は自国株式の相対パフォーマンスを先行して上昇してきた。これは歴史的な相関からの逸脱である（チャート I-13）。防御的な株式を好むような株式市場のリセットが起きれば、米国株式・債券への資金流入が起きて先進国通貨にとって逆風となり、ドルを押し上げるだろう。今期の決算で米国はより強いポジティブな収益改定を享受しているのは懸念材料である。 対応して、米国のプット／コール比率は依然として非常に低く、多くの株式市場で自信過剰が支配している（チャート I-14）。 チャート I-13A 通貨は株式のアウトパフォームを先行している 通貨はエクイティのアウトパフォーマンスに先行している 通貨はエクイティのアウトパフォーマンスに先行している チャート I-13B 通貨は株式のアウトパフォームを先行している カレンシーはエクイティのアウトパフォーマンスに先行している カレンシーはエクイティのアウトパフォーマンスに先行している チャート I-14 米国株の熱狂が目立つ 米国株式にあふれる熱狂 米国株式にあふれる熱狂 チャート I-15 株式とドルは乖離している エクイティとドルが乖離している エクイティとドルが乖離している 市場リセットの性質を考慮することは重要だ。例えば： 世界株が調整するが、テクノロジーとヘルスケアが下落を主導する。こうしたシナリオでは、米国がこれらのディフェンシブセクターの比率が高いため、ドルは相対的に弱含みとなる（チャート I-15）。グロースやディフェンシブが主導する場合は現在進行中のようにドルが下落する。逆にバリュー株や景気循環株が下落を主導すれば反対の結果になる。 世界株が調整し、同時に債券利回りも低下する。初期反応としては米国への資金流入が加速しドルは強くなるが、これは同時に米国債利回りがドイツ国債（Bund）や日本国債（JGB）に向けて収斂するため、ドルの魅力を抑えるだろう。さらに米国の実質金利はさらに急落する。こうしたシナリオでは我々はドルの強さに対して売りを仕掛けるだろう。 世界株が調整するが利回りは上昇する。もし米国利回りが先導して上昇するなら、当初はドルが買われるが、同時に米国株からの資金流出が加速する。これが持続的な回転であるなら、最終的にはドルは下落するだろう。というのも海外市場は利回り上昇に高くレバレッジしているからである。 要するに、米国債市場は魅力的な利回りを提供しており、米国株式市場は市場調整時に防御的に振る舞う可能性がある（歴史的にもその傾向がある）。これが今日ドルをショートすることのリスクを生んでいる。 通貨ストラテジー 通貨市場は重要な岐路にある（チャート I-1 魅力的な通貨バスケットに対して引き続きUSDをショートする。この観点から我々は既にスカンジナビア通貨のロングを保有している。 ポジショニングが歪んでいることからUSD/JPYをショートする。USD/JPYは本日110で指値売りを入れている。またユーロの指値買いを1.18に引き上げている。興味深いことにEUR/JPYのクロスは数年にわたる下落トレンドを突破した。このクロスはドルと逆相関がある。 通貨ボラティリティ上昇を見越して本日CHF/NZDを買う。これは各中央銀行のテーパリング政策（FRB対他の先進国経済）に市場が悩む局面で良い保険となる（チャート I-16）。 株式市場の調整が一巡するのを待ち、その後改めてドルを全面的にショートするゴーサインが出るだろう。歴史的に5月はドルにとって良い月であり、株式にとってはボラティリティの高い月である（チャート I-17）。とはいえ、ドルのベア相場はしばしば長期サイクルで進行する。 チャート I-16 保険としてCHF/NZDを買う 保険としてCHF/NZDを買う 保険としてCHF/NZDを買う チャート I-17 ドルと季節性 ドルと季節性 ドルと季節性   Chester Ntonifor 外国為替ストラテジスト chestern@bcaresearch.com   脚注 1 フォーリン・エクスチェンジ・ストラテジー特別レポート、"2021 Key Views: Tradeable Themes," 2020年12月4日付を参照。 2 グローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジー特別レポート、"Who Tapers Next?," 2020年12月04日付を参照。 通貨 米ドル チャート II-1 USD テクニカル 1 米ドルのテクニカル指標 1 米ドルのテクニカル指標 1 チャート II-2 USD テクニカル 2 USDのテクニカル分析 2 USDのテクニカル分析 2 最近の米国のデータは混在している： 時間当たり平均賃金は4月に前月比0.7％改善し、予想の0.1％を上回った。 非農業部門雇用者数は4月に266千人増加し、予想の978千人や3月の770千人を大きく下回った。 失業率は3月の6％から4月に6.1％へわずかに悪化し、予想の5.8％改善から外れた。  NFIB中小企業景況感指数は3月の98.2から4月に99.8へ小幅上昇した。 4月のCPIは前年比4.2％で、予想の3.6％上昇を上回った。前月比では4月に0.8％上昇し、コンセンサスの0.2％を大きく上回った。 コアCPIは4月の前年比で3％となり、予想の2.3％を上回った。 PPIも上振れし、4月の前年比で6.2％となり、予想の5.8％上昇を上回った。 米ドルのDXY指数は今週1.3％下落した。CPIは急上昇したが、雇用は期待を大きく下回った。市場が期待するタイミングでFRBの「最大雇用」目標が達成される可能性は低く、この組み合わせ—FRBのハト派的姿勢の持続と潜在的な大幅インフレ—はドルにとって弱材料である。   レポートリンク： Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - 2021年3月19日 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - 2021年3月5日 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - 2021年2月19日 ユーロ チャート II-3 EUR テクニカル 1 EUR テクニカル 1 EUR テクニカル 1 チャート II-4 EUR テクニカル 2 ユーロ テクニカル 2 ユーロ テクニカル 2 ユーロ圏の最近のデータは強い： 3月のドイツ輸入は前月比6.5％と、予想の0.7％を大きく上回った。 ドイツZEW現状は5月に-40.1となり、4月の-48.8を大きく上回った。 ドイツZEW期待も5月に84.4と予想の72を上回った。  ユーロ圏全体のZEW景況感は5月に66から84へ上昇した。 Sentixの投資家信頼感は4月の13.1から5月に21へ改善し、予想の14を上回った。 Sentixの期待は36.8の過去最高に上昇した。現況は2020年2月以降で初めてプラス圏に入った。 3月の鉱工業生産は前月比0.1％増で、予想の0.7％を下回った。 ユーロは今週対米ドルで1.3％上昇した。ZEW調査の好結果は、ユーロ圏に有利な世界的な成長回転の期待を補強する。ECBが資産購入を縮小しない可能性はあるものの、力強いワクチン接種がサービス部門を中心にさらなるデータの上振れをもたらすはずだ。ユーロ圏の経済サプライズ指数（ESI）は高水準にあり、米国のESIは2020年7月のピークから急落しているのとは対照的である。   レポートリンク： Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - 2021年4月16日 Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - 2021年1月29日 円 チャート II-5 JPY テクニカル 1 JPY テクニカル 1 JPY テクニカル 1 チャート II-6 JPY テクニカル 2 JPY テクニカル 2 JPY テクニカル 2 今週の日本のデータは乏しかった： 家計支出は3月に前月比7.2％増と、予想の2.1％増を大きく上回った。 日本の経常収支は3月に2.65兆円と、2月の2.9兆円から悪化した。 エコノミスト・ウォッチャーズ調査は4月に期待を裏切り、現状は49から39.1へ、期待は49.8から41.7へ低下した。 円は今週対米ドルで0.5％上昇した。長引く緊急事態宣言の延長は短期的に円を押し下げる圧力となるだろう。しかし、日本株と通貨が売られ過ぎの状態にあることから、本年後半にかけて円に対して慎重に楽観的である。   レポートリンク： The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - 2021年3月5日 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - 2021年1月29日 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - 2020年11月6日   英国ポンド チャート II-7 GBP テクニカル 1 GBP テクニカル 1 GBP テクニカル 1 チャート II-8 GBP テクニカル 2 英ポンド テクニカル指標 2 英ポンド テクニカル指標 2 英国の最近のデータは弱い： 建設PMIは4月に61.6とほぼ横ばいで推移した。 第1四半期のGDPは前期比で1.5％減となった。より失望的だったのは、企業設備投資が第1四半期に前期比で11.9％減、前年比で18.1％減少した点である。 3月のGDPは前月比2.1％増と強かったことから、第1四半期の落ち込みは主にロックダウンが原因であることを示唆している。 3月の製造業生産は前月比2.1％増で、1％のコンセンサスを上回った。 3月の貿易赤字は117.1億ポンドに縮小した。  ポンドは今週対米ドルで1.7％上昇した。第1四半期の弱い生産データは主に冬季のロックダウンによるものであり、3月の改善がその穴埋めを示している。制限の解除に伴い、サービス業の生産と家計消費（過剰貯蓄に起因）は製造業の最近の反発に速やかに追いつくはずだ。ただし市場は英国のワクチン接種のアウトパフォームを過大評価している可能性があり、それは小型株の過大評価として反映されている。   レポートリンク： Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - 2020年11月6日 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - 2020年9月11日 豪ドル チャート II-9 AUD テクニカル 1 AUD テクニカル 1 AUD テクニカル 1 チャート II-10 AUD テクニカル 2 AUD テクニカル分析 2 AUD テクニカル分析 2 オーストラリアの最近のデータは良好である： NAB企業景況感は4月に17から26へ上昇した。 NABビジネスサーベイ指数も4月に25から32へ上昇した。 小売売上高は3月に前月比1.3％増となり、予想の1.4％をわずかに下回った。 第1四半期の小売売上高は前期比で0.5％減と、推定の0.4％減を下回った。 第1四半期のCPIは前期比0.6％、前年比1.1％と予想を下回った。 AUDは今週対米ドルで1.2％上昇した。NABの景況感と企業状況指数は記録的な高さだが、オーストラリアの物価圧力は依然として弱く、ワクチン接種の進捗も遅れている。それでも設備投資意向や受注残のような先行指標は改善している。当社は主にメキシコの米国回復の近接性を活かすためにAUD/MXNをショートしている。   レポートリンク： The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - 2021年3月5日 Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - 2021年1月20日 ニュージーランドドル チャート II-11 NZD テクニカル 1 NZドル テクニカル分析 1 NZドル テクニカル分析 1 チャート II-12 NZD テクニカル 2 NZD テクニカル分析 2 NZD テクニカル分析 2 ニュージーランドの最近のデータは乏しかった： 電子カード小売売上高は4月に前月比4％増となり、3月の0.8％減から回復した。 食品価格指数は4月に前月比1.1％となり、3月の0％から上昇した。 NZDは今週対米ドルで0.8％上昇した。ニュージーランドの最近のポジティブなデータを踏まえ、我々のグローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジーの同僚はRBNZが2021年後半にテーパリングに動く最有力候補と判断している。ただし、Q2のインフレ期待は依然として弱く、観光部門は国境閉鎖の影響を受け続けているため、キウイに対しては慎重である。   レポートリンク： Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - 2020年7月10日 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - 2019年11月29日 カナダドル チャート II-13 CAD テクニカル 1 CADのテクニカル分析 1 CADのテクニカル分析 1 チャート II-14 CAD テクニカル 2 CADのテクニカル分析 2 CADのテクニカル分析 2 カナダの最近のデータはやや失望的だった： 雇用報告は落胆させる内容だった。カナダは4月に207.1千の雇用を失い、参加率は65.2％から64.9％に低下した。 失業率も4月に7.5％から8.1％へ悪化し、予想を上回った。  Ivey PMIは4月に72.9から60.6へ低下し、予想通りの結果となった。 CADは今週対米ドルで1.35％上昇した。ルーニー（カナダドル）の数か月にわたる上昇や住宅価格の上昇にもかかわらず、CADは実効実質為替レートから見て依然割安である。原油価格の上昇は通貨を引き続き支援するはずだ。COVID-19ロックダウンの延長やワクチン接種の遅れは下振れリスクである。   レポートリンク： Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - 2021年4月16日 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - 2021年2月12日 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - 2020年7月10日   スイス・フラン チャート II-15 CHF テクニカル 1 CHF テクニカル 1 CHF テクニカル 1 チャート II-16 CHF テクニカル 2 CHF テクニカル 2 CHF テクニカル 2 スイスの最近のデータは中立的だった： 失業率は4月に3.3％とほぼ横ばいで、予想どおりであった。 スイス・フランは今週対米ドルで1％上昇した。実効実質為替レートは公正価値より1標準偏差低く、フランは割安である。世界貿易の回復が続けばフランは恩恵を受けるだろう。ただしSNBは過度のフラン高、特にユーロに対しては引き続き抑制する姿勢を取ると我々は考えている。したがって長期的にはフランはユーロに遅れをとると見ている。通貨ボラティリティが高まれば本日CHF/NZDのロングを仕掛ける予定だ。    レポートリンク： Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - 2020年11月6日 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - 2020年2月21日   ノルウェー・クローネ チャート II-17 NOK テクニカル 1 NOK テクニカル 1 NOK テクニカル 1 チャート II-18 NOK テクニカル 2 NOK テクニカル指標 2 NOK テクニカル指標 2 ノルウェーの最近のデータは混在している： 4月のCPIは3％で、予想どおりだった。 PPI成長率は4月の前年比で22.5％を記録した。 第1四半期のGDPは前期比で0.6％低下し、推定の0.4％減を下回った。 本土ベースのGDPも第1四半期に前期比1％減と期待を下回った。 NOKは今週対米ドルで1％上昇した。第1四半期の軟調なデータは、2020年3月の安値以来の顕著なパフォーマンスを踏まえると短期的にはNOKを抑える可能性がある。それでも原油価格の上昇はNOKを支援し続けるだろう。ワクチン接種の進捗がユーロ圏並みであれば通貨の追い風となる。   レポートリンク： Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - 2020年9月11日 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - 2020年4月10日   スウェーデン・クローナ チャート II-19 SEK テクニカル 1 SEK テクニカル指標 1 SEK テクニカル指標 1 チャート II-20 SEK テクニカル 2 SEK テクニカル分析 2 SEK テクニカル分析 2 最近のスウェーデンのデータはやや良好である： 失業率は3月の8.4％から4月に8.2％へ低下した。 4月のCPIは前年比2.2％、前月比0.2％で予想どおりだった。 CPIFは4月に前年比2.5％、前月比0.3％となり、いずれもコンセンサスを上回った。 SEKは今週対米ドルで2％上昇した。スウェーデンのワクチン接種の進捗はユーロ圏に僅かに劣る程度である。コモディティ主導の混雑したトレードからセンチメントが抜け出すことがあれば、近い将来の欧州回復を背景に輸出主導のSEKを支援する可能性がある。   レポートリンク： Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - 2020年9月11日 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - 2019年11月29日 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - 2019年6月7日   脚注 1     フォーリン・エクスチェンジ・ストラテジー特別レポート、"2021 Key Views: Tradeable Themes," 2020年12月4日付を参照。 2     グローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジー特別レポート、"Who Tapers Next?," 2020年12月04日付を参照。 トレード＆予想 予想サマリー コア・ポートフォリオ タクティカル・トレード 指値注文 クローズ済みトレード

ハイライト 米国は、欧州水準の債券利回りまで、あと1回のデフレーション・ショックを残すのみです。 複数年の視野では、デフレーション・ショックはほぼ確実です。 そのショックはデフレ型になります。仮に当初はインフレ型で始まっても、やがて迅速にデフレに転じるためです。 理由は、インフレ型ショックによる債券利回りの急上昇が、世界の不動産300兆ドル相当の価値を損ない、結果として大規模なデフレーション衝撃を引き起こすからです。 したがって、米国の30年債は最終的に、絶対リターンで概ね100％に近いリターンをもたらすでしょう… …およびコアな欧州および日本の債券に対する相対的リターンでも。 フラクタルトレード候補：株式は債券に対して調整を挟む見込み；コモディティは危険なほど過熱している；USD/CADの買い。 特集 今週のチャート 債券利回りの構造的水準は、持続的なデフレーション・ショックの回数に依存する 債券利回りの構造的水準は、持続的なデフレショックの回数によって決まる。 債券利回りの構造的水準は、持続的なデフレショックの回数によって決まる。 10年前、米国、英国、ドイツの30年債利回りはほぼ同水準の約3％でした。しかし今日ではそれらの利回りは大きく乖離しており、米国は2.3％、英国は1.3％、ドイツは0.3％です。 何が起きたのか？ 2012年、ドイツの債券利回りは英国や米国と分岐しました。ユーロ債務危機によるデフレーション・ショックがユーロ圏に集中したためです。さらに2016年には、ブレグジットによるデフレーション・ショックが英国およびEU27に集中したため、英国の債券利回りが米国から分離しました（今週のチャート）。 債券利回りの『ショック理論』 ここで新たな概念──債券利回りの『ショック理論』──へようこそ。この理論によれば、高格付け国債の構造的利回り水準は、経済が受けた持続的なデフレーション・ショックの回数の関数に過ぎません。各デフレーション・ショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へと押し下げ、下限に達するまでこれが続きます（チャート I-2）。 チャート I-2 各デフレーション・ショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へ押し下げ、下限に達するまで続く 次々と起きるデフレショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へと引き下げ、もはやこれ以上下げられなくなるまで続く。 次々と起きるデフレショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へと引き下げ、もはやこれ以上下げられなくなるまで続く。 2011年以降、米国、英国、ドイツの債券利回りが乖離したのは、米国が英国より1回、ドイツより2回少ないデフレーション・ショックの影響を受けてきたためです。しかし重要な結論は、米国は欧州水準の債券利回りまであと1回のデフレーション・ショックしかない、ということです。 そのデフレーション・ショックが到来し、米国の30年債利回りが英国で記録された最近の安値に達すれば、債券価格は50％超の上昇に相当します。さらにドイツで記録された最近の安値に達すれば、価格上昇は100％を大幅に上回ることになります。 多くの人はそのような上昇は不可能だと言います。しかし10年前、同じ人々が英国やドイツの長期債利回りがゼロ近傍まで低下することはあり得ないと言っていたのを思い出してください。結果はご覧の通りです。 我々の高い確信度を持つ見解は、米国の長期債が最終的に優れた絶対リターンと、欧州および日本のコア債券に対する優れた相対リターンをもたらす、というものです。 その単純な理由は、別のデフレーション・ショックは時間の問題に過ぎない、ということです。 長期投資家は常にショックに備えるべき 大半のストラテジストや投資家は、パンデミックのようなショックは本質的に予測不可能であり、したがって備えることはできないと主張します。 我々はそうは思いません。 確かに、個々のショックの発生時期や性質は本質的に予測不可能です。しかし我々がショックを予測する方法で説明したように、ショックの統計的な分布は高度に予測可能です。 ショックとは何か？確立された定義はないため、我々の定義は、主要国の長期債価格が少なくとも25％上昇または下落する事象とします。1 （チャート I-3）この定義で過去50年を通して見た場合、任意の10年期間におけるショックの回数の統計分布はポアソン（3.33）であり、ショック間の時間の統計分布は指数分布（3.33）です。 チャート I-3 ショックとは長期債価格の25%の変動であり、ショックはおおむね3年ごとに発生する傾向がある ショックとはデュレーションの長い債券の価格が25％変動することであり、ショックはおおむね3年ごとに発生する傾向がある。 ショックとはデュレーションの長い債券の価格が25％変動することであり、ショックはおおむね3年ごとに発生する傾向がある。 したがって、任意の10年期間にショックが発生する確率はほぼ確実な96％です（チャート I-4）。さらに任意の5年期間でも、ショックの発生確率は非常に高い81％です。 チャート I-4 複数年の視野では、ショックはほぼ確実である 債券利回りの「ショック理論」 債券利回りの「ショック理論」 多くの人にとって、これは認知的不協和を生みます。ショックがほぼ確実であっても、その正確な性質や発生時期を思い描けないために、備えることを回避します。しかし長期投資家は常にショックに備えなければなりません。備えないことは許されません。 インフレ型ショックは迅速にデフレ型へ転じる 重要な問題は、次のショックがデフレ型かインフレ型かということです。我々の高確度の見解は、ネットでデフレ型になるというものです。つまり、たとえ当初はインフレ型で始まっても、すぐにデフレ型へ移行するということです。 その単純な理由は、インフレ型ショックによる債券利回りの急上昇が、世界の不動産300兆ドル相当の価値を損ない、結果として大規模なデフレーション衝撃を引き起こすからです。 2010年代の住宅ブームはその浸透力と地域的広がりにおいて前例がなく、北米、欧州、アジア、オーストララシアの都市部、郊外、農村部を同時に包含しました。ほぼすべての地域で価格が倍増した結果、世界の不動産価値は$150兆増加しました（チャート I-5）。そのうち$75兆は債券利回りの低下による評価上昇が原因です（チャート I-6）。文脈化すると、債券利回りの低下は世界の不動産価値を世界GDPに匹敵する規模だけ押し上げたことになります！ チャート I-5 2010年代の住宅ブームで、世界の不動産価値は$150兆増加した… 2010年代の住宅ブームで、世界の不動産の価値は150兆ドルも急増しました... 2010年代の住宅ブームで、世界の不動産の価値は150兆ドルも急増しました... チャート I-6 …そのうち$75兆は債券利回りの低下によるものだった ...そのうち75兆ドルは債券利回りの低下によるものです ...そのうち75兆ドルは債券利回りの低下によるものです 多くの人は不動産や株式などの実物資産はインフレ型ショックで強いと信じていますが、これは誤解です。確かに実物資産が生む収益は名目GDPに追随するはずです。しかし、その収益に対して支払われる評価が現在のように高い水準から始まっている場合、評価は崩壊します。 インフレ型ショック下で所望の実質リターンを生むために必要な初期評価は、価格安定下よりもはるかに低くなります。例えば、低インフレの1990年代・2000年代の株式では、初期の株価収益率（PER）が15であれば、一貫して将来10年の実質リターンが10％となりました。しかし1970年代のインフレショックでは、同じ初期PER15でも実質リターンはゼロでした。実質リターン10％を得るには、初期PERを7に半減させる必要がありました（チャート I-7）。 チャート I-7 1970年代のインフレ型ショックでは評価が崩壊した 1970年代のインフレ・ショックでは、バリュエーションが崩壊した 1970年代のインフレ・ショックでは、バリュエーションが崩壊した 債券利回りは世界の不動産価値を損なうまでどれだけ上昇し得るのか？過去10年で、世界の賃料利回りは世界の長期債利回りから100ベーシスポイント以上乖離したことがありません。2 現在、債券利回りは賃料利回りより約25bp高いため、世界の不動産価格が傷む前に長期債利回りが上昇できるのは最大75bpに過ぎないと推定されます（チャート I-8）。  チャート I-8 世界の不動産価格が損なわれる前に、債券利回りが上昇できるのは最大75bp 世界の不動産価格が悪影響を受ける前に、債券利回りは最大でも75ベーシスポイントしか上昇できない 世界の不動産価格が悪影響を受ける前に、債券利回りは最大でも75ベーシスポイントしか上昇できない 当社の重要な構造的推奨を改めて繰り返すと、米国の長期債は最終的に卓越した絶対リターンと、欧州および日本のコア債券に対する卓越した相対リターンをもたらすでしょう。 カウンタートレンド反転の候補 今週は、株式対債券（MSCIオール・カントリー・ワールド対30年米国債）におけるラリーが、260日フラクタル構造の脆弱性が2008、2010、2013、2020の節目と類似していることから、今後数か月で調整を挟む可能性が高いことに注目します（チャート I-9）。 チャート I-9 株式対債券のラリーは今後数か月で調整に入る可能性が高い 株式と債券のラリーは今後数か月で持ち合いになる可能性が高い。 株式と債券のラリーは今後数か月で持ち合いになる可能性が高い。 また、コモディティから距離を置くよう改めて警告します。すべてのコモディティのラリーが危険なほど過熱しており、2008年に見られたフラクタルの脆弱性の極端さを呈しています（チャート I-10およびチャート I-11）。 チャート I-10 コモディティのラリーは危険なほど過熱している... コモディティのラリーが危険なほど過熱している... コモディティのラリーが危険なほど過熱している... チャート I-11 …2008年に見られたフラクタルの脆弱性の極端さを示している …2008年に見られたフラクタル脆弱性の極端な状態を表示しています …2008年に見られたフラクタル脆弱性の極端な状態を表示しています 現時点で良いトレードはカナダドルのショートです。ルーニーの複合フラクタル構造に基づくと、多くの好材料がすでに織り込まれており、危険なほど過熱したコモディティ市場やカナダ銀行の（タカ派）資産買入のテーパリングを含んでいます。したがって、カナダドルは今後数か月で反転すると予想します（チャート I-12）。 チャート I-12 カナダドルをショート カナダドルをショートする カナダドルをショートする USD/CADをロングし、利益目標と対称的なストップロスを3.7％に設定してください。 Dhaval Joshi チーフ・ストラテジスト 脚注 1 債券利回りが下限に近づくにつれて、このショックの定義は変更する必要があります。長期債価格が25％上昇することが不可能になるためです。 2 ここでの世界の長期債利回りは、米国と中国の30年利回りの平均として定義しています。 フラクタル・トレーディング・システム フラクタルトレード 6か月の推奨 構造的推奨 決済済みフラクタルトレード 決済済みトレード 資産パフォーマンス 株式市場のパフォーマンス   注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り チャート II-1 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - ユーロ圏 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り - ユーロ圏 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り - ユーロ圏 チャート II-2 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - 欧州（ユーロ圏除く） 注目指標 - 債券利回り - 欧州（ユーロ圏を除く） 注目指標 - 債券利回り - 欧州（ユーロ圏を除く）     チャート II-3 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - アジア 注目すべき指標 - アジアの債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - アジアの債券利回り チャート II-4 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - その他先進国 注目指標 - 債券利回り - その他の先進国 注目指標 - 債券利回り - その他の先進国     注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-5 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-6 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し     チャート II-7 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-8 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し    

Highlights Biden’s first 100 days are characterized by a liberal spend-and-tax agenda unseen since the 1960s. It is not a “bait and switch,” however. Voters do not care about deficits and debt. At least not for now. The apparent outcome of the populist surge in the US and UK in 2016 is blowout fiscal spending. Yet the US and UK also invented and distributed vaccines faster than others. US growth and equities have outperformed while the US dollar experienced a countertrend bounce. While growth will rotate to other regions, China’s stimulus is on the wane. Of Biden’s three initial geopolitical risks, two are showing signs of subsiding: Russia and Iran. US-China tensions persist, however, and Biden has been hawkish so far. Our new Australia Geopolitical Risk Indicator confirms our other indicators in signaling that China risk, writ large, remains elevated. Cyclically we are optimistic about the Aussie and Australian stocks. Mexico’s midterm elections are likely to curb the ruling party’s majority but only marginally. The macro and geopolitical backdrop is favorable for Mexico. Feature US President Joe Biden gave his first address to the US Congress on April 28. Biden’s first hundred days are significant for his extravagant spending proposals, which will rank alongside those of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, if not Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, in their impact on US history, for better and worse. Chart 1Biden's First 100 Days - The Market's Appraisal The global financial market appraisal is that Biden’s proposals will turn out for the better. The market has responded to the US’s stimulus overshoot, successful vaccine rollout, and growth outperformance – notably in the pandemic-struck service sector – by bidding up US equities and the dollar (Chart 1). From a macro perspective we share the BCA House View in leaning against both of these trends, preferring international equities and commodity currencies. However, our geopolitical method has made it difficult for us to bet directly against the dollar and US equities. Geopolitics is about not only wars and trade but also the interaction of different countries’ domestic politics. America’s populist spending blowout is occurring alongside a sharp drop in China’s combined credit-and-fiscal impulse, which will eventually weigh on the global economy. This is true even though the rest of the world is beginning to catch up in vaccinations and economic normalization. As for traditional geopolitical risk – wars and alliances – Biden has not yet leaped over the three initial foreign policy hurdles that we have highlighted: China, Russia, and Iran. In this report we will update the view on all three, as there is tentative improvement on the Russian and Iranian fronts. In addition, we will introduce our newest geopolitical risk indicator – for Australia – and update our view on Mexico ahead of its June 6 midterm elections. Biden’s Fiscal Blowout From a macro point of view, Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) was much larger than what Republicans would have passed if President Trump had won a second term. His proposed $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan (AJP) is also larger, though both candidates were likely to pass an infrastructure package. The difference lies in the parts of these packages that relate to social spending and other programs, beyond COVID relief and roads and bridges. The Republican proposal for COVID relief was $618 billion while the Republicans’ current proposal on infrastructure is $568 billion – marking a $3 trillion difference from Biden. In reality Republicans would have proposed larger spending if Trump had remained president – but not enough to close this gap. And Biden is also proposing a $1.8 trillion American Families Plan (AFP). Biden’s praise for handling the vaccinations must be qualified by the Trump administration’s successful preparations, which have been unfairly denigrated. Similarly, Biden’s blame for the migrant surge at the southern border must be qualified by the fact that the surge began last year.1 A comparison with the UK will put Biden’s administration into perspective. The only country comparable to the US in terms of the size of fiscal stimulus over 2019-21 so far – excluding Biden’s AJP and AFP, which are not yet law – is the United Kingdom. Thus the consequence of the flare-up of populism in the Anglo-Saxon world since 2016 is a budget deficit blowout as these countries strive to suppress domestic socio-political conflict by means of government largesse, particularly in industrial and social programs. However, populist dysfunction was also overrated. Both the US and UK retain their advantages in terms of innovation and dynamism, as revealed by the vaccine and its rollout (Chart 2). Chart 2Dysfunctional Anglo-Saxon Populism? No sharp leftward turn occurred in the UK, where Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservatives had the benefit of a pre-COVID election in December 2019, which they won. By contrast, in the US, President Trump and the Republicans contended an election after the pandemic and recession had virtually doomed them to failure. There a sharp leftward turn is taking place. Going forward the US will reclaim the top rank in terms of fiscal stimulus, as Biden is likely to get his infrastructure plan (AJP) passed. Our updated US budget deficit projections appear in Chart 3. Our sister US Political Strategy gives the AJP an 80% chance of passing in some form and the AFP only a 50% chance of passing, depending on how quickly the AJP is passed. This means the blue dashed line is more likely to occur than the red dashed line. The difference is slight despite the mind-boggling headline numbers of the plans because the spending is spread out over eight-to-ten years and tax hikes over 15 years will partially offset the expenditures. Much will depend on whether Congress is willing to pay for the new spending. In Chart 3 we assume that Biden will get half of the proposed corporate tax hikes in the AJP scenario (and half of the individual tax hikes in the AFP scenario). If spending is watered down, and/or tax hikes surprise to the upside, both of which are possible, then the deficit scenarios will obviously tighten, assuming the economic recovery continues robustly as expected. But in the current political environment it is safest to plan for the most expansive budget deficit scenarios, as populism is the overriding force. Chart 3Biden’s Blowout Spending Biden’s campaign plan was even more visionary, so it is not true that Biden pulled a “bait and switch” on voters. Rather, the median voter is comfortable with greater deficits and a larger government role in American life. Bottom Line: The implication of Biden’s spending blowout is reflationary for the global economy, cyclically negative for the US dollar, and positive for global equities. But on a tactical time frame the rotation to other equities and currencies will also depend on China’s fiscal-and-credit deceleration and whether geopolitical risk continues to fall. Russia: Some Improvement But Coast Not Yet Clear US-Russia tensions appeared to fizzle over the past week but the coast is not yet clear. We remain short Russian currency and risk assets as well as European emerging market equities. Tensions fell after President Putin’s State of the Nation address on April 21 in which he warned the West against crossing Russia’s “red lines.” Biden’s sanctions on Russia were underwhelming – he did not insist on halting the final stages of the Nord Stream II pipeline to Germany. Russia declared it would withdraw its roughly 100,000 troops from the Ukrainian border by May 1. Russian dissident Alexei Navalny ended his hunger strike. Putin attended Biden’s Earth Day summit and the two are working on a bilateral summit in June. Chart 4Russia's Domestic Instability Will Continue De-escalation is not certain, however. First, some US officials have cast doubt on Russia’s withdrawal of troops and it is known that arms and equipment were left in place for a rapid mobilization and re-escalation if necessary. Second, Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists will be emboldened, which could increase fighting in Ukraine that could eventually provoke Russian intervention. Third, the US has until August or September to prevent Nord Stream from completion. Diplomacy between Russia and the US (and Russia and several eastern European states) has hit a low point on the withdrawal of ambassadors. Fourth, Russian domestic politics was always the chief reason to prepare for a worse geopolitical confrontation and it remains unsettled. Putin’s approval rating still lingers in the relatively low range of 65% and government approval at 49%. The economic recovery is weak and facing an increasingly negative fiscal thrust, along with Europe and China, Russia’s single-largest export destination (Chart 4). Putin’s handouts to households, in anticipation of the September Duma election, only amount to 0.2% of GDP. More measures will probably be announced but the lead-up to the election could still see an international adventure designed to distract the public from its socioeconomic woes. Russia’s geopolitical risk indicators ticked up as anticipated (Chart 5). They may subside if the military drawdown is confirmed and Biden and Putin lower the temperature. But we would not bet on it. Chart 5Russian Geopolitical Risk: Wait For 'All Clear' Signal Bottom Line: It is possible that Biden has passed his first foreign policy test with Russia but it is too soon to sound the “all clear.” We remain short Russian ruble and short EM Europe until de-escalation is confirmed. The Russian (and German) elections in September will mark a time for reassessing this view. Iran: Diplomacy On Track (Hence Jitters Will Rise) While Russia may or may not truly de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, the spring and summer are sure to see an increase in focus on US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Geopolitical risks will remain high prior to the conclusion of a deal and will materialize in kinetic attacks of various kinds. This thesis is confirmed by the alleged Israeli sabotage of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility this month. The US Navy also fired warning shots at Iranian vessels staging provocations. Sporadic attacks in other parts of the region also continue to flare, most recently with an Iranian tanker getting hit by a drone at a Syrian oil terminal.2 The US and Iran are making progress in the Vienna talks toward rejoining the 2015 nuclear deal from which the US withdrew in 2018. Iran pledged to enrich uranium up to 60% but also said this move was reversible – like all its tentative violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) so far (Table 1). Iran also offered a prisoner swap with the US. Saudi Arabia appears resigned to a resumption of the JCPA that it cannot prevent, with crown prince Mohammed bin Salman offering diplomatic overtures to both the US and Iran. Table 1Iran’s Nuclear Program And Compliance With JCPA 2015 Still, the closer the US and Iran get to a deal the more its opponents will need to either take action or make preparations for the aftermath. The allegation that former US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shared Israeli military plans with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif is an example of the kind of political brouhaha that will occur as different elements try to support and oppose the normalization of US-Iran ties. More importantly Israel will underscore its red line against nuclear weaponization. Previously Iran was set to reach “breakout” capability of uranium enrichment – a point at which it has enough fissile material to produce a nuclear device – as early as May. Due to sabotage at the Natanz facility the breakout period may have been pushed back to July.3 This compounds the significance of this summer as a deadline for negotiating a reduction in tensions. While the US may be prepared to fudge on Iran’s breakout capabilities, Israel will not, which means a market-relevant showdown should occur this summer before Israel backs down for fear of alienating the United States. Tit-for-tat attacks in May and June could cause negative surprises for oil supply. Then there will be a mad dash by the negotiators to agree to deal before the de facto August deadline, when Iran inaugurates a new president and it becomes much harder to resolve outstanding issues. Chart 6Iran Deal Priced Into Oil Markets? Hence our argument that geopolitics adds upside risk to oil prices in the first half of the year but downside risk in the second half. The market’s expectations seem already to account for this, based on the forward curve for Brent crude oil. The marginal impact of a reconstituted Iran nuclear deal on oil prices is slightly negative over the long run since a deal is more likely to be concluded than not and will open up Iran’s economy and oil exports to the world. However, our Commodity & Energy Strategy expects the Brent price to exceed expectations in the coming years, judging by supply and demand balances and global macro fundamentals (Chart 6). If an Iran deal becomes a fait accompli in July and August the Saudis could abandon their commitment to OPEC 2.0’s production discipline. The Russians and Saudis are not eager to return to a market share war after what happened in March 2020 but we cannot rule it out in the face of Iranian production. Thus we expect oil to be volatile. Oil producers also face the threat of green energy and US shale production which gives them more than one reason to keep up production and prevent prices from getting too lofty. Throughout the post-2015 geopolitical saga between the US and Iran, major incidents have caused an increase in the oil-to-gold ratio. The risk of oil supply disruption affected the price more than the flight to gold due to geopolitical or war risk. The trend generally corresponds with that of the copper-to-gold ratio, though copper-to-gold rose higher when growth boomed and oil outperformed when US-Iran tensions spiked in 2019. Today the copper-to-gold ratio is vastly outperforming the oil-to-gold on the back of the global recovery (Chart 7). This makes sense from the point of view of the likelihood of a US-Iran deal this year. But tensions prior to a deal will push up oil-to-gold in the near term. Chart 7Biden Passes Iran Test? Likely But Not A Done Deal Bottom Line: The US-Iran diplomacy is on track. This means geopolitical risk will escalate in May and June before a short-term or interim deal is agreed in July or August. Geopolitical risk stemming from US-Iran relations will subside thereafter, unless the deadline is missed. The forward curve has largely priced in the oil price downside except for the risk that OPEC 2.0 becomes dysfunctional again. We expect upside price surprises in the near term. Biden, China, And Our Australia GeoRisk Indicator Ostensibly the US and Russia are avoiding a war over Ukraine and the US and Iran are negotiating a return to the 2015 nuclear deal. Only US-China relations utterly lack clarity, with military maneuvering in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and tensions simmering over the gamut of other disputes. Chart 8Biden Still Faces China Test The latest data on global military spending show not only that the US and China continue to build up their militaries but also that all of the regional allies – including Japan! – are bulking up defense spending (Chart 8). This is a substantial confirmation of the secular growth of geopolitical risk, specifically in reaction to China’s rise and US-China competition. The first round of US-China talks under Biden went awry but since then a basis has been laid for cooperation on climate change, with President Xi Jinping attending Biden’s virtual climate change summit (albeit with no bilateral summit between the two). If John Kerry is removed as climate czar over his Iranian controversy it will not have an impact other than to undermine American negotiators’ reliability. The deeper point is that climate is a narrow basis for US-China cooperation and it cannot remotely salvage the relationship if a broader strategic de-escalation is not agreed. Carbon emissions are more likely to become a cudgel with which the US and West pressure China to reform its economy faster. The Department of Defense is not slated to finish its comprehensive review of China policy until June but most US government departments are undertaking their own reviews and some of the conclusions will trickle out in May, whether through Washington’s actions or leaks to the press. Beijing could also take actions that upend the Biden administration’s assessment, such as with the Microsoft hack exposed earlier this year. The Biden administration will soon reveal more about how it intends to handle export controls and sanctions on China. For example, by May 19 the administration is slated to release a licensing process for companies concerned about US export controls on tech trade with China due to the Commerce Department’s interim rule on info tech supply chains. The Biden administration looks to be generally hawkish on China, a view that is now consensus. Any loosening of punitive measures would be a positive surprise for Chinese stocks and financial markets in general. There are other indications that China’s relationship with the West is not about to improve substantially – namely Australia. Australia has become a bellwether of China’s relations with the world. While the US’s defense commitments might be questionable with regard to some of China’s neighbors – namely Taiwan (Province of China) but also possibly South Korea and the Philippines – there can be little doubt that Australia, like Japan, is the US’s red line in the Pacific. Australian politics have been roiled over the past several years by the revelation of Chinese influence operations, state- or military-linked investments in Australia, and propaganda campaigns. A trade war erupted last year when Australia called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 and China’s handling of it. Most recently, Victoria state severed ties with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Despite the rise in Sino-Australian tensions, the economic relationship remains intact. China’s stimulus overweighed the impact of its punitive trade measures against Australia, both by bidding up commodity prices and keeping the bulk of Australia’s exports flowing (Chart 9). As much as China might wish to decouple from Australia, it cannot do so as long as it needs to maintain minimum growth rates for the sake of social stability and these growth rates require resources that Australia provides. For example, global iron ore production excluding Australia only makes up 80% of China’s total iron ore imports, which necessitates an ongoing dependency here (Chart 10). Brazil cannot make up the difference. Chart 9China-Australia Trade Amid Tensions Chart 10China Cannot Replace Australia This resource dependency does not necessarily reduce geopolitical tension, however, because it increases China’s supply insecurity and vulnerability to the US alliance. The US under Biden explicitly aims to restore its alliances and confront autocratic regimes. This puts Australia at the front lines of an open-ended global conflict. Chart 11Introducing: Australia GeoRisk Indicator (Smoothed) Our newly devised Australia GeoRisk Indicator illustrates the point well, as it has continued surging since the trade war with China first broke out last year (Chart 11). This indicator is based on the Australian dollar and its deviation from underlying macro variables that should determine its course. These variables are described in Appendix 1. If the Aussie weakens relative to these variables, then an Australian-specific risk premium is apparent. We ascribe that premium to politics and geopolitics writ large. A close examination of the risk indicator’s performance shows that it tracks well with Australia’s recent political history (Chart 12). Previous peaks in risk occurred when President Trump rose to power and Australia, like Canada, found itself beset by negative pressures from both the US and China. In particular, Trump threatened tariffs and the Australian government banned China’s Huawei from its 5G network. Today the rise in geopolitical risk stems almost exclusively from China. There is potential for it to roll over if Biden negotiates a reduction in tensions but that is a risk to our view (an upside risk for Australian and global equities). Chart 12Australian GeoRisk Indicator (Unsmoothed) What does this indicator portend for tradable Australian assets? As one would expect, Australian geopolitical risk moves inversely to the country’s equities, currency, and relative equity performance (Chart 13). Australian equities have risen on the back of global growth and the commodity boom despite the rise in geopolitical risk. But any further spike in risk could jeopardize this uptrend. Chart 13Australia Geopolitical Risk And Tradable Assets An even clearer inverse relationship emerges with the AUD-JPY exchange rate, a standard measure of risk-on / risk-off sentiment in itself. If geopolitical risk rises any further it should cause a reversal in the currency pair. Finally, Australian equities have not outperformed other developed markets excluding the US, which may be due to this elevated risk premium. Bottom Line: China is the most important of Biden’s foreign policy hurdles and unlike Russia and Iran there is no sign of a reduction in tension yet. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator supports the point that risk remains very elevated in the near term. Moreover China’s credit deceleration is also negative for Australia. Cyclically, however, assuming that China does not overtighten policy, we take a constructive view on the Aussie and Australian equities. Biden’s Border Troubles Distract From Bullish Mexico Story The biggest criticism of Biden’s first 100 days has been his reduction in a range of enforcement measures on the southern border which has encouraged an overflow of immigrants. Customs and Border Patrol have seen a spike in “encounters” from a low point of around 17,000 in 2020 to about 170,000 today. The trend started last year but accelerated sharply after the election and had surpassed the 2019 peak of 144,000. Vice President Kamala Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, both with Mexico and Central American states. She does not have much experience with foreign policy so this is her opportunity to learn on the job. She will not be able to accomplish much given that the Biden administration is unwilling to use punitive measures or deterrence and will not have large fiscal resources available for subsidizing the nations to the south. With the US economy hyper-charged, especially relative to its southern neighbors, the pace of immigration is unlikely to slacken. From a macro point of view the relevance is that the US is not substantially curtailing immigration – quite the opposite – which means that labor force growth will not deviate from its trend. What about Mexico itself? It is not likely that Harris will be able to engage on a broader range of issues with Mexico beyond immigration. As usual Mexico is beset with corruption, lawlessness, and instability. To these can be added the difficulties of the pandemic and vaccine rollout. Tourism and remittances are yet to recover. Cooperation with US federal agents against the drug cartels is deteriorating. Cartels control an estimated 40% of Mexican territory.4 Nevertheless, despite Mexico’s perennial problems, we hold a positive view on Mexican currency and risk assets. The argument rests on five points: Strong macro fundamentals: With China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse slowing sharply, and US stimulus accelerating, Mexico stands to benefit. Mexico has also run orthodox monetary and fiscal policies. It has a demographic tailwind, low wages, and low public debt. The stars are beginning to align for the country’s economy, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy. US and Canadian stimulus: The US and Canada have the second- and third-largest fiscal stimulus of all the major countries over the 2019-21 period, at 9% and 8% of GDP respectively. Mexico, with the new USMCA free trade deal in hand, will benefit. US protectionism fizzled: Even Republican senators blocked President Trump’s attempted tariffs on Mexico. Trump’s aggression resulted in the USMCA, a revised NAFTA, which both US political parties endorsed. Mexico is inured to US protectionism, at least for the short and medium term. Diversification from China: Mexico suffered the greatest opportunity cost from China’s rise as an offshore manufacturer and entrance to the World Trade Organization. Now that the US and other western countries are diversifying away from China, amid geopolitical tensions, Mexico stands to benefit. The US cannot eliminate its trade deficit due to its internal savings/investment imbalance but it can redistribute that trade deficit to countries that cannot compete with it for global hegemony. AMLO faces constraints: A risk factor stemmed from politics where a sweeping left-wing victory in 2018 threatened to introduce anti-market policies. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO) and his MORENA party gained a majority in both houses of the legislature. Their coalition has a two-thirds majority in the lower house (Chart 14). However, we pointed out that AMLO’s policies have not been radical and, more importantly, that the midterm election would likely constrain his power. Chart 14Mexico’s Midterm Election Looms These are all solid points but the last item faces a test in the upcoming midterm election. AMLO’s approval rating is strong, at 63%, putting him above all of his predecessors except one (Chart 15). AMLO’s approval has if anything benefited from the COVID-19 crisis despite Mexico’s inability to handle the medical challenge. He has promised to hold a referendum on his leadership in early 2022, more than halfway through his six-year term, and he is currently in good shape for that referendum. For now his popularity is helpful for his party, although he is not on the ballot in 2021 and MORENA’s support is well beneath his own. Chart 15AMLO’s Approval Fairly Strong MORENA’s support is holding at a 44% rate of popular support and its momentum has slightly improved since the pandemic began. However, MORENA’s lead over other parties is not nearly as strong as it was back in 2018 (Chart 16, top panel). The combined support of the two dominant center-right parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the National Action Party, is almost equal to that of MORENA. And the two center-left parties, the Democratic Revolution Party and Citizen’s Movement, are part of the opposition coalition (Chart 16, bottom panel). The pandemic and economic crisis will motivate the opposition. Chart 16MORENA’s Support Holding Up Despite COVID Traditionally the president’s party loses seats in the midterm election (Table 2). Circumstances are different from the US, which also exhibits this trend, because Mexico has more political parties. A loss of seats from MORENA does not necessarily favor the establishment parties. Nevertheless opinion polling shows that about 45% of voters say they would rather see MORENA’s power “checked” compared to 41% who wish to see the party go on unopposed.5 Table 2Mexican President’s Party Tends To Lose Seats In Midterm Election While the ruling coalition may lose its super-majority, it is not a foregone conclusion that MORENA will lose its majority. Voters have decades of experience of the two dominant parties, both were discredited prior to 2018, and neither has recovered its reputation so quickly. The polling does not suggest that voters regret their decision to give the left wing a try. If anything recent polls slightly push against this idea. If MORENA surprises to the upside then AMLO’s capabilities would increase substantially in the second half of his term – he would have political capital and an improving economy. While the senate is not up for grabs in the midterm, MORENA has a narrow majority and controls a substantial 60% of seats when its allies are taken into account. In this scenario AMLO could pursue his attempts to increase the state’s role in key industries, like energy and power generation, at the expense of private investors. Even then the Supreme Court would continue to act as a check on the government. The 11-seat court is currently made up of five conservatives, two independents, and three liberal or left-leaning judges. A new member, Margarita Ríos Farjat, is close to the government, leaving the conservatives with a one-seat edge over the liberals and putting the two independents in the position of swing voters. Even if AMLO maintains control of the lower house, he will not be able to override the constitutional court, as he has threatened on occasion to do, without a super-majority in the senate. Bottom Line: AMLO will likely lose some ground in the lower house and thus suffer a check on his power. This will only confirm that Mexican political risk is not likely to derail positive underlying macro fundamentals. Continue to overweight Mexican equities relative to Brazilian.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix 1 The market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd and as such our Geopolitical Risk Indicators were not designed to predict political risk but to answer the question of whether and to what extent markets have priced that risk. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator (see Chart 11-12 above) uses the same simple methodology used in our other indicators, which avoid the pitfall of regression-based models. We begin with a financial asset that has a daily frequency in price, in this case the AUD, and compare its movement against several fundamental factors – in this case global energy and base metal prices, global metals and mining stock prices, and the Chilean peso. Australia is a commodity-exporting country. It is the largest producer of iron ore and is among the largest producers of coal and natural gas. It is also a major trading partner for China. Due to the nature of its economy the Australian dollar moves with global metal and energy prices and the global metals and mining equity prices. Chile, another major commodity producer also moves with global metal prices, hence our inclusion of the peso in this indicator. The AUD has a high correlation with all of these assets, and if the changes in the value of the AUD lag or lead the changes in the value of these assets, the implication is that geopolitical risk unique to Australia is not priced by the market. We included the peso as Chile is not as affected as Australia by any conflict in the South China Sea or Northeast Asia, which means that a deviation of the AUD from CLP represents a unique East Asia Pacific risk. Our indicator captures the involvement of Australia in a few regional and international conflicts. The indicator climbed as Australia got involved in the East Timor emergency and declined as it exited. It continued declining even as Australia joined the US in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which showed that investors were unperturbed by faraway wars, while showing measurable concern in the smaller but closer Timorese conflict. Risks went up again as the nation erupted in labor protests as the Howard government made changes to the labor code. We see the market pricing higher risk again during the 2008 financial crisis, although it was modest and Australia escaped the crisis unscathed due to massive Chinese stimulus. Since then, investors have been climbing a wall of worry as they priced in Northeast Asia-related geopolitical risks. These started with the South Korean Cheonan sinking and continued with the Sino-Japanese clash over the Senkaku islands. They culminated with the Chinese ADIZ declaration in late 2013. In 2016, Australia was shocked again when Donald Trump was elected, and investor fears were evident when the details of Trump-Turnbull spat were made public. The risk indicator reached another peak during the trade wars between the US and the rest of the world. Investors were not worried about COVID-19 as Australia largely contained the pandemic, but the recent Australian-Chinese trade war pushed the risk indicator up, giving investors another wall of worry. If the Biden administration forces Australia into a democratic alliance in confrontation with autocratic China then this risk will persist for some time.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com We Read (And Liked) ... The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, And The Fate Of Liberty This book is a sweeping review of the conditions of liberty essential to steering the world away from the Hobbesian war of all against all. In this unofficial sequel to the 2012 hit, Why Nations Fail: The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty, Daron Acemoglu (Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and James A. Robinson (Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago) further explore their thesis that the existence and effectiveness of democratic institutions account for a nation’s general success or failure. The Narrow Corridor6 examines how liberty works. It is not “natural,” not widespread, “is rare in history and is rare today.” Only in peculiar circumstances have states managed to produce free societies. States have to walk a thin line to achieve liberty, passing through what the authors describe as a “narrow corridor.” To encourage freedom, states must be strong enough to enforce laws and provide public services yet also restrained in their actions and checked by a well-organized civil society. For example, from classical history, the Athenian constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes “were helpful for strengthening the political power of Athenian citizens while also battling the cage of norms.” That cage of norms is the informal body of customs replaced by state institutions. Those norms in turn “constrained what the state could do and how far state building could go,” providing a set of checks. Though somewhat fluid in its definition, liberty, as Acemoglu and Robinson show, is expressed differently under various “leviathans,” or states. For starters, the “Shackled Leviathan” is a government dedicated to upholding the rule of law, protecting the weak against the strong, and creating the conditions for broad-based economic opportunity. Meanwhile, the “Paper Leviathan” is a bureaucratic machine favoring the privileged class, serving as both a political and economic brake on development and yielding “fear, violence, and dominance for most of its citizens.” Other examples include: The “American Leviathan” which fails to deal properly with inequality and racial oppression, two enemies of liberty; and a “Despotic Leviathan,” which commands the economy and coerces political conformity – an example from modern China. Although the book indulges in too much jargon, it is provocative and its argument is convincing. The authors say that in most places and at most times, the strong have dominated the weak and human freedom has been quashed by force or by customs and norms. Either states have been too weak to protect individuals from these threats or states have been too strong for people to protect themselves from despotism. Importantly, many states believe that once liberty is achieved, it will remain the status quo. But the authors argue that to uphold liberty, state institutions have to evolve continuously as the nature of conflicts and needs of society change. Thus society's ability to keep state and rulers accountable must intensify in tandem with the capabilities of the state. This struggle between state and society becomes self-reinforcing, inducing both to develop a richer array of capacities just to keep moving forward along the corridor. Yet this struggle also underscores the fragile nature of liberty. It is built on a precarious balance between state and society; between economic, political, and social elites and common citizens; between institutions and norms. If one side of the balance gets too strong, as has often happened in history, liberty begins to wane. The authors central thesis is that the long-run success of states depends on the balance of power between state and society. If states are too strong, you end up with a “Despotic Leviathan” that is good for short-term economic growth but brittle and unstable over the long term. If society is too strong, the “Leviathan” is absent, and societies suffer under a pre-modern war of all against all. The ideal place to be is in the narrow corridor, under a shackled Leviathan that will grow state capacity and individual liberty simultaneously, thus leading to long-term economic growth. In the asset allocation process, investors should always consider the liberty of a state and its people, if a state’s institutions grossly favor the elite or the outright population, whether these institutions are weak or overbearing on society, and whether they signify a balance between interests across the population. Whether you are investing over a short or long horizon, returns can be significantly impacted in the absence of liberty or the excesses of liberty. There should be a preference among investors toward countries that exhibit a balance of power between state and society, setting up a better long-term investment environment, than if a balance of power did not exist.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia Footnotes 1 "President Biden’s first 100 days as president fact-checked," BBC News, April 29, 2021, bbc.com. 2 "Oil tanker off Syrian coast hit in suspected drone attack," Al Jazeera, April 24, 2021, Aljazeera.com. 3 See Yaakov Lappin, "Natanz blast ‘likely took 5,000 centrifuges offline," Jewish News Syndicate, jns.org. 4 John Daniel Davidson, "Former US Ambassador To Mexico: Cartels Control Up To 40 Percent Of Mexican Territory," The Federalist, April 28, 2021, thefederalist.com. 5 See Alejandro Moreno, "Aprobación de AMLO se encuentra en 61% previo a campañas electorales," El Financiero, April 5, 2021, elfinanciero.com. 6 Penguin Press, New York, NY, 2019, 558 pages. Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights The US fiscal outlook has deteriorated substantially over the past two decades, as a consequence of the fiscal response to both the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. US government debt-to-GDP is now nearly as high as it was at the end of the Second World War, and is projected by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to explode higher over the coming 30 years. Some investors argue that extreme levels of government debt now virtually guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, and we test this claim alongside a scenario that limits the projected rise in the primary deficit. We find that US fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will likely be negative for health care stocks. We also note that even in a scenario where the US limits the size of its future primary budget deficit, net interest outlays will likely rise to elevated levels compared to history. A comparison with the Canadian experience in the 1990s suggests a structurally negative outlook for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point. Finally, we note that the US fiscal outlook does not necessarily prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in a scenario where investors raise their expectations for the neutral rate of interest, a possibility that we discussed in last month’s report. This scenario is not our base case view, but it is plausible and should actively be monitored by investors over the coming one to two years. For now, we do not expect that rising interest rates pose a risk to stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Investors should remain cyclically overweight equities within a multi-asset portfolio, and should maintain a below-benchmark level of duration on a risk-adjusted basis. In 2001, US government debt held by the public as a share of GDP stood at 31.5%, after having fallen roughly 16 percentage points from early 1993 levels. Today, as a result of both the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the debt to GDP ratio has risen to a whopping 100%, and is projected to rise meaningfully higher over the coming decades. Feature In this report we review the long-term US fiscal outlook in the wake of the pandemic, with a focus on the implications for interest rates. Some investors argue that extreme levels of government debt now virtually guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, and we test this claim alongside a scenario that limits the projected rise in the primary deficit. We find that US fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will likely be negative for health care stocks, whose fundamental performance has outstripped that of the broad equity market since the mid-1990s (reflecting pricing power that stands to be curtailed through regulation). We also note that even in a scenario where the US limits the size of its future primary budget deficit, net interest outlays will likely rise to elevated levels compared to history. A comparison with the Canadian experience in the 1990s suggests a structurally negative outlook for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point. Finally, we note that the US fiscal outlook does not necessarily prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in the hypothetical scenario that we described in last month’s report,1 i.e., an environment where the narrative of secular stagnation is challenged and investor expectations for the neutral rate rise closer to trend rates of economic growth. This scenario is not our base case view, but it is plausible and should actively be monitored by investors over the coming one to two years. For now, investors should remain cyclically overweight equities within a multi-asset portfolio, and should maintain a below-benchmark level of duration on a risk-adjusted basis. Debt Sustainability, And The CBO’s Baseline Projection When analyzing the US fiscal outlook, the Congressional Budget Office’s Long-Term Budget Outlook report is typically the reference point for investors. The report provides annual projections for the budget deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio for the next three decades, as well as a breakdown of the projected deficit into its primary (i.e., non-interest) and net interest components. Charts II-1 and II-2 present the most recent baseline projections from the CBO, which clearly present a dire long-term outlook. The deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio are projected to be relatively stable over the next decade, but explode higher over the subsequent 20 years. In 2051, the CBO’s baseline projects that the budget deficit will be roughly 13% of GDP, with net interest costs accounting for approximately two-thirds of the deficit. Chart II-1The CBO’s Fiscal Outlook Is Extremely Negative Chart II-2In 2051, The CBO Projects A 13% Annual Budget Deficit In order to understand what is driving the CBO’s dire long-term budget and debt forecast, it is important to review the government debt sustainability equation shown below. The equation highlights that the change in a government’s debt-to-GDP ratio is approximately equal to 1) the primary deficit plus 2) net interest costs as a share of GDP, the latter being defined as the product of last year’s debt-to-GDP ratio and the difference between the average interest rate on the debt and the rate of GDP growth. Δ Debt-To-GDP Ratio ≈ Primary Deficit As A % Of GDP2 + (r-g)*(Prior Period Debt-To-GDP Ratio) Where: r = Average interest rate on government debt and g = Nominal GDP growth The equation highlights that expectations of a persistently rising debt-to-GDP ratio must occur either because of expectations of a persistent primary deficit, or expectations that interest rates will persistently exceed the rate of economic growth (or some combination of the two). This underscores why debt sustainability analysis often focuses on the primary budget balance, as a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio will be stable if no primary deficit exists and interest costs are at or below the prevailing rate of economic growth. Chart II-3 illustrates the source of the CBO’s projected rise in debt-to-GDP beyond 2031, by presenting the two components of the debt sustainability equation alongside the projected annual change in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The chart makes it clear that while the CBO is forecasting a sizeable primary deficit to continue, it is projected to grow at a slower pace than the debt-to-GDP ratio itself. The increasing rate at which the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to grow in the latter years of the CBO’s forecast period is clearly driven by the interest rate component, meaning that “r” is projected to be greater than “g”. Chart II-4 presents this point directly, by highlighting that the CBO is forecasting the average interest rate on government debt to exceed that of nominal GDP growth in 2038, and to continue to exceed growth (by an increasing amount) thereafter. Chart II-3Decomposing The CBO's Projected Change In The Debt-To-GDP Ratio Chart II-4The CBO's Projections Rest, In Part, On Rates Eventually Exceeding Growth   Three Adjustments To The CBO’s Baseline We make three adjustments to the CBO’s baseline in order to assess how the US fiscal outlook shifts under an interest rate path that is different than that projected by the CBO. First, we adjust the CBO’s projected budget deficit over the coming few years based on deficit forecasts from our US Political Strategy service following the passage of the American Recovery Plan act.3 Chart II-5We Test The Effect Of An Initially Higher, But More Sustainable, Rate Path Next, we adjust the interest component of the total budget deficit based on a new path for short- and long-term interest rates that models a scenario in which the neutral rate of interest rises to, but not above, GDP growth (Chart II-5). In last month’s report we outlined a scenario in which this could feasibly occur,1 and the hypothetical path for interest rates shown in Chart II-5 thus incorporates both the negative budgetary impact of an earlier rise in interest rates and the positive budgetary impact of “r” never rising above “g”. We explicitly exclude any crowding out effect on long-term interest rates, based on the view that term premia are likely to remain muted in a world of low potential economic growth, unless a fiscal crisis appears to be imminent (see Box II-1). Box II-1 Arguing Against The CBO’s Crowding Out Assumption The CBO’s projection that interest rates will ultimately rise above the rate of economic growth rests on the view that increased government spending will absorb savings that would otherwise finance private investment (a “crowding out” effect). We agree that crowding out can occur over the course of the business cycle, especially in a scenario where increased government spending pushes output above its potential (creating a cyclical acceleration in inflation and eventually an increase in interest rates). But the CBO is assuming that high government debt-to-GDP ratios will crowd out private investment on a structural basis, and on this basis we disagree. First, Chart Box II-1 highlights that there is essentially no empirical relationship across countries between a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio and its long-term government bond yield. Japan is a clear outlier in the chart, but including Japan implies that the relationship is negative, not positive. Chart Box II-1There Is No Empirical Relationship Between Debt-To-GDP And Interest Rates In addition, given that central banks directly control interest rates at the short-end of the curve, a structural crowding out effect can only manifest itself in the form of an elevated term premium embedded in longer-term government bond yields. Our bet is that term premia are likely to stay low in a world of low falling nominal growth, as evidenced by the experience of the past decade.4 Finally, we model the impact of two changes, beginning in 2031, that would work towards reducing the primary deficit: an increase in average government revenue to 20% of GDP (its peak level reached in 2000), and a slower pace of increase on major health care program spending. Despite the fact that population aging will increase mandatory spending on social security and health care over the coming three decades, the CBO has highlighted that the majority of the increase in spending towards these programs is projected to occur due to rising health care costs per person (Chart II-6). We thus model the impact of medical care cost control by limiting the rise in net mandatory outlays on health care programs between 2021 and 2051 to roughly half of what the CBO baseline projects. This adjustment does not prevent mandatory spending on health care programs from rising, given the strong political challenges involved in limiting spending increases that are caused by an aging population. Chart II-6The US Structural Primary Balance Is Heavily Impacted By Medical Costs Charts II-7 and II-8 illustrate how these three adjustments impact the long-term US fiscal outlook. Relative to the CBO’s baseline projections, the American Recovery Plan (ARP) budget deficit forecasts from our US Political Strategy service imply that the debt-to-GDP ratio will be approximately three to four percentage points higher over the very near term, and roughly ten points higher over the long term. Chart II-7Even With Higher Rates, The Fiscal Outlook Is Meaningfully Less Bad… Relative to this new baseline, an increase in interest rates to, but not above, the projected rate of nominal economic growth increases the debt-to-GDP ratio by an additional ten percentage points (20 points higher versus the CBO’s baseline) in the middle of the forecast period, but it lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio over the longer run by eliminating the effect of outsized interest rates magnifying a persistent primary deficit. Still, the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise to a whopping 207% of GDP by 2051 in this scenario, with a budget deficit in excess of 10% of GDP. The third adjustment shown in Charts II-7 and II-8 underscores the impact on the US fiscal outlook of actions aimed at reducing the primary deficit. Increases in government revenue and the prevention of rising health care costs per person results in the debt-to-GDP ratio that is 64 percentage points lower in 2051 than in our normalized interest rate scenario. The budget deficit in this scenario still increases to approximately 6% of GDP thirty years from today, but in this case most of the deficit is due to the net interest component rather than the primary deficit, meaning that the debt-to-GDP ratio would be increasing at a much slower rate if interest rates were no higher than the rate of economic growth. Chart II-8 highlights that net interest spending in this scenario would rise to 4.5% of GDP, which would be meaningfully higher than the prior high of roughly 3% in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Chart II-8...With Higher Taxes And Medical Cost Control Chart II-9A Meaningful, But Not Unprecedented, Rise In Net Interest Outlays But that is far from unprecedented or necessarily consistent with a fiscal crisis. Chart II-9 also shows that Canada’s public debt charges rose to 6.5% of GDP in the early 1990s without triggering a public debt crisis. It is true that Canada subsequently embarked on a painful fiscal consolidation program in order to reduce its public debt burden, but this, in part, occurred because of a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of approximately 3% - twice as large as that projected for the US in 2051 in our adjusted scenario shown in Charts II-7 and II-8. Revenue And Health Care Cost Reform Our third adjustment to the CBO’s long-term budget outlook involved changes to revenue and health care cost control to reduce the US’ projected primary deficit. Are these adjustments achievable? In our view, the answer is yes: As noted above, our scenario modeled these changes taking place a decade from today, which allows for policymakers and stakeholders to have a substantial amount of time to act and adjust to these changes. On the revenue front, we noted above that US government revenue has reached 20% of GDP in the past, in the year 2000. Chart II-10 highlights that while raising taxes will likely reduce US competitiveness, the US maintains a sizeable tax advantage relative to other advanced economies, and that this was true prior to the tax cuts that took place under the Trump administration. On the health care cost front, Chart II-11 highlights that US healthcare expenditure is much larger as a share of GDP than other countries, which was not the case prior to the 1980s. Chart II-12 highlights that this cost difference is entirely due to inpatient (i.e., hospital) and outpatient (i.e., drug) costs. While it is not clear what form it will take, it seems likely that future reforms by policymakers to eliminate rising health care costs per person will occur and can be achieved. Chart II-10The US Government Can Afford To Raise Revenue Chart II-11The US Spends Much More On Health Care Than Other Countries   Chart II-12The US Significantly Outspends The World On Hospital And Drug Costs The key point for investors is not whether these changes should or should not occur, but whether there are any feasible scenarios in which spiraling government debt and interest payments are avoided without the Fed purposely maintaining monetary policy at levels persistently below the rate of economic growth – and thus risking major inflationary pressure. Our analysis above highlights that there are; the question is when policymakers will choose to act and in what form. A potential tipping point may be when US government spending on net interest as a % of GDP exceeds its prior high, which occurs in 2026 in the scenario modeled in Chart II-8. In a scenario where reforms fail to materialize or where financial markets force policymakers to act, a fiscal risk premium could certainly emerge in longer-term government bond yields, which could lead the Fed to maintain lower short-term interest rates than it otherwise would. But this scenario is only likely to emerge after interest rates converge towards rates of economic growth, as US government debt will remain highly serviceable for some time if "r" remains meaningfully lower than "g". Investment Conclusions There are three potential investment implications of our research. First, the fact that rising medical costs have such a significant impact on the CBO’s projections of the primary deficit implies that fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will be negative for US health care stocks. Chart II-13 highlights that US health care sector earnings have outperformed broad market earnings since the mid-1990s, and that the sector has consistently delivered an above-average return on equity. This historical performance likely reflects the sector’s pricing power, which stand to be curtailed through regulatory efforts in a world where rising health care costs per person collide with fiscal belt-tightening. Interestingly, Chart II-12 highlighted that US per capita spending on medical goods is not significantly higher than in other developed markets, suggesting that the health care equipment & supplies industry may fare better over a very long term time horizon than overall health care. Second, Charts II-7 and II-8 highlighted that even if the US does raise revenue as a share of GDP and limits excessive growth in medical costs, a primary deficit will still exist and net interest outlays will still rise to elevated levels compared to what has historically been the case. We noted that Canada experienced a higher public debt burden in the 1990s and did not suffer from a fiscal crisis, but Chart II-14 highlights that the fiscal situation did weigh on the Canadian dollar, which progressively traded 10-20% below its PPP-implied fair value level over the course of the 1990s. Thus, the implication is that eventual fiscal reform in the US may be structurally negative for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point (panels 3 and 4 of Chart II-14). Chart II-13Eventual Fiscal Reform Will Likely Be Negative For Health Care Stocks Chart II-14The US Fiscal Outlook, Even With Some Reforms, Is Dollar-Negative   Finally, our scenario analysis highlights that very elevated levels of government debt do not guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, especially over the next decade when the US primary deficit is projected to remain relatively stable. For investors focused on forecasting the direction of 10-year Treasury yields from the perspective of valuation, it should be noted that the next decade is the relevant projection period for the Fed funds rate, not what occurs to net interest outlays in the two decades that follow. Over the very long run, it is true that there may ultimately be very strong political pressure on the Fed to keep interest rates below the prevailing rate of economic growth, as policymakers in 2030 will be able to avoid a structural adjustment to the primary deficit of roughly 1.1-1.3% of GDP for every percentage point that average interest rates on government debt are below nominal GDP growth. However, we noted above that this pressure is unlikely to build before the second half of this decade even in a scenario where interest rates rise significantly over the coming few years, and it remains an open questions whether the Fed will acquiesce to this pressure given its strong potential to fuel excess private sector leveraging. Over the coming one to two years, the key conclusion is that the US fiscal outlook is not likely to prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in the hypothetical scenario that we described in last month’s report, i.e., an environment where the narrative of secular stagnation is challenged and investor expectations for the neutral rate rise closer to trend rates of economic growth. This remains a risk to our overweight stance towards risky assets and is not our base case view. But it does highlight the importance of monitoring long-dated rate expectations over the coming year, and argues, on a risk-adjusted basis, for a below-neutral duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks," dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Presented in this fashion, a budget deficit (surplus) is recorded with a positive (negative) sign. 3 For more information, please see US Political Strategy report “Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda,” dated April 1, 2021, available at usp.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see “Term premia: models and some stylised facts”, by Cohen, Hördahl, and Xia, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2008.

Highlights After staging a tentative rebound in the first three months of the year, the US dollar has resumed its weakening trend. We expect the greenback to drift lower over the next 12 months, as global growth momentum rotates from the US to the rest of the world, the Fed maintains its ultra-accommodative monetary stance, and the US struggles to finance its burgeoning trade deficit. China will provide adequate fiscal and monetary support for its economy, which will buoy commodity prices, the yuan, and other EM currencies. The Canadian dollar should strengthen as the Bank of Canada continues to shrink its balance sheet with the goal of lifting rates by the end of 2022. EUR/USD is on track to rise to 1.25 by year-end. The pound will strengthen against the euro. While the yen’s defensive nature will limit any gains in the currency, a cheap valuation and relatively high Japanese real rates will keep downside risks in check. Global Growth Momentum To Rotate From The US To The Rest Of The World Sizable upward revisions to US growth projections gave the US dollar a modest boost in the first quarter of 2021 (Chart 1). According to Bloomberg consensus estimates, US real GDP grew by 5.4% in the first quarter, spurred on by massive fiscal stimulus and a speedy vaccination rollout. In contrast, real GDP in the euro area, the UK, and Japan contracted (Table 1). Chart 1A Dovish Fed Kept The Dollar From Strengthening Much This Year Despite Strong US Growth Vis-À-Vis The Rest Of The World Table 1Growth In Major Advanced Countries Is Expected To Start Catching Up To The US Later This Year While economic momentum still favors the US in the second quarter, the gap with other countries will narrow dramatically. The US economy is on track to expand by 8.1% in the current quarter. Bloomberg consensus expects the euro area to grow by 7.4%, the UK by 17.4%, and Japan by 4.7%. Looking out to the third quarter, both the euro area and the UK are poised to grow faster than the US. Continental Europe, in particular, should see much stronger growth in the second half of 2021 following a sluggish start to the vaccine rollout. Enough Vaccines For All? The vaccination campaign has gotten off to a slow start in most emerging markets. The spread of more contagious Covid-19 variants has led to a surge in infections in some regions. Notably, India is reporting over 300,000 new cases a day. Matters should improve on the pandemic front for many developing economies later this year. Assuming that vaccine makers are able to achieve their production targets, the Duke University Global Health Innovation Center estimates that 12 billion vaccine doses will be produced in 2021. This would be enough to vaccinate 75% of the world’s population, close to most measures of “herd immunity.” China Will Maintain Ample Policy Support Chart 2Real Rate Differentials Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve In Q1, But Not At The Short End Investor concerns that the Chinese authorities are about to reverse stimulus measures are overblown. Jing Sima, BCA’s chief China strategist, expects the general government budget deficit to average 8% of GDP in 2021, largely unchanged from 2020 levels. She sees credit growth falling from 15% in 2020 to 12% this year (in line with her estimate of nominal GDP growth). Given that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 270%, credit growth of 12% would leave the outstanding stock of credit roughly 33 trillion yuan (32% of GDP) higher at the end of 2021 compared to end-2020. That is a lot of new credit formation, all of which should buoy commodity prices, the yuan, and other EM currencies. Rate Differentials Remain Dollar Bearish Despite strong US growth, US 2-year real rates have continued to decline in relation to rates abroad. Long-term yield differentials did rise in favor of the US in the first three months of the year, giving the dollar a lift. However, long-term differentials have since reversed course, which helps account for the dollar’s renewed weakness (Chart 2). The Fed’s dovish stance explains why stronger growth has given so little support to the dollar. The 10-year Treasury yield generally tracks the expected Fed funds rate two-to-three years out (Chart 3). At present, the markets are as hawkish relative to the median Fed dot as they have ever been (Chart 4). Chart 3Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Rise Much Unless The Market Lifts Its Estimate Of Where The Fed Funds Rate Will Be 2-To-3 Years Out Chart 4The Market Is Very Hawkish Relative To The Fed Dots This doesn’t mean that market expectations cannot get more hawkish from here. However, for this to happen, the Fed would need to start aggressively talking up the prospect of tapering asset purchases and accelerating the timeline to hiking rates. This does not seem probable to us. Chart 5Prime-Age Employment Remains Well Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The prime-age employment-to-population ratio is still 3.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 5). Overall US employment is about 5% below where it was in January 2020. Among workers earning less than $20 per hour, employment is down more than 10% (Chart 6). While some firms have complained about a shortage of workers, this likely reflects the combination of generous unemployment benefits (which expire in September) and lingering fears about catching the virus from work (which will abate as more people are vaccinated). Just as was the case following the Great Recession – when market commentary was rife with talk about a permanent increase in “structural unemployment” – concerns that the pandemic has led to lasting labor market damage will prove to be largely unfounded.   Chart 6US Employment Still Down About 5% From Its Pre-Pandemic Levels   The Dollar Faces Balance Of Payments Pressures The dollar is not a cheap currency. It is 13% overvalued based on Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates (Chart 7). One of the consequences of the dollar’s overvaluation has been a persistent trade deficit. As Chart 8 shows, the US trade deficit in goods and services has widened sharply since early 2020. Chart 7The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value Chart 8The Widening US Trade Deficit Excessively large budget deficits drain national savings, leading to a larger current account deficit. Hence, the dollar has usually weakened whenever the government has eased fiscal policy beyond what was necessary to close the output gap (Chart 9). Foreigners have been net sellers of Treasurys this year. To a large extent, equity inflows have supported the dollar (Chart 10). However, if growth rotates from the US to the rest of the world, non-US stock markets are likely to outperform. This could cause foreign equity inflows into the US to turn into outflows. The dollar would then need to weaken to make US stocks more attractive in foreign-currency terms. Chart 9The Dollar Usually Weakens Whenever The Government Eases Fiscal Policy Beyond What Is Necessary To Close The Output Gap Chart 10Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year   Technicals Point To A Weaker Dollar For many investment decisions, being a contrarian is a smart strategy. This does not apply to trading the US dollar, however. The dollar is a high momentum currency (Chart 11). When it comes to the dollar, you want to be a trend follower. Chart 11The Dollar Is A High Momentum Currency   Chart 12 shows that a simple trading rule that bought the dollar index when it was trading above its moving average would have made money, whereas a rule that bought the index when it was below its moving average would have lost money. While trading rules using short-term moving averages work best, even long-term moving average rules yield profitable results. Chart 12ATrading The Dollar: Follow Momentum (I) Chart 12BTrading The Dollar: Follow Momentum (II)   Today, the dollar is trading below all of its various moving averages, which points to further downside for the currency. The dollar’s momentum status extends to sentiment. In general, the dollar is more likely to strengthen when sentiment is already bullish. On the flipside, the dollar is more likely to weaken when sentiment is bearish. At present, dollar sentiment is bearish, which increases the odds of further dollar weakness (Chart 13). Chart 13ABeing A Contrarian Doesn’t Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar (I) Chart 13BBeing A Contrarian Doesn't Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar (II)   Chart 14Seasonality In The FX, Bond, And Equity Markets Finally, the dollar has tended to exhibit seasonal fluctuations. In general, the greenback has strengthened in the first half of the year and weakened in the second half (Chart 14). It is not entirely clear what explains this phenomenon, but it is worth noting that since 1985, almost all of the cumulative decline in Treasury yields has occurred in the back half of the year. Cyclical Currencies Are Most Likely To Strengthen Against The US Dollar Cyclical (i.e., high-beta) currencies will fare best against the US dollar over the next 12 months. In the EM space, strong global growth will benefit the Mexican peso, Chilean peso, Brazilian real, South African rand, Korean won, and the Indonesian rupiah. In the developed economy sphere, the Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, and Australian and Canadian dollars are poised to appreciate the most. We are particularly bullish on the loonie. The Bank of Canada announced on Wednesday that it will reduce the weekly pace of government bond purchases from C$4 billion to C$3 billion. Even before this announcement, the BoC’s balance sheet was shrinking following the decision to scale back repo operations and discontinue several other asset purchase programs. The BoC also indicated that it expects the Canadian economy to return to full employment in the second half of 2022, which should set the stage for the first rate hike by the end of next year. We expect EUR/USD to reach 1.25 by year-end. The British pound will strengthen to 1.50 against the dollar and 1.20 against the euro. Chart 15 shows that GBP/USD has closely tracked the rise and fall of global equities. Notably, the pound is 15% undervalued against the euro based on real 2-year interest rate differentials (Chart 16). Chart 15GBP/USD Has Closely Tracked Global Equities Chart 16The Pound Is Undervalued Against The Euro Based On Real Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials   The Japanese yen is a highly defensive currency. Hence, stronger global growth will pose a headwind to the yen. Nevertheless, the yen is quite cheap, trading at a 20% discount to its Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate (Chart 17). Moreover, real yields are higher in Japan than they are in the other major economies, reflecting ongoing deflationary pressures (Chart 18). On balance, we expect the yen to move sideways against the US dollar over the next 12 months. Chart 17The Yen Is Quite Cheap Chart 18Real Yields Are Higher In Japan Than In The Other Major Economies   Equity Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Cyclical stocks tend to outperform defensives when the dollar is weakening. To the extent that cyclicals are overrepresented in stock market indices outside the US, a weaker dollar favors non-US equities (Chart 19). Chart 19Cyclical Stocks Tend To Outperform Defensives When The Dollar Is Weakening Chart 20Value Stocks Generally Do Best In A Weak Dollar Environment Value stocks also tend to do best in a weak dollar environment (Chart 20). As such, we recommend that investors overweight cyclicals, non-US, and value stocks over the next 12 months.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

特別レポート

ハイライト 緑の党が9月26日の連邦選挙でドイツ政府の支配権を握る可能性が高い。少なくとも新連立政権で非常に影響力を持つだろう。 ドイツはEU内で長期にわたる地政学的目標の多くを達成している。金融政策と財政政策はハト派で、環境政策はタカ派というコンセンサスがある。最大の変化は外部からもたらされるだろう。 米国とドイツの関係はより困難になっている。両国ともロシアと中国の侵略には反対するが、ドイツは米国の攻撃的行動には抵抗するだろう。 キリスト教民主同盟（CDU）が政府に留まる確率は65％であり、これにより緑の党の論争的で野心的な増税議題は制限されるだろう。左派連立の確率は35％であり、回復のために財政刺激を前倒しで実行するだろう。 経済は回復基調にあり、緑の党主導の財政緩和は回復を加速させるだろう。しかし、連立政治はドイツの人口動態の悪化、生産性の低下、大きな過剰貯蓄といった問題に対処することはおそらくできないだろう。 景気循環の観点では、ブントに対して周辺欧州債をオーバーウェイト；EUR/USD；およびドイツ株に対してイタリア株とスペイン株をオーバーウェイト。 特集 チャート 1ドイツ人は若い女性と緑の党に注目 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ドイツは緑の党が指導する主要国としては初めての国になる見込みだ。少なくとも9月26日のドイツ選挙では現政権が期待を下回り、緑の党が期待を上回る番狂わせが起きるだろう（チャート 1）。 オンラインベッティング市場は30％で、アナレーナ・ベアボックが2022年に緑の党出身として初の首相、かつ第三党から選出される初の首相になる確率を過小評価している（チャート 2）。 「ドイツ問題」――ドイツを統一しつつ隣国との平和を維持する方法の問題――は過去二世紀にわたりヨーロッパの中心にあったが、今日では実質的に解決されたように見える。平和で統一されたドイツが平和で概ね統一されたヨーロッパの中心に位置している。様々なリスクは差し迫っているが、このポジティブな背景は認識されるべきである。 チャート 2市場はベアボックの首相挑戦に気づき始めている 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ドイツ選挙で最もあり得るシナリオはいずれも、ユーロ圏の連帯を目指す政策を継続させることで現在の状況を強化するだろう。緑のシフトですら既にかなり進行しているが、緑の党主導の政府はそれをさらに加速するだろう。それでも今年の選挙は重要だ。なぜならドイツの左方へのシフトを告げ、少なくとも今後4年間の財政、エネルギー、産業、貿易政策を形作るからである。 左派の大勝は短期的には株式市場に興奮をもたらすだろう――パンデミック後の反発を加速させるポジティブな財政サプライズ――が、長期的には過去との決別を招き、政策の不確実性を高めるだろう（チャート 3）。緑の党は増税や規制の大幅な強化、および産業とエネルギー政策における大きな変更を支持している。左派の大勝がない場合、連立政治は混迷を招き、ドイツの既存政策が継続されるだろう。 チャート 3ドイツの政策不確実性の高まり ドイツの政策不確実性が高まっている ドイツの政策不確実性が高まっている ドイツ国内で何が起ころうとも、地政学的環境は一段と危険になっている。ドイツは米国のロシアや中国との大国間闘争に巻き込まれることを避けようとするが、選択の余地がないかもしれない。 ドイツの地政学 ドイツ統一の困難さは近代ヨーロッパ史の中心にある。ドイツ語を話す大きく生産的な人口を有していたため、1871年の統一は近隣諸国にとって安全保障上の脅威となり、それが世界大戦へとつながった。冷戦後の平和的なドイツ再統一は、EUが大陸の平和と繁栄を確立する可能性を生み出した。 この体制は最近の挑戦を乗り越えてきた。ドイツとEUの関係は金融危機、アラブの春と移民流入、ブレグジット、トランプ大統領の貿易関税によって脅かされた。しかし最終的にこれらの出来事は、外圧に直面してドイツとヨーロッパの結びつきが強まる現実を固めた。ドイツは軍事的役割を回避し、経済面でフランスと歩調を合わせ、ロシアとの衝突を避けることで大陸における優越性を達成した。 ドイツは長年求めてきた戦略目標の多くを達成しているため、過去10年間に米国や英国のようなナショナリストの反発に見舞われることはなかった。しかしドイツはポピュリズムや反既成勢力の感情に無縁ではない。二大政治勢力であるキリスト教民主同盟と社会民主党は最近の選挙で支持を失い、やむなく大連立を組むことになった。 ドイツの反既成感情は有権者を左に動かし、緑の党を支持する傾向を生んだ。緑の党は過去10年間で着実に支持を伸ばし、選挙のわずか5か月前に勢いをつかんだ（チャート 4）。しかしドイツの緑の党は基本的に既成政党でもある。16州のうち11州で州政府に参加しており、現在はドイツで三番目に人口が多く生産的な州であるバーデン＝ヴュルテンベルク州で首位の座にある。1998年から2005年にかけては政府に参加し、新自由主義的な構造改革や海外への軍事派遣にかかわったこともある。さらに緑の党は単独で政権をとることはできず、連立政権の中で統治する必要があり、それが彼らのより論争的な政策を調整するだろう。 チャート 4緑の党躍進、キリスト教民主同盟失速 緑の党が躍進、キリスト教民主党は失速 緑の党が躍進、キリスト教民主党は失速 今日のドイツは、三つの重要な条件を満たすことでフランスおよびEUと足並みを揃えている：完全な金融緩和（ドイツ連邦憲法裁判所による欧州中央銀行への挑戦は効果がない）、完全な財政的順応（アンゲラ・メルケル首相はCOVID-19危機下で共同債の発行と緩い赤字管理に同意し、かつ強力なグリーン・エネルギー政策を採用した）、そして完全な安全保障上の調整（ドイツの再軍備はNATOの文脈内で行われ、ヨーロッパの安全保障上の願望はフランスと足並みを揃えて実行されている）。これらの条件は、たとえ緑の党が左派連立の先頭に立って政権を掌握したとしても、2021年の選挙で変わることはないだろう。 結論：ドイツはヨーロッパを統一し統治するという大戦略的目標を事実上達成した。どのドイツ政府もこの状況に挑むことはなく、すべてのドイツ政府はこれを固めようと努めるだろう。この体制に対する最大のリスクは国内よりもむしろ国外から生じる。 ドイツ問題の再来か？ ドイツの地政学的立場はチャート 5 に要約される。これは各国や機関に対する国民の見方を示している。ドイツ人はEUや国連のようなグローバルな機関に対しては好意的であり、NATOに対してはやや低い好感度を示す。それ以外のものに対しては好意的ではない。ロシアに対しては否定的な見方をしているが、劇的ではなく、これはロシアとの衝突に関心がないことを示している――彼らは別の大規模な欧州戦争の戦場や城壁になりたくないのだ。彼らは米国と中国をさらに、かつ同等に嫌っている。2020年の選挙以降米国に対する態度が改善したとしても、純粋な不支持は示唆的である。 チャート 5ドイツは米国よりロシアを好んでいるのか？ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 世界金融危機以降、特に2014年のロシアによるウクライナ侵攻以降、ドイツは軍備を増強してきた。この増強は米国の促しの下で、旧ソ連圏における勢力圏回復を図るロシアの軍事行動に対応するNATO同盟国と歩調を合わせて行われている（チャート 6）。ただしドイツの軍事支出はNATOのGDP比2％の目標にはまだ達していない。フランスやヨーロッパと統合され、ロシア抑止を目的としている限り、それは近隣国にとって脅威とは見なされないだろう。 チャート 6ドイツとNATOが軍事支出を増加させる 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ チャート 7ロシア・ドイツ関係の亀裂がヨーロッパの基盤に与える影響を注視せよ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ロシアの攻撃性はドイツ人とヨーロッパ人を互いに引き寄せ続けるはずだ。もしプーチンが軍事的強制ではなく外交を追求すれば状況は変わり得る。そうなればドイツを東ヨーロッパから切り離す可能性がある。 ノルドストリーム2パイプラインを完成させるというロシアとドイツの現在の強硬な姿勢からもその可能性は明らかである。これは米国や東欧の反対にもかかわらず進められている。パイプラインは選挙に間に合うよう9月までに完成する予定であり、緑の党がこれに反対していることが影響している部分も少なくない。もし米国がパイプラインの停止を主張すれば、ロシアとの間で危機が発生し、メルケルとキリスト教民主同盟は屈辱を受けるだろう。しかし米国はロシアの軍事的脅威に直面してそれを控える可能性もある（確率は五分五分である）。 ロシアが今年ウクライナ国境に10万人以上の部隊を配置したこと――そして報道によれば5月1日までに部隊を基地に戻すよう命じたとされること――はロシア・ドイツ関係の試金石に相当する。プーチンはウクライナで容易にロシアの影響力を拡大することができ、緊張は少なくともロシアの議会選挙が行われる9月までは高止まりするだろう。ドイツ人は再度の侵攻に対して制裁で応じるだろうが、米国が提案するより厳しい制裁は和らげられる可能性が高い。真に情勢を変えるのはロシアがウクライナ全土を征服する場合だろう。それはありそうもない――正にそれがドイツ、ヨーロッパ、米国を結束させ、ロシアにとって経済的損失と戦略的劣勢をもたらすからである（チャート 7）。 中国の台頭もまたドイツをヨーロッパと結びつけ続ける要因となるはずだ。ドイツ人は中国の技術的・製造面での進展、特にデジタルインフラやネットワークへの中国の関与を恐れている。緑の党は二酸化炭素排出量が多い中国製品が低炭素のドイツ製品の価格を圧迫している点を批判している。ベアボックはカーボン調整手数料を支持しているが、これは関税の婉曲表現である。しかしドイツ人は中国とのビジネス関係を維持したがっており、中国の軍事力を大いに恐れているわけではない。したがって中国問題を巡って米独が分裂するリスクがある。 もしドイツが米国の反対にもかかわらず一貫してロシアや中国に肩入れするならば、米国のみならず同胞の欧州諸国からも敵対的な注目を浴びる危険がある。最終的にはEU外の大国と関係を結ぶことでドイツの力が過剰になるのではないかと恐れられるだろう。しかしこれは今日の主要なリスクではない。米国はドイツを取り込み、トランス大西洋同盟を再活性化しようとしている。一方でドイツはロシアの軍事的脅威や中国の貿易慣行に対抗するために米国の支援を必要としている。米独関係は、米国が独裁的勢力との全面的な対立へドイツを強いるようなことがない限り改善するだろう。 結論：米国とドイツの関係は過去よりも難しくなっているが、両国はロシアの侵略と中国の技術的・貿易上の野心を抑止するという共通の利益を共有している。バイデン大統領がこれらの大国に多国間で対処しようとする試みは、ドイツのリスク回避的姿勢によって制約されている。2021年選挙のシナリオ ドイツの選挙結果については現実的なシナリオがいくつか考えられます。私たちが緑の党が政権を形成すると予想するのは、複数の基本的要因に基づいています。世論調査は現在、明確に私たちの見方に有利に転じており、残り5か月で緑の党が勢いを増しています。政党をイデオロギーのブロックに分類すると、争いはほぼ拮抗しています。我々の見立ては、その勢いが野党である緑の党に傾くというもので、その理由を以下に説明します。 一方で自由民主党（FDP）は好成績を収め、キリスト教民主同盟から票を奪うはずです。右派のAlternative für Deutschland（AfD）は大きく得票するわけではないものの、キリスト教民主同盟からいくつかの票を奪うほどには根強く存在しています。これらは保守派にとって「失われた」票であり、連立に加わる政党がないため戻らないでしょう（Chart 8）。 Chart 8Germany's Median Voters Shifts To the Left ドイツの中央値の有権者が左傾化 ドイツの中央値の有権者が左傾化 キリスト教民主同盟は、新鮮味を失い脆弱な政府のすべての兆候を示しています。彼らは16年間政権を担っており、州および連邦選挙での成績は最近悪化しており、今年も含まれます（Table 1）。有権者は「変化の時だ」という強い考えに影響されやすい状況です。メルケル首相の支持率はまだ約60％ですが急落しており、彼女の成功した功績だけでは党を救えません。党内は動揺の兆候に満ちています：後継問題、優柔不断、内紛、汚職スキャンダル。緑の党は「増税・支出拡大」の左派とみなされるでしょうが、実際に何が立法化され得るかは連立構成次第です（Table 2）。1 Table 1AChristian Democrats Fall, Greens Rise, In Recent State Elections 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ Table 1BChristian Democrats Fall, Greens Rise, In Recent State Elections 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ Table 2Policy Platforms Of The Green Party 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ キリスト教民主同盟とそのバイエルンの姉妹政党であるキリスト教社会同盟が首相候補の争いでこれほど苦戦したことは不吉な前兆です。さらに、党内のエリート層は、より人気のあったマルクス・ゼーダーではなくメルケルが指名した後継者アルミン・ラシェットという安全策を選びました（Chart 9）。この分裂は今年後半に党を悩ませる可能性が高いでしょう。 Chart 9Christian Democrats And Christian Social Union Divided Ahead Of Election 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ラシェットは指名で世論調査における反発上昇（バウンス）を受けましたが、それは一時的なものになるでしょう。それ以前の世論調査で彼が大きな存在感を示したことはありません。 Chart 10Dissatisfaction Points To Government Change 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 彼はパンデミック対応をめぐってメルケルや連立と公然と対立してきました。そもそも彼はメルケルの第一の後継者の選択肢ではありませんでした。第一の候補はアナグレート・クランプ＝カレンバウアーであり、わずかなAfDとの協力の示唆をめぐる論争で失脚しました。メルケルの後継を埋めるには明白な問題があります。 連立内の内紛以上に重要なのは、ドイツが世界の他の国々と同様に、経済と社会に対する歴史的ショックを受けたという事実です。パンデミックと景気後退は不適切なワクチン配布によってさらに悪化しました。国民の不満は高く、現職党にとっては別のネガティブサインです（Chart 10）。 もちろん選挙はまだ5か月先です。ワクチンはやがて行き渡り、経済は再開し、消費者の景況感は改善するでしょう――以下に示すように、ドイツが選挙までに期待すべき非常にポジティブなマクロの上振れがあるからです。有権者は概して厳格なパンデミック対策を支持しており、メルケルの影響力は長く続くでしょう。キリスト教民主同盟とキリスト教社会同盟は再統一以降のほとんどの期間にわたって現代ドイツを支配してきており、世論の支持率が33％を下回ったことはありません。緑の党は世論調査ではしばしば投票所での得票よりも多くの勢いを喚起してきました。こうした点を踏まえ、以下に主観的確率を付した選挙シナリオを提示します： 緑・赤・赤連立 – 緑の党がキリスト教民主同盟抜きで政権を率いる – 35％の確率. 緑・黒連立 – 緑の党がキリスト教民主同盟とともに政権を率いる – 30％の確率. 黒・緑連立 – キリスト教民主同盟が緑の党とともに政権を率いる – 25％の確率. 大連立（現状維持） – キリスト教民主同盟が緑の党抜きで政権を率いる – 10％の確率. 私たちの主観的確率は、上記の世論調査やオンライン賭けのデータに基づきますが、緑の党の勢い、キリスト教民主同盟の内部分裂、「変化の時」要因、そして歴史的な外生的経済・社会ショックの存在を考慮して調整したものです。 選挙前に地政学的なサプライズが起こる可能性はありますが、それらはたいてい緑の党を強化する方向に働くでしょう。緑の党はロシアと中国に対して強硬な姿勢を取っているからです。 要点： 緑の党が次期ドイツ政府を主導する可能性が高いですが、少なくとも強力な影響力は持つでしょう。 選挙シナリオの政策影響 どの連立が政権を構成するかが新たな政策の枠組みを決定します。財政政策は選挙の結果に基づいて変わり、支出と税の両方が影響を受けます。緑の党は「増税・支出拡大」の左派ですが、実際に何が立法化され得るかは連立次第です。2 緑の党の考え方は、環境政策を通じて再建プロセスを「舵取り」することです。しかし左派が強固な多数を欠く場合、緑の党のより論争的で懲罰的な施策は通りません。変革的な政策は低所得層に重くのしかかるでしょう（Chart 11）。 Chart 11Ambitious Climate Policy Will Face Resistance 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 各首相候補の政策姿勢は、ドイツにおける高い政策的一致度を示すのに役立ちます。Table 3は、ある政策分野において候補者が「鷹派」（積極的、攻撃的）か「鳩派」（受動的、防御的）かに基づいて候補者を見ています。際立っているのは、党の違いにもかかわらず候補者間の合意です。誰も財政や金融の鷹派ではありません。貿易に関して鷹派と分類できるのはベアボックだけです。3 移民問題で鷹派とされる者はいません。ほとんど全員が気候変動対策には強硬です。またロシアや中国に対する姿勢はより懐疑的になりつつありますが、完全な強硬派というわけではありません。 Table 3Policy Consensus Among German Chancellor Candidates 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化する 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化する 緑の党が期待を下回ったとしても、ドイツはグリーン関連の取り組みを放棄しないでしょう。現在の大連立は、緑の党が野党にあったとしても、国民の圧力により気候対策パッケージを追求しました。ドイツ国民は他のヨーロッパ諸国よりも環境志向がかなり強いです（Chart 12）。グリーンへのシフトは世界的にも進行しています。米国も現在グリーン競争に参入しており、中国も独自の理由で取り組みを強化しています。4月22-23日のバイデンのアースデイ気候サミットに先立つ一連の発表を受けて更新された現在のグリーン目標と措置については、付録を参照してください。 Chart 12Germans Care Even More About Environment Than Other Europeans 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ いかなる連立でも、COVID後の経済回復に注力するため支出を税よりも多く引き上げるでしょう。ドイツの積極的な財政転換には長い前奏があり、それは持続力があり無視すべきではありません。キリスト教民主同盟を中核とする連立は他の場合より早く財政規律を回復させようとするでしょうが、上に示したシナリオによればそれが実行できる確率はわずか5％にすぎません。EUの財政上限が2022年に凍結されている間、欧州の他国は積極的な支出を行う動機を持つでしょう。特にドイツ政府がより鳩派に傾く場合はなおさらです。 米英以上に、ドイツはワシントン・コンセンサス的な新自由主義から距離を置きつつあります。しかしドイツでは米国型の激しい分極化やポピュリズムの急増は見られていません。少なくとも現時点ではそうです。これは長期的にはリスクになり得ます。キリスト教民主同盟、AfD、および様々な内外の展開の行方次第です。 要点： ドイツには金融、財政、貿易、移民に関しては鳩派的な国民的一致があり、環境政策については強硬（プロ・グリーン）の一致があります。ロシアや中国との地政学的対立に関しては以前より強硬になりつつあります。連立政権が現実的であることを踏まえると、この合意が今年の選挙後の実際の政策を決定する可能性が高いでしょう。 与党の構成にかかわらずいくつかの点は明確です。第一に、ドイツは成長の新たな源として内需を求め、経済の再均衡とEU統合の深化を図っていること。第二に、ドイツはグリーン・エネルギー推進を加速していること。第三に、ドイツはロシアとの新たな冷戦のただ中にいることを受け入れられないこと。第四に、対中国政策はあいまいであること。ドイツのマクロ見通し より広範な財政の状況を考慮する以前から、今後12〜24か月のドイツの経済活動見通しはすでにポジティブでした。9月の選挙に関する当社のベースケースは、緑の党を中心とした連立政権を想定しており、この楽観的な見方を裏付けるものです。ただし、ドイツは依然として重大な長期的課題に直面しており、これらの構造的逆風に適切に対処するための政治的合意はこれまでのところ形成されていません。緑の党は幾つかの解決策を提示していますが、すべての提案が建設的というわけではなく、多くは議会での勢力次第となるでしょう。 短期を覗くと… ドイツ経済は世界的な景気循環の回復の恩恵を受ける見込みであり、これはBCAリサーチの現在の見通しの核心にある見方です。4 ドイツは依然として貿易と製造の強国であり、そのため世界的な製造業の回復から大きな恩恵を受けます。製造業と貿易はドイツのGDPのそれぞれ20％と88％を占めており、主要経済の中で最も高い割合です。別の見方では、OECDによれば、ドイツ製品に対する海外需要は国内付加価値のおよそ30％を占めており、これは韓国のような小規模経済よりも高い比率です（Chart 13）。さらに、自動車、機械およびその他の輸送機器、ならびに化学製品および関連製品は、ドイツの輸出の53％を占めています。これらの製品はいずれも世界的な景気循環に特に敏感であり、したがって今後2年間でドイツ経済のパフォーマンスを高めるでしょう。 欧州域内との貿易は、今後のドイツ経済にとってもう一つの後押しとなります。ユーロ圏向けおよびEU域内向けの出荷はそれぞれドイツの輸出の34％と23％、合計で57％を占めます。現在、停滞気味の欧州経済はドイツにとってハンディキャップですが、欧州には米国よりも抑圧された需要が多く、耐久財の消費はワクチン接種がさらに進展すれば急増するでしょう（Chart 14）。これは、今後12〜18か月で欧州の消費が大幅に回復すると当社が予想するため、ドイツにとって大きな追い風となります。5 Chart 13ドイツはグローバル貿易に依存している 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ Chart 14欧州は米国よりも多くの潜在需要を抱えている 欧州は米国よりも先送りされた需要が大きい 欧州は米国よりも先送りされた需要が大きい Chart 15ワクチン接種の進捗 ワクチン接種の進捗 ワクチン接種の進捗 国内要因も対外要因だけでなくドイツ経済の強さを示しています。ワクチン接種のペースはドイツで急速に加速しています（Chart 15）。四半期向けに追加で5000万回分、そして今後2年間で最大18億回分のワクチン購入を行うというEUの最近の発表はさらなる改善を示唆しています。より幅広いワクチン接種の取り組みは、消費に対する基礎的な追い風を触発するでしょう。 ドイツの家計所得も大幅に改善する見込みです。クルツァルバイト制度は危機時に失業率を抑える上で重要な役割を果たし、失業率は2020年初めの5％からピークでも6.4％にとどまりました。しかし、この制度は総就業時間の7％という大幅な減少を阻止することはできませんでした。というのも定義上、600万人の従業員が所定労働時間の短縮を余儀なくされていたからです（Chart 16）。この制度の大きな利点の一つは、労働者と雇用主との連結が断絶するのを防ぐことであり、したがって活動が回復する際の摩擦的失業が少なく、家計所得に長期的な損傷が生じにくい点にあります。一方で、ドイツ政府は債務ブレーキの適用の遅延を受けて、家計と企業への支援を継続する可能性が高いでしょう。緑の党は債務ブレーキを2022年に復元するのではなく改定することを提案しており、保守派が約束する復元とは対照的です。 Chart 16クルツァルバイトが功を奏した Kurtzarbeitが窮地を救った Kurtzarbeitが窮地を救った 家計のバランスシートが強固であることは、増加する所得を消費に回す余力があることを意味します。住宅不動産価格は年率8％のペースで上昇しており、資産対可処分所得比率を過去最高水準に押し上げています。一方で、債務対資産比率と金利水準も非常に低く、既存債務の返済負担は最小限にとどまっています（Chart 17）。 このような状況では、耐久財支出が加速し、たとえドイツの家計が過去1年間で蓄積した1,200億ユーロの過剰貯蓄を多く使わなかったとしても、全体として景気循環的な支出は持ち上がります。Chart 18が示すように、米国の耐久財支出はすでにコロナ前の高水準を上回っていますが、ドイツは長期トレンド付近に留まっています。したがって、今夏に経済が再開し、所得と雇用が増加するにつれて、同時に高まる消費者信頼感が景気循環的支出の回復を可能にするでしょう。 Chart 17強固な家計のバランスシート 強固な家計のバランスシート 強固な家計のバランスシート Chart 18ドイツも米国より多くの潜在需要を抱えている ドイツも米国よりも抑えられた需要が大きい ドイツも米国よりも抑えられた需要が大きい Chart 19多くの指標からのポジティブなメッセージ 多くの指標が示すポジティブなメッセージ 多くの指標が示すポジティブなメッセージ さまざまな経済指標がすでに到来しつつあるドイツの経済ブームを示しています。製造受注は堅調で、ほとんどのセクターで経済センチメントが上昇しています。一方で、消費者の楽観主義は底を形成しつつあり、新車登録は急速に増加しています。最も好ましい点として、完成品在庫が崩壊しており、これは将来の需要を満たすために生産が増強されることを示唆しています（Chart 19）。 要点：ドイツ経済は今年後半から2022年にかけて加速する見込みです。いつものように、ドイツは力強い世界成長から健全な利益を享受しますが、ワクチン接種プログラムの拡大、雇用主と従業員の良好な関係、強固な家計のバランスシート、および耐久財に対する顕著な潜在需要も国内経済を後押しします。ベルリンでの政治的な左派へのシフトを受けて9月以降に財政政策が引き続き緩和的に推移するという当社のベースケースは、この不可避の回復をさらに加速させるだけでしょう。…そして長期的見通し 目先の見通しが明るいのに対し、ドイツ経済の長期的見通しは依然として芳しくない。新たな与党連合の政策がドイツの厳しい人口動態、悪化する生産性、大きな過剰貯蓄という問題に対処する可能性は低い。グローバルなグリーン・エネルギーとハイテクの競争の文脈で生産性の押し上げ余地はあるが、現時点では憶測の域を出ない。 ドイツが直面するもっとも明白な問題は高齢化であり、合計特殊出生率はわずか1.6にとどまる。今後30年間で、ドイツの扶養比率は80%まで急増する見込みで、高齢者扶養比率が20%増加することが主因である（チャート20）。生産年齢人口は2050年までに18%減少する見込みで、潜在GDPの成長を抑制するだろう。 ドイツの生産性成長の見通しも厳しい。ドイツの生産性成長は長期的に低下しており、1975年の5%から2019年には1%を下回った。一般に広まっている考えに反し、1999年から2007年の間、ドイツの労働生産性成長はフランスやスペインと同程度にしか過ぎなかった；2008年以降はこの二国に遅れをとっているが、イタリアは上回っている。 ドイツの生産性が振るわない重要な理由の一つは投資不足である。これは同国の緊縮的な財政運営を反映している面もある。例えば2019年、ドイツの公的投資はGDPの2.4%であり、OECD平均の3.8%や、米国の公的投資であるGDPの3.6%と比べても見劣りする。この数字はドイツの公的資本ストックの減価償却を考慮していない。ユーロ導入以降、ネット公的投資は平均でGDPの0.03%にとどまっている。最大の問題は自治体レベルにある。2012年から2019年にかけて、連邦および州レベルのネット投資は平均でGDPの0.2%だった一方で、自治体のネット投資は平均でGDPの0.2%をマイナスにした。新政権がこのドイツ経済の欠陥に対処できることが望まれる。緑の党が最も積極的ではあるが、障害に直面するだろう。 ドイツの生産性にとってより大きな問題は企業の設備投資である。企業の投資は同国で低迷してきた。ユーロ導入以降、ドイツにおける資本集約度の生産性への寄与はイタリアと同等であり、フランスやスペインよりも劣後している。その結果、ドイツの資本ストックの平均年齢は過去最高水準であり、米国やユーロ圏平均を大きく上回っている（チャート21）。 チャート20ドイツは人口動態が厳しい ドイツは人口動態が悪い ドイツは人口動態が悪い チャート21ドイツの資本ストックは老朽化している ドイツの資本ストックは老朽化している ドイツの資本ストックは老朽化している ドイツの設備投資の内訳は生産性のハンディキャップを悪化させている。ドイツ連邦銀行（ブンデスバンク）の研究によれば、情報通信技術（ICT）への資本支出が労働生産性に与えた寄与は、2008年から2012年の間で年平均0.05パーセントポイントだった。この指標において、ドイツはフランスや米国より遅れていたが、それでもイタリアは上回っていた。2013年から2017年にかけては、ICT投資の生産性への寄与は0.02パーセントポイントに落ち、依然としてフランスや米国より低いが、イタリアとは同水準であった。 ICTや知識基盤資本（KBC）への投資の絶対水準を見ると、ドイツの課題がさらに浮き彫りになる。2016年におけるICT機器、ソフトウェアとデータベース、研究開発および知的財産生産物、その他のKBC資産（組織資本や研修を含む）への総投資はGDPの8%未満を占めていた。フランス、米国、スウェーデンではそれぞれこれらの支出がGDPの11%、12%、13%を占めていた（チャート22、上段）。この投資不足はドイツのイノベーション能力を直接的に損ねる。チャート22の下段は、ICT特許の総数の80%を占める8つの主要カテゴリについて、ドイツが米国、日本、韓国、あるいは中国に著しく遅れを取っていることを示している。 チャート22ドイツはICT投資で遅れを取っている 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ICTおよびKBC投資におけるドイツのハンディキャップの主要因の一つは中小企業であり、これらは資本の投入に特に消極的であった。OECDの研究は、2010年から2019年の間に、ドイツの小企業と大企業の間のICTツールおよび活動の採用ギャップがOECD平均に比べて悪化したことを示している（チャート23）。ベンチャーキャピタル投資の不足もこれらの問題を悪化させている可能性が高い。2019年におけるドイツのベンチャーキャピタル投資はGDPの0.06%を占めるにすぎない。これはフランスや英国（それぞれ0.08%および0.1%）の水準を下回り、ましてや韓国、カナダ、イスラエル、米国（それぞれ0.16%、0.2%、0.4%、0.65%）の水準には遠く及ばない。緑の党は新たなベンチャーキャピタル・ファンドを創設すると主張しているが、この分野での実行力は疑わしい。 チャート23ドイツの中小企業におけるICT能力の遅れ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ドイツの生産性成長はOECD諸国の他と比べて今後も平均を下回る可能性が高く、フランスや英国にも遅れを取る見込みであるため、ドイツが競争力を維持する唯一の方法はコストを抑制することである。つまり、ドイツは近年の競争力喪失をこれ以上放置することはできない（チャート24）。したがって、生産性の低成長はドイツの実質賃金を制約するだろう。 チャート24ドイツの競争力は低下している ドイツの競争力が低下している ドイツの競争力が低下している この賃金抑制は消費に悪影響を与えるだろう。今後12～24か月の一時的な押し上げを除けば、ドイツの消費は抑制されたままである可能性が高い。これは千年紀の変わり目以降の最初の15年に見られた状況と同様であり、ハルツIVの労働市場改革は実質賃金にも打撃を与えた。緑の党は福祉給付を拡充し、最低賃金を引き上げ、ハルツIVの運用を緩和することを目指している。 結論：ドイツの過剰貯蓄は構造的に幅広く残るだろう。設備投資が実質的に回復しなければ、ドイツの非金融企業は純貸し手のままである。加えて、実質賃金成長が低い世界で将来の家計の状況を不安視している家計は、所得のかなりの割合を引き続き貯蓄するだろう。その結果、千年紀の変わり目以降にドイツが蓄積した過剰貯蓄は定着する（チャート25）。言い換えれば、ドイツは大きな経常収支黒字を維持し、欧州および世界に対してデフレ的な影響を及ぼし続けるだろう。 9月の選挙に出馬する各党が提唱する政策が、設備投資低迷やICT投資低迷という問題を覆す新法につながるとは限らない。緑の党は経済の過剰規制をさらに悪化させるだろう。すべての目的を達成するような政策革命が実行されない限り（非常に高いハードルである）、ドイツにはこれまでと同様の状況、つまり緩やかに衰退する経済が続くと予想される。 チャート25貯蓄過多、投資不足 貯蓄過多、投資不足 貯蓄過多、投資不足 チャート26ドイツは再生可能エネルギーで好成績 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ とはいえ、明るい点もある。ドイツは再生可能エネルギー分野でリーダーになりつつあり、この流れの拡大を活かして輸出市場を拡大することができる（チャート26）。 投資への示唆 債券市場 ドイツとユーロ圏全体の経済見通しは、欧州のフィクスト・インカム・ポートフォリオ内でドイツ・ブントをアンダーウェイトすることと整合的です。 ブントは世界で最も割高な債券市場の一つに入っており、特に今年後半に欧州で経済の良いサプライズが生じた場合、非常に脆弱になります。とりわけ9月の選挙を受けてドイツの財政政策がさらに緩和されれば脆弱性は増します（チャート27）。さらに、ドイツの財政政策が緩和されれば欧州の周辺国債が支えられ、現在ECBが積極的に買っている割安なイタリアBTPは特に恩恵を受けるでしょう。したがって、我々はBTPのオーバーウェイトを継続し、ギリシャ債とポルトガル債をそのリストに加えます。 チャート27ドイツ・ブントは割高である 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ チャート28ドイツ利回りは既に欧州に関して多くの悲観を織り込んでいる ドイツ国債利回りは既に欧州に対する相当な悲観を織り込んでいる ドイツ国債利回りは既に欧州に対する相当な悲観を織り込んでいる 米国債と比較すると、ブントの見通しはより複雑です。一方で、ECBはこのサイクルの後半でFRBほど金融政策を引き締めないでしょう。さらに、欧州のインフレ率は今年および事業サイクルを通じて米国水準を下回る可能性が高いです。他方で、ブントは既に実質ターミナル・レートの代理指標とタームプレミアムの両方で国債（Treasury Notes）よりもかなり低い数値を織り込んでいます（チャート28）。 総合的に見れば、BCAリサーチのグローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジー・サービスは、ブントは今年米国債をアウトパフォームすべきだと見ています。なぜならブントはベータが低く、利回り上昇局面で価値のある特徴を持っているからです。6 我々はこの見方に関連するリスクを注意深くモニターします。なぜなら欧州の景気回復が世界的な利回り上昇の触媒になる可能性があり、その場合ドイツ・ブントは一時的にアンダーパフォームすることがあり得るからです。 構造的には、ベルリンがドイツの生産性問題に対処しない限り、ドイツ・ブントは世界の利回りにとっての錨（アンカー）であり続ける公算が大きいです。ドイツは過剰貯蓄に溢れ、これはデフレ的な錨として作用するとともに、欧州の実質金利の長期的な上昇を抑制します。過剰貯蓄は大きな経常収支黒字をもたらすため、ドイツは引き続き貯蓄を海外へ輸出し、世界の利回りを抑制する要因として作用し続けるでしょう。 ユーロ 中期的な見通しはユーロの大幅な上昇を示唆しています。 今後12カ月で欧州およびドイツの成長が良いサプライズとなるという我々の予想は、ユーロのアウトパフォーマンスと整合します。過去10年間、投資家がユーロ圏から資金を取り出し米国へ移してきたという事実は、この議論に説得力を与えます（チャート29）。 我々のドイツの財政政策に関する見解もユーロに有利に働きます。ドイツの財政赤字拡大は欧州の経済活動を助け、ユーロ圏全体のリスクプレミアムを縮小します。このプロセスはユーロにとって二重にポジティブです。第一に、周辺国のリスクプレミアム低下はユーロ圏への資金流入を呼び込みます。とりわけギリシャ、ポルトガル、イタリア、スペインの利回りは代替投資よりも価値を提供します。第二に、強い成長と低いリスクプレミアムは、ユーロ圏の唯一のリフレーターであるECBへの負担を軽減します。これにより、マージンではありますが、欧州の極めて低迷したターミナル・レート代理指標が押し上げられ、EUR/USDを支援するはずです。 欧州内部のポジティブな力に加え、堅調な世界経済活動はユーロの魅力を高めます。ドルはカウンターサイクル通貨であり、したがって世界の景気サイクルの上昇は一般にドル安と一致し、EUR/USDの魅力を増します。とはいえ、もし世界経済の押し上げが米国から生じれば、ドルは強くなる可能性があります。この現象は2021年の第1四半期に見られました。しかし、今後12カ月で世界の成長リーダーシップは米国から離れる見込みであり、これは世界成長とドルの逆相関という通常の関係が再びユーロに有利に働くことを意味します。 欧州の国際収支の動態はユーロの魅力をさらに強固にします。ドイツおよびユーロ圏の経常収支黒字は依然として大きく、特に米国で拡大する双子の赤字と比較すると際立っています。 今後12〜24カ月を超えた期間では、ドイツおよび欧州経済の構造的な活力欠如がユーロを円やスイスフランのようなセーフヘイブン通貨へと変える可能性が高いです。強い国際収支と低金利（いずれも過剰貯蓄の症状）はファンディング通貨の定義的特徴であり、改革が生産性低迷に対処しない限りユーロ圏の恒久的属性となるでしょう。ユーロ圏の対外純資産ポジションは既に上昇しており、低インフレはユーロの購買力平価見積りに構造的な上方バイアスを与えるでしょう（チャート30）。これらの展開は日本やスイスですでに見られており、時間が経てばユーロのプロサイカリティ（景気循環性）は消えていく可能性が高いです。 チャート29投資家は既に欧州資産をアンダーウェイトしている 投資家は既に欧州資産をアンダーウェイトしている 投資家は既に欧州資産をアンダーウェイトしている チャート30ユーロのフェアバリューにおける上方バイアス ユーロのフェアバリューには上方バイアスがある ユーロのフェアバリューには上方バイアスがある チャート31ドイツはユーロ圏の他国よりアウトパフォームしていない ドイツはユーロ圏の他国を上回っていない ドイツはユーロ圏の他国を上回っていない ドイツ株式 絶対的に見れば、DAXおよびドイツ株式は今後12〜24カ月で依然として大きな上振れ余地を持っています。BCAリサーチは株式に対してポジティブな姿勢を想定しており、ベータが高い市場であるドイツは恩恵を受ける可能性があります。7 さらに、ドイツ株式は世界経済活動への感応度が高いことがその魅力を際立たせます。我々は欧州株式を好み、ドイツ株も例外ではありません。8 より複雑な問題は、欧州株式ポートフォリオ内でドイツ株式をどのように位置付けるかです。2003年から2012年にかけて大幅にアウトパフォームした後、ドイツ株式はそれ以降ユーロ圏の他と同じ動きになっています（チャート31）。さらに、ドイツ株式は現在、主要なバリュエーション指標のすべてでユーロ圏の他地域に対してディスカウントで取引されています（チャート31、下段）。 ドイツ株式のユーロ圏他地域に対する見通しを左右するグローバル・マクロの力は現在、相反するメッセージを送っています。一方では、コモディティ価格が上昇したりユーロが上昇したりすると通常ドイツ株はアウトパフォームします（チャート32）。他方では、世界の利回りが上昇したり、中国の過剰準備が減少した期間の後にはドイツ株はアンダーパフォームすることもあります。今日見られるような環境がそれに該当します。 こうした世界的要因からの不明確さがあるため、ドイツの相対的パフォーマンスに関する答えは欧州の経済動態の中にあります。ドイツはユーロ圏の他地域に対して競争力を失いつつあり（チャート24 22ページ）、これはユーロが強くなった場合にドイツ株が過去10年のパフォーマンスほど恩恵を受けないことを示唆しています。さらに、ドイツ株はドイツの製造業PMIが広いユーロ圏のそれに対して上昇したときにアウトパフォームします。ドイツとユーロ圏の製造業PMIの差はほぼ史上高水準にあり、ユーロ圏の他地域が追いつくにつれてこの差は縮小する可能性が高いです。これはドイツ株のパフォーマンスに影響を与えるはずです（チャート33）。 チャート32ドイツの相対的パフォーマンスにとって混在するグローバルな背景 ドイツの相対パフォーマンスを取り巻く混在するグローバル環境 ドイツの相対パフォーマンスを取り巻く混在するグローバル環境 チャート33欧州の経済の追いつきはドイツ株にとって不利となる 欧州の経済の追い上げはドイツ・エクイティに打撃を与える 欧州の経済の追い上げはドイツ・エクイティに打撃を与える 最後に、セクター別の動態が最終的な決定要因となる可能性があります。表4はドイツとユーロ圏の他市場との間でセクター配分に限定的な差しかないことを示しており、これが過去9年間の相対的パフォーマンスの安定性を説明するのに役立ちます。 しかしながら、国別に見ればドイツと特定の欧州諸国との間で差異は大きくなります。この観点では、BCAの成長株に対するネガティブなスタンスはオランダに対してドイツをオーバーウェイトすることと相関します。さらに、我々の金融株と債券利回りに関するポジティブな見通しは、ドイツがイタリアおよびスペインの株式に対してアンダーパフォームすべきであることを示唆します。 表4欧州主要取引所におけるセクター別内訳 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ   マット・ガートケン バイスプレジデント ジオポリティカル・ストラテジー mattg@bcaresearch.com   マチュー・サヴァリー, チーフ・ヨーロピアン・インベストメント・ストラテジスト Mathieu@bcaresearch.com 付録：世界の気候政策コミットメント 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 脚注 1 Matthew Karnitschnig、"German Conservatives Mired In ‘The Swamp,’" Politico、2021年3月24日、politico.eu。 2 緑の党は炭素税、デジタルサービス税、金融取引税を含む様々な税に関心を持っています。彼らはまた、鉄鋼や自動車メーカーに一定割合の炭素中立鋼材や電気自動車を販売させる工業クオータにも関心があります。Baerbock氏への優れたインタビューはIleana GrabitzとKatharina Schuler、"I don’t have to convert the SUV driver in Prenzlauer Berg," Zeit Online、2020年1月2日、zeit.deを参照してください。 3 Zeit Onlineに対する彼女のコメントを参照してください。 4 BCAリサーチ グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・アウトルック "Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?"、日付2021年3月26日、gis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 5 BCAリサーチ ヨーロピアン・インベストメント・ストラテジー・スペシャル・レポート "A Temporary Decoupling"、日付2021年4月5日、eis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 6 BCAリサーチ グローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・レポート "Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger"、日付2021年3月16日、gfis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 7 BCAリサーチ グローバル・インカム・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・アウトルック "Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?"、日付2021年3月26日、gis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 8 BCAリサーチ ヨーロピアン・インカム・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・レポート "Time And Attraction"、日付2021年4月12日、eis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。

Dear Client, Next week I will be hosting a series of Roundtable discussions with BCA’s clients in both Europe and Asia. Our next report published on April 28th will be a recap of my observations from these meetings. Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Highlights The sharp uptick in Chinese producer prices should be transitory, unlikely to trigger a policy response. There are two scenarios under which Chinese manufacturers’ profit margins will benefit: either Chinese exporters will raise export prices and pass input costs onto American customers, or the RMB will depreciate versus the US dollar and commodities prices will experience a setback. The second scenario is more likely in the next 3-6 months. After a pandemic-driven boost in 2020, US imports from China will likely moderate in the second half of 2021 and into 2022. President Biden’s grand infrastructure spending plan, even if approved later this year, will not be a game changer for China’s exports or economy. The strength in the USD may intensify in the near term, and Chinese policymakers will be happy to allow the RMB to depreciate mildly. Stay underweight Chinese stocks. Feature Last week’s China’s producer price index (PPI) was more elevated than the market expected. However, it does not warrant a policy response, given that the increase was mostly driven by supply constraints rather than an overheating domestic economy. Chinese manufacturers have had a tough time passing on mounting input prices to customers, which raises the question about how profit margins will be maintained. For exporters, the answer may be a combination of increasing export prices in USD terms and depreciating the RMB.  The rate of growth in US demand for Chinese export goods may moderate in the second half of 2021 and into 2022 after a pandemic-driven boost in 2020. China’s economic growth and interest rate differentials with the US will continue to narrow in the rest of this year. We expect the RMB to face headwinds against the USD, at least in the next quarter or two. Meanwhile, global investors should continue to underweight Chinese stocks. The PBoC Will Not React To Supply-Side Price Pressures Chart 1Marchs Strong PPI Does Not Reflect An Overheating Domestic Economy Despite above-expectation readings in China’s PPI, the domestic economy shows no signs of overheating. The upside pressure on producer prices reflects the impact of both the global rally in commodities and base effects (Chart 1). In March, strength in the PPI was also accentuated by seasonality due to a resumption in construction and real estate activity following the Chinese New Year holiday. While base effects and global supply bottlenecks will continue to buoy PPI prints throughout Q2, these effects are likely transitory and would not justify a policy response. At 0.4% year-over-year in March, core CPI remains significantly below the central bank’s 3% target and does not indicate any demand-side pressure. Instead, the inability for Chinese producers to pass on higher input prices to consumers highlights the relatively subdued state of domestic demand (Chart 1, bottom panel). Chart 2Current Macro Policy Works To Cap The Upsides In Both The Price And Quantity Of Money At this point there are little signs that rising producer prices are spilling over to consumer prices. We expect Chinese authorities to continue its current policy trajectory, which intends to keep a steady interbank rate while keeping money supply growth at or below the rate of nominal GDP expansion (Chart 2). China’s Deteriorating Terms Of Trade Chinese export prices climbed slightly in USD terms, but not by enough to offset the RMB’s relentless appreciation from the second half of last year, as indicated by falling export prices in RMB terms (Chart 3). A deteriorating terms of trade (ToT), defined as export prices relative to import costs, means that Chinese producers must export a greater number of units to purchase the same number of imports (Chart 4).  The declining ToT can be a powerful deflationary force for China’s manufacturing sector. Chart 3Chinese Export Prices Are Rising In USD Terms But Falling In Local Currency Terms Chart 4Terms Of Trade Have Been Falling Chart 5Chinese Output Prices Lead US Consumer Inflation By A Year While there are limited choices for China to improve its ToT, manufacturers could raise export prices in USD terms and “recycle” cost-push inflation back to the US. Chinese PPI normally leads US consumer inflation by 12 to 18 months (Chart 5). Hence, it is possible that the US will see import prices from China picking up more momentum by the middle of next year. The RMB’s performance is a key macro driver for manufacturing-related output prices. A depreciation in the RMB can be a meaningful reflationary force for manufacturers. There has been a clear negative correlation between the trade-weighted RMB and Chinese manufacturers' output prices and industrial profits, as shown in Chart 6. In this scenario, the USD will continue to appreciate against the RMB and possibly emerging market currencies, a headwind to global trade (Chart 7). Chart 6A Falling RMB Can Be Reflationary To Chinese Producers Chart 7A Stronger USD Will Be Headwinds For Global Trade Maintaining a strong RMB can partly mitigate the pain stemming from escalating commodity import prices.  However, in our view it is the least preferred option by policymakers. In previous cycles a rapidly strengthening RMB did not have a major impact on Chinese exporters' competitiveness, mainly because declines in commodities prices effectively offset a rising RMB (Chart 8 and Chart 9). Therefore, Chinese exporters did not need to boost prices in USD terms to maintain their profit margins. Chart 8RMB Appreciations Did Not Hurt Chinas Share In Global Trade Chart 9...Because Declines In Commodities Prices Were Able To Offset A Rising RMB Bottom Line: Chinese exporters can either raise prices and pass the inflation onto American customers, or the PBoC will allow further depreciation in the RMB to maintain Chinese producers’ competitiveness. Appreciating the RMB is the least preferred option. Don’t Count On A US Buying Spree  Market participants in China are pricing in large windfalls from the US$1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan and proposed US$2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan.1 A positive export tailwind in Q1 this year boosted China’s economic activity beyond what measures of domestic money and credit would have predicted, as shown in Chart 10. However, given the strongly positive relationship between the export sector and real investment in China, it is concerning that any deceleration in US demand for Chinese export goods would seriously challenge the sanguine view for China’s economy this year (Chart 11). Chart 10Export Strength Appears To Be Propping Up The LKI Chart 11China's Export Sector Is Highly Investment-Intensive Moreover, US demand for Chinese export goods is subject to several countervailing forces, at least in the second half of 2021: The USD currently benefits from widening real interest differentials and stronger US growth relative to the rest of the world. For the next quarter or two, persistent strength in the USD and US Treasury yields will be headwinds to global trade and may cause a temporary setback for the global manufacturing sector (Chart 7 on Page 4). Residential and business investment in the US may not regain much vigor despite large stimulus checks. Our colleagues at BCA US Investment Strategy expect US residential investment to match the long-run trend growth, but the increase will be largely offset by below-trend growth in non-residential investment. More working-from-home options will continue to drive demand for single-family homes in the suburbs and beyond. On the other hand, demand will suffer for office space in central business districts and dwellings in urban centers. Brick-and-mortar retail construction is also going to crater. Consumption for goods in the US may also see below-trend growth in the second half of 2021 and into 2022, whereas the service sector will benefit most from the coming recovery in US business and social activities. Table 1 shows that goods spending rose in 2020 despite an overall decline in consumption, because households dramatically shifted their consumption into goods from services. As such, 2020’s pandemic-driven dividend for Chinese exporters is likely to become a drag on tradeable goods exports to the US in 2021 and/or 2022. Table 1US Consumer Spending Gap Is Almost Entirely On The Services Side It is also important for investors to put the US$2.4 trillion infrastructure spending budget proposed in the American Jobs Plan into prospective. The US lags far behind China in infrastructure spending. In the past 10 years, US public infrastructure investment (federal and state combined) has declined to an average of about $450 billion.2 This compares with China’s US $1.9 trillion yearly spending on infrastructure (Chart 12). China currently consumes seven to eight times more industrial metals than the US (Chart 13). As such, even if the US infrastructure investment plan will be approved later this year, it is unlikely to be a game changer for global commodity prices or Chinese exports. Chart 12Infrastructure Spending, China Vs. The US Chart 13US Consumption Of Industrial Metals Is Too Small Relative To China The proposed US$1.2 trillion spending on the US nation’s roads, bridges, green spaces, water, electricity, and universal broadband will be spread over the next eight years.  The additional $150 billion per annum to the US public infrastructure investment will only boost the US spending from 24% to about 32% of China’s annual infrastructure investment. Furthermore, the fiscal multiplier effect from the extra public spending on investment from the US private sector and overall economy may not be as positive as the market has priced in, depending on the size of corporate tax hikes in the final bill. Bottom Line: After a pandemic-driven boost in 2020, growth in US imports from China will likely moderate in the second half of 2021 and into 2022. The proposed infrastructure spending plan in the US will benefit Chinese exports, but the magnitude of the windfall may be disappointing. Investment Implications As discussed in a previous report, rising US bond yields will have a muted effect on their Chinese counterparts. Tightened regulations on the real estate industry and a new round of environmental protection laws in China will continue to suppress the domestic credit demand.  As a result, interest rate differentials between China and the US will continue to narrow. The strength in the USD has not run its course and the RMB will face slight depreciation pressures in Q2 and possibly into Q3. A declining RMB will provide reflationary benefits to China’s industrial profits, but with about a six-month time lag. In the meantime, we recommend global investors to continue underweighting Chinese stocks (Chart 14A and 14B). Chart 14AContinue Underweighting Chinese Stocks Chart 14BContinue Underweighting Chinese Stocks   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1According to the OECD, recent US stimulus will boost US GDP growth by almost 3 percentage points in the first full year (from 2021Q2 to 2022Q2). The knock-on effect from the stimulus on other economies is projected to be significant, including a half percentage point addition to China’s GDP during the same period. 2The Congressional Budget Office estimated that combined federal, state and local spending on infrastructure was (in 2019 dollars) $441 billion as of 2017. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations