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Highlights Chart 1What’s The Downside? How low can it go? This is the question most investors are asking these days about the 10-year Treasury yield. Our answer is that it can’t go much lower unless the U.S. economy falls into recession, an event we don’t anticipate in 2019. Considering the main macro drivers of the 10-year Treasury yield, we find that the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1), U.S. dollar bullish sentiment (not shown) and Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (not shown) are all close to mid-2016 levels. In other words, the economic growth and policy environment is almost identical to the one that produced a 1.37% 10-year Treasury yield in mid-2016. What’s preventing a return to mid-2016 yield levels is that the Fed has delivered nine rate hikes since then, and rising wage growth confirms that the output gap has closed considerably (bottom panel). In other words, with short-maturity yields much higher than three years ago, we would need to see a much more pronounced growth slowdown, i.e. PMIs well below 50, to re-produce a sub-2% 10-year Treasury yield. If 2019 continues to follow the 2016 roadmap and the Global PMI bottoms-out around 50, then the 10-year Treasury yield has probably already found its floor. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +268 bps. The Federal Reserve’s pause opens a window for corporate spreads to tighten during the next few months. We recommend overweight positions in corporate bonds for now, but will be quick to reduce exposure once spreads reach our near-term targets. Aaa spreads are already below target levels and we recommend avoiding that credit tier. Other credit tiers still have room to tighten, though Aa and A-rated bonds are only 3 bps and 5 bps above target, respectively (Chart 2).1 Once spreads reach more reasonable levels for this phase of the cycle, we will be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure because some indicators of corporate default risk are already sending warning signals.2 Most notably, corporate profits grew only 4.0% (annualized) in Q4 2018 while corporate debt rose 5.3% (annualized). The result is that our measure of gross leverage ticked higher for the first time since Q3 2017 (bottom panel). Going forward, with corporate profit growth likely to stabilize in the mid-single digit range, gross leverage will probably stay close to its current level. That would be consistent with a 3% speculative grade default rate, significantly above the 1.7% rate currently projected by Moody’s. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview   High-Yield: Overweight High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +566 bps. Junk spreads for all credit tiers remain above our near-term spread targets.3 At present, the Ba-rated option-adjusted spread is 235 bps, 55 bps above our target. The B-rated spread is 285 bps, 102 bps above our target. The Caa-rated spread is 802 bps, 244 bps above our target (Chart 3). Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview Elevated spreads mean that investors are currently well compensated for default risk, but that could change later in the year. In a recent report we showed that some leading default indicators – gross leverage, C&I lending standards and job cut announcements (bottom panel) – are showing signs of deterioration.4 Specifically, our model suggests that the speculative grade default rate could be 3% or higher during the next 12 months. Moody’s currently forecasts 1.7%. If the Moody’s forecast is correct, the high-yield default adjusted spread is 306 bps. If the Moody’s forecast turns out to be correct, then investors will take home a default-adjusted spread of 306 bps, well above the historical average of 250 bps. If our 3% forecast is correct, then the default-adjusted spread falls to 230 bps, slightly below the historical average (panel 4). In either case, investors are reasonably well compensated for bearing default risk, but that will change when spreads reach our near-term targets. We will be quick to cut exposure at that time. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +27 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 3 bps on the month, driven entirely by an increase in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The option-adjusted spread (OAS) held flat at 40 bps. Falling mortgage rates since the beginning of the year have caused an increase in refinancing activity, leading to some widening in nominal MBS spreads (Chart 4). However, the tepid pace of new issuance in recent years means that the existing mortgage stock is not very exposed to refinancing risk. Consider that, despite an 80 bps drop in the 30-year mortgage rate, the MBA Refinance index has only risen to 1290. The Refi index’s historical average is 1824. Chart 4MBS Market Overview Further, housing starts and new home sales appear to have stabilized, meaning that there is probably not much further downside for mortgage rates. As a consequence, we don’t see much more scope for MBS spread widening. While MBS spreads appear relatively safe, the sector does not offer attractive expected returns compared to the investment alternatives. For example, the index option-adjusted spread for conventional 30-year MBS is well below its average historical level (panel 3) and the sector offers less compensation than normal compared to corporate bonds (panel 4). MBS also offer a poor risk/reward trade-off compared to other Aaa-rated spread products, as we showed in a recent report.5   Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +115 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 13 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +334 bps. Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 53 bps and Foreign Agencies outperformed by 42 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +139 bps and +151 bps, respectively. Domestic Agencies outperformed by 11 bps in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +20 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +16 bps. The USD-denominated sovereign debt of most countries continues to look expensive relative to equivalently-rated U.S. corporate credit. However, in a recent report we highlighted that Mexican sovereign debt is an exception (Chart 5).6 Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Not only is Mexican sovereign debt cheap relative to U.S. corporates, but our Emerging Markets Strategy service has shown that the Mexican peso is cheap.7 The prospect of a stronger peso versus the U.S. dollar makes the spread on offer from Mexican sovereign debt look even more attractive.   Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 39 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +52 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio rose 1% in March, and currently sits at 82% (Chart 6). This is more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and right around the average of 81% that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview The Municipal / Treasury yield ratio for short maturities (2-year and 5-year) remains well below the yield ratio for longer maturities (10-year, 20-year and 30-year). In other words, the best value in the municipal bond space is at the long-end of the curve, and we continue to recommend that investors favor those maturities. Recently released data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows that state & local government revenue growth declined in Q4 2018, for the first time since Q2 2017. As a result, our measure of state & local government interest coverage fell from a lofty 17 all the way down to 5 (bottom panel). Positive interest coverage means that state & local governments are still generating sufficient revenue to cover current expenditures and interest payments, and we therefore don’t anticipate a surge in muni ratings downgrades any time soon. We also continue to note that municipal bonds tend to perform better in the middle-to-late phases of the economic cycle, while corporate credit delivers its best returns early in the recovery.8 Investors should maintain an overweight allocation to municipal debt. Treasury Curve: Adopt A Barbell Curve Positioning Treasury yields fell dramatically in March, as the Fed surprised markets with a larger-than-expected downward revision to its interest rate projections. The result is that the overnight index swap curve is now priced for 34 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months (Chart 7). Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 7 bps to end the month at 14 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 1 bp to end the month at 58 bps. In recent reports we urged investors to adopt barbell positions along the yield curve. In particular, investors should avoid the 5-year and 7-year maturities and instead focus their allocations at the very short and long ends of the curve.9 There are three main reasons to prefer a barbell positioning. First, the 5-year and 7-year yields are most sensitive to changes in our 12-month discounter. In other words, those yields fall the most when the market prices in rate cuts and rise the most when it prices in rate hikes. As long as recession is avoided, the market will eventually price rate hikes back into the curve. Favor the 2/30 barbell over the 7-year bullet. Second, barbells currently offer a yield pick-up relative to bullets. The duration-matched 2/10 barbell offers 10 bps more yield than the 5-year bullet (panel 4), and the duration-matched 2/30 barbell offers 9 bps more yield than the 7-year bullet. This means that investors will earn positive carry in barbell positions while they wait for rate hikes to get priced back in. Finally, all barbell combinations look cheap according to our yield curve fair value models (see Appendix B). TIPS: Overweight TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 44 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +76 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 7 bps to end the month at 1.88% (Chart 8). The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 8 bps to end the month at 1.98%. Both rates remain below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed’s target. Chart 8Inflation Compensation As we noted in last week’s report, with financial conditions no longer excessively easy, the Fed has pivoted to a more dovish stance in an effort to re-anchor inflation expectations at levels more consistent with its 2% target.10 This change should support wider TIPS breakevens, though investors will also need to see evidence of firming realized inflation before meaningful upside materializes. So far, such evidence is in short supply. Note that trimmed mean PCE inflation has rolled over again after having just touched 2% (bottom panel). Trimmed mean PCE is running at 1.84% year-over-year. Nevertheless, we would maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. First, our commodity strategists see further upside in the price of oil (panel 2), and second, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 6 bps too low relative to the fair value from our Adaptive Expectations model (panel 4).11 ABS: Underweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +40 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 34 bps, exactly equal to its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview We showed in a recent report that Aaa-rated consumer ABS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off compared to other U.S. fixed income sectors, a result that is echoed by the Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C.12 This should not be surprising given that Aaa ABS spreads are close to all-time lows. What is surprising is that ABS spreads are so tight while the consumer delinquency rate is rising (panel 3). Although the delinquency rate remains well below pre-crisis levels, it will likely continue to rise going forward. Household interest payments are rising quickly as a share of disposable income (panel 3) and banks are tightening lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans (bottom panel). We recommend an underweight allocation to consumer ABS, preferring to take Aaa spread risk in MBS and CMBS. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +146 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 2 bps to end the month at 73 bps, below its average pre-crisis level but somewhat higher than recent tights (Chart 10). Chart 10CMBS Market Overview In a recent report we noted that non-agency CMBS offer the best risk/reward trade-off of any Aaa-rated U.S. spread product.13 While we remain cautious on the macro outlook for commercial real estate, noting that prices are decelerating (panel 3) and banks are tightening lending standards (panel 4) amidst falling demand (bottom panel), we view elevated CMBS spreads as providing reasonable compensation for this risk for the time being. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +74 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 50 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector remains appropriate. Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 34 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We do not anticipate any rate cuts during this timeframe, and therefore recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B - Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of +53 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 53 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of March 29, 2019) Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of March 29, 2019) Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return.   Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further details on how we arrive at those spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Assessing Corporate Default Risk”, dated March 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Assessing Corporate Default Risk”, dated March 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus”, dated January 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy”, dated March 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Highlights U.S. growth remains robust, despite some temporary softness in recent months. Ex U.S., growth continues to fall but, with China probably now ramping up monetary stimulus, should bottom in the second half. Central banks everywhere have turned more dovish, partly in an attempt to push up inflation expectations. The combination of resilient growth and easier monetary policy should be good for global equities. We remain overweight equities versus bonds. Bond yields have fallen sharply everywhere. However, with U.S. inflation still trending up, and central banks unlikely to turn any more dovish this year, yields are unlikely to fall much further in 2019. We recommend a slight underweight on duration. We remain overweight U.S. equities, but are on watch to upgrade the euro zone and Emerging Markets when we have stronger conviction about China’s stimulus. Given structural headwinds in both Europe and EM, this would probably be only a tactical upgrade. We have been tilting our equity sector recommendations in a more cyclical direction, last month raising Industrials and Energy to overweight. We also prefer credit over government bonds within the fixed-income category, though we warn that spreads will not fall much further given weak corporate fundamentals. Feature Recommended Allocation Overview Don’t Fight The Doves The performance of risk assets essentially comes down to a battle between growth and monetary policy/interest rates. Last September, despite the fact that global economic growth was clearly slowing, the Fed sounded hawkish; this triggered an 18% drop in global equities in Q4. But, since late last year, all major developed central banks have turned more dovish, culminating in March’s decision of the ECB to push back its guidance for its first rate hike, and the FOMC’s wiping out its two planned hikes for 2019. But, at the same time, U.S. economic growth is showing resilience, and we see the first “green shoots” of a cyclical pickup in growth outside the U.S. This is an environment in which risk assets should continue to perform well. Why did the Fed back off? The most likely explanation is that it wants to give itself more room to act come the next recession. Inflation expectations have become unanchored, with 10-year breakevens over the past decade steadily below a level that would be consistent with the Fed achieving its 2% core PCE inflation target in the long run. In the period since the Fed formally introduced this (supposedly “symmetrical”) target in 2012, it has exceeded it in only four months (Chart 1). Around recessions over the past 50 years, the Fed has on average cut rates by 655 basis points (Table 1). It sees little risk, therefore, in letting the economy “run a little hot” and allowing inflation to rise somewhat above 2%. This would reanchor expectations, and eventually get nominal short- and long-term rates higher before the next recession. Chart 1Market Doesn’t Believe The Fed’s Target Table 1Fed Won’t Be Able To Cut This Much Next Time   Chart 2Financial Conditions Now Much Easier Chart 3Housing Market Bottoming Out Meanwhile, U.S. growth seems to be stabilizing at a decent level after signs of weakness late last year caused by tighter financial conditions, a slowdown elsewhere in the world, and the six-week government shutdown. An easing of financial conditions since the beginning of the year should help to keep U.S. GDP growth above trend at around 2.0-2.5% this year (Chart 2). Most notably, interest-rate sensitive areas of the economy that were under pressure last year, especially housing, are showing signs of bottoming (Chart 3). Consumption also should be robust, given strong wage growth, consumer confidence close to historic record high levels, and amid no signs of a deterioration in the labor market (Chart 4). Chart 4No Signs Of Weaker Labor Market Chart 5Some 'Green Shoots' For Global Growth   A key question for us over the next few months will be when to shift allocations to more cyclical, higher-beta equity markets such as the euro area and Emerging Markets. These have underperformed year-to-date despite the strong risk-on market. China’s nascent reflationary stimulus will decide the timing and level of conviction of this shift. As we explain in detail on page 6, we think the jury is still out on whether China is injecting liquidity on anything like the same scale as it did in 2016. Even if it is, historically it has taken six to 12 months before the effect showed through via a rebound in global trade, commodity prices, and other China-related indicators. The first early signs of a bottoming are emerging: Chinese fixed-asset investment and the Caixin Manufacturing PMI beat expectations last month, the German ZEW Expectations indicator has started to recover, and the diffusion index of the Global Leading Economic Indicator (which often leads the LEI itself by a few months) has picked up (Chart 5). We are on watch to shift our allocation1 but, given the long-term structural headwinds against both Europe and EM, we need to be more convinced about the strength of Chinese stimulus before doing so. The seeds of recession are sown in expansions. Eventually, we see the newly dovish Fed falling behind the curve. The Fed Funds Rate is still below the range of estimates of the neutral rate – hard though this is to estimate in real time (Chart 6). If the economy remains as strong as we expect, sometime next year inflation could begin rising to uncomfortable levels (and asset bubbles start to be of concern), which would push the Fed back into hiking mode. Given that the market is pricing in Fed rate cuts, not hikes, and that the Fed can hardly sound any more dovish than it does now without moving to an outright easing path, it seems to us that long-term rates are very unlikely to fall from here (Chart 7). Chart 6Fed Still Below Neutral Chart 7Can The Fed Get Any More Dovish Than This? In this environment, therefore, we continue to expect global equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. However, a recession is possible in 2021 triggered by the Fed late next year needing to put its foot abruptly on the brake.   What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 8Ex-U.S. Equities Driven By China Stimulus When Is The Time To Switch Allocations To Europe And EM? It is slightly surprising that the 12% rally in global equities this year has been led by the low-beta U.S., up 13%, rather than Europe (up 9%) or emerging markets (up 9% - and much less if the strong Chinese market is excluded). Is it time to switch to these underperforming, more cyclical markets? Our answer is, not yet. Global growth ex-U.S. continues to weaken. It is likely to bottom sometime in the second half, as a result of Chinese growth stabilizing. However, the jury is still out on whether the increase in Chinese credit creation in January was a one-off, or major policy reversal. Even if it is the latter, a revival in global growth (and cyclical markets) has typically lagged Chinese stimulus by 6-12 months (Chart 8, panel 1). There are also significant structural headwinds for both the euro zone and Emerging Markets which make us reluctant to overweight them unless there are clear cyclical reasons to do so. Both have lagged global equities fairly consistently since the Global Financial Crisis, with only brief outperformance during periods of economic acceleration, such as in 2016 and 2012 (panel 2). The euro zone remains challenged by its banking system. Loan growth has been stagnant for years, and banks remain undercapitalized relative to their U.S. peers, and highly fragmented (panels 3 and 4). Emerging markets are hampered by their high level of foreign-currency debt (which makes them highly sensitive to U.S. financial conditions), dependence on China, and lack of structural reform. We could see ourselves shifting our recommendation from the U.S. to the euro area and EM, and becoming outright bearish on the U.S. dollar (a counter-cyclical currency), over the coming months if we find confirmation of a bottoming of global cyclical growth and become more confident in the size of China’s stimulus. But given the structural headwinds, and the steady underperformance of these markets, we need stronger evidence first.   Chart 9Oil, Positioning, And Housing Why Is The 10-Year Bond Yield So Depressed? Despite U.S. equities rallying back to within 4% of a record high, the U.S. Treasury bond yield has fallen further this year (Chart 9, panel 1). Moreover, the 3-month/10-year yield curve has briefly inverted. Besides the Fed’s recent more dovish turn, what has depressed bond yields? We would pin the cause on the following factors: Dampened inflation expectations: Over the past few years the 10-year yield has been closely correlated with the oil price via inflation expectations. A temporary supply shock in Q4 caused oil prices to decline sharply. But tighter supply this year should allow the oil price to recover further. This should cause a rise in inflation expectation (panel 2). Trade positioning: Late last year,  speculative short positions in government bonds were at their highest levels since 2015. However, the Q4 equity selloff pushed investors to cover their positions; these are now close to neutral (panel 3). Home Sales: Housing data has been weak over the past few quarters, with both existing and new home sales declining. But there are now signs of recovery: mortgage applications have started to pick up, which should in turn push home sales higher (panel 4). This should also allow for a rise in bond yields. Our key take-away from March’s FOMC meeting, when the tone turned decidedly dovish, is that the Fed is focusing on re-anchoring inflation expectations, which should push nominal yields higher. We think the market is very pessimistic by pricing in 42 and 56 bps of rate cuts over the next 12 and 24 months respectively. It would take a significant further weakening of economic data to make the Fed’s stance turn even more dovish and for nominal yields to fall even further.   How Will U.S. Corporate Bonds Perform In The Next Recession? Historically high levels of U.S. corporate debt, as well as declining credit quality in the investment-grade space, have started to worry investors (Chart 10). Specifically, investors are worried that, when the next default cycle comes, a large portion of investment-grade debt will be downgraded to junk, forcing fund managers who are constrained to hold certain credit qualities to sell. These worries seem to be justified. Investment-grade bonds of lower credit quality tend to experience large increases in migration to junk status during credit recessions (Chart 11). Given the current composition of the U.S. investment-grade corporate bond universe, a credit recession would imply a downgrade to junk status of 4.6% of the index if we assume similar behavior to previous recessions. Depending on the speed of the selloff, such a downgrade could also have grave consequence for liquidity. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), average daily turnover in the U.S. corporate bond market was 0.34% in 2018. Thus, it is not hard to envision a situation where forced selling could surpass normal levels of liquidity. However, it is hard to tell what would be the effect of such a fire-sale on credit spreads, given that they tend to widen in recessions regardless. While this asset class could perform poorly in the next recession, we don’t expect that its weakness will translate to the real economy. Leveraged institutions such as banks hold just 18% of corporate credit. Furthermore, despite being at all-time highs, U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt to GDP is still at a much healthier level than in other countries (Chart 12). Chart 10Declining Quality In Investment Grade Chart 12U.S. Corporate Debt Levels Are Healthy Relative To The Rest Of The World   Chart 13A Value Rebound?   Is It Time To Favor Value Over Growth Again? Since it peaked in May 2007, the ratio of global value to growth has attempted to rebound several times amid a sustained downtrend (Chart 13). Due to the cyclical nature and the neutral relative valuation of the value/growth indexes, we have preferred to use sector positioning (cyclicals vs. defensives) to implement a value/growth style tilt in our global portfolio since March 20162 (Chart 13, panel 1). Lately, we have received many requests on the topic of the value-versus-growth-ratio. After reaching a historical low in August 2018, the  value/growth ratio slightly rebounded in Q4 2018 before reversing some of its gains so far this year. Additionally, the value/growth valuation gap as measured by both price-to-book and forward P/E has reached a historically low level (Chart 13, panel 4). As we have often noted, the sector composition of both the value and growth indexes changes over time.2 Chart 14 shows the current sector weights of S&P Pure Value and Pure Growth Indexes.3 It’s clear that now a bet on Pure Value versus Pure Growth is essentially a bet on Financials (which account for 35% of the Pure Value index) versus Tech and Healthcare (which together account for 38% of the Pure Growth index) - see also Chart 13, panel 2. Given the cyclical nature of the value/growth ratio and also the sector concentration, it’s not surprising that the value/growth play is also a play on euro area versus U.S. equities (Chart 13, panel 3). Currently, we are neutral on Financials and Tech, while overweight Healthcare in our global sector portfolio, and we are putting the euro area on an upgrade watch (see page 14). Therefore, maintaining a neutral stance between value and growth is in line with our sector and country views. However, a close watch for a possible upgrade of value is also warranted given the extreme valuation measures.   Global Economy Overview: U.S. growth has slowed recently, though it remains more robust than in the more cyclical economies in Europe and emerging markets. Central banks almost everywhere have recently turned dovish. However, China’s increased monetary stimulus should help global growth bottom out in H2. This could lead the Fed and central banks in other healthy economies to return to a rate-hiking path. U.S.: The U.S. economy has been weak in recent months. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 15, panel 1) has collapsed, and the Fed NowCasts point to only 1.3-1.7% QoQ annualized GDP growth in Q1 (compared to 2.2% in Q4). But the slowdown is mostly due to the six-week government shutdown (which probably took 1% off growth), some seasonal adjustment oddities (which leave Q1 as the weakest quarter almost every year), and tighter financial conditions in H2 2018 which have now largely reversed. The manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs in February were  still healthy at 54.2 and 59.7 respectively. Consumption (propelled by strong employment growth and accelerating wages) and capex remain strong (panel 3). BCA expects GDP growth in 2019 to be around 2.0-2.5%, still above trend. Euro Area: The European economy continues to slow, driven by weak exports to emerging markets, troubles in the banking sector, and political uncertainty. Q4 GDP growth was only 0.8% QoQ annualized, and the manufacturing PMI has fallen to 47.6 (with Germany as low as 44.7). But there are some early signs of an improvement. The ZEW Expectations index for Germany has bottomed (Chart 16, panel 1), fiscal policy should boost euro area growth this year by around 0.5 percentage points, and wage growth has begun to accelerate. The key remains Chinese stimulus, whose positive effects should help European exports recover sometime in H2. Chart 15U.S. Growth Slowing But Still Robust Chart 16Signs Of Bottoming In Global Ex-U.S.? Japan: Japan also remains highly dependent on a Chinese stimulus. Machine tool orders (the best indicator of capex demand from China) fell by 29% YoY in February. Despite stronger wage growth, now 1.2% YoY, inflation shows no signs of moving up towards the Bank of Japan’s target of 2%: ex energy and food CPI inflation is still only 0.4%. The biggest risk in 2019 is October’s planned consumption tax hike from 8% to 10%. Prime Minister Abe has said that he will cancel this only in the event of a shock on the scale of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The government has put in place measures to soften the impact (most notably a 5% rebate on purchases at small retailers after October 1 paid for electronically), but consumption is still likely to fall significantly. Emerging Markets: China seems to have ramped up its monetary stimulus, with total social financing in January and February combined up 12% over the same months last year. Recent data have shown signs of a stabilization of growth: the manufacturing PMI rebounded to 49.9 in February from 48.3, and fixed-asset investment beat expectations at 6.1% YoY in January and February combined. Nonetheless, the size of liquidity injection is likely to be smaller than in previous episodes such as 2016, since Premier Li Keqiang and the PBOC have warned of the risk of excessive speculation. Elsewhere, some emerging economies (notably Brazil and Mexico) have showed signs of recovery after last year’s deterioration, whereas others (such as South Africa, Indonesia, and Poland) continue to suffer. Interest rates: Central banks worldwide have generally turned more dovish in recent months, with the Fed and ECB both moving to signal no rate hikes this year. This has pushed down long-term rates globally, with 10-year bond yields falling below 0% again in Germany and Japan. However, with global growth likely to bottom over the next few months, rates may not stay at current depressed levels. U.S. inflation, in particular, continues to trend up, and the Fed’s target PCE inflation measure is likely to exceed 2% over coming months. We see the Fed turning more hawkish by year-end, and long rates globally more likely to rise than fall from current levels.   Global Equities Chart 17Watch Earnings Remain Cautiously Optimistic: We added risk in our January Portfolio Update4 by putting cash back to work in global equities, and then in the March Portfolio Update5 we reduced the underweight in EM equities and increased the tilt to cyclicals at the expense of defensives, to hedge against a continuing acceleration in Chinese credit growth. All these came after our risk reduction in July 2018.6 GAA’s portfolio approach has always been to take risks where they are most likely to be rewarded. BCA’s macro view is that global economic growth data is likely to be on the weak side in the coming months, but will pick up in the second half. This implies that equities are likely to rally again after a period of congestion within a trading range, supporting a cautiously optimistic portfolio allocation for the next 9-12 months. At the asset-class level, our positioning of overweight equities versus bonds while neutral on cash, reflects the “optimistic” side of our allocation. However, the rebound in global equities since the December sell-off has been driven completely by a valuation re-rating, while earnings growth has been revised down sharply. (Chart 17). As such, within global equities, our preference for low-beta countries (favoring DM versus EM, and favoring the U.S over the rest of DM) reflects the “cautious” aspect of our allocation. Our macro view hinges largely on what happens to China. There are signs that China may have abandoned its focus on deleveraging, yet it is too early to tell if it has switched back to a reflationary path. Therefore, our global equity sector overlay has a slight cyclical tilt by overweighting Industrials and Energy, which are among the main beneficiaries of Chinese reflationary policies or a positive resolution to U.S.-China trade negotiations. Chart 18Warming Up To The Euro Area Euro Area Equities: On Upgrade Watch We have favored U.S. equities relative to the euro area since July 2018.7 Since then, the U.S. has outperformed the euro area by 11% in USD terms and by 8% in local currency terms, with the difference being attributed to the weakness of the euro versus the U.S. dollar. Given BCA’s view on the global economy and the U.S. dollar, however, we are watching closely to switch our recommendation between the U.S. and euro area equities, for the following reasons: First, as shown in Chart 18, panel 1, the relative performance between the euro area and the U.S. is highly correlated with the EUR/USD exchange rate. BCA believes that the U.S. dollar is set for a period of weakness starting in the second half of the year,8 which bodes well for the outperformance of euro area equities. Second, relative earnings growth between the euro area and the U.S. is driven by the underlying strength of the economies, as represented by PMIs (panel 2). Both the relative earnings growth and relative PMI have stopped falling and have begun to bottom in favor of the euro area; Third, even though the euro area’s beta has been declining while that of the U.S. has increased, euro area beta is still higher than that in the U.S., making it more of a beneficiary of a global growth recovery; However, the relative valuation of euro area equities to their U.S. counterparts is now  neutral not at the extreme level which historically has been a good entry-point into eurozone  equities (panel 4).   Chart 19Becoming Less Defensive Global Sector Allocation: Gradually Becoming Less Defensive GAA’s sector portfolio took profits on its pro-cyclical positioning and went defensive in July 20189 and remained so until the March Monthly update10 when we upgraded Energy and Industrials to overweight from neutral, while downgrading Consumer Staples two notches to underweight from overweight (Chart 19). The upgrade of Industrials was mainly a hedge against further acceleration in China’s credit growth. But why did we upgrade Energy to overweight yet maintained an underweight in Materials? Long-term GAA clients know that, in terms of global sector allocation, we have structurally favored the oil-related Energy sector to the metals-related Materials sector since October 2016, because oil supply/demand is more global in nature while the supply/demand of metals, especially industrial metals, is closely linked to China (see also the Commodity section of this Quarterly on page 18). From a cyclical perspective, the relative performance of the two sectors has historically closely correlated with the relative prices of oil and metals, as shown in panel 2. This is not surprising because changes in forward earnings for the two sectors are also closely linked to change in the corresponding commodity prices (panels 3 and 4). BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy service has an overweight rating on oil and a neutral stance on metals, implying that the growth in the oil price will outpace that of metal prices, which suggests that the Energy sector will outperform the Materials sector (panel 2).   Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration. Global equities have recovered 16% since reaching the low of 2018 on December 24, yet the global bond yield has decreased by 21 bps over the same period. While the directional movement of bond yields is somewhat puzzling given such strong performance in equities (see page 7 for some explanations), it’s evident that the bond markets have been driven by the recent weakness in global growth (Chart 20, panel 3), and are pricing out any expectation of rate hikes over the coming year in major developed economies. Given the surprisingly dovish tone at the March FOMC meeting and BCA’s House View that global economic growth will rebound in the second half, bond yields are now highly exposed to any hawkish shift in central bank policies and any recovery in inflation expectations. As such, it’s still appropriate to maintain a slight underweight on duration over the next 9-12 months. Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. Depressed inflation expectations have been one reason why global bond yields have decoupled from equities. However, the crude oil price, which closely correlates with inflation expectations, has stabilized. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects Brent crude to end 2019 at US$75 per barrel (Chart 21). This implies a significant rise in inflation expectations in the second half of the year, supporting our preference for inflation-linked bonds over nominal bonds. However, TIPS are no longer cheap. For those who have not already moved to overweight TIPS, we suggest “buying TIPS on dips”. Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) in Australia and Japan are also still very attractive versus their respective nominal bonds. Overweighting ILBs in those two markets also fits well with our macro themes. Chart 20Rates: Likely More Upside Risk Chart 21Favor Inflation Linkers   Corporate Bonds Chart 22Tactical Upside Remains For Credit In February, we raised credit to overweight within a fixed-income portfolio while underweighting government bonds. So far, this has proven to be the right decision, as corporate bonds have generated excess returns of 90 basis points over duration-matched Treasuries. We based our positioning on the mounting evidence that global growth is turning up: credit impulses are starting to rebound in several major economies, monetary conditions have eased, and our diffusion index of global leading indicators has rebounded sharply, indicating that there remains tactical upside for global credit (Chart 22– panel 1 and 2). When will we close our tactical overweight? Our U.S. Bond Strategy Service has set a target for spreads of U.S. corporate bonds with different credit ratings. According to their targets, which denote the median spread typical of late-cycle environments, there is still some room for further spread compression in non-AAA credits (Chart 22 – panel 3 and 4). However, the upside is limited and, if spreads keep tightening, we will probably close our position by the end of Q2. On a cyclical horizon, the fundamentals of corporate health are still a headwind, with both the interest-coverage and liquidity ratio for U.S. investment-grade corporates standing near 10-year lows.11 Moreover, we expect these ratios to deteriorate further, as corporate profits will likely come under pressure due to increasing wage growth. Finally, we expect that the Fed will turn more hawkish by the end of 2019, turning monetary policy from a tailwind to a headwind. Thus, we recommend investors to remain overweight, but be ready to turn bearish in the back end of the year.   Commodities Chart 23Prefer Oil, Watch Metals Energy (Overweight): Stable demand, declining Venezuelan production due to U.S. sanctions, instability and possible outages in Libya, Iraq, and Nigeria, alongside the GCC’s commitment to cut output through year-end, should support oil prices and allow further upside (Chart 23, panels 1 & 2). While U.S. crude production is on the rise, bottlenecks in its export capabilities should limit market oversupply. Crude supply shocks should outweigh any slowdown in demand, specifically from emerging markets. BCA’s energy strategists expect Brent to average $75 and $80 throughout 2019 and 2020 respectively, and for the gap between WTI and Brent to narrow significantly. Industrial Metals (Neutral): China, the world’s largest consumer, still plays a big role in the direction of industrial metals. Year-to-date, metals prices have been supported partly by a more stable dollar. For now, we maintain a neutral stance until we see confirmation that Chinese stimulus will trigger further upside to metal prices perhaps in the second half. However, a lack of sustained Chinese demand, alongside weaker global growth over the next few months, would weigh down on metal prices (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): Gold has reversed its downslide and rallied by over 10% from its Q4 2018 low. With the market pricing out any Fed rate hikes this year, rising inflation expectations, a weaker USD by year-end, and lower real rates should help gold outperform other commodities in this late-cycle phase. We recommend an allocation to gold as an inflation hedge, as well as a hedge against geopolitical risks (panel 4).     Currencies Chart 24The End Of The Dollar Bull Market U.S. Dollar: Our bullish stance on the dollar has proven to be correct, as the trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 5% in the past 12-months thanks to the slowdown in global growth. However, the two reasons for the growth slowdown – Fed tightening and Chinese deleveraging – have started to ease. On March 20 the Fed revised its forward guidance to no rate hikes in 2019 and only one rate hike in 2020. Meanwhile, Chinese total social financing relative to GDP has bottomed, indicating that Chinese authorities have opted for a pause in their deleveraging campaign (Chart 24, panel 1). These developments will likely boost global growth and hurt the countercyclical greenback. Therefore, we recommend investors to slowly shift to a cyclical underweight on the dollar. Euro: Most of the factors that dragged the euro down last year are fading: political risk in Italy has eased, fiscal policy is moving from a headwind to a tailwind, and the relative LEI between the EU and the US has started to pick up (panel 2). Moreover, we see little scope for euro area monetary policy to turn any more dovish versus the U.S., since forward rate expectations currently stand near 2014 lows (panel 3). Thus, we expect the euro to be one of the best performing currencies this year. Yen: Easy monetary policy by global central banks will boost asset prices and reduce volatility, creating a risk-on environment that is typically negative for the yen (panel 4). Moreover, the IMF still projects Japan to have a negative fiscal drag of 0.7% this year, which will force the BoJ to prolong its yield curve control regime. As a result, we expect the yen to be one of the worst performing currencies this year.       Alternatives Intro: Investors’ allocation to alternatives is on the rise as we get closer to the end of the business cycle along with increasing realized volatility in traditional assets. In the alternatives assets space, we recommend thinking about allocations through three buckets: 1) return enhancers, means of outperforming traditional equity, fixed income, and mixed-asset strategies; 2) inflation hedges, means of preserving capital throughout periods of elevated inflation; and 3) volatility dampeners, means of reducing drawdowns and portfolio volatility during periods of market drawdowns. Return Enhancers: In our July and October 2018 Quarterly reports, we recommended investors trim back on PE allocations and reallocate towards hedge funds. Growing competition in the PE space has pushed up multiples. Given where the business cycle currently is, we favor macro hedge funds, as they tend to outperform in this sort of environment as well as in downturns and recessions (Chart 25, panel 1). Inflation Hedges: In our July 2018 Quarterly, we recommended investors pare back their real estate allocations, given the backdrop of a slowdown/sideways trend in the sector, and specifically within the retail segment. Given that the end of the current cycle is likely to be accompanied by elevated levels of inflation, we recommend clients to modestly allocate to commodity futures on the likelihood of a softer dollar and rising energy prices (panel 2). Volatility Dampeners: We continue to recommend both farmland and timberland since they have lower volatility than other traditional and alternative asset classes (panel 3). While timberland is more impacted by economic growth via the housing market, farmland has a near-zero correlation with economic growth. We do not favor structured products due to their unattractive valuations. Chart 25Prefer Hedge Funds Over Private Equity   Risks To Our View Our economic outlook is quite sanguine. What would undermine this scenario? Many investors have become nervous about the inversion of the U.S. yield curve. And we have shown in the past that an inversion of the 3-month/10-year yield curve has been a reliable indicator of recessions 12-18 months ahead.12 Its inversion in March, then, is a concern. But note that the indicator works only using a three-month moving average (Chart 26); the curve often inverted for a brief period without signaling recession. We expect long-term rates to rise from here, steepening the curve. But a prolongation of the current inversion would clearly be a worrying signal. The direction of China continues to play a key role in defining the macro picture. Our current allocation is based on the view that China is doing some monetary and fiscal stimulus but that, at the current pace, it will be much smaller than in 2016 (Chart 27). The weak response of money supply growth suggests, as Premier Li Keqiang has complained, that the liquidity is mostly going into speculation (note that A-shares have risen by 20% this year) rather than into the real economy. The March Total Social Financing data, released in mid-April, will give a better read of the degree of the reflation. If it is bigger than we expect, this would suggest a quicker shift into euro area and Emerging Market equities than we currently advocate. The U.S. dollar remains a key driver of asset allocation. The dollar is a counter-cyclical currency and, with global growth slowing, has continued to appreciate moderately this year (Chart 28). We see a weakening of the dollar later this year, when global growth picks up. But if this were to happen more quickly or dramatically than we expect – not impossible given the currency’s over-valuation and crowded long-dollar positions – EM stocks and commodity prices, given their strong inverse correlation with the dollar, could bounce sharply. Chart 26Yield Curve Inversion Chart 27How Much Is China Reflating? Chart 28Dollar Is Counter-Cyclical   Garry Evans, Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa Ossa, Senior Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy,  Research Associate amrh@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see the Equities Section of this Quarterly on page 14 for more details. 2      Please see Global Asset Allocation “GAA Quarterly,” dated March 31, 2016 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 3       Please see https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-us-style.pdf 4       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly - January 2019,” dated January 2, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5     Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly - March 2019,” dated March 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 7       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 8       Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “What’s Next For The Dollar?” dated March 15, 2019  available at gis. bcaresearch.com 9       Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 10    Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly Portfolio Update,” dated March 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 11    Based on BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy’s bottom-up health monitor. 12   Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Can Asset Allocators Rely On Yield Curves?” dated June 15, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
ハイライト グローバル株式およびその他のリスク資産は、今後数週間はボラティリティ高止まりの横ばい推移となり、その後一連の出だし失敗を経て世界成長がようやく加速するにつれて年末までは徐々に上昇するだろう。 私たちは現在、フェドが以前想定していたよりも遅いペースで利上げを行うと見ているが、最終的にはインフレを抑えるために利上げを急がざるを得なくなるだろうと考えている。 フェドファンド金利はおそらく2021年に4%で頭打ちとなり、市場が現在織り込んでいるよりも四半期ごとに0.25ポイントの利上げが合計9回多く示唆される。 12か月の投資期間では、投資家はグローバル株式をオーバーウェイトし、国債をアンダーウェイトし、現金配分は中立を維持すべきである。 ドルは第2四半期にピークを迎え、その後年末までおよび2020年にかけて弱含みとなり、来年遅い時期に再び強含み始めるだろう。 投資家は今後数週間、新興国(EM)および欧州株を一時的に格上げする準備をすると同時に、景気循環型の株式セクターへのエクスポージャーを増やすべきである。 工業用金属と原油は年の経過とともに強含みとなるだろう。金は押し目で買うべきである。 投資家は2020年末にポートフォリオのリスク低減を開始し、2021年の景気後退に備えるべきである。 チャート 001   特集 また始まるのか? 昨年6月によりディフェンシブになった後、私たちは12月のFOMC後の急落を受けて株式に対して強気に転じた。株式が反発を続けるにつれて、私たちは楽観を和らげた。3月初めに私たちは「年初から上昇してきた世界の株式は、投資家が慌てていわゆるグリーンシュートの出現を待つため、今後6~8週間で『デッドゾーン』に入る可能性が高い」と書いた。1 先週金曜日に発表された期待外れの欧州PMIデータは、グリーンシュート論に一部止めを刺した格好だ。ドイツの製造業PMIは6年ぶりの低水準に落ち込み、新規受注の構成要素はグレート・リセッション以来の弱い水準を示した。これを受けてドイツの10年国債利回りは2016年以来初めてマイナス圏に入り、米10年国債利回りも15か月ぶりの低水準まで下落し、3か月/10年のカーブが逆イールド化した。歴史的に見て、逆イールドは米国の景気後退を予測する信頼できる指標であった(チャート1)。 チャート1イールドカーブの逆転、景気後退、およびタームプレミアム イールドカーブの逆転、景気後退、そしてタームプレミアム イールドカーブの逆転、景気後退、そしてタームプレミアム トランプ大統領がテレビ評論家のスティーブン・ムーアをフェドの理事に任命する決定を下したことも事態を好転させなかった。供給側(サプライサイド)の「経済学者」ラリー・クドローの推薦を受けたムーアは、2007年の住宅市場の懸念を軽視したこと、2010年にQEがハイパーインフレを引き起こすと的確に予測したことで知られ、トランプ減税が財政赤字を小さくするだろうと信じている点でも有名だ。 世界成長は年の後半に加速するだろう これらの憂慮すべき展開を踏まえ、景気とリスク資産に対して再び景気循環的に弱気に転じるべき時だろうか。私たちはそうは考えない。今後数週間は株式にとって厳しい局面があり得る――これは私たちのマクロクオンツ・モデルが現在示しているリスクだ――が、一連の出だし失敗を経て世界成長がようやく加速するにつれてセンチメントは改善するはずだ。実際、すでにいくつかの前向きな兆候が見えている:上昇している先行指標を持つ国の比率を追跡する当社のグローバル先行経済指標の拡散指数は上昇しており(チャート2)、グローバルLEIを先行している。サービス業のPMIも概ね改善しており、世界成長の弱さは主に貿易と製造業に集中していることを示唆している。さらに貿易面でも、バルチック・ドライ指数や世界のコンテナ船の活動を示す週次のHarpex海運指数といったいくつかの先行指標が安値から反発している。 我々はイールドカーブのシグナルを過小評価すべきだと考える。現在それはマイナスのタームプレミアムによって深刻に歪められているからだ。もし米10年のタームプレミアムが2004年の水準に戻っていれば、3か月/10年のスロープは200ベーシスポイント以上急勾配になり、この問題について誰も話題にしないだろう。実際、今日のタームプレミアムを考慮すれば、1995年にはほぼ確実にカーブは逆転していただろう。当時株式を手放した者は歴史上最も偉大なブルマーケットの一つを逃したことになる。 また、米10年利回りの一部低下はポジティブな展開を反映していることは言うまでもない:フェドがよりハト派に転じたのだ。10年/30年部分のイールドカーブを見れば、実際にはスティープ化している。これは市場がフェドの行動をリフレーション的であると見なしている兆候である。 逆イールドカーブが経済活動を鈍化させる明確な因果メカニズムはないが、イールドカーブの逆転が投資家を怯ませ、それによって金融環境のタイト化を招くという自己成就的予言になる可能性はある(チャート3)。このような「ドゥームループ」は概念的には可能だが、今年初めに我々が議論したように、現在の環境で発生する可能性は低い。2いずれにせよ、金融環境は年初以来緩和している。これは今後数か月の成長を押し上げるはずだ。   チャート2世界成長は##br##安定し始めている可能性がある 世界の成長は安定し始めている可能性がある 世界の成長は安定し始めている可能性がある チャート3年初来の金融環境の緩和は世界成長にとって好材料 年初以来の金融環境の緩和は世界経済の成長にとって好材料だ 年初以来の金融環境の緩和は世界経済の成長にとって好材料だ 中国のクレジット成長は上昇へ 世界成長は中国経済の減速に足を引っ張られてきた。昨年のデレバレッジ化キャンペーンは投資支出の大幅な減速を招き、これは世界中の資本財メーカーやコモディティ生産者に悪影響を及ぼした(チャート4)。 歴史的に見て、クレジット成長が名目GDP成長に近づくとき、中国は金融部門への締め付けを緩めてきた(チャート5)。おそらく我々はそのポイントに達したようだ。季節調整で歪んだ弱い2月の数値にもかかわらず、クレジット成長はついに前年比で加速している。 チャート4中国:デレバレッジ化キャンペーンは投資支出に悪影響を与えた 中国:デレバレッジ化の取り組みは投資支出に悪影響を及ぼした 中国:デレバレッジ化の取り組みは投資支出に悪影響を及ぼした チャート5歴史的に、中国はクレジット成長が名目GDP成長に接近するとデレバレッジを縮小してきた 歴史的に見ると、信用の伸びが名目GDP成長率に近づくと、中国はデレバレッジの取り組みを縮小してきた。 歴史的に見ると、信用の伸びが名目GDP成長率に近づくと、中国はデレバレッジの取り組みを縮小してきた。 我々は中国のクレジット成長が過去の再レバレッジ局面ほど大きく上昇するとは予想していない。だが、これは経済の状態がより良くなっているためであり、現状からの債務増加に内在的な制約があるためではない。 中国の高い貯蓄率は、ターム名目GDP成長率よりも金利を大きく下回る水準に保ってきた。これは債務持続可能性の主要な決定要因である(チャート6)。3中央政府が現在のように大部分の地方債務と企業債務に対して暗黙の保証を維持している限り、デフォルトリスクは最小限にとどまるだろう。いずれにせよ、総債務がGDP比240%に達していることを考えれば、クレジット成長が1パーセンテージポイント上昇するだけで、GDPの2.4%に相当する大きなクレジット刺激が生じることになる。 中国のクレジットインパルスは輸入を約6~9か月先行する(チャート7)。これは年の後半における世界貿易にとって良い兆候である。 チャート6中国の高い貯蓄率は金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を大きく下回る水準に保ってきた 中国の高い貯蓄率が金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を大幅に下回る水準に抑えている 中国の高い貯蓄率が金利をトレンドの名目GDP成長率を大幅に下回る水準に抑えている チャート7中国のリフレーション的刺激は世界貿易に恩恵をもたらすだろう グローバル・トレードは中国のリフレーション的な刺激から恩恵を受けるだろう グローバル・トレードは中国のリフレーション的な刺激から恩恵を受けるだろう   貿易戦争の一服か? 貿易戦争の緊張緩和は事態を改善するだろう。自称「名交渉人」であるドナルド・トランプは、来年の大統領選挙前に中国との合意をまとめる必要があり、同時にその合意が米国にとって有利な条件で成立したと有権者に納得させなければならない。 任期序盤に中国と合意に達することは、双方向の貿易赤字を減らせなかった場合にはリスクがあった――米国の財政政策が景気循環的であることを考えればそれは全くあり得る結果だ。しかし現時点では、トランプは中国と素晴らしい取引をまとめたと自慢でき、かつその成果が実現するのは再選後であると有権者に安心させることができる。したがって、トランプが合意の締結を目指す可能性は高まっている。 中国側は可能な限り大きな交渉力を確保したがっている。これは、自国経済が双方の利益にならない貿易協定を突っぱねても、その影響を十分に吸収できるほど強いと説得力を持って示せることを意味する。クレジットサイクルが中国成長の支配的な原動力であるため、これはデレバレッジ化キャンペーンを一時的に後回しにすることを必要とする。世界成長の加速と強い国内需要は欧州に恩恵をもたらす 中国の成長加速は今年後半に欧州の輸出セクターを助けるだろう。中国のCaixin購買担当者指数(PMI)の輸出コンポーネントは底値から上昇している。これはユーロ圏のPMIを約三か月先行している。一方で、ユーロ圏の国内需要はより緩和的な財政政策と低下する債券利回りの恩恵を受けるだろう。 イタリアにとっては債券利回りの低下が特に有益だ。昨年三月にポピュリスト政権が選出された後の利回り急騰と企業信頼感の喪失は景気後退に突入させた(チャート 8)。現在、10年物BTP利回りが高値から100ベーシスポイント以上低下しているため、イタリア経済は回復し始めるはずだ。 国内成長が加速しても欧州中央銀行は今年利上げを行わないだろうが、市場はおそらく2020年以降に数回の利上げを織り込むだろう。これによりコア欧州債券市場の利回り曲線がわずかに再スティープ化し、長らく苦しんでいる銀行の収益にはプラスに働くはずだ。 ブレグジットは依然として懸念材料だ。この継続する物語は滑稽な段階に達しており、1) 英国はEU離脱に投票したが、2) 議会はブリュッセルと満足のいく合意に達しない限りEUに留まることに投票し、しかも3) 提示されていた唯一の合意案を拒否した。多くの英国有権者がもはやブレグジットを望んでいないことを考えると(チャート 9)、我々は政府がいわゆる先送りを続け、二度目の国民投票が発表されるか「ソフト・ブレグジット」合意が策定されるまでその問題を先送りにするだろうと考えている。いずれの結果も市場には歓迎されるだろう。 チャート 8イタリアの債券利回りはもはや逆風ではない イタリア国債利回りはもはや逆風ではない イタリア国債利回りはもはや逆風ではない チャート 9英国:やり直しとなれば残留側が勝つ可能性が高い 英国:やり直しが行われれば、残留派が勝つ可能性が高い 英国:やり直しが行われれば、残留派が勝つ可能性が高い   フェッドはどうするか? チャート10 昨年の「クリスマス暴落」はフェッドの反応関数を明らかによりハト派の方向へと変えた。今後数か月でジェローム・パウエルが利上げを行うとは予想していないが、世界成長の再加速は12月にフェッドを再び引き締めに向かわせる可能性が高い。フェッドは2020年に四半期に一度の利上げを継続し、インフレ上昇に対応して2021年には引き締めペースを加速させるだろう。 総じて、我々はこのサイクルの終わりまでにフェデラルファンド金利が約4%に上昇すると見ている。これは市場が現在織り込んでいる水準よりも四半期ごとの25ベーシスポイントの利上げが九回多いことを意味する(チャート 10)。我々はフェデラルファンド先物のショートポジションで損切りになったが、顧客には2021年6月限フェデラルファンド先物または同等の手段をショートすることを推奨する。 米国経済:再び好調 基本的に米国経済は堅固な基盤にあり、より高い金利にも耐えられる。10年前とは異なり、住宅市場は良好な状態にある(チャート 11)。持ち家空室率は記録的な低水準近辺にある。フィコ・スコアを見る限り、住宅ローンの貸出の質は依然として高い。労働市場も堅調で、求人件数は二月に再び過去最高を記録した(チャート 12)。健全な住宅市場と労働市場の組み合わせは消費者にとって不可避的に良い。 チャート 11米国の住宅の基礎条件は堅調 米国の住宅ファンダメンタルズは堅調だ 米国の住宅ファンダメンタルズは堅調だ チャート 12米国の労働市場は堅調である 米国の労働市場は堅調だ 米国の労働市場は堅調だ チャート13 個人貯蓄率は現在7.6%にあり、家計の純資産対可処分所得比率から期待される水準よりもかなり高い(チャート 13)。貯蓄率の低下は消費支出が所得よりも速く増加することを可能にするだろう。後者は賃金上昇によって支えられているため、これは消費にとって強気材料となる。 設備投資意向は過去数か月で低下したが、歴史的基準から見ると依然として高い水準にある(チャート 14)。実質非住宅資本ストックは回復開始以来平均でわずか1.7%しか成長しておらず、リセッション前の期間の3%から低下している(チャート 15)。生産性成長の景気循環的な上振れ、上昇する労働コスト、低い余剰生産能力の水準は、企業が新しい工場や設備に投資する動機付けとなるはずだ。 チャート 14設備投資意向は軟化したが、依然として高水準にある 設備投資の意向は軟化したが、依然として高水準にある 設備投資の意向は軟化したが、依然として高水準にある チャート 15米国の設備投資余地はまだある 米国への資本投資にはさらなる余地がある 米国への資本投資にはさらなる余地がある   企業債務:どれほどのリスクか? チャート 16米国の企業債務は世界基準で極端ではない 米国の企業債務は世界基準では極端ではない 米国の企業債務は世界基準では極端ではない 近年、企業債務水準は大幅に増加し、契約条項の緩いローンの増加に見られるように引受基準は悪化した。それでも状況は深刻とは程遠い。 他国と比べると、米国の企業債務はかなり低い(チャート 16)。フランスの企業債務はGDP比で143%に達し、米国の2倍である。これはフランスの企業セクターがすべて順調であることを示すわけではないが、事実としてフランスは企業債務の危機に見舞われていない。これは米国が差し迫った危機に瀕していないことのシグナルにもなる。 現金を差し引くと、米国の企業債務のGDP比は1989年と同じ水準にあり、その年のフェデラルファンド金利はほぼ9%であった。法人ネット負債対EBITDの比率は比較的低いままである。利子負担能力比率は歴史平均を上回っている。加えて、過去数年で企業資産もかなり速く増加しており、企業の債務対資産比率は概ね安定している(チャート 17)。 企業部門の金融収支--企業の収入と支出の差--は依然としてGDPの1%でプラス圏にある。過去50年のすべての景気後退は企業部門の金融収支が赤字になったときに始まっている(チャート 18)。 チャート 17米国の企業債務:どのくらい高いか? 米国の企業債務:どこまで高くなる? 米国の企業債務:どこまで高くなる? チャート 18企業部門の金融収支は依然として黒字 企業部門の金融収支は依然として黒字 企業部門の金融収支は依然として黒字 住宅ローンのようにレバレッジドな機関が多く保有する債務とは異なり、ほとんどの企業債務は年金基金、保険会社、ミューチュアル・ファンド、イーティーエフのような非レバレッジのプレイヤーによって保有されている。銀行貸出は非金融企業部門債務のわずか18%を占め、1980年の40%から低下している(チャート 19)。銀行が保有するレバレッジド・ローンのシェアは10年前の約25%から現在は10%未満に低下している。さらに、今日の銀行は過去よりもはるかに高品質の自己資本を多く保有している(チャート 20)。これにより企業債務は経済にとってシステミックに重要である度合いが低くなっている。   チャート 19銀行は企業セクターへのエクスポージャーを削減した 銀行は企業向けのエクスポージャーを縮小した 銀行は企業向けのエクスポージャーを縮小した チャート 20米国の銀行は十分な自己資本を保有している 米国の銀行は健全な資本水準にある 米国の銀行は健全な資本水準にある 我々が12月にリスク資産に対してより強気になった理由の一つは、株式が急落し企業スプレッドが拡大したにもかかわらず金融ストレス指数に大きな追随がなかったためである。例えば、悪名高いテッド・スプレッドはほとんど動かなかった(チャート 21)。 チャート 21テッド・スプレッドは落ち着いており、深刻な金融ストレスの兆候は示していない TEDスプレッドは良好に推移しており、金融ストレスの重大な兆候は見られない TEDスプレッドは良好に推移しており、金融ストレスの重大な兆候は見られない みんなラリーに同意している 米国経済に大きな不均衡がないことを踏まえると、投資家はなぜフェッドが実際にはさらに利上げできないと考えているのだろうか。フェデラルファンド金利の実質ベースはかろうじてゼロを上回っているにすぎないのに。答えは、投資家がラリー・サマーズの世俗的停滞(セキュラー・スタグネーション)論を受け入れているように見えることである。これは中立金利が過去に比べて今日ははるかに低いという仮説である。 我々はこの理論にいくぶんの同情を持っているが、これは生産性や人口動態といった長期的な金利決定要因に関する理論であることを忘れてはならない。この理論は景気循環的な金利のドライバー、すなわち余剰生産能力の量、財政政策のスタンス、信用の成長、賃金動向などについてはほとんど何も語っていない。 今十年初め、我々がまだ債券に非常に強気であったときには、経済は極めて低い金利を必要としているともっともらしく主張できた:産出ギャップは依然として大きく、デレバレッジのサイクルは始まったばかりであり、住宅と株価は下押しされ、賃金上昇は乏しく、大不況の間の短い景気刺激のバーストの後に財政政策は制約的になっていた。中立からはほど遠いか? 上述のすべての要因は、過去数年の間に完全にまたは部分的に方向を転じている。財政政策を一例として挙げると、IMFは米国の構造的財政赤字が2014–15年にGDPの平均で3.3%だったと推計している。2019–20年にはIMFは赤字がGDPの平均で5.6%になると見込んでいる。 より緩和的な財政政策はどの程度まで米国の中立金利を押し上げたのだろうか。保守的に仮定して、追加の1ドルの財政刺激が総需要を1ドル押し上げるとしよう。この場合、財政政策は過去5年間で総需要に対してGDP比で2.3%を上乗せしたことになる。総需要が1パーセンテージポイント増加すると中立金利が1%上昇すると仮定すると(これはイエレン元FRB議長が支持したテイラールールの仕様と一致する)、財政政策だけで中立金利を2パーセントポイント以上押し上げたことになる。 上の議論は、長期的な構造要因が中立金利を下押ししているとしても、景気循環的な要因が中立金利をかなり押し上げた可能性があることを示唆している。FRBは今後1〜2年の経済にとって適切な水準を見据えて金利を設定するはずなので、金利が過度に低い状態が長く続くことになりかねない。これにより経済は過熱し、最終的にはインフレが急上昇するだろう。 インフレの脅威 良いニュースは、我々のお気に入りの指標のいずれも大規模な差し迫ったインフレ上昇を示していないことだ(チャート22)。関税が高まっているにもかかわらず、消費者向け輸入物価のインフレ率は鈍化している。コア中間財の生産者物価インフレ率は減速している。ISMや地域連銀の調査における支払価格項目は急落している。インフレ・サプライズ指数は反転して低下している。調査ベースおよび市場ベースのインフレ期待はともに昨夏より低いままである。これらの動きに沿って、BCAの独自のパイプライン・インフレ指標は2年半ぶりの低水準に下落している。 賃金上昇は加速しているが、生産性の伸びの方がさらに大きくなっている。その結果、単位労働コストのインフレ率は昨年中頃から低下している。単位労働コストはコアCPIの約12か月先行指標である(チャート23)。これは少なくとも来年下半期までは消費者物価のインフレ率が不快なほど高い水準に達する可能性は低いことを示唆している。 Chart 22米国における差し迫った大規模インフレ上昇の兆候は見られない 米国で差し迫った大規模なインフレーションの急騰の兆候は見られない... 米国で差し迫った大規模なインフレーションの急騰の兆候は見られない... Chart 23単位労働コストの減速は当面インフレ圧力を和らげる ...そして、単位労働コストの減速は当面の間、インフレ圧力を和らげるだろう ...そして、単位労働コストの減速は当面の間、インフレ圧力を和らげるだろう その時点では、インフレが上昇に転じるリスクが高い。これによりFRBは2021年初めに急激な利上げを開始せざるを得なくなり、ドルが上昇し株式やスプレッド・プロダクトが売られる可能性がある。結果として金融状況が引き締まり、2021年中~後半に米国と世界の景気が後退に陥る恐れが高い。   当面はグローバル株式に強気を維持し、来年後半に防御的姿勢へ転換 Chart 24アナリスト予想はかなり控えめである アナリストの予想はかなり控えめだ アナリストの予想はかなり控えめだ 上で述べた二段階のFRBによる引き締めサイクル――12月に始まり2020年にかけて徐々に利上げを行い、その後インフレ上昇に反応してより積極的な利上げに移行する――が今後数年間の投資見解を形作る。本刊行物の冒頭にある主要金融市場予測チャートは、主要資産クラスが向かう先の大まかなスケッチを示している。 株式や他のリスク資産は、FRBが年内にさらに利上げを示唆して市場の準備を始める時期の前後でボラティリティが高まるものの、最初の段階の利上げを織り込むことができるだろうと我々は考えている。昨年9月とは異なり、利益見通しはより保守的だ。ボトムアップの推計では、2019年に米国で1株当たり利益(EPS)が3.9%上昇し、世界のその他地域で5.4%上昇する見通しである(チャート24)。成長の加速、金融環境の緩和、継続的な自社株買いの組合せは、これらの数値に上振れ余地を示唆している。 さらに重要な点は、9月とは異なり、FRBは経済が良好に推移している場合にのみ利上げを開始するだろうということである。パウエルは米国経済が減速し始めたちょうどその時に「金利は中立からは遠い」と述べてしまい、誤りを犯した。もしその発言が米国の成長がまだ加速している時点で出ていたなら、投資家はおそらくそれを無視しただろう。 ジェローム・パウエルは同じ過ちを繰り返さないだろう。代わりに別の誤りを犯す可能性がある:経済を過熱させ、FRBが明らかに後手に回り、追いつくために慌てて利上げを行わざるを得ない状況にしてしまうことである。その結果生じるスタグフレーション的な環境――労働力不足により成長が鈍化しつつインフレが上向く状況――は株式や他のリスク資産にとって有毒となるだろう。 タイミングを正確にするのは難しいが、我々は投資家に対して今後12〜18か月は控えめにリスク志向を維持することを推奨する。ただし、FRBが利上げのペースを加速する前の来年後半には株式とスプレッド・プロダクトへのエクスポージャーを削減すべきだ。 国際株式を一時的に格上げする準備をする 米国株式市場は他の市場と比べて「ロー・ベータ」になりがちである。もし今年後半に世界成長が加速するなら、国際株式は米国株式をアウトパフォームするだろう。我々はEEMイーティーエフのプットを1月3日に売却して104%の利益を得ており、現在は新興国株式を純粋にロングすることを推奨している。世界成長の回復を示すさらなる確証が得られ次第、為替ヘッジなしの条件で新興国株式と欧州株式の両方をオーバーウェイトへ格上げすることを数週間以内に検討する予定だ。 日本株については判断が分かれるところだ。強い世界成長は日本の多国籍企業に恩恵をもたらすが、国内市場に重心を置く企業は政府が10月に消費税を引き上げるなら打撃を受ける可能性がある。当面は日本株の格上げは見送るつもりだ。 グローバルなセクターレベルでは、我々は今年初めにディフェンシブ寄りの配分を縮小した(昨夏により慎重になっていた後で)。投資家にはエネルギーとインダストリアル(工業)をオーバーウェイトすることを推奨する。金融とマテリアル(素材)にも好感を抱き始めている。前者は今年後半のイールドカーブのスティープ化やクレジット成長の加速から恩恵を受けるだろう。後者はより堅調な中国経済から利益を得るだろう。ヘルスケア、情報技術、コミュニケーション・サービスは中立配分を維持する。不動産と公益事業は債券利回りが上昇し始めるとどちらも傷を負う。生活必需品のような古典的なディフェンシブ・セクターもアンダーパフォームするだろう。  世界の債券利回りは上昇しそうだ 世界の債券利回りは、成長が上振れサプライズを起こすにつれて今後12〜18か月で上昇する可能性が高い。インフレが加速するにつれて利回りは2021年前半に向けてさらに上昇し続けるだろう。 過去のリスクオフ局面とは異なり、次の景気後退に向かう過程で米国債が大きなセーフヘイブンの役割を果たすとは限らない。上述の通り、今日債券利回りがこれほど低い理由の一つはターム・プレミアムが非常に低下していることだ。FRBの債券買入の累積効果がターム・プレミアムを押し下げている可能性は高いが、より大きな影響は投資家が米国債をさまざまなマクロリスクに対する保険として見なしていることに由来している。投資家は、経済が景気後退に陥ると株価は下落し、住宅市場は悪化し、賃金上昇は鈍化し、雇用見通しは悪化するが、少なくとも債券ポートフォリオの価値は上がるだろうと考えることに慣れているのだ。 この考え方の問題は、それが有効なのはFRBが成長の強まりに対して利上げを行う場合だけだという点だ。もしFRBがインフレが手に負えなくなっていることに反応して利上げを行うなら、米国債利回りは上昇する一方で株式は下落する可能性がある。これは実際、1960年代後半から2000年代初頭にかけては常態だった(チャート25)。 Chart 25米国債利回りが上昇する一方で株式が下落する可能性 米国債利回りは上昇する一方で、株価は下落する可能性がある 米国債利回りは上昇する一方で、株価は下落する可能性がある もし米国債がセーフヘイブンの地位を失えば、ターム・プレミアムは上昇するだろう。利回り上昇が株式市場を弱め、投資家が株式と債券の両方から現金へと一斉に逃げることで、さらなる利回り上昇と株価下落を招くという悪循環が生じる可能性がある。 投資家は今後12か月間、米国債に対してはやや短めのデュレーション・スタンスを維持し、その後インフレが表面化し始める2020年中頃にはデュレーションを最大限アンダーウェイトにするべきだ。デュレーションをロングする(長めの債を保有する)判断が合理的になるのは、FRBが金利を制約的な水準まで引き上げ、経済が景気後退に入った場合だけである。それが起こるのは2021年下半期まで見込まれない。 地域別には、今後12か月間で米国債に対して欧州、カナダ、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、特に日本の国債を好む。米国経済が最も過熱するリスクにさらされているからだ。通貨ヘッジありの観点では、10年物米国債利回りは世界の主要国の中で低い部類に入る(表1)。例えば日本の10年国債は通貨ヘッジありの条件で2.72%を提供し、ドイツ国債は2.94%を示している。 Table 1先進国の債券市場 2019年第2四半期 ストラテジー見通し:デッドゾーンからエンドゾーンへ 2019年第2四半期 ストラテジー見通し:デッドゾーンからエンドゾーンへ  米ドル:ソフト・パッチへ向かう 米ドルの見通しを測るのはやや厄介だ。米連邦準備制度理事会(Fed)は今後12か月間で段階的に利上げを行うにせよ、市場が織り込んでいる水準よりは高い利上げを行う見込みだ。他の大半の中央銀行がまだ様子見の姿勢を続けているため、短期金利差は米ドルに有利に動く可能性が高い。それでも、日本を除けば、世界的な成長が強まると投資家は2020年以降の他の先進国での追加利上げを織り込む可能性が高い。その結果、長期の利回り差は短期の利回り差ほど拡大しないかもしれない。 おそらくそれ以上に重要なのは、米ドルはカウンターサイクリカル、つまり世界成長の動きと逆方向に動く通貨であるという点だ(Chart 26)。この逆循環性は、米国経済が世界の他地域と比べて製造業よりもサービス業により重点を置いていることに起因する(Chart 27)。したがって、世界成長が加速すると、資本は米国から世界の他地域へ流れる傾向が強まり、外貨需要が増え、ドル需要は減少することになる。 Chart 26ドルは逆循環通貨である ドルは景気循環に逆行する通貨である ドルは景気循環に逆行する通貨である Chart 27米国はグローバル成長に対する低ベータの投資対象である 米国はグローバル成長に対する低ベータの投資先 米国はグローバル成長に対する低ベータの投資先 もし世界成長が今年後半に持ち直すなら、ドルは第2四半期にピークを付け、その後2019年末から2020年にかけて弱含む可能性が高い。ドルの動きは、2017年の経過と似た経路をたどるかもしれない。2017年はFedが4回利上げした年だが、貿易加重換算の広義ドルはそれでも7%弱含んだ。 Chart 28円はリスクオフ通貨である 円はリスクオフ通貨だ 円はリスクオフ通貨だ 2017年と同様に、ユーロは今年後半に米ドルに対して上昇するだろうし、多くの新興国通貨やコモディティ通貨も同様に上昇するだろう。ただし、2017年に多くの通貨がドルに対して上昇したのに日本円がその動きに参加しなかったのと同じように、円は米ドルに対してあまり勢いよく上昇するのは難しいだろう。 円は“リスクオフ”通貨であり、したがって世界のリスク資産が上昇すると円は弱まる傾向がある(Chart 28)。さらに、もし今年後半に世界の国債利回りが日本国債(JGB)利回りに対して上昇するならば、円は打撃を受けるだろう。特に、財政政策の引き締まりを受けて日銀がイールドカーブ・コントロールの運用を長引かせざるを得ない場合はその傾向が強まる。123を下回る場面ではEUR/JPYをロングするつもりだ。 一旦弱含んだ後、米ドルは来年末に再び上昇する 米国経済が2020年に供給面の制約にますます直面するにつれ、成長は鈍化し、インフレは加速するだろう。Fedはインフレの上昇以上の速さで利上げを行って応じる。結果として実質金利が上昇し、ドルに上方圧力がかかるだろう。 このスタグフレーション的な環境では、株式は急落し、クレジットスプレッドは拡大する。米国の金融環境の引き締まりは世界中に波及し、世界成長はそれがなかった場合よりも一層減速するだろう。これがさらにドルを加速させる。米ドルがピークを付けるのは、Fedが2021年末に利下げを開始した時点のみである。 コモディティ:より強気に 今年後半のドルの弱含みと、中国の回復に牽引された世界成長の強化はコモディティにとって追い風となる。BCAのコモディティ・ストラテジストは、現行水準で銅のロングを推奨する。また、原油に対する強気のバイアスも維持している。ブレントは今年平均75ドル/バレル、2020年は80ドル/バレルになると見込んでいる。米国のシェール生産の増加は、深海の輸出施設整備の遅延によって相殺され、供給は比較的タイトに保たれるだろう。 過去のレポートでは、インフレヘッジとして金を購入することの有用性を論じてきた。ただし、我々はドル強気見解のためにそれを実行に移すのを控えてきた。今やドルが今後数か月でピークを付けると見ているため、1275ドル/オンスを下回る場面があれば金を買いたい。   Peter Berezin, チーフ・グローバル・ストラテジスト グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー peterb@bcaresearch.com 脚注 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “グレツキーのドクトリン,” dated March 1, 2019. 2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “FCIドゥーム・ループの可能性は低い,” dated January 4, 2019. 3      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “本当に世界には政府債務が多すぎるのか?” dated February 22, 2019. ストラテジー & マーケット動向 マクロクォント・モデルと現在の主観的スコア チャート29 タクティカル・トレード ストラテジー推奨 クローズド・トレード
At present, the average option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is 388 bps. If we assume that defaults occur in line with the Moody’s baseline forecast during the next 12 months, then we would expect default losses of…
The chart above shows that the trailing 12-month speculative grade default rate has been steadily falling since early 2017. However, it also shows that the fair value reading from our U.S. Bond Strategy team’s macro-driven default rate model has not fallen as…
The recent dovish pivot in global central bank rate guidance supports the outperformance of risk assets by removing the threat of higher global bond yields at a time of slowing growth. The result has been sharp rallies in global equity and credit markets,…
Highlights Global Spread Product: The current low-volatility backdrop, triggered by more dovish central banks, will be maintained until there is more decisive evidence that global growth is rebounding. That will not occur until the latter half of 2019, thus keeping the window for corporate credit outperformance open for a few more months. Stay overweight global corporates versus governments, favoring the U.S. Canada: Much weaker-than-expected Canadian economic growth has surprised the Bank of Canada. Rate hikes are now off the table for at least the rest of 2019, and possibly longer. Upgrade Canadian government debt to neutral (3 out of 5) in global currency-hedged government bond portfolios. Feature Stick With A Tactical Overweight To Global Corporates We’ve dedicated our last few Weekly Reports to analyzing the outlook for government bond yields in the developed markets (DM), in light of the recent dovish shift in the policy stance of central banks. We concluded that yields had fully discounted a slower global growth backdrop, through lower inflation expectations and the pricing out of future interest rate hikes. Further declines in bond yields would require a deeper deceleration of activity than we are expecting, thus maintaining a below-benchmark medium-term duration stance is appropriate. That dovish shift by policymakers also took away a major roadblock for risk assets, namely the threat of a continued policy-induced rise in global yields at a time of slowing growth. The result has been sharp rallies in global equity and credit markets, with declining volatility (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekSlowing Growth Isn’t Always Bad For Risk Assets We upgraded global corporate debt, and downgraded global government bonds, on a tactical basis back on January 15 of this year.1 Since then, credit spreads have declined substantially across both DM and emerging markets (EM), most notably in Europe (Chart 2). Within our upgrade to overall global credit, we maintained a relative bias towards U.S. corporates versus non-U.S. equivalents, based on our expectation of relatively faster economic growth in the U.S. In our model bond portfolio, that meant moving U.S. corporates to an above-benchmark weighting, while reducing the size of the underweight in EM debt and only raising European credit to a neutral allocation. Looking at the performance of each of the major credit markets in excess return terms (versus duration-matched government bonds) since January 15, currency-hedged into U.S. dollars, there have not been huge differences between U.S. and non-U.S. returns. The exception is European high-yield which had an excess return of 4.4%, but only represents 0.8% of our custom benchmark index for our model portfolio (and where we are not underweight). Excess returns for investment grade and high-yield corporates in the U.S. have averaged 2.3%, compared to 2.2% for EM credit (averaging hard currency sovereign and corporate debt). We see the global “risk-on” dynamic continuing in next few months, fueled by benign monetary policies, thus we are sticking with our current overweight allocation to global corporates. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the decision to upgrade overall global corporate debt versus government bonds has been far more important than adjusting any regional credit allocations. We see that global “risk-on” dynamic continuing in next few months, fueled by benign monetary policies, thus we are sticking with our current allocations to global corporates. Our cue to reverse our tactical overweight stance on corporates will come from the U.S. Any additional spread tightening and easing of overall financial conditions will keep U.S. economic growth above trend and eventually force the Fed to become more hawkish in the second half of 2019. This will turn global monetary policy from a tailwind for corporate credit to a headwind, justifying a downgrade of corporate allocations. In the meantime, we recommend continuing to earn carry in a policy-induced low volatility environment. Bottom Line: The current low-volatility backdrop, triggered by more dovish central banks, will be maintained until there is more decisive evidence that global growth is rebounding. That will not occur until the latter half of 2019, thus keeping the window for corporate credit outperformance open for a few more months. Stay overweight global corporates versus governments, favoring the U.S. Canada: Upgrade To Neutral Canadian government bonds have been clawing back much of the relative underperformance that occurred in 2017 and 2018 while the Bank of Canada (BoC) was delivering multiple rate hikes. The spread between the yields on the Bloomberg Barclays Canada Treasury index and the overall Global Treasury index has narrowed by -40bps since October 2018, after widening 69bps between May 2017 and October 2018 (Chart 3). Expressed as a relative return (duration-matched and currency-hedged into U.S. dollars), Canadian government debt has lagged the Global Treasury index by -232bps since May 2017. Chart 3Canadian Bonds No Longer Underperforming That underperformance was driven by the combination of a strong Canadian economy, accelerating inflation and tightening monetary policy. The year-over-year pace of real GDP growth reached 3.8% in mid-2017 and stayed above-trend for the following year. The unemployment rate fell to 5.8%, while core inflation accelerated back to the midpoint of the BoC’s 1-3% target band, alongside faster wage growth. The BoC – devotees of the Phillips Curve, like virtually every other DM central bank – took the message from the combination of tight labor markets and rising inflation and embarked on the long march away from a near-zero (0.5%) policy rate back in July 2017. Now, after 20 months and 125bps of rate hikes, Canada’s economy is weakening sharply. Real GDP only grew at a paltry 0.4% annualized pace in the 4th quarter of 2018, dragging the year-over-year pace to 1.6%. Inflation has followed suit, with headline CPI inflation falling from an early 2018 peak of 3% to 1.4% and the BOC’s median CPI index now growing at only a 1.8% pace. The most concerning part for the BoC is that the economy could be decelerating this rapidly with a policy rate of only 1.75%, which is well below the central bank’s estimated 2.5-3.5% range for the neutral rate. Our own BoC Monitor has rapidly fallen towards the zero line, indicating no pressure to either tighten or ease monetary policy (Chart 4). The more recent rapid decline in the BoC Monitor has been driven by the inflation-focused components of the indicator, while the growth-focused elements have been steadily drifting lower since that 2017 peak in real GDP growth. Chart 4Is The BoC Done, Well South Of Neutral? The BoC has been stunned by that shockingly weak Q4/2018 growth outturn. In the official policy statement released following the March 6 BoC meeting, the central bank’s Governing Council was forthright about how the growth uncertainty has put future rate hikes in question: “Governing Council judges that the outlook continues to warrant a policy interest rate that is below its neutral range. Given the mixed picture that the data present, it will take time to gauge the persistence of below-potential growth and the implications for the future inflation outlook. With increased uncertainty about the timing of future rate increases, Governing Council will be watching closely developments in household spending, oil markets and global trade policy.” Rising interest rates may be the big reason why growth has slowed so dramatically in Canada. The BoC’s economic projections for 2019 had already factored in some slowing global growth, as well a hit to business confidence and capital spending from global trade conflicts and last year’s decline in energy prices (a big deal for Canada’s huge oil industry). BoC officials, including Governor Stephen Poloz, have noted that a resolution of the U.S.-China trade tensions could therefore be a positive for the Canadian economy by removing a critical drag on Canadian business confidence and export demand. Yet when looking at the contribution to Canadian real GDP growth from the main components, there have been large drags on growth from consumer spending, capital spending and housing (Chart 5). That suggests that there is something more fundamental than just a series of external shocks at work here. Chart 5Broad-Based Weakness In Canadian Domestic Demand A look at the more interest-sensitive components of the Canadian economy suggests that rising interest rates may be a big reason why growth has slowed so dramatically. Consumer Durables Real consumer spending growth has plunged from a 4% pace in 2018 to 1.3% in Q4/2018, driven by a collapse in demand for consumer durables which contracted -1.2% year-over-year terms (Chart 6). Car sales plunged 7.5% on a year-over-year basis in Q4, suggesting that rising interest rates on auto loans may have been a major factor driving the weakness in durables spending. Softer incomes have also played a role, with wage growth rolling over even with the majority of evidence pointing to a very tight Canadian labor market that is getting even tighter (third panel). The fact that the drop was so focused on durables, however, suggests that higher interest rates were the more likely reason for the plunge in overall consumer spending. Chart 6Weak Canadian Consumption Concentrated In Durables Housing The overheated Canadian housing market has endured the double-whammy of rising mortgage interest rates and increasing macro-prudential changes to mortgage lending. House prices in the hottest Toronto and Vancouver markets – which should be most impacted by the changes in mortgage regulations – have stopped increasing, helping bring the growth in national house prices to only 1.9% (Chart 7). Yet the sharp deceleration of mortgage credit growth, alongside a contraction in housing starts and overall residential investment, suggests that higher mortgage rates could be the bigger driver of the housing weakness. Chart 7Some Long-Needed Cooling Of Canadian Housing The BoC has noted that it is difficult to disentangle the impact of regulatory changes in Canadian mortgages from that of rising interest rates. Yet the impact of higher mortgage rates on Canadian consumer spending power can be seen in the rising debt service ratio for Canadian households. As of Q4/2018, Canadians must now pay 14.5% of their household income to service their debts, an 0.53 percentage point increase over the past two years (Chart 8). For highly indebted Canadian households, who have mortgage debt equal to 107% of disposable income, even a modest pickup in mortgage rates can have a big impact on spending power through higher interest costs. Chart 8Leveraged Canadian Consumers Pinched By Higher Rates Does the fact that consumer spending has fallen so rapidly mean that the interest sensitivity of the Canadian economy is far greater than the BoC has assumed? If so, then the neutral range of 2.5-3.5% for the BoC policy rate may be too high, and the central bank could be closer to, if not already at, the end of its hiking cycle. The low level of the household savings rate – currently only 1.1%, a product of the housing bubble and the associated wealth effects on spending activity – makes Canadian consumers even more vulnerable to rate increases that diminish their spending power. For highly indebted Canadian households, even a modest pickup in mortgage rates can have a big impact on spending power through higher interest costs. Capital Spending Canadian companies have seen a steady decline in corporate profit growth over the past couple of years, decelerating from a 23% pace in 2017 to 2% late in 2018 on a top-down basis. Yet even allowing for that, the -8% contraction in year-over-year real non-residential investment spending in Q4/2018 is a shock. Particularly since the BoC’s Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that credit conditions have been easing, and our own Canadian Corporate Health Monitor is flashing that Canadian companies are in solid financial condition (Chart 9). Chart 9An Unusually Sharp Fall In Canadian Capex Business surveys from the BoC and the Conference Board did both show a sharp plunge in confidence and future sales expectations (bottom panel). This suggests that worries about global trade tensions and diminished trade activity may have weighed on Canadian business confidence and capital spending – especially coming alongside a big drop in oil prices as was seen last year, which hinders the ability of Canadian energy producers to ramp up investment. Canadian exports accelerated over the final half of 2018 while business confidence was falling. However, oil prices have now stabilized and, more importantly, Canadian exports accelerated over the final half of 2018 while business confidence was falling (Chart 10). That acceleration was seen for both energy and non-energy exports, but was also heavily concentrated in exports to China, which are now growing 24% on a year-over-year basis (a pace that is wildly at odds with the overall growth in Chinese imports, suggesting that Canadian exporters have increased their market share in China). Chart 10Should Canadian Companies Be Worried About Global Trade? Could higher corporate borrowing rates, rather than worries about plunging export demand, be the true reason why Canadian companies have so drastically cut back on capital spending? It is no surprise that the BoC has chosen to take a pause on its rate hiking cycle, given all those conflicting messages from the Canadian economic data. The growth slump could be related to global trade uncertainty, or regulatory changes in the housing market, or past declines in oil prices, or previous interest rate increases. Or all of the above. The BoC can also take some time before considering its next interest rate move given cooling inflation and wage growth (Chart 11). The central bank has reduced its estimate of the Canadian output gap to -0.5%, based off the downside surprises already seen in Canadian economic growth. A closed output gap, combined with accelerating inflation, was the main argument the BoC had been using to justify its interest rate increases over the past two years. Now, neither of those conditions is currently in place, and the BoC can take its time to assess the underlying trend of economic growth without having to worry about above-target inflation. Chart 11Slowing Inflation = More Dovish BoC The Governing Council next meets in April, when a new Monetary Policy Report and updated economic projections will be published. The 2019 growth and inflation forecasts will surely be downgraded, perhaps heavily as the European Central Bank just did in response to the sharp growth slowdown in Europe – which led to a new round of monetary easing measures. What will be more interesting from the point of view of Canadian bond investors will be the Bank’s assessment of the size of Canada’s output gap, the pace of trend growth and, perhaps, even the appropriate neutral range for the BoC policy rate. The lowering of any of those three elements would be supportive of Canadian bond yields staying lower for longer. We have maintained an underweight in Canadian government bonds since July 2017, based on our view that the BoC would follow in the Fed’s footsteps and attempt to normalize interest rates. A strong economy and rising inflation would allow them to do that. Now, both the Fed and BoC are on hold, with small probabilities of rate cuts now priced into Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves (Chart 12). Chart 12BoC Now Less Likely To Follow The Fed Given the BCA view that Fed rate hikes will resume later this year on the back of a rebound in U.S. and global growth, we had been sticking with the bearish view on Canadian government bonds as well. Yet given the stunning drop in Canadian growth that startled the BoC, the odds now favor the BoC staying on hold for longer, even once the Fed begins to hike again. This would also provide additional easing of Canadian financial conditions through a soft Canadian dollar (bottom two panels). We are upgrading our recommended allocation to Canadian bonds to neutral(3 out of 5) this week from underweight (2 out of 5).  In light of this uncertainty over the BoC’s next move given the weak economy, the underlying rationale for our underweight Canada position is no longer applicable. Thus, we are upgrading our recommended allocation to Canadian bonds to neutral (3 out of 5) this week from underweight (2 out of 5). The excess return of Canadian government bonds versus the Global Treasury index since we went to underweight back in July 2017 was -0.83%, so our bearish recommendation did generate positive alpha. In our model bond portfolio, we are funding that additional Canadian allocation from a reduction of the overweight in Japanese government bonds. We are also closing our tactical trade of being long 10-year Canadian Real Return Bonds versus nominal 10-year government debt, at a loss as 10-year inflation breakevens are now 1.6%, or 16bps below the entry level on our trade (Chart 13). Chart 13Upgrade Canadian Government Bonds To Neutral We will contemplate any additional changes to our Canadian allocation after the releases of the latest BoC Business Outlook Survey and Senior Loan Officer Survey on April 15 and the new BoC Monetary Policy Report and economic projections at the April 24 monetary policy meeting. Bottom Line: Much weaker-than-expected Canadian economic growth has surprised the Bank of Canada. Rate hikes are now off the table for at least the rest of 2019, and possibly longer. Upgrade Canadian government debt to neutral (3 out of 5) in global currency-hedged government bond portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Enough With The Gloom: Upgrade Global Corporates On A Tactical Basis”, dated January 15th 2019, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
特別レポート Highlights Corporate Default Rate: The trailing 12-month corporate default rate is too low according to our macro model. Further, the likely trajectories for corporate profit and debt growth suggest that the default rate is more likely to rise than fall during the next 12 months. We expect the corporate default rate to be above 3% during the next 12 months, higher than the Moody’s baseline forecast of 1.7%. Corporate Bond Valuation: Corporate bond investors are still adequately compensated for default risk, even under our more pessimistic scenario. However, some junk spread widening later this year is possible if market default rate expectations converge with our more pessimistic forecast. Investment Strategy: Corporate spreads have room to tighten in the near-term, due to accommodative Fed policy and a budding improvement in global growth. However, tighter Fed policy and a higher-than-expected corporate default rate could pressure spreads wider in the second half of 2019. We will be quick to back off our overweight corporate bond stance when our near-term spread targets are met. Feature Investors should remain overweight corporate bonds within U.S. fixed income portfolios, but be conscious that the window for outperformance may close quickly. While the Fed’s dovish turn and signs of global growth stabilization will allow spreads to tighten during the next few months, corporate default risk is rising in the background. This week’s report focuses on corporate default risk. We assess where the default rate is headed during the next 12 months and discuss the implications for investment strategy. Default Rate Near A Bottom Chart 1 shows that the trailing 12-month speculative grade default rate has been steadily falling since early 2017. However, it also shows that the fair value reading from our macro-driven default rate model has not fallen as much. The actual trailing 12-month default rate came in at 2.7% in February, the fair value reading from our model stands at a loftier 3.6%. Chart 1Corporate Default Rate Near A Bottom? Our default rate model is based on two factors, Commercial & Industrial bank lending standards and gross corporate leverage. The latter is defined as total nonfinancial corporate debt divided by pre-tax profits. With that in mind, our model provides a framework for assessing where the default rate is headed under different scenarios for corporate profit and debt growth. We consider each of these two factors in turn. Corporate Profit Growth Will Moderate Nonfinancial corporate pre-tax profits grew an astonishing 17% during the four quarters ending in Q3 2018, but all leading indicators point to deceleration in Q4 2018 and beyond. On the revenue side of the ledger, leading indicators are in universal agreement that growth is poised to slow (Chart 2): Chart 2Corporate Revenues Will Soften The ISM Manufacturing index has fallen to 54.2 from a recent peak above 60. The year-over-year growth rate in total business sales came in at 2% in December, down from a recent peak of 8.4%. The year-over-year growth rate in industrial production fell to 3.5% in February, from a September peak of 5.7%. The year-over-year growth rate in the U.S. Leading Economic Indicator is down to 3.2% as of January, from a September peak of 6.8%. Clearly, the global growth slowdown has migrated to the U.S. and the impact is being seen in the leading U.S. economic data. Some slowdown in corporate revenue growth is all but assured. All leading indicators point to deceleration in corporate profit growth in Q4 2018 and beyond. Corporate profit growth and investment spending are tightly linked in the sense that firms are more likely to take on new projects when they feel better about their future cash flow prospects. The upshot is that we can infer trends in corporate profits by looking at data on investment spending and firms’ investment plans. That data paint a similar picture of widespread deceleration (Chart 3): Chart 3Investment Indicators The year-over-year growth rate in core durable goods orders is down to 4% from a recent peak close to 9%. An average of firms’ capital spending plans as reported in regional Fed surveys remains elevated, but has declined markedly in recent months. Small business capital spending plans, as reported to the NFIB, have fallen sharply during the past few months. Periods of tightening lending standards coincide with decelerating corporate debt. Wage growth is another important driver of corporate profits. In particular, we can get a read on profit growth by looking at the difference between corporate selling prices and unit labor costs, aka our Profit Margin Proxy (Chart 4). Our Profit Margin Proxy remains at a high level because growth in unit labor costs has been tepid. Even though top-line wage growth has improved, this has been matched by an acceleration in productivity growth (Chart 4, bottom panel). The latter has kept unit labor costs low, even as nominal wages have risen. Chart 4Wage Growth A Drag On Profits Extremely tight labor markets will lead to a continued acceleration in wage growth during the next few quarters.1 Meanwhile, the prospect for continued rapid productivity growth is much more uncertain. It seems reasonable to expect that corporate profits will come under some downward pressure from rising unit labor costs during 2019. Finally, we can get a sense of the corporate profit outlook by looking at equity analyst net earnings revisions (Chart 5). Analyst earnings per share (EPS) upgrades outpaced downgrades for most of 2018, but that trend reversed sharply near the end of last year. Analysts are once again lowering EPS forecasts more often than they are raising them. Chart 5More EPS Downgrades Than Updgrades Debt Growth Should Also Slow Fortunately, some of the balance sheet impact from decelerating profits will likely be offset by slower debt growth during the next few quarters. Corporate debt growth has been robust and fairly stable since 2012, but C&I lending standards tightened slightly in the fourth quarter of last year. Typically, periods of tightening lending standards coincide with decelerating corporate debt (Chart 6). Chart 6Tighter Lending Standards Implies Slower Debt Growth Anecdotally, several high profile firms have recently taken steps to curtail debt growth. Most notably, General Electric just announced a major asset divestment to pay down debt, and the stock market rewarded them for doing so. If our default rate forecast turns out to be correct and the Moody’s forecast is eventually revised higher, it will likely coincide with some junk spread widening. More broadly, we observe that firms with low debt/asset ratios have been outperforming firms with high debt/asset ratios, a dynamic that tends to occur when lending standards are tightening and corporate debt growth is falling (Chart 7). Chart 7Low Leverage Firms Are Outperforming For a sense of scale, nonfinancial corporate debt grew 6.5% in the four quarters ending Q4 2018 and has averaged 6.3% since 2012. Some mild deceleration from these growth rates is likely during the next few quarters. Putting It All Together Table 1 shows that trailing 12-month profit growth of 17% and debt growth of 6.5% led to gross corporate leverage of 6.95, which translates to a fair value default rate of 3.6%. Table 1 also shows where the fair value default rate will head during the next 12 months based on different scenarios for profit and debt growth. Table 1Default Rate Scenarios For example, if profits grow by 5% and debt growth is between 0% and 8%, then the fair value default rate will be between 3.5% and 4.1% one year from now. This seems like a reasonable scenario based on our macro forecast. A scenario that would result in a default rate that is much higher than the current Moody’s baseline forecast of 1.7%. And One More Thing Though they are not included in our model, job cut announcements are a fairly reliable coincident indicator of corporate defaults. Recently, job cut announcements have clearly bottomed even as the default rate has continued to fall (Chart 8). This is a clear warning sign that the default rate might head higher in the coming months. Chart 8Warning Sign From Job Cuts Bottom Line: The trailing 12-month corporate default rate is too low according to our macro model. Further, the likely trajectories for corporate profit and debt growth suggest that the default rate is more likely to rise than fall during the next 12 months. We expect the corporate default rate to be above 3% during the next 12 months, higher than the Moody’s baseline forecast of 1.7%. It increasingly looks like the second half of 2019 will be more challenging for corporate credit. Are Investors Adequately Compensated For Default Risk? Forecasting the default rate is important, but it is only one side of the coin when it comes to corporate bond investing. The other relevant question is whether current spreads offer adequate compensation for expected defaults. At present, the average option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is 388 bps. If we assume that defaults occur in line with the Moody’s baseline forecast during the next 12 months, then we would expect default losses of approximately 90 bps (assuming a 49% recovery rate).2 That translates to an excess junk spread of 298 bps, well above the historical average realized excess spread of 250 bps. In other words, investors should expect better than average excess junk returns if the Moody’s baseline default rate forecast turns out to be correct. However, our analysis suggests that the default will be significantly higher during the next 12 months. If we assume a 3.5% default rate, more in line with our macro forecast, and a slightly lower recovery rate of 45%, then the excess spread available in the high-yield index falls to 198 bps. This number is still positive, so unless there is significant spread widening investors should still earn a positive excess return versus Treasuries, but it is considerably below average historical levels. Another factor to consider is the historical correlation between junk spreads and the Moody’s baseline default rate forecast. We find that the average high-yield OAS has the strongest positive correlation with the 9-month forward Moody’s baseline default rate expectation (Chart 9). In other words, if our default rate forecast turns out to be correct and the Moody’s forecast is eventually revised higher, it will likely coincide with some junk spread widening. Chart 9Default Rate Revisions Will Lead To Wider Spreads Bottom Line: Corporate bond investors are still adequately compensated for default risk, even under our more pessimistic scenario. However, some junk spread widening later this year is possible if market default rate expectations converge with our more pessimistic forecast. Investment Strategy While this report has focused on detecting early warning signs of default risk, that is not the only thing that matters for corporate spreads. We continue to believe that spreads have room to tighten in the near-term, due to accommodative Fed policy and a budding improvement in global growth.3 The purpose of this report is to stress that our current overweight stance on corporate bonds is unlikely to last through to the end of the year. First, if spreads tighten during the next few months leading to an easing in overall financial conditions, then the Fed will probably turn more hawkish in the second half of 2019 and monetary policy will shift from being a tailwind for corporate credit to a headwind. This shift could occur at around the same time that corporate defaults start to exceed current expectations. As a matter of strategy, we have published spread targets for each corporate credit tier based on average spread levels seen during similar stages of past economic cycles (Charts 10A & 10B).4 We will be quick to move off our overweight stance once these spread targets are achieved. Note that Aaa spreads are already below target. We recommend that investors avoid Aaa-rated corporate bonds. Chart 10AInvestment Grade Spread Targets Chart 10BHigh-Yield Spread Targets While the current environment remains positive, it increasingly looks like the second half of 2019 will be more challenging for corporate credit. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift,  U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further details on the amount of labor market slack in the economy please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We forecast the recovery rate based on its inverse historical relationship with the default rate. A higher default rate implies a lower recovery rate, and vice-versa. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For more details on our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com
Highlights Chart 1Track The CRB/Gold Ratio Earlier this year the Fed signaled a dovish policy shift in response to slowing global growth and tighter financial conditions. In large part due to the Fed’s move, financial conditions are now easing and the CRB Raw Industrials index – a timely proxy for global growth – is starting to perk up. But when will this improvement translate to higher Treasury yields? The CRB/gold ratio offers some clues. Gold moves higher when monetary policy eases. Then with a lag, that easier policy spurs stronger global growth and a rising CRB index. Eventually, that stronger growth puts rate hikes back on the table. A more hawkish Fed limits the upside in gold and sends Treasury yields higher. In fact, we find that the 10-year Treasury yield only starts to rise when the CRB index outpaces the gold price (Chart 1). The recent jump in the CRB index is a positive sign, but we shouldn’t expect Treasury yields to rise until the CRB/gold ratio heads higher. In the meantime, investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and initiate positive-carry yield curve trades (see page 10) to boost returns while we wait for the next upward adjustment in yields. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 59 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +243 bps. The Federal Reserve’s pause opens a window for corporate spreads to tighten during the next few months. We recommend overweight positions in corporate bonds for now, but will be quick to reduce exposure once spreads reach our near-term targets (Chart 2). Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview In last week’s report we published option-adjusted spread targets for each corporate credit tier.1 The targets are based on the median 12-month breakeven spreads during prior periods when the slope of the yield curve is quite flat but not yet inverted, what we call a Phase 2 environment.2 Currently, the Aa-rated spread of 59 bps is 3 bps above our target (panel 2). The A-rated spread of 91 bps is 6 bps above our target (panel 3). The Baa-rated spread of 156 bps is 28 bps above our target (panel 4). The Aaa-rated spread is already below our target. We advise investors to avoid the Aaa-rated credit tier. With profit growth poised to moderate during the next few quarters, it is unlikely that gross corporate leverage will continue to decline at its current pace (bottom panel). As such, we will be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure when spreads reach our targets. Renewed Fed hawkishness will be another headwind for corporate bonds in the second half of the year. High-Yield: Overweight High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 175 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +590 bps. In last week’s report we published near-term spread targets for each high-yield credit tier.3 The targets are based on the median 12-month breakeven spreads seen during periods when the yield curve is quite flat but not yet inverted, what we call a Phase 2 environment.4 At present, the Ba-rated option-adjusted spread is 224 bps, 37 bps above our target. The B-rated spread is 376 bps, 81 bps above our target. The Caa-rated spread is 780 bps, 208 bps above our target. Our default-adjusted spread is an alternative measure of high-yield valuation. It represents the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses. It is currently 243 bps, very close to the historical average of 250 bps (Chart 3). In other words, if corporate defaults match the Moody’s baseline forecast during the next 12 months, high-yield bonds will return 243 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming no change in spreads. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview The Moody’s baseline forecast calls for a default rate of 2.4% during the next 12 months. This appears a touch too optimistic, as our own macro model is calling for a default rate closer to 3.5%.5 In either case, junk bonds currently offer adequate compensation for default risk. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +39 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread tightened 2 bps on the month, driven by a 5 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The fall in option cost was partially offset by a 3 bps widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The recent drop in the 30-year mortgage rate led to a jump in mortgage refinancings from historically low levels, putting some temporary upward pressure on MBS spreads (Chart 4). However, the relatively tepid pace of new issuance during the past few years means that the existing MBS stock is not very exposed to refinancing risk, even if mortgage rates fall further. All in all, we view agency MBS as one of the safest spread products in the current macro environment. Chart 4MBS Market Overview The problem with MBS is that valuation remains unattractive. The index option-adjusted spread for conventional 30-year MBS is well below its average pre-crisis level (panel 3) and the sector offers less compensation than normal compared to corporate bonds (panel 4). We continue to recommend a neutral allocation to agency MBS. An upgrade will only be appropriate when value in the corporate sector is no longer attractive relative to expected default risk. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 97 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +320 bps. Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 54 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +86 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 44 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +109 bps, while Domestic Agencies outperformed by 12 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +9 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 10 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. The USD-denominated sovereign debt of most countries continues to look expensive relative to equivalently-rated U.S. corporate credit. However, in a recent report we highlighted that Mexican sovereign debt is an exception (Chart 5).6 Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Not only is Mexican sovereign debt cheap relative to U.S. corporate credit, but our Emerging Markets Strategy service highlights that the Mexican peso is very cheap as measured by the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs.7 This is not surprising given that the peso has been relatively flat versus the dollar during the past two years, despite real interest rates being much higher in Mexico than in the U.S. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio fell 5% in February, and currently sits at 81% (Chart 6). This is more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and right at the average level that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview In other words, municipal bonds on average are no longer cheap. Rather, they appear fairly valued compared to similar prior macro environments. But a pure focus on the average yield ratio across the curve hides an important distinction. The yield ratio for short maturities (2-year and 5-year) is very low relative to history, while the yield ratio for long maturities (10-year, 20-year and 30-year) remains quite cheap (panel 2). Investors should continue to focus on long-maturity municipal debt to add yield to U.S. bond portfolios. In our research into the phases of the credit cycle, we often divide the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve. Since 1983, in the middle phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps (where it stands today), investment grade corporate bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +3 bps. In contrast, municipal bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +64 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage).8 Given strong historical returns during the current phase of the cycle and the fact that our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory (bottom panel), we advocate an overweight allocation to municipal bonds. Treasury Curve: Favor 2/30 Barbell Over 7-Year Bullet Treasury yields rose in February, led by the long-end of the curve. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 3 bps on the month and currently sits at 21 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 57 bps. Our 12-month fed funds discounter remains below zero, meaning that the market is priced for rate cuts during the next year (Chart 7). We continue to view rate hikes as more likely than cuts on this time horizon, and therefore recommend yield curve trades that will profit from a move higher in our discounter. In prior research we found that the 5-year and 7-year Treasury maturities are most sensitive to changes in our discounter, so any trade where you sell the 5-year or 7-year bullet and buy a duration-matched barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve will provide the appropriate exposure.9 Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview An added benefit of implementing a barbell over bullet strategy in the current environment is that barbells currently offer higher yields than bullets, meaning that you earn positive carry as you wait for the market to price rate hikes back into the curve (bottom 2 panels).10 Not surprisingly, barbell strategies also look attractively valued on our yield curve models, the output of which is found in Appendix B. TIPS: Overweight TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 36 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +120 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 11 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.96%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.07%. Both rates remain below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed’s target. After last month’s increase, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently very close to the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations model (Chart 8).11 This model is based on a combination of backward-looking and forward-looking inflation measures and is premised on the idea that investors’ inflation expectations take time to adjust to changing macro environments. The current fair value reading from the model is 1.97%, but that fair value will trend steadily higher as long as core CPI inflation remains above 1.84%. The 1.84% threshold is the annualized trailing 10-year growth rate in core CPI, and it is the most important variable in the model. Chart 8Inflation Compensation On that note, core CPI has increased at an annual rate of 2.58% during the past four months, well above the necessary threshold. And while some forward-looking inflation measures have moderated, notably the ISM Prices Paid index (panel 3), this is largely a reaction to the recent drop in energy prices. A drop that should reverse as global growth improves in the coming months. ABS: Neutral Cut To Underweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +38 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS narrowed 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 31 bps, 3 bps below its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview Our excess return Bond Map, shown in Appendix C on page 18, shows that Aaa-rated ABS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off compared to other U.S. bond sectors. Aaa-rated auto loan ABS in particular offer greater risk and lower potential return than the Aggregate Plus index (the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate index plus high-yield).  Tight spreads look even more unattractive when you consider that the delinquency rate for consumer credit is rising, and according to the uptrend in household interest expense, will continue to march higher in the coming quarters (panel 4). Lending standards are also tightening for both credit cards and auto loans, a dynamic that often coincides with a rising delinquency rate and wider ABS spreads (bottom panel). Given the recent spread tightening, we advise investors to reduce consumer ABS exposure in U.S. bond portfolios. Other sectors, such as Agency CMBS, offer a more attractive risk/reward trade-off within high-rated spread product. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 74 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +142 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 13 bps on the month and currently sits at 93 bps, below the average pre-crisis level but somewhat higher than the recent tights (Chart 10). Chart 10CMBS Market Overview The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks tightened lending standards on commercial real estate (CRE) loans in Q4 and witnessed falling demand (bottom 2 panels). This, coupled with decelerating CRE prices paints a relatively negative picture for non-agency CMBS. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Teasury index by 49 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +77 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 48 bps. The excess return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 2 basis points of rate cuts during the next 12 months. Given that we expect the Fed to deliver rate hikes in the second half of this year, we recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the change in the fed funds rate. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Appendix B - Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of +55 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 55 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of February 28, 2019) Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of February 28, 2019) Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return.   Ryan Swift,  U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com   Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus”, dated January 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9  Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018 available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Highlights Fed: With financial conditions easing and core inflation more likely to rise than fall, the majority of Fed officials will feel justified lifting rates again in the second half of this year. The best way to position for the resumption of rate hikes is to sell the 5-year or 7-year part of the Treasury curve and buy a duration-matched barbell consisting of the short and long ends of the curve. These sorts of positions currently offer positive carry, meaning you get paid as you wait for the market to price rate hikes back in. Corporate Spreads: Maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) with the exception of the Aaa credit tier. But be prepared to reduce exposure when spreads reach our target levels. Economy: Tracking estimates for 2018 Q4 and 2019 Q1 real GDP have fallen significantly during the past two weeks. The decline in tracking estimates is heavily influenced by an abnormal December retail sales report. That impact will reverse in 2019. Feature The Federal Reserve’s “on hold” strategy is now well known and has been completely discounted in the market. In fact, the overnight index swap curve is priced for 9 bps of rate cuts during the next 12 months and 21 bps of cuts during the next 24 months (Chart 1). Chart 1Primary Dealers Still Looking For Hikes At this point, the only thing that’s unclear is how the Fed will respond to the economic data going forward. Will it be eager to re-start rate hikes at the first sign of calm? Or perhaps the Fed is leaning toward a strategy where the next move will be a rate cut in the face of flagging economic growth? Survey Says Unfortunately, last month’s FOMC meeting was not accompanied by an updated Summary of Economic Projections. We therefore don’t know how policymakers have revised their rate hike expectations since December. However, the New York Fed’s Survey of Primary Dealers was updated in January, and it shows that the median primary dealer still expects two rate hikes this year. The only change between the December and January surveys is that the median primary dealer now expects one of the 2019 rate hikes in June and the other in December. In the December survey, both 2019 rate hikes were anticipated before the end of June (Chart 1). Typically, the median primary dealer and the median FOMC participant have very similar views on the future interest rate trajectory. Counting The Minutes The next stop on our search for clarity is the minutes from the January FOMC meeting, which were released last week. The January minutes provide a lot of insight into the thought processes of different FOMC participants. Unfortunately, they also reveal a serious lack of cohesion amongst the group. All in all, the document might confuse more than it clarifies. A few key excerpts from the document drive this point home. Referring to “global economic and financial developments”: Many participants observed that if uncertainty abated, the Committee would need to reassess the characterization of monetary policy as “patient” and might then use different language. This suggests that many Fed participants view the pause in rate hikes as a result of slower non-U.S. growth and tighter financial conditions. They also suggest that if global growth improves and financial conditions ease it would be appropriate to abandon a “patient” stance. … several […] participants argued that rate increases might prove necessary only if inflation outcomes were higher than in their baseline outlook. This second statement is much more dovish than the first. It suggests that several participants think that even improving global growth and an easing of financial conditions would not be sufficient to re-start rate hikes. They would also need to see inflation come in stronger than expected. Several other participants indicated that, if the economy evolved as they expected, they would view it as appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate later this year. Finally, this last statement reveals that several other participants disagree with the view that an unexpected rise in inflation is a pre-condition for further rate hikes. What can we make of all this mess? The first thing that seems clear is that all Fed members view easier financial conditions as a pre-condition for further rate hikes. In this regard, we are already well on our way. Financial conditions have eased considerably since the start of the year, with the stock-to-bond total return ratio up sharply and credit spreads, the VIX and the dollar all off their highs (Chart 2). Chart 2Financial Conditions Are Easing Second, all FOMC participants need more confidence that inflation will return to target before re-starting rate hikes, but this bar seems higher for some than for others. Year-over-year core and trimmed mean CPI are currently running at 2.15% and 2.19%, respectively. This is slightly below the 2.4% level that is consistent with the Fed’s inflation target (Chart 3).1 The minutes suggest that some FOMC participants would be comfortable re-starting rate hikes as long as core inflation moves higher in the next few months and approaches the Fed’s target from below. Some others, however, may need to see an overshoot of the Fed’s inflation target before recommending rate hikes. Chart 3Core Inflation Needs To Move Higher Depressed inflation expectations, as seen in the TIPS market or the Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey, are a related issue (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). The Fed will probably want to see upward movement in both of these measures before resuming rate hikes. In fact, New York Fed President John Williams warned last week that the “persistent undershoot of the Fed’s [inflation] target risks undermining the 2 percent inflation anchor.” He added that “the risk of the inflation expectations anchor slipping toward shore calls for a reassessment of the dominant inflation targeting framework.”2 Williams has long been an advocate for a monetary policy framework where the Fed targets an overshoot of its inflation target in the future to “make up” for undershooting its target in the past, i.e. some form of price level targeting. The Fed is currently conducting a year-long investigation into whether it should switch to this sort of regime and we learned last week that the Fed will announce the results of its investigation in the first half of 2020. Our own sense is that the Fed will eventually adopt some sort of “history dependent” inflation target as a way to avoid continuously bumping up against the zero-lower bound on interest rates. But this change will not occur this year and maybe not even next year. Of course, the more immediate concern for bond investors is whether inflation pressures will be meaningful enough in the next few months for the Fed to resume rate hikes in 2019. We expect they will be. We have previously shown that base effects alone will pressure year-over-year core CPI higher as we head toward mid-year.3 Meanwhile, other signs also point toward rising core inflation (Chart 4): Chart 4Inflation Pressures Building The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge is running close to 3% (Chart 4, top panel). The ISM Manufacturing PMI is off its highs, but is still consistent with rising year-over-year core CPI (Chart 4, panel 2). Our CPI Diffusion Index is deep in positive territory, pointing to further near-term upside in the core measure (Chart 4, bottom panel). Bottom Line: With financial conditions easing and core inflation more likely to rise than fall, the majority of Fed officials will feel justified lifting rates again this year. January’s FOMC minutes imply that several Fed members want to see an overshoot of the inflation target before advocating for the resumption of rate hikes, but until the Fed changes its inflation targeting regime they will likely be out-voted. The Best Way To Trade The Fed We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration bias in U.S. bond portfolios, on the view that rate hikes will exceed depressed market expectations on a 12-month horizon. However, this is not the most attractive way to position for the resumption of Fed rate hikes. The best way to trade the Fed in the current environment is by initiating a duration-neutral yield curve trade where you buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve, and sell the 5-year or 7-year maturity. In a prior report we demonstrated that the 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields are most sensitive to changes in our 12-month fed funds discounter.4 That is, when the market starts to price-in more Fed rate hikes, the 5-year and 7-year Treasury yields increase more than other maturities. Similarly, the 5-year and 7-year yields fall the most when our discounter declines. Clearly, this means that if you are short the 5-year/7-year part of the curve versus the wings, you will make money as rate hikes are priced back into the market. Usually the problem with implementing such a trade is that it has negative carry. That is, the 5-year or 7-year bullet typically offers a greater yield than what you would earn on a duration-matched 2/10 or 2/30 barbell. If you don’t time the trade properly, you end up losing money waiting for Fed rate hike expectations to move. However, this is not a problem at the moment. In fact, duration-matched barbells are now positive carry propositions relative to 5-year and 7-year bullets (Chart 5). Chart 5 Barbell Yields Greater Than Bullet Yields In other words, if you think rate hikes will resume at some point, you are currently getting paid to wait for the market to catch on. The only way to lose money in this sort of trade is if our 12-month fed funds discounter falls further from its current -9 bps level. We view that as an unlikely scenario. Bottom Line: The best way to position for the resumption of Fed rate hikes is to sell the 5-year or 7-year part of the Treasury curve, and buy a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve. We currently recommend being short the 7-year and long the 2/30 barbell. This trade has positive carry, meaning that you will earn money as you wait for rate hikes to get priced back in.  Corporate Spread Targets As we have discussed in prior reports, we think the Fed’s pause opens up a window where corporate bond spreads have room to tighten during the next few months.5 However, we also acknowledge that the window for outperformance is limited. Once financial conditions ease and the Fed resumes rate hikes, the environment will quickly become more difficult for corporate bonds. For this reason, in last week’s report we presented Chart 6. The diamonds in Chart 6 show where corporate 12-month breakeven spreads are today relative to past “Phase 2” periods, which are environments similar to today when the yield curve is quite flat but still positively sloped.6 We argued that we would be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure when the breakeven spreads reach the historical median for Phase 2 periods, i.e. when the diamonds fall to the 50% line in Chart 6. However, we acknowledge that this is not a helpful guide for investors who don’t have timely access to our valuation metrics. So this week we present Charts 7A and 7B. These charts estimate the option-adjusted spread (OAS) levels for each credit tier of the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond indexes that would be consistent with the 50% line in Chart 6. To make these estimates we need to assume that the average duration of each index remains constant. The results show the following spread targets: For Aa we target 55 bps. The current OAS is 61 bps. For A we target 84 bps. The current OAS is 94 bps. For Baa we target 128 bps. The current OAS is 161 bps. For Ba we target 186 bps. The current OAS is 236 bps. For B we target 298 bps. The current OAS is 391 bps. For Caa we target 571 bps. The current OAS is 813 bps. We do not recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated corporate bonds, where spreads are already expensive relative to past Phase 2 periods (Chart 7A, top panel). Chart 7aInvestment Grade Spread Targets Chart 7BHigh-Yield Spread Targets   Bottom Line: Maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) with the exception of the Aaa credit tier. But be prepared to reduce exposure when spreads reach our target levels. Economic Update We will finally receive GDP data for the fourth quarter of 2018 on Thursday, and investors should ready themselves for a weak number. In fact, the most recent tracking estimates from the New York Fed have real GDP coming in at 2.35% in Q4 and a mere 1.20% in 2019 Q1 (Chart 8). Chart 8Poor GDP Tracking Estimates ... It will come as no surprise that the trend in GDP growth is vital to our interest rate call. In fact, we showed in a recent report that when year-over-year nominal GDP growth falls below the 10-year Treasury yield it is often a good signal that monetary policy has turned restrictive and that interest rates have peaked for the cycle.7 With that in mind, if we add 1.2% expected real growth in Q1 to the 1.7% average growth rate of the GDP deflator (Chart 8, bottom panel), we can roughly estimate nominal GDP growth of 2.9% in Q1. This remains above the current 10-year Treasury yield, suggesting that monetary conditions would still be accommodative, but just barely. However, we expect the Q1 tracking forecast to improve as new data come in. According to the New York Fed’s model, the weak December retail sales report trimmed 0.41% from its Q1 growth forecast and this report increasingly looks like an aberration. In contrast to the retail sales number, the Johnson Redbook index of same-store sales is growing at a rate close to 5%, and indexes of consumer confidence remain elevated (Chart 9). Chart 9...Driven By Abnormal Retail Sales Even the Fed staff’s economic report, as presented in the January FOMC minutes, suggests that December should have been a good month for consumer spending: The release of the retail sales report for December was delayed, but available indicators – such as credit card and debit card transaction data and light motor vehicle sales – suggested that household spending growth remained strong in December. Bottom Line: However, we expect the Q1 tracking forecast to improve as new data come in. According to the New York it seems likely that the partial government shutdown influenced the collection of the December retail sales data and led to an abnormal print. Since the retail sales data feed directly into GDP, the impact will be felt in the next GDP report. But the impact will prove fleeting.   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Fed’s target is for 2% PCE inflation. CPI tends to run about 0.4% above PCE. 12-month core PCE is currently 1.88%, but data only go to November. This is why we refer to CPI in this report, which has data through January. 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/wil190222 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caught Offside”, dated February 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit”, dated January 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For more detail on the different phases of the economic cycle please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Running Room”, dated January 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification