新興市場

Highlights Geopolitical risks are starting to abate as a result of material constraints influencing policymakers. China needs to ensure its economy bottoms and a debt-deflationary tendency does not take hold. President Trump needs to avoid further economic deterioration arising from the trade war. The U.K. is looking to prevent a recession induced by leaving the EU without an agreement. Iran and the risk of an oil price shock is the outstanding geopolitical tail risk. Feature Readers of BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy know that what defines our research is our analytical framework – specifically the theory of constraints. Chart 1The Electoral College – An Overlooked Constraint The theory holds that policymakers are trapped by the pressures of their office, their nation’s global position, and the stream of events. These pressures emerge from the material world that we inhabit and as such are measurable. If a leader lacks popular approval, cannot command a majority in the legislature, rides atop a sinking economy, or suffers under stronger or smarter foreign enemies, then his policy preferences will be compromised. He will have to change his preferences to accommodate the constraints, rather than the other way around. Case in point is the U.S. electoral college: it proved an insurmountable political constraint on the Democratic Party in 2016. The college is intended to restrain direct democracy or popular passions; it also restrains the concentration of regional power. In 2012, Barack Obama won a larger share of the electoral college than the popular vote, while in 2016 Hillary Clinton won a smaller share (Chart 1). Clinton’s lack of appeal in the industrial Midwest turned the college and deprived her of the prize. The rest is history. In this report we highlight five key constraints that will shape the direction of the major geopolitical risks in the fourth quarter. We recommend investors remain tactically cautious on risk assets, although we have not yet extended this recommendation to the cyclical, 12-month time frame. China’s Policy: The Debt-Deflation Constraint We have a solid record of pessimism regarding Chinese President Xi Jinping’s willingness and ability to stimulate the economy – but even we were surprised by his tenacity this year. His administration’s effort to contain leverage, while still stimulating the economy, has prevented a quick rebound in the global manufacturing cycle. The constraint limiting this approach is the need to avoid a debt-deflation spiral. This is a condition in which households and firms become pessimistic about the future and cut back their spending and borrowing. The general price level falls and drives up real debt burdens, which motivates further cutbacks. A classic example is Japan, which saw a property bubble burst, destroying corporate balance sheets and forcing the country into a long phase of paying down debt amid falling prices. China has not seen its property bubble burst yet. Prices have continued to rise despite the recent pause in the non-financial debt build-up (Chart 2). Looser monetary and fiscal policy have sustained this precarious balance. But the result is a tug-of-war between the government and the private sector. If the government miscalculates, and the asset bubble bursts, then it will be extremely difficult for the government to change the mindset of households and companies bent on paying down debt. It will be too late to avoid the vicious spiral that Japan experienced – with the critical proviso that Chinese people are less wealthy than the Japanese in 1990 and the country’s political system is less flexible. A Japan-sized economic problem would lead to a China-sized political problem. This is why the recent drop in Chinese producer prices below zero is a worrisome sign (Chart 3). Policymakers have loosened monetary and fiscal policy incrementally since July 2018 and they are signaling that they will continue to do so. This is particularly likely in an environment in which trade tensions are reduced but remain fundamentally unresolved – which is our base case. Chart 2China's Property Bubble Intact Chart 3China's Constraint Is Debt-Deflation Are policymakers aware of this constraint? Absolutely. If the trade talks collapse, or the global economy slumps regardless, then China will have to stimulate more aggressively. Xi Jinping is not truly a Chairman Mao, willing to impose extreme austerity. He oversaw the 2015-16 stimulus and would do it again if he came face to face with the debt-deflation constraint. Is China still capable of stimulating? High debt levels, the reassertion of centralized state power, and the trade war have all rendered traditional stimulus levers less effective by dampening animal spirits. Yet policymakers are visibly “riding the brake,” so they can remove restraints and increase reflation if necessary. Most obviously, authorities can inject larger fiscal stimulus. They have insisted that they will prevent easy monetary and credit policies from feeding into property prices – and this could change. They could also pick up the pace when it comes to reducing average bank lending rates for small and medium-sized businesses.1 In short, stimulus is less effective, but the government is also preferring to save dry powder. This preference will be thrown by the wayside if it hits the critical constraint. The implication is that Chinese stimulus will continue to pick up over a cyclical, 12-month horizon. There is impetus to reduce trade tensions with the U.S., discussed below, but a lack of final resolution will ensure that policy tightening is not called for. Bottom Line: China’s chief economic constraint is a debt-deflation trap. This would engender long-term economic difficulties that would eventually translate into political difficulties for Communist Party rule. If a trade deal is reached, it is unlikely alone to require a shift to tighter policy. If the trade talks collapse, stimulus will overshoot to the upside. Trade War: The Electoral Constraint The U.S. and China are holding the thirteenth round of trade negotiations this week after a summer replete with punitive measures, threats, and failed restarts. Tensions spiked just ahead of the talks, as expected. Immediately thereafter President Trump declared he will meet with Chinese negotiators to give a boost to the process and reassure the markets.2 Trump’s major constraint in waging the trade war is economic, not political. Americans are generally sympathetic to his pressure campaign against China. Public opinion polls show that a strong majority believes it is necessary to confront China even though the bulk of the economic pain will be borne by consumers themselves (Chart 4). Yet Americans could lose faith in Trump’s approach once the economic pain fully materializes. Critically, the decline in wage growth that is occurring as a result of the global and manufacturing slowdown is concentrated in the states that are most likely to swing the 2020 election, e.g. the “purple” or battleground states (Chart 5). Chart 4Americans To Confront China Despite The Costs? Chart 5Trump Faces Pressure To Stage A Tactical Trade Retreat Furthermore, a rise in unemployment, which is implied by the recent decline in the University of Michigan’s survey of consumer confidence regarding the purchase of large household goods, would devastate voters’ willingness to give Trump’s tariff strategy the benefit of the doubt (Chart 6). Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, two critical states, have seen a net loss of manufacturing jobs on the year. The fear of an uptick in U.S. unemployment will prevent Trump from escalating the trade war. An uptick in unemployment would be a major constraint on Trump’s trade war – he cannot escalate further until the economy has stabilized. And that may very well require tariff rollback while trade talks “make progress.” We expect that Trump is willing to do this in the interest of staying in power. As highlighted above, the Xi administration is not without its own constraints. Our proxies for China’s marginal propensity to consume show that Chinese animal spirits are still vulnerable, particularly on the household side, which has not responded to stimulus thus far (Chart 7). Since this constraint is less immediate than Trump’s election date, Xi cannot be expected to capitulate to Trump’s biggest demands. Hence a ceasefire or détente is more likely than a full bilateral trade agreement. Chart 6Waning Consumer Confidence On Big Ticket Items Foreshadows Rise In Unemployment Trump’s electoral constraint also suggests that he needs to remove trade risks such as car tariffs on Europe and Japan (which we expect he will do). We have been optimistic on the passage of the USMCA trade deal but impeachment puts this forecast in jeopardy. Chart 7China's Trade War Constraint? Animal Spirits   Bottom Line: Trump will stage a tactical retreat on trade in order to soften the negative impact on the economy and reduce the chances of a recession prior to the November 3, 2020 election. China’s economic constraints are less immediate and it is unlikely to make major structural concessions. Hence we expect a ceasefire that temporarily reduces tensions and boosts sentiment rather than a bilateral trade agreement that initiates a fundamental deepening of U.S.-China economic engagement. U.S. Policy: The Economic Constraint The 2020 U.S. election is a critical political risk both because of the volatility it will engender and because of what we see as a 45% chance that it will lead to a change in the ruling party governing the world’s largest economy. Will Trump be the candidate? Yes. If Trump’s approval among Republicans breaks beneath the lows plumbed during the Charlottesville incident in 2017 (Chart 8A), then Trump has an impeachment problem, but otherwise he is safe from removal. Judging by the Republican-leaning pollster Rasmussen, which should reflect the party’s mood, Trump’s approval rating has not broken beneath its floor and may already be bouncing back from the initial hit of the impeachment inquiry (Chart 8B). The rise in support for impeachment and removal in opinion polls is notable, but it is also along party lines and will fade if the Democrats are seen as dragging on the process or trying to circumvent an election that is just around the corner. Chart 8ARepublican Opinion Precludes Trump’s Removal Chart 8BRepublican-Leaning Pollster Shows Support Holding Thus Far How will all of this bear on the 2020 election? Turnout will be high so everything depends on which side will be more passionate. A critical factor will be the Democratic nominee. Former Vice President Joe Biden, the establishment pick, has broken beneath his floor in the polling. His rambling debate performances have reinforced the narrative that he is too old, while the impeachment of Trump will fuel counteraccusations of corruption that will detract from Biden’s greatest asset: his electability. According to a Harvard-Harris poll from late September, 61% of voters believe it was inappropriate for Biden to withhold aid from Ukraine to encourage the firing of a Ukrainian prosecutor even when the polling question makes no mention of any connection with Biden’s son’s business interest there. Moreover, 77% believe it is inappropriate that Biden’s son Hunter traveled with his father to China while soliciting investments there. With Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s candidacy now defunct as a result of his heart attack and old age, Elizabeth Warren, the progressive senator from Massachusetts, will become the indisputable front runner (which she is not yet). In the fourth primary debate on October 15, she will face attacks from all sides reflecting this new status. Given her debate performances thus far, she will sustain the heightened scrutiny and come out stronger. This is not to say that Warren is already the Democratic candidate. Biden is still polling like a traditional Democratic primary front runner (Chart 9), while Warren has some clear weaknesses in electability, as reflected in her smaller lead over Trump in head-to-head polls in swing states. Nevertheless Warren is likely to become the front runner. Chart 9Biden Polling About Average Relative To Previous Democratic Primary Front Runners The recession call remains the U.S. election call. Two further considerations: Impeachment and removal of President Trump ensure a Democratic victory. There are hopes in some quarters that President Trump could be impeached and removed and yet his Vice President Mike Pence could go on to win the 2020 election, preserving the pro-business policy status quo. The problem with this logic is that Trump cannot be removed unless Republican opinion shifts. This will require an earthquake as a result of some wrongdoing by Trump. Such an earthquake will blacken Pence’s and the GOP’s name and render them toxic in the general election. Not to mention that Pence’s only act as president in the brief interim would likely be to pardon Trump and his accomplices. He would suffer Gerald Ford’s fate in 1976. Which means that a significant slide in Trump’s approval among Republicans will translate to higher odds of a Democratic win in 2020 and hence higher taxes and regulation, i.e. a hit to corporate earnings expectations. We expect this approval to hold up, but the market can sell off anyway because … The market is overrating the Senate as a check on Warren in the event she wins the White House. It is true that relative to Biden, Warren is less likely to carry the Senate. Democrats need to retain their Senate seat in Alabama, while capturing Maine, Colorado, and Arizona (or Georgia) in addition to the White House in order to control the Senate. Biden is more competitive in Arizona and Georgia than Warren. But this is a flimsy basis to feel reassured that a Warren presidency will be constrained. In fact, it is very difficult to unseat a sitting president. If the Democrats can muster enough votes to kick out an incumbent and elect an outspoken left-wing progressive from the northeast, they most likely will have mustered enough votes to take the Senate as well. For instance, unemployment could be rising or Trump’s risky foreign policy could have backfired. Chart 10Business Sentiment Threatens Trump Re-Election In our estimation the Democrats have about a 45% chance of winning the presidency, and Warren does not significantly reduce this chance. The resilient U.S. economy is Trump’s base case for success. But Trump’s trade policy and the global slowdown are rapidly eating away at the prospect that voters see improvement (Chart 10). This speaks to the constraint driving a ceasefire with China above, but it also speaks to the broader probability of policy continuity in the U.S. As Warren’s path to the White House widens, there is a clear basis for equities to sell off in the near term. Bottom Line: Trump’s approval among Republicans is a constraint on his removal via impeachment. But the status of the economy is the greater constraint. The recession call remains the election call. While we expect downside in the near term, we are still constructive on U.S. equities on a cyclical basis. War With Iran: The Oil Price Constraint The Senate will remain President Trump’s bulwark amid impeachment, notwithstanding the controversial news that Trump is moving forward with the withdrawal of troops from Syria, specifically from the so-called “safe zone” agreed with Turkey, giving Ankara license to stage a larger military offensive in Syria. This abandonment of the U.S.’s Kurdish allies at the behest of Turkey (which is a NATO ally but has been at odds with Washington) has provoked flak from Republican senators. However, it is well supported in U.S. public opinion (Chart 11). Trump is threatening to impose economic sanctions on Turkey if it engages in ethnic cleansing. The Turkish lira is the marginal loser, Trump’s approval rating is the marginal winner. The withdrawal sends a signal to the world that the U.S. is continuing to deleverage from the Middle East – a corollary with the return of focus on Asia Pacific. While the Iranians are key beneficiaries of this pivot, the Trump administration is maintaining maximum sanctions pressure on the Iranians. The firing of hawkish National Security Adviser John Bolton did not lead to a détente, as President Rouhani has too much to risk from negotiating with Trump. Instead the Iranians smelled U.S. weakness and went on the attack in Saudi Arabia, briefly shuttering 6 million barrels of oil per day. The response to the attack – from both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. – revealed an extreme aversion to military conflict and escalation. Instead the U.S. has tightened its sanctions regime – China is reportedly withdrawing from its interest in the South Pars natural gas project, a potentially serious blow to Iran, which had been hyping its strategic partnership with China. This reinforces the prospect for a U.S.-China ceasefire even as it redoubles the economic pressure on Iran. As long as the U.S. maintains the crippling sanctions on Iran, there is no guarantee that Tehran will not strike out again in an effort to weaken President Trump’s resolve. The fact that about 18% of global oil supply flows through the critical chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s ace in the hole (Chart 12). It is the chief constraint on Trump’s foreign policy, as greater oil supply disruptions could shock the U.S. economy ahead of the election. Trump can benefit from minor or ephemeral disruptions but he is likely to get into trouble if a serious shock weakens the economy at this juncture. Chart 11U.S. Opinion Constrains Foreign Policy Chart 12Oil Price Constrains U.S. Policy Toward Iran An oil shock does not have to originate in Hormuz shipping or sneak attacks on regional oil infrastructure. Iran is uniquely capable of fomenting the anti-government protests that have erupted in southern Iraq. The restoration of stability in Iraq has resulted in around 2 million barrels of oil per day coming onto international markets (Chart 13). If this process is reversed through political instability or sabotage, it will rapidly push up against global spare oil capacity and exert an upward pressure on oil prices that would come at an awkward time for a global economy experiencing a manufacturing recession (Chart 14). Chart 13Iran's Leverage Over Iraq Chart 14Global Oil Spare Capacity Constrains Response To Crisis Bottom Line: Iran’s power over regional oil production is the biggest constraint on Trump’s foreign policy in the region, yet Trump is apparently tightening rather than easing the sanctions regime. The failure of the Abqaiq attack to generate a lasting impact on oil prices amid weak global demand suggests that Iran could feel emboldened. The U.S. preference to withdraw from Middle Eastern conflicts could also encourage Iran, while the tightening of the sanctions regime could make it desperate. An oil shock emanating from the conflict with Iran is still a significant risk to the global bull market. Brexit: The No-Deal Constraint The fifth and final constraint to discuss in this report pertains to the U.K. and Brexit. We do not consider the October 31 deadline a no-deal exit risk. Parliament will prevail over a prime minister who lacks a majority. Nevertheless the expected election can revive no-deal risk, especially if Boris Johnson is returned to power with a weak minority government. Chart 15U.K.: Public Opinion Constrains Parliament And No-Deal Brexit While parliament is the constraint on the prime minister, the public is the constraint on parliament. From this point of view, support for Brexit has weakened and the Conservative Party is less popular than in the lead up to the 2015 and 2017 general elections. The public is aware that no-deal exit is likely to cause significant economic pain and that is why a majority rejects no-deal, as opposed to a soft Brexit. Unless the Tory rally in opinion polling produces another coalition with the Northern Irish, albeit with Boris Johnson at the helm, these points make it likely that a no-deal Brexit will become untenable when all is said and done (Chart 15). If Johnson achieves a single party majority the EU will be more likely to grant concessions enabling him to get a withdrawal deal over the line. We remain long GBP-USD but will turn sellers at the $1.30 mark. Investment Implications The path of least resistance is for China’s stimulus efforts to increase – incrementally if trade tensions are contained, and sharply if not. This should help put a floor beneath growth, but the Q1 timing of this floor means that global risk assets face additional downside in the near term. We continue to recommend going long our “China Play” index. U.S.-China trade tensions should decline as President Trump looks to prevent higher unemployment ahead of his election. China has reason to follow through on small concessions to encourage Trump’s tactical trade retreat, but it does not face pressure to make new structural concessions. We expect a ceasefire – with some tariff rollback likely – but not a big bang agreement that removes all tariffs or deepens the overall bilateral economic engagement. Stay long our “China Play” index. We remain short CNY-USD on a strategic basis but recognize that a ceasefire presents a short term (maximum 12-month) risk to this view, so clients with a shorter-term horizon should close that trade. We are long European equities relative to Chinese equities as a result of the view that China will stimulate but that a trade ceasefire will leave lingering uncertainties over Chinese corporates. U.S. politics are highly unpredictable but constraint-based analysis indicates that while the House may impeach, the Senate will not remove. This, combined with Warren’s likely ascent to the head of the pack in the Democratic primary race, means that Trump remains favored to win reelection, albeit with low conviction (55% chance) due to a weak general approval rating and economic risks. The risk to U.S. equities is immediate, but should dissipate. The U.S. is rotating its strategic focus from the Middle East to Asia Pacific, which entails a continued rotation of geopolitical risk. However, recent developments reinforce our argument in July that Iranian geopolitical risk is frontloaded relative to the China risk. This is true as long as Trump maintains crippling sanctions. Iran may be emboldened by its successes so far and has various mechanisms – including Iraqi instability – by which it can threaten oil supply to pressure Trump. This is a tail risk, but it does support our position of being long EM energy producers.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research, China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Mild Deflation Means Timid Easing,” October 9, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 China knows that Trump wants to seal a deal prior to November 2020 to aid his reelection campaign, while Trump needs to try to convince China that he does not care about election, the stock market, or anything other than structural concessions from China. Hence the U.S. blacklisted several artificial intelligence companies and sanctioned Chinese officials in advance of the talks. The U.S. opened a new front in the conflict by invoking China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which is also an implicit warning not to create a humanitarian incident in Hong Kong where protests continue to rage. These are pressure tactics but have not yet derailed the attempt to seal a deal in Q4.

Analysis on Turkey is available below. Highlights A dovish Fed or robust U.S. growth does not constitute sufficient conditions for a bull market in EM. China’s business and credit cycles are much more important factors for EM than those of the U.S. A recovery in the Chinese economy and global manufacturing is not imminent. The common signal reverberating from various financial markets is that the risks to the global business cycle are still skewed to the downside. Feature Current investor perceptions of emerging markets are mixed. Some expect EM to benefit greatly from low U.S. interest rates. These investors view even a partial trade deal between the U.S. and China as sufficient for EM to embark on a bull market. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team disagrees with this narrative. We deliberated the significance of the U.S.-China confrontation to EM in our September 19 report; therefore, we will not go over this subject here. Rather, in this report we discuss some of the more common misconceptions surrounding EM currently, and infer what these mean for investment strategies. Perception 1: The share of resource sectors (materials and energy) in the EM equity benchmark has declined substantially. This along with the expanded role of consumers and consumer stocks (Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu) in EM economies and equity markets has made their share prices less exposed to the global trade cycle and commodities prices. Reality: It is true that in many EM bourses, the weight of consumer stocks has been growing. Nevertheless, their financial markets in general, and equity markets in particular, remain very sensitive to the global trade cycle and commodities prices. Chart I-1 illustrates that the aggregate EM equity index has historically been and continues to be strongly correlated with the global basic materials stock index. The latter includes mining, steel and chemical companies. Global materials stocks also exhibit a very strong correlation with Chinese banks’ share prices. Moreover, global materials stocks also exhibit a very strong correlation with Chinese banks’ share prices (Chart I-2). The rationale for the high correlation is that both mainland banks’ profits and global demand for basic materials are driven by a common factor: China’s business cycle. Chart I-1EM And Global Materials Stocks Move Together Chart I-2Chinese Bank And Global Materials Share Prices Are Highly Correlated For example, construction in China is contracting (Chart I-3), which entails both higher NPLs for Chinese banks and lower demand for basic materials. China accounts for about 50% of global consumption of industrial metals, cement and many other basic materials. Finally, EM ex-China bank stocks also correlate strongly with global basic materials share prices. The basis is as follows: Many emerging economies export raw materials, and commodities price fluctuations impact their business cycle, exports and exchange rates. Chart I-3China: Construction Activity Is Contracting Chart I-4High-Yielding EM: Currencies And Local Bond Yields Historically, in high-yielding EM markets, currency depreciation has led to higher interest rates and lower bank share prices, and vice versa (Chart I-4). Lately, EM bond yields have not risen in response to EM currency depreciation. However, we believe this correlation will soon be re-established if EM currencies continue drifting lower.  In short, China’s money/credit cycles drive not only the mainland’s business cycle, banking profits and NPLs, but also global trade and commodities prices. The latter two - via their impact on exchange rates and in turn interest rates - have historically explained credit and domestic demand cycles in high-yielding EM. Perception 2:  EM stocks are a high-beta play on the S&P 500, i.e., EM equities outperform when the S&P 500 rallies, and vice versa. Reality: Since 2012, the beta for EM equity versus the S&P 500 has often been below one (Chart I-5). Furthermore, since 2012, EM share prices often failed to outpace their DM peers during global equity rallies. Indeed, EM relative equity performance versus DM, as well as the EM ex-China currency total return index, have been closely tracking the relative performance of global cyclicals versus global defensive stocks (Chart I-6). Chart I-5EM Equities Beta To The S&P 500 Chart I-6Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Equity Ratio And EM   In short, EM equities and currencies have been, and will remain, sensitive to the global business cycle rather than the S&P 500. Since 2012, the latter has - on several occasions - decoupled from the global manufacturing and trade cycles. Perception 3:  EM stocks, currencies and fixed-income markets are very sensitive to U.S. interest rates. Hence, a dovish Fed will lead to EM currency appreciation.  Reality: Chart I-7 reveals that EM currencies, total returns on EM local currency bonds in U.S. dollar terms and EM sovereign credit spreads do not exhibit a strong relationship with U.S. Treasury yields. U.S. interest rate expectations have a much smaller impact on EM financial markets than commonly perceived by the investment community.  Overall, U.S. interest rate expectations have a much smaller impact on EM financial markets than commonly perceived by the investment community.  Chart I-7EM And U.S. Bond Yields: No Stable Correlation Chart I-8China Cycle And EM Stocks Led U.S. Bond Yields On the contrary, the declines in U.S. bond yields in both 2015/16 and in 2018/19 were due to the growth slowdown that emanated from China/EM. The top panel of Chart I-8 illustrates that Chinese import growth rolled over in December 2017, yet U.S. bond yields rolled over in October 2018. What is more, EM share prices have been leading U.S. bond yields in recent years, not the other way around (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Perception 4:  If the U.S. avoids a recession, EM risk assets will recover. Chart I-9EM Profits Are Driven By Chinese Not U.S. Business Cycle Reality: EM per-share earnings contracted in 2012-2014 and in 2019, despite reasonably robust growth in U.S. final demand (Chart I-9, top panel). This suggests that even if the U.S. economy avoids a recession, that will not be a sufficient condition to be bullish on EM. EM corporate profits are highly driven by China’s business cycle. The bottom panel of Chart I-9 illustrates that mainland domestic industrial orders have been the key driver of EM corporate profit cycles since 2008. Perception 5:  EM equities, fixed-income markets and currencies are cheap. Reality: EM stocks are not cheap. They are fairly valued. Equity sectors with very poor fundamentals have very low multiples. Hence, they are “cheap” for a reason. These include Chinese banks, state-owned enterprises in various countries and resource companies. Equity segments with robust fundamentals are overpriced. Given that Chinese banks, state-owned enterprises in various countries, resource companies, and cyclical businesses have very large market caps, EM market-cap based equity valuation ratios are low – i.e., they appear cheap.  To remove the impact of these large market cap segments, we constructed and have been publishing the following valuation ratios: median, 20% trimmed mean and equal-sub-sector weighted (Chart I-10). Each of these is calculated based on the average of trailing and forward P/E ratios, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings and price-to-dividend ratios. EM equities relative to DM are not cheap either. Chart I-11 demonstrates the same ratios – median, 20% trimmed-mean and equal-sub-sector weighted values for EM versus DM. Chart I-10EM Equities Are Not Cheap Chart I-11Relative To DM EM Stocks Are Not Cheap Further, when valuations are not at extremes as in the case of EM equities at the moment, the profit cycle holds the key to share price performance over a 6 to 12-month horizon. EM earnings are presently contracting in absolute terms, and underperforming DM EPS. Two currencies that offer value are the Mexican peso and Russian ruble. Chart I-12EM Local Yields Are Low In Absolute Terms And Relative To U.S. In the fixed-income space, EM local bond yields are very low in absolute terms and relative to U.S. Treasury yields (Chart I-12). EM sovereign and corporate spreads are not wide either. As to exchange rates, the cheapest currencies are those with the worst fundamentals, such as the Argentine peso, Turkish lira and South African rand. The majority of other EM currencies are not very cheap. Two currencies that offer value are the Mexican peso and Russian ruble. Yet foreign investors are very long these currencies, and a combination of lower oil prices and portfolio outflows from broader EM will weigh on these exchange rates as well. Takeaways And Investment Strategy Chart I-13EM Currencies And Industrial Metals Prices EM risk assets and currencies exhibit the strongest correlation with global trade and commodities prices. Chart I-13 indicates that the EM ex-China currency total return index closely tracks commodities prices. This corroborates the messages from Chart I-1 on page 1 and Chart I-6 on page 4.  China’s business and credit cycles are much more important for EM than those of the U.S. A dovish Fed or strong U.S. growth are not sufficient reasons to bet on an EM bull market. A recovery in the Chinese economy and global manufacturing is not imminent. Individual EM countries’ domestic fundamentals such as return on capital, inflation, banking system health, competitiveness and politics drive individual EM performance. On these accounts, the outlook varies among EM. Readers can find analyses on specific EM economies in our Countries In-Depth page. Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM stocks, credit and currencies versus their DM counterparts.  Absolute-return investors should outright avoid EM, or trade them on the short side. Within the EM equity space, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, Central Europe, Korea ex-tech, Thailand and the UAE. Our underweights are South Africa, Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, Turkey and Colombia. The path of least resistance for the U.S. dollar is up. Continue shorting the following basket of EM currencies versus the dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. We are also short the CNY versus the greenback. As always, the list of our country allocations for local currency bonds and sovereign credit markets is available at the end of our reports – please refer to page 16. Take Cues From These Markets We suggest investors take cues from the following financial market signals. They are unequivocally sending a downbeat message for global growth and risk assets: The ratio between Sweden and Swiss non-financial stocks in common currency terms is heading south (Chart I-14). Swedish non-financials include many companies leveraged to the global industrial cycle, while Swiss non-financials are dominated by defensive stocks. Hence, the persistent decline in this ratio presages a continued deterioration in the global industrial sector. Where is the next defense line for this ratio? To reach its 2002 and 2008 nadirs, it will need to drop by another 10%. In the interim, investors should maintain a defensive posture. Chart I-14A Message From Swedish And Swiss Equities Chart I-15A Breakdown In The Making? U.S. FAANG stocks appear to be cracking below their 200-day moving average. The relative performance of global cyclical versus global defensive stocks is relapsing below the three-year moving average that served as a support last December (Chart I-15). U.S. FAANG stocks appear to be cracking below their 200-day moving average (Chart I-16). If this support gives, the next one will be about 17% below current levels. Finally, U.S. high-beta share prices are on the verge of a breakdown (Chart I-17). The next technical support is 10% below current levels. Chart I-16FAANG Are On The Support Line Chart I-17U.S. High-Beta Stocks Are On The Edge Bottom Line: The common message reverberating from these financial markets corroborates our fundamental analysis that a global business cycle recovery is not imminent, and that global risk assets in general, and EM financial markets in particular, are at risk of selling off further. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Turkey: Is The Mean-Reversion Rally Over? Turkish financial markets have rebounded to their respective falling trend lines (Chart II-1). Are they set to break out or is a setback looming? Chart II-1Back To Falling Trend Chart II-2TRY Is Cheap Pros The economy has undergone a considerable real adjustment and many excesses have been purged: The current account balance has turned positive as imports have collapsed. Going forward, lower oil prices are likely to help the nation’s current account dynamics. The lira has become cheap (Chart II-2).  According to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs, the currency is one standard deviation below its fair value. Core and headline inflation have fallen, allowing the central bank to cut interest rates aggressively. However, the exchange rate still holds the key: if the currency depreciates anew, local bonds yields will rise and the ability of the central bank to reduce borrowing costs further will diminish. Finally, private credit and broad money growth have decelerated substantially and are contracting in inflation-adjusted terms (Chart II-3). Chart II-3Money & Credit Have Bottomed Chart II-4Banks Have Been Aggressively Buying Government Bonds The recent gap between broad money and private credit growth has been due to commercial banks buying government bonds (Chart II-4). When a commercial bank purchases a security from non-banks, a new deposit/new unit of money supply is created. Banks’ purchases of government bonds en masse have capped domestic bond yields. However, if pursued aggressively, such monetary expansion could weigh on the currency’s value.   Cons Presently, potential sources of macro vulnerability in Turkey are: Foreign debt obligations (FDOs) – which are calculated as the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months – are at $168 billion, which is sizable. The annual current account surplus has reached only $4 billion and is sufficient to cover only 2.5% of FDOs, assuming the capital and financial account balance will be zero. Clearly, Turkey needs to both roll over most of its foreign debt coming due and attract foreign capital to finance a potential expansion in its imports if its domestic demand is to recover. Critically, $20 billion of net FX reserves, excluding gold, swap lines with foreign central banks and net of domestic banking and non-banking corporations’ foreign exchange deposits, are not adequate either to cover foreign debt obligations. Even though headline and core inflation measures have fallen, wage inflation remains rampant (Chart II-5). If wage inflation does not drop substantially very soon, rapidly rising unit labor costs will feed into inflation leading to negative ramifications for the exchange rate. This is especially crucial in Turkey given President Erdogan has undermined the central bank’s credibility and is resorting to populist measures to revive his popularity. Finally, Turkish banks remain under-provisioned. Currently, the banking regulator is requiring banks to boost their non-performing loans (NPL) ratio to 6.3% of total loans.This a far cry from the 2001 episode when the NPL ratio shot up to 25% (Chart II-6).   Even though interest rates rose much more in 2001 than last year, the private credit penetration in the economy was very low in the early 2000s. A higher credit penetration usually implies weaker borrowers have borrowed money and heralds a higher NPL ratio. Typically, following a credit boom and bust, it is natural for the NPL ratio to exceed 10%. We do not think Turkish banks stocks, having rallied a lot from their lows, are pricing in such a scenario. Chart II-5Surging Wages Are A Risk Chart II-6NPL Ratio Is Unrealistic Investment Recommendation We recommend both absolute-return investors and asset allocators not to chase Turkish financial markets higher. Renewed market volatility lies ahead. Given we expect foreign capital outflows from EM, Turkish companies and banks will encounter difficulties in rolling over their external debt and attracting foreign capital into domestic markets. This will produce a new downleg in the exchange rate. In turn, currency depreciation will weigh on performance of local bonds as well as sovereign and corporate credit. Stay underweight.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The Chinese economy is still slowing, and there is not yet enough evidence from forward-looking economic data to suggest a turnaround is imminent. Deflation has returned to China’s industrial sector. Even though overall price deceleration has been relatively mild, it is further squeezing already deteriorating industrial profit growth. We do not expect deflation to spiral into a 2015/2016-style episode, which removes at least one risk to our growth outlook. At the same time, a mild deceleration in prices will not provide enough incentive for Chinese policymakers to hit the stimulus button.  The People’s Bank of China’s new interest rate-setting regime, the LPR, will not provide much in the way of stimulus over the next few months. But it has the potential to improve China’s monetary policy transmission mechanism over the coming year, increasing the odds that policymakers will succeed in stabilizing economic activity. Short-term downside risks to growth have not abated, and we remain tactically bearish on Chinese stocks. Cyclically, we continue to recommend an overweight stance, on the basis of an eventual reacceleration in economic activity. Feature Chart 1The Chinese Economy Is Still Slowing China’s economy is at a critical juncture: “Half-measured” stimulus so far has been able to keep the domestic economy in better shape than in the 2015-2016 down cycle, but overall economic activity has not bottomed (Chart 1). The Sino-America trade talk has resumed at the moment, but the two sides have yet to make any substantive progress towards a deal. In the meantime, the global economy has also reached a critical point where the degree of economic weakness has the potential to feed on itself, possibly triggering a recession.1  This underscores our tactically bearish stance towards Chinese stocks versus the global equity benchmark. Barring more forceful stimulus or resolution on the trade front, any external shock and/or internal policy missteps could easily tip the Chinese economy into a deeper growth slowdown. Hence, downside risks remain elevated for Chinese stocks over the next 3- to 6-months.    The “D” Word Returns, But Won’t Spur Aggressive Further Easing Chart 2Industrial Price Deflation Returns Economic data over the past two months have provided mixed signals. Readings from both China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) PMI and from the Caixin PMI show an improvement in the manufacturing sector. However, industrial deflation has returned to China: Three years after the country declared victory against a prolonged industrial destocking cycle, producer price inflation (PPI) relapsed into negative territory in July and declined further in August (Chart 2).   While prices are typically lagging indicators and reflect lingering effects from past economic conditions, there is not enough evidence in forward-looking economic data right now to suggest a turnaround in the economy is imminent.2  A deflationary PPI is not a trivial source of concern for Chinese policymakers. Last time growth in China’s PPI turned negative, it took policymakers four and a half years and an annualized 28% of GDP worth of credit expansion to pull the industrial sector out of its deflationary cycle. Chart 3Deflation Threatens Recovery In Industrial Profit Growth For investors, deflation has pernicious effects on profits, and we have received several client inquiries concerning the topic since PPI growth turned negative. The historical relationship suggests profit growth for both the A-share and investable markets is highly linked to fluctuations in producer prices (Chart 3), and China’s industrial sector profit growth has already been rapidly deteriorating over the past 12 months. The good news is that we do not expect the current episode of PPI deflation to become as protracted as it did in 2012-2016, or as severe as in 2015-2016. Two reasons underpin our view: Since early-2018, monetary policy has been much easier than during past deflationary episodes. Monetary policy in the past year and half has been much more accommodative than in the three years leading to the deep industrial deflationary cycle in 2015, particularly on the exchange rate front. The RMB was soft-pegged to a rising U.S. dollar before it was decoupled by the PBoC in August 2015, and was appreciating against its trading partners throughout most of 2012-2015. Bank lending rates were also kept at historically high levels during this period (Chart 4). This time, even though money and credit growth has not returned to the same pace as in 2015-2016, current ultra-loose monetary conditions should spur enough credit growth to keep prices from deflating aggressively. Chart 4Monetary Conditions Easier Than Last Cycle Inventory levels are low, and capacity levels do not appear to be overly excessive. After years of industrial consolidation, China’s industrial capacity does not appear to be particularly excessive compared to the past cycle. This is distinctively different from the prolonged contraction in PPI between 2012 and 2016, when China’s industrial inventories were coming off a five-year-long destocking cycle, and capacity utilization fell markedly (Chart 5). This is not the case today. Moreover, even though final demand has been weak, production has retrenched even more, drawing down inventories to the point where the pace of inventory destocking may have reached a cyclical bottom (Chart 6). A re-stocking of industrial goods should boost producers’ pricing power. Chart 5Capacity Is Not Excessively Underutilized Chart 6Inventory Destocking May Be Bottoming Out But the bad news (for investors), is that contained, or mild producer price deflation will not be reason alone to spur aggressive further easing from policymakers. This means that the re-emergence of price deflation, even mild and short-lived, will weigh on earnings and investor sentiment. Bottom Line: This episode of producer price deflation is unlikely to become as pernicious as occurred in the past, but policymakers are thus unlikely to act aggressively to counter it. While this removes some of the downside risks for Chinese stocks, even mild deflation will weigh on earnings growth (and thus sentiment) which underscores our tactically bearish stance on Chinese stocks. Demystifying China’s New Loan Prime Rate: Not The Stimulus You Are Looking For On August 20th, the PBoC launched a new loan prime rate (LPR) system, a revamped reference regime for setting bank loan interest rates3 (Chart 7). In September, the new LPR rate for one-year bank loans was lowered by five basis points. Since then, the market has been fixated on predicting whether the PBoC will cut the Medium-Lending Facility (MLF) rate next, which would be perceived as a change in China’s monetary stance. Chart 7China's New LPR: A Shadow 'Tax Cut' PBoC will increase its control of the pricing of credit, while tight financial regulations will restrict the size and speed of credit growth. The new LPR reform, in our view, is designed to force state-owned (and better-capitalized) commercial banks to hand out a “tax cut” to struggling small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by lowering bank lending rates. At the same time, it allows the PBoC to take back control of the pricing of credit from commercial banks, “killing two birds with one stone.” There are three main market implications from this approach: The new LPR is likely to gradually narrow the gap between corporate bond yields (i.e. “market rates”) and bank lending rates; A cut in the MLF rate in the near term should be interpreted as a “reward” to commercial banks rather than a stimulus for the economy; Most importantly, the new LPR system does not mean rapid credit expansion is in the cards. Quite the opposite, in the near term, banks may tighten their lending. The wide spread between the 3-month interbank repo rate and average bank lending rate illustrates the reason why the PBoC has introduced the LPR.4 This gap is also evident when comparing the yield of AAA-rated corporate bonds and the average bank lending rate (Chart 8). These gaps exist because Chinese commercial banks have largely manipulated the 1-year bank lending rate set by the PBoC when lending to their “preferred customers,” usually state-owned enterprises and real estate developers, by offering significantly discounted loan rates. Banks then charge substantial “risk premiums” on loans to the private sector, mostly SMEs, to make up for the narrower profit margins on loans to SOEs (Chart 9). Chart 8An Impaired Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism Chart 9Evidence Of Asymmetrical Lending Practices The new LPR system is designed to minimize this discrepancy, since the new LPRs are more market based and are quoted based on the price of loans banks charge their prime clients. By design, the new LPR system should force the average bank lending rate closer to the rate companies borrow in the bond market. This means bank lending rates will be guided lower, including lending rates for SMEs. However, the new system will be implemented in phases, and the PBoC is likely to gradually guide LPRs lower to allow banks to readjust their pricing models.  The LPR rate is essentially the MLF rate plus bank profit margins (the added basis points above the MLF rate). The market will guide the top line lending rate, while the PBoC will have control over the floor rate (MLF) through open market operations. The fact that the PBoC is keeping the MLF rate unchanged while allowing the LPR to drop (albeit slightly) sends an explicit message: The PBoC is forcing banks to lower lending rates first before boosting their now-narrowed profit margins by lowering the MLF rate. In contrast to expectations of market participants that the LPR system will ease credit conditions, banks may actually tighten their lending in the coming months. While the PBoC will increase its control of the pricing of bank loans by the rate reform plan, the strengthening in financial regulations that has occurred over the past year will restrict the size and speed of credit growth. This combination has created more room for monetary easing without unleashing “animal spirits.” Borrowing costs to risky institutions have been higher since the Baoshang Bank takeover and are likely to remain elevated even if interest rates are lower (Chart 10). More importantly, mortgage and real estate developer loans together account for nearly 30% of total bank credit. Unless policymakers ease the brakes on lending restrictions to the property sector, bank lending growth is unlikely to pick up meaningfully (Chart 11). In fact, the PBoC has explicitly excluded mortgage and property-related lending from benefitting from the LPR rate cut.5 Barring a significant worsening in economic data, we do not expect the PBoC to lower mortgage lending and real estate-related loan rates in the coming months. Chart 10Tightened Financial Regulations Will Keep Cost Of Risky Lending High Chart 11Mortgage Rate Unlikely To Return To Its 2016 Low Finally, in the next two- to three-quarter mandatory implementation period, banks will be readjusting their pricing and credit risk-assessing models. During the transition, we expect more cautious sentiment among both lenders and borrowers. Hence, in the short term, bank loan growth may actually moderate. Bottom Line: The new LPR system may lower China’s banking sector profits in the short term. But in the next 6- to 12-months, we expect the PBoC to compensate commercial banks by keeping ample liquidity in the interbank system and by eventually lowering the MLF rate. The new LPR system may slow bank credit growth in the next few months, but after its full implementation (by the second quarter of 2020), it will have the potential to make PBoC’s policy more effective. Investment Conclusions We expect two phases of Chinese equity relative performance over the coming year: one phase of flat-to-potentially seriously down performance to last from now until sometime in the first quarter of 2020 when the economy bottoms, and then a phase of outperformance. Our expectation that the economy will bottom in Q1 2020 rests on the existing reflationary response by Chinese policymakers and an improved monetary transmission mechanism. Chart 12We Expect The Chinese Economy To Bottom In Q1 2020 Our expectation that the economy will bottom in the first quarter of 2020 continues to rest on the existing reflationary response by Chinese policymakers (Chart 12), and the fact that China’s new LPR system has the potential to improve what is currently a seriously impaired monetary transmission mechanism beyond the next two or three quarters. But the existing response of policymakers has been considerably more measured when compared to past economic cycles, meaning that equity investors are unlikely to be as forward-looking as they otherwise might be. Weak producer price deflation will weigh on investor sentiment, and it is unlikely to be weak enough to spur aggressive further easing. The potential for further escalation of the U.S.-China trade war also compellingly argues against an overweight stance in the near-term, even if we expect economic growth to subsequently improve. Consequently, we remain tactically bearish and cyclically bullish towards Chinese stocks: medium-term investors who are already positioned in favor of China-related assets should stay long, whereas investors who have not yet moved to an overweight stance should wait for a better buying opportunity to emerge over the coming few months.   Jing Sima China Strategist JingS@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Outlook “Fourth Quarter 2019 Strategy Outlook: A “Show Me” Market”, dated October 4, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “China Macro And Market Review”, dated October 2, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3      Announcement of the People’s Bank of China on Improving Loan Prime Rate (LPR) Formation Mechanism, August 19, 2019, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/3877490/index.html 4      PBC Official Answers Press Questions on Improving Loan Prime Rate (LPR) Formation Mechanism, August 20, 2019, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/3877865/index.html 5      Announcement of the People’s Bank of China No.16, August 27, 2019, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/3881177/index.html Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

特別レポート

ハイライト 冷戦は米中対立の限定的な類推に過ぎない; 多極化する世界では、貿易の完全な二分化は困難、いや不可能に近い; 歴史は、ライバル同士の貿易は最小限の障害しかなく継続すると示唆している; 長期的には、防衛株、欧州、キャップエックス、非同盟国を買う。 特集 中国と米国が冷戦へ突き進んでいるという見方が強まっている。BCA Researchは、少なくとも投資コミュニティに関しては、この合意形成に一役買った — 2012年9月に「Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?」を掲載したことである。1 この10年の大部分において、ジオポリティカル・ストラテジーは地政学リスクがますます無関係になりつつある中東から、ますます重要性を増すであろう東アジアへと回帰しているという説に焦点を当ててきた。 この仮説はなお示唆に富むが、それが必ずしも「シリコン・カーテン」が世界を二つの分断された資本主義圏に分けることを意味するわけではない。貿易、資本フロー、人の交流は中国と米国の間で継続し、場合によっては拡大するだろう。しかし、軍事的なものを含む紛争のリスクは低下しない。 本報告では、まず米中緊張の背後にある地政学的論理を概観する。次に、貿易および経済関係の観点から両国の関係がどのように展開するかに関する手がかりを得るために学術文献を精査する。政治理論からの証拠は意外であり、投資に極めて関連性が高い。その後、投資家にとって意味するところを探るために歴史を遡る。 結論として、米国と中国が地政学的ライバルであり続ける可能性が高いと考える。ただし、多極化という地政学的文脈のために、結果として「分断された資本主義」が生じるとは考えにくい。むしろ、地政学が評価、モメンタム、ファンダメンタルズ、マクロ経済と並んで投資機会とリスクを決定する要因群の歴史的な位置を占める、刺激的で変動の大きい環境が投資家を待ち受けると予想する。 トゥキディデスの罠は現実である … 1897年にライヒスタークで演説したドイツの外相ベルンハルト・フォン・ビューローは、ドイツが「太陽の下での自らの場所」を要求すべき時であると宣言した。2 これは東アジアに対するドイツの政策を巡る討議の場であった。ビューローは間もなくカイザー・ヴィルヘルム2世の下で首相に就き、ドイツ外交政策をリアルポリティークからヴェルトポリティークへと進化させる過程を監督した。リアルポリティークがビスマルク首相下で慎重に列強の均衡を保つ姿勢を特徴としたのに対し、ヴェルトポリティークはビューローとヴィルヘルム2世が攻撃的な外交・貿易政策を通じて現状を書き換えようとした。 帝政ドイツは、アテネから現代の中華人民共和国に至るまでの敵対者の長いリストに加わり、人類史の悲劇的な劇とも呼べる「トゥキディデスの罠」に名を連ねた。3 Chart 1 帝国の過剰拡張 帝国の過剰拡張 帝国の過剰拡張 この基本概念は世界史を学ぶ者にはよく知られている。その名はギリシャの歴史家トゥキディデスと彼の代表作History of the Peloponnesian Warに由来する。トゥキディデスはなぜスパルタとアテネが戦争に至ったのかを説明するが、同時代の他者のように道徳化したり神々を非難したりはしない。むしろ、改革を志向するアテネと既存勢力であるスパルタの対立が不信の連鎖によって不可避になったことを冷静に描写している。 米国の国際関係論を代表する学者の一人、グラハム・アリソンは、現状勢力と挑戦者の相互作用はほとんど常に紛争を導いたと主張している。彼が調査した16例のうち12例で実際の軍事衝突が発生した。戦争に至らなかった4例のうち3例は、深い文化的親和性と既存の制度への尊重を共有する国間の移行を伴っていた。4 これらのケースでは、移行は新しい経営陣がほぼ同じ組織構造を運営するようなものだった。そして、戦争に至らなかった4例のうちの一つはまさにソ連と米国の冷戦であった。 現状勢力にとって根本的な問題は、その帝国または「勢力圏」が最盛期と同じ大きさのままである点にある。しかし、相対的な衰退は古典的な「帝国の過剰拡張」の問題を引き起こす。覇権的または帝国的な勢力は、もはや維持できない現状を誤って固持しようとする（Chart 1）。 挑戦者側も責めを免れない。挑戦者は覇権国の弱さを感じ取り、地域的な勢力圏を形成し始める。問題は、地域覇権が世界的覇権への跳躍台になり得る点だ。挑戦者の意図が限定的で抑制的であったとしても（しばしば野心的で横柄であるが）、現状勢力は意図ではなく能力に反応せざるを得ない。能力は物質的かつ実在のものであるのに対し、意図は認知された一時的なものである。 挑戦者には常にその野心を正当化する内的論理がある。中国の場合、今日のエリートの間には国家が長い歴史の多くの世紀にわたってあったあり方へ単に平均回帰しているにすぎないという感覚がある（Chart 2）。言い換えれば、中国は過去300年を現状と定義するならば「挑戦者」だが、もっと昔に遡れば「既存」の強国である。したがって、中国の合意形成では、現代の状況は西洋の帝国主義による既存の中国および地域秩序への「挑戦」の結果に過ぎないため、現状に対して従属すべきではないとされる。 Chart 2 中国の平均回帰的な物語 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 加えて、中国は少なくとも米国と同等に世界経済にとって重要であり、したがって国際ガバナンスにおいてより大きな発言権に値するという正当な主張を持っている。米国がなお世界経済のより大きなシェアを占めている一方で、中国は過去20年で世界の増分GDPに対して23％を寄与しており、米国の13％と比べて大きい（Chart 3）。 Chart 3 北京コンセンサス 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 結論： 中国と米国の間で顕在化している緊張は、トゥキディデスの罠の理論的かつ実証的な枠組みにきれいに当てはまる。我々は、両国が世俗的または予測可能な範囲で闘争と対立を回避する方法はないと見ている。 では、投資家にとって何を意味するか。ひとつには、防衛株の背後にある長期的な追い風は持続するだろう。しかしそれ以外は？ 世界経済は完全に二分化され、シリコン・カーテンで隔てられた二つの軍事陣営に分かれる運命にあるのか？ アリババとアマゾンの協定は、冷戦時代のNATOとワルシャワ条約機構のように互いに疑いのまなざしを向け合うのか？ 答えは、慎重に言えば、否である。 …しかし経済の二分化には至らない トランプ大統領の強硬な通商政策も、ある程度までは政治理論に整合する。 政治学におけるリアリズムは、貿易を含むすべての関係において絶対利得より相対利得に焦点を当てる。なぜなら、貿易は経済的繁栄をもたらし、繁栄は経済剰余の蓄積へ、経済剰余は軍事費、研究開発へとつながるからである。競争を重視し相対利得のみを気にする国家同士はゼロサムゲームを生み出し、協力の余地はなくなる。これは協力を選ばないことで両側が非最適な経済結果を招く「囚人のジレンマ」である。 米中対立は世界経済の完全な二分化をもたらさないだろう。 図表1は、国家の貿易行動に対する相対利得計算の影響を示している。地政学が存在しない場合、需要（Q3）は国内生産（Q0）がそれを満たせないため、貿易（Q3-Q0）によって満たされる。 Diagram 1 双極世界における貿易戦争 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る しかし、地政学的外部性—すなわち他国とのライバル関係—は輸入の限界的社会コストを引き上げる。すなわち貿易はライバルにより多くの利得を与え、地政学的能力の面で「追いつかせる」。したがって、貿易する国家はこの外部性を関税（t）で除去し、国内生産をQ1へ引き上げ、需要をQ2へ縮小させ、輸入を（Q2-Q1）のみに削減する。これは地政学が問題とならない世界での水準の一部にすぎない。 相対利得の力学は、弱まって再考を迫られる覇権国にも強く作用する。政治学者ダンカン・スナイダルは1991年の論文で次のように論じた。 世界システムが初めて構築されるとき、覇権国は小国と取引を行う。覇権国は絶対利得をより重視し、小国は相対利得をより重視するため交渉は厳しくなる。小国を有利にする協力体制は相対的な覇権の衰退に寄与する。利益の不均等配分が小国の追いつきを助けると同時に、小国が覇権国に対して相対利得の重みを下げることになる。同時に相対的優越の低下は覇権国の他国、特に台頭する挑戦者に対する相対利得への関心を高める。結果として最大の行為者から既存システムを変えて協力利益のより大きなシェアを得ようとする圧力が増す。5 小国が当初相対利得をより気にする理由は、覇権国よりも国の安全保障に対してはるかに敏感だからだ。覇権国は力の優位性を持ち、安全保障に対して比較的余裕がある。これが、ジョージ・ブッシュ（父）、ビル・クリントン、ジョージ・ブッシュ（子）がいずれも「誤った取引」を中国と行った理由を説明する。 スナイダルは30年近く前に、この米中貿易戦争を的確に描写した。彼は来たる無秩序の十年を記述していると思っていた。しかし彼と同時代の政治学者たちは米国の力を過小評価していた。アメリカの覇権の「一極の瞬間」は終わったのではなく、始まっていただけだった！ したがって、スナイダルが描いた力学は実を結ぶまでに30年を要した。 米国の覇権からの移行を考えるとき、多くの投資家は冷戦にアンカーを置く。冷戦は彼らが知る非一極的世界の唯一の例であり、単純な双極の力配分はゲーム理論で容易にモデル化できるからだ。もし我々がこれから住む世界が米国と中国が米ソのように地球全体を勢力圏に分ける世界ならば、スナイダルの論文から抜き出した段落が結末になるだろう。アメリカはグローバリゼーションを完全に放棄し、中国の周囲に厳しいシリコン・カーテンを敷き、同盟国にそれに従うことを強制するだろう。 しかし、近代史の大部分は双極ではなく多極の勢力配分によって定義されてきた。用語としての「冷戦」は、軍事力の比較的均衡が全面的な「熱戦」を防ぐ可能性があるという意味で米中に適用できる。しかし最終的に、米ソ冷戦は今日の世界に対する貧弱な類推に過ぎない。スナイダルは結論として、「協力しない国家は、互いに協力する他の相対利得最大化者に遅れをとる。これは、ライバルが多国間で協力している場合、協力こそが最良の防御（および最良の攻撃）となる」と述べている。彼はプレイヤー数が2から増えるにつれて相対利得感受性が急速に低下することを形式的モデルで示している。6 米中関係は真空中で起きているわけではなく、世界的文脈によって緩和される。今日の世界的文脈は多極化である。多極化とは、地政学的な力の配分がもはや一つか二つの大国に支配されていないことを指す（Chart 4）。例えば欧州や日本は強力な経済力と軍事能力を有している。ロシアは依然として強力な軍事大国であり、一方でインドは総合的な地政学的力の面でロシアを上回りつつある。 Chart 4 世界はもはや二極ではない 世界はもはや二極化していない 世界はもはや二極化していない 多極化した世界は最も「秩序だっていない」そして最も不安定な世界システムである（Chart 5）。理由は三つである： Chart 5 多極化は混沌としている 多極化は混沌としている 多極化は混沌としている 数学的観点: 多極化は紛争につながり得る潜在的な「紛争ダイアド」をより多く生む。単極の世界では規範と行動規則を決める国は一つだけである。紛争は可能だが、それは覇権国が望む場合に限られる。双極世界では紛争は可能だが、それは二つの支配的勢力の軸に沿わなければならない。多極世界では同盟は常に移り変わり、新たな紛争ダイアドを生む。 調整の欠如: 多極化の時期には「拒否権プレイヤー」が増えるため、世界的な調整が損なわれる。これは攻勢的な改革勢力が武力を使う場合や世界が経済危機に直面する場合など、ストレスの高い時期に特に問題となる。チャールズ・キンドルバーガーは、覇権の不安定性がまさに大恐慌を第二次世界大戦へと陥らせたと指摘している。7 誤算: 単極・双極世界では同時に振られるサイコロの数が非常に限られているため、悲劇的な誤算の確率は低く、複雑な正式関係（例えばゲーム理論に基づく米ソの相互確証破壊）があれば軽減できる。しかし多極世界では、要人の暗殺のようなランダムな出来事が世界大戦の引き金になることがある。多極システムははるかに動的であり、したがって予測不可能である。 多極化した世界では、米国は中国を国際システムから排除することはできない。 図表2は多極化した世界に合わせて修正したものだ。すべては同じだが、我々は他の大国に失われる貿易を強調している。ライバルとの貿易に関する限界的社会コストを下げるために関税を用いることを検討する国家は、この「失われた貿易」を考慮しなければならない。今日の中国との貿易戦争の文脈では、これは欧州のすべてのエアバスやブラジル産大豆が米国の輸出の代わりに中国に販売される分の総和となる。中国にとっては、アジアの残りから生産され米国に出荷されるすべての機械、電子機器、資本財の総和である。 Diagram 2 多極世界における貿易戦争 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る ワシントンは、欧州、日本、韓国、台湾などの同盟国に対して、中国との貿易で失われる（Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1)という潤沢な貿易を利用しないよう要請できるだろうか？ もちろんだ。しかし実証研究は、彼らがそのような結束の訴えを無視する可能性が高いことを示している。同盟が双極システムで生まれると二国間貿易フローに統計的に有意で大きな影響を与える一方で、その関係は多極化の文脈では弱まる。これはジョアン・ゴーワとエドワード・D・マンフィールドが1993年に示した結論である。8 著者らは1905年から始まる80年間の期間を用いて結論を導いており、これは数十年にわたる世界の多極性を含んでいる。 米国が同盟関係を徹底的に締め付け、貿易制裁を強制するという全力の外交努力を行わない限り—現政権下ではほとんど想定しがたい—、米国の同盟国は自らの利害に基づき中国との貿易を継続するだろう。米国は中国を国際システムから排除することはできないし、中国が習近平氏の誇る「自給自足」を達成することもできないだろう。 我々の見方へのリスクは、1990年代初頭の政治学者たちが世界システムを誤判断したのと同様に、我々も世界システムを誤判断している可能性があるという点だ。その点を踏まえ、Chart 1とChart 4が世界が均衡した多極状態にあるという見解を真に支持しているわけではないことを認める。米国は明らかに世界で最も強力な国であり続けている。しかし問題は、相対的な衰退が進んでいること、そしてその勢力圏がグローバルであるため非常に費用がかかる一方で、ライバルは当面地域的な野心しか持っていないということである。したがって、我々はアメリカの覇権が比較的速やかに再主張される可能性は認めるが、それは他の極のどれかで重大な大災害が発生することを必要とするだろう。例えば、中国の国内安定が崩壊し、同時に米国の政治的安定が回復するような場合だ。 結論： 米中間の貿易戦争は地政学的に持続不能である。それが継続し得る唯一の状況は、残りの国家が両超大国の背後に厳密に結集するような双極世界である。我々は現時点で世界が—当面のところ—多極化しているとの確信度が高い見解を持っている。アメリカの同盟国はワシントンの「中国孤立」要求を逃れ、抜け道を探すだろう。これは、米国が1990年代末から2000年代初頭に享受したような圧倒的な力の優位をもはや持っていないからである。 ここまでの洞察は政治学の形式理論に由来する。では歴史は何を教えてくれるか？ 敵と貿易する 1896年、英国でベストセラーとなったパンフレット『Made in Germany』は不吉な絵を描いた: 「巨大な商業国家が台頭して我々の繁栄を脅かし、世界の貿易を巡って我々と争うだろう。」9 著者E.E.ウィリアムズは読者に自宅を見渡すよう促した。「あなたの子供が遊んでいるおもちゃや人形、童話の本はドイツ製だ：いや、あなたのお気に入りの（愛国的な）新聞の紙だって、同じ出生地を持つかもしれない。」ウィリアムズは後に関税が解決策であり、それが「ドイツをひざまずかせ、我々の寛容を乞わせるだろう」と書いた。10 1890年代後半には、ドイツが英国にとって最大の国防上の脅威であることは明らかだった。1898年と1900年のドイツ海軍法は、地理的制約であるユトランド半島からドイツ帝国を解放することを単一の目的として大規模な海軍建造を開始した。1902年までに王立海軍のファースト・ロードは「新しく大きくなったドイツ海軍は我々との戦争の観点から注意深く築かれている」と指摘した。11 ドイツが英国にとって最も深刻な国防上の脅威であったことは疑いようがない。その結果、ロンドンは1904年4月にフランスと一連の協定を締結し、それはエントント・コルディアルとして知られるようになった。このアンタントは1905年の第一次モロッコ危機でドイツにより即座に試され、同盟はむしろ強化された。ロシアは1907年にこの協定に組み込まれ、三国協商が成立した。 振り返れば、この同盟構造は1871年の統一からのドイツの急速な台頭を考えれば明白だった。しかし、英国とフランスが数世紀にわたる対立を解消し、1904年に同盟を正式化したことの規模を過小評価してはならない。それは歴史、根深い敵意、イデオロギーの流れに逆らって行われた地殻変動的なシフトであった。12 歴史は、ライバル間や戦時中でも貿易は行われると教えてくれる。 政治学者と歴史家は、地政学的敵対が冷戦で見られたような経済関係の二分化を生むことは稀であると指摘してきた。実証研究と形式的モデリングの両方が、ライバル同士や戦時中でも貿易は行われることを示している。13 これは英国とドイツの間では確かに当てはまり、両国の貿易は第一次世界大戦勃発直前まで着実に増加した（Chart 6）。これは英国のレッセフェール経済へのイデオロギー的なコミットメントで説明できるのか？ あるいはロンドンは保護主義に転じれば軽装備の植民地に対する動きが起きることを恐れたのか？ これらはもっともな議論だ。しかし、それだけではロシアとフランスが同期間にドイツ帝国との総貿易を伸ばし続けた理由を説明しない（Chart 7）。三国ともに戦争の到来を見抜けなかった無能な政策立案者に率いられていた—というのはありそうにない—か、あるいは互いにドイツとの貿易の利得を奪われる余裕がなかったのだ。 Chart 6 同盟国はドイツと貿易していた… 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る Chart 7 …第一次世界大戦直前まで 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る Chart 8 日本と米国は貿易を落とさなかった 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 第二次世界大戦前も同様の力学が働いていた。1930年代に米国と日本の関係は悪化し、1931年の満州事変が起きた。1935年、日本は1922年のワシントン海軍条約を離脱し、太平洋の勢力均衡の基盤を崩して大規模な海軍建造を開始した。1937年、日本は中国へ侵攻した。明らかな差し迫った危険があったにもかかわらず、米国は1941年7月26日まで日本との貿易を続けた — これは日本がインドシナ南部に侵攻した数日後のことである（Chart 8）。12月7日、日本は米国を攻撃した。 懐疑論者は主張するかもしれない。第一次・第二次世界大戦で政策担当者が戦争に向かって無自覚に進んだのは事実であり、今回は同じ誤りを犯さない（あるいは犯すべきではない）だろう、と。 第一に、我々は政策提言を行う立場ではなく、したがって「あるべき」ことに関心はない。第二に、20世紀前半の政策立案者が現代の啓蒙された指導者と比べて欠陥があったと考える見方には強く懐疑的である。我々の制約に基づくフレームワークは、指導者の行動に対して制度的な理由を求めることを促す。 政治学は、ロンドンやワシントンが明白な脅威にもかかわらず敵と貿易を続けた理由を明確に説明する。答えは制約の制度的性質にある：多極世界は、同盟関係の変化と同盟国の行動を統制する難しさにより集団行動の問題を導入し、政策立案者の相対利得への感受性を低下させる。 米中の場合、これはトランプ大統領が多国間外交を回避し、（貿易赤字への執着のような）重商主義的な力の測定に強く焦点を当てる戦略を採っていることでさらに顕著になっている。もし反中国通商政策が同盟国との寛大な貿易関係を伴っていれば、北京に対する「志願者の連合」を生むことができただろう。しかし、関税とEU、日、カナダへの脅しの2年間を経て、トランプ政権は世界に対して古い同盟と協調の道筋が見直しの対象であることを既に示している。 次の10年の間に現れると我々が見ている結果は二つある。 第一に、米国の指導部は自らが動いている制度的制約を認識し、対中国貿易は制限や変動を伴いながらも継続する。しかし、そのような貿易は地政学的緊張を減少させることはなく、軍事衝突を阻止もしない。実際、貿易が維持される一方で軍事衝突の確率は増す可能性すらある。 第二に、米国の指導部が自らが多極化した世界で行動していることを正しく評価できず、図表2で示した貿易利得を欧州や日本といった経済ライバルに譲り渡すことになる。 我々は制約に基づく予測法を採用しているため、後者のシナリオが起こる可能性は低いと強く考えている。 結論： 米中対立は冷戦の再演ではない。世界的多極性からの制度的圧力は、米国に中国との貿易を続けさせる。とはいえ、中国が他の技術的に先進した国から依然として入手する新興の二重用途技術に関しては交換が制限されるだろう。これは、地政学が投資に対して外生的なものと見なされなくなる複雑で興味深い世界を生み出す。 楽観的な結論に対するリスクは、歴史的記録は今日に適用できるが、時間が遅くなっている可能性があるという点だ。すでに1941年7月26日、すなわち米国が日本とのすべての貿易を破棄した時点に近い — 1930年代の初めではない。したがって、米中間のもう10年の貿易が残されているわけではなく、我々はサイクルの終わりにいるのかもしれない。 これはリスクだが、起こりにくい。米国の政策立案者は、日本に対して行ったのと同等のレベルで貿易戦争を中国に対して拡大するために軍事衝突のリスクを取ることを受け入れる必要があるだろうという点だ。客観的事実として、中国は地域における攻撃的な外交を明確に強化してきた。しかし1941年の日本とは異なり、中国は過去10年で他国を明確に侵略してはいない。したがって、そのような衝突を支持する大衆の意欲は不透明であり、米国民のうち中国を米国にとって最大の脅威と考える者はわずか21％に過ぎない。 投資への示唆 本分析は楽観的であることを意図しているわけではない。第一に、米国と中国は経済関係が世界的な二分化につながらないとしてもライバルであり続ける。ひとつには、中国は20世紀初頭のドイツのように外部市場へのアクセスを懸念しており、その経済の19.5％が依然として外需に依存している。したがって中国は近隣圏を支配しようとして現代的な海軍と軍隊を整備しており、これは世界を支配したいからではなく、むしろ近隣を支配したいからである。これはモンロー主義を始めとする米国の欲求に類似する。このことは南シナ海や東シナ海での中国の攻撃性を引き起こし、米海軍との衝突の確率を高める。 トゥキディデスの罠の物語がなお妥当であることを踏まえ、投資家はグローバル株式市場に対してS&P 500の航空宇宙・防衛株をオーバーウエイトすることを検討すべきである。本仮説を別の方法で活用するならば、グローバルの防衛株のバスケットを構築することだ。多極化は貿易保護主義への制約を生むかもしれないが、地政学的変動性を助長し、防衛支出を支えるだろう。 第二に、グローバリゼーションが再び上昇することは期待しない。多極化は国がライバルとの貿易を完全に閉ざすことを難しくするかもしれないが、グローバリゼーションは単にライバル間の貿易だけで成り立つわけではない。グローバリゼーションは大国間の高度な調整を必要とし、それは覇権的条件下でのみ可能である。Chart 9は、英国とその後のアメリカの覇権が過去200年にわたり貿易に強力な追い風を与えたことを示している。 Chart 9 グローバリゼーションの頂点は過ぎ去った グローバリゼーションの頂点はすでに過ぎている グローバリゼーションの頂点はすでに過ぎている 「Apex of Globalization」は既に過ぎ去った—ここからは下り坂である。しかしこれは二分法的な見方ではない。外国貿易がゼロになることはない。米国と中国が互いの勢力圏をシリコン・カーテンで完全に封鎖することはないだろう。 代わりに、我々は多極化、米中地政学的対立、グローバリゼーションの頂点という三つの潮流によって特徴づけられる世界から派生する五つの投資テーマに注目する。 欧州が利益を得る: 米中の敵対関係が深まるにつれて、いくつかの欧州企業が恩恵を受けると予想する。投資コミュニティはすでにこのトレンドを察知しており、貿易緊張が2019年に高まるたびに欧州株が米国株をややアウトパフォームした証拠がある（Chart 10）。しかし我々の仮説からすると、米国が中国市場で欧州に完全に市場シェアを奪われる可能性は低い。したがって我々は特にテクノロジーに注目している。ここでは、システム上の圧力があっても米中は非関税障壁を強化すると予想するからだ。したがって、欧州のテクノロジー企業を米国の同業と比較して戦略的にロングすることは理にかなっているかもしれない（Chart 11）。 Chart 10 欧州：貿易戦争の避難所 欧州：貿易戦争のセーフヘイブン 欧州：貿易戦争のセーフヘイブン Chart 11 欧州は本当にこれほど無能なのか？ ヨーロッパは本当にここまで無能なのか？ ヨーロッパは本当にここまで無能なのか？ 米ドルの強気相場は終焉する: 貿易戦争は貿易関係を調整する非常に破壊的な手段であり、報復を招き相対的損失を被る可能性がある。したがって我々は、米国が2018年の引き締めを積極的に反転させるか、貿易ライバルに自国通貨を強化させることを強制することで、最終的に米ドルを減価させると予想する。そのような動きは米ドル離れの追い風となり、ユーロに利益をもたらすだろう。 キャップエックスの強気相場: グローバルな製造チェーンの再配線は引き続き行われる。悪いニュースは、多国籍企業が利益率を切り崩してサプライチェーンを移転する必要があることだ。良いニュースは、それを達成するために製造キャップエックスに投資する必要があることである。このテーマの一つの表現は、半導体向け資本財企業の指数を買うことだ（AMAT、LRCX、KLAC、MKSI、AEIS、BRIKS、TERなど）。資本財企業は景気循環性が高いため、エントリーポイントは貿易緊張が緩和し世界成長の芽が見え始めたときに検討することを勧める。 「非同盟」市場が恩恵を受ける: 世界が最後に多極だったとき、大国は帝国主義を通じて競争した。今回は同様のダイナミクスが発展し、中国の「一帯一路」構想を模倣しようとする国々が現れるだろう。これはフロンティア市場にとって好材料である。輸出とサービスを提供するためのラッシュは供給を増やしコストを下げるため、これまで忘れられていた市場に投資のブームをもたらすだろう。インドや中国を除くアジアは、グローバル製造チェーンの再配線を利用するために積極的な改革を行っている現在の政権下で、魅力的な中国の代替先として立っている。 資本市場はグローバル化を維持する: 先進国の多くで金利がゼロ近傍にあり、人口動態上の負担が年金により高いリターンを強く求めさせているため、利回り探索は資本市場をグローバルに保ち続ける強力な動機となるだろう。制限は増える可能性が高く、特に二重用途技術への越境プライベート投資に関してはそうだ。しかし資本市場の完全な二分化はありそうにない。 我々が描写する世界は、地政学がグローバル投資家にとってますます重要な役割を果たす世界である。世界が単純に二つの交戦陣営に分かれ、投資家が地政学を無視できるようなきれいに分かれた区分けができるというのは都合が良いが、それは起こりそうにない。むしろ世界は19世紀末の動的な時代に似ており、粗野で混沌とした時代であって、投資には学際的なアプローチが求められるだろう。   Marko Papic, コンサルティング編集者、BCAリサーチ チーフ・ストラテジスト、Clocktower Group Marko@clocktowergroup.com 脚注 1 BCAリサーチ ジオポリティカル・ストラテジー、「Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?」（2012年9月25日）、「Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think」（2013年10月4日）、「The Great Risk Rotation」（2013年12月11日）、および「Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward」（2014年1月23日）、「Underestimating Sino-American Tensions」（2015年11月6日）、「The Geopolitics Of Trump」（2016年12月2日）、「How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia」（2017年3月1日）など。これらはgps.bcaresearch.comで入手可能、またはリクエストに応じて提供。 2 German Historical Institute、「Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’」（1897年）参照。http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3 Graham Allison、Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?（New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017）参照。 4 戦争とならなかった三例は、16世紀のポルトガルからスペインへの移行、20世紀の英から米への移行、そして21世紀におけるドイツの地域覇権への台頭である。 5 Duncan Snidal、「Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation」、The American Political Science Review, 85:3（1991年9月）、pp. 701-726。 6 本稿ではスナイダルの優れたゲーム理論による形式モデルを詳細に再検討しないが、興味のある読者には原著を推奨する。 7 Charles P. Kindleberger、The World In Depression, 1929-1939（Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013）参照。 8 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield、「Power Politics and International Trade」、The American Political Science Review, 87:2（1993年6月）、pp. 408-420。 9 Ernest Edwin Williams、Made in Germany（再版、Ithaca: Cornell University Press）参照。https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830。 10 Margaret MacMillan、The War That Ended Peace（Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014）に引用。 11 Peter Liberman、「Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains」、International Security, 21:1（1996年夏）、pp. 147-175。 12 フランスとロシアは、共和制と暴力的蜂起に基づく共和国—フランス—と貴族的権威主義体制—ロシア—というイデオロギー的差異を乗り越えた点でさらに大きな溝を克服した。 13 James Morrow、「When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?」、The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1（1997年2月）、pp. 12-37；および Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri、「Trading With the Enemy During Wartime」、Security Studies, 13:3（2004年12月）、pp. 1-47 を参照。